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1. The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition

Author:
Bonnie L. Rushing and Kyleanne Hunter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
Russia’s experience in Ukraine highlights the importance of the human weapon system in next generation warfare. They show that despite technological superiority and investment in sophisticated weapons and equipment, such as hypersonic missiles, people are the core of a successful military strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in kinetic and largely conventional warfare, the human weapon system is essential across the range of military operations, particularly in gray zone operations. There may be no place where the human weapon system is more important; strategic and meaningful management of the human weapon system for use in countering gray zone activities may prevent escalation into kinetic operations.
Topic:
National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Employment, Diversity, Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, Hybrid Warfare, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

2. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:
Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

3. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Economics of Defense

Author:
Patrick Callaway, James Lockhart, Nikolas Gardner, Rebecca Jensen, Ian Brown, J. Craig Stone, Lauren Mackenzie, and Kristin Post
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
During the past two decades, the U.S. government infrastructure has ground to a halt for a variety of reasons, particularly due to deficit reductions, military spending, health care, and overall party-line budget disagreements, but even more recently on border security and immigration. Regardless of party politics and the daily administrative drama in the White House, how does one of the wealthiest countries in the world prepare for the impact of making war and defending peace within these economic and political constraints? Authors for this issue of MCU Journal address the economics of defense and how those costs impact nations. Aside from the economic costs the United States bears for its defense, the articles in the Spring issue of MCU Journal will demonstrate there are other costs and unique limitations faced by America and other nation-states. For example, smaller nations such as Oman must rely on technologically advanced allies for their defense support. Long-term political costs also may apply to these nations, as James Lockhart’s article on the Central Intelligence Agency’s intervention in Chilean politics discusses. There are also other ways to wage “war” that are discussed in this issue; for example, looking to the past, President Thomas Jefferson attempted to wage a trade war against Great Britain and France to maintain U.S. trade neutrality and, looking to the present and future, governments must address the real costs of cyberwar. Finally, we must consider the political and diplomatic costs associated with U.S. servicemembers and their work in foreign states, but also the relationship repair they must rely on to keep the peace.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Counterinsurgency, Culture, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, Weapons, Economy, Military Spending, History, Coup, Trade, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Augusto Pinochet
Political Geography:
Britain, Afghanistan, China, South Asia, Canada, Asia, South America, North America, Chile, Oman, and United States of America

4. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Lessons Learned

Author:
Nathan Packard, Joseph A. Lore, Jonathan Wong, James E. Fanell, and Kerry K. Gershaneck
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
U.S. government agencies and military Service branches produce numerous reports and briefs each year that fall in the category of lessons learned. These institutional reports, and the effort that goes into them, play an important role for groups who are responsible for many lives and the nation’s resources. Some of these documents come after extensive investigations related to accidents, such as the loss of the space shuttle Columbia in 2003, or as a part of regular operations, such as after action reports. Moreover, all of the Services set up divisions dedicated to collecting lessons learned reports for internal and external inquiries, including the Army with its Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Navy’s Lessons Learned Information System, whose title mirrors the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, and the Air Force Lessons Learned Program. The United States Marine Corps is, as always, aligned with its sister Services in its efforts to write, publish, and disseminate doctrinal publications. At Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, home of Marine Corps University (MCU), the Corps supports several divisions that house lessons learned. The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) produces a variety of documents to support training and planning for Marine Corps exercises and operations, but also for the warfighting capability development process. Their Marine Corps Campaign of Learning Information System keeps these documents secured and available for those with suitable credentials. The History Division’s Archives Branch, located in the Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center, is designated by Records, Reports, Directives, and Forms Management (ARDB) to collect, hold, and transfer command chronologies filed by units semiannually (monthly when deployed), which in turn are reported to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and become permanent records of the United States. Command chronologies stand as the official record of a unit and its activities for the reporting period and are used by Headquarters Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, Congress, and other governmental and nongovernmental entities to understand the activities, procedures, processes, and lessons learned by units. The Archives Branch holds all submitted unit command chronologies from 1976 to the present. In addition, it maintains after action reports, special action reports, and reports on lessons learned for units deployed during World War I, World War II, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Archives also maintains reports on major Marine Corps amphibious exercises from 1921 to 1980, major developments in amphibious doctrine between 1935 and 1990, and the development of amphibious technology from 1930 to 2000, many of which contain insight into lessons learned from those activities. These resources, once deposited with the Archives Branch, are useful to commanders and historians, and despite difficulties obtaining high-quality documents, History Division staff encourage Marines to write and deposit command chronologies regularly. Mention the term lessons learned to any Marine, soldier, sailor, or airman, and they will joke about lessons captured, observed, unlearned, or the so-called black box where these reports disappear. There may be some validity to their criticism, yet all of the Services continue to record lessons learned with good reason. Without a record of facts, it is impossible to reflect on how to improve operations from the tactical to the logistical. For this issue of the MCU Journal, the editors—with the guidance of the editorial board and numerous peer reviewers—have assembled different interpretations of lessons learned. Indeed, the authors of these four articles address diverse topics in the pursuit of increasing military readiness and effectiveness. Dr. Nathan Packard looks to the Corps’ relations with Congress, identifying how the Marine Corps, more so than other Services, has gained a reputation with and sometimes the criticism of members of Congress. Colonel Joseph A. Lore, however, sees room for improvement in supporting military efforts by revising a staple in any Marine officer’s library—the Small Wars Manual. Dr. Jonathan Wong extends Packard’s civilian-military relations theme, recommending that the Department of Defense learn from its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq by adopting some of the rapid acquisition techniques used during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to guarantee the future warfighter’s ability to engage in the next generation of war, which will undoubtedly strain the nation’s resources as the fight against terrorism and insurgencies continues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Occupation, History, and Vietnam War
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iraq, Asia, Vietnam, and United States of America

5. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Rebalance to Asia

Author:
Michael J. Colarusso., Eric Y. Shibuya, Douglas Stuart, Christopher D. Yung, Rebecca Jensen, Keil Gentry, and T. X. Hammes
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific—economically, politically, and militarily—was one reason that the editors of MCU Journal decided to dedicate the spring issue to that region. An early foreign policy decision by the administration of President Barack H. Obama had been to refocus its efforts on the region through what eventually became known as the Rebalance to Asia, and that region has been in the purview of the new administration as well. The Asia-Pacific is a complex region with a diverse set of political and security challenges. The vastness of the region also poses some unique operational challenges. These challenges and the strong likelihood that students of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College (CSC) would be returning to this area of responsibility in some future assignment were but two of the reasons why the organizers of the CSC capstone exercise, Nine Innings, chose the region as the subject of the scenarios of the exercise. Eric Shibuya and Lieutenant Colonel Micheal Russ, in “Anticipating and Understanding the Rebalance,” describe the origins of Nine Innings, provide the intent on what the exercise is meant to accomplish, and describe how the exercise organizers meet that intent. Noteworthy is the fact that the exercise involves extensive support from the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), both in terms of the USPACOM staff helping to shape the exercise plan and USPACOM personnel participating as advisors in the exercise; that it involves extensive interaction between the students and Asia-Pacific subject-matter experts, and student representatives of Asian countries; and that the final product of the exercise is presented to a senior principal at USPACOM.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Robotics
Political Geography:
Asia and United States of America