Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Rejection of the Trump plan outright, denunciation of any steps towards its implementation, and adherence to the failed Oslo-era paradigm for peace – is certain to condemn all sides to continued conflict.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, Leadership, Conflict, and Peace
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Now that IRGC leadership in Iran’s space effort is out in the open, it can be expected that its homemade, long-range rockets with a global reach will be revealed soon, as well.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The virus crisis will lead to protectionism, skepticism of international institutions, narrow immigration policies, and other signposts of nationalism; thereby rolling-back policies that characterized the liberal and globalist democratic order.
Topic:
Nationalism, State Building, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In the meantime, it doesn’t seem as though Iran – the driving force behind most of the friction in the Middle East – is changing its plans or abandoning its dreams, whether in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or even Yemen.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
There are four factors to consider when weighing action against the coronavirus: public health, preservation of the economy, civil rights, and the international and regional context. National decision-making must take all four of these elements into account, with emphases shifting over the course of time as circumstances change.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Overall, Israeli society has remained resilient in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, and there are reasons to rate highly key aspects of the government’s response.
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The use of special measures to stop the virus is necessary, even though this impinges on individual privacy rights, if the data is deleted after a short time.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Privacy, Surveillance, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Even amidst the ongoing crisis, it is critical to adjust government decision-making structures and operational management procedures to “emergency” mode, in order to ensure optimal outcome.
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The spread of so lethal a virus on so wide a scale in so globalized an economy is unprecedented. Its impact is expected to be more ruinous than that of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The resilence of Israeli society at a time of national emergency (the corona pandemic) has direct strategic and security implications. Despite the huge budgetary challenge, it is vital to maintain investment in advanced IDF military capabilities, because a nuclear confrontation with Iran is still possible.
Topic:
Security, Pandemic, Resilience, COVID-19, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
We have five years of experience to compare to the competing assessments of 2015. Now we know that Netanyahu’s gloomy forecast has proven to be the more prescient.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, and Conflict
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
PIJ is an important part of the Iranian strategy for fighting Israel. The regime in Tehran makes use of charities and other civilian organizations, such as money changers, to transfer funds to its allies in Gaza.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Conflict, and State Sponsored Terrorism
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Europe ought to press the Palestinians to negotiate with Israel for a demilitarized state on a territory similar in size to the pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza Strip and whose economy will be rebuilt and boosted by a $50 billion investment.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel should act to implement the Trump Plan and reap its early rewards, because it transforms the Mideast peace paradigm. Most importantly, the plan reflects, and can serve as a platform for, Israeli consensus on the Palestinian issue.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, Leadership, and Peace
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Even if the Palestinians reject Trump’s peace plan, it still serves their long-term interests. False, undeliverable expectations – based on the assumption that “everybody knows” what Israel will be forced to concede – eventually need to give way to a more realistic paradigm, which in turn may lead to a better life for both sides.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, Leadership, and Peace
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Everything short of a military confrontation needs to be done, though, to deter Erdogan from establishing a barrier diagonally across the Mediterranean, barring Cyprus, Egypt and Israel from connecting their gas infrastructure to Greece and hence to Europe.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and Mediterranean
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It is convenient for Amman to have Israel retain security control over the Jordan Valley. And this is a rare opportunity to advance and potentially realize Israel’s security needs for a cemented border in the east with the support of the world’s top superpower.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Conflict, and Peace
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The new government is the product of escalating popular protests under way since October 15. The protests are in response to Lebanon’s dire economic state.
Topic:
Economics, Military Strategy, Governance, Conflict, and Hezbollah
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Trilateral cooperation among Israel, Greece and Cyprus to build a natural gas subsea pipeline is setting the stage for more tensions with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and Mediterranean
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Jewish state’s relationship with the U.S. is stronger for resting on an informal basis; replacing it with a formal alliance would do no good and only anger the world’s other major power.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Conflict, Peace, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America
In 2019, 22.9 million people or 4.7% of
the total population of the European Union were
non-European citizens. According to the European
Commission, in the same year, the Member States
granted 3 million first time resident permits to
third country citizens. Whilst the number of asylum
requests totalled 1.28 million in 2015, it decreased to
689,000 in 2019.
Across the Union, figures vary from one
country to another: if we look at the number of
migrants in 2019, Germany took in the most with
13.4 million, i.e. 15.7% of its population, followed
by France (8.3 million), Spain (6.5 million) and Italy
(6.2 million). In the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, Poland, according to the OECD was the
leading destination of temporary working migrants,
ahead of the USA; in 2018 Poland delivered more than
a million new permits to extra-European workers.
Topic:
Migration, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Asylum
Democracy is the political and moral foundation of the
European Union and its Member States. Its smooth
functioning endeavours to pacify political alternation,
reduce social tensions and eliminate judicial
arbitrariness, thus guaranteeing civil peace and the
prosperity of European societies. Moreover, in a world
where the markers of liberal democracy resulting from
the European Enlightenment are receding, the value of
democracy is a tool of the Union's power and influence.
In the absence of a functioning democracy the Union
and its Member States would lose their capacity to act
and defend their interests, either via the upkeep of
rules-based multilateralism or the projection of their
values and standards that are emulated by others.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Regional Integration
The global economic and sanitary situation has accelerated many States’ commitments to fight climate
change and, more specifically, the inclusion of climate issues in national recovery plans. Almost a year
after the announcement of the Green Deal by the European Commission, and several weeks after
ambitious climate announcements made by China and Japan, Europe will be playing an important
round in its commitments at the forthcoming European Council on 10th and 11th December.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Carbon Emissions, and Economic Recovery
Iran is trying to maintain its political and military position in Syria until it recovers from the impact of COVID-19. Protection of its interests via securing Damascus, driving out the military forces of the United States, and maintaining control of the areas that allow access to Lebanon (and the Eastern Mediterranean) are still priorities. The deteriorating economic situation and the slump in oil prices will most likely relax Iran’s control over its proxies in Syria, such as the Fatemiyoun and local tribes existing in Deir ez-Zor. The consolidation of the Turkish military presence in Idlib and the northeast will only make Iran more determined to expel American forces after the COVID-19 crisis subsides. The real challenge for Iran is losing the competition with Russia over influence in the security and economic sectors in Syria.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
May 3 rd, Russia’s COVID-19 infection rate resembled that of the United Kingdom. This situation has the potential to significantly impact the country’s financial situation, influencing the country’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. By the beginning of the lock-down period, the most optimistic forecasts for 2020 predicted a fall in the Russian economy by 4-6% of GDP.1 However, after four weeks of confinement, a decline of 6-8% was considered to be the most positive scenario, provided that it is possible to avoid a second wave for the epidemic in the autumn as predicted by the Higher School of Economics forecast.
The Russian situation is complicated by the fact that the outbreak of COVID-19 coincided with the dramatic decline in oil and gas prices. The federal budget’s breakeven price for 2020 was set at $42.4 per barrel.3 However, prices by the end of March and the beginning of April went significantly lower. This means that Russia may not be able to match the predicted government spending for 2020. Moreover, its leadership may not be able to spend money as generously to advance projects serving the country’s foreign policy.
Moscow, short on revenue, will unlikely take foreign policy and domestic political adventures. Foreign policy projects, primarily those that require significant budgetary expenditures in the Middle East and specifically in Syria, will be frozen. A passive Russian international engagement is expected to dominate until the end of 2020. The exception to this policy will be when a response is unavoidable. Domestic policy is likely to be just as reactive. The baseline will likely be to maintain the current state of affairs and absorb any shocks to stability given the scarcity of financial resources.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has pursued a careful policy towards the Syrian conflict based on keeping Syrian state institutions intact and simultaneously supporting Syrian people’s aspirations. In order to maintain this balance, Abu Dhabi has relied in part on a legacy of pragmatic relations with Damascus since the 1990s. This legacy allowed Abu Dhabi to resume its diplomatic ties with Damascus with the aim of drawing it closer to its Arab neighbours when Iran’s influence over the country’s decision-making increased. In order to keep its engagement constructive, the UAE has utilised humanitarian aid since 2011 to support the Syrian people in refugee camps outside the country and within Syria especially amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The UAE however faces challenges from regional and international actors involved in the Syrian conflict.
Measures taken by the administration and the population against COVID-19 in Idlib have been insufficient. Although local health authorities were aware of dangers, they lacked the capacity to influence political and military decision-makers. Therefore, COVID-19 did not have a considerable impact on the daily life of the population and training of military groups. People still convened in open spaces and held closed meetings; markets were crowded and without adequate protection measures; mosques were crowded during the month of Ramadan and celebrations were performed as usual. As escalation and new political/social dynamics now dominate Idlib’s current agenda after the Moscow agreement, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a priority for the actors on the ground. This contribution aims to examine the activities of HTS in the context of the pandemicflict.
Measures taken by the administration and the population against COVID-19 in Idlib have been insufficient. Although local health authorities were aware of dangers, they lacked the capacity to influence political and military decision-makers. Therefore, COVID-19 did not have a considerable impact on the daily life of the population and training of military groups. People still convened in open spaces and held closed meetings; markets were crowded and without adequate protection measures; mosques were crowded during the month of Ramadan and celebrations were performed as usual. As escalation and new political/social dynamics now dominate Idlib’s current agenda after the Moscow agreement, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a priority for the actors on the ground. This contribution aims to examine the activities of HTS in the context of the pandemicflict.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Pandemic, and COVID-19
The safe zones in the northern part of Syria have been established following three operations in the region, namely: the Euphrates Shield in 2016, the Olive Branch in 2018, and the Peace Spring in 2019. Before the outbreak of pandemic, the healthcare capacity was semisufficient with urgent cases being treated in Turkey and with frequent hospital transfers being conducted. In terms of livelihood opportunities, humanitarian aid was predominantly channelled through Turkey with limited involvement of Western and international organisations. Trade with the outside world was limited due to the sanctions imposed on Syria. The infrastructural investment in the region was predominantly made by the Turkish state and NGOs in the form of renovations and building of schools, hospitals, as well as water and energy supply. As of May 28th, 2020, there are no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in both regions yet living conditions have deteriorated due to the conditions in Turkey, Syria and rest of the world.
Right-wing extremists (RWEs) are using the current protests over police brutality in the United States as a cover to commit terroristic acts and to grow their numbers. They present a significant danger to public safety and security and are a growing threat in the West. Despite this, the rise of right-wing extremism (a homogenized term for white ethnonationalists, alt-rights, white supremacist groups, male supremacist groups, and right-wing anti-government extremists) has not been afforded the priority and attention it justly deserves. There are three reasons for this. First, the global narrative maintains that terrorism rests almost exclusively in the hands of a balaclava-clad Salafi-jihadist holding a Kalashnikov. Second, Western right-wing media has largely pushed back against covering the rise of right-wing extremism and the media as a whole has failed to contextualize the systematic threat RWEs present. Third, the global pandemic has forced governments to focus their attention on maintaining public health and socioeconomic order and have consequently failed to see how RWEs are subversively using the pandemic to support and expand their own agenda.
Topic:
Internet, Radical Right, Digitization, and Political Extremism
As a consequence of the attractiveness of the use of drones – for obvious reasons of cost and pilot safety – the international market in armed drones is booming, creating risks of widespread proliferation, especially to non-state actors or states known for their lack of respect for the laws of warfare.This paper analyses these proliferation risks and formulates recommendations on how to mitigate them.
Starting in the late 20th century, the growth of guided-missile technologyled the international community to draw up political and legal rules in order to control the export of such sensitive equipment – subsequently including UAVs – to countries where the risk of uncontrolled and/or illicit proliferation and use is the highest. The first such attempt was the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was established in 1987 to harmonise policies for the export of missiles and related technology and has been gradually extended to cover UAVs. The second regime was a voluntary transparency measure, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA),
established in 1991, to which UN member states are encouraged to report their exports and imports of conventional arms, including UAVs. The third was the Wassenaar Arrangement, launched in 1996 as a multilateral export control regime for conventional and dual-use goods and technologies, to which UAVs were added. The most recent initiative is the ATT, which entered into force in 2014 and regulates transfers of conventional arms, including certain categories of UAVs. As we will see in section 2, however, these regimes are far from being universal and all have limitations that make it difficult to impose constraints on UAV exports.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Drones
Over the years a wide range of different evolving threats have been drastic in their impact and magnitude. This impact is likely to be amplified in the future, especially as global risks such as deglobalisation, fractured social contracts, digital divides and technological gaps increase.39 Also, the rollout of stimulus packages and soaring debt that is estimated to top US$10 trillion by the end of 2020 is likely to make the global economic landscape more fragile.40
The COVID-19 outbreak has perhaps resulted in the single largest socio- economic experiment in the history of humankind. As an evolving threat, what started as a health pandemic in China has snowballed, causing disruptions around the globe and impacting every single industry and individual. Countless lessons are being extrapolated from the outbreak.
At the core of these lessons is the importance of resilience and agility in any response to an evolving threat. If governments, organisations, businesses, and society are to manage and mitigate threats of this kind that may occur in the future, there is a need to consolidate and further invest in the four pillars highlighted in this study: strategic management and foresight; human capital, diversity and leadership; collaboration and partnerships; and technology and innovation.
Together, these pillars make for organisational resilience and agility. This in turn helps organisations to overcome ambiguity and uncertainty by embedding adaptability and flexibility across their structures. This will allow organisations and vested stakeholders to better map out ecosystem changes that threaten their interests and growth. It will also allow them to respond proactively, timeously and effectively by implementing whole- of-enterprise risk management functions and developing solid decision- making structures and frameworks.
Investments in these pillars will also provide opportunities for shared value creation and avoid duplication and wastage. This will help drive growth and mitigate the impact of evolving threats by generating innovative solutions faster and more dynamically, and will accelerate the focus on solving problems rather than fighting them. It will also help to develop human capital, ensure accessibility to a variety of solutions to a wide range of problems, and increase integration, which in turn will create safety buffers and support shock containment.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Resilience