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16901. The Impact of COVID-19 on the Military Dynamics in Northern Syria

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Measures taken by the administration and the population against COVID-19 in Idlib have been insufficient. Although local health authorities were aware of dangers, they lacked the capacity to influence political and military decision-makers. Therefore, COVID-19 did not have a considerable impact on the daily life of the population and training of military groups. People still convened in open spaces and held closed meetings; markets were crowded and without adequate protection measures; mosques were crowded during the month of Ramadan and celebrations were performed as usual. As escalation and new political/social dynamics now dominate Idlib’s current agenda after the Moscow agreement, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a priority for the actors on the ground. This contribution aims to examine the activities of HTS in the context of the pandemicflict.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

16902. COVID-19 in Turkish Controlled Areas and Idlib

Author:
Başak Yavçan
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The safe zones in the northern part of Syria have been established following three operations in the region, namely: the Euphrates Shield in 2016, the Olive Branch in 2018, and the Peace Spring in 2019. Before the outbreak of pandemic, the healthcare capacity was semisufficient with urgent cases being treated in Turkey and with frequent hospital transfers being conducted. In terms of livelihood opportunities, humanitarian aid was predominantly channelled through Turkey with limited involvement of Western and international organisations. Trade with the outside world was limited due to the sanctions imposed on Syria. The infrastructural investment in the region was predominantly made by the Turkish state and NGOs in the form of renovations and building of schools, hospitals, as well as water and energy supply. As of May 28th, 2020, there are no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in both regions yet living conditions have deteriorated due to the conditions in Turkey, Syria and rest of the world.
Topic:
Security, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

16903. White-Crusade: How to Prevent Right-Wing Extremists from Exploiting the Internet

Author:
Christina Schori Liang and Matthew John Cross
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Right-wing extremists (RWEs) are using the current protests over police brutality in the United States as a cover to commit terroristic acts and to grow their numbers. They present a significant danger to public safety and security and are a growing threat in the West. Despite this, the rise of right-wing extremism (a homogenized term for white ethnonationalists, alt-rights, white supremacist groups, male supremacist groups, and right-wing anti-government extremists) has not been afforded the priority and attention it justly deserves. There are three reasons for this. First, the global narrative maintains that terrorism rests almost exclusively in the hands of a balaclava-clad Salafi-jihadist holding a Kalashnikov. Second, Western right-wing media has largely pushed back against covering the rise of right-wing extremism and the media as a whole has failed to contextualize the systematic threat RWEs present. Third, the global pandemic has forced governments to focus their attention on maintaining public health and socioeconomic order and have consequently failed to see how RWEs are subversively using the pandemic to support and expand their own agenda.
Topic:
Internet, Radical Right, Digitization, and Political Extremism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

16904. Regulating and Limiting the Proliferation of Armed Drones: Norms and Challenges

Author:
Cholpon Orozobekova and Marc Finaud
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
As a consequence of the attractiveness of the use of drones – for obvious reasons of cost and pilot safety – the international market in armed drones is booming, creating risks of widespread proliferation, especially to non-state actors or states known for their lack of respect for the laws of warfare.This paper analyses these proliferation risks and formulates recommendations on how to mitigate them. Starting in the late 20th century, the growth of guided-missile technologyled the international community to draw up political and legal rules in order to control the export of such sensitive equipment – subsequently including UAVs – to countries where the risk of uncontrolled and/or illicit proliferation and use is the highest. The first such attempt was the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was established in 1987 to harmonise policies for the export of missiles and related technology and has been gradually extended to cover UAVs. The second regime was a voluntary transparency measure, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), established in 1991, to which UN member states are encouraged to report their exports and imports of conventional arms, including UAVs. The third was the Wassenaar Arrangement, launched in 1996 as a multilateral export control regime for conventional and dual-use goods and technologies, to which UAVs were added. The most recent initiative is the ATT, which entered into force in 2014 and regulates transfers of conventional arms, including certain categories of UAVs. As we will see in section 2, however, these regimes are far from being universal and all have limitations that make it difficult to impose constraints on UAV exports.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Drones
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16905. Resilience and Agility: Managing and Mitigating Evolving Threats in a Hyperconnected World

Author:
Hasssan Abul-Enein
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Over the years a wide range of different evolving threats have been drastic in their impact and magnitude. This impact is likely to be amplified in the future, especially as global risks such as deglobalisation, fractured social contracts, digital divides and technological gaps increase.39 Also, the rollout of stimulus packages and soaring debt that is estimated to top US$10 trillion by the end of 2020 is likely to make the global economic landscape more fragile.40 The COVID-19 outbreak has perhaps resulted in the single largest socio- economic experiment in the history of humankind. As an evolving threat, what started as a health pandemic in China has snowballed, causing disruptions around the globe and impacting every single industry and individual. Countless lessons are being extrapolated from the outbreak. At the core of these lessons is the importance of resilience and agility in any response to an evolving threat. If governments, organisations, businesses, and society are to manage and mitigate threats of this kind that may occur in the future, there is a need to consolidate and further invest in the four pillars highlighted in this study: strategic management and foresight; human capital, diversity and leadership; collaboration and partnerships; and technology and innovation. Together, these pillars make for organisational resilience and agility. This in turn helps organisations to overcome ambiguity and uncertainty by embedding adaptability and flexibility across their structures. This will allow organisations and vested stakeholders to better map out ecosystem changes that threaten their interests and growth. It will also allow them to respond proactively, timeously and effectively by implementing whole- of-enterprise risk management functions and developing solid decision- making structures and frameworks. Investments in these pillars will also provide opportunities for shared value creation and avoid duplication and wastage. This will help drive growth and mitigate the impact of evolving threats by generating innovative solutions faster and more dynamically, and will accelerate the focus on solving problems rather than fighting them. It will also help to develop human capital, ensure accessibility to a variety of solutions to a wide range of problems, and increase integration, which in turn will create safety buffers and support shock containment.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16906. The Future of Mediation in the Post-COVID World

Author:
Itonde Kakoma and Edward Marques
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The UN Secretary-General António Guterres described the state of the world today in two words “uncertainty” and “instability”.28 These two terms will remain the defining characteristics of the future. If we want international peacemaking structures to remain relevant then the evolving nature of conflict must be taken more seriously. Doing so will require addressing fundamental questions including but not limited to: what does an effective mandate look like in the current geopolitical climate? What might de-escalation mechanisms or a ceasefire look like for hybrid or cyber conflicts? How can virtual safe space for dialogue be secured? How do we ensure that peace agreements hold, when the parties to the conflict are so many, and so far away from the conflict itself? How can we advance international cooperation on peacemaking in the absence of an effective UN Security Council? Given the increasingly blurred lines between peace and conflict, the basic concepts of global peace and security and thus the future of peace mediation will need to be reconceived.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Peace, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16907. The impact of regulatory frameworks on the global digital communications industry

Author:
Robert Dewar and Ellie Templeton
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
A range of regulatory frameworks have been imposed by national governments and intergovernmental actors to control the operations of the digital communications sector. Whilst exercising their rights to manage entities operating within their jurisdictions, the imposition of economic restrictions has a significant impact beyond limiting commercial operations. This policy brief will analyse the impact of regulatory frameworks on the digital communications industry by exploring three high-profile programmes of restrictions imposed by three very different international actors
Topic:
Communications, Governance, Regulation, and Industry
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16908. Partial Local Autonomy in Southern Syria: Conditions, Durability, and Replicability

Author:
Alexander Decina
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In July 2018, Daraa Governorate, once home to an array of rebel groups and local governance councils, supported by significant international assistance, was partially recaptured by the Government of Syria (GoS). Through a combination of force and negotiations, the GoS has restored control over key routes and infrastructure, although a number of former rebel groups have retained limited autonomy in their own communities. Since then, poor security and economic conditions, inadequate services, and competition between and among GoS security actors and former opposition factions have challenged the status quo in Daraa, but, by and large, the situation has held. These negotiated outcomes – and the GoS’s willingness to accept them – were predicated upon multiple factors, including the relatively moderate nature of southern opposition factions, Russian and Israeli military postures, and the historical connections of the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) in Daraa. While lessons learned from the south are important, the particular conditions and outcomes i
Topic:
Security, Governance, Local, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

16909. The Battle for the Tribes in Northeast Syria

Author:
Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Northeast Syria (NES) is fragmented under the control of different powers that are all seeking to gain the support of the local Arab tribes. Those seeking to upset the status quo include the Assad regime and its allies (Russia and Iran), Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies, and ISIS —all seeking disruption with different motivations, yet working side by side. Those seeking to maintain the status quo include the U.S.-led Coalition, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Often, earning the support and alliance of the tribes is a transactional process whereby the tribes seek direct financial support and community investment, employment opportunities, military support, and autonomy to run their own affairs. Currently, most local tribal groups are calculating that a tenuous U.S.-protected order in northeast Syria provides better security and provisions than the alternatives from the Assad regime and its allies, or by Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies. However, ISIS remains a threat to all the powers involved in northeast Syria, and it is the major spoiler seeking to create the conditions for a return to the old order which was established under ISIS’s territorial Caliphate from 2014-2019.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

16910. Syrian National Army: Russian View

Author:
Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In autumn 2017, the Council of the Syrian Islamic Scholars devised an initiative to unite all groups of the Syrian moderate opposition into the Syrian National Army (SNA), which was supposed to become FSA 2.0. At that time, 80% of the Syrian opposition factions, including Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, as well as the majority of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) armed groups were prepared to join the SNA. It was the first time since 2012 that the FSA had managed to bring all opposition forces under its banner, and the creation of a unified military network with a common structure and command gained a new impetus. However, the SNA project was five years too late and, by the time the rebels began to merge into this new unified army, the Syrian opposition had already lost the war.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

16911. Russia and Issues of HTS and Tanzim Hurras ad-Din

Author:
Anton Mardasov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Moderate Syrian opposition includes some natives from Russia’s North Caucasus, although they are a minority. Caucasian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) natives were, in large part, members of the Islamic State (IS) or in some way linked to the forces formally led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and later by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Those who went to Syria and Iraq to fight can be roughly divided into two generations. The first one includes Caucasus Emirate members who responded to the call of Salafi sheikhs from Arab-Islamic centres. Natives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Turkmenistan (migrant workers, for the most part) were mainly recruited for jihad in Russia or within various diasporas across Europe.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

16912. ‘Assuring our Common Future’, a guide to parliamentary action in support of disarmament for security and sustainable development

Author:
Alyn Ware
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This guide to parliamentary action in support of disarmament for security and sustainable development has been produced by the partner organisations in order to educate and engage legislators (parliamentarians) in all fields of disarmament, including of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, other inhumane weapons, small arms and light weapons, other conventional weapons and emerging weapons. The approach and focus of the guide draws primarily from Securing our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament, a report released by the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) in 2018 and followed up by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) with guidelines and support for implementation. The parliamentary guide offers recommendations and examples of parliamentary action and exemplary policy relating to the disarmament issues and goals outlined in the UNSG’s report. In addition it includes a section on disarmament and public health in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, also with recommendations and examples of policy and parliamentary action.
Topic:
Security, Development, Disarmament, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16913. America’s ‘Turkey Dilemma’ in the Mediterranean

Author:
Jon B. Alterman
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Turkey represents a multi-layered challenge for the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean, where it is simultaneously an ally and an antagonist. Its status as a partly European and partly Middle Eastern state confounds a US policy process that has stark divisions between the two regions. Turkey’s maritime activities stymie a policy process that is overwhelmingly terrestrial in its orientation. Turkey is also seeking to become more deeply involved in a region in which the United States has important stakes but where it is seeking to reduce its footprint. Most importantly, though, the United States lacks both a strategy and a policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean, providing opportunities for a proactive Turkey to act while the United States and its allies react. While a strategy would not by itself resolve growing US tensions with Turkey, it would provide opportunities for greater policy coordination across the US government, and with allies as well. The US–Turkey alliance was a bulwark of US global strategy for decades, but tensions have been growing lately. Turkey’s Kemalist heritage, its massive conventional army, and its wariness of the Soviet Union just to its north served US strategy in the half-century after World War II. However, in the last two decades, all three pillars of the relationship have been shaken. Turkey’s simultaneous embrace of a muscular nationalism, politicians’ marginalisation of the military, and the country exploring a new modus vivendi with Russia all render Turkey a troubling and confounding partner.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Leadership, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

16914. Is Escalation Between France and Turkey in the Middle East and Beyond Inescapable?

Author:
Dorothee Schmid
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In recent years, France and Turkey have been on opposing sides relating to Middle East concerns. The countries’ disagreements over situations in Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and lately the Caucasus, have escalated significantly, generating fears of a proxy conflict with direct military confrontation between the two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. Attempting to rally widespread European support, France assertively challenges the Turkish “neo-Ottoman” ambitions; while Paris is anxious of Ankara’s acts outside of Paris’s expectations for a historically narrowly defined Turkish national interests. In the medium-term, the two countries appear to be testing each other to redefine their respective zones of influence, adapting their foreign policy objectives in the turbulent dynamics of the post-Arab Spring era. This power competition resonates domestically, as both the French and the Turkish public are receptive to the developing negative narratives of “the other.”
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and France

16915. Syrian People’s Council Elections 2020: The Regime’s Social Base Contracts

Author:
Ziad Awad and Agnes Favier
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of an unprecedented economic crisis, the Syrian People’s Council elections were held in July 2020, following two postponements due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the electoral campaign slogans launched by the candidates – especially the independents – focused on economic concerns, and made reference to charitable contributions and propaganda from the candidates, the elections failed to capture the interest of the majority of constituencies in the territories controlled by the Bashar al-Assad regime. As usual, the ruling Baath Party controls the majority of seats in the new Council. Certain marginal parties allied with the Baath are also represented within the so-called National Progressive Front (NPF), which is led by the Baath itself. Independents rank second in terms of seat numbers after the Baathists. However, partisan affiliations are of no significance in terms of stances vis-à-vis the regime, since loyalty is a non-negotiable prerequisite for all 250 MPs, and indeed all candidates. Though the Baath Party retains an absolute majority of seats in parliament (66.8%), the elections demonstrated the inability of its leadership to revive the Party as an effective political tool capable of exercising influence by itself. First, the primaries for selecting Party candidates were marked by limited participation, accusations of corruption and widespread objections within the Party. Second, the parliamentary elections saw a historically low turnout (33%), illustrating the Party's inability to mobilise the electorate. Finally, attempts to renew the Baathist bloc in the People's Council resulted in the rise of military and paramilitary figures (with the entry into parliament of retired army and police officers); a growing influence of capital (with higher numbers of businessmen MPs); and the emergence of centres of power outside the traditional Party structure (with the entry of charity and development activists, backed by First Lady Asma al-Assad). This heterogeneity within the Baath’s parliamentary bloc illustrates the reality of the Party today, which appears weaker than it was before the outbreak of the revolution.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Democracy, and Local
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

16916. Bridging Geneva and Astana: The Best Hope for Sustained De-escalation in Syria

Author:
Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
As the conflict in Syria approaches its tenth anniversary, a holistic political settlement encompassing the entirety of the country is unlikely in the near to medium term. More than eight years of diplomatic initiatives have yielded only limited results. The two principal tracks – the Geneva and the Astana/Sochi processes – are running up against the complexity of the conflict and an emboldened Assad regime; neither process is sufficient on its own to generate momentum towards a lasting political settlement for the whole of Syria. However, creatively bridging these two processes could bring greater stability to those areas of Syria still beyond the Assad regime’s control, assuaging the suffering of some Syrians, and potentially serving as a building block for a longer-term settlement. Barring a major strategic shift in diplomacy, developments on the ground could render both diplomatic efforts obsolete. Instead, negotiation efforts should pivot to develop innovative approaches to bridge the Geneva and Astana processes. This bridging effort would focus on consolidating fragile ceasefires in Syria’s northwest and northeast regions, and anchoring some semblance of stability in these areas through improved humanitarian access and enhancing local governance structures.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

16917. Syria in the US and Israeli debate on Iran

Author:
Shira Efron
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
With presidential elections in the United States underway in November 2020[1], the only possible scenarios for Washington in the Middle East are either continuation and solidification, or a change in its Iran policy, each with different potential impacts on the geopolitical conflict between the United States, Israel, and allied Arab countries on one side and Iran and its regional Axis-of-Resistance on the other. Analysing current convergences and divergences between the United States and Israel on Syria and Iran is important to anticipate potential changes in both countries’ positions following the US election, as such changes may impact the effectiveness and even the prospect of the continuation of the United States’ so-called ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign. The policies of the two countries on Syria and Iran became varyingly intertwined as Iran entrenched itself deeply in Syria. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Israel and the United States differ in their approaches to tackling Syria. This contribution attempts to assess the US campaign against Iran, the cost it is likely to have inflicted upon it in Syria, and the outlook of an agreement with Iran. Although we are considering US policy on Iran, the analysis here also includes the Israeli perspective. Private conversations with Israeli current and former officials have provided important insights into how Israeli officials see US policy in Syria and vis-à-vis Iran, and can add a unique contribution to the dialogue. In this analysis, we sought to address several issues. First, whether there are any incentives for Iran to concede to US demands or reach a meaningful bargain, and whether under a Biden or Trump administration a new Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) could be renegotiated to include Iranian expansion in the region. We also examined the form and incentives structure that could entice Iran to offer a constructive contribution to the stability of Syria and the region. In addition, we assessed to what extent the Maximum Pressure campaign affects Iran, and whether targeting Syria with sanctions would incentivise both the Syrian government and the Syrian locals (who are working with Iran as fighters) to break with Iran. Finally, assuming that Iran is in Syria to protect its own interests, we question whether more threats to Tehran would lead to reduced presence in Syria.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Governance, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

16918. The Syrian National Army (SNA): Structure, Functions, and Three Scenarios for its Relationship with Damascus

Author:
Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Syrian National Army (SNA) is officially part of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and responds to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Abdurrahman Mustafa, the President of the SIG, and Selim Idris, the Minister of Defense, oversee the SNA. Idris is also the Chief of Staff of the SNA. The SNA is then further divided into legions and factions. The commanders of the three key legions of the SNA, namely Muataz Raslan, Mahmud el-Baz, and Abu Ahmad Nour, are responsible for all of the factions of their legion. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh legions are organised under the National Liberation Front (NLF). Each faction commander is officially under the legion’s command, though each legion’s number of factions vary, and each legion commander makes decisions as a representative of their legion in coordination with Selim Idris, the commanders of the other legions, and the council. The council is made up of SNA faction leaders who each maintain their own autonomous area and thus can exercise significant power. Therefore, most decisions need explicit or at least tacit approval from them. The SNA’s Chief of Staff and the MoD have different offices operating autonomously from the factions of the SNA and only respond to Selim Idris. The SNA is additionally composed of eight offices (figure 1): The media office, the military court office, the military police, the guidance counselors’ office, the finance office, the administration and organisation office, the operational office, and the training office.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Leadership, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

16919. Security, Stability, and Counter-Terrorism in Idlib: A Turkish Perspective

Author:
Serhat Erkmen
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In Idlib, armed groups can be categorized under three conglomerates: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), and radicals led by Hurras al-Deen (HaD). Among these three anti-government groups, HTS is the strongest one. Though the SNA’s Idlib branch has more manpower than other groups, HTS has superiority in terms of discipline, organisation and weaponry.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Governance, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

16920. Russia’s Increasing Stalemate in Southwest Syria

Author:
Alexey L. Khlebnikov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The town and province of Daraa in southwest Syria is known for being a “cradle of the Syrian revolution”. Six years after the start of the Syrian uprising, it has been included in one of the four de-escalation zones that Russia established in Syria striking deals between different opposition armed groups and Damascus, with the consent of external actors. The southwest de-escalation zone is comprised of three provinces – Daraa, al-Suwaida, and al-Quneitra – whose proximity to Israel has been a crucial factor in Moscow’s strategy in the region. The southwest Syria de-escalation zone has several peculiarities that make it distinct from the other zones, in particular its geography, i.e. its proximity to Israel, which has defined Russia’s very special and nuanced approach to it. At the same time, the Russian approach to dealing with the armed opposition groups within the zone was similar to the groups in other de-escalation zones. So, what makes Russia’s approach different?
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria