This Update provides an overview of the international trade in small arms and light weapons in 2013. The first section of the Update reports on the total values and main categories of small arms1 transferred by top and major exporters and importers. This section also assesses changes in trade patterns from 2012 to 2013. The second section presents the 2016 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, whose
methodology and sourcing have been revised. As explained below, the Barometer now includes a new source—the Regional Report on Arms Exports, prepared by of the South Eastern and Eastern Europe
Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms (SEESAC).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Arms Trade
The UN arms embargo on Darfur— imposed in 2004, expanded in 2005,
and elaborated in 2010 with additional due-diligence requirements—has
demonstrably failed to prevent the delivery of materiel to Darfur’s armed
actors. A transnational supply chain based in locations as diverse as the
remote Central African trading town of Am Dafok and the commercial
centres of Dubai continues to furnish weapons, ammunition, and other
military equipment to all sides in a 14-year-old conflict (see Map 1).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Arms Trade
The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan is a multi-year project administered by the Small Arms Survey. It was developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations Mission in Sudan, the United Nations Development Programme, and a wide array of international and Sudanese partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely, empirical research, the project supports violence reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes,
incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, as well as security
sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan and South Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on redressing insecurity.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, International Security, Reform, and UNDP
UN member states adopted the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in November 2000.3 UNTOC was supplemented by three protocols that address trafficking in persons, the smuggling of migrants, and the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in firearms. The third of these—the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, known as the Firearms Protocol—was adopted on 31 May
2001 by General Assembly Resolution 55/255 and entered into force on 3 July 2005 (UNGA, 2001c). For states that have ratified or otherwise formally expressed their consent to be bound by it, the Firearms Protocol is legally binding.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, Weapons, and Arms Trade
The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
(PoA) provides an increasingly critical framework for governments
and civil society. Armed groups continue to illegally access and
use illegal weapons to mount mass attacks on civilians and terrorize
cities and communities, commit human rights violations and banditry, and incite and prolong armed conflicts. Some 60 million people are displaced due to war and insecurity (UNHCR, 2016). Armed attacks and kidnappings directed at humanitarian workers are at record highs. Armed groups are increasingly disregarding international humanitarian law and, as a result, are blocking much needed assistance to populations at risk.1 The vast majority of deaths from armed violence do not occur in conflict settings, however. Of the more than 500,000 lives that are lost
annually to armed violence, in some countries small arms––many
of them illicit––are used in more than three out of four homicides
(Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Governance, Weapons, and UNDP
Lucie Collinson, Andrew Winnington, and Mary Vriniotis
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Studying the evidence related to the burden of injury of a population is a
critical component of developing strategies to prevent and reduce violence. In many countries around the world, national observatories have been established to collect data to measure and monitor armed violence in an effort to inform and strengthen evidence-based armed violence reduction initiatives. These observatories collect data on violent incidents to enhance awareness of the extent and distribution of armed violence in varying geographic and socio-economic settings. An observatory’s ability to inform effective violence prevention strategies depends in large part on the efficient collection and timely sharing of quality data (Gilgen and Tracey, 2011).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, and Armed Struggle
Weapons play a pivotal role in violence and insecurity worldwide: around 44 per cent of all violent deaths involve the use of firearms (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015, p. 2). Given their typically long life spans, small arms can circu- late in a region or between regions over dec- ades, while in the wrong hands even small quantities of arms and ammunition can have destabilizing effects. In particular, the illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition is a driver of modern armed conflicts, often pro- longing their effects (Anders, 2015; Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2014; Florquin and Leff, 2014). Flows of illicit arms also affect countries sup- posedly ‘at peace’, contributing to high levels of violence (Schroeder, 2013; 2014; 2016).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Military Strategy, Armed Struggle, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Weapons play a pivotal role in violence and insecurity worldwide: around 44 per cent of all violent deaths involve the use of firearms (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015, p. 2). Given their typically long life spans, small arms can circu- late in a region or between regions over dec- ades, while in the wrong hands even small quantities of arms and ammunition can have destabilizing effects. In particular, the illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition is a driver of modern armed conflicts, often pro- longing their effects (Anders, 2015; Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2014; Florquin and Leff, 2014). Flows of illicit arms also affect countries sup- posedly ‘at peace’, contributing to high levels of violence (Schroeder, 2013; 2014; 2016).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Military Strategy, Armed Struggle, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Weapons play a pivotal role in violence and insecurity worldwide: around 44 per cent of all violent deaths involve the use of firearms (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015, p. 2). Given their typically long life spans, small arms can circu- late in a region or between regions over dec- ades, while in the wrong hands even small quantities of arms and ammunition can have destabilizing effects. In particular, the illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition is a driver of modern armed conflicts, often pro- longing their effects (Anders, 2015; Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2014; Florquin and Leff, 2014). Flows of illicit arms also affect countries sup- posedly ‘at peace’, contributing to high levels of violence (Schroeder, 2013; 2014; 2016).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Military Strategy, Armed Struggle, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Weapons play a pivotal role in violence and insecurity worldwide: around 44 per cent of all violent deaths involve the use of firearms (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015, p. 2). Given their typically long life spans, small arms can circu- late in a region or between regions over dec- ades, while in the wrong hands even small quantities of arms and ammunition can have destabilizing effects. In particular, the illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition is a driver of modern armed conflicts, often pro- longing their effects (Anders, 2015; Diehl and Jenzen-Jones, 2014; Florquin and Leff, 2014). Flows of illicit arms also affect countries sup- posedly ‘at peace’, contributing to high levels of violence (Schroeder, 2013; 2014; 2016).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Military Strategy, Armed Struggle, Military Affairs, and Weapons
In September 2015 UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000–15) with a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. While reaffirming core MDG aims, such as poverty reduction and the promotion of health care and education, these SDGs and targets tackle a much broader range of factors driving underdevelopment, includ- ing violence and insecurity (UNGA, 2015a).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, International Security, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Sustainable Development Goals
In September 2015 UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000–15) with a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. While reaffirming core MDG aims, such as poverty reduction and the promotion of health care and education, these SDGs and targets tackle a much broader range of factors driving underdevelopment, includ- ing violence and insecurity (UNGA, 2015a).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, International Security, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Sustainable Development Goals
In September 2015 UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000–15) with a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. While reaffirming core MDG aims, such as poverty reduction and the promotion of health care and education, these SDGs and targets tackle a much broader range of factors driving underdevelopment, includ- ing violence and insecurity (UNGA, 2015a).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, International Security, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Sustainable Development Goals
In September 2015 UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000–15) with a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. While reaffirming core MDG aims, such as poverty reduction and the promotion of health care and education, these SDGs and targets tackle a much broader range of factors driving underdevelopment, includ- ing violence and insecurity (UNGA, 2015a).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, International Security, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Sustainable Development Goals
In September 2015 UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000–15) with a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. While reaffirming core MDG aims, such as poverty reduction and the promotion of health care and education, these SDGs and targets tackle a much broader range of factors driving underdevelopment, includ- ing violence and insecurity (UNGA, 2015a).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, International Security, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Sustainable Development Goals
In September 2015 UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000–15) with a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. While reaffirming core MDG aims, such as poverty reduction and the promotion of health care and education, these SDGs and targets tackle a much broader range of factors driving underdevelopment, includ- ing violence and insecurity (UNGA, 2015a).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, International Security, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Sustainable Development Goals
In September 2015 UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (2000–15) with a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. While reaffirming core MDG aims, such as poverty reduction and the promotion of health care and education, these SDGs and targets tackle a much broader range of factors driving underdevelopment, includ- ing violence and insecurity (UNGA, 2015a).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, International Security, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Sustainable Development Goals
While it was in power the Qaddafi regime tightly regulated the Libyan domestic arms trade, and local black market sales were virtually unheard of. Supplies were constrained as well—international sanctions prohibited the legal importation of arms into Libya from 1992 to 2003.1 Even when sanctions were lifted in September 2003 and international arms exports began to flow again (supplementing the Qaddafi regime’s already massive government arsenal), the domestic arms trade was stagnant (Jenzen-Jones and McCollum, forthcoming).
The Libyan revolution deposed the Qaddafi regime in 2011 and with it brought to an end the Libyan state’s regulation of the arms trade. Military stockpiles were raided, and small arms and light weapons made their way into the hands of non-state armed groups and private sellers.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Sanctions, Military Affairs, and Weapons
This iconic line from the 2005 film Lord of War conveys widely held assumptions about international arms traffickers: that they are ambitious, well-connected, globe-trotting entre-preneurs who single-handedly arm criminals and militias throughout the world. The film’s fictional protagonist, Yuri Orlov, is based on five actual arms dealers, including Russian businessman Viktor Bout, whose vast global network of shell companies and unsavoury clients earned him the moniker ‘the Merchant of Death’ (Gilchrist, 2005). The composite image of Bout and his peers has become the archetypal arms trafficker, the image that comes to mind whenever the illicit arms trade is discussed. Yet most arms traffickers bear little resemblance to that image.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Military Strategy, Mass Media, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Emergent ammunition technologies are likely to prove key in future firearms designs, while many also apply to legacy weapons. Emergent cartridge case technologies, the rise of the ‘general-purpose’ calibre, and other nascent technologies will affect the way in which firearms are designed, produced, managed in service, tactically employed, maintained, and sustained.
Many of these technologies are focused on reducing the logistics burden on armed forces and security agencies, and on reducing the carrying load of the individual combatant. While these technologies also apply to medium- and large-calibre ammunition, this Working Paper restricts its focus to small-calibre ammunition—cartridges of up to 14.5 × 114 mm in calibre—which are commonly fired from firearms referred to as small arms and light weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Since the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations released its seminal report in 2000, UN missions have grown considerably in size and com- plexity. As of November 2015, more than 100,000 uniformed personnel were serving in UN peace operations—a three-fold increase since 2000 and a 50 per cent rise since 2005 (UNDPKO, 2005; UNGA and UNSC, 2015b, p. 20). These troops, military observers, and police officers increasingly operate in large, underdeveloped countries, alongside violent armed groups that show little interest in political compromise and have few compunctions about attacking UN forces (UNGA and UNSC, 2015b, pp. 21–22). Succeeding in these environments requires that peacekeepers be well trained and well armed.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Politics, United Nations, International Security, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, and Military Affairs
The Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR)—including its armed wing, the Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (Abacunguzi Fighting Forces, FOCA)1—is among the most enduring armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Several members of the group’s top leadership are suspected of involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, making the FDLR’s continued presence in the DRC a recurring point of contention between Kinshasa and Kigali and a source of tensions for the Great Lakes region as a whole (Omaar, 2008, pp. 65– 66, 236–312). Maj. Gen. Sylvestre Mudacumura, the group’s military commander, is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes committed in the DRC itself (ICC, 2012). The group’s presence has also led to the emer- gence of local armed groups that claim to protect communities, further complicating security dynamics in the eastern DRC (Debelle and Florquin, 2015, p. 206).
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Ethnic Conflict, Genocide, Armed Struggle, and War Crimes
More than four years after the start of the Syrian uprising, the country is the stage of a protracted civil war with a perplexing multitude of armed opposition factions competing over territory with the regime and among each other. Well over 1,000 such groups are currently active in Syria (Carter Center, 2014a, p. 11). They range from relatively small local protection units with a few hundred fighters to large movements with a national reach, such as Ahrar alKSham, which is estimated to number at least 10,000 fighters (Stanford University, 2014b).
Topic:
Political Violence, Civil War, Armed Struggle, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
The Islamic State (IS) is often identified as the world’s leading proponent of Salafism, or fundamentalist Sunni Islam. But, as Dr. Jacob Olidort points out, most of the world’s Salafis are not violent or politically active -- in fact, they explicitly condemn both. In this illuminating video presentation, Institute Soref Fellow Olidort provides an introduction to Salafi thought, describes the emergence of the Salafi movement, and deconstructs the Salafism of IS. This is essential viewing for anyone interested in the ideological roots of IS and how it diverges from other Islamist groups.
Dr. Jacob Olidort, an adjunct professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, received his BA in Middle Eastern studies from Brandeis University, his AM in Near Eastern languages and civilizations from Harvard University, and his MA and PhD in Near Eastern studies from Princeton University. Dr. Olidort has spent nearly two years in the Middle East, including a Fulbright Scholarship in the UAE and field work on Salafism in Jordan. He has given presentations and has briefed on Salafism and on countering violent extremism to various academic and policy settings. His writing has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Washington Post, the National Interest, and Lawfare, among other publications.
Topic:
Islam, Religion, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Salafism
Since June 2016, Iran has been enduring terror attacks and assassinations by ethnic-opposition elements operating within its territory and adjacent to it. Attacks on Iranian petroleum infrastructure in Ahvaz are a reaction to Iran’s ongoing repressive policy against the Arab minority in Ahvaz, including the ongoing arrests, trials, executions, and expulsions of young people in that area. There are currently six to seven million Kurds living in Iran. Although they are part of the Iranian state, they may be distinguished from the Shiite minority by language and religion (most Kurds are Sunnis). The Arab Sunni fighters’ targeting of the oil facilities, if it gains momentum, could pose a problem for Iran just as it is trying to renew oil exports after the lifting of sanctions. Attacks on energy infrastructure for gas and oil could foster an unsafe, unstable environment for international energy companies. Iran’s security forces have been cracking down on the Arabs, augmenting this population’s discontent along with its separatist aspirations. The Iranian regime, which so far has been spared the regional repercussions of the Arab Sprin
For more than half a century, the United States has played a leading role in shaping order in East Asia. This East Asian order has been organized around American military and economic dominance, anchored in the U.S. system of alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other partners across Asia. Over the decades, the United States found itself
playing a hegemonic role in the region—providing security, underwriting stability, promoting open markets, and fostering alliance and political partnerships. It was an order organized around “hard” bilateral security ties and “soft” multilateral groupings. It was built around security, economic, and political bargains. The United States exported security and imported goods. Across the region, countries expanded trade, pursued democratic transitions, and maintained a more or less stable peace.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Hegemony
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Today, as a species, we face two existential threats: nuclear annihilation and catastrophic climate change. Both stem from human origins.
We need to fight both threats aggressively. There are many things we can
and should do to tackle the climate threat, beginning with putting a price on carbon emissions, promoting market mechanisms that reward efficiency, leveling the playing field for all lower-carbon energy sources, and leveraging the Paris Climate Agreement into more effective international action. But even adding up all existing national commitments to curtail greenhouse gas emissions, and assuming perfect execution, the world falls far short of the cuts needed to avoid catastrophic climate change. The expanded use of nuclear energy can make a major contribution to closing that gap and meeting our climate goals. But inherent in the use of atomic fission is the risk that the technology and materials can be diverted to terrorists or hostile nations.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Human Welfare, Markets, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Global Markets
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Today, as a species, we face two existential threats: nuclear annihilation and catastrophic climate change. Both stem from human origins.
We need to fight both threats aggressively. There are many things we can
and should do to tackle the climate threat, beginning with putting a price on carbon emissions, promoting market mechanisms that reward efficiency, leveling the playing field for all lower-carbon energy sources, and leveraging the Paris Climate Agreement into more effective international action. But even adding up all existing national commitments to curtail greenhouse gas emissions, and assuming perfect execution, the world falls far short of the cuts needed to avoid catastrophic climate change. The expanded use of nuclear energy can make a major contribution to closing that gap and meeting our climate goals. But inherent in the use of atomic fission is the risk that the technology and materials can be diverted to terrorists or hostile nations.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Human Welfare, Markets, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Global Markets
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Today, as a species, we face two existential threats: nuclear annihilation and catastrophic climate change. Both stem from human origins.
We need to fight both threats aggressively. There are many things we can
and should do to tackle the climate threat, beginning with putting a price on carbon emissions, promoting market mechanisms that reward efficiency, leveling the playing field for all lower-carbon energy sources, and leveraging the Paris Climate Agreement into more effective international action. But even adding up all existing national commitments to curtail greenhouse gas emissions, and assuming perfect execution, the world falls far short of the cuts needed to avoid catastrophic climate change. The expanded use of nuclear energy can make a major contribution to closing that gap and meeting our climate goals. But inherent in the use of atomic fission is the risk that the technology and materials can be diverted to terrorists or hostile nations.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Human Welfare, Markets, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Global Markets
A change in the Baltic Sea regional security situation has already taken place and is having direct and indirect impacts on the countries in the region. Potential risks to stability in the Baltic Sea Region have been activated, although they are not yet, and hopefully never will be actualized in the form of open military conflict. Russia’s self-perception as a target of Western aggression is a way to legitimize assertive foreign
policy towards the West in general and to continue military posturing in the Baltic Sea Region, where both the risks and possible gains for Russia are the greatest. Considering the full-spectrum approach to conflict and the web of relationships that exists throughout the Baltic Sea Region, it is possible to conclude that beyond a certain point, all Baltic Sea littoral states will not only be impacted but drawn into a conflict occurring in the region.
In this paper, we take up the burgeoning debate about the underrepresentation of the working class in politics. In the literature section we discuss theories of group representation and look at recent empirical studies of responsiveness that have begun to disaggregate public opinion by sociodemographic categories. Empirically, we analyze a dataset of more than 700 survey items collected in Germany between 1980 and 2012. The analysis shows that respondents within one social class are more similar to each other than to members of other classes and that class-based differences outweigh those of education, region, or gender. While opinion differences are not always large, they can reach 50 percentage points. There are frequently gaps of between 20 or 30 percentage points in support for or opposition to policy changes. Since workers’ opinions tend to differ from the opinions of those groups who are well represented in parliament, their numerical underrepresentation might bias decisions against them, as recent studies suggest.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Politics, Race, Social Stratification, and Sociology
State concerns about crime and security issues have strongly affected conceptions of economic action outside the law, a traditional field of research in sociology. This increasing encroachment by policy-related concerns on the intellectual framework of the discipline has led, on one hand, to an almost exclusive focus on criminal organizations in the analyses of illegal economic activity. On the other hand, it has led to the downplaying of the importance of classic topics of sociological reflection, such as the embeddedness of action, the moral dimension of illegal products, or the relationship between social change and the spread of illegal exchanges. This short paper problematizes economic action outside the law by taking legal definitions and their effects seriously. It begins with the problem of naturalizing state definitions. This is followed by a discussion of the illegality of illegal markets, which illustrates sociological contributions. Finally, three dimensions of the study of illegal markets are suggested. Overall, the paper lays out a research program for this field of sociological inquiry.
In sociology generally, the infringement of legal norms is not treated as a special kind of norm violation, the sociology of law being an obvious exception. The study of illegal markets therefore faces the challenge of distinguishing illegality from legality, and relating both to legitimacy. There is no conceptual ambiguity about the distinction between
legal and illegal if legality is formally defined. In practice, (formal) legality and (social) legitimacy can diverge: there is both legitimate illegal action and illegitimate legal action. Illegal markets are a special kind of illegal social system, constituted by market transactions. Illegal markets are empirically related to organized crime, mafia and even
terrorist organizations, and they interact both with legal markets and the forces of state order. Where legal and illegal action systems are not separated by clear social boundaries, they are connected by what has come to be called “interfaces”: actors moving between a legal and an illegal world, actions that are illegal but perceived as legitimate or the other way around, and a gray zone of actions that are neither clearly legal nor illegal, and neither clearly legitimate nor illegitimate. Interfaces facilitate interaction between legal and illegal action systems, but they are also sources of tension and can lead to institutional change.
This paper challenges the focus on budget deficits that permeates the literature on fiscal policy. It analyzes countries running budget surpluses and asks why some of them preserved these surpluses while others did not. Whereas several OECD members recorded surpluses for just a few years, balanced budgets became the norm in Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden in the late 1990s. The paper compares the fiscal policy choices of both types of countries from a historical-institutionalist perspective. It argues that a path-dependent shift in the balance of power among fiscal policy interests explains why surpluses persisted in one group of countries but not in the other. This reconfiguration of interests was triggered by a deep fiscal crisis and an ensuing expenditure-led consolidation. It can be interpreted as creating a new “surplus regime” in which fiscal policy became structured around the goals of balancing the budget and cutting taxes.
This paper investigates how the intergovernmental reform process of European economic governance affected national parliaments’ oversight of this policy area. Which parliaments became disempowered and which managed to secure their formal powers – and why? The dependent variable of the study is operationalized as the presence or absence of “emergency legislation” allowing governments to accelerate the legislative process and minimize the risk of a default by constraining national parliaments’ powers. The paper examines how national parliaments in all eurozone states were involved in approving the following measures: the EFSF (establishment and increase of budgetary capacity), the ESM, and the Fiscal Compact. The findings demonstrate that whereas northern European parliaments’ powers were secured (or in some cases even fostered), southern European parliaments were disempowered due to the following factors: (i) domestic constitutional set-up permitting emergency legislation, (ii) national supreme or constitutional courts’ consent to extensive application of emergency legislation, and (iii) international
economic and political pressure on governments to prevent default of the legislative process. Due to significant power asymmetries, national parliaments remained de jure but not de facto equal in the exercise of their control powers at the EU level. As a consequence, both the disempowerment of particular parliaments and the asymmetry of powers among them has had a negative effect on the legitimacy of European economic governance.
In the past two years, the creation of the Chinese-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has caused considerable attention in many capitals, particularly in Washington and Tokyo. Some view the establishment of the AIIB as a challenge to the supremacy of the post-World War II Bretton Woods order. Others see it as another symbol of shifting regional power in Asia. Some have deep concerns about the AIIB’s willingness to adhere to international safeguards and open procurement.
The United States’ strong partnership with Costa Rica has deep roots: our countries established diplomatic relations in 1851, when Costa Rican Minister Felipe Molina presented his credentials in Washington, and a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation was finalized the following year. This early cooperation provided a strong foundation for a bilateral relationship that has only gained depth and breadth, and which continues to grow, evolve, and reveal new sources of strength. Today, the United States is Costa Rica’s largest trading partner and greatest source of foreign investment. Costa Rica’s stability, natural beauty, and proximity to the United States make it a favorite destination for US citizens—tourists, investors, and residents alike—further deepening the connections between our countries. Our shared values, long history of close cultural and commercial ties, and growing cooperation on regional initiatives make Costa Rica a valued strategic partner as the United States promotes prosperity, good governance, and security—the three pillars of the US Strategy for Engagement in Central America (the Strategy)—throughout the region.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Foreign Direct Investment, and Governance
The mythic American legends we grow up with as children in the United
States may not be accurate renderings of history, but they are formative in building our values and beliefs. They include George Washington, a soldier and politician, who occasionally made a mistake but never told a lie; the freed slave John Henry, who worked so hard he beat a steam drill while laying rail; and the fearless Calamity Jane, who lived as she chose in the Wild West. But for me, the most influential was Johnny Appleseed, a poor farmer who traveled the land making friends and planting apple seeds, but rarely if ever returning to see the well-tended trees that grew in his wake. The life of a diplomat is a similar journey of planting ideas, programs, and projects while trusting that others will nurture them to grow strong and produce.
Since its independence in the 1960s, Cameroon has shared few common objectives with the United States. Its vaunted political stability has been predicated on a complex system of tribal patronage and—through most of its history—strict controls on freedom of expression and assembly. This stability has been punctuated by periods of political violence and crackdowns, most recently in 2008, which have alienated the international community and strained bilateral relations. Yet, confronted by the threat of violent extremism and virulent pandemics, Cameroon and the United States have begun to “push on open doors” to expand and deepen bilateral relations, and this in turn has opened up further—previously impossible—avenues for discussion on sensitive topics, such as humanitarian assistance and democratic and political transition.
Topic:
Political Violence, Humanitarian Aid, Bilateral Relations, Violent Extremism, and Freedom of Expression
Public Diplomacy (PD) at the State Department shows signs of going through a serious rethink. The push to be more strategic in our programming has taken off. Public Diplomacy officers can rattle off the Integrated Country Strategy goals with the best of them. More rigorous program planning and evaluation may be coming to a cloud platform near you soon (see the excellent article by my colleague Carissa Gonzalez in the previous issue of The Ambassadors Review). Social media
regulations are in the Foreign Affairs Manual. EducationUSA and American Spaces have slick branding, unified looks, and centralized websites. These new strategies and tools are great, and in many cases, long overdue. However, as we redesign Public Diplomacy for the
21st century (albeit we are already well into that century), we should go back to the basics for a moment, and remember why we’re here.
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States and Austria have enjoyed one of the most mutually beneficial and prosperous relationships in the world. Born from a shared desire for lasting peace and nourished by trade, education, and people-to-people exchanges, Austria and the United States share an intertwined past and interconnected future. Today, our shared democratic ideals and our willingness to work together to combat global threats serve as an example of collaboration on the world stage. But since the earliest days of the modern era, our common goals have been underwritten by a series of often-overlooked exchange programs that have exposed thousands of people to the significance of our shared values. The intimate human bonds built by exchange participants continue to weave an increasingly beautiful, intricate, and durable social fabric that strengthens our bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Politics, War, Bilateral Relations, and Global Security
The world we live in today is more interconnected than ever before—though we may not share soil or language, religion or currency, we are neighbors in this global community. Together, we face challenges that are more complex than any we have ever encountered: violent extremism that threatens our core values of democracy, equality, and freedom; conflicts and natural disasters that devastate and displace; diseases that unroll in waves across entire regions.
Topic:
Democratization, Globalization, Religion, International Affairs, and Freedom of Expression
The Afghanistan of today would surprise most outsiders, even those who closely follow developments in the country. We are often wrongly branded as a failing state with a struggling government whose young people are fleeing en masse for Europe and whose military has lost control of the security situation. While anecdotal evidence can always be found to lend isolated support to such claims, this sweeping characterization offers a distorted picture of reality.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, and Military Affairs