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16342. Iran’s Involvement in Syria during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Continuity or Change?
- Author:
- Hamidreza Azizi
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Iran is trying to maintain its political and military position in Syria until it recovers from the impact of COVID-19. Protection of its interests via securing Damascus, driving out the military forces of the United States, and maintaining control of the areas that allow access to Lebanon (and the Eastern Mediterranean) are still priorities. The deteriorating economic situation and the slump in oil prices will most likely relax Iran’s control over its proxies in Syria, such as the Fatemiyoun and local tribes existing in Deir ez-Zor. The consolidation of the Turkish military presence in Idlib and the northeast will only make Iran more determined to expel American forces after the COVID-19 crisis subsides. The real challenge for Iran is losing the competition with Russia over influence in the security and economic sectors in Syria.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Syria
16343. The Impact of COVID-19 on Russia’s Middle East and Syria Policies
- Author:
- Leonid Isaev and Andrey Sakharov
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- May 3 rd, Russia’s COVID-19 infection rate resembled that of the United Kingdom. This situation has the potential to significantly impact the country’s financial situation, influencing the country’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. By the beginning of the lock-down period, the most optimistic forecasts for 2020 predicted a fall in the Russian economy by 4-6% of GDP.1 However, after four weeks of confinement, a decline of 6-8% was considered to be the most positive scenario, provided that it is possible to avoid a second wave for the epidemic in the autumn as predicted by the Higher School of Economics forecast. The Russian situation is complicated by the fact that the outbreak of COVID-19 coincided with the dramatic decline in oil and gas prices. The federal budget’s breakeven price for 2020 was set at $42.4 per barrel.3 However, prices by the end of March and the beginning of April went significantly lower. This means that Russia may not be able to match the predicted government spending for 2020. Moreover, its leadership may not be able to spend money as generously to advance projects serving the country’s foreign policy. Moscow, short on revenue, will unlikely take foreign policy and domestic political adventures. Foreign policy projects, primarily those that require significant budgetary expenditures in the Middle East and specifically in Syria, will be frozen. A passive Russian international engagement is expected to dominate until the end of 2020. The exception to this policy will be when a response is unavoidable. Domestic policy is likely to be just as reactive. The baseline will likely be to maintain the current state of affairs and absorb any shocks to stability given the scarcity of financial resources.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria
16344. The UAE’s Role in Syria’s Stability
- Author:
- Najla al-Qasemi
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has pursued a careful policy towards the Syrian conflict based on keeping Syrian state institutions intact and simultaneously supporting Syrian people’s aspirations. In order to maintain this balance, Abu Dhabi has relied in part on a legacy of pragmatic relations with Damascus since the 1990s. This legacy allowed Abu Dhabi to resume its diplomatic ties with Damascus with the aim of drawing it closer to its Arab neighbours when Iran’s influence over the country’s decision-making increased. In order to keep its engagement constructive, the UAE has utilised humanitarian aid since 2011 to support the Syrian people in refugee camps outside the country and within Syria especially amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The UAE however faces challenges from regional and international actors involved in the Syrian conflict.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Hegemony, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, and UAE
16345. Is the “New Normal” in Idlib Different from the “Old Normal”?: How the COVID-19 Pandemic has Affected Idlib
- Author:
- Serhat Erkman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Measures taken by the administration and the population against COVID-19 in Idlib have been insufficient. Although local health authorities were aware of dangers, they lacked the capacity to influence political and military decision-makers. Therefore, COVID-19 did not have a considerable impact on the daily life of the population and training of military groups. People still convened in open spaces and held closed meetings; markets were crowded and without adequate protection measures; mosques were crowded during the month of Ramadan and celebrations were performed as usual. As escalation and new political/social dynamics now dominate Idlib’s current agenda after the Moscow agreement, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a priority for the actors on the ground. This contribution aims to examine the activities of HTS in the context of the pandemicflict.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
16346. The Impact of COVID-19 on the Military Dynamics in Northern Syria
- Author:
- Nikolay Surkov
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Measures taken by the administration and the population against COVID-19 in Idlib have been insufficient. Although local health authorities were aware of dangers, they lacked the capacity to influence political and military decision-makers. Therefore, COVID-19 did not have a considerable impact on the daily life of the population and training of military groups. People still convened in open spaces and held closed meetings; markets were crowded and without adequate protection measures; mosques were crowded during the month of Ramadan and celebrations were performed as usual. As escalation and new political/social dynamics now dominate Idlib’s current agenda after the Moscow agreement, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a priority for the actors on the ground. This contribution aims to examine the activities of HTS in the context of the pandemicflict.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
16347. COVID-19 in Turkish Controlled Areas and Idlib
- Author:
- Başak Yavçan
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- The safe zones in the northern part of Syria have been established following three operations in the region, namely: the Euphrates Shield in 2016, the Olive Branch in 2018, and the Peace Spring in 2019. Before the outbreak of pandemic, the healthcare capacity was semisufficient with urgent cases being treated in Turkey and with frequent hospital transfers being conducted. In terms of livelihood opportunities, humanitarian aid was predominantly channelled through Turkey with limited involvement of Western and international organisations. Trade with the outside world was limited due to the sanctions imposed on Syria. The infrastructural investment in the region was predominantly made by the Turkish state and NGOs in the form of renovations and building of schools, hospitals, as well as water and energy supply. As of May 28th, 2020, there are no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in both regions yet living conditions have deteriorated due to the conditions in Turkey, Syria and rest of the world.
- Topic:
- Security, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria
16348. White-Crusade: How to Prevent Right-Wing Extremists from Exploiting the Internet
- Author:
- Christina Schori Liang and Matthew John Cross
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Right-wing extremists (RWEs) are using the current protests over police brutality in the United States as a cover to commit terroristic acts and to grow their numbers. They present a significant danger to public safety and security and are a growing threat in the West. Despite this, the rise of right-wing extremism (a homogenized term for white ethnonationalists, alt-rights, white supremacist groups, male supremacist groups, and right-wing anti-government extremists) has not been afforded the priority and attention it justly deserves. There are three reasons for this. First, the global narrative maintains that terrorism rests almost exclusively in the hands of a balaclava-clad Salafi-jihadist holding a Kalashnikov. Second, Western right-wing media has largely pushed back against covering the rise of right-wing extremism and the media as a whole has failed to contextualize the systematic threat RWEs present. Third, the global pandemic has forced governments to focus their attention on maintaining public health and socioeconomic order and have consequently failed to see how RWEs are subversively using the pandemic to support and expand their own agenda.
- Topic:
- Internet, Radical Right, Digitization, and Political Extremism
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
16349. Regulating and Limiting the Proliferation of Armed Drones: Norms and Challenges
- Author:
- Cholpon Orozobekova and Marc Finaud
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- As a consequence of the attractiveness of the use of drones – for obvious reasons of cost and pilot safety – the international market in armed drones is booming, creating risks of widespread proliferation, especially to non-state actors or states known for their lack of respect for the laws of warfare.This paper analyses these proliferation risks and formulates recommendations on how to mitigate them. Starting in the late 20th century, the growth of guided-missile technologyled the international community to draw up political and legal rules in order to control the export of such sensitive equipment – subsequently including UAVs – to countries where the risk of uncontrolled and/or illicit proliferation and use is the highest. The first such attempt was the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was established in 1987 to harmonise policies for the export of missiles and related technology and has been gradually extended to cover UAVs. The second regime was a voluntary transparency measure, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), established in 1991, to which UN member states are encouraged to report their exports and imports of conventional arms, including UAVs. The third was the Wassenaar Arrangement, launched in 1996 as a multilateral export control regime for conventional and dual-use goods and technologies, to which UAVs were added. The most recent initiative is the ATT, which entered into force in 2014 and regulates transfers of conventional arms, including certain categories of UAVs. As we will see in section 2, however, these regimes are far from being universal and all have limitations that make it difficult to impose constraints on UAV exports.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Drones
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
16350. Resilience and Agility: Managing and Mitigating Evolving Threats in a Hyperconnected World
- Author:
- Hasssan Abul-Enein
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Over the years a wide range of different evolving threats have been drastic in their impact and magnitude. This impact is likely to be amplified in the future, especially as global risks such as deglobalisation, fractured social contracts, digital divides and technological gaps increase.39 Also, the rollout of stimulus packages and soaring debt that is estimated to top US$10 trillion by the end of 2020 is likely to make the global economic landscape more fragile.40 The COVID-19 outbreak has perhaps resulted in the single largest socio- economic experiment in the history of humankind. As an evolving threat, what started as a health pandemic in China has snowballed, causing disruptions around the globe and impacting every single industry and individual. Countless lessons are being extrapolated from the outbreak. At the core of these lessons is the importance of resilience and agility in any response to an evolving threat. If governments, organisations, businesses, and society are to manage and mitigate threats of this kind that may occur in the future, there is a need to consolidate and further invest in the four pillars highlighted in this study: strategic management and foresight; human capital, diversity and leadership; collaboration and partnerships; and technology and innovation. Together, these pillars make for organisational resilience and agility. This in turn helps organisations to overcome ambiguity and uncertainty by embedding adaptability and flexibility across their structures. This will allow organisations and vested stakeholders to better map out ecosystem changes that threaten their interests and growth. It will also allow them to respond proactively, timeously and effectively by implementing whole- of-enterprise risk management functions and developing solid decision- making structures and frameworks. Investments in these pillars will also provide opportunities for shared value creation and avoid duplication and wastage. This will help drive growth and mitigate the impact of evolving threats by generating innovative solutions faster and more dynamically, and will accelerate the focus on solving problems rather than fighting them. It will also help to develop human capital, ensure accessibility to a variety of solutions to a wide range of problems, and increase integration, which in turn will create safety buffers and support shock containment.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
16351. The Future of Mediation in the Post-COVID World
- Author:
- Itonde Kakoma and Edward Marques
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- The UN Secretary-General António Guterres described the state of the world today in two words “uncertainty” and “instability”.28 These two terms will remain the defining characteristics of the future. If we want international peacemaking structures to remain relevant then the evolving nature of conflict must be taken more seriously. Doing so will require addressing fundamental questions including but not limited to: what does an effective mandate look like in the current geopolitical climate? What might de-escalation mechanisms or a ceasefire look like for hybrid or cyber conflicts? How can virtual safe space for dialogue be secured? How do we ensure that peace agreements hold, when the parties to the conflict are so many, and so far away from the conflict itself? How can we advance international cooperation on peacemaking in the absence of an effective UN Security Council? Given the increasingly blurred lines between peace and conflict, the basic concepts of global peace and security and thus the future of peace mediation will need to be reconceived.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Peace, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Mediation
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
16352. The impact of regulatory frameworks on the global digital communications industry
- Author:
- Robert Dewar and Ellie Templeton
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- A range of regulatory frameworks have been imposed by national governments and intergovernmental actors to control the operations of the digital communications sector. Whilst exercising their rights to manage entities operating within their jurisdictions, the imposition of economic restrictions has a significant impact beyond limiting commercial operations. This policy brief will analyse the impact of regulatory frameworks on the digital communications industry by exploring three high-profile programmes of restrictions imposed by three very different international actors
- Topic:
- Communications, Governance, Regulation, and Industry
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
16353. Partial Local Autonomy in Southern Syria: Conditions, Durability, and Replicability
- Author:
- Alexander Decina
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- In July 2018, Daraa Governorate, once home to an array of rebel groups and local governance councils, supported by significant international assistance, was partially recaptured by the Government of Syria (GoS). Through a combination of force and negotiations, the GoS has restored control over key routes and infrastructure, although a number of former rebel groups have retained limited autonomy in their own communities. Since then, poor security and economic conditions, inadequate services, and competition between and among GoS security actors and former opposition factions have challenged the status quo in Daraa, but, by and large, the situation has held. These negotiated outcomes – and the GoS’s willingness to accept them – were predicated upon multiple factors, including the relatively moderate nature of southern opposition factions, Russian and Israeli military postures, and the historical connections of the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) in Daraa. While lessons learned from the south are important, the particular conditions and outcomes i
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Local, and Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
16354. The Battle for the Tribes in Northeast Syria
- Author:
- Nicholas Heras
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Northeast Syria (NES) is fragmented under the control of different powers that are all seeking to gain the support of the local Arab tribes. Those seeking to upset the status quo include the Assad regime and its allies (Russia and Iran), Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies, and ISIS —all seeking disruption with different motivations, yet working side by side. Those seeking to maintain the status quo include the U.S.-led Coalition, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Often, earning the support and alliance of the tribes is a transactional process whereby the tribes seek direct financial support and community investment, employment opportunities, military support, and autonomy to run their own affairs. Currently, most local tribal groups are calculating that a tenuous U.S.-protected order in northeast Syria provides better security and provisions than the alternatives from the Assad regime and its allies, or by Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies. However, ISIS remains a threat to all the powers involved in northeast Syria, and it is the major spoiler seeking to create the conditions for a return to the old order which was established under ISIS’s territorial Caliphate from 2014-2019.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America
16355. Syrian National Army: Russian View
- Author:
- Kirill Semenov
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- In autumn 2017, the Council of the Syrian Islamic Scholars devised an initiative to unite all groups of the Syrian moderate opposition into the Syrian National Army (SNA), which was supposed to become FSA 2.0. At that time, 80% of the Syrian opposition factions, including Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, as well as the majority of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) armed groups were prepared to join the SNA. It was the first time since 2012 that the FSA had managed to bring all opposition forces under its banner, and the creation of a unified military network with a common structure and command gained a new impetus. However, the SNA project was five years too late and, by the time the rebels began to merge into this new unified army, the Syrian opposition had already lost the war.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
16356. Russia and Issues of HTS and Tanzim Hurras ad-Din
- Author:
- Anton Mardasov
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Moderate Syrian opposition includes some natives from Russia’s North Caucasus, although they are a minority. Caucasian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) natives were, in large part, members of the Islamic State (IS) or in some way linked to the forces formally led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and later by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Those who went to Syria and Iraq to fight can be roughly divided into two generations. The first one includes Caucasus Emirate members who responded to the call of Salafi sheikhs from Arab-Islamic centres. Natives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Turkmenistan (migrant workers, for the most part) were mainly recruited for jihad in Russia or within various diasporas across Europe.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Opposition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria
16357. ‘Assuring our Common Future’, a guide to parliamentary action in support of disarmament for security and sustainable development
- Author:
- Alyn Ware
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- This guide to parliamentary action in support of disarmament for security and sustainable development has been produced by the partner organisations in order to educate and engage legislators (parliamentarians) in all fields of disarmament, including of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, other inhumane weapons, small arms and light weapons, other conventional weapons and emerging weapons. The approach and focus of the guide draws primarily from Securing our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament, a report released by the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) in 2018 and followed up by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) with guidelines and support for implementation. The parliamentary guide offers recommendations and examples of parliamentary action and exemplary policy relating to the disarmament issues and goals outlined in the UNSG’s report. In addition it includes a section on disarmament and public health in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, also with recommendations and examples of policy and parliamentary action.
- Topic:
- Security, Development, Disarmament, and Sustainability
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
16358. America’s ‘Turkey Dilemma’ in the Mediterranean
- Author:
- Jon B. Alterman
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Turkey represents a multi-layered challenge for the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean, where it is simultaneously an ally and an antagonist. Its status as a partly European and partly Middle Eastern state confounds a US policy process that has stark divisions between the two regions. Turkey’s maritime activities stymie a policy process that is overwhelmingly terrestrial in its orientation. Turkey is also seeking to become more deeply involved in a region in which the United States has important stakes but where it is seeking to reduce its footprint. Most importantly, though, the United States lacks both a strategy and a policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean, providing opportunities for a proactive Turkey to act while the United States and its allies react. While a strategy would not by itself resolve growing US tensions with Turkey, it would provide opportunities for greater policy coordination across the US government, and with allies as well. The US–Turkey alliance was a bulwark of US global strategy for decades, but tensions have been growing lately. Turkey’s Kemalist heritage, its massive conventional army, and its wariness of the Soviet Union just to its north served US strategy in the half-century after World War II. However, in the last two decades, all three pillars of the relationship have been shaken. Turkey’s simultaneous embrace of a muscular nationalism, politicians’ marginalisation of the military, and the country exploring a new modus vivendi with Russia all render Turkey a troubling and confounding partner.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Leadership, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America
16359. Is Escalation Between France and Turkey in the Middle East and Beyond Inescapable?
- Author:
- Dorothee Schmid
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- In recent years, France and Turkey have been on opposing sides relating to Middle East concerns. The countries’ disagreements over situations in Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and lately the Caucasus, have escalated significantly, generating fears of a proxy conflict with direct military confrontation between the two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. Attempting to rally widespread European support, France assertively challenges the Turkish “neo-Ottoman” ambitions; while Paris is anxious of Ankara’s acts outside of Paris’s expectations for a historically narrowly defined Turkish national interests. In the medium-term, the two countries appear to be testing each other to redefine their respective zones of influence, adapting their foreign policy objectives in the turbulent dynamics of the post-Arab Spring era. This power competition resonates domestically, as both the French and the Turkish public are receptive to the developing negative narratives of “the other.”
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, and France
16360. Syrian People’s Council Elections 2020: The Regime’s Social Base Contracts
- Author:
- Ziad Awad and Agnes Favier
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Against the backdrop of an unprecedented economic crisis, the Syrian People’s Council elections were held in July 2020, following two postponements due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the electoral campaign slogans launched by the candidates – especially the independents – focused on economic concerns, and made reference to charitable contributions and propaganda from the candidates, the elections failed to capture the interest of the majority of constituencies in the territories controlled by the Bashar al-Assad regime. As usual, the ruling Baath Party controls the majority of seats in the new Council. Certain marginal parties allied with the Baath are also represented within the so-called National Progressive Front (NPF), which is led by the Baath itself. Independents rank second in terms of seat numbers after the Baathists. However, partisan affiliations are of no significance in terms of stances vis-à-vis the regime, since loyalty is a non-negotiable prerequisite for all 250 MPs, and indeed all candidates. Though the Baath Party retains an absolute majority of seats in parliament (66.8%), the elections demonstrated the inability of its leadership to revive the Party as an effective political tool capable of exercising influence by itself. First, the primaries for selecting Party candidates were marked by limited participation, accusations of corruption and widespread objections within the Party. Second, the parliamentary elections saw a historically low turnout (33%), illustrating the Party's inability to mobilise the electorate. Finally, attempts to renew the Baathist bloc in the People's Council resulted in the rise of military and paramilitary figures (with the entry into parliament of retired army and police officers); a growing influence of capital (with higher numbers of businessmen MPs); and the emergence of centres of power outside the traditional Party structure (with the entry of charity and development activists, backed by First Lady Asma al-Assad). This heterogeneity within the Baath’s parliamentary bloc illustrates the reality of the Party today, which appears weaker than it was before the outbreak of the revolution.
- Topic:
- Governance, Elections, Democracy, and Local
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria