Author: / Political Geography: Europe / Publication Year: within 10 Years / Topic: Geopolitics

1. A battle against time – and against Putin’s Russia

Author:: Erwan Fouéré
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: With Putin’s war against Ukraine about to enter its third year, the EU’s enlargement policy remains at the top of its foreign policy priorities, with the focus being on both Ukraine and Moldova. This is following the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with both countries. But where does this leave the countries of the Western Balkans and their very long journey towards the EU which began over 20 years ago? Will these countries’ hopes for much needed political momentum in their accession prospects be fulfilled during 2024, despite the repeated delays and the EU’s failure to respect its commitments to the region over the past few years? With elections taking place across Europe offering fertile ground for Russia to deploy its arsenal of disinformation tactics, time is not on the EU’s side. To counter Russian attempts to influence developments in the region, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of backsliding in democratic and rule of law reforms, the EU will need to adopt a more robust, consistent and determined approach towards the Western Balkans. Without any further delay, it needs to set out a much needed geopolitical and security direction for its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Rule of Law, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Balkans

2. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:: Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: the liberal power and its limits

Author:: Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. There was talk of a "paradigm shift" in France, of a "Zeitenwende" ("change of era") in Germany, of an "end to naivety". Across Europe, a surge of sympathy and solidarity for Ukraine and its suffering has gripped public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colours of the EU and Ukrainian flags being ostensibly displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has given massive economic aid to Ukraine (€20 billion already paid out, €20 billion planned for 2023) and has taken in 4 million Ukrainian refugees. At the June European Council, it accepted Ukraine's membership application, as well as that of Moldova, and a prospect of accession for Georgia. By adopting sanctions against Russia that were unprecedented since those taken against Serbia at the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has also demonstrated its capacity for "hard power". In the wake of its common defence policy, it delivered arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3 billion "peace facility". By almost completely depriving itself of Russian fossil fuels, it is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the enormous change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is undergoing a new existential crisis after the repeated shocks of the last few years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy that Europe would be built through crises and would be the sum of the solutions brought to these challenges. By defending its values against Russia, the European Union is asserting itself as a "liberal power". But it remains no less fragile beyond its response.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Liberalism, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:: Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. Kazakhstan could lead Central Asia in mitigating the world’s energy and food shortages

Author:: Margarita Assenova, Ariel Cohen, and Wesley Hill
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has had significant economic and political repercussions across the globe, including energy shortages and growing food insecurity. The war has forced Central Asian states to emphasize their independence from Moscow and accelerate their economic diversification. Central Asia—comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—has the potential to mitigate global shortages of energy, food, and fertilizers, caused by Russia’s war of aggression. The primary challenges for Central Asia and its Western partners remain diversifying export routes and expanding the capacity of alternative transportation corridors, especially the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Corridor, or the “Middle Corridor.” Kazakhstan is the leading producer of uranium ore in the world, grows 2 percent of the world’s wheat, and has major hydrocarbon reserves. Kazakhstan has the opportunity to lead Central Asia forward on the path to becoming an important supplier of energy, grain, fertilizers, and nuclear fuel to world markets. The energy crisis in Europe spurred renewed interest in the long-planned Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline. A potential United States and European Union ban on uranium civilian-reactor fuel exports from Russia could ensure Kazakhstan’s importance as a nuclear fuel exporter to Europe. To do this, Kazakhstan first needs to build its own conversion and enrichment facilities. This would allow it to double its share in the European market while utilizing the Middle Corridor. By encouraging Western investment, the states of Central Asia can become an important force in global commodity markets. To this end, they should implement the recently signed far-reaching regional agreements on cooperation and integration, so that they are less susceptible to “divide and conquer” strategies from predatory foreign powers and can exercise greater leverage when negotiating as a bloc. The US and the EU should also recognize that Central Asia’s energy and agricultural potential and resources make the region an area of strategic interest with promising business opportunities. The Central Asian states need to intensify their Western-oriented diplomatic outreach to attract support from state and private actors for investment and technological partnerships. Geographic proximity to Russia and China means Central Asian countries will always have economic relationships with Moscow and Beijing. But greater Western engagement in the region can diminish the chances for Russo-Sino cooperation in Central Asia. Russia’s war against Ukraine has weakened its geopolitical position and the Western sanctions on its economy have opened up new opportunities for Central Asia to supply critical energy and food commodities to world markets. Kazakhstan, as the region’s largest economy and its largest producer of oil, uranium, and grain, is well-positioned to lead this transition.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Food Security, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Kazakhstan

6. Europe and Russia on the Balkan Front. Geopolitics and Diplomacy in the EU’s Backyard

Author:: Giorgio Fruscione
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has taken its toll on the stability of the Balkans by reshuffling regional geopolitics and reviving diplomatic competition between the West and Russia. Since the summer of 2022, growing tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have raised concerns about a possible Russian involvement and pushed the European Union to react promptly. By brokering a new normalisation agreement, the West seeks to prevent new hotbeds in Europe and push Russia one step back from the Balkans. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given new momentum to the integration process of candidate states, making EU membership a tangible goal rather than an unattainable dream. Will the EU be able to stabilise the Balkans? Will Russia continue to exert its influence in the region? Are Belgrade and Pristina on the eve of a new phase in the normalisation process?
Topic:: Diplomacy, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Balkans

7. Global trends in countries‘ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Drawing on global media reports, we conduct a sentiment analysis of the image of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the evolution of its image over time. Our main finding is that perceptions of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many geographies from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is in sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past. This is notwithstanding increases in debt levels with China, much of which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant inter- and intra-regional differences in the average sentiment towards China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative in countries which, until today, are not part of the BRI. Finally, we focus on the European Union, Africa and China’s immediate neighbourhood to better understand the complexities behind the perceived benefits and challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

8. Will Turkiye Find Herself A Place in the New World Order?

Author:: Oğul Tuna
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Türkiye has been a challenging actor in the regional and global politics since the early 2010s, which relies on its imperial past and soft power. This paper argues that Türkiye has embraced a conventional foreign policy principle, pursuing the balance of power, to adapt to the new multipolar world in the contemporary period, which can be defined as “the new nineteenth century.” The country can only exploit its power and resilience to the utmost extent after realizing its limitations to accomplish its regional and international foreign policy goals. Then, it might emerge as a dependable crisis mediator and a significant player in world politics.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Liberal Order, Strategic Interests, and World System
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

9. Western Balkans’ Horizon 2023 – New uncertainties in a changed geopolitical setting

Author:: Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: “The age of uncertainty” has recently become the most used description for the time we live in. The aggression of Russia against Ukraine and the war approaching now its second year have changed the globe. Global uncertainties and huge geopolitical changes we witness are mirrored in European semiperipheral regions like the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans has been in a limbo for a while with no major progress towards the EU and democracy in general. Instead of steady democratization in the region we witnessed a gradual autocratization, most prominently in Serbia, and constant rise of crisis and tensions.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Autocracy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans

10. The EU in the South Caucasus: Navigating a geopolitical labyrinth in turmoil

Author:: Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The tectonic plates of geopolitics are shifting in such a profound way that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has not only increased tensions between the world’s major powers, but also severely impacted the regions in which they traditionally strive to project their power. This applies especially to areas in the wider Eurasian region that the Russian Federation unjustifiably considers as part of its sphere of influence, such as the South Caucasus. Russia’s failure to achieve a quick and decisive victory in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not only forced the Kremlin to limit its objectives on the battlefield, at least for the time being, to Ukraine’s east. It has also reduced the credibility of the Russian military that much of its power projection has depended upon – and has reduced its attractiveness as a security partner for countries that have traditionally regarded Russia as such. Russia has had to withdraw some of its troops and military equipment from the South Caucasus, its leadership is preoccupied with Ukraine, and it has not lived up to its security commitments to Armenia. This has contributed to a geopolitical vacuum and uncertainty in the South Caucasus that other actors are eager to exploit.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe and South Caucasus

11. One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The geopolitical struggle is not where you think it is

Author:: Roshni Menon and Faiza Shaheen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: When Russia invaded Ukraine one year ago, there were immediate concerns about the effects on food and energy security, and on geopolitical alignment in other countries. The world was right to be concerned, but the repercussions have been much wider and deeper than many predicted. There are two main ways in which conflict dynamics have shifted, neither of them solely caused by the war but both exacerbated by it: Russian’s war on Ukraine has shone the lens on inter-state conflict and proxy war Compounding the pandemic and climate change, a war started in one corner of the world has resulted in a global cost-of-living crisis and increasing debt for almost every country worldwide—countries that had no hand in Russia’s invasion or in the failure to respond to public health and socio-economic crisis. This analysis looks at the multiple and cascading crises (increasingly referred to as the polycrisis), and how we can take action in the face of polycrisis,
Topic:: Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Europe’s policies for a green transition: The European Commission’s geopolitical turn and its pitfalls

Author:: Marco Siddi
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The European Commission has published numerous policy documents concerning the European Green Deal and the energy transition since 2019. Several have an important foreign policy component. Following the Covid-19 crisis and especially Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the discourse and policy objectives of these documents have taken a ‘geopolitical turn’, meaning that the EU’s security, interests and cooperation with Western allies have become more prominent than before. The REPowerEU plan, the new External Energy Strategy and the Green Deal Industrial Plan exemplify this shift by combining green and geopolitical objectives. The EU’s geopolitical turn in external energy politics involves several risks. Third countries could perceive some policies as ‘green protectionism’ or ‘green colonialism’. Domestically, some business actors dislike restrictions on imports of critical raw materials and green technology from abroad, whereas additional mining in the EU may not be compatible with biodiversity and environmental protection. At the same time, ‘offshoring’ mining outside the EU may transfer the ecological consequences to contexts with laxer regulation.
Topic:: Geopolitics, European Commission, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe

13. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:: Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

14. Climate, Peace and Security in a Changing Geopolitical Context: Next Steps for the European Union

Author:: Simone Bunse
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: This policy brief analyses current initiatives and ways forward to address the nexus between climate change, peace and security within the European Union’s (EU) foreign, security and defence policies. Considering Sweden’s reputation and credibility in advancing international cooperation on climate security and in light of the 2023 Swedish presidency of the Council of the EU, there is an opportunity to address the current lack of alignment between the climate and conflict-sensitizing work of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the climate adaptation and mitigation work of the European Commission. Closer collaboration between the EEAS, the European Commission and EU member states to align resources and tools would allow for a qualitative leap forward by fostering actions that are preventative rather than reactive to climate-related security risks in the short to medium term.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe

15. The art of vassalisation: How Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed transatlantic relations

Author:: Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed Europeans’ profound dependence on the US for their security, despite EU efforts at achieving “strategic autonomy.” Over the last decade, the EU has grown relatively less powerful than America – economically, technologically, and militarily. Europeans also still lack agreement on crucial strategic questions for themselves and look to Washington for leadership. In the cold war, Europe was a central front of superpower competition. Now, the US expects the EU and the UK to fall in line behind its China strategy and will use its leadership position to ensure this outcome. Europe becoming an American vassal is unwise for both sides. Europeans can become a stronger and more independent part of the Atlantic alliance by developing independent capacity to support Ukraine and acquiring greater military capabilities.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

16. EU-Pacific talks: Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Bold vision for bold players

Author:: Zsanett Gréta Papp
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: If you missed the EU-Pacific talks: Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Bold vision for bold players, here you can read the report from the debate written by Zsanett Gréta Papp. During the debate it was discussed, for example, that although each country has its own interests concerning the region, there are several global problems that countries should face together, because one country cannot solve them. On the other hand, it is really difficult to establish dialogue with the Indo-Pacific countries.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Debates
Political Geography:: Europe and Indo-Pacific

17. EU – Pacific Talks: EU – Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia

Author:: Tomáš Moudrý
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia, here you can read the report from the debate written by Tomáš Moudrý. During the debate, it was discussed, for example, that despite the considerable geographical distance, the EU and the Indo-Pacific region are now more interconnected than ever before and both sides are seeking to strengthen their partnership in many areas, with security policy now one of the most important due to many factors.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

18. Hydrodiplomacy and the Food, Water and Energy Nexus: A holistic approach for transboundary cooperation and peace

Author:: Fadi Comair
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The rapid social and economic development in the world is leading to increased levels of water stress that point to potential water crises. As the most vital and strategic of natural resources, water can serve as an instrument of domination or of cooperation. Given the presence of key geopolitical concerns in the Near East, regional hydro-diplomatic cooperation is necessary to ensure fair sharing of the resource and to avoid additional tensions and conflict. Nine of the seventeen EMME countries are below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 m3/year per capita, including all six countries in the Gulf region, Jordan and Palestine. Those countries that share major transboundary basins in the EMME region such as the Nile, Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates basins are subject to multiple challenges which include unilateral water resources management, water scarcity, and environmental degradation leading to food insecurity. Hydrodiplomacy is a tool for applying integrated water resource management at a national and transboundary level in accordance with a cooperative model seeking peace among riparian countries. Multiple UN agencies contribute to bringing riparian countries together with a view to fostering dialogue and the sharing of information on water management and transboundary cooperation.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Water, Food, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Middle East

19. The Greek Defence Sector: Turning the Page?

Author:: Antonis Kamaras
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: From the 1980s to the 2000s, Greece’s defence industry was mismanaged and failed to utilize Greece’s high defence expenditures to become innovative. The impact of Greece’s fiscal crisis and the subsequent expansion of the Turkish threat mean that both economics and geopolitics now favour an invigorated Greek defence sector. The first major weapons procurement programme since the end of Greece’s fiscal crisis has not meaningfully involved the Greek defence sector. Yet the sector’s future prospects have improved, assured by the need for the sector to be financially viable and internationally competitive and by the broader awareness of the defence sector as a building block in national defence. The EU’s growing role in Europe’s collective defence, driven by continent-wide geopolitical developments and industrial imperatives, will also boost the prospects of the Greek defence sector. Mutually reinforcing obstacles still hamper the Greek defence sector’s progress: (a) a polity which privileges distribution over capital investments in its fiscal choices, and (b) an officer corps which lacks the degree of autonomy to co-create novel defence solutions together with the Greek defence sector. Despite these obstacles, the ongoing Turkish threat engenders national insecurity within Greece to such an extent that it can drive the sustainable growth of the Greek defence sector.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Innovation, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Greece

20. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order

Author:: Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America

21. Evolution of the World Order and Russia’s Ideas About the Outside World

Author:: A. Bogaturov and O. Lebedeva
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The idea of the outside world and the role that Russia plays in it has undergone radical changes in Moscow’s official worldviews since 2014. The degradation of the international security situation indicates a deep crisis in the existing world order, which was formed in the spirit of the US’s unipolar hegemony after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Attempts are being made to turn the UN, the only universal platform for reaching collective decisions on an inclusive and equal basis, into a tool of the collective West for pressuring “revisionist states.” The decline in the culture of global-level dialogue leads not only to the aggravation of military-political conflicts but also to the inability to effectively respond to new challenges and transnational threats.
Topic:: Partnerships, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Global Focus

22. The Ripple Effect: A U.S. Diplomatic Strategy for a Changing World Order

Author:: Chester A Crocker and Barbara K. Bodine
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine upended what policymakers thought they knew about the world and territorial military aggression. The ensuing war has brought destruction to Europe unlike anything since the Second World War. Regardless of how the war ends, several strategic trends, whether entirely new or preexisting and now reinforced, have set in a motion a new strategic environment in which the United States must compete. Ultimately, the new strategic environment is being defined by a global diffusion of power, where the agency of middle powers and their importance in solving geopolitical problems rise in tandem. In the spring of 2023, ISD convened two New Global Commons/Schlesinger Strategic Surprise working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group identified key trends and potential strategic surprises emanating from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, honed in on the issues that would affect the strategic environment regardless of the war’s outcome, and put forth policy guidelines and recommendations for the United States as it seeks to navigate a more diverse geopolitical landscape in the coming years.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

23. After Gaza, Recalibrated Prospects for a Geopolitical Europe

Author:: Selin Uysal
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On October 26, the European Council adopted a new set of conclusions relating to the war in Gaza. Notably, these reiterated condemnation of Hamas, Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law, calls to release all hostages, concern for all civilian lives, the need to ensure humanitarian access to Gaza, and a commitment to achieving a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Earlier European dissonance regarding the Gaza conflict thus appeared to be replaced by clearer communication. But European unity could soon be tested again, including on humanitarian messaging, which is less easily consented upon than meets the eye. More broadly, whereas the war in Ukraine had given rise to optimism about the emergence of a “geopolitical Europe”—a European Union capable of defining common strategic international objectives and deploying concrete operational means to achieve them—events following the Hamas attacks have exposed divisions within European institutions and highlighted the absence of a clear strategic approach in the southern neighborhood, potentially undermining the ability to achieve such objectives.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Regional Politics, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

24. Conventional and Hybrid Actions in the Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Craisor-Constantin Ionita
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The paper aims to analytically present the existing data and information regarding notable aspects of the ongoing war in Ukraine, notably through lessons identified in the political-military field, both conventionally and hybrid. The article hypothesis starts from the consideration that even the war is not over, there are some lessons identified that should be considered for the future security of Europe and the international environment. The author uses the analytical method of research to explain the cause-effect relationship between the war itself and its future influence for the European security and world order, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. It will also theoretically test those implications to determine whether they fit the specified hypothesis. The conflict itself has deepened the international consequences of almost two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. It magnified the disastrous security situation not only in Europe, but all around the world, by creating additional energy (gas) and food (cereal) crises. Therefore, the Russian – Ukrainian War has significantly modified regional and international security environment and there are tendencies to challenge the current World order. What happened in Ukraine in the past year has and will continue to have direct implications for the European and Euro-Atlantic security, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. Therefore, this paper is significant for advising the political-military decision-makers on better understanding the modern operational environment and addapting future defence capabilities to face 21st Century Warfare.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. Should the EU Pursue a Strategic Ginseng Policy? Trade Dependency in the Brave New World of Geopolitics

Author:: Oscar Guinea and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: Political leaders all over the world are calling for strategic autonomy. The removal of critical trade dependencies has become a guiding principle in most policy proposals, including the EU’s new industrial strategy. In making these decisions, it is important for policymakers to understand the reasons behind why shortages of critical goods and technologies have emerged in the first place. The instruments that new policies cerate should respond to real problems, not invented ones. For instance, if shortages are due to temporary mismatches of supply and demand, most of them will be fixed without the need of any policy intervention. On the other hand, shortages can also be engineered by countries using their dominance in the production of certain goods to coerce other countries. As the EU experienced first-hand after the Russian war on Ukraine in 2022, the concentration of market power in the production of any product carries geopolitical risks. For that purpose, it is crucial to understand the nature of trade dependencies. This policy brief presents indicators and a conceptual framework to measure trade dependency. The framework consists of two indicators: the first measures the share of EU imports from outside the EU over EU production proxied as the sum of imports and exports, while the second indicator considers the market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). It then applies this framework to EU trade with the rest of the world in 2020 and elaborates on the product categories and partner countries behind these dependencies. From a total of more than 9,000 product categories, there were only 233 products that could be classified as dependent within our framework. In terms of values, they represented 1.5% of EU total imports or €50 billion. The major suppliers of these products to the EU were China, United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Imports of hydrocarbons from Russia are part of this list of trade dependencies, but so are many other goods which are not of strategic importance. A policy intervention should be tailored to the specific product and the specific export country. Given the small size of the EU imports in which the EU can be considered dependent, it is not advisable to base Europe’s new industrial policy on a general fear of dependency and apply new policies in many sectors. Many of these products are easy to substitute and the economy can function without them. For the select few products where dependency is an economic concern, our paper explores different measures that the EU can put in place to lower trade dependency and how this dependency can be reduced through international trade.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Geopolitics, and Imports
Political Geography:: Europe

26. Terms, Conditions, Intersecting Interests Turkey and Regional Cooperation After the Second Karabakh War

Author:: Ayça Ergun
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: This essay should be understood as a series of reflections on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus in the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War and how this has provided Turkey with a great opportunity to revisit, redefine, and even consolidate its newfound role and mission in the region. It is predicated on the assessment that, starting in July 2020, Turkey became more proactive and involved in the region, which in turn laid the foundation for a game‑changing development; Turkey’s stature then grew even further in the wake of the 10 November 2020 tripartite statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War. Now Ankara is taking on a balancing role—if not quite a mediating one—in the region. The situation is not straightforward: the well‑consolidated empowerment of the Russian Federation in the wake of the war has ensured its continuing status as the main mediator in conflict resolution as well as open the possibility for it to become a genuine peacemaker. Turkey is considered the main balancing power to potentially check or restrain Russia’s dominant position, at least down the road. But for now, Russia can be considered as “being fully back” on the ground: its armed forces are present in each of the three South Caucasus states—by invitation or otherwise. This lends a certain pallor of instability to the newly achieved status quo, although this is not widely recognized, much less pronounced in Turkey and in Azerbaijan. It is thus too early to speak about full‑on regional integration, which will take time to bring about. Yet already today there is potential for the realization of regional cooperation. The ideas related to the latter are being discussed in various fora, yet the feasibility of the implementation of these ideas remains open to interpretation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hegemony, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

27. The geopolitics of digital financial technologies: A chance for Europe?

Author:: Brigitte Dekker, Arief Hühn, Pim Korsten, and Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Geopolitical tensions are permeating the digital domain. During the 1990s, the emergence of the internet still involved optimism and high hopes for digital technology as a force for openness, connectedness and freedom for all. Yet contrary to these promises, a trend of centralization, is prevalent in the digital economy. This trend of centralization, with the subsequent problems of gatekeeping, ecosystem lock-in, disproportional rent-seeking and monopolists that set market rules, is now also evident in the financial industry. Whereas smaller financial technology (fintech) companies, including many European firms, revolutionized the financial sector in the 2000s – disrupting traditional banks and their vested interests – we now witness a concentration of power and data in this sector, either in incumbent firms or within Big Tech companies. In response, governments in China, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are devising regulations, while at the same time technology innovators are building a radically new infrastructure to underpin our financial sector: Decentralized Finance (DeFi). The geopolitical implications of this disruptive transformation of the financial sector – through both fintech and DeFi – require forward-looking government responses that protect and promote European interests in the long term. This Clingendael Report first reflects on these trends of centralization in digital finance and decentralization in ‘traditional finance’. The paper examines the relationship between geopolitics and finance and looks at the position of the EU and its member states. The analysis considers the medium to longer-term implications in the following three domains: economic competitiveness and innovation; financial–economic and social stability; and inclusivity and equality. Data governance, data protection and data portability between financial services are key concepts in each of these areas. Building on these insights, the report argues for a push towards greater awareness among European policymakers on the potentials of DeFi to counter Big Tech’s rising influence in the European financial system with a decentralized, human-centred and value-based system. At the same time, the regulatory and security risks of DeFi – and the trend of decentralization in general – must be addressed. The report also highlights the need to help people to develop digital skills and become responsible and resilient digital citizens, and calls for enhanced dialogues with officials and technology company executives in like-minded countries on current developments. New approaches, such as multi-stakeholder consultations and increased rapprochement with the open-source and crypto-communities, are needed to facilitate knowledge exchange and best practices that will improve (regulatory) responses.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Geopolitics, Internet, and Digital Finance
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

28. Investors beware: Europe’s top firms are highly exposed to China

Author:: Ties Dams and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Europe’s top firms are highly exposed to China, and therefore to China-related geopolitical risk. This risk is only set to increase in the coming years, as geopolitical tensions between China, the US and the EU are not expected to decrease. Moreover, case studies of LVMH, HSBC, ASML and BMW show that some of Europe’s biggest listed firms could and should offer investors more transparency on their risk-management strategies. Intelligence on China and geopolitical risk exposure is key for investors, and investors that get ahead of the curve may have the edge in the long term. This report is aimed at investors in Europe’s biggest listed firms. It argues that investors have a growing need for transparency amongst European biggest companies with regard to their strategies in dealing with China-related geopolitical risk. Even investors without direct interests in China are or will be affected by China-related geopolitical risk due to the various forms of exposure of companies in the European home market. This means that investors may be increasingly exposed to the risks linked to great power competition, without having the knowledge necessary to anticipate geopolitical changes. As geopolitical tensions between China, the US and the EU are not expected to decrease, investors would be wise to seek greater transparency about European companies’ exposure to the Chinese market – and indeed get ahead of the curve and gain a competitive advantage by investing in those firms that have forward-looking geopolitical strategies in place. This report aims to put this point on investors’ strategic agenda by making the following three points: Europe’s top firms are highly exposed to China. China-related geopolitical risk is spreading. Case studies suggest that Europe’s top firms may not be sufficiently transparent about geopolitical risk management.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Business, Investment, and Risk
Political Geography:: China and Europe

29. The Economics of Great Power Competition: Why Germany Must Step Up on Defense

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Without a sound economic foundation, political and military ambitions cannot be sustained. This also applies to the geopolitical competition between the United States and its rivals. So far, America and its allies are economically ahead of Russia and China. But where Russia’s long-term outlook is weak, China’s economic might is rapidly increasing. Despite the war in Ukraine, Washington will have to focus its resources on Asia. In Europe, Germany, with its large financial and economic base, should lead on military spending and enhanced security.
Topic:: NATO, Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

30. The Geopolitics of Digital Technology Innovation: Assessing Strengths and Challenges of Germany’s Innovation Ecosystem

Author:: Tyson Barker and David Hagebölling
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The COVID-era public and private investment influx into Germany’s digital technology R&D is reversing amid inflation, fiscal consolidation, and geopolitical pressures coming from the Zeitenwende. Germany’s future in an EU that is among the top-tier technology powers requires a profound and rapid transition of the country’s R&D strengths into data-intensive, systems-centric areas of IoT and deep technology that are linked to the domestic manufacturing base. New policy approaches in three areas – money, markets, and minds – are needed. New technologies such as robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced material science, biotech, and quantum computing tend to have broad general-purpose applications. But uncoordinated funding vehicles, universities’ civil clauses, and restrictive visa and onboarding guidelines for skilled foreign workers slow innovation in these sectors and hamper German geo-technological competitiveness. In the mid-term, Germany could look at a scheme to bundle the Future Fund together with new institutional investment in a sort of embryonic German Sovereign Wealth Fund, with a proportion of funding specifically geared toward strategically important VC endeavors.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Innovation, and Digitization
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

31. Principled pragmatism: Europe’s place in a multipolar Middle East

Author:: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A multipolar Middle East is emerging as the US “right-sizes” its posture in the region – and as regional states and external powers, including Russia and China, become more assertive. Russia’s war on Ukraine is accelerating these dynamics, while also provoking destabilising price shocks and underscoring the region’s importance to energy markets. The Middle East’s geopolitical shifts pose huge challenges to Europe, but multipolarity could create space to promote European interests more effectively. A coherent European approach should be guided by principled pragmatism: acknowledging the region as it is rather than as Europeans want it to be, while staying focused on the principles needed to secure longer-term stability. Europeans need to enhance transatlantic complementarity and stop ceding leverage to their Middle Eastern partners. While they compete for influence with Russia and China, they should maintain room for coordination with both countries. Europe should tap into the opportunities created by stabilisation support, green energy, and economic diversification – areas that could provide an edge over China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, Strategic Interests, Pragmatism, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

32. The geopolitics of technology: How the EU can become a global player

Author:: Julian Ringhof and José I. Torreblanca
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Battles in the digital space have taken centre stage in today’s global power struggles. The EU cannot stay aside. To become a geopolitical actor, the EU needs to learn to play global technology politics and should adopt an ambitious digital diplomacy strategy. A digital diplomacy strategy will enable the EU to better defend its values, enhance its security, and foster digital markets at home and worldwide. To counter Chinese and Russian influence in the technology realm, the EU should build digital alliances with like-minded countries. The EU needs to seek greater convergence with the US and other Western allies, and offer the global south an attractive alternative path to digital development. For the European External Action Service and the European Commission to succeed in this task, the concurrence of the EU institutions, the member states, and a variety of private stakeholders is essential.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Human Rights, Science and Technology, European Union, Geopolitics, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

33. EU - Pacific talks: EU - ASEAN relations: For better and for worse

Author:: Europeum
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:: If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - ASEAN relations: for better and for worse, you can read the report from the debate written by Šárka Váchalová. During the debate these questions were discussed: As tensions with authoritarian powers such as Russia and China amplify, how can the EU and ASEAN partnership remain strong moving forward? What are the areas that the two regions can strengthen given the ongoing geopolitical tug of war?
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Europe

34. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Unity is good, but ambition is better

Author:: Sophie Pornschlegel and Ilke Toygür
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In view of the volatile geopolitical environment, EU leaders no longer have the luxury of waiting for all 27 member states to find a consensus. In order to lead the way to a Union that is apt for future challenges, the EU should become more ambitious and embrace alternatives, such as differentiated integration, in the coming months and years. Rather than returning to the status quo ante, the EU should use this momentum to progress in five policy fields: economic governance, with a new recovery package and a reform of the fiscal rules; security and defence, with improved EU–NATO cooperation and a stronger ‘European pillar’; energy policy, by quickly steering member states away from dependence on Russian fossil fuels while simultaneously ensuring admissible energy prices for consumers and respecting the climate targets; enlargement and neighbourhood policy, by rethinking its aims and creating options for countries that are unlikely to become EU members in the foreseeable future; and the rule of law, to safeguard the Union’s values ‘at home’. Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion revealed that the EU institutions and leaders are capable of managing crises swiftly and decisively. This reality certainly increases its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens as well as its allies. The European Union could use this moment of change to increase its ambition for reforms and for moving European integration forward. This should encourage leaders to think about all the options for designing the Union’s future. This is not a time for black and white thinking – Treaty change or nothing –, but rather a time to explore all the shades of grey for securing necessary reforms. If like-minded countries could lead the way, others may also follow. The changing and evolving positions in the EU could help secure more inclusive alliances for moving forward. The political momentum to do so is finally here.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Rule of Law, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security

Author:: Merle Maigre
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace.
Topic:: NATO, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

36. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:: Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

37. The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin’s Rhetoric Towards Ukraine

Author:: Björn Alexander Düben
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: As tensions between Russia and Ukraine reach an almost-tipping point, Björn Alexander Düben analyses the historical and geopolitical rhetoric Putin and his government have deployed against the post-Maidan Ukraine since 2014. Asking, can this be seen as another Russian assertion of dominance in the post-Soviet region, could there be reasons closer to home, or why tensions across the border seem to once again be at a breaking point? From global oil prices to regime consolidation, an analysis into the words of Russia’s elites could unveil what future Europe is steering towards.
Topic:: Geopolitics, History, Conflict, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:: Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

39. Interpreting the Commission Opinions on the membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and next steps for the European Council

Author:: Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, and Tinatin Akhvlediani
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The Commission’s three Opinions on the membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, if endorsed by the European Council as seems likely on 23-24 June, will mark a geopolitical turning point for Europe, bringing the three eastern European states into the EU’s enlargement process, albeit with a less advanced formulation for the time being for Georgia than for Ukraine and Moldova. A broad geopolitical advance is favourably viewed by most EU citizens and its main international partners. The European Council’s agenda is of even wider importance, with discussions due to take place on both possible reform of the existing enlargement process and the ideas advanced by Presidents Macron and Michel for a new form of political community that would aim to embrace the whole of Europe (except of course for Russia and Belarus).
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Regional Politics, and European Council
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

40. The Geopolitics of Clean Hydrogen – Opportunities and Challenges for Italy

Author:: Marco Giuli
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The emergence of clean hydrogen as an energy carrier promises to shape the future geography of the energy trade. Under growing contestation of interdependence, such a geography should be read through political lenses alongside commercial and technological ones. Generally, hydrogen is likely to reduce the geopolitical sensitivity of energy trade with respect to a fossil-fuel-based energy order by increasing the share of energy produced domestically, shifting geostrategic competition from a focus on grabbing resources to a focus on mastering technology and setting standards, and offering petrostates opportunities for economic diversification. Italy can exploit the opportunities offered by a hydrogen economy for enhancing its energy security and positioning in the regional energy trade. However, it should be careful with monitoring how geopolitical barriers such as regional instability may affect its hydrogen ambitions.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Trade, Hydrogen, Pipeline, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

41. The EU and the Ukraine War: Making Sense of the Rise of a “Geopolitical” Union

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: By ordering Russian armed forces into Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin has arguably made the greatest blunder of his twenty-two-year long rule. The Russian president seems to have underestimated not just Ukraine’s capacity to resist the invasion, but also the resolve of the United States and its partners to oppose it.[1] If that is indeed the case, the greatest surprise must have come from the European Union.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. A Scramble for Gas: Qatari LNG and EU Diversification Plans

Author:: Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Amidst a worsening geopolitical and energy crisis in Europe, the EU is scrambling to increase liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports as one component of its larger objective to reduce its overdependence on Russian gas. In 2021, the EU imported 155 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas from Russia (140 bcm via pipeline and 15 bcm of LNG). Under its REPowerEU initiative, the European Commission aims to increase LNG imports to replace 50 bcm of Russian gas by the end of 2022.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Gas, Diversification, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Qatar

43. Software Power The Economic and Geopolitical Implications of Open Source Software

Author:: Alice Pannier
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Open source plays a central role in software development, both in parallel with proprietary software and increasingly intertwined with it. It has become a major factor for companies’ innovation processes and for the success and popularity of their products. For users, using open source software can alleviate risks stemming from proprietary solutions, including data privacy concerns or trade restrictions. Beyond that, open source is the foundation of critical software bricks and Internet languages and protocols. However, open source is a victim of its own success. It suffers of a lack of resources dedicated to the maintenance of open source components, even though vulnerabilities in open source code can have serious consequences, as illustrated by the Log4Shell vulnerability in December 2021. For these reasons, private companies are investing ever more money and human resources in the development and maintenance of open source software, and acquiring structuring roles in the governance of the ecosystem. This support, however, is not without risk for the open source ecosystem, which is increasingly shaped by the private interests of Big Tech companies. Meanwhile, governments are getting increasingly concerned with the cybersecurity implications of open source software, and with risks not only of accidental vulnerabilities, but also manipulation of codes by criminals and foreign agents. The interest of governments in open source is not new, but it is evolving: governments are no longer only seeking to adopt open source or to develop software solutions, but also to contribute to the financing or even the governance of open source ecosystems, at the national and/or global level. An analysis of the United States, Chinese and European cases show that government involvement in open source is not only pragmatic; it is increasingly politicized, and serves to uphold governments’ ambitions for national security, international influence, or digital sovereignty. The study highlights the dilemmas that emerge, for public authorities, from the tensions between the desire to secure universally used, critical open source components, the desire to develop “sovereign” technologies, and the risk of encroaching on the horizontal and decentralized functioning of open source.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Economy, Software, and Open Source
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

44. Neither Surveillance Nor Algorithm-driven Consumerism: Toward an Alternative European Model for Smart Cities

Author:: Jacques Priol and Joé Vincent-Galtié
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Smart city projects take many forms, ranging from the installation of connected street lights to total initiatives such as The Line – the gargantuan and futuristic project carried out by Saudi Arabia. In one form or another, these initiatives are multiplying, guided by the objectives of efficiency and the improvement of public policies. What they have in common is that they mobilize various digital tools and use data to develop and manage public services. As they are exported, these projects also become levers for international influence. Where does Europe stand on this spectrum? While many smart territory projects have already been implemented on the continent, Europe is still looking for its own model. Two models are unanimously rejected: the one promoted by China, and the one implemented by certain North American cities. The first subordinates the smart city to security and social control imperatives and contributes to the constant surveillance of the population. In contrast to this model, which is primarily concerned with control and surveillance on behalf of the State, the Californian-inspired North American model is criticized for its massive use of personal data, which is collected and used by private actors. Users are alarmed by the potential use of this data for commercial purposes and denounce the replacement of democratic decision-making by automated tools. From there, developing a European model requires taking these pitfalls into account and respecting both the issues related to privacy protection and the maintenance of open and democratic procedures. Europe can rely on an ambitious regulatory framework, capable of encouraging the development of smart cities in its territory. This framework can also be a real asset for exporting its model to other continents. European initiatives in the field of smart cities are also part of efforts to promote digital sovereignty. In this respect, matters of standardization, interoperability and infrastructure are at the heart of the debate and must be fully integrated into the projects implemented. They are also subject to intense international competition.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Governance, Geopolitics, Urban, Smart Cities, and Data
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

45. Systemic Geopolitical Analysis in the research of power distribution in Eastern Europe

Author:: Erwin Metera
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The article presents Systemic Geopolitical Analysis, which as a scientific method can be an important tool for studying the distribution of power in Eastern Europe, supporting the assumptions of structural realism with an element of quantitative research. This region, as a place where spheres of influence and the ensuing economic and potentially military conflicts meet, is an area where the knowledge of the most precise distribution of power may be a crucial element in the analysis of the genesis of conflicts, the shifts in power distribution during their course, as well as in the prediction of future flashpoints. Being the first attempt to correlate Systemic Geopolitical Analysis with the issue of conflicts in Eastern Europe, the paper contains a hypothesis that Systemic Geopolitical Analysis is a research method that enables an effective analysis of the geopolitical reality in the region because of: 1) the conflicts occurring in the system due to differences in power distribution; 2) the nature of the components of power, measurable by the means of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis. Confirming the above hypothesis, the article points to the economic aspect, linked to the Russian natural gas exports, and the military aspect, by taking into account the characteristics of contemporary tensions in the region, which reduce the role of supra-systemic reserves.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Gas, Conflict, Exports, Regional Politics, and Structural Realism
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

46. The Influence of Political Processes and the War in Ukraine on the Formation of Generation Alpha and the iGeneration (Z): Defining Specific Features

Author:: Liudmyla Kryvachuk
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The article attempts to analyse and define the specific features of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha in Ukraine in the context of the political processes and the war taking place in Ukrainian society. The article discusses the generation issues, taking into account the characteristics of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha. Assuming that a generation is an identifiable group of people who share a similar time of birth and significant events at critical stages of development, the article presents an original approach to determining the specific features of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha in Ukraine. The Orange Revolution (2004), the Revolution of Dignity (2014) and the hybrid war (2014-2022) and Russian-Ukrainian war (from 24.02.2022) had a significant impact on the formation of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha in Ukraine.
Topic:: Children, Geopolitics, Youth, Social Policy, Hybrid Warfare, Generation, Generation Z, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

47. Will economic statecraft threaten western currency dominance? Sanctions, geopolitics, and the global monetary order

Author:: Carla Norrlof
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The return of great power rivalry is stoking renewed fears of weakening Western currency dominance. Financial sanctions are becoming the preferred economic tool for accomplishing geopolitical goals. These instruments are especially popular with the United States and Europe. In response, rival great powers, notably China and Russia, are diversifying away from Western currencies and developing counterstrategies to maintain economic and foreign policy autonomy. As other countries are hit by increasingly punishing Western sanctions, the incentive to join Russia and China’s alternative international monetary order increases. New analysis, published in this report, shows early signs that some countries may be trying to diversify away from the dollar. A growing circle of countries attempting to evade the Western-centric financial and currency order may over time erode the dollar and the euro’s sizeable lead, though will likely fall well short of ending their global dominance. This report analyzes these trends and quantifies the extent of reserve diversification following Russia’s 2022 war on Ukraine. It also assesses the polarity of the international currency order since the onset of the euro in 2002. Reserve diversification out of the dollar, and into the euro, has been modest, though Chinese renminbi reserves grew after Russia’s February offensive in Ukraine. Dollar unipolarity declined acutely in 2017 as the number of countries sanctioned by the United States increased and the US President Donald J. Trump threatened to revoke alliance commitments. Using economic statecraft while retaining global economic influence will require the United States to keep its economic house in order and allies close, if the current unipolar currency order is to survive.
Topic:: Economics, Monetary Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

48. India Emerges as a Key Power and Important Partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: India’s commissioning of its second aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, in September this year reaffirms the country’s aim to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific. The country’s importance in the region will depend mainly on the course of the India-China rivalry, an increase in its economic potential, and the support provided to it by foreign partners. The convergence of goals in the Indo-Pacific strengthens India’s partnership with the U.S. and opens up opportunities for intensifying cooperation with the EU, especially in terms of connectivity, climate change, and the development of capacity in maritime domain awareness.
Topic:: International Cooperation, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Europe, South Asia, India, and Indo-Pacific

49. The Lynchpin of the Middle Corridor

Author:: Anthony Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Particularly in today’s evolving geopolitical and economic reality triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Caspian region has gained greater relevance whilst acquiring renewed significance. More specifically, one of the geostrategic consequences of Putin’s ongoing assault against Ukraine and its broader implications for the global economy has been the enhanced impetus for ensuring the pragmatic and strategic utility of the “Middle Corridor” (also more formally known as the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR) for the Caspian region and beyond as a viable commercial transport route alternative to the long‑established northern pathway through Russia. China, which has been eager to expand its economic networks, had hoped to dominate economically the utilization of the Middle Corridor as part of an expanding BRI. But at least some of the countries in the region (and beyond) have grown increasingly uneasy about participating in it. They have viewed China as leaving many of its BRI promises unfulfilled. And they have also become more concerned that Beijing’s BRI engagement comes with too many geopolitical strings attached and can lead to debt traps. By and large, China has invested in a number of infrastructure projects in Central Asia within the framework of BRI. Most of China’s activity has taken place on the eastern shore of the Caspian. Major port, pipeline, and infrastructure projects on the Caspian’s western shore have been done without much, if any, direct Chinese involvement. Making the Middle Corridor work properly is not an easy task: it will take considerable degrees of time, financial means, and political commitment. With many economic and political challenges lingering around, by no means, the cross‑country transportation route could become the cheapest option any time soon. Nonetheless, in an increasingly raucous world where diversifying supply chains reduce risk and has become more desirable, the route could become not only fully viable but, more importantly, truly cost‑effective.
Topic:: Security, Development, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia

50. Geopolitical Consequences of the War in Ukraine

Author:: John Rennie Short
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine signals a new world order that has developed from the bipolar world of 1945 to 1991 and the brief unipolar interlude from 1991 to 2008. This new world order is dominated by a relatively declining U.S. and an emerging Sino-Russo anti American alliance, a renewed sense of the West as a counter to authoritarian regimes and reversal of the globalization trends of the past thirty years. We are moving into a deglobalizing, multipolar world.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

51. Geopolitics, Geography an the Ukrainian Russian War

Author:: Serdar Ş. Güner
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The trigger of the Ukraine-Russia war is the enlargement of NATO, essentially a Western exploitation of Russian weakness emanating from Soviet Union’s dissolution. Russia has communicated her reactions to the enlargement peacefully until the prospect of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. The second wave of enlargement coming from the direction of neutral states such Finland and Sweden originates from Finnish and Swedish fears of being the next targets of Russian military campaigns. NATO enlargement to Ukraine has caused Russia-Ukraine war that in turn has caused some neutral states to leave their neutrality and become NATO members. Therefore, NATO expansion efforts has led to a further expansion through war. However, the exclusion of and warring with Russia only obliterates the opportunity to form a large alliance to balance China. The West should understand that it is not wise to create incentives for the formation of a Sino-Russian alliance.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Conflict, Geography, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

52. The geopolitical implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Paul Dibb
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The eminent Harvard University professor of Ukrainian history, Serhii Plokhy, observed that Russia’s occupation of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 raised fundamental questions about Ukraine’s continuing existence as a unified state, its independence as a nation, and the democratic foundations of its political institutions.1 This created a new and dangerous situation not only in Ukraine but also in Europe as a whole. For the first time since the end of World War II, a major European power made war on a weaker neighbour and annexed part of the territory of a sovereign state. This unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine threatened the foundations of international order—a threat to which, he said, the EU and most of the world weren’t prepared to respond. Two years later, Plokhy published a book called Lost kingdom: a history of Russian nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin 2 in which he observed—correctly, in my view—that the question of where Russia begins and ends, and who constitutes the Russian people, has preoccupied Russian thinkers for centuries. He might have added that Russia has no obvious or clear-cut geographical borders. Plokhy also stated that the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict is only the latest turn of Russian policy resulting from the Russian elite’s thinking about itself and its East Slavic neighbours as part of their joint historical and cultural space, and ultimately as the same nation. He asserts that the current conflict reprises many of the themes that have been central to political and cultural relations in the region for the previous five centuries. Those include Russia’s great-power status and influence beyond its borders; the continued relevance of religion, especially Orthodox Christianity, as defined in Russian identity and the conduct of Russian policy abroad; and, last but not least, the importance of language and culture as tools of Russian state policy in the region. Moreover, the conflict reminds the world that the formation of the modern Russian nation is still far from complete. Plokhy concludes that this threat is no less serious than the one posed in the 19th and early 20th centuries by the German question—the idea of uniting all the German lands to forge a mighty German Empire.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

53. Walking the tightrope towards the EU: Moldova’s vulnerabilities amid war in Ukraine

Author:: Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: When the Council of the European Union decided on 23 June 2022 to grant Moldova the status of EU candidate country, it boosted the morale of a beleaguered government in Chișinău trying to circumnavigate a daunting series of crises. Since Maia Sandu ousted Socialist President Igor Dodon in the presidential election in 2020 and her reform-oriented Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) obtained a parliamentary majority in 2021, Moldova has barely had a chance to catch its breath. In the year that followed, the country experienced an energy crisis that almost deprived it of gas in the winter of 2021-2022, a budding economic crisis with rampant inflation, and a security and refugee crisis as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The war in its immediate neighbourhood, with Russian troops advancing in the spring along Ukraine’s southern coast to barely over 100 kilometres of Moldova’s borders, has further complicated the already difficult geopolitical balancing act of successive Moldovan governments. It has also aggravated existing security risks. For years, Moldova has balanced its aspirations to join the EU with its constitutional neutrality and its many dependencies on the Russian Federation. While President Putin was quick to congratulate Maia Sandu on her election and has so far refrained from open hostility towards her government, there are still many vulnerabilities that Moscow already leverages and could further exploit if it chose to destabilise Moldova. Not only is Moldova’s economy highly fragile and dependent on Russian energy, there are also political forces and regions that see their interests threatened by the reforms of the PAS government in Chișinău – and over which Moscow has different degrees of influence. Two of such regions are the separatist region of Transnistria in the east and the autonomous region of Gagauzia in the south of the country. A better understanding of these key vulnerabilities could help the EU and the Netherlands to assist Moldova in reducing them and to increase the stability and resilience of the EU’s newest candidate country. The central question of this research report therefore is to what extent Russia’s influence over Moldovan domestic politics as well as the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia poses risks to the internal and external stability of Moldova.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova

54. Navigating an uncertain future: An exploration of China’s influence on the Netherlands’ future maritime logistics hub function

Author:: Frans-Paul van der Putten and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The maritime logistics hub function is of strategic importance to the Netherlands as a trading country. The Netherlands positions itself as the ‘Gateway to Europe’ thanks to its advanced logistics network and plays an important role in the global economy. This position nevertheless faces an uncertain future: there is no guarantee that the Netherlands will remain a leader in the years ahead. Geopolitics, and particularly the influence of China, will have a major impact on the Dutch maritime logistics hub function. On behalf of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this report examines China’s influence on the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function. The main question posed in the study is: How is China’s influence on the central position of the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function likely to evolve in the decades ahead and what possible actions could the Dutch government take in response to it? The purpose of this study is to assess scenarios as a basis for possible actions by the Dutch government and the Dutch maritime logistics sector, particularly with regard to the Netherlands’ central position and strategic autonomy as a maritime logistics hub.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Logistics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Netherlands

55. Germany’s Global Technology Diplomacy Strengthening Technology Alliances, Partnerships, and Norms-Setting Institutions

Author:: David Hagebölling and Tyson Barker
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The fusion of technological, geopolitical, and ideological ambitions is straining internet governance discourses, cyber norms diplomacy, technical standard-setting, and the global connectivity infrastructure. The German government has made support for global, open, and secure digital connectivity a centerpiece of its foreign policy. However, it has yet to make the shaping of a corresponding international technology agenda a strategic policy priority. To shape a global technology order that reflects Germany’s interests as a high-tech industrial economy and democratic society, the government should focus on realizing synergies with EU international digital policy, strengthening coordination with like-minded partners, and engaging with the Global South on an inclusive and democratic global digital agenda.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Norms, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

56. A German Digital Grand Strategy: Integrating Digital Technology, Economic Competitiveness, and National Security in Times of Geopolitical Change

Author:: Tyson Barker and David Hagebölling
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: This report systematically outlines the state of play in digital policy and Berlin’s current policy approach. It provides 48 recommendations for strengthening Germany’s efforts to build a confident, high-performing European digital economy embedded in an open, democratic, and rules-based digital order.
Topic:: Economics, National Security, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Europe

57. The Geopolitics of Digital Technology Innovation: Assessing Strengths and Challenges of Germany’s Innovation Ecosystem

Author:: Tyson Barker and David Hagebölling
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The COVID-era public and private investment influx into Germany’s digital technology R&D is reversing amid inflation, fiscal consolidation, and geopolitical pressures coming from the Zeitenwende. Germany’s future in an EU that is among the top-tier technology powers requires a profound and rapid transition of the country’s R&D strengths into data-intensive, systems-centric areas of IoT and deep technology that are linked to the domestic manufacturing base. New policy approaches in three areas – money, markets, and minds – are needed. New technologies such as robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced material science, biotech, and quantum computing tend to have broad general-purpose applications. But uncoordinated funding vehicles, universities’ civil clauses, and restrictive visa and onboarding guidelines for skilled foreign workers slow innovation in these sectors and hamper German techno-geopolitical competitiveness. In the mid-term, Germany could look at a scheme to bundle the Future Fund together with new institutional investment in a sort of embryonic German Sovereign Wealth Fund, with a proportion of funding specifically geared toward strategically important VC endeavors.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Geopolitics, Innovation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

58. The geo-economics and geopolitics of COVID-19: implications for European security

Author:: Bastain Giegerich, Fenella McGerty, and Peter Round
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The pandemic was not an unforeseen event. Foresight reports, policy simulations and national risk assessments had long included a similar challenge among the possibilities. Nevertheless, when the coronavirus pandemic came the world was not prepared and despite the existence of a myriad of international organisations, alliances and friendships, the reactions were mostly national and inward-looking. Governments started to spend vast amounts of resources on fighting the pandemic, looking for preventatives and cures, and propping up their own economies when the primary weapon in the arsenal to fight the pandemic was the so-called ‘lockdown’. Many governments will emerge from the coronavirus pandemic laden with debt and a severely depressed outlook for economic growth. It is conceivable that among the second- and third-order effects of the pandemic is an accelerated rebalancing of power away from the Euro-Atlantic community. This could threaten the ability of NATO and EU member states to shape and defend the rules-based international order. The pandemic itself may be a driver of instability and insecurity at a time when the ability to deliver stabilising measures and crisis-management capacity is weakened. Divergent recoveries could create conditions that see an accelerated rebalancing of global power and the development or disintegration of global alliances. While levels of uncertainty caused by the pandemic remain high, it is now possible to attempt a first assessment of the geo-economic and geopolitical implications of the pandemic. In geo-economic terms, it is useful to take stock of the costs of the pandemic and attempt to evaluate who wins and who loses as a result. In geopolitical terms, there are important questions relating to international order and great-power politics, as well as the ability of multinational institutions to contribute to problem solving in the age of COVID-19, especially in the face of a resurgence of nation-state power. From the perspective of security and defence policy, the pandemic further complicates an already challenging picture, straining resources while adding to a long list of relevant threat vectors and risks. Between September and December 2020, the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened six web-based discussion meetings, bringing together a group of international experts and officials to pursue three parallel strands of debate – economics, international order, and security and defence. This paper, written by IISS staff, draws on these conversations and is informed by them. It does not represent a shared assessment or a consensus view among the participants, but it hopefully serves to provide some orientation and fuel for constructive debate in a world that very much remains in flux.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Geopolitics, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe

59. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Taking Stock of Europe’s New Trade Policy Strategy

Author:: Fredrik Erixon
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This Policy Brief takes stock of the EU Trade Policy Review – the Commission’s proposed strategy for trade. Despite appearances, the Review doesn’t come close to its billing as a strategy for the new geopolitics of trade. In fact, the Review is weak on key geopolitical developments and rather gives the impression that the EU doesn’t have an ambition to shape outcomes. Obviously, the Review is anchored in Europe’s general economic climate: defensiveness on globalization, competition and digitalization. It follows that Europe is getting increasingly detached from world developments. There are several good parts in the Review. The Commission wants to revive and reform the World Trade Organisation, and it’s clear about what factors that have made the Geneva-based trade body dysfunctional. The Review also acknowledges that the EU will seek a closer alliance with the United States and use that for constructive purposes. Finally, it is welcome that the Commission proposes some new instruments for dealing with market distortions caused by foreign subsidies and protectionism in government procurement. All these initiatives can achieve good outcomes. However, they all require that Europe makes changes in its own policies and positions. The bad parts in the Review are Europe’s weak agenda for getting better market access in the growth regions in the world and its continued passivity on matters related to China. Europe’s main trade-policy challenge in the next decade is to ensure that businesses and consumers in Europe get better integrated with a world-market dynamism that predominantly will come from the Asian region. Absent a realistic and medium-term strategy for dealing with challenges connected to the rise of China, Europe will have difficulties getting the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment approved. Europe needs an actionable agenda for addressing bilateral frictions with China and problems that occur outside bilateral trade. Finally, the ugly part of the trade strategy are all the commercial policies in the EU – with strong effects on trade – that aren’t recognized or only casually mentioned in the Review. The latter category includes the ambition to introduce an autonomous carbon border tax on imports. Such a policy comes at a high political and economic cost, and the measure’s effect on reducing global carbon emissions is at best very negligible.
Topic:: Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Geopolitics, Digital Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

60. Domestic Politics and Regional Dynamics in Turkey’s Geopolitical Approach to the Middle East Between 2002-2019

Author:: Billy Agwanda
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: During the last two decades, key reforms in social, economic, and political structures have elevated Turkey into a rising regional power. In the Middle East, the increasing influence of Turkey for a better part of the last two decades has been reinforced by its humanitarian oriented foreign policy. Whereas this transformation is extensively attributed to the reform agenda by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the last decade has proved to be challenging for Turkey’s foreign policy stance. Regional dynamics, such as the Syrian civil war, Qatar crisis, and the Kurdish question, have influenced Turkey to gradually shift from its previous subtle to a more assertive foreign policy. Additionally, the frequent domestic political challenges and economic pressure on the AKP government have only pushed Turkey further towards a more assertive Middle East foreign policy. This article examines how regional and domestic political developments are influencing Turkish foreign policy approach. The analysis will attempt to provide a comprehensive perspective on why Turkish geopolitical engagement and an increasingly assertive foreign policy that is characterised by unilateralism particularly in the pursuit of national and regional security is leading to its isolation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

61. Supercharged: The EuroAsia Interconnector and Israel’s Pursuit of Energy Interdependence

Author:: Gabriel Mitchell
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:: Contemporary analysis of Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics tends to focus on the discovery of offshore hydrocarbons, and how a desire to maximize commercial profits has spurred a realignment of regional interests. There is similar emphasis on how this realignment pushed some Eastern Mediterranean states into conflict with one another over maritime boundaries and drilling rights. But while natural gas pipelines may dominate political and analytical discourse, there are other infrastructure projects that deserve attention and shed further light on the region’s evolution and Israel’s role in this transitionary period. One example to support this claim is the EuroAsia Interconnector, an ambitious infrastructure project that intends to connect the European electrical grid via undersea cable from Greece to Cyprus, and Israel. Few in Israel are familiar with the interconnector. Unlike the much-publicized EastMed pipeline, the interconnector garners little attention. Ironically, there is a greater chance that the interconnector – whose cable would run along a similar route as the EastMed pipeline – will successfully link Israel and Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean, and not the more recognizable natural gas project.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Gas
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, Israel, Asia, Palestine, and Mediterranean

62. The geopolitics of the European Green Deal

Author:: Mark Leonard, Jeremy Shapiro, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Simone Tagliapietra, and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Green Deal is a plan to decarbonise the EU economy by 2050, revolutionise the EU’s energy system, profoundly transform the economy and inspire efforts to combat climate change. But the plan will also have profound geopolitical repercussions. The Green Deal will affect geopolitics through its impact on the EU energy balance and global markets; on oil and gas-producing countries in the EU neighbourhood; on European energy security; and on global trade patterns, notably via the carbon border adjustment mechanism. At least some of these changes are likely to impact partner countries adversely. The EU needs to wake up to the consequences abroad of its domestic decisions. It should prepare to help manage the geopolitical aspects of the European Green Deal. Relationships with important neighbourhood countries such as Russia and Algeria, and with global players including the United States, China and Saudi Arabia, are central to this effort, which can be structured around seven actions: Help neighbouring oil and gas-exporting countries manage the repercussions of the European Green Deal. The EU should engage with these countries to foster their economic diversification, including into renewable energy and green hydrogen that could in the future be exported to Europe. Improve the security of critical raw materials supply and limit dependence, first and foremost on China. Essential measures include greater supply diversification, increased recycling volumes and substitution of critical materials. Work with the US and other partners to establish a ‘climate club’ whose members will apply similar carbon border adjustment measures. All countries, including China, would be welcome to join if they commit to abide by the club’s objectives and rules. Become a global standard-setter for the energy transition, particularly in hydrogen and green bonds. Requiring compliance with strict environmental regulations as a condition to access the EU market will be strong encouragement to go green for all countries. Internationalise the European Green Deal by mobilising the EU budget, the EU Recovery and Resilience Fund, and EU development policy. Promote global coalitions for climate change mitigation, for example through a global coalition for the permafrost, which would fund measures to contain the permafrost thaw. Promote a global platform on the new economics of climate action to share lessons learned and best practices.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe

63. New game in the (post)covid Balkans?

Author:: Engjellushe Morina, Florian Bieber, Vuk Viksanovic, Jovana Marovic, Faruk Ajeti, and Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The global pandemic is changing the world. The Western Balkans were hit severely and are currently struggling with the rapid increase in numbers of Covid-19 infections. The state-of-the-play in the region is shaped by the dynamics of the pandemics but also by underlying structural problems, by the “return of geopolitics’ in the Balkans and question marks put behind the EU-Enlargement and new transatlantic relations. What we see at display right now is a sort of 'vaccine nationalism' threatening to replace the European solidarity. We see China rapidly increasing its influence, EU struggling to find a strong common policy towards the region and new expectations (for some) or even fears (for some others) related to the new Biden Administration. The debate seeks to explore this new game in the (post)covid Balkans. Are non-Western players using the pandemic with their ‘vaccine politics’ to fill Western’s gap or to challenge Western’s influence in the Balkans? What is the role of the EU and what the future prospects for enlargement? Will China’s increased influence in the Western Balkans hinder its transatlantic aspirations? How will the Biden administration meet the new challenges in the region? In cooperation with the Ministry of Defense (bmlv), the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation, and the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Topic:: Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Vaccine, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Balkans

64. The European Perspective of the Anti-Western Information Warfare

Author:: Erekle Iantbelidze
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: The transfer of the international political reality to a new multi-polar prism makes geopolitics, as one of the directions of interdisciplinary education, more important in the current situation. The development of digital and scientific technologies has moved the phenomenon of the balance of power to a new stage and for a number of states and intergovernmental organizations, the term geopolitics has become the flagship of security strategy, cultural domination and democratic processes. In terms of the new “geopolitical commission,” the action plan of Ursula von der Leyen rests on two main principles – Europe’s climate and digital transition (European Parliament, 2020). Therefore, in the conditions of a war of values, geopolitics and digitalization, technological development has become a super-important component that the European Union is attempting to bring to the forefront as it wrestles with the world’s foremost states (China, India, Russia, Turkey). As the EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, stated, Europe must not become a playground for other great powers and it must take the role of a geopolitical leader in the world (Barigazzi, 2019). It must also be pointed out that the geopolitical nature of Europe also envisages the development and gradual expansion of its neighborhood policy. That said, the associated partners within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) format (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine) have bigger ambitions and goals than the development of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the full implementation of the Association Agreement (AA) (European Commission, 2019).
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Geopolitics, and Free Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

65. Europe’s Capacity to Act in the Global Tech Race: Charting a Path for Europe in Times of Major Technological Disruption

Author:: Kaan Sahin and Tyson Barker
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Technological leadership has become a central dimension of geopolitical power. In this development, the primary front in the emerging tech power rivalry is between the US (United States of America) and China (People’s Republic of China). The European Union (EU) has fallen behind and needs to catch-up. The stakes in this race are high and will have an impact on economic competition, national security and broader values-based notions of political order. This study sheds light on Europe’s approach to technological mastery. This study looks into the progress of the EU and its member states across selected technological fields and their global entanglements with other nations and technology actors.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Science and Technology, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

66. Blurry Counterterrorism: A Chance for Russia, A Risk for Europe

Author:: Miriam Heß
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The European Union should actively address the problematic use of counterterrorism by non-European states – especially Russia – and make it a permanent aspect in developing counterterrorism strategies and agendas. Failing to address the misuse of counterterrorism sends the wrong signal not only to those with reason to fear geopolitical interference by their countries of origin, but also to states that pursue “anti-terrorist-operations” in the form of abductions and executions abroad.
Topic:: European Union, Counter-terrorism, Geopolitics, and Risk
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

67. Germany Between a Rock and a Hard Place in China-US Competition

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The Biden administration has just issued its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. The guidance document states the need to “build back better at home” and acknowledges that “international economic policies must serve all Americans” – a theme often referred to as “foreign policy for the middle class”. While the interim guidance does not preclude cooperation with China in selected policy areas, it is unambiguous in considering China a strategic competitor. The prospect of intensifying China-US geopolitical and (geo)economic competition is bad news for Germany, which has high value trading and investment relationships with both countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, National Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, Germany, North America, and United States of America

68. How Russia Does Foresight: Where is the world going?

Author:: Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Thinking about the long-term future is a prominent feature of the Russian official strategic planning and public policy debate. Speaking in 2008, for instance, President Putin indicated the horizons of strategic planning when he stated that a concrete development plan for the period through to 2010 had been elaborated, and “now we need to look beyond this horizon – look at least 10 years ahead”. “Today we are deciding one of the most important issues for Russia’s future – defining its development strategy through to 2020”, he stated, and in setting out Russia's long-term vision for the future, "our long-term references must be clear to everyone”, and “must have the support of our citizens.” By the mid-2010s, policy-oriented public organisations were looking even further ahead. The Valdai Club, for instance, was conducting a project entitled Club 2035, to “look beyond the horizon” at a number of themes, including technological and socio-cultural trends, and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) was running a “World in 100 Years” project, including the series “On the eve of 2037”. Other major institutes, such as the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs (IMEMO) and the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO), also hold regular major events and publish substantial volumes reflecting on twenty-first century megatrends and strategic forecasting up to 2030 and beyond.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Energy Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

69. Fish and ships: Chinese fishing and Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy

Author:: Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The fisheries sector has become a central geopolitical issue in the Indo-Pacific. China is a major cause of the problems in the industry, thanks to the size of its fleet and the tonnage of its captures. China also contributes to the erosion of ocean governance through its participation in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Beijing instrumentalises its fishing fleet for geopolitical gain, as evidenced by its policy on the South China Sea. These predatory fishing activities threaten Europe’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests, as well as its attempts to protect marine biodiversity. Europe cannot be a bystander on the issue; it should develop a more proactive policy on fisheries.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Fishing, Strategic Interests, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

70. Power play: Europe’s climate diplomacy in the Gulf

Author:: Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Gulf monarchies believe hydrocarbons will continue to be a fundamental – albeit shrinking – source of revenues for decades. But, as shown by Saudi Arabia’s net-zero pledge, they now see economic and political opportunities in embracing the green energy transition. If the EU is to achieve its climate and geopolitical goals, it will need to substantially increase its engagement with Gulf states on the European Green Deal. Electricity interconnection and green hydrogen are the two most promising fields of clean energy cooperation between the sides. Europeans should not cave to international pressure to lower their ambitions on carbon taxation, including the carbon border adjustment mechanism, as this remains a powerful incentive for hydrocarbons producers to make the transition to cleaner energy.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Engagement, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

71. Geo-tech politics: Why technology shapes European power

Author:: Ulrike Franke and José I. Torreblanca
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: New technologies are a major redistributor of power among states and a significant force shaping international relations. The European Union has for too long seen technology primarily through an economic lens, disregarding its implications for its partnerships and for its own geopolitical influence. If the EU wants to be more than a mediator between the two real technological powers, the United States and China, it will need to change its mindset. For the EU and its partners, the vulnerabilities created by battles over technology divide into two types: new dependencies and openness to foreign interference. The EU and its member states need deeper engagement with the geopolitical implications and geopolitical power elements of technology. This engagement has an external element of reaching out to partners and an internal element of ensuring close cooperation between the EU and its member states.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

72. Europe’s green moment: How to meet the climate challenge

Author:: Susi Dennison, Rafael Loss, and Jenny Söderström
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: EU member states are publicly committed to the European Green Deal, but are divided over the details of its implementation. They have different views on issues such as the proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism, the role of nuclear energy in Europe’s future energy mix, bridging technologies in the transition to net zero, and the socio-economic consequences of closing down carbon-intensive industries. Member states are not divided into two diametrically opposed camps but rather agree or disagree with one another in varying constellations. This makes the implementation of the European Green Deal an intricate puzzle – yet achievable if coalitions of states push one another to implement its constituent parts. The EU needs a strong foreign policy strategy to manage the geopolitical dimension of the deal and to generate the political resolve to drive climate action. The bloc also needs to mitigate the socio-economic challenges of implementing the European Green Deal if the effort is to succeed.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Green Deal
Political Geography:: Europe

73. Network effects: Europe’s digital sovereignty in the Mediterranean

Author:: Matteo Colombo, Federico Solfrini, and Arturo Varvelli
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Undersea internet cables are critical infrastructure as important as gas and oil pipelines, and are becoming a focus of growing geopolitical competition. Throughout the EU’s wider neighbourhood, geopolitics influences states’ decisions about who is allowed to build internet infrastructure and where they can do so. China and the US differ in their approaches, but both are racing ahead of the EU in their influence over internet infrastructure and the states that depend on it. The EU has the ambition and potential to become a sovereign digital power, but it lacks an all-encompassing strategy for the sector, in which individual governments are still the key players. The EU should set industry standards, help European telecommunications companies win business abroad, and protect internet infrastructure against hostile powers.
Topic:: Infrastructure, European Union, Geopolitics, Internet, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:: China, Europe, United States of America, and Mediterranean

74. Spoiler alert: How Europe can save diplomacy in Libya

Author:: Tarek Megerisi
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Key European states need to make Libya a shared foreign policy priority, and to overcome their competing approaches to the country. Europeans must reinvigorate the UN political track and use it to reinforce a unified national structure rather than entrench competing administrations. They should focus on protecting Europe’s core interests in Libya: sustainably ending the conflict, creating a reliable local partner, and preserving European influence. To make the UN process work, Europeans should take a more hands-on approach to blocking and isolating domestic and international spoilers, refocusing the political track on unifying objectives, and supporting security sector reform. Europeans should also provide stabilisation, technical, and diplomatic support to strengthen Libya’s governance and accountability mechanisms, which are needed to ensure a new government can successfully hold elections in December 2021.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe and Libya

75. The geopolitics of the European Green Deal

Author:: Mark Leonard, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Jeremy Shapiro, Simone Tagliapietra, and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The European Green Deal will have profound geopolitical repercussions, some of which are likely to have an adverse impact on the European Union’s partners. The EU should prepare to manage these repercussions in its relationships with important countries in its neighbourhood such as Russia and Algeria, and with global players such as the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia. The bloc should engage with oil- and gas-exporting countries to foster their economic diversification, including into renewable energy and green hydrogen that could be exported to Europe. The EU should improve the supply security of critical raw materials and limit its dependence on other countries – primarily on China – for these materials. It should work with the US and other partners to establish a ‘climate club’ whose members would apply similar carbon border adjustment measures. The EU should become a global standard-setter for the energy transition, particularly in hydrogen and green bonds. It should internationalise the European Green Deal by mobilising the EU budget, the EU recovery fund, and EU development policy. The EU should promote global coalitions for climate change mitigation, such as one to protect the permafrost. The bloc should promote a global platform on the new economics of climate action, to share lessons learned and best practice.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, and Green Deal
Political Geography:: Europe

76. Useful enemies: How the Turkey-UAE rivalry is remaking the Middle East

Author:: Asli Aydıntaşbaş and Cinzia Bianco
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are engaged in a decade-long feud that is reshuffling the geopolitical order in the Middle East and North Africa. They see each other as existential rivals and are waging a series of proxy wars between the Horn of Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. Their rivalry also plays out in the halls of Washington and Brussels, the global media discourse, the energy industry, and, lately, ports and the high seas. Europe should avoid being sucked into this power struggle to redefine the Middle East and North Africa. Instead of using the UAE to push back against Turkey or vice versa, Europe should develop its own strategy on their rivalry. Europe should establish a NATO deconfliction mechanism, push ahead with the political process in Libya, and design a constructive new framework to insulate European-Turkey relations from the rivalry.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and United Arab Emirates

77. Reconceptualizing Lithuania’s Importance for U.S. Foreign Policy

Author:: Nikolas Gvosdev
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: During the immediate post-Cold War period, the importance of Lithuania, along with other Central-Eastern European countries, to U.S. foreign policy increased. Lithuania became one of the jumping-off points for further “democratic enlargement” in Europe, Eurasia, and the Greater Middle East. Today, U.S. policy is focused on retrenchment and consolidation—defined by a shift in attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic region and the Greater Middle East towards the Indo-Pacific region—as well as the growing priority of climate change and the environment as central organizing principles. U.S. foreign policy is also increasingly subordinated to domestic political considerations about the costs and benefits of overseas action for constituencies within the United States. In the 2020s, Lithuania’s importance will rest less on the Russia dimension and further Euro-Atlantic enlargement into the post-Soviet space, and more on its ability to play a greater role in European affairs, to assist in the rebalance to Asian affairs more generally, and to contribute to energy, supply chain, and environmental security.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, Lithuania, and United States of America

78. Russia’s Nuclear Activity in 2020: A Show of Strength Despite COVID-19

Author:: Maxim Starchak
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation’s powerful nuclear arsenal has stood as a cornerstone of its political and military influence. In 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces maintained a high degree of activity. The number of nuclear exercises and air and sea deterrence patrols was stable and not much different from 2019. The Russian strategic nuclear arsenal remains an integral tool of the Kremlin’s pressure on rivals in Europe and North America.
Topic:: Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and North America

79. The European Union and the geopolitics of Covid19 vaccines in the Western Balkans – Isabelle Ioannides

Author:: Isabelle Ioannides
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The race for the limited Covid19 vaccines has led to shifts in the geopolitics at play in the Western Balkans. Despite the impressions that China and Russia have the upper hand, however, the European Union (EU) has not been absent from the region. Given the difficulties to meet vaccine needs in its member states, the EU has concentrated on long-term consequences of the Covid19 pandemic in the Western Balkans. Meanwhile, Covid19 cases and deaths are increasing in the region, pointing to the need for more attention on short-term challenges. The handling of the pandemic in the Western Balkans has also reaffirmed long-standing shortcomings in the EU foreign policy. Given that the vaccination is on track in EU member states, the time has come for the EU to prioritise the delivery of Covid19 vaccines to the Western Balkans.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Balkans

80. Greece’s Rise as a Trans-Mediterranean Power: Greece’s Eastern Mediterranean strategic shift to Europe-to-Africa and Europe-to-Middle East connectivity

Author:: Michaël Tanchum
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Greece stands at the threshold of a strategic shift that could see the Hellenic Republic become Europe’s geopolitical gatekeeper of the emerging East Africa-to-Europe and Middle East-to-Europe commercial corridors. Whether Greece becomes a European leader in trans-Mediterranean connectivity depends on Athens’ ability to develop its own position in East Africa-to-Europe and Middle East-to-Europe manufacturing value chains. Greece’s advancing green energy, innovation economy offers promising avenues to engage Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in joint ventures that will transform Greece into a cutting-edge trans-Mediterranean actor. Greece’s new trans-Mediterranean profile is a strategic shift that will require the EU system to adjust its perception of Greece and incentivize closer coordination between Greece and other member states to facilitate joint venture investments in the two corridors. In the absence of such coordination, Athens will continue to deepen its relations with Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia while engaging with select EU member states. The extent to which Greece succeeds at industrial value chain integration will determine its role in the emerging trans-regional commercial architecture, and with it, Greece’s strategic standing within the European Union and the MENA region.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Value Chains
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, Greece, and Mediterranean

81. Give Lisbon a chance: How to improve EU foreign policy

Author:: Fraser Cameron
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: After almost three decades of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a decade since the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), it is high time to assess whether EU foreign policy has indeed become “more visible, more coherent and more effective”, as stated in the Lisbon Treaty. Despite most media and experts having a rather disdainful view, there have been some successes. And the increasingly bleak geopolitical situation has a led to growing recognition in EU member states that they must try and work together if Europe is to become an international actor, defend multilateralism and maximise its influence on the world stage. But that understanding has not always been on display in recent years. Clearly, there remain significant challenges in coordinating the foreign policies of 27 member states, each with their own interests, traditions and capabilities. Fraser Cameron (EPC Senior Adviser), therefore, argues that the EU should have more modest ambitions. Instead of harbouring grand ideas, it could take small yet concrete steps in the direction of a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy. In this Policy Brief, he puts forward ten practical ideas.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Europe

82. Strategic autonomy in security and defense: The EU geopolitical aspiration that is not being realized/Autonomía estratégica en seguridad y defensa: un anhelo geopolítico que no se hace realidad en la Unión Europea

Author:: María José Molina and Miguel Ángel Benedicto
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: In the troubled and insecure global and regional international systems, the European Union is committed to become an operational, autonomous and credible actor in the present international relations, despite a certain internal erosion of the pillars of integration, the lack of a common strategic culture that prevents a clear identification of political and security priorities, plus the new US approaches towards the European Union, no longer its strategic priority. The US would only provide assistance to the EU when its national interests are affected. Consequently, Europe must modify its approaches to face contemporary geopolitical and strategic changes and perhaps the change of paradigm in world governance. This study tries to explain the current policies and initiatives of the Union in the field of security and defense, questioning its consistency./En el convulso e inseguro contexto global y regional, la Unión Europea apuesta por reivindicarse como un actor operativo, autónomo y creíble en las actuales relaciones internacionales, pese al cierto desgaste interno que acusan los pilares que cimentan la integración, la falta de una cultura estratégica común que impide una clara identificación de prioridades políticas y de seguridad y la nueva actitud de EE.UU. hacia el concierto europeo, que deja de ser una prioridad para sólo aportar asistencia cuando sus intereses nacionales se vean afectados. Consecuentemente, Europa debe modificar sus planteamientos para enfrentarse a las coordenadas geopolíticas y estratégicas contemporáneas, y quizás al cambio de paradigma en la gobernanza mundial. Estas consideraciones encauzan el objeto general de nuestro estudio destinado a comprender y cuestionar cuál es el perfil real y actual de la Unión en el ámbito de la seguridad y defensa regional e internacional.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, International Order, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

83. Hedging by Default: The Limits of EU “Strategic Autonomy” in a Binary World Order

Author:: Richard Higgott and Simon Reich
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: For some time, international relations has trended in the direction of an American and Chinese dominated binary world order. While the Trump administration has been an accelerator not a cause of this trend between 2016 and 2020, not coincidentally the post 2016 era has also seen key EU figures move to develop a strategy of greater "strategic autonomy". This interest in strategic autonomy was, in no small part, a reflection of growing European distrust in the reliability of both China and, increasingly, the USA. The paper shows, in contrast to the Cold War era during which the EU was unambiguously aligned, how the EU now appears to have embarked on a hedging strategy, albeit implemented more by default than design. In its desire to defend its core interests the EU appears to lean to one side or the other on an issue by issue basis in at least seven key policy domains identified in the paper. This approach is seen to be the outcome of its dual desire to articulate the values of its much touted “Geopolitical Commission" at the same time as it tries to continue its traditional institutional commitment to multilateralism. The paper concludes that the ambiguity present in this endeavour to straddle the realist-liberal fence only serves to expose the limitations of the strategy.
Topic:: International Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

84. Participating in European sovereignty through law

Author:: Hugo Pascal
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: In the late 1980s, as the debate about the decline of American hegemony intensified[1], economist and political scientist Susan Strange emphasised the 'structural power' of the United States, understood as “the power to determine the frameworks of the global economy that has allowed it to choose and shape the structures within which other countries, their political institutions, businesses and professionals must operate”[2]. In Europe, the reputedly "extraterritorial" scope of certain US laws, illustrated by the heavy fines imposed by the American authorities on continental companies, could be considered as one of the most immediate manifestations of this power. It also appears to be a response to the new gap created by globalisation between a now deterritorialized market and regulatory States that are no longer homogeneous and superimposed[3], and this at a time when the institutions of international economic regulation often seem to be in deadlock. The growing interdependence between economies, enabled by globalisation and encouraged by free trade, has gradually eroded the markets established by borders to such an extent that the nation-State, conceived as the protector of a narrowly defined territory, could be considered a historically dated model[4], without a new body with a general scope having been able, to date, to replace it in its tasks, such as the fight against financial crime. In this new complex system, «new geopolitics of norms» has been created.[5] Europe must find its rightful place within it so that it can assert its sovereignty.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Law, Geopolitics, and Norms
Political Geography:: Europe

85. Europe as a power, European sovereignty and strategic autonomy: a debate that is moving towards an assertive Europe

Author:: Reni Lefebvre
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: By defending a “geopolitical” Commission, The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said that the European Union had emerged from its economic and technocratic origins, that it was now ready to assume and strengthen its power, to measure itself against the new global balance of power. In this sense, she was responding to French President Emmanuel Macron who, since 2017, has been theorising about "European sovereignty" and advocating this call for power[1].
Topic:: Sovereignty, European Union, Geopolitics, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

86. The Sino-Russian Geopolitics in Eurasia and China-USA Disputes: Asia Pacific Great Eurasia vs Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lucas Gualberto do Nascimento and Marcos Cordeiro Pires
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: This article aims to analyze the main elements and processes underway in Eurasia, involving three essential actors: the United States, Russia, and China. At first, it is emphasized the importance of Eurasia as a space that has historically influenced the hegemonic disputes between Great Powers. Then, Eurasia is analyzed as a space for development cooperation, presenting the intersections of the Chinese BRI and the Russian EAEU. Last, the US approach to China is addressed, specifically the Indo-Pacific strategy. We conclude that despite the intense pressure to contain the rise of China and Russia in Eurasia, rivaling both powers is not feasible. In the current path, it will boost the cooperation between two giants, China and Russia.
Topic:: Hegemony, Geopolitics, Conflict, Space, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

87. Health Data Governance: Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic in Europe, China, and the United States

Author:: Clément Tonon and Julie Martinez
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The health crisis has triggered a tectonic movement in the recomposition of health data governance and protection models around the world, while accelerating the investment of large digital companies in the field of e-health. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the shortcomings of pre-existing governance models in every region of the world and the need to move towards a model of public health crisis management "through health data". For Europe and for France in particular, the health crisis has revealed a long "technological innocence". Despite a strategic awakening, questions remain about the ability of Europeans to cooperate effectively and move towards a common digital space in health. In the United States, the pandemic has created tensions around the health data governance model – particularly on the articulation between the federal government and state authorities. Changes are announced by President Joe Biden, which tend towards a model of global regulation of personal data. In China, the pandemic has accelerated the transition to a model of surveillance capitalism which could lead in the short term to a new power struggle between the regime and the Chinese digital giants. Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated the rise of digital companies, which are now positioning themselves on the entire value chain of health data, from its raw collection via connected objects to its mass processing for insurance purposes. They now have all the levers in hand to economically value this massive data with the help of artificial intelligence.
Topic:: Health, Governance, Geopolitics, Data, COVID-19, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

88. European Contributions to Indo-Pacific Maritime Order

Author:: David Scott
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: This paper looks at European contributions to the Indo-Pacific maritime order. The policy significance is two- fold. Firstly, the Indo-Pacific has become an increasingly crucial geographic region, with a constellation of leading powers. The United States and Japan face a rising China, with India a vital swing state. European powers are now faced with choices of policy in response to power competition in the Indo-Pacific. This also reflects the rising geo-economic importance of the region, home to the world’s most populous countries, India and China, and critical commercial sea lanes. Secondly, European actors–France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (EU) –have all announced various specific Indo-Pacific strategies to support their interests. Nevertheless, despite European interests and contributions to Indo-Pacific security, the European response to China-related maritime challenges, such as those in the South China Sea, has been too limited. European states are finding it difficult to balance national security interests tied to maritime stability and rules-based order in the region, with economic interests tied to China, the world’s second-largest economy. Europe needs a principled approach and a long-term view of its overall interests in the South China Sea and the wider maritime Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: National Security, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Europe and Indo-Pacific

89. El artículo analiza la compleja relación, presente en la esfera internacional,entre política y justicia que queda reflejada en el Tribunal Especial para el Líbano. Se emplean,como líneas argumentales, la problemática de su establecimiento por medio de la resolución 1757 (2007) del Consejo de Seguridad y su carácter selectivo, así como la confrontación jurídico-doctrinal planteada en el caso Ayyash et al., también conocido como asunto Hariri. Se subraya la importancia de los factores contextuales,especialmente aquellosdesencadenados a partir de 2004, con el fin de explicar la división interna —con protagonistas internacionales—del país en dos bloques cuya confrontación serviría de pretexto para la puesta en marcha de un tribunal único que responde a los intereses de una comunidad internacional seducida porla posibilidad de lograr una condena judicial por terrorismo contra Hizballah —y/o Siria—en un momento de preponderancia de la formación chií.La decisión interlocutoria de 2011 de la Sala de Apelaciones pareció manifestarse como un buen augurio en aquella dirección al afirmar la necesidad de interpretar el delito de terrorismo recogido en el artículo 314 del Código Penal del Líbano conforme a un crimen internacional de terrorismo de carácter consuetudinario. La revolucionaria decisión —junto con el proceso que llevó a su publicación—reveló,sin embargo,cierta precipitación y oportunismo que por fortuna y justicia la sentencia de 2020 rechaza por innecesaria e incierta.El artículo sostiene que todo ello ha contribuido a debilitar la credibilidad de un Tribunal,ejemplo de justicia selectiva, y ha mostrado pocadeferencia por la soberanía del Estado libanés.

Author:: Esteban Vidal Pérez
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:: International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:: Este artículo trata los diferentes enfoques geopolíticos de las causas de la guerra. Comienza con la exposición de la relación histórica entre la geopolítica y la guerra a partir de las contribuciones de diferentes autores para presentar las principales explicaciones sobre esta materia. De esta forma analizamos el papel de la geografía en la guerra y su impacto en los conflictos. Esto nos conduce a la perspectiva organicista que considera que la expansión del Estado es un fenómeno natural que produce la guerra. Además, la geografía físicainfluye en el estallido de la guerra. El segundo enfoquees el de la disposición de las tierras emergidas que afirma que determinados lugares son propensos a la guerra debido a su ubicación estratégica. El tercer enfoque es el accidentalista. Los autores de esta perspectiva afirman que la guerra depende de la distancia geográfica entre países y los conflictos fronterizos. Finalmente, desarrollamos una nueva perspectiva basada en la fragmentación geopolítica para explicar la guerra en la Europa moderna. Este enfoque explora la importancia de la fragmentación en la formación del Estado moderno y en el moldeamiento de un entorno anárquico con el nacimiento del sistema de Estados. La guerra se convirtió en un rasgo del sistema internacional debido a que el Estado moderno nació para hacer la guerray se convirtió en la institución dominante. Por tanto, la fragmentación geopolítica es la causa principal dela violencia entre Estados en la Europa moderna.
Topic:: War, Geopolitics, State, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:: Europe

90. Post-War Situation in the South Caucasus Region

Author:: Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:: Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:: The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Post-War Situation in the South Caucasus Region” is dedicated to the possible cooperation opportunities in the aftermath of latest 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 with focus on different views from various experts driven from different countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, History, European Union, Geopolitics, Conflict, Peace, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and United States of America

91. Beyond Global Britain: A realistic foreign policy for the UK

Author:: Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The UK government’s vision for Global Britain aims to restore British greatness as a maritime trading nation. But this vision does not reflect today’s geostrategic realities, including the continuing importance of the EU. The Johnson government seems to need the perennial fights of a permanent Brexit, but this approach is eroding the UK’s capacity to cooperate with the EU on foreign and security policy. At the same time, as ECFR polling reveals, the British public do not have any particular animus towards the EU. While the public value British sovereignty and independence, they would support a foreign policy that worked cooperatively with the bloc. The public is on to something: Britain still has extraordinary assets and can forge an effective foreign policy. Yet, to do so, it must focus on British strengths, avoid military adventures in distant lands, and find balanced, effective working relationships with the EU and the US. British security and prosperity will increasingly depend on unromantic issues such as carbon tariffs and investment screening – on which the best way to protect British interests is to triangulate between the EU and US positions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Brexit
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

92. The Modern Interfaces of Intermarium and the Fight against Destiny

Author:: Adrian Popa and Cristian Barna
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:: Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:: Russia’s recent buildup of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries. While the mare sui generis status of the Black Sea might be altered under the expected inauguration of Canal Istanbul in 2023 as it would probably require the revision of the Montreux Convention, the mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might also be questioned as Russia contests NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in this region. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, Pilsudski’s ideas of Intermarium seem to have revived within the Central and Eastern European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. This paper proposes a comparative analysis between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in terms of their newly-emerged geostrategic context, discusses the feasibility of the recent endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and Eastern European countries and not ultimately, highlights the utility of a regional military alliance in support of NATO.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Asia, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

93. From Strategic Autonomy to the Internationalization of the Euro: Europe's Challenges and the Impact of the COVID-19 Crisis

Author:: Nicola Bilotta and Alissa Siara
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: One of the key priorities of the new European Commission is to enhance the EU’s geopolitical credentials and “learn to use the language of power”, as stated by the incoming EU High Representative Josep Borrell. The EU’s ambition is two-fold: to increase the Union’s ability to project power and influence at the global level, including through increased integration and coordination among member states, and secondly to enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy from the US in the political, military and economic domains. Both objectives, ambitious in the best of circumstances, are today under severe strain by the COVID-19 crisis. Implications will be long-lasting and multidimensional, and for Europe, its impact will have a direct bearing on its ambition for strategic autonomy, touching each of the three pillars outlined above.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Economy, Autonomy, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:: Europe and European Union

94. Fostering Europe’s Strategic Autonomy - A question of purpose and action

Author:: Giovanni Grevi
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Strategic autonomy is about empowering Europe, not disengaging from partnerships, globalisation or multilateralism. The core of strategic autonomy is not that Europeans should act alone, but that they should have a purpose of their own, and a stronger power base to fulfil that purpose through cooperation with others whenever possible, or on their own, if needed. As such, strategic autonomy is not a condition to be achieved once and for all, but a mindset and a process, guiding initiatives across multiple areas. By advancing its strategic autonomy, Europe should acquire a stronger position to manage interdependence amidst geopolitical competition – arguably the defining challenge of our times. The concept has become central to a number of statements by EU and national leaders, and to important EU policy documents. Although the level of ambition and requirements for progress differ across policy areas – from trade and investment to innovation, the single market or security and defence – and are the subject of ongoing debate, an EU strategic narrative is emerging alongside current or envisaged policy measures and initiatives. These policy developments point to three main tracks of action, or dimensions of Europe’s strategic autonomy, namely bracing against threats and challenges, empowering Europe by joining forces and engaging others to strengthen a rules-based international order. Bracing. Europe needs to strengthen its resilience and political cohesion in the face of multi-dimensional competition. It needs to counter trade-distorting practices and unfair competition, while better enforcing the rules and obligations of EU trade agreements. Europe should also reduce its current overdependence on foreign technologies and companies, such as for 5G and data infrastructure, and Europeans should do more to secure their critical infrastructure against malicious practices or cyberattacks. Empowering. Europe is much more than the sum of its parts, even though it often performs as less than that because of disagreements among EU member states, or their reluctance to pool their resources. Completing and strengthening the Single Market is crucial to sustaining both Europe’s growth and the EU’s regulatory power. Eliminating current barriers within the Digital Single Market will be critical to spur innovation and scale-up European technology companies while creating a regime for data sharing and access that benefits all market actors and citizens. To both deliver the capabilities that Europeans need and acquire a real operational capacity, EU member states should make full use of the arrangements for defence cooperation established in the last few years, on the basis of a better-defined set of shared goals. Engaging. The purpose of shaping and supporting a rules-based international order should continue to drive Europe’s foreign policy, even though Europeans will need to take a pragmatic approach in a context of geopolitical competition. The election of Joe Biden paves the way to dialogue and cooperation with the US, and to reinforcing the transatlantic partnership and multilateralism.
Topic:: Globalization, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

95. Ambassador Richard Morningstar on Energy and Geopolitics in the Caspian Region

Author:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs and Richard L. Morningstar
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: On November 18, the Georgetown School of Foreign Service welcomed former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Richard Morningstar for a conversation on energy security in the Caspian region. Prior to the event, GJIA sat down with Ambassador Morningstar to discuss the intersection of energy and geopolitics, legacies from the Soviet Union, and energy security challenges facing Central Asian states.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, and Interview
Political Geography:: Europe, Central Asia, Soviet Union, Caspian Sea, and United States of America

96. How Can Global Governance Be Fixed in an Age of Upheaval?

Author:: Thierry de Montbrial, Robin Niblett, Ed Feulner, and Feng Zhu
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Ifri’s Executive Chairman Thierry de Montbrial spoke at the 20th World Knowledge Forum in Seoul on September 25, 2019 with Robin Niblett, Chatham House's director, Ed Feulner, The Heritage Foundation's Founder and Former President and Feng Zhu, Director of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University about the major governance issues of our time. The global geopolitical situation is caught in a maelstrom. The conflict between the United States and China is getting worse and subsequent negative effects are rising. In Europe, Brexit is making the continent more divisive than harmonious. The instability in Middle East is not solved. In addition, the North Korea’s nuclear weapons are an endless source of problem that defies a quick solution, which made the politics surrounding the Korean Peninsula more complex. The problem is that the currently weak global governance may lead the global political landscape into a serious crisis. To give an answer to these problems, heads of top think tanks share their prospect and the future of the global governance, giving a guideline for each country to listen for a better direction.
Topic:: Governance, Geopolitics, Think Tanks, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Middle East, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America

97. Confettis d’empire ou points d’appui? L’avenir de la stratégie française de présence et de souveraineté

Author:: Élie Tenenbaum, Morgan Paglia, and Nathalie Ruffié
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: France is one of the few nations in the world to benefit from a permanent global military presence. With more than 10,000 military personnel from all three services, deployed across the five continents and the three main oceanic basins, it benefits from the second largest network of prepositioned forces in the world. This global military posture is structured around five “presence forces”, based in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates, as well as five “sovereignty forces” in the dependent overseas territories of the Antilles, French Guyana, Southern Indian Ocean, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Over the past twenty years, this unique force posture has been hit by a series of deep budgetary cuts, translating into staff reductions and persisting delays in equipment delivery. As a result, the current military presence is under serious strain, as some capability are now weighing on the ability of these prepositioned forces to contribute as much as they could to the five strategic functions reiterated in the 2017 Strategic Review. These considerations are all the more important given the coming demographic, climatic, economic, geopolitical, and of course military challenges that will dramatically constrain the operational environment of the French forces in the coming years.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, France, Latin America, and Asia-Pacific

98. Russia’s Shift from “Greater Europe” to “Greater Asia”

Author:: Emil Avdaliani
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:: Though analysts tend to portray Russia’s foreign policy as truly global (that is, independent of Europe, the US, and China), the country is plainly tilting toward Asia. The Russian political elite does its best to hide this development, but the country is accumulating more interests and freedom to act in Asia than in Europe or anywhere else.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Geopolitics, and Global Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

99. France and the Russian Presence in Africa

Author:: Łukasz Maślanka
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron initiated a Franco-Russian dialogue aimed at improving bilateral relations, as well as EU-Russia relations. This effort could be confounded by the growing Russian engagement in Africa, mainly through their military, business, and propaganda activities. These are increasingly harmful to France, which traditionally engages in the politics and economies of African states. The French government hasn’t yet prepared any coherent strategy vis-à-vis the Russian challenge, preferring to wait it out.
Topic:: International Relations, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and France

100. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:: Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS