China has tried to take advantage of the Coronavirus crisis to boost its international role and status. Nonetheless, China’s own mistakes in battling the virus as well as diplomatic aggressiveness have raised doubts about its capacity to become a world leader.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Coronavirus, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Why would Trump run the risk of a war by assassinating Iran’s most effective general? Conventional Realist explanations do not answer the question adequately. The imperial strategy and the American Empire’s decline points toward a more convincing (and alarming) explanation.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
What kind of economic recovery from the Covid-19 crisis should we expect? Attempts to answer this question must start by acknowledging an unusually high degree of uncertainty about the immediate future. There is uncertainty about the recurrence of the virus, about how policy makers will balance public health and economic goals, and about the ability of governments to ramp up their capacity to test, trace and isolate the infected, thereby making it safe for others to return to work. Further sources of uncertainty include the behavioral responses of households and investors, the sustainability of the extraordinary monetary and fiscal policies adopted in response to the crisis, and the extent to which economic organization will change in the new public-health environment. These aspects of the current crisis and their contrasts with crises past suggest that recovery from the Covid-19 crisis will be bumpy, subdued and above all uncertain, and that it will differ in Europe and the United States.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Global Focus, and United States of America
Kissinger aims to skip any debate of the financial elitist performance of Neoliberalism. He seeks to dissipate concerns over a post-Coronavirus reality with some romanticized Enlightenment values. He expects the world’s democracies “to defend and sustain their Enlightenment values.”
“The Central Intelligence Agency has been secretly supplying Iraq with detailed intelligence, including data from sensitive U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography, to assist Iraqi bombing raids on Iran’s oil terminals and power plants in the war between the two nations … Iraq reportedly used the intelligence to calibrate attacks with mustard gas on Iranian ground troops.” (1) This was a Washington Post report in 1986.
“In 1988, during the waning days of Iraq’s war with Iran, the United States learned through satellite imagery that Iran was about to gain a major strategic advantage by exploiting a hole in Iraqi defenses. U.S. intelligence officials conveyed the location of the Iranian troops to Iraq, fully aware that (Saddam) Hussein’s military would attack with chemical weapons, including sarin, a lethal nerve agent.” (2) This was part of one of the declassified CIA documents published by Foreign Policy on 26 August 2013.
Satellite imagery, communications intercepts and CIA assessments forwarded by the United States to Iraqi commanders showing ‘where the Iranian weaknesses were’ led to the death of many Iranian soldiers and civilians during the bloody 1980-88 war. That bitter and costly experience left a profound impact on the minds of Iranian military strategists. Having an intelligence eye to watch enemies from the sky and prevent similar disasters in the future preoccupied their brains. At the outset, possessing instruments of visual observation in the sky appeared to be a dream for many Iranians. But that would be a long-term project to make sure that Iran would not suffer again.
Reconnaissance satellite is now widely seen as a strategic asset enabling states possessing this technology to obtain first-hand key information about the activities and resources of their enemies. It also enables states to protect their national security in this competitive world. This paper argues that great powers threaten weaker states. And regional powers like Iran have no option to survive but to get strong in order not to be bullied. It also argues that Iran, by successfully launching its “first military satellite” into orbit, has demonstrated a new capability that may shift the balance of power in its favor amid increasing tensions with the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
There has been fluctuation and reconstruction of political legitimacy. Since the summer of 2014, two battles over legitimacy have spoiled Libyan politics and weakened the UN mediation with two rounds of international recognition of one new political institution or another.
Topic:
Politics, United Nations, Conflict, and Legitimacy
Foreign manipulation defies the wisdom of envisioning a political settlement of the Libyan conflict. All international diplomatic gestures need to be aligned via the UN platform, with a well-defined trajectory, rather than any zero-game equation or realist calculation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, United Nations, Conflict, and Legitimacy
Tremendous socio-economic and political challenges are facing Morocco during the Coronavirus crisis. Regardless of the promising signs of a short-term momentum in unity and institutional trust, the institutional weaknesses in the public policy and healthcare system have not disappeared.
Topic:
Politics, Coronavirus, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Europe is among the most affected regions in the world by the spread of COVID-19. The continent was designated in March 2020 as the new epicenter of the pandemic and Europe’s recovery strategy to the crisis seems to be threatened by a lack of solidarity. This paper analyses how the European Union (EU) governance system has – so far – conditioned the construction of a modest coordinated European response to the crisis. It examines how the insufficiencies of the EU governance system have – so far – conditioned the construction of a modest coordinated European response to the crisis. It suggests that COVID-19 is a learning opportunity(1) rather than a make-or-break event. Crises in the EU are important catalysts of change(2) and offer a propitious context for policy learning.(3)
This paper suggests that COVID-19 is a learning opportunity rather than a make-or-break event. Two lessons are highlighted: first, this crisis shows that if Europeans bet on solidarity as an incentive to cooperate, their chances to produce prompt and ambitious responses are slim and overshadowed by power-struggles on what the governance of the EU ought to be. Second, while the crisis started as a public health problem, the crux of the debate is now centered on a common economic recovery strategy. The challenge ahead will be to avoid that lessons learned about public health are cannibalized by economic affairs.
The current riots across America represent a moment of rebuttal at the conjuncture between an exit from the Coronavirus dilemma and Trump’s pursuit of a second term a few weeks before the National Conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties.