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42. U.S. Security Ties With Korea and Japan: Getting Beyond Deterrence
- Author:
- Stephen Haggard
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Japan and Korea—the United States’ two key allies in Northeast Asia—are both advanced industrial democracies facing similar constraints from a rising China and a nuclear North Korea. One would think that trilateral cooperation would be a cinch. Yet Japan and Korea have been at each other’s throats over simmering historical issues and differing approaches to China. Forging a trilateral alliance is highly unlikely. But strengthening cooperation is possible by focusing less on the military components of the alliance—i.e., providing extended deterrence—and more on new issues such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and infrastructure, which can strengthen collective capabilities and make cooperation more appealing.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Nuclear Power, Innovation, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific
43. Is Arms Control Over?
- Author:
- Andrew Reddie
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- In February 2021, the Biden administration announced that it would exercise Article XIV of the New START Treaty—extending the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the United States and Russia for five years. The announcement came against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving arms control landscape. The collapse of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty have led many to suggest that the existing arms control regime might be close to its end. Complicating matters are growing calls for emerging military technologies like cyber and artificial intelligence to be regulated by arms control agreements.2 These developments beg several questions for both policymakers and academics: Why does arms control matter today? What are the near-term challenges to the existing arms control regime? And what are the possible paths forward for arms control?
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- United States of America
44. Why the U.S. Should Prioritize Security in Its 5G Roll Out
- Author:
- James Lee
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- 5G technology promises to transform practically every sphere of life, from smartphones and self-driving cars, to remote surgery and virtual reality. Policies related to the rollout of 5G in the United States have tended to focus on mitigating security risks, but does protecting security come at the cost of expanding U.S. global influence—or does it simply cost too much? This policy brief by IGCC postdoctoral research associate James Lee analyzes the three main criteria for deciding what a “good” 5G policy should look like—security, global influence, and efficiency— and recommends that the United States’ 5G strategy prioritize security first, influence second, and efficiency third.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Science and Technology, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Power
- Political Geography:
- China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
45. The One-China Policy: Adapting to Tensions in the Taiwan Strait
- Author:
- James Lee
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Tensions are growing in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese warplanes have violated Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in record numbers, prompting fears of an invasion.1 2021 was the first year in which a potential crisis over Taiwan rose to the level of a “Tier 1 risk” in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Preventive Priorities Survey, which is an annual survey of American foreign policy experts.2 The United States faces a decision about what it can do to help prevent crossstrait tensions from escalating into war. A vital question is whether, and how much, the United States should change its “One-China policy.” Beginning with the Trump administration and continuing with the Biden administration, the United States has bolstered its support for Taiwan and become more assertive in resisting Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the self-governing democracy.3 Although U.S. officials stress that the United States continues to adhere to the One-China policy, there is growing concern, as expressed by Daniel Russel of the Asia Society Policy Institute, that the United States is “edging closer and closer to the line that separates unofficial relations with official relations, which, in effect, could hollow out America’s One-China policy.”4 How much flexibility is built into the One-China policy, and what limits does the policy impose on what the United States can do to support Taiwan? To answer those questions, this policy brief explains what the One-China policy is and how it can exhibit both continuity and change. Analysis of the One-China policy often focuses on the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances, which can create the impression that the One-China policy has not changed since those texts were formulated in the 1970s and 1980s.5 In fact, the One-China policy has been revised, such as in the Taiwan Policy Review during the Clinton administration.6 The One-China policy is neither set in stone nor completely fluid, and this policy brief identifies which elements are fixed and which elements are variable. It explains the OneChina policy at three levels: the fundamental position, the doctrinal statements, and the practices and conventions. These levels of policy range from the most abstract to the most concrete, but each is logically consistent with the others.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Strategic Competition, and One-China Policy
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific
46. Information disorder and What Ukraine is Doing About It: Analysis of Ukraine’s Policies and Actions to Combat Russia-Generated information disorder
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Abstract:
- It is a conventional wisdom that information is power, but even more power lies in the manner in which it is (mis)used. Disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, all parts of so called ‘information disorder’, are phenomena that seem to be wreaking havoc worldwide nowadays. The emergence of the Internet and social media has brought fundamental changes to the way information is produced, communicated and distributed and thus has given new momentum to the phenomenon of ‘information disorder’. Its effects, in combination with online technologies, are proving to be devastating: it destabilizes public discourse, undermines general belief in democratic institutions and threatens national, international and civilian security. Based on a theoretical analysis approach, the paper will look into the nature of the ‘information disorder’, and how the Internet and social media contribute to its growing influence. It will also examine what are the effects of the phenomenon, and how it threatens national and international security. With Russia arguably being the most aggressive in spreading disinformation nowadays, and Ukraine being the country affected by Russia’s information offensive the most, the paper will try to analyze Ukraine’s policies and actions to combat Russia-generated ‘information disorder’. In the conclusion, the paper will make an effort to suggest recommendations on tackling negative informing.
- Topic:
- International Security, Geopolitics, Information Age, Basic Data, and Propaganda
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Asia
47. The Modern Interfaces of Intermarium and the Fight against Destiny
- Author:
- Adrian Popa and Cristian Barna
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Institution:
- Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
- Abstract:
- Russia’s recent buildup of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries. While the mare sui generis status of the Black Sea might be altered under the expected inauguration of Canal Istanbul in 2023 as it would probably require the revision of the Montreux Convention, the mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might also be questioned as Russia contests NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in this region. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, Pilsudski’s ideas of Intermarium seem to have revived within the Central and Eastern European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. This paper proposes a comparative analysis between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in terms of their newly-emerged geostrategic context, discusses the feasibility of the recent endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and Eastern European countries and not ultimately, highlights the utility of a regional military alliance in support of NATO.
- Topic:
- NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Asia, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States
48. Perceptions and Reflections of the Security Crisis in the Black Sea Region
- Author:
- Plamen Pantev
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
- Abstract:
- The first reflection about the geopolitical environment that Bulgaria faced after the tectonic systemic shifts in the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century thirty years later is that the efforts of the country to influence the transformation of the Balkans into a regional security community were successful. The second reflection is that Bulgaria was not able to influence effectively a similar development in the Black Sea area. Both the Balkans and the Caspian Sea-Caucasus- Black Sea area were conflictual knots of relations inherited from the Cold War divide. While the traditional European great powers that polarized the Balkan system of international relations pushing the small countries one against the other and the United States had the strategic interest of pacifying the South Eastern region of Europe, the dominating great power in the Black Sea area – Russia, aimed at preserving the opportunities of coming back to the territories that the Soviet Union lost after its collapse by preserving various degrees of conflictness in the neighbouring countries. Depending on the general condition of the Russian economy and state as well as its domestic political status different opportunities were either designed or just used to preserve the profile of Russia of the empire that sooner or later will be back. What are, in this regard, the perceptions in Bulgaria of the annexation of Crimea?
- Topic:
- Security, International Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Empire
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Caucasus, Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Caspian Sea
49. Do the BRICS care about International Security?
- Author:
- Filippo Cutrera
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- BRICS Policy Center
- Abstract:
- The present paper has three main objectives: first, to show that, over the first decade of existence of the group, between 2009 and 2018, the BRICS have manifested an increasing interest in expanding their cooperation beyond the traditional areas of economy and development to the field of global security; second, to present the content of their common security agenda and how it has developed throughout this period; third, to identify the main factors influencing the agenda-setting process of the group as well as the main challenges to further advancement. The research will conclude that the high levels of informality in the group’s cooperation and heterogeneity in the interests of its members have enabled BRICS to formulate common positions and to establish cooperation mechanisms on a broad range of issues of international security.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, National Security, Regional Cooperation, and International Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil
50. NATO and 5G: Managing “High Risk” Vendors and Other Outsourced Infrastructure
- Author:
- Clodagh Quain and Isabelle Roccia
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Women In International Security (WIIS)
- Abstract:
- Fifth-generation telecommunications (5G) technology promises to dramatically increase the interconnectedness and efficiency of commercial and civilian communication infrastructures. 5G will also enable other advances. On the civilian side, it will improve existing applications and give rise to others, from telemedicine to connected cars. It also presents an opportunity to enhance NATO’s capabilities, improving logistics, maintenance, and communications. For instance, 5G will speed communication and improve response time in a theater of operation.
- Topic:
- NATO, Science and Technology, International Security, Communications, Cybersecurity, 5G, and Digital Policy
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus