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11971. Modus Operandi of the Largest Russian Cyber-Intelligence Operation of Recent Times – Attack On Solarwinds

Author:
Giorgio Uzarashvili
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The 2020 attack on SolarWinds is one of the largest cyber-intelligence campaigns in US history which inflicted significant damage on agencies such as the US Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).1 Incidentally, SolarWinds is a US-registered company that provides a wide range of IT-related services to the private and public sectors, including tools used for the remote management of the network’s infrastructure.2 Later, in April of this year, the attack was officially attributed to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (СВР - Служба Внешней Разведки). Its consequences were severe not only due to the fact that the attacker, with high probability, gained access to at least part of the information held by the above-mentioned US agencies, but also primarily for the demonstrative effect of this operation. In particular, the attacker demonstrated that no one is protected against Russian cyber-intelligence actors, including the agencies directly in charge of ensuring the information security of the national critical infrastructure throughout the country. Consequently, the attack on SolarWinds negatively affected the US not only in terms of security, more specifically cyber security, but it also poses a significant challenge to its reputation. Namely, this incident questions whether or not US security forces have highly qualified personnel and appropriate technical equipment to protect significant information assets and prevent similar attacks. Moreover, there is a threat that this precedent will encourage similar actions by other hostile actors against the US in the future, primarily China and Iran.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

11972. New Silk Road - China’s Grand Strategy and Georgia

Author:
Gvantsa Chachanidze
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
One Belt, One Road is no doubt the most ambitious project of the century. The initiative was first announced by China’s President Xi Jinping in 2013. He said that China founded a massive infrastructure program that would involve 140 states and 30 international organizations. Xi’s grandiose ambition is to build a global network of infrastructure to ease commerce, investment and connectivity with China. Originally, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) consisted of the Economic and Maritime Silk Road. Eventually the Digital Silk Road, the Belt and Road Space Information Corridor and the Health Silk Road were added to the list. The BRI helps China gain economic advantage by sending goods to European and other foreign markets cheaper and faster than competitors while also ensuring low-cost access to natural resources via BRI corridors. In fact, the shortage of natural resources is a huge issue for both Chinese economics and society. China wants to establish a strong and wealthy society by 2049 by increasing competitiveness and ensuring stable energy imports. The New Silk Road has been continuously portrayed by China’s authorities as an economic cooperation project based on a “win-win” collaboration that promotes global peace and development.
Topic:
Markets, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

11973. The Sources of Russian Misconduct

Author:
Giorgi Badridze
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
One of the fundamental problems of international relations is that people from the countries whose political system is based on the rule of law and human rights often do not understand the logic of conduct of authoritarian regimes. Incidentally, this is equally the case with the relatively conservative and completely liberal observers. Such misunderstanding has, on many occasions, produced catastrophic outcomes. The most vivid illustration of this is the 1930’s policy of appeasement. Despite the facts that Nevil Chamberlain was motivated by the noble goal of averting the war, the wrongful assessment of the Hitler regime brought about the bloodiest war in history. In this paper, I will attempt to evaluate some aspects of Russian foreign policy which, in my humble opinion, are misunderstood in the West and have resulted in serious complications for Russia’s neighbors and the West itself and which continues to represent a clear and present danger. Naturally, I do not intend to diminish the achievements of generations of brilliant diplomats, analysts and political leaders whose wisdom, vision and courage contributed to many triumphs of Western civilization in its struggle with tyrannies. Today, the world needs precisely the type of leaders who would be ready to see the reality that the ideals of human dignity, freedom and democracy are again under threat and that they must be defended.
Topic:
International Relations, Authoritarianism, and Appeasement
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

11974. Achieving Self-Sufficiency in Arms Production to Enhance Defense Capabilities for the Georgian Military

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Some defense economists argue that the full-scale self-sufficiency of the defense industry, which can also be termed defense autarky, may not be necessary for future wars. Due to weapon systems becoming increasingly sophisticated and highly technological, producing these systems requires the growing importation of components and sub-systems for the manufacturing of indigenous and advanced weapons and equipment; even the United States defense contractors import components and sub-systems from many different foreign countries. “The transformation of arms production has created opportunities for many states. Through defense industrial partnerships, recipient states can now exploit foreign component technology and technical knowledge to produce advanced military systems.” Therefore, no country has a comprehensive domestic defense-industrial base (DIB) because all countries rely on technology imports. Even though defense autarky is not necessary, some countries with strong or moderate economies are still trying to develop an autonomous DIB to decrease the influence of arms supplier countries. However, even countries with developed economies have weaknesses in designing, developing and producing advanced weapon systems because they “suffer from shortages of skilled personnel and sufficient scientific and technical infrastructure to pursue breakthroughs and applied research in many critical defense technologies.”
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Georgia

11975. The European Perspective of the Anti-Western Information Warfare

Author:
Erekle Iantbelidze
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The transfer of the international political reality to a new multi-polar prism makes geopolitics, as one of the directions of interdisciplinary education, more important in the current situation. The development of digital and scientific technologies has moved the phenomenon of the balance of power to a new stage and for a number of states and intergovernmental organizations, the term geopolitics has become the flagship of security strategy, cultural domination and democratic processes. In terms of the new “geopolitical commission,” the action plan of Ursula von der Leyen rests on two main principles – Europe’s climate and digital transition (European Parliament, 2020). Therefore, in the conditions of a war of values, geopolitics and digitalization, technological development has become a super-important component that the European Union is attempting to bring to the forefront as it wrestles with the world’s foremost states (China, India, Russia, Turkey). As the EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, stated, Europe must not become a playground for other great powers and it must take the role of a geopolitical leader in the world (Barigazzi, 2019). It must also be pointed out that the geopolitical nature of Europe also envisages the development and gradual expansion of its neighborhood policy. That said, the associated partners within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) format (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine) have bigger ambitions and goals than the development of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the full implementation of the Association Agreement (AA) (European Commission, 2019).
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Geopolitics, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

11976. Critical Infrastructure Protection in Europe: Strengthening Resilience Under Article 3 of The Washington Treaty

Author:
Megi Benia
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
NATO is a major military organization responsible for security in the Euro-Atlantic space. Consequently, the current security environment in the world and, especially, in Europe stimulates debates about NATO’s readiness to resist an armed attack. However, these debates are normally held around the Alliance’s Article 5 as a key component of collective defense and in this process, the principles of Article 3 are ignored, something which is a wrong approach. NATO’s Article 3 states that: “In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (NATO, Resilience and Article 3 2020). Therefore, fulfilling obligations under Article 3 is a crucial part of the organization’s main idea of collective defense as it enables NATO to fulfil the obligations of Article 5. However, one must remember that in today’s unpredictable security situation, “capacity to resist armed attack” (NATO, Resilience and Article 3 2020) means not only military readiness. To be able to deploy rapidly during operations or a potential armed attack, military forces need the support of transport systems, satellite communications and power supplies, etc. However, it is a well-known fact that these systems are highly vulnerable during an attack in both peace and war.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

11977. How concerning is Bolsonaro’s recent political and military shakeup?

Author:
Ryan C. Berg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
urbulent politics and a deep shakeup in Brasilia have many concerned for the stability of Jair Bolsonaro’s administration. The stampede of ministerial exits started early this week with the resignation of foreign minister Ernesto Araújo. The defense minister followed suit shortly thereafter. By day’s end, six ministers had either resigned or moved to new posts — about one-third of Bolsonaro’s cabinet. Perhaps more concerning than the political overhaul was what transpired one day after the ministerial shakeup: the leadership restructuring within Brazil’s armed forces — occurring, no less, one day before the 57th anniversary of the military coup. The heads of all three major branches — the army, the navy, and the air force — resigned en masse, purportedly over concerns for their independence, handing Bolsonaro the opportunity to handpick their successors. Brazil witnessed something analogous only once before — in 1977, under the turbulent rule of military dictator Ernesto Geisel. This has left some Brazil watchers fretting that an insecure Bolsonaro could be laying the foundations “for his own January 6.”
Topic:
Politics, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Populism, and Jair Bolsonaro
Political Geography:
Brazil and Latin America

11978. Europe’s last chance: How the EU can (and should) become the indispensable actor in Venezuela’s democratic restoration

Author:
Ryan C. Berg and Jorge González-Gallarza
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The EU’s current policy approach toward Venezuela is insufficient to contribute meaningfully to a political transition in the country and protect human rights. Oftentimes, the EU’s policy has been at odds with the US, having permitted unrelated disagreements to cloud its recognition of its strategic interest in a free, prosperous, and democratic Venezuela. The Nicolas Maduro regime’s illicit investment schemes have found fertile ground in the EU at large, with a particular hotspot in Spain. A torrent of investments and acquisitions has allowed corrupt cronies in Maduro’s entourage to engage in unfathomable kleptocracy and stash their ill-gotten gains in the eurozone, vitiating the rule of law in the process. The EU consistently underappreciates the Maduro regime’s multi-faceted security threat, which intersects with and compounds many of the EU’s greatest geostrategic challenges in the post-COVID-19 landscape. China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia are all at once strategic rivals of the EU and enablers of the Maduro regime’s threat to its security. The Joe Biden administration’s commitment to multilateral engagement in Venezuela offers the EU a chance to reclaim transatlantic cooperation and present a common vision for political transition in the country. Beefing up sanctions and developing a coordination mechanism, as well as drumming up humanitarian aid, would constitute serious progress and potentially thrust the EU into the role of indispensable actor in Venezuela’s democratic restoration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Sanctions, European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Hugo Chavez
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, Spain, and Venezuela

11979. The Eastern Partnership: Three dilemmas in a time of troubles

Author:
Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In early 2021 a new Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit will take place between the European Union and the six countries in its eastern neighbourhood: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. After over a decade, the ambitious objectives of the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy to deliver ‘stability, security and prosperity’ to the region remain far from reality. Democratization and good governance reforms have been stalled by vested interests in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, while Azerbaijan and Belarus have remained outright autocratic, and the latter faces sustained domestic protests. The EaP faces geopolitical pushback by an increasingly assertive Russian Federation and the region is further affected by multiple protracted and ongoing conflicts, including the recent bitter war over Nagorno-Karabakh. But despite its shortcomings, the EaP is not without successes, especially but not only in the economic sphere. The EU has also managed to keep the door open for conversation, spurred lower-level reform and provided civil society support. As such, the EaP has an important role to play in the policy of the Netherlands towards the region, especially in light of recent requests by the Dutch Parliament to formulate an Eastern Europe strategy. But many thorny questions remain in the run-up to the summit. This report assesses three policy dilemmas that need to be considered by the Netherlands and the European Union in order to make the EaP more effective. First, the EU needs to reconcile its geopolitical interests with its normative aspirations. Second, the added value of the EaP’s multilateral track should be deliberated with consideration of the differentiation in bilateral relations with EaP countries. Third, the EU will need to consider how to deal with protracted conflicts, hybrid threats, and other security challenges in the EaP region.
Topic:
Democratization, Governance, Authoritarianism, Reform, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus

11980. Turkey’s love-in with Qatar: A marriage of convenience

Author:
Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This report assesses the impact of Turkish-Qatari cooperation between 2002 and 2020 on conflict and geopolitical competition across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa based on close examination of its drivers. The report notes that neither ideological nor economic drivers adequately explain the recent blossoming of Turkish-Qatari relations. Converging political interests and pragmatism offer a more compelling explanation. On the one hand, Turkey aspires to play a regional leadership role and uses its cooperation with Qatar to strengthen its soft power claim to leadership of the Sunni world. On the other hand, Qatar seeks to ensure its territorial and dynastical safety from Saudi Arabia and its allies – the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain (the Quartet) – by working with Turkey, the recent thaw of the Al-Ula declaration notwithstanding. Turkish-Qatari collaboration is therefore best seen as a pragmatic partnership enabled by compatible geopolitical perspectives, particularly regarding the Muslim Brotherhood.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates