Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Djibouti, Liberia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, Burundi, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, South Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, Comoros, Gabon, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, and Republic of Congo
Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zambia, Chad, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Congo
Liberal discourse should have a hard time looking for 'evil' in international relations. Standing on the pillar of rationalism and humanitarianism, there seems to be little space for the morally and emotionally charged notion of evil to enter considerations. Yet, the liberal belief in the freedom of will implies that humans are capable of turning against the advice of reason and opt for evil behavior and underlying principles. This possibility is epitomized by Kant's construction of the 'evil enemy'. Since 'evil' appears sporadically in international relations, with Hitler's Germany as prototype, its existence in the real world of international relations cannot be ruled out a priori. Designating an 'other' as evil is thus a discursive possibility. The practice to turn this possibility into reality is conceptualized here as 'evilization' in analogy to 'securitization'. There is strong variance among liberal democracies in applying this practice, ranging from 'pacifism' to 'militancy', which often leads to dire consequences. Deriving the principles of fallibility and prudence from liberal reasoning, this article concludes with the proposition that 'liberal pacifism' is the preferable option in most conceivable circumstances, but that the possibility of confronting political evil is rare, but existing.