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4391. A Smart Alliance in the Age of Complexity

Author:
Seongho Sheen
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States today faces a complex security environment, in which the threats it confronts are more diverse, more complicated, and require a more delicately balanced approach than ever before. In particular, expectations—even demands—are growing for South Korea to contribute to world peace and stability as a global partner for the United States in pursuing their mutual security interests (Campbell et al. 2009). Do the ROK and the United States share enough strategic interests to sustain such an alliance in the twenty-first century? And should South Korea assume an increasing role in maintaining regional and global peace? During the Cold War, the two countries' alliance was a military one, focused on the clear and direct threat from North Korea. Now, in the twenty-first century, the two security partners must transform their hard alliance into a "smart" alliance to meet more diverse security challenges together. A different set of hard and soft approaches are required, and a smart alliance will call for a more flexible combination of roles played by each partner, depending on the circumstances.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

4392. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

4393. Muddling along with Missiles

Author:
Dongho Jo
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On April 5, 2009, North Korea carried out a rocket launch. North Korea argued that it was a satellite launch vehicle rather than a warhead-carrying ballistic missile, and portrayed the launch in innocuous and civilian terms, even naming the rocket “Unha,” which means “Galaxy” in Korean, to emphasize its space-oriented function. However, most nations, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, suspect that these words were only a cover for a test of North Korea’s long-range missile technology. In addition, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, followed by several launches of short-range missiles from its east coast. Furthermore, North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles on July 2 and additional seven missiles on July 4, despite the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1874 on June 12, condemning North Korea’s hostile activities in the strongest possible terms. Why has North Korea gone ahead with its provocative actions in the face of serious opposition from most of the outside world? To date, analysts have focused on the political aspects of the missile launch. They speculate that its purpose was to push the United States toward bilateral dialogue or to pressure the South Korean government to return to its more positive stance known as the “sunshine policy.” Others argue that the launch was meant to strengthen leadership’s weakening hold inside the country and to ensure its dynastic line of succession. All of these explanations are plausible, and North Korea, of course, may have had multiple goals. But observers seeking to understand the North Korea’s actions are missing one critical component: the economic factor. The North Korean economy was in very poor shape in the 1990s and is still experiencing difficulties. This economic hardship, however, has not only been evident in recent decades but had already begun in the early 1970s, mainly due to lack of capital. Since then, the country’s top economic priority has been to determine how to encourage foreign capital to help the North Korea escape from economic shortages. One alternative pursued since the mid-1990s has been to develop the missile program as an effective means of earning foreign exchange. Understanding the part played by the economic situation in North Korea’s decisions about its missile program is the purpose of this brief article.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

4394. North Korea at the Crossroads

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korea is now at the crossroads. It needs to make a strategic decision on whether to defend its nuclear program and “military-first politics” against the pressure of increasing international sanctions or to denuclearize and pursue “economy-first politics.” Depending on which decision Kim Jong-il makes, his successor will face either the path of opportunity or the path of peril. Currently, Kim faces the challenge of ensuring a smooth transition of power to his successor. At the same time, he must negotiate with an international community that is trying to induce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program by simultaneously imposing sanctions on it while offering a comprehensive negotiation package. In this situation, the surrounding countries must construct an international environment that is favorable to convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and join the international community. Furthermore, the neighboring countries need to actively support and develop a clear formula for establishing a lasting peace framework on the Korean Peninsula. Since the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, Kim Jong-il has faithfully followed the will of his father, who stated that North Korea will denuclearize if and only if the United States withdraws its hostile policy and nuclear threat toward Pyongyang. Amidst the backdrop of its increasing international isolation in the post-Cold War era, the North Korean regime made the decision to develop nuclear weapons as to safeguard its survival. However, this decision brought it into sharp conflict with the United States, who strongly opposed Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The United States could not allow a nuclear-armed North Korea that would destabilize the East Asian region. Subsequently, its strategic decision to pursue the nuclear military-first politics has led North Korea to become a “weak and vulnerable nation” rather than a “strong and prosperous nation,” enduring hardships along the “arduous march.” Compared to circumstances in 1994 and 2003, the current situation confronting Kim Jong-il is far more complex and difficult. Not only must he revive a shattered economy but he must also adroitly manage the sensitive process of leadership succession that is still ongoing. If Kim fails to take the initiative to give up his nuclear program and allows the nuclear military-first politics to dominate the succeeding regime, it will become even more difficult for North Korea to make the transition toward a non-nuclear economy-first politics. Given the fact that external pressure from the international community for denuclearization and internal pressure of attenuating stability will only continue to increase, the succeeding regime will be in a position where giving up the card that guarantees its survival is impossible. Moreover, it would be political suicide for the new regime to abandon the nuclear military-first politics. As the son of Kim Il-sung who is the embodiment of Chuche ideology, Kim Jong-il needs to make the critical decision to abandon North Korea’s nuclear program. There is no other method for resolving the tense situation without denuclearization. Nuclear weapons might be a shot of morphine to ease the pain temporarily, but it cannot be the remedy to cure a dying patient.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

4395. Prospects for Change in the Beijing-Pyongyang Nexus

Author:
Sukhee Han
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Having detonated its first nuclear device in October 2006, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Having consistently attempted to dissuade the North from such tests, China has been infuriated by the North’s defiance of Chinese advice and interests. Immediately after the 2009 test, China released a statement almost identical to the one it announced in the wake of the 2006 test. Beijing’s unprecedented wrath and “resolute opposition” to Pyongyang’s unmannerly behavior had been clearly expressed in the 2006 statement. In the 2009 statement, the Chinese government “strongly demands” that Pyongyang abide by its non-nuclearization commitments, “stop actions that may lead to a further deterioration of the situation,” and “return to the track of the Six-Party Talks.” Furthermore, China’s subsequent vote in favor of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which was designed to impose tougher sanctions on the Pyongyang regime than its previous resolution passed in 2006, seemed to indicate that China may implement a strategic shift away from North Korea and may also increase its strategic cooperation with the international community in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Witnessing China’s stern behavior toward the North, some China watchers in Washington and Seoul have argued that North Korea’s second nuclear test, along with a series of other provocations in the first half of 2009, which included a rocket launch and a complete withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, have prompted China to reconsider its long-standing policy of amity toward North Korea. In contrast to its traditional policy, China since the 2009 nuclear test has not hesitated to make it clear in its official statements that North Korea has become a liability than a strategic asset, and that it was not satisfied with North Korea’s arbitrary behavior threatening the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Remarkably open discussions about North Korea have also been permitted in the Chinese academia and media. In the debates, some Chinese analysts have criticized their government for its failure to get tough with North Korea; others have also advocated for Beijing to take a firmer stance toward North Korea. These debates seem to be a departure from the traditional brotherly attitudes many Chinese have shared concerning North Korea, and also serve as convincing reasons for many experts to argue that China may change its policy toward North Korea. At the same time, however, China has made clear that it intends to continue its traditional policy of friendship toward North Korea. U.S. foreign policy circles have frequently commented that the Chinese leadership has become increasingly angry at the Kim Jong-il regime, especially in the wake of the second nuclear test, and that Beijing is willing and able to use its leverage to pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. In contrast, however, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, during his visit to Pyongyang to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of PRC-DPRK(People’s Republic of China-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) diplomatic relations, reassured North Korea of its economic patronage by providing a number of economic measures for expanding China’s economic exchanges with the North. Furthermore, the recent visit of Liang Guanglie, China’s defense minister, to North Korea has also consolidated the Sino–North Korean military alliance. His avowal of “China’s willingness to have closer military contacts with the DPRK” must have provided more confidence for the North Korean leaders in dealing with post–nuclear test reactions. Given this situation, that China’s national interest concerning North Korea has been the maintenance of peace and stability is reconfirmed. On the one hand, in order to keep Pyongyang from further undermining peninsular security, Beijing has resolutely opposed North Korea’s provocations. China’s statements have emphasized its diplomatic pursuit of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and have also underscored that China, as a great power, acknowledges that it shares responsibility for preserving regional order and stability. On the other hand, China still places more importance on the maintenance of the status quo, in the sense of supporting the North Korean regime itself. China has exerted much more effort on behalf of the North’s survival than on behalf of its denuclearization. While China has in principle supported the UN economic sanctions on the North, it has never been sympathetic to the implementation of realistically effective sanctions. In facing Kim Jong-il’s presumed health concerns and subsequent contingencies in the North, however, China has realized that the status quo on the Peninsula cannot always guarantee regional peace and stability. Given that the demise of Kim Jong-il himself is relatively imminent and certainly inevitable, China has to adopt a new approach to North Korea. China’s chief concern is to strengthen its economic and military grip over the North with the intention of keeping the regime afloat and its leadership under China’s control even after Kim Jong-il has passed from the scene.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

4396. How Common is the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU: Where does Turkey fit in?

Author:
Ceren Zeynep Ak, Paul Luif, and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
This study has been co-authored by Paul Luif from OIIP, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar and Ceren Zeynep Ak from TESEV. The objective has been to examine the patterns of convergence and/or divergence within the foreign policy orientations of Turkey and the EU as well as among the European Union member states – or to put it more precisely, to look at whether Turkey and the EU are on the same page when considering the foreign policy questions that form the basis of a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. This publication looks at the past trends in Foreign Policy decisions with a quantitative research. The research examines the past behavior of Turkey and the EU member states, and finds out that they actually converge more than what is believed. The examined behavior is derived from the voting data in the UN General Assembly over a certain period. This publication also evaluates and compares how much actual convergence existed and exists among the EU member states themselves. The authors show that there is actual convergence between Turkey and the EU member states, and sometimes this convergence is more than the amount of convergence among the EU member states.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, United Nations, and European Union
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

4397. Almanac Turkey 2006-2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight

Author:
Ahmet İnsel and Onur Bayramoğlu
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
Today it is vitally important that citizens examine the security sector with an aim towards democratization. In order to make such an examination more than just an useless exercise, it must be informed by objective data. Therefore, studies like the Almanac are an indispensable part of examining, debating and researching alternatives to the policies that public and private security actors impose on society, the instruments related to these policies and the solutions that these policies are aimed at. This second Almanac covers the three-year period from the beginning of 2006, when the first study was concluded, to the end of 2008. It also gives some information regarding the first half of 2009. In addition to examining the developments which occurred in the Introduction Ali Bayramo¤lu, Ahmet ‹nsel 2 Turkish security sector during this time, the Almanac also focuses on the discussions surrounding the position of security actors in political and social life. It attempts to summarize the historical background that triggered these developments and thus to elucidate both the continuities and the various divergences from historical patterns and trends in Turkish security sector policy. The most crucial debates in the history of the Republic regarding the political and social position of the security forces in Turkey took place between 2006 and 2008. The debates which followed the discovery of diaries belonging to retired admiral, Özden Örnek, gained new significance with the discovery in 2007 of weapons and ammunition that some retired and active-duty officers had hidden in their houses or buried. A clandestine network of relations between retired and active-duty military officers, police officers and civilians is at the center of the legal proceedings that have become known as the Ergenekon case, which remains on-going. The plans for a coup evidenced by other diaries and documents that came to light after the Özden Örnek diaries and during the Ergenekon investigation, as well as preparation for actions aimed at creating a general sense of insecurity in society, have demonstrated with amazing clarity just how important it is that security sector actors in Turkey be under the supervision of civilian political powers and, most importantly, the parliament.
Topic:
Security, Reform, Democracy, and Oversight
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

4398. Security Sector Policy Report 1: The Security Sector in Turkey: Questions, Problems and Solutions

Author:
Hale Akay
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
Security has been and is a problematic and contentious area in the Turkish political system due both to the structural, functional and organizational significance of the security sector within this system and to the autonomous and leading role that the security sector plays. This report discusses the various problems within the Turkish security sector by focusing on the armed forces and includes an analysis of the scholarship created by TESEV’s “Security Sector and Democratic Governance” Almanacs. It may be asserted that Turkey’s civil-military relations and the corresponding institutional structures possess three interrelated qualities: 1) An administrative and legislative structure that is constructed through historical continuity; deepened with every military intervention; institutionalized around a broad and ambiguous national security concept; and on several occasions, concealed behind a veil of secrecy. 2) A form of tutelage where the military sphere expands and the political sphere contracts; where the relationship between authority and responsibility is reversed; and where the military acts as the regulator, not the regulated. 3) An autonomous, institutionally isolated, and over-centralized organizational structure within the military. The analysis in this report primarily highlights these three qualities as well as the security-centered organizational structure in Turkey, and yields the following conclusions: Although significant progress towards civilianization has been recorded since the beginning of the reform process in the 2000s, particularly in the National Security Council (NSC), the definition of national security, on which the NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC frameworks are based, remains unchanged. Prompted by a national security concept within which the bounds of internal and external security threats are still vague, NSC continues to operate as a center of power where official policies addressing a vast policy universe are made. Despite civilianization of the Secretariat General of the NSC (SGNSC), news stories on some personnel appointments indicate that the military retains its strong hold over internal security matters. At the same time, traditionally ambiguous concepts, like national security, and conventional practices, such as psychological operations, are passed down to new domestic security institutions by their ancestors. The informal mechanisms employed by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to exercise political influence, coupled with the allegations, currently addressed through judicial processes, against the TAF of planning direct military inventions and social engineering schemes, show that the tradition of military guardianship is intact. While some new regulations were introduced to the military’s organizational structure, the practices of concentrating decision-making power in, and of granting autonomy to, the center of the organizational hierarchy is still dominant. The militarization of the field of internal security resumes because secret by-laws and practices that lack legal justification or basis continue to prevail; and the confusion among security sector institutions regarding their corresponding authorities and responsibilities ensues. The changes that need to be implemented to resolve the above issues are grouped into three categories: 1) Regulations involving the redefinition of national security and the abolishment of the military’s role as the regime’s guardian; 2) proposals to change the autonomous organizational structure of the military; and 3) civilian capacity building measures that particularly include increasing the parliament’s powers to oversee the security sector.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Democracy, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean

4399. The Assassin Under the Radar: China’s DH-10 Cruise Missile Program

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Of all the asymmetric weapons or “assassin maces”?China has been developing and deploying across the Taiwan Strait, perhaps none has been as poorly understood and as chronically underreported as China’s rapidly emerging DH-10 (DongHai-10), “East Sea-10″? cruise missile program.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

4400. TOWARDS A CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY

Author:
Ivo Samson
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Issues: Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs
Institution:
Slovak Foreign Policy Association
Abstract:
The author defines that institutionalization through the construction of the Visegrad Group identity has aided in this region's rise to prevalence in areas such as trade and security; and contends that in order to have even stronger influence in Europe, the Group must continue to define its relevance as a unified faction. The author concludes that the building up of a common Visegrad identity must be necessarily based on a common language, in which one addresses common security threats, positions toward Russia, toward the transatlantic relations and a common vision of one geographically and culturally shared political view of European and Euro- Atlantic affairs.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe