International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
Why was the United States, despite its overwhelming superiority in power, unable to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons? Why did North Korea persist in its nuclear pursuit in the face of U.S. opposition? In this article, we represent nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation as situations of subjective strategic interaction between states. We measure preferences over strategies and outcomes using operational codes of the leaders of each country, derived via linguistic analysis. Our results indicate that neither the U.S. nor North Korea accurately understood the other side’s preference ordering, and that their operational codes interacted in such a way as to produce an outcome favorable to North Korea – the weaker party - and unfavorable to the U.S. – the stronger. The wider contribution is to show that (mis)perceptions of the goals and resolve of the opponent play a crucial role in the success or failure of strong states to compel weak states and vice versa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Leadership, and Perception
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
Merve ÖZDEMİRKIRAN-EMBEL, B. Toygar Halistoprak, and Michael Young
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This article investigates whether campaign speeches during the US presidential elections can help predict
foreign policy behavior. We use speeches made by Donald J. Trump during his bid for president in 2016.
We compare the analysis from 2016 with his actual foreign policy decisions during his tenure, 2017-2020.
Operational code analysis and leadership traits analysis approaches are used to analyze candidate Trump’s
foreign policy beliefs and strategies associated with them. We use Profiler Plus software to conduct content
analysis which produces OCA and LTA results. We use three separate datasets to analyze Trump’s beliefs
and traits focusing on his general foreign policy speeches, the MENA region, and a third one only about
Islamic State and Syria. Our results show that Trump’s profile indicates a foreign policy orientation that
avoids involvement in affairs that are perceived as beyond immediate interests. The consistency between
his beliefs and traits during the 2016 campaign and his actual foreign policy behavior leads us to conclude
that individual level analysis, and specifically OCA and LTA approaches, are useful tools to analyze, explain
and predict foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Elections, Leadership, Donald Trump, and Political Beliefs
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America
This strategic update introduces the challenges posed by China’s united front work, which has significantly expanded due to unprecedented institutional elevation and support under Xi Jinping. Mariah argues that Taiwan—a country that has effectively resisted China’s united front activities for several decades—can serve as an instructive case for other democratic countries in institutionalising counter-interference operations. The briefing initially explores the origins of Taiwan’s political warfare system, its evolution from the martial law era to democratisation in the 1990s, and how this history informs the institution’s modern structure and operations. The information presented in this report was compiled during a period of fieldwork in Taiwan from late September to early November 2022, in which she interviewed dozens of political warfare officers as well as Taiwanese defence and security experts–a majority of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. In the conclusion, Mariah offers broad policy recommendations based on these findings that may be applicable to other countries experiencing united front work activities and or seeking to institutionalise counter-interference operations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Regional Security
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in 2003, Iraqi political parties proliferated in a show of enthusiasm for the country’s emerging democracy. In recent years, however, a handful of personalities and families have consumed all of the country’s political oxygen, dashing hopes for a truly pluralistic ecosystem. Especially discouraging has been the authoritarian shift in Kurdistan, once viewed as a democratic beacon in the Middle East. At the federal level, feuding between the Sadr and Maliki camps now dominates Shia politics, and Mohammed al-Halbousi has crowded out other Sunni players. Meanwhile, corruption touches every surface, and the rare official who holds to ethical standards risks being rendered entirely ineffectual.
In this wide-ranging Policy Note, experts Sardar Aziz and Bilal Wahab outline the dispiriting state of Iraqi politics and how the United States can respond. To achieve the scaled-down goals of maintaining sovereignty and accountability, they argue, American officials must be creative, working with Iraqi institutional actors while simultaneously engaging with less central figures such as apolitical military commanders and the business community.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Democracy, State, and Shia Islam
As Palestinians and Israelis mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Oslo Accords, it is worth pausing to examine what remains of the original promise contained in the agreement (hint: something does remain). More than that, it is worth examining whether those remnants can survive the many challenges facing the Palestinian Authority, especially those likely to emerge “the day after” President Mahmoud Abbas exits the stage.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Democracy, Palestinian Authority, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
In March 2020, Lebanon opted for a “hard default” on $32 billion in sovereign debt, allowing the government to avoid negotiating with its Eurobond holders and investors. Beirut thereafter showed little interest in addressing the consequences of default, and the country’s economic meltdown worsened. As usual, the Lebanese people were the casualties, suffering amid what the World Bank has called a “deliberate depression.” This official negligence has cleared the way for a proliferating cash economy—which in turn has spawned a currency exchange scheme involving the central bank, foreign exchange agents, and Lebanese politicians. Hezbollah specifically has profited in areas ranging from real estate to solar energy, pharmaceuticals, and the illicit Captagon trade.
In this Policy Note, authors Samara Azzi and Hanin Ghaddar—a venture capitalist and a former Lebanese journalist—skillfully diagram the corrupt status quo and explain why entrenched actors want to avoid systemic change. But as the study makes clear, the future health of the Lebanese economy requires an overhaul, and the international community must now press for deep reforms and personal accountability.
Topic:
Politics, Non State Actors, Financial Crisis, Economy, Hezbollah, and Shia Islam
On May 14, Turkey’s citizens will cast their ballots for president and parliament, and polls suggest the longtime incumbent could actually lose this time. President Erdogan’s challenger, Republican People’s Party head Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has assembled an ideologically diverse coalition united in its determination to oust the ruling bloc. Guiding the opposition, known popularly as the “Table of Six,” is a message focused on restoring competence amid sky-high inflation and a faltering response to the devastating February earthquakes. But Erdogan’s challengers still face headwinds created in part by his near-complete control of the media.
In this Policy Note compilation, Turkey expert Soner Cagaptay and his fellow contributors concur that Erdogan will use polarizing tactics to keep power, whatever the results of the May 14 balloting or a possible May 28 presidential runoff. They also assess how various wild card developments—including the entry of spoiler candidate Muharrem Ince and meddling from Russia—could aid the Turkish leader in unforeseen ways.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, Democracy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Strategic Competition, and AKP
As he approaches the third anniversary of his ascension to the throne in Oman, on November 14 Sultan Haitham addressed the opening of the 8th session of the Majlis Oman, a parliament that combines both the appointed Majlis ad-Dawla and the wholly elected Majlis al-Shura. This was the first occasion at which Sultan Haitham had made such a speech since assuming the throne, a formal stock-take of the progress he has made in implementing his vision for Oman.
Unlike, for example, the King’s speech to the combined U.K. Houses of Parliament, where the government of the day writes the speech which the King merely reads, on this occasion the Sultan owned this speech himself[1]. It outlined both what as sovereign he had set out to achieve, and what as prime minister he had delivered.
On display when he gave his speech, Haitham’s presentation is calm and understated, authoritative but less effervescent and more managerial than the style of his predecessor Sultan Qaboos. But nonetheless, he sketched out remarkable progress achieved over the last three years.
When news broke of the Hamas attack on Israel last month, the silence from Beijing was conspicuous amid the din of international statements. When the government finally addressed the conflict at a press conference the day after, its words were remarkable for being unremarkable. An unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed “deep concern,” called on “relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities,” and lamented the “protracted standstill of the peace process”—a diplomatic endeavor in which Beijing has never shown more than a passing interest. The wording was nearly identical to China’s reactions during past Gaza conflicts, despite the fact that the circumstances were radically different. Because the brief remarks failed to condemn Hamas or even recognize the scale of the horrors that occurred on October 7, Israeli commentators interpreted them not as neutral, but as hostile.
Beijing soon confirmed that interpretation. On October 14, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Israel’s actions went “beyond the scope of self-defense” and demanded that it stop imposing “group punishment” on Palestinians, while still refusing to condemn Hamas. (For a full listing of Beijing’s official statements on the conflict, see The Washington Institute’s statement tracker.) Chinese media have likewise presented the war as one of Israeli aggression—despite being heavily censored, their early reports were rife with anti-Semitic, anti-Israel commentary claiming that Hamas was defending the two-state solution, even though the group’s past and present actions are patently bent on destroying the Israeli state. Notably, the strident tone in online Chinese commentary moderated in the run-up to President Xi Jinping’s November 15 meeting with President Biden, underscoring the government’s well-established influence over such messaging.
This approach is a stark departure from Beijing’s past impassivity toward Middle East conflicts, in which Chinese officials had usually sought to avoid entanglement. Rather, it reflects the government’s new inclination to use far-flung conflicts as opportunities to undermine the United States and score points in the “Global South.” Yet it could also hold longer-term consequences for China, particularly regarding the government’s three-decade effort to improve relations with Israel. In addition, using the current crisis to take potshots at Washington may constrain Beijing’s ability to project impartiality in other regional conflicts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Strategic Competition, and Palestinians
On November 14, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) made waves by ruling on a complaint against Speaker of Parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi, ultimately deciding to revoke his membership in the legislature. In the absence of any appeal mechanism, Halbousi will have to step down from the speakership he has held since 2018—a development that will have ripple effects on the provincial elections scheduled for December 18.
As Lebanon’s economic and socio-political conditions have spiraled downward since the rise and fractionalization of the 2019 popular protests—known as the October 17 Revolution—various proposals have emerged as to how to remedy the bankrupt and virtually failed state. All agree that the current outlook is grim; today, the Lebanese currency has lost almost all its value and the presidential seat is contested and remains vacant. Political elites are at loggerheads and blamed for robbing the state, society is polarized across intra- and inter-confessional lines, and poverty has reached a popular level not seen since the Great Famine of World War I.
Among the proposed suggestions is the federal option, put as an alternative to the country’s confessional system. Such ideas are not new; in fact, the federal option had been championed and the subject of debate among mainly Christian politicians and parties prior to and during Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1990). President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958) offered a detailed plan for a federal Lebanon; the Lebanese Front, representing mainly Maronite aspirations, likewise presented a federal project during the Lebanon National Dialogue in Lausanne in 1984; and president-elect Bashir Gemayel, assassinated in 1982, toyed with the idea of federalism.
However, Lebanon’s civil war ended when the antagonistic parties signed the Document of National Reconciliation of 1989, also known as the Taif Agreement, which introduced administrative decentralization instead of federalism. And while the agreement ended the civil war, it subsequently ushered in an era of Lebanese politics marked by the Syrian occupation of Beirut until 2005 and the rise of the Islamist Shia party Hezbollah, effectively building a state within a state and commanding a militia more or less better equipped than the Lebanese Armed Forces. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s political elites entered into a Faustian pact with Hezbollah under which they legitimized the ‘Party of God’ in exchange for turning a blind eye to their theft of the state. It is this bargain that has brought Lebanon to its almost total collapse as a state and a nation.
Following President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s victory in the Turkish general elections in May 2023, Turkish foreign policy in Iraq has the potential to evolve in a different direction under the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan. Though the management of Turkey’s affairs in Iraq has shifted between various Turkish institutions since 2003, President Erdoğan has consolidated decision-making into his own hands since 2017, and his recent appointment of Fidan—a former intelligence director and loyal ally of Erdoğan—signals a continuation of this process, especially vis-a-vis Iraq.
As Director of National Intelligence, Fidan oversaw the most sensitive backchannels with various regional and international actors, and he played a leading role in formulating Turkish intelligence and security policy. Notably, Fidan also led Turkey's reconciliation efforts with a variety of adversaries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He has also been intimately involved in Turkish efforts to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), targeting many PKK leaders and allied factions in northern Iraq, particularly in Sinjar, Makhmur, and al-Kuwayr.
In this regard, Fidan comes equipped with deep connections to Iraq’s bureaucratic circles, having already succeeded in building bridges between various Iraqi actors and institutions. In particular, Fidan has developed close ties with both Sunni and Kurdish political leaders and has good relations with Falih al-Fayyadh, chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces, whom he met during one of his secret trips to Iraq in September 2022. Fidan notably conducted such bridge-building efforts during the formation of the current Iraqi government led by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.
Given this background in Iraqi politics along with his experience in intelligence, Fidan is an important player through which Erdoğan can rethink Turkish involvement in Iraq on a number of different issues. Though Fidan’s appointment certainly indicates a shift toward more security-focused policies for Turkey, the new minister will also have to balance Turkey’s political ties, economic and energy interests, environmental concerns, and military operations in Iraq. Indeed, Erdoğan likely hopes that Fidan can both diversify Turkey’s relationship networks in Iraq and reestablish normalized energy negotiations with key partners while also curbing the threat of the PKK and Iranian-aligned militias operating in Turkey’s areas of involvement in Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Energy
Nearly a decade later, many victims are still missing, and thousands now live in displacement camps in unstable, unsanitary conditions.
This anniversary is an opportunity to reflect on the ongoing armed conflict in the Sinjar region and the profound influence on its inhabitants. It also serves as an opportunity to appreciate the resilience of the Yazidis, looking toward a future with new hope and new aspirations—a future where Yazidis can experience peace, stability, justice, and equitable opportunities to reconstruct their lives and their communities.
Yazidi resilience is clearly evident in how they bore the burden of this genocide, how they have persevered in the face of ongoing persecution and genocide for centuries, and how they have been steadfast in maintaining their identity and heritage despite these adversities and the repeated campaigns to tarnish their image.
Yet Yazidis still face significant challenges in Iraq today. Despite relative stability in the Sinjar region, there are concerns among the Yazidi population about the return of armed conflict between groups vying for influence. Even more troubling, the issue of expulsion and displacement remains unresolved despite the liberation of Sinjar from ISIS in 2015. Many Yazidis still live in displacement camps, where they are without their homes, their land, or their basic rights. These refugees have yet to be materially compensated for their losses.
In a recent letter to President Biden that was soon reinforced by three U.S. lawmakers, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government expressed his alarm over the region’s survival. Noting that the KRG is “bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically,” he laid the blame on Baghdad’s “dishonorable campaign” against Erbil. Barzani has a point—federal authorities have indeed been undoing the KRG’s hard-won autonomy in the years since the Islamic State fell and the Kurds launched an unsuccessful independence bid. Most notably, Baghdad has recentralized policymaking in the capital and blocked Kurdish oil exports amid a decade-old dispute over energy management.
Yet Barzani’s narrative does not tell the whole story. The United States has long supported Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy, security, and development, fostering greater stability and pro-American sentiment. At the same time, however, Washington has overlooked the KRG’s vulnerabilities—namely, the internal divisions, corruption, and democratic backsliding that have diminished Erbil’s reliability and brought on the current existential crisis. The United States has a strategic interest in continuing to promote a stable and prosperous KRG, but it cannot do so without addressing the region’s internal problems.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Autonomy, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
Lebanon, had non-visible relationships with Turkey after its independence and the post-civil war period. Although it lost the balance of political stability at times, the political affinity that emerged with the participation of Lebanon in the close relations, which Turkey sought to establish with Arab countries in the 2000s, continued with mutual negotiations at the point of cooperation. After the Lebanon-Israel war in 2006, which caused political and economic destruction in the country, Turkey increased its support for Lebanon. Accordingly, the crises appeared after the Arab Spring in the region led Turkey to follow the sensitive policy over the sectarian groups in the country. However, some reactions arose in Lebanon’s political arena against Turkey’s increasing regional activism, bringing several ideological questions on Turkey’s approach towards Lebanon. Regarding the relationship between Turkey and Lebanon, “Does Turkey desire to establish a new Ottoman administration in the Middle East?” was one of the questions asked. Moreover, a negative environment was created and used occasionally as a trump card against Turkey’s approach toward Lebanon, saying that even the Ottoman Empire did not play an active role in the Lebanon region.
This study examines whether there are traces of Neo-Ottomanism and sectarianism in the political roadmap followed by the Turkish Government in its Lebanon policy. It discusses, the diplomatic response of Turkey to the anti-Ottoman rhetoric in Lebanese politics and its effect on bilateral relations. Accordingly, the study analyzes Turkey’s effort to maintain the balance against sectarian discourse that shapes Lebanon’s policy.
Topic:
Politics, Sectarianism, Neo-Ottomanism, and Regional Power