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1. China’s Role in the Middle East

Author:
John Calabrese and Yun Sun
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss China’s role in the Middle East amid rising regional tensions and growing threats to both international security and the global economy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Security, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

2. Spotlight on US Syria policy

Author:
Charles Lister and Alistair Taylor
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
On this week's episode, Director of MEI's Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism Programs Charles Lister and MEI Editor-In-Chief Alistair Taylor talk about US policy toward Syria. The deadly Jan. 28 drone attack on a US military outpost in northeastern Jordan, near the borders with Syria and Iraq, has drawn renewed attention to the US military presence in the area. This comes against a backdrop of regional conflict and escalation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Escalation, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

3. Iranian Proxies in Iraq and Syria

Author:
Charles Lister and Douglas London
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss Iran’s proxy network throughout Syria and Iraq.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Proxy Groups
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

4. Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation: How Member States Matter

Author:
Pınar Atakara
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
“Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation: How Member States Matter” by Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters conducts a distinctly member-state based theoretical examination of interorganizational cooperation between the EU and NATO. Ewers-Peters mainly intends to demonstrate member states’ foreign/security policy orientations, roles and positions affecting the functionality and dys-functionality of Euro-Atlantic security, between the period of the end of the Cold War and 2021. The book is composed of seven chapters including conclusion and implications. By providing 28 face-to-face semi-structured interviews carried out in Berlin and Brussels between February 2017 and February 2018, with different member states’ representatives (see Appendix A.), as well as document analysis of primary and secondary sources, the book relies on well-designed qualitative research.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, European Union, and Book Review
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

5. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:
Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

6. Assessing the Impact of Turkey’s Quest for Status Since the 2000s on Foreign Policy Change: Transformational or Transactional?

Author:
Samiratou Dipama and Emel Parlar Dal
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:
International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:
This paper delves into an assessment of the impact of Turkey’s quest for status since the 2000s on changes in its foreign policy. In other words, how has Turkey’s search for status influenced its foreign policy stances since the 2000s? And can we consider the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy change transformational or transactional in essence? In this vein, this paper will make essential contributions to the existing literature on Turkey’s status-seeking strategies by using specific cases to link them to changes in Turkey’s foreign policy and assessing the extent to which they are transactional or transformational. The examination of this topic is all the more important in light of internal developments in Turkey, such as democratic backsliding and economic crisis, as well external factors such as its tense relationships with the EU, its rapprochement with Russia and China, and its increasingly proactive profile in regional crises. This paper critically assesses the pattern of Turkey’s foreign policy change from transformational and transactional perspectives.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Status, and International Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

7. The Mattei Plan for Africa: A Turning Point for Italy’s Development Cooperation Policy?

Author:
Daniele Fattibene
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
At the end of January 2024, Italy hosted an Africa summit during which Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni outlined the vision and first projects of the so-called “Mattei Plan”, an ambitious project announced officially at the end of 2023[1] that aims to shape Italy’s strategy for Africa in the years to come.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Italy

8. The Italy-Africa Summit 2024 and the Mattei Plan: Towards Cooperation between Equals?

Author:
Filippo Simonelli, Maria Luisa Fantappiè, and Leo Goretti
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italy inaugurated its year of G7 presidency with the Italy-Africa summit on 28-29 January in Rome, an event representative of the current government’s ambitions.[1] The long-awaited meeting was the first test for the strategy of “cooperation as equals” with African states that Giorgia Meloni has repeatedly proposed as central to her government's foreign policy. It was also the first occasion to test the real scope of the so-called Mattei Plan for Africa, the project with which the Italian government wants to substantiate this strategy but whose official strategic outline has yet to be announced.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Italy

9. Pyongyang in Search of a New Cold War Strategy

Author:
Jihwan Hwang
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Jihwan Hwang, a professor at the University of Seoul, predicts that the strengthening alliance between North Korea, China, and Russia could enable North Korea to overcome its international isolation, weakening the influence of the US-South Korea alliance and increasing China’s leverage over the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Hwang points out that even without the establishment of a new Cold War order, the strengthened cooperation among the authoritarian regimes will pose a significant strategic challenge to South Korea. As Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang has been based on a unipolar system led by Washington, Dr. Hwang highlights the need for South Korea to explore new approaches to address the changing security environment.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

10. Russia’s Stance on the North Korean Narrative of a New Cold War

Author:
Seho Jang
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Seho Jang, a research fellow in the Institute for National Security Strategy, states that North Korea is promoting strategic solidarity with China and Russia to achieve its goal of dismantling US hegemony. While Russia also shares the perception that the US-centered unipolar order is not conducive to attaining its national interests, it rarely uses the term “new Cold War” in official foreign policy discourse, reflecting its apprehension about the concept and its potential implications. He evaluates that this caution possibly originated from Russia’s historical trauma as a loser of the Cold War, making it highly likely to be opposed to the emergence of the new Cold War order led by Washington and Beijing. Dr. Chang suggests that this subtle difference could become an important inflection point as Washington’s clout in international politics decreases in the future.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Multipolarity, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, North Korea, and United States of America

11. U.S. Foreign Policy an the War in Ukraine

Author:
James A. Russell
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
This essay assesses the impact of the war in Ukraine on American foreign policy. The thesis provided here is that the war in Ukraine must be viewed as a painful but maybe necessary shock therapy that has helped to relieve the residual hangover from America’s two-decade-long, ill-advised war on terror and the lost wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In parallel, the war has served as a vehicle for the reinvigoration of national grand strategy and the foreign policy that provides the vital connective tissue between ends, ways, and means. In this trinity, the foreign policy represents an instrumental tool to connect the assumptions that undergird grand strategy to the practical, real-world of international politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

12. China's Political-Economy, Foreign and Security Policy: 2023

Author:
Center for China Analysis
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
It has now been three months since the 20th Party Congress convened in Beijing on October 15. While the Congress set Xi Jinping’s ideological, strategic, and economic direction for the next five years, much has happened since then that the Chinese leadership did not anticipate. Principal among these surprises was the spontaneous eruption in late November of public protests across multiple Chinese cities against the economic and social impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s “dynamic zero-COVID” policy. These protests resulted in an unprecedented U-turn on December 8 from China’s relentless pursuit of its three-year-long national pandemic containment strategy to the Party now seeking desperately to restore economic growth and social calm. This shift has in turn generated major public pressures on the Chinese health system as hospitals struggle to cope with surging caseloads and mortalities. All of these developments stand in stark contrast to the political, ideological, and nationalist self-confidence on display at the 20th Party Congress. In October, Xi Jinping swept the board by removing any would-be opponents from the Politburo and replacing them with long-standing personal loyalists. Xi also proclaimed China’s total victory over COVID-19, contrasting the Party’s success with the disarray its propaganda apparatus had depicted across the United States and the collective West. Despite faltering economic growth, Xi had doubled down in his embrace of a new, more Marxist approach to economic policy which prioritized planning over the market, national self-sufficiency over global economic integration, the centrality of the public sector over private enterprise, and a new approach to wealth distribution under the rubric of the Common Prosperity doctrine. At the same time, Xi’s 2022 Work Report, delivered at the Congress, abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s long-standing foreign policy framework that “peace and development are the principal themes of the time” and instead warned of growing strategic threats and the need for the military to be prepared for war. As part of a continuing series on China’s evolving political economy and foreign policy, this paper’s purpose is threefold: to examine the political and economic implications of this dramatic change in China’s COVID-19 strategy; to analyze what, if any, impact it may have on China’s current international posture; and to assess whether this represents a significant departure from the Party’s strategic direction set at the 20th Party Congress last October. The paper concludes that the Party changed course on COVID-19 for two reasons: (1) it feared that not doing so would threaten its unofficial social contract with the Chinese people based on long-term improvements in jobs and living standards; and (2) that a structural slowdown in growth could also undermine China’s long-term strategic competition against the United States. This paper also concludes that the stark nature of the December 8 policy backflip, together with the Chinese health system’s lack of preparedness for it, has dented Xi Jinping’s political armor for the medium term. This setback comes on top of internal criticism of Xi’s broader ideological assault on the Deng-Jiang-Hu historical economic growth formula that Xi has prosecuted since 2017, as well as Xi’s departure from Deng’s less confrontational foreign policy posture that characterized previous decades. Nonetheless, these policy errors remain manageable within Chinese elite politics, where Xi still controls the hard levers of power. Furthermore, many of these changes on both the economy and external policy are more likely to be short-to-medium term and therefore tactical in nature, rather than representing a strategic departure from the deep ideological direction laid out for the long-term in Xi’s October 2022 Work Report. While these changes to current economic and foreign policy settings are significant in their own right, there is no evidence to date that Xi Jinping’s ideological fundamentals have changed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Political Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

13. Taiwan Strait Crises: Island Seizure Contingencies

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Conflict across the Taiwan Strait could disrupt East Asia’s extensive trade links, sever global production chains, generate serious shocks to regional economies, upend Asia’s security architecture, and, potentially, escalate into a catastrophic superpower war. Many regional states — including U.S. allies — are beginning to seriously consider how they would respond to a potential use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But analytic attention has focused overwhelmingly on the worst-case scenario of a PRC invasion, largely ignoring more likely contingencies calculated to stay below the threshold of lethal force. It is in this “gray zone” that the PRC has made strategic advances in the East and South China Seas in recent years. This paper argues that, compared with an invasion or blockade of Taiwan’s main island, an operation to capture one or more offshore islands currently controlled by the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) would offer Beijing considerable advantages. In an immediate tactical sense, it would offer Beijing greater flexibility and escalation control, lower risk of civilian casualties, and less likelihood of sparking a strong Taiwanese response or U.S. intervention. Strategically, such an operation could open up an array of options for further probes, faits accomplis, information gathering, and coercive pressure on ROC forces—and, in the case of the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, substantial opportunities for enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistical support for a future invasion of the main island. Domestically, in contrast with a bloody and potentially catastrophic all-out invasion or a blockade that would risk conflict with the United States, outlying island seizure could offer Beijing a low-risk yet highly symbolic rallying point in a period of likely economic struggles and rising social dissatisfaction. Policymakers and strategists on all sides of politics in Taiwan, the United States and elsewhere need to carefully consider how they would respond to such contingencies, in order to enable an effective international response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

14. Informing Australia’s next independent intelligence review: learning from the past

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Australian Government commissions a review of its intelligence community every five to seven years. With July 2023 marking six years since release of the last review’s report and, with funding already allocated in this year’s federal budget, the next one is likely to commence shortly. The best starting place for the forthcoming review is the work that precedes it, so reflection on 2017’s Independent Intelligence Review proves valuable. This report, Informing Australia’s next independent intelligence review, reflects on the experiences of the 2017 review and the implementation of its recommendations, and draws lessons to inform the terms of reference, approach and suggested focus of the next review. In doing so the report identifies three broad topics upon which the next review can most profitably ground its work: attracting, building and retaining a skilled workforce; adapting to rapid and profound technological change; and leveraging more, and closer, partnerships. It also highlights how the past six years have raised important and challenging questions in relation to each of those broad topics and identifies opportunities to further advance the future performance of the National Intelligence Community. In addition, specific recommendations are made to inform government’s planning and preparation for the new review.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and Statecraft
Political Geography:
Australia

15. An inflection point for Australian intelligence: revisiting the 2004 Flood Report

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The 2003 Iraq war, and more particularly intelligence failure in relation to Iraqi WMD, led to a broad-ranging inquiry into Australian intelligence conducted by Philip Flood AO. Flood’s July 2004 report has proven an inflection point between the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) of the immediate post–Cold War period and today’s National Intelligence Community (NIC). Flood laid out an ambitious vision for Australian intelligence and forcefully advocated for sovereign intelligence capability. The scope of his review extended beyond more than ‘recent intelligence lessons’ – that is, Iraq’s WMD, the 2002 Bali bombings and the unrest that led to 2003’s Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands - to the effectiveness of oversight and accountability within the AIC (including priority setting), ‘division of labour’ between AIC agencies and their communications with each other, maintenance of contestability in intelligence assessments, and adequacy of resourcing (especially for the Office of National Assessments - ONA). It was in addressing these matters that Flood laid the foundation for the future NIC, upon which would be constructed the reforms instituted by the L’Estrange-Merchant review of 2017. Importantly, Flood’s recommendations significantly enhanced ONA’s capabilities—not just analytical resources but also the resources (and tasking) needed to address the more effective coordination and evaluation of foreign intelligence across the AIC. This was a critical step towards the more structured and institutionalised (if sometimes bureaucratic) NIC of 2023 and an enhanced community leadership role for, ultimately, ONI. In addition, the Flood Report identified issues that remain pertinent and challenging today – including the vexed issue of the public presentation of intelligence for policy purposes, the central importance of the intelligence community’s people (including training, career management, recruitment and language proficiency), intelligence distribution (including avoiding overloading time-poor customers), the need to maximise collaborative opportunities between agencies, and how best to leverage intelligence relationships (including broadening relations beyond traditional allied partners).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Intelligence, National Security, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

16. Incels in Australia: the ideology, the threat, and a way forward

Author:
Jasmine Latimore and John Coyne
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report explores the phenomenon of ‘incels’—involuntary celibates—and the misogynistic ideology that underpins a subset of this global community of men that has become a thriving Internet subculture. It examines how online spaces, from popular social media sites to dedicated incel forums, are providing a platform for not just the expansion of misogynistic views but gender-based violent extremism. It raises key questions regarding Australian efforts to counter misogynistic ideologies within our nation. If there’s a continuum that has sexist, but lawful, views on gender at one end and gendered hate speech at the other, at what point does misogynistic ideology tip into acts of gendered violence? What’s needed to prevent misogynistic ideologies from becoming violent? And how do we, as a society, avoid the epidemic levels of violence against women in Australia? This report doesn’t intend to provide answers to all of those questions. It does, however, seek to make an important contribution to public discourse about the increasing trend in misogynistic ideology through examination of a particularly violent community of misogynists, and proposes a range of policy options for consideration to tackle the threat that misogynistic ideology poses to Australia. This report makes six recommendations designed to reduce and, where possible, prevent the risk of future occurrence of incel and similar violence in Australia. The recommendations include greater awareness raising and policy recognition that incel violence can be an ideological form of issue-motivated extremism which would provide certainty that incels could formally fall within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)—in addition to law-enforcement agencies—and would encourage tailored education programs focused on engaging young males at risk from indoctrination in this extreme subculture (along with their parents).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Law Enforcement, Counter-terrorism, Ideology, Threat Assessment, and Incels
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

17. Chinese foreign policy in 2023: Stepping back from the brink

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2023, decision-makers in Austria and Europe have to most importantly consider three partly interrelated and highly topical questions that are and should be preoccupying China researchers. Will China escalate its support for Russia during the war in Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan? How will China’s protest movement and exit from Zero-COVID impact foreign policy? Further trends in China research will address the need to employ digital methods due to a lack of access for fieldwork (COVID or political restrictions) (BCCN 2022), the importance of protests more broadly (labour issues or Hong Kong democracy) (Wei and Chan 2022; Cheng et al 2022), and the fragility of a centralized system around Xi Jinping with no succession plan as Xi enters his third term as president in March 2023 (Tsang and Cheung 2021). Following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has supported Moscow in the informational and diplomatic domain, but has remained self-interested in the economic domain, and has not shifted from previous policies in the military domain (Chestnut Greitens 2022, 751). China needs Russia as a partner in mounting a (normative) challenge to US power and the liberal international order (Johnston 2022, 1307), gaining influence in multilateral institutions (Wang and Sampson 2022, 374), and preserving the Communist Party regime (Pavel, Kirchberger and Sinjen 2022, 295). The Chinese leadership would like to see a Russian victory, and dreads a defeatinduced regime collapse in Moscow (Lo 2022). Beijing has condemned the West for provoking the war and for imposing sanctions. In the UN, China abstained or voted for Russia. At the same time, since the beginning of the war, bilateral trade has grown significantly. Yet, Chinese companies and banks have partly withdrawn or broken off ties with Russian counterparts to steer clear of secondary sanctions. Moreover, while joint military exercises continue, there is no clear evidence for arms or equipment deliveries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

18. The Impacts of the Russo-Ukranian War on Latin America in the Age of Strategic Competition

Author:
Guido Torres
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
As we enter the second year of the Russo-Ukranian war, it is prudent that the foreign policy community examine the impacts of the conflict on other regions, including Latin America. Despite the distance between Latin America and Ukraine, the conflict has disrupted the region and exacerbated the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 disproportionately affected Latin America’s fragile socioeconomic, fiscal, and political situation. For example, Brazil, a major regional economic powerhouse, was one of the worst-struck countries in the region, and the pandemic significantly impacted its economy. The country’s GDP contracted by 4.1% in 2020, and unemployment reached a record high of 14.1% in the first quarter of 2021. The pandemic also impacted Brazil’s fiscal situation, with the country’s debt reaching 90% of GDP. Brazil’s downturn is not an isolated incident, albeit a microcosm of the region. In addition, the instability allowed authoritarian regimes to further consolidate control in places like Nicaragua, Venezuela, and El Salvador. For instance, leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele capitalized on the chaos of the pandemic and a desperate citizenry to strengthen his power. Furthering the impacts on domestic politics, the confluence of the pandemic and war in Ukraine disrupted global supply chains, agriculture production, and energy resources. Moreover, as tensions between the West and nations such as Russia and China continue to grow, globalization is becoming increasingly divided. This will likely lead to further political turmoil and socioeconomic disparity in Latin America, which has already been compounded by the war and the lackluster COVID-19 recovery efforts. With these repercussions still lingering, a lack of economic and trade development, an intensifying energy crisis, and rampant inflation prevailing in 2023, the region’s outlook remains bleak.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Latin America

19. Greenland in the mirror of Puerto Rico

Author:
Rafael Cox Alomar
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The quest for self-determination is as critical today as it was in the aftermath of the Second World War. As was the case during the heyday of decolonization, the path to political devolution remains entangled to realpolitik. It is the geopolitical calculus of the metropolitan centers that still defines the viability and feasibility of the decolonizing formulas available to their non-sovereign territories. The options available to Greenland and Puerto Rico will no doubt reflect the new global order emerging from the ashes of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the United States and Denmark (along with their NATO partners) engage in the complex task of redrawing and redefining the boundaries and security priorities of their transatlantic alliance. It is precisely against this background that the present brief offers a succinct description of Puerto Rico’s politico-constitutional status. While bound to their respective metropoles within the context of contrasting constitutional arrangements, the political and legal issues besieging Greenland and Puerto Rico are not wholly dissimilar and deserve careful attention. More specifically, the definition of free association adopted by the US House of Representatives on December 15, 2022, upon approving the 2022 Puerto Rico Status Act bill, might prove informative to policymakers in Nuuk and Copenhagen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, History, and Self-Determination
Political Geography:
North Atlantic, Denmark, Caribbean, Greenland, and Puerto Rico

20. Free Association and the United Nations

Author:
Rachael Johnstone
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Since 1945, most States, on achieving independence, seek admission to the United Nations. This is a shortcut to international recognition on the world stage and secures their statehood against future challenge. Although in theory States do not require formal recognition from other States to come into existence, it is desirable. Rather than seeking recognition and/or expensive diplomatic relations with dozens of other States, admission to the UN puts to bed any doubts about the nation’s existence as a State once and for all. Membership is available to States in Free Association (FA States). UN Members each hold a seat on the General Assembly with an equal vote (irrespective of population or economy). The General Assembly controls the UN budget and elects Member States to other major UN bodies (e.g., ECOSOC, Human Rights Council and Security Council). Membership of these bodies allows States to influence UN focus and policy. A small, new Member State may not desire or have the capacity to seek a seat on these bodies directly, but it can engage in “vote-trading” to promote its interests within the broader system. The General Assembly is also a crucial diplomatic forum in which Member States build trust and alliances with one another.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, United Nations, History, and Free Association
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

21. Climate resilience and Cook Islands' relationship of Free Association with Aotearoa / New Zealand

Author:
David J. Kilcullen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
On 1 January 2020, the Cook Islands was removed from the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s List of Official Development Assistance (ODA) Recipients. Having been assessed as a “high-income status country”, this re-classification rendered the Cook Islands ineligible for OECD development assistance. It was unfortunate timing. The Covid-19 pandemic hit a few months later and caused a significant contraction in the tourism sector on which the Cook Islands is economically dependent. The result was, by the government’s own description, a “severe recession” with a total contraction of -21.6% of GDP in 2020/ 2021. Thus, only months after being recognized as having a sufficiently high income as to no longer warrant OECD development-assistance, the Cook Islands lost nearly a quarter of its GDP. This was especially significant for a country that is particularly susceptible to climate change and weather-related hazards. The Cook Islands is made up of 15 coral atolls and volcanic islands. Over 90% of the residents of the 12 inhabited islands live within one kilometer of a coastline. In addition, its already modest population of just under 15,000 people is rapidly decreasing (down from approximately 17,500 in 2016), undermining social and economic resilience to shocks. Despite notable economic growth in the years preceding Covid-19, greater infrastructure and other investment remains essential to brace the country for future climate-related changes. A question thus arises as to the benefits of Free Association in circumstances where the former colony faces crises.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, History, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, New Zealand, and Cook Islands

22. The European Political Community: Putting politics first?

Author:
Fabrizio Tassinari
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The European Political Community (EPC) was launched in Prague on October 6th of 2022 in the presence of 44 European heads of state and government, including all 27 Member States of the EU, as well as governments of neighbouring European countries, most notably the United Kingdom, Ukraine and Turkey. The initiative came in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its stated aims was to address the shortcomings of the European institutional architecture. While the project is a direct emanation of the French government, its objectives, perspectives and potential as an intergovernmental forum for political and strategic discussions about the future of Europe remain unexplored. The gathering has already planned three future summits (in Chișinău, Moldova; Granada, Spain and the United Kingdom) but it is as yet unclear if and how the new format can contribute to the wider European security architecture in light of the war, ongoing NATO enlargement to Finland and Sweden and the EU’s opt-out referendum in Denmark. This brief aims to spell out three questions surrounding the evolution of the EPC across three key dimensions that concerns its possible institutional, policy and power-related contribution to the wider European constellation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

23. South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral

Author:
Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Multilateral Relations, Maritime, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, Philippines, East China, United States of America, and South China Sea

24. ROK-US Alliance: Linchpin for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Author:
Rob York, Chloe Clougher, Julian Gluck, Jaeeun Ha, and Lindsay Horikoshi
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The US-ROK alliance in 2023 celebrates its 70th anniversary, and in both countries remains broadly popular. Previous doubts that both countries have had about the other’s commitment have largely given way to a sense of shared opportunities, and shared challenges. Not only is there an ever-more belligerent North Korea, with its growing nuclear and missile arsenals, but the People’s Republic of China uses both military and economic means to coerce other countries and Russia has demonstrated a willingness to upend norms, redraw borders, and dare former partners (including Seoul) to risk its ire. This is also an era of the minilateral, as the US seeks to move past its previous hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia and draw its partners into closer cooperation. South Korea, especially under its current administration, demonstrates increased interest in becoming a regional player, with its recent gestures toward old frenemy Japan representing a key test: historical differences between the US’ two closest partners have prevented a “normal” relationship from emerging despite many similarities in political systems, values, and interests, and Korean public opinion remains skeptical of the Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. Furthermore, there is always a chance that issues complicating US-ROK relations in the past—conduct by US military personnel in Korea, trade disputes, environmental concerns related to US bases—could resurface. All of these issues present challenges for the alliance that will require addressing. In that light, the Pacific Forum, with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, has launched the “ROK-US Next Generation Leaders Initiative” program, bringing together young burgeoning scholars and analysts from both countries to discuss pressing issues in the alliance the way forward. This edited volume contains edited papers on pressing topics—extended deterrence, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and much more—by rising scholars we expect to see addressing these issues in the years to come. Their active engagement, we believe, will help the alliance endure another 70 years, will providing for the security and prosperity of both countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
South Korea, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

25. Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives

Author:
John Hemmings, Ariel Mota Alves, Attawat Joseph Ma Assavanadda, Fikry A. Rahman, Katrina Guanio, and Siu Tzyy Wei
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated. The primary mechanism for engagement with the individual countries in Southeast Asia has been through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its attendant bodies, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM). Meanwhile, ASEAN member states have promoted the principle of “ASEAN centrality” as a means to prevent major power interference in the sub-region and to retain influence over security cooperation within Southeast Asia and beyond. As a result, the acknowledgement of ASEAN centrality has become a “boilerplate” for strategy and policy documents related to regional security. One example of this is the inclusion of the principle in the 2021 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the increasingly pressing nature of challenges confronting the broader region, their speed and intensity, are beginning to outpace the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN. The ASEAN Way – an emphasis on informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus as the basis of major decisions – has been integral to creating internal cohesion and harmony within ASEAN decision-making and is an enabler of socio-political integration. On the other hand, it has also stymied efforts to develop effective collective responses to conflicts and has made ASEAN hostage to great powers able to use their influence over members to break consensus. While defenders of ASEAN point to its successes and remain confident that it will adapt to regional issues over time, others are increasingly skeptical that ASEAN can retain its status as the gatekeeper of regional security agenda. It is in this context that Pacific Forum carried out this extended study with support from the Luce Foundation to investigate Southeast Asian perspectives on the “biggest threats or most pressing security issues, now and in the foreseeable future.” We asked a group of our Southeast Asian cohort of Young Leaders (ages 21 to 35), what problems were most pressing to them, and asked them how they thought their countries should address these issues, noting which third-parties would be most important for them to leverage in doing so. We believe this publication, which cuts across a broad range of security issues, is a fair representation of the eclecticism and diversity that characterize the region itself and hope that our readers will find them as useful as we have here at Pacific Forum. The collection starts with traditional security issues and then moves to more non-traditional security issues, though this does not reflect any internal emphasis or prioritization on the part of the editors. The first essay, by Siu Tzyy Wei, is entitled “Caught in the Middle: The Measured Voice of Brunei’s Foreign Policy Amidst the South China Sea Dispute.” Beginning with the South China Sea is appropriate for any collective study on the region, but Brunei’s position as a “silent claimant” presents a perspective not often heard. The author’s assertion that it is China and external powers – AUKUS and the Quad are mentioned – that are adding pressure to the South China Sea and adding a dangerous complexity, compelling Brunei’s “neutrality,” a striking claim given the threat to Bruneian sovereignty. The second essay moves to another flashpoint, the political crisis in Myanmar; a national issue that has reverberated around ASEAN as well as further abroad in Washington and Brussels. Appropriately titled “The Coming of the Raging Fire: The Revolution in Myanmar,” Thiha Wint Aung analyzes the lead-up to the political crisis and concludes by calling for the international community to explicitly support the people’s “armed resistance” against the military. The third essay presents a bold national case for a region-wide issue: dealing with rising Chinese influence. In “Malaysia’s China Policy Amid China’s Growing Security Concerns,” Fikry A. Rahman argues that Malaysian policy elites will have to prioritize strategic concerns over economic ties vis-a-vis China if it is to adequately defend Malaysian sovereignty. The next group of essays focuses on non-traditional security issues, beginning with climate change, one of the most pressing global issues. Southeast Asia is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as noted in the fourth essay, “When it Rains, it Pours: Disaster Displacement and the Future of Human Security in the Philippines Amid Changing Climate.” Katrina Guanio calls for policymakers to be aware of gradual or even sudden human migrations due to inclement weather, such as typhoons, and the impact these have on national health, economic, and security dynamics. Taking an unusual and unique perspective, the fifth essay, “Climate Maladaptation: Migration, Food Insecurity, and the Politics of Climate Change in Timor-Leste” by Ariel Mota Alves, makes the provocative argument that international organizations can sometimes promote detrimental Western development narratives that undermine local solutions to local climate change effects. The sixth essay, “Human Trafficking in Vietnam: A Top-Tier Non-Traditional Security Threat in the 21st Century” by Thu Nguyen Hoang Anh, measures the impact of the scourge of human trafficking in Vietnam and offers practical policy solutions to mitigating its impact on victims. Finally, the seventh essay, by Attawat Assavanadda, looks at “Thailand’s Brain Drain Challenge: Trends and Implications,” noting the push-pull drivers of the phenomenon and its impact on Thailand’s overall development. As one can see from this summary, the range of topics chosen by our talented Young Leader cohort from Southeast Asia is as diverse, inspiring, and multidimensional as the region itself. Ranging from security issues that are well covered by regional and international media to those that take an eclectic look at local variations of international issues, we are pleased to showcase these essays. As ever, the mission of Pacific Forum only begins with the creation of such young leader cohorts, and empowering them to present their analyses and recommendations should only be a prelude to robust regional conversations and discussions. We have been since our creation – a forum for those discussions – and hope that our readers will take that engaging approach to these essays and their authors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Migration, Brain Drain, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia

26. Understanding Alignment Decisions in Southeast Asia: A Review of U.S.-China Competition in the Philippines

Author:
William Piekos
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The United States and China are engaged in an ongoing struggle for the alignment commitments of Southeast Asian governments, employing a variety of measures to entice, cajole, and threaten states to alter their policy behavior. Caught between this competition, countries in Southeast Asia weigh their alignment options in search of the strategy viewed by the ruling regime as most likely to ameliorate risk and increase its prospects for survival. While nonalignment through hedging is a sought-after option, most often smaller states align with the major power that offers inducements (over coercion), as the material and diplomatic benefits bolster regimes’ claim to performance-based legitimacy and its domestic stability and security. A review of the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning during the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations reveals that inducements and coercion have played a significant role in the country’s alignment decisions. During the Aquino administration, coercive measures taken by China in the South China Sea and continued security and diplomatic inducements from the United States underscore the respective approaches of Beijing and Washington. The candidacy and election of Duterte, however, switched this dynamic, and the new president courted and received promises of Chinese economic assistance to support his domestic growth strategy and downplayed U.S. ties in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. In the end, continued Chinese provocations in the South China Sea and domestic security challenges led Duterte to call upon U.S. assistance once again, and Duterte was unable to initiate a full reconsideration of Manila’s position. Still, his strategic flirtation with China underscores the importance of performance-based legitimacy and the impact of inducements and coercion in shaping the foreign policy choices of smaller states. The findings of this study suggest that Washington’s focus on great power competition and sanctions handicaps U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The Philippines’ leaders focused on securing their domestic political prospects and legitimacy; criticism and coercive measures were largely ineffective for the United States or China in gaining influence over policy decisions. Washington should more often consider the promise and provision of inducements—while remaining sensitive to human rights concerns, governance issues, and liberal norms—to support the needs of Southeast Asian states, incentivize more transparent behavior, and increase the likelihood that these states will support U.S. interests in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

27. War and Peace for Moscow and Beijing

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Perhaps more than any other time in their respective histories, the trajectories of China and Russia were separated by choices in national strategy. A year into Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, the war bogged down into a stalemate. Meanwhile, China embarked upon a major peace offensive aimed at Europe and beyond. It was precisely during these abnormal times that the two strategic partners deepened and broadened relations as top Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow in the first few months of the year (China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, President Xi Jinping, and newly appointed Defense Minister Li Shangfu). Meanwhile, Beijing’s peace initiative became both promising and perilous as it reached out to warring sides and elsewhere (Europe and the Middle East). It remains to be seen how this new round of “Western civil war” (Samuel Huntington’s depiction of the 1648-1991 period in his provocative “The Clash of Civilizations?” treatise) could be lessened by a non-Western power, particularly after drone attacks on the Kremlin in early May.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

28. The Return of Shuttle Diplomacy

Author:
Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In March 2023, Japan and South Korea had a long-awaited breakthrough in their bilateral relations, which many viewed as being at the lowest point since the 1965 normalization. On March 16, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio held a summit in Tokyo and agreed to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” a crucial mechanism of bilateral cooperation that had been halted for about a decade. Behind the positive developments was President Yoon’s political decision on the issue of compensating wartime forced laborers. The two leaders took steps to bring ties back to the level that existed prior to actions in 2018 and 2019, which precipitated the downward spiral in their relationship. Japan decided to lift the export controls it placed on its neighbor following the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018. South Korea withdrew its complaint with the World Trade Organization on Japan’s export controls. Less than a week after the summit, Seoul officially fully restored the information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) that it had with Tokyo. They also resumed high-level bilateral foreign and security dialogues to discuss ways to navigate the changing international environment together as partners. The big question now is whether this trend of restoring and expanding bilateral cooperation would continue throughout and beyond the Yoon presidency. In South Korea, critics argue that his handling of the forced labor issue is not a lasting solution to historical issues with Japan. The breakthrough was not a product of any major change in South Korean public sentiment toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Nor was it a product of changes in the Japanese position on outstanding bilateral historical and territorial issues. Both the Japanese and South Korean governments, however, feel the urgent need to cooperate for their own national security, and for economic reasons. Whether the advances in the first four months of 2023 will be short-lived or the start of a new partnership and reconciliation will likely depend on how much understanding they both show in seeing things from the other’s perspective and how willing they will be in accommodating the other’s political needs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

29. Deepening Suspicions and Limited Diplomacy

Author:
Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
China and South Korea began 2023 with the temporary imposition of tit-for-tat restrictions by both governments on travel to the other country after China lifted its zero-COVID policy. Although the restrictions proved temporary, they pointed to the reality of a sustained downward spiral in China-South Korea relations accompanied by increasingly strident public objections in Chinese media to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s steps to redouble South Korean alignment with the United States regarding Indo-Pacific strategy, supply chain resiliency, and shared values. South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin’s congratulatory call to newly appointed Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang on Jan. 9 was one of the few positive senior-level interaction between the two countries in early 2023; by the end of April, the main diplomatic interactions between China and South Korea had devolved into a dueling exchange of private demarches and public assertions that the other side had committed a “diplomatic gaffe.” As Yoon took steps to strengthen South Korean ties with NATO, stabilize relations with Japan, and upgrade efforts with the US to deter North Korea from continued nuclear development, Chinese criticisms of South Korea became increasingly ominous. They culminated in a stern Chinese diplomatic response to Yoon’s interview with Reuters on April 19 in which he characterized a possible cross-strait conflict between mainland China and Taiwan as a global security issue. Meanwhile, the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) in February and China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) confirming Xi Jinping’s third term as president in March drove symbolic exchanges of support between Chinese party-state and military leaders and their North Korean counterparts. The continued lack of a unified UN response to North Korean missile provocations renewed calls for Chinese “responsibility” and “influence” and Beijing’s reassertions of Pyongyang’s own “insecurity.” The arrival of Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Wang Yajun in Pyongyang, delayed for two years following his appointment due to pandemic-related quarantines, may presage a broader opening for China-North Korea humanitarian exchanges alongside concerns about North Korea’s ongoing military development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

30. Washington Zeroes in on Manila

Author:
Catharin Dalpino
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
With an apparent renaissance in the US-Philippine alliance, spurred by rising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, the Biden administration ramped up diplomatic activity with Manila as the two countries moved toward an official visit from President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., in May. At the same time, the 42nd iteration of Cobra Gold, which returned to full strength for the first time since the 2014 coup in Bangkok, suggested momentum in the US-Thailand alliance, albeit with a lower profile. While the international environment continued to be roiled by US-China rivalry, the Russian war in Ukraine, and high food and commodity prices, Southeast Asia’s own internal turmoil was evident. The junta in Myanmar extended the state of emergency and stepped up aerial bombing of areas held by the opposition and armed ethnic groups. As Indonesia takes up the ASEAN chair, prospects for implementing the Five-Point Consensus Plan are dim, if not dead. Vietnam and Thailand began leadership transitions—Hanoi with an anti-corruption purge and Bangkok with the launch of general elections—while Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen continued to eviscerate the opposition ahead of his near-certain re-election in July. As Southeast Asian leaders work to grow their economies in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, competition among them to attract foreign domestic investment is intensifying, particularly in technology and electric vehicles. In the meantime, the region awaits the conclusion of negotiations for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which will offer insight into Washington’s vision of an economic order for the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Philippines, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

31. An Even Larger Role in Everything

Author:
Akhil Ramesh and Michael Rubin
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
On May 24, 2022, President Joe Biden met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the Quad summit in Tokyo. According to the White House readout of the meeting, “The leaders reviewed the progress made in the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. They committed to deepen the Major Defense Partnership, encourage economic engagement that benefits both countries, and expand partnership on global health, pandemic preparedness, and critical and emerging technologies.” While such statements are often aspirational and lag in implementation, the first four months of 2023 show the renaissance in US-India ties to be real.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

32. US-China Effort to Set “Guardrails” Fizzles with Balloon Incident

Author:
Sourabh Gupta
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The proposed “guardrail” that Joe Biden and Xi Jinping sought to erect last fall in Bali failed to emerge in the bitter aftermath of a wayward Chinese surveillance balloon that overflew the United States and violated its sovereignty. Though Antony Blinken and Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference afterward, aspersions cast by each side against the other, including a series of disparaging Chinese government reports, fed the chill in ties. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during the return leg of her US transit added to bilateral and cross-strait tensions and were met with Chinese sanctions. Issues pertaining to Taiwan, be it arms sales or a speculated Chinese invasion date of the island, remained contentious. The administration’s attempt to restart constructive economic reengagement with China, including via an important speech by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, appears to have fallen on deaf ears in Beijing. Following the Biden-Xi meeting on Nov. 14 on the sidelines of the G20 Leaders Summit in Bali, Indonesia, US-People’s Republic of China relations were transitioning to an improving track—or so it seemed. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense Ministers” Meeting-Plus meeting in Cambodia on Nov. 22. On Dec. 11-12, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink held “candid, in-depth and constructive” talks in Beijing. On Jan. 18, Secretary Yellen had a “candid, substantive, and constructive conversation” with departing Vice-Premier Liu He in Zurich ahead of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Hours before Secretary Blinken was due to board a flight to Beijing on Feb. 3, which would have been the highest-ranking contact between the two sides since the Bali meeting, the budding rapprochement came to a screeching halt.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

33. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

Author:
Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

34. India’s Ongoing “Strategic Correction to the East” during 2022

Author:
Satu Limaye
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
India’s East Asia relations in 2022 followed the arc articulated by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s address at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand in August. He recalled three decades ago India made a “strategic correction to the East…[o]riginally…contemplated as an economic measure, with trade and investment at its core” and mostly focused on ASEAN. He said the geography, concepts, and assessments of India’s Indo-Pacific vision have expanded “to cover Japan, Korea and China, and in due course, Australia as also other areas of Pacific Islands…[and] facets of cooperation also increased…now cover[ing] connectivity in various forms, people-to-people ties and more recently, defense and security.” And while dutifully referencing India’s Indo-Pacific policies including Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI), he gave the most attention to the revitalized Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”). The highlights of India in East Asia in 2022 were numerous Quad meetings, the inaugural India-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, the second India-Japan 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, the Australian deputy prime minister and minister for defense’s visit to India, and India’s defense minister visits to Vietnam and Mongolia. Defense and security engagement included numerous exercises, defense dialogues, military-to-military exchanges, and navy ship visits.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Interests, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
India, East Asia, and Asia

35. China-Russia Relations: Ending the War? Or the World?

Author:
Yu Bin
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
As the Ukraine conflict was poised to expand, the “extremely complicated” situation at the frontline (in Vladimir Putin’s words on Dec. 20) gave rise to intensified high-level exchanges between Moscow and Beijing as they searched for both an alternative to the conflict, and stable and growing bilateral ties. As the Ukraine war dragged on and mustered a nuclear shadow, it remained to be seen how the world would avoid what Henry Kissinger defined as a “1916 moment,” or a missed peace with dire consequences for not only the warring parties but all of civilization.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

36. Xi Moderates to US and Others Amid Continued Competition

Author:
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Southeast Asia was the center of international attention in November as regional and global leaders gathered at the G20 conference in Indonesia, which took place between the annual ASEAN-hosted summit meetings in Cambodia and the yearly APEC leaders meeting in Thailand. Acute China-US rivalry loomed large in media and other forecasts, warning of a clash of US-Chinese leaders with negative implications feared in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The positive outcome of the Biden-Xi summit at the G20 conference and related actions eased tensions, which was welcomed, particularly in Southeast Asia, but the implications for the US and allies’ competition with China remain to be seen. Tensions over disputes in the South China Sea continued unabated. President Xi Jinping made his first trip to a major international gathering at the G20 conference followed by the APEC meeting after more than two years of self-imposed isolation in line with his government’s strict COVID-19 restrictions. His visit occurred against the background of China’s unprecedented military show of force in response to US advances in relations with Taiwan, strident criticism of US efforts to increase influence in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and remarkable warnings about China’s determination to resist adverse international threats in his landmark report to the 20thCommunist Party Congress in October validating his third term as party leader. Representing the United States at the ASEAN and G20 summits, President Joseph Biden gave no ground on Taiwan or other sensitive issues, increased US support for the island government, signed two massive bills calling for over half a trillion dollars of spending to compete with China on high technology and climate change, and imposed strict export controls on advanced computer chip technology to undermine China’s high technology ambitions. Because of protocol and scheduling, Xi and Biden overlapped only at the G20 meeting, making the Xi-Biden summit meeting on the sidelines of that conference a focus of attention. As discussed in the US-China chapter of this edition of Comparative Connections, Xi adopted a more moderate approach in dealing with the United States. He notably ended China’s past insistence that the United States change its policies toward China before China would agree to the Biden government’s longstanding request to work with China to set guardrails to manage US-China rivalry in ways that would avoid military conflict. The Chinese leader’s new approach was accompanied by public diplomacy efforts that were remarkable because they were starkly contrary to Chinese diplomacy throughout 2022. Chinese representatives and commentary endeavored to persuade audiences in Southeast Asia and elsewhere that Xi’s report and recent strident Chinese commentary and provocative actions did not represent China’s intentions. They corrected such “misperceptions” and advised that Chinese intentions were moderate, accommodating, and positive, focused on constructive outreach for cooperation in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. In addition to the United States, targets for this call to improve ties included US allies and partners heretofore strongly criticized by China for their policies in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, notably Japan and Australia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

37. US-India Relations: Friends with Benefits

Author:
Akhil Ramesh
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
2022 was a challenging year, not just for US-India relations, but for every India analyst trying to explain the Indian government’s position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Explaining to a non-IR audience India’s history of nonalignment during the Cold-War era and its current policy of multi-alignment was not a gratifying endeavor. While the last four months of 2022 did not have the friction and stress-tests as the first four of 2022 or the slow and steady expansion of relations that followed between May and September, they certainly had multiple surprising events that could make them the halcyon months of 2022. In mid-November, the US and Indian armies engaged in a military exercise at Auli, not far from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian-held and Chinese-held territory. While the US and Indian armies have engaged in exercises prior to 2022, this proximity to the Indo-China border is a first. A month later, in another first, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen traveled to India to meet Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman to expand the US-India “Indo-Pacific partnership.” Yellen characterized India as a “friendly shore” for supply chain diversification and as the indispensable partner for the US. A country that earned notoriety for its bureaucracy and trade protectionism over the years was suddenly characterized as “friendly”; one that was highly skeptical of foreign militaries on its shores was actively engaging the US military at one of its most sensitive and tempestuous borders. The primary catalyst for this sea change has been shared concerns over a rising, authoritarian, and hegemonic China. The events of the last four months, while making India’s multi-alignment labored, also made it abundantly clear that the US-India relations will continue to expand to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

38. De-escalation Efforts: What Tehran wants from a prisoner swap deal with Washington?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
US National Security Council Spokesperson Adrienne Waston, in a statement on August 10, 2023, affirmed that Iran has released from prison five Americans who were detained and has placed them on house arrest. US citizens Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others were released from Tehran’s notorious Evin prison to house arrest. The US official described their release as “an encouraging step” and stressed that Washigton will continue efforts to bring them “all back home in the United States.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

39. Diplomacy of Neglect: Assessing the European Union’s engagement in the Sudanese Crisis

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The European Union aims to strengthen its involvement in the Sudanese crisis. This was recently evident when Brussels welcomed a delegation of Sudanese political leaders on July 27, 2023. This effort aims to establish an active European role in the endeavors to settle the Sudanese crisis.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, European Union, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Sudan

40. Cautious Pragmatism: What is thе potential outcome of Washington's approach to thе Nigеr crisis?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On August 8, 2023, US Sеcrеtary of Statе Antony Blinkеn announcеd that diplomacy is thе prеfеrrеd way of rеsolving thе crisis causеd by thе coup in Nigеr. Following thе coup on July 26, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan strongly condemned any effort to detain or subvert thе functioning of Nigеr's dеmocratically еlеctеd govеrnmеnt, led by President Mohamеd Bazoum. Thеsе statements reflect thе ambiguity of Washington's stance regarding thе crisis in Nigеr.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Counter-terrorism, Crisis Management, Coup, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Niger, and United States of America

41. A Bid to Contain Pressure: What are the motives behind Iranian President's East Africa tour?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi went on a trip to Africa from July 11 to 13, 2023, during which he visited Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe on invitations from the leaders of the three countries, President William Ruto, Yoweri Museveni and President Emmerson Mnangagwa, respectively. Raisi led a high-level delegation including First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Health Minister Behrouz Aghaei, and Minister of Agriculture Seyyed Javad Sadati Nejad, and several other high-ranking officials and businessmen.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Uganda, Kenya, Iran, Middle East, Zimbabwe, and East Africa

42. Partnership Diversification: What are the implications of the sixth round of the Russia-GCC strategic dialogue?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Following a five-year hiatus, Russia and the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, held the sixth round of their strategic dialogue in Moscow on July 10, 2023, at a critical juncture. The meeting has several implications aligning with the Gulf’s endeavors that began in the wake of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and later took shape in the wake of the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Diversification, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Gulf Nations

43. A Surprising Shift: Is Somalia choosing Moscow over Washington?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Somali Foreign Minister Abshir Omar Jama made a surprise visit to Moscow on May 26, 2023, to meet with several Russian officials, including his counterpart Sergey Lavrov. His visit raised several questions regarding motives and implications, particularly in light of the Russian top diplomat’s statements about Russia’s readiness to supply Mogadishu with the necessary military equipment for its ongoing war against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Engagement, Al-Shabaab, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Somalia, and United States of America

44. The Israeli ThreatL What is driving the renewed escalation between Iran and Azerbaijan?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Ministry of Interior, Security Agency, and Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan announced in a joint statement on Tuesday, May 16, 2023, that nine individuals were arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the government by force, assassinate prominent figures and senior Azerbaijani officials. The statement indicated that they had connections to Iranian intelligence agencies, and that the cell was composed of a person named Ruhollah Akhoundzadeh and his son Mursal, along with seven others working under his supervision. On his part, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Kanaani, rejected the accusations in a statement on May 18, denying any official or unofficial relationship between these individuals and Iran. He affirmed that imprisoning individuals on the pretext of their connection to Iran is unacceptable.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Azerbaijan

45. Macron’s Tour: A new French strategy for Africa

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
French President Macron ended a four-nation tour of Africa earlier in March, which took him to Gabon, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Hopeful of restoring France’s influence in the continent, Macron met with African presidents amid popular protests – signs of rising anti-French sentiment in parts of Francophone Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Migration, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa, France, and Democratic Republic of Congo

46. Intertwined Interest: What’s behind China-Ivory Coast strengthened relations?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The diplomatic relation between China and Ivory Coast spans over more than four decades. Both sides have strengthened their relations in recent years as China looks to cement its presence in Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Ivory Coast

47. Encircling Damascus: Iran’s Foreign Minister Visits Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, has made a surprise visit to Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus, reflecting his country’s increased engagement in the region. His trip to Ankara replaced a postponed trip to Moscow, where he was set to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Engagement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

48. Diplomatic Defeat: Uncovering the low turnout to the Arab League meeting in Tripoli

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Libya’s outgoing Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, failed to host a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in the capital Tripoli on January 21, 2023. The chief diplomats of most of the Arab states and the organization’s secretary-general boycotted the meeting. Representatives of only seven Arab states, including Tunisia’s and Algeria’s foreign ministers, attended the gathering, which was a diplomatic blow to the al-Dbeibah government.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arab League, and Instability
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

49. Russia’s 2023 foreign policy concept: war against Ukraine, confrontation with the west, and continuation of the tradition of imperialism

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On March 31, 2023, the sixth Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation was published (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2023). The document was updated for the first time in six years, the main reason for which is the deteriorating international situation for Moscow amid the Russo-Ukrainian war. The text of the concept is highlighted by harsh and revanchist calls against the West and especially the USA. The document almost entirely refers to the Russo-Ukrainian war, at the same time, the concept shows that the current war is only one part of Russia’s confrontation with the Western world. The concept contains a number of statements inconsistent with the real policy of Russia and even lies, but despite the absurd, propagandistic content of the new document, it is important to find out how the new concept differs from its predecessor, and also what factors Russia relies on in the current difficult international situation? Based on the 2023 Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia the impact of Russia’s imperialist worldview on its foreign policy in the light of full-scale military intervention in Ukraine, the changed attitude towards the West, the prospects of Russia-West relations, Russia’s attempt to strengthen ties with non-Western countries, and finally, threats from Russia to Georgia are discussed in this publication.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Georgia, and United States of America

50. The Zeitenwende in German Foreign Policy And The Eastern Partnership

Author:
Mariam Macharashvili
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
This paper aims to analyze Germany’s approach to the Eastern Partnership against the backdrop of the “turning point” (Zeitwende) in German foreign policy announced by Olaf Scholz in February 2022. The deviation from the previous policy came as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which disrupted the European collective security system and called into question the main characteristics of German foreign policy. The outbreak of the war on the territory of Europe showed the German leadership that the use of non-military means in the foreign policy, as well as their policy of openness and normalization towards the East (Ostpolitik), which largely implies Russia, turned out to be wrong. Russia’s war in Ukraine also became the basis for the rethinking of yet another political concept - change through trade (Wandel durch Handel), according to which trade and economic interdependence with Russia will facilitate its integration into Europe and push it towards peaceful mutual cooperation. Germany’s dependence on Russian natural resources on the one hand gave Russia a lever of political influence, and on the other made the German economy vulnerable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Partnerships, Regional Integration, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

51. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

52. Unravelling Turkish involvement in the Sahel: Geopolitics and local impact

Author:
Andrew Lebovich and Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In the past decade, Turkey has significantly expanded its engagement in Africa, leading to concerns within the European Union (EU) that this influence might be used to undermine EU policy and member states. This policy brief analyses the strategic motives and evolution of Turkish involvement in the Sahel region, focusing specifically on Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Drawing from interviews conducted with Sahelian and Turkish political, business, diplomatic and educational stakeholders between October and December 2022, the authors contend that Turkey’s foreign policy in the Sahel demonstrates a multifaceted approach that aims to strengthen its presence across economic, cultural, defence and development spheres. However, it is also emphasised that Turkey’s engagement in the Sahel remains relatively limited when compared to its activities in other African countries, for example Libya, Somalia and Algeria. In light of these findings, this policy brief recommends that the EU adopt a pragmatic approach, drawing lessons from Turkey’s strategy while trying to manage, and where possible benefit from, the impact of Turkish security assistance and to foster opportunities for Sahelian populations in Europe through scholarships and employment initiatives.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North Africa, and Sahel

53. The EU in the South Caucasus: Navigating a geopolitical labyrinth in turmoil

Author:
Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The tectonic plates of geopolitics are shifting in such a profound way that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has not only increased tensions between the world’s major powers, but also severely impacted the regions in which they traditionally strive to project their power. This applies especially to areas in the wider Eurasian region that the Russian Federation unjustifiably considers as part of its sphere of influence, such as the South Caucasus. Russia’s failure to achieve a quick and decisive victory in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not only forced the Kremlin to limit its objectives on the battlefield, at least for the time being, to Ukraine’s east. It has also reduced the credibility of the Russian military that much of its power projection has depended upon – and has reduced its attractiveness as a security partner for countries that have traditionally regarded Russia as such. Russia has had to withdraw some of its troops and military equipment from the South Caucasus, its leadership is preoccupied with Ukraine, and it has not lived up to its security commitments to Armenia. This has contributed to a geopolitical vacuum and uncertainty in the South Caucasus that other actors are eager to exploit.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe and South Caucasus

54. Al-Sudani’s first 100 days – Or how to keep everyone happy

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The job of an Iraqi Prime Minister is a complex balancing act on both the domestic and international fronts. To begin with, there is the challenge of managing competition between the country’s factitious elites. Then there is the unresolved tension between self-interested elites and a citizenry that has largely lost faith in its political leaders. Finally, there is the foreign policy dilemma of balancing political and economic dependence on both the US and Iran. By these standards, Prime Minister Mohammed Shiya al-Sudani’s first 100 days in office have provided a crash course on how to please all sides. He has allocated government positions to his supporters with gusto, provisionally left most Sadrist bastions of power in the state untouched (even though Sadrists are excluded from the government) and offered extensive ‘bread and games’ for the population by promising jobs and social security. Al-Sudani has furthermore sought to reassure opposing foreign actors through a hitherto fairly balanced foreign policy. His approach has been enabled by the broad coalition of Iraqi political elites that brought him to the premiership, along with record oil revenues that help grease the wheels of patronage politics. While structural reforms in politics, administration and economics are overdue, they will not happen because Iraq’s political leaders have no need for them in the immediate term. However, unresolved elite contention, a lack of public investment and the absence of reform mean that Iraq is likely heading for tougher times within the space of a couple of years.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Elites, and Public Investment
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

55. Turkey Earthquake: Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
In addition to the direct losses – both human lives and damage to buildings and infrastructure – domestically, the earthquake may have implications for the coming presidential and parliamentary elections. In terms of foreign policy, it triggered a quasi-coup in Turkey’s regional and international relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Natural Disasters, Infrastructure, Elections, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

56. A Dead-End War: Russian Failure and Ukrainian Destruction

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
With all parties still clinging to their demands, there is no end in sight to the war: Russia wants to cement its control over four Ukrainian provinces, win recognition of its sovereignty over Crimea, and secure guarantees for Ukrainian neutrality. Ukraine wants a definitive end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (including Crimea), and negotiations on its strategic future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

57. Into the Blue Pacific: Why the EU Should Help Island Nations Address Climate Change and Maritime Insecurity

Author:
Elisabeth Suh and Hanna Gers
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The ‘Blue Pacific’ is a vast region in the South Pacific, encompassing 30 million square kilometers, three million inhabitants and 14 nations. Its consists of thousands of islands threatened by climate change – a concern aggravated by geopolitical competition. The EU can help mitigate these challenges through capacity-building for climate adaptation and maritime security and regional consolidation. This overlaps with European strategic interests, including establishing itself as a trusted outside power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and Pacific Islands

58. Climate and Environmental Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Author:
Kira Vinke, Loyle Campbell, Dana Schirwon, Katongo Seyuba, Florian Krampe, Hafsa Maalim, and Guélor Isulu Mbungwal
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Climate change is compounding the Democratic Republic of Congo’s tangle of problems – a long-running civil war, weak governance, and deeply entrenched poverty and inequality. The country’s future is of global significance: its vast Congo-basin rainforest is a crucial carbon sink and a haven of biodiversity. DRC’s hydropower potential and its deposits of copper and cobalt could enable the energy transition, but a green resource looms over development prospects. Germany will need flexible and well-aligned national strategies to effectively support peace, human progress, and environmental protection in the DRC while putting the focus on the needs of marginalized populations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Poverty, Inequality, and Hydropower
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

59. Migration in the Context of Climate Foreign Policy

Author:
Kira Vinke, Hannes Einsporn, Dana Schirwon, and Mahalia Thomas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Migration, displacement and resettlement in the context of climate change are not distant scenarios of the future, but are now materializing along increasingly severe extreme events and slow-onset degradation. In view of accelerating global warming and the danger of crossing tipping points in the Earth system, forward-looking climate foreign policy and development policy should increasingly focus on severe climate impacts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Development, and Migration
Political Geography:
Germany and Global Focus

60. After Ostpolitik: A New Russia and Eastern Europe Policy Based on Lessons from the Past

Author:
Stefan Meister and Wilfried Jilge
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The large-scale Russian war of aggression against Ukraine that began in February 2022 demonstrates both the failure of Germany’s cooperative Ostpolitik of the last 30 years and the need for energy policy disentanglement. Russia has become the greatest security risk in Europe. To safeguard national and European security, Germany’s ruling coalition must learn lessons from the past, initiate a radical new beginning in Germany’s policy on Russia and Eastern Europe, and assume a leadership role in Europe.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Governance, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, and Ukraine

61. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations

Author:
Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

62. Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Until NATO Membership, Extending the Joint Expeditionary Force Is the Best Option

Author:
Benjamin Tallis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
There are no security “guarantees,” but NATO membership is as close as it gets – and has long proven its effectiveness in deterring ­Russian aggression. It is thus the only real option for Ukraine – and for wider European security. Addressing the lack of political will to recognize this, especially in Washington and Berlin, means finding an interim solution that provides credible, collective security in the meantime and fosters more durable, fairly delivered European ­security in the long term.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

63. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

64. Forced migration, aid effectiveness, and the humanitarian–development nexus: The case of Germany’s P4P programme

Author:
Stefan Leiderer and Helge Roxin
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation has been a contentious issue in academia and development practice for decades. Drawing on an evaluation of Germany’s ‘Partnership for Prospects’ initiative, this paper argues that, whilst the supplement of ‘peacebuilding’ to the nexus (humanitarian–development–peacebuilding [HDP] nexus) brought an important context factor into the discussion in an environment of conflict, it is only of marginal help in a context of forced migration to neighbouring countries of a given conflict. For the context of host countries of refugees in a protracted crisis, it is more relevant that host countries show ownership and reliability in their policies to create long-term perspectives for refugees. These policies in turn need to be embedded in reliable rules (polity) and negotiation processes (politics) in host countries. Consequently, the paper suggests that a ‘HD–Triple-P’ nexus would take the necessary political dimension into account more adequately. However, it might also mark the boundary as to what development politics can achieve.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, Refugees, Conflict, and Forced Migration
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

65. Gender and poverty as a feminist foreign policy priority

Author:
Joanne Crawford
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:
This issues paper is dedicated to the late Sylvia Chant, who named household-level measurement as a barrier to evidence related to the ‘feminization of poverty.’ Her work underpinned the commitment of the author and International Women‘s Development Agency (IWDA) to change the way that poverty is measured so that its gendered dimensions are visible. As IWDA worked with othersi to create an alternative quantitative measure of poverty, Chant’s focus on the “feminization of responsibility and obligation – women’s increasing liability for dealing with poverty (responsibility), and their progressively less choice other than to do so (obligation)” ii informed the inclusion of voice, unpaid work and time use as dimensions of gendersensitive measurement of multidimensional poverty.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Poverty, Feminism, and Gender
Political Geography:
Global Focus

66. Peacebuilding and feminist foreign policy

Author:
Federico Casolari and Patricia Sango Pollard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:
In this paper, Dr Frederica Caso from La Trobe University and independent researcher Patricia Sango Pollard examine the added value of a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) approach to peacebuilding in the Pacific by looking at the case of Australia and Solomon Islands. In the strategic competition over allies, a FFP will promote a value-based approach that can attract and secure key partners and bolster the idea of the Pacific Family.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Feminism, Intersectionality, and Gender
Political Geography:
Australia

67. United States Foreign Policy Towards Jordan From the Political and Security Dimensions from 1990 to 2017

Author:
Ala Alkhawaldeh and Ayman Hayajneh
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
Foreign policy cannot be dissociated from what we call the theory of international relations (Holsti, 2015). Relations between Jordan and the United States go back to 1949 when diplomatic relations were first established. The United States contributed to providing economic and military assistance to Jordan for the first time since 1951 and 1957, respectively, and has continued until now. The United States and Jordan share the common goals of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East and to end violent extremism that threatens the security of Jordan, the region, and the world at large. The peace process and counterterrorism between the two countries aid American interests. The United States has helped Jordan maintain its stability and prosperity through military assistance and close political cooperation (Bush, 2009).This study examines the United States foreign policy towards Jordan from 1990 to 2017. This period witnessed important regional and international political events that significantly impacted American foreign policy in the Arab region and the United States - Jordan in particular. The political events covered in the study have the greatest impact on the development or decline of relations between the two countries in terms of politically and security aspects.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

68. The Foreign Policy of Post-Revolutionary Iran: Expediency at the Crossroad of Suprra-Nationalism and Soverignty

Author:
Hamoon Khelghat-Doost
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy has been a source of argument among scholars since the establishment of the revolutionary regime in 1979. Iran’s foreign policy just like its revolution is still a mystery to many researchers as it is difficult to find an appropriate theoretical framework for it. Revolution and how revolutionary states such as China and Cuba view the world and build their foreign relations with other nations have been long discussed in the works of prominent scholars including Leng (1972), Armstrong (1993), Walt (1996), Halliday (2002), and Doma-Nguez & Domínguez (2009). However, what makes the foreign policy of revolutionary Iran different from other revolutionary states (mostly Marxist revolutions) and, therefore, more confusing to study, is the Shi’a Islamic nature of it.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

69. Erdoğan's Re-election as President Raises Concerns among Allies

Author:
Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s win in the presidential election and ministerial appointments promises to further weaken democracy, move Türkiye further away from EU standards, and continue so-called personal diplomacy and transactionalism in foreign policy. This could prolong the Turkish parliament’s ratification of Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Sweden

70. Examining Changes in Regional Cooperation in Central Europe from a Polish Perspective

Author:
Tomasz Żornaczuk
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Visegrad Group (V4), until recently the most active and multidimensional cooperation platform in Central Europe, does not serve currently to strengthen the voice of the region on the most essential issues concerning its security. This is because Hungary’s stance on Russia’s attack on Ukraine is different than that of its partners. That is why Poland is tightening relations with the other Visegrad countries—Czechia and Slovakia. At the same time, Poland is also intensifying cooperation with the Baltic states, which has its source in joint actions on security and eastern affairs in the years preceding the war.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Visegrad Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Central Europe, Slovakia, and Czechia

71. South Africa-Russia Maintain Special Relations

Author:
Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Although South Africa declares it is neutral regarding the war in Ukraine and offers mediation, it remains a de facto ally of Russia. This is due to the strong sentiment among the ruling elites for the period of cooperation with the USSR, its successor Russia and its activity and influence in this country, and the perception that BRICS will help elevate South Africa’s international importance. If Vladimir Putin visits Johannesburg as scheduled in August, the authorities of the state, which is party to the Rome Statute, will not be willing to fulfil their obligation to arrest him or may even leave the International Criminal Court.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and South Africa

72. Lavrov Visits Latin America to Try to Lure It to Russia's Side

Author:
Bartłomiej Znojek
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
On 17-21 April, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. During his trip, he argued that the goals and interests of Russia and most Latin American countries coincide. He also repeated false Russian narratives, for example, about the reasons for the invasion of Ukraine, portraying Russia as a victim of the policy of the West. While he used his stay in Brazil to legitimise the Russian narratives, in other countries, it was mainly about consolidating Russia’s ties with their authoritarian regimes, including cooperation on evading sanctions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Narrative, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Latin America

73. China Adapts Policy in Response to Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China perceives the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expression of resistance to the U.S. and NATO hegemony and an important element of building a new international order that marginalises the West. Based on this, China is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, striving to weaken the international position of the U.S., the EU, and their partners, while testing reactions to a possible escalation of Chinese actions towards Taiwan, for example. President Xi Jinping expressed this policy course during his March visit to Russia. At the same time, China is trying to gain support from the countries of the Global South. This approach means a continuation of China’s assertive policy towards the European Union, among others.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

74. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea

75. Iceland Makes Changes to Foreign Policy after Russia's Aggression against Ukraine

Author:
Veronika Jóźwiak
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian aggression against Ukraine forced Iceland to adjust its foreign policy. As a small country without armed forces but covered by security guarantees as a NATO member, it wants to strengthen ties with its allies while resigning from contacts with Russia. Its partnership with the U.S. and the Nordic countries, as well as activity in international organisations and relations with Central European EU Member States, including Poland, have become even more important to the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Iceland

76. Mateship Amongst Competition: Recommendations for the U.S.-Australia Alliance

Author:
Randall G. Schriver and Wallace "Chip" Gregson
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The U.S.-Australia alliance is one of the deepest and most comprehensive alliances in existence. In this report, a bipartisan study group co-chaired by Project 2049 Chairman Hon. Randall Schriver and LtGen Wallace “Chip” Gregson identify three key priorities for the U.S.-AUS alliance. Then, they explore recommendations to address these priorities in four main spheres: political, defense, trade, and resource security. Their recommendations range from minor adjustments of current alliance institutions to expansive changes such as the broadening of ITAR. They conclude by reaffirming the current strength of the U.S.-AUS alliance, and that its current challenges present an opportunity to demonstrate how like-minded allies can “lift as one” and deliver a robust, agile, and sustainable response in the face of an increasingly unstable security environment.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Australia, North America, and United States of America

77. Balance of Trade, Balance of Power: How the Trade Deficit Reflects U.S. Influence in the World

Author:
Daniel Griswold and Andreas Freytag
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The U.S. trade deficit is a misunderstood symbol of U.S. economic strength and influence in the world. The deficit is not driven by unfair trade abroad or industrial weakness at home and, as the Trump years show, cannot be “fixed” through higher tariffs. Instead, the trade deficit is driven by a persistent net inflow of foreign capital, which reduces interest rates and fuels economic output. Contrary to myth, the trade deficit is not a cause of deindustrialization or a loss of manufacturing jobs. In fact, the current balance of trade points to America’s continuing influence in global affairs—as a haven for global investment, as a robust producer and buyer of global goods and services, and as the provider of a strong dollar that remains at the center of the global economy. Policymakers should reject measures that restrict trade and foreign investment and instead seek to expand America’s commercial ties to the rest of the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Trade, and Trade Deficit
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

78. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

79. Sustaining Congressional Engagement with Southeast Asia

Author:
Erik Ashida
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As a representative institution whose members can outlast presidential administrations, Congress plays a vital role in sustaining long-term US foreign policy commitments. The perception of long-term commitment is particularly important in Southeast Asia, where most states seek to maximize their strategic autonomy by balancing relations among great powers. Thus, expectations about the future behavior of great powers can significantly affect foreign policy choices. Congress speaks through the exercise of its formal powers but also in more subtle ways. Congressional actions on foreign relations operate along three channels. The first channel is support for policies initiated by the executive branch, e.g., passing appropriations, making requested statutory changes, or, at the very least, not obstructing what an administration seeks to do. The second channel is symbolic support for a relationship, such as meetings with foreign officials or public statements of support. Though these actions are generally nonbinding, they can be a more meaningful gauge of support than the first channel because legislators must seek them out and can define the terms of their engagement—something not always possible when voting on legislation. The third channel is policy advanced independently from the executive branch, such as standalone bills, conditions placed on funding, or rigorous oversight. Each of these tools is available to individual legislators, groups of legislators such as caucuses or committees, or the entire legislative branch acting collectively.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:
Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

80. What North Korea Has Been Learning From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A year ago, in February 2022, Russia invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. Russian aggression has upended the post-war security mechanisms in Europe and made the international multilateral system, including the UN Security Council, more fragile and ineffective than ever. Even though the war in Ukraine has implications for security in Northeast Asia, many Asian nations consider it a distant issue for Europeans to solve. However, this perspective mirrors what Europe’s Asian counterparts, especially the Koreans, have faced for decades. It serves as an apt analogy for explaining the dangers of North Korea to Europe. North Korea is also watching the war closely to discern what lessons or leverage can be extracted from the unfolding conflict. This short article reflects on two lessons and three opportunities that the War in Ukraine presents to Kim Jong Un and concludes with recommendations on what the Europeans could do in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

81. Two Peripheries: The Ukraine War's Effect on North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Anthony V. Rinna
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Spanning the Eurasian landmass, Russia’s actions in adjacent Ukraine invariably affect the geopolitical state of play on the similarly adjacent Korean Peninsula. Although ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia have been of largely secondary importance for both countries since their veritable rupture in the early- and mid-1990s, Moscow-Pyongyang relations became more mutually beneficial in 2022. Whereas most countries have outright condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or taken up an ambiguous position, the DPRK has been vocal in its support for Russia. From the DPRK perspective, the Kremlin’s post-2022 diplomatic and economic estrangement from much of the world has provided Pyongyang with an opening to leverage ties with Russia to push for an easing of its own diplomatic and economic isolation. Meanwhile, strengthening its DPRK ties allows Russia to undermine US influence on its Asian periphery. In supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea appears to be aiming toward obtaining economic benefits from closer ties with Russia, a country whose economy has managed to stay afloat despite heavy Western sanctions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided the impetus for Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow. However, the roots of the current upswing in Moscow-Pyongyang relations go back to the April 2019 summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Kim received an invitation to meet with Putin in May 2018 yet waited eleven months to meet with the Russian leader, even as Kim regularly met with the leaders of other major players on the Korean Peninsula. Kim may have decided after the February 2019 Hanoi summit yielded few results that strengthening ties with Russia, which was more reluctant than China to support UN sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017, was a more viable option for sanctions relief. Aside from the fact that Russia has demonstrated a clear unwillingness to impose new sanctions against the DPRK, North Korean citizens are reported to still be working in Russia in contravention of UN Resolution 2397. North Korean workers’ earnings are said to have suffered because of Russia’s reduced access to hard currency. Yet, the ruble’s continued resilience may mean that earning currency in Russia is still worthwhile for laborers dispatched at Pyongyang’s behest.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

82. United Kingdom Engagement with North Korea

Author:
Alastair Morgan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As one of the Allied Powers, The United Kingdom was involved in Post-World War II planning for the Korean peninsula, including the November 1943 Cairo Conference declaration that “… in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.” However, US President Roosevelt’s proposal at the February 1945 Yalta Conference did not establish a formal role for the UK in the trusteeship of Korea. Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula at the 38th parallel in August 1945, and direct British involvement in the peninsula was limited prior to the Korean War. The United Kingdom’s Korean War contribution to the United Nations Command was second only to the United States, with significant deployments of maritime and air assets in addition to the provision of ground troops. Almost 60,000 British troops saw action, with nearly 5,000 killed, wounded, missing in action, or taken prisoner. Following the armistice, the United Kingdom has continued to send representation to the United Nations Command. The armistice agreement includes an obligation on so-called “Sending States” to respond to renewed hostility. Although there is no automatic UK commitment to send forces, the armistice agreement remains a consideration in engagement with North Korea.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Education, Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

83. North Korea-Germany Relations: An Ambassador's Perspective of Diplomacy with Pyongyang

Author:
Armin Schäfer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in 2001 at the request of the South Korean government, which hoped that Germany and the European Union (EU) would play a more active role in supporting the “Sunshine Policy.” Since then, Germany, together with the other EU states, has sought to moderate North Korea through a “Policy of Critical Engagement” to convince it of the benefits of international cooperation, respect for the rule of law, and improving the political and economic situation of its people. In doing so, Germany could build on the long relationship between North Korea and the former East Germany. “Critical engagement” means being willing to talk and get involved, but without holding back on criticism—and, if need be, imposing sanctions. It also implies that comprehensive engagement is not (yet) possible because of the circumstances. There is ample cause for a constrained approach from North Korea’s aggressive foreign policy and systematic human rights violations to the absence of suitable economic and fiscal conditions for business and development cooperation. Moreover, the lack of will on the part of considerable segments of the North Korean regime to engage with other countries also hampers broader engagement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Education, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Germany

84. North Korea-Guyana Relations in the Burnham Era

Author:
Moe Taylor
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
During the reign of Forbes Burnham (1923-85), the South American republic of Guyana (formerly British Guiana) became one of North Korea’s greatest foreign policy success stories. Pyongyang not only acquired a new trading partner in the Americas but also gained a vocal advocate for its position on Korean unification on the international stage. These close ties grew in large part from Burnham’s admiration for North Korea, where he saw a highly disciplined citizenry united around the Great Leader, willing to work hard and sacrifice for the collective good. Guyana perhaps did more than any other single actor to help North Korea become viewed as an economic model for developing countries. First elected Premier of the colony of British Guiana in 1964, Burnham became Prime Minister upon independence in 1966 and ruled until his death in 1985. A lawyer and trade unionist from the capital’s Afro-Guyanese middle class, his rise to power was backed by the United States, which viewed him as the only realistic alternative to the communists. While Burnham veered to the Left once in power and frequently irritated Washington, he was more or less tolerated because his pro-Soviet opposition would almost certainly fill his absence.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, South America, and Guyana

85. Ending Counterproductive U.S. Involvement in Yemen

Author:
Annelle Sheline
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
• The Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis maintain a de facto truce; however, should the Saudis choose to begin dropping bombs again, they would do so with the assistance of the United States. • Washington should use the current lull in fighting to withdraw support for military actions by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. • If the Biden administration fails to withdraw, Congress should pass a War Powers Resolution ending U.S. involvement in the conflict. In the absence of a War Powers Resolution, Saudi Arabia or the UAE could drag the United States into deeper involvement in the war. • The Biden administration justifies its opposition to a War Powers Resolution on the basis of its support for negotiations. However, evidence indicates that the longevity of the de facto truce reflects a mutually painful stalemate rather than American diplomacy. • To protect current and future negotiations, the Biden administration should address the threat import restrictions pose to diplomacy. Congress should request information as to why, after the United States arranged to rehabilitate Hodeidah port, almost no containerized goods, including medical equipment and supplies, have been permitted through the port. • Foreign intervention in the war has failed to undermine the Houthis militarily and instead has strengthened their legitimating narrative.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Military Intervention, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

86. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:
Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

87. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

88. Defense Contractor Funded Think Tanks Dominate Ukraine Debate

Author:
Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Think tanks in the United States are a go–to resource for media outlets seeking expert opinions on pressing public policy issues. But think tanks often have entrenched stances; a growing body of research has shown that their funders can influence their analysis and commentary. This influence can include censorship — both self-censorship and more direct censoring of work unfavorable to a funder — and outright pay–for–research agreements with funders. The result is an environment where the interests of the most generous funders can dominate think tank policy debates. One such debate concerns the appropriate level of U.S. military involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since Vladimir Putin’s illegal and disastrous decision to launch a full–scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States has approved approximately $48.7 billion in military spending.1 Despite the very real risk that escalations could lead to direct U.S. military involvement in the war, few think tanks have critically scrutinized this record setting amount of U.S. military assistance. Within the context of public debate about U.S. military involvement in the Ukraine war, this brief investigates Department of Defense (DoD) and DoD contractor funding of think tanks, those organizations advocacy efforts for policies that would benefit those funders, and the media’s predominant reliance on think tanks funded by the defense sector. The analysis finds that the vast majority of media mentions of think tanks in articles about U.S. arms and the Ukraine war are from think tanks whose funders profit from U.S. military spending, arms sales and, in many cases, directly from U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. These think tanks also regularly offer support for public policy solutions that would financially benefit their funders without disclosing these apparent conflicts of interest. While this brief did not seek to establish a direct causality between think–tank policy recommendations and their arms industry funding in the case of the Ukraine war, we find a clear correlation between the two. We also found that media outlets disproportionately rely on commentary from defense sector funded think tanks.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Think Tanks, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

89. Ethnic Divisions and Ensuring Stability in Kazakhstan: A Guide for U.S. Policy

Author:
Suzanne Loftus
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief assesses ethnic divisions in Kazakhstan, analyzes the potential risks of ethnic and geopolitical tension and makes recommendations for U.S. policy. Kazakhstan’s current approach to managing its internal divides and overall stability is assessed and drivers of potential risk are evaluated. Due to renewed cold war tensions with China and Russia, the United States must resist any temptation to become involved in Kazakhstan’s internal politics and refrain from any efforts to sway Kazakhstan to ally itself with the West. This would only cause internal instability and hostile relations with its neighbors, Russia and China. Given Kazakhstan’s potential for domestic strife, U.S. interests are best served by a restrained approach to the country that better preserves its internal and external stability. Kazakhstan’s vast land mass and sparse population leave the country vulnerable to potential external threats. Kazakhstan borders Russia and China, its strongest security and economic partners respectively. These two powers are very close while the United States is far and consequently plays a relatively minor role in the country. The United States can and should, however, engage economically with Kazakhstan to support its development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political stability, Ethnicity, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and United States of America

90. Normalizing U.S.–Pakistan Relations

Author:
Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is often portrayed negatively among the lawmakers, media, and general public of both countries, with a focus on mutual resentment and dysfunction. The early relationship was burdened by mismatched expectations regarding support in conflicts with India. Different priorities from the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s further strained the relationship. The United States also sanctioned Pakistan and India for developing nuclear weapons, which had a disparate impact on Pakistan, causing ongoing tension. Many in Washington’s policy and journalistic communities hold negative views of Pakistan, viewing it as an enabler of terrorism that seeks geopolitical rents but rarely delivers. Pakistanis often resent what they view as Washington’s use of the country as a “frontline state” in both the Cold War and the War on Terror, claiming tens of thousands of lives, only to discard it later. These grievances are largely dismissed in Washington as self–inflicted. Despite the negative public debate, serving officials in both governments generally hold a more nuanced view, recognizing the broad overlapping interests shared by the United States and Pakistan in areas like climate change, trade, and counterterrorism. There is already an exhaustive literature on terrorism in Pakistan, nuclear security, and potential conflicts along the Line of Control with India. This brief will instead focus on revitalizing U.S.–Pakistan relations through innovative diplomacy in areas that have received less attention, such as trade, regional integration, people–to–people connections, and climate change. Its principal recommendation is that Washington should resist viewing Pakistan through the narrow lens of the “War on Terror” or great power competition. Instead it should pursue its interests through more normalized relations, while recognizing U.S. limitations in influencing events in Pakistan or the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

91. Winning the Majority: A New U.S. Bargain with the Global South

Author:
Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The ongoing Ukraine war has exposed the waning influence of the United States in the vast arc of the world stretching from Latin America to Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands known as the Global South. Most Global South states, while opposed to the Russian invasion, have not backed the United States on its strategies of sanctioning Russia or seeking a defeat of Moscow. Some have explicitly criticized what they see as Washington’s double standards. Despite the region’s great diversity and heterogeneity, a new nonalignment is emerging in the Global South. However, it is not the same as its previous version (of the Non-Aligned Movement) in important respects — being much less institutionalized, less ideological, and based more on national interests. This makes it more durable and harder to counter through tools that the United States has traditionally employed. The United States cannot succeed in a world where power is increasingly diffuse without strong ties to the Global South. It is the region where the majority of humanity lives. It contains sites of crucial natural resources, supply chains, major markets, and increasing innovation. It is an essential partner to solve the climate challenge. Its states are wealthier and more assertive when it comes to their interests and resources. Over the past two decades, most have built deep economic ties with China, and continue to value ties with Russia. In general, the states of the Global South wish to leverage all of their international relationships for their own benefit and not take sides in or support a new cold war between the great powers. Most are unconvinced or alienated by Washington’s rhetoric of “democracy v. autocracy” and the “rules–based order.” They feel particularly threatened by U.S. policies of secondary sanctions designed to limit or end their ties with U.S. rivals. But the current U.S. strategy is inadvertently pushing the Global South toward Beijing and Moscow. This is an unforced error Washington can ill afford.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Interests, Russia-Ukraine War, and Nonalignment
Political Geography:
United States of America and Global South

92. Competition Versus Exclusion in U.S.–China Relations: A Choice Between Stability and Conflict

Author:
Jake Werner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Biden administration’s China policy is pulling in two different directions, but the tension is not widely recognized because every antagonistic measure aimed at China is filed under the heading of competition. As a result, Washington’s debate on China loses the crucial distinction between “competition” — a kind of connection with the potential to be carried on in healthy ways — and “exclusion,” an attempt to sever connection that necessarily leads to conflict if the domain is significant. Biden’s exclusion policies focus on cutting China out of the principal growth sectors in the global economy and the most lucrative and strategically important markets. Administration officials think their approach is sensible and moderate compared to more extreme voices in Washington calling for exclusion in all realms. Even so, the Biden approach is highly destabilizing because both countries consider the targeted areas vital to the future of global authority and economic prosperity, and because the attempt to trap China in a position of permanent subordination represents a serious threat to the legitimacy of China’s leaders. Healthy competition requires a shared stake in the future. In earlier periods, despite sharp tensions and mutual suspicions suffusing the relationship, U.S.–China ties were stabilized first by the joint project of containing Soviet power and then by a shared commitment to market–led globalization. Now that leaders on both sides are disenchanted with key facets of globalization, the two countries are caught in an escalatory cycle of exclusion and retaliation that risks hardening zero–sum pressures in the global system into a permanent structure of hostility. In such a scenario, each country would organize its own society and international partners to undermine the other, dramatically increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. The warning signs are already clear on both sides, as each increasingly interprets every action on the other side as part of a conspiracy to achieve domination. Notwithstanding widespread complacency about the risks of conflict after a tentative diplomatic opening in recent months, the rise of securitized thinking in both countries is steadily building institutional and ideological momentum for confrontation that can only be broken by a new and inclusive direction for the relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

93. Common Good Diplomacy: A Framework for Stable U.S.–China Relations

Author:
Jake Werner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
One curious feature of the emerging U.S.–China conflict is that each side claims to be defending the existing international order against the threat the other poses to it. Hidden beneath this seemingly irreconcilable dispute is a crucial truth: both the United States and China are status quo powers, sharing a deep interest in a stable global security environment and an open global economy. At the same time, both countries are pursuing urgently needed reforms to a global system increasingly defined by zero–sum pressures. Yet both are prone to exclusionary impulses that threaten to ruin the possibility of a shared reform agenda and instead throw the world into conflict. Working with China to revitalize the international order would not only prevent such a conflict, it would also establish the conditions for healthy forms of both competition and cooperation in the U.S.–China relationship. But how can U.S. leaders pursue such a project without simply giving a pass to China’s sometimes undesirable behavior? The focus should be diplomacy to frame an inclusive global system, focusing on actions that would reduce zero–sum constraints. In the three key realms of global authority and security, the global economy, and climate change, China is currently engaged in counterproductive moves that exacerbate existing tensions but is also pursuing promising reforms that could expand the scope for positive–sum outcomes. Rather than seeking to counter every Chinese initiative, U.S. leaders should carefully distinguish between beneficial and damaging outcomes, affirming and building on China’s constructive proposals and managing differences through negotiation rather than polemics and confrontation. Some potentially fruitful areas for cooperation include joint action to limit climate change, development in the Global South, revising the global guidelines for economic statecraft, and reforming international institutions to create a more open and inclusive world order. Pursuing cooperative efforts in such areas would both create direct benefits and improve U.S. credibility as a responsible leader of the world order rather than simply a rival of China. It would also open space to pursue competition within a rules–based order rather than risk a slide into destructive zero–sum conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Political stability, and International Order
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

94. Deciphering Erdoğan's Regional Paradigm Shifts

Author:
Ofra Bengio
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Professor Ofra Bengio analyses the trajectory of Turkish foreign and domestic policies by examining three paradigms in Erdogan's strategy since the early 2000s. In addition, we offer our sincere condolences to the victims of the earthquake last week.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Arab Spring, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Middle East

95. Less is More: A New Strategy for US Security Assistance to Africa

Author:
Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The US strategy toward Africa today is neither effective nor sustainable. It’s time to flip the script. US policy in Africa has for too long prioritized short-term security to the detriment of long-term stability by prioritizing the provision of military and security assistance. This is done in hopes that partner countries will use this capacity to suppress radical groups at home and reduce the likelihood that they will spread disorder in the region or create threats to US interests at home and abroad. Yet, this strategy has neither produced security in Africa nor reduced threats to the United States and its interests. Washington should rein in its use of security assistance with partners that fail to demonstrate commitment to the reforms necessary to build long-term stability. Partnerships and military assistance with illiberal, undemocratic countries have delivered little, if any, sustainable security improvements, and in many cases have prompted further instability and violence by building the capacity of abusive security forces. They have also provided harmful associations between the US government and the abuses committed by those we arm and assist. Since terrorism in Africa poses a low threat to US national security interests, there is no justification for focusing on short-term security issues at the cost of good governance, rule of law, and other factors that contribute to long-term stability. The costs of doing so are increasingly being recognized, with Congress today more likely to apply existing legal provisions to end security cooperation with abusive regimes. But these interventions typically come too late and are too inconsistent to influence behavior of illiberal regimes. A more systemic approach is needed to break the pattern of poor outcomes. The rise of great-power competition exacerbates the risk that the US national security establishment will double down on its security cooperation strategy in the region out of concern that doing otherwise would leave a vacuum that America’s competitors might fill. In reality, however, the argument for being more selective in distributing security assistance is even stronger with the return of great-power competition, as values and reputation become increasingly important in attracting support for the United States over other great powers. Security and military assistance will continue to play a role in the region. However, the United States would be better off being more deliberate and cautious, only pursuing it after completing a holistic assessment of the potential impact of such assistance on governance, human rights, and broader stability. Security assistance can and must be more closely scrutinized with enhanced US government oversight tools to ensure it does not undermine governance and stability, and Washington should be more willing to choose different tools when shaping relationships with weak partners, to condition assistance to ensure it does not facilitate bad outcomes, and to cut it off when partner countries use it to abuse civilians.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

96. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

97. Incivility in Diplomacy as a Reflection of the Crisis in Foreign Policy Culture

Author:
V. Chumakov
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The 2020s have been characterized by a profound crisis of confidence in international relations and world politics manifested in the use of political, psychological, and rhetorical methods and techniques that are atypical of traditional diplomatic practices and do not correspond to generally recognized norms of diplomatic protocol. Such manifestations include, for example, the use of unverified information and disinformation, the dissemination of deliberately false information (“fake news”), the unilateral disclosure of confidential face-to-face or telephone conversations to the media, and the publication of diplomatic correspondence not only as an unofficial translation but also as direct copies of informational documents (notes, letters, telegrams, and attachments to them). We also see the use of undiplomatic expressions (accusations, insults, namecalling, threats, blackmail, jokes) against counterpart or senior foreign or international officials, albeit primarily behind their backs, as well personal correspondence between such individuals on publicly available electronic mail services, instant messengers, and social networks.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, OSCE, New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

98. FACTORS IN CONSTRUCTING INDONESIA’S PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDO-PACIFIC

Author:
Mohd. Agoes Aufiya
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
The term “Indo-Pacific” became increasingly significant and was accepted by several countries, including Indonesia. The government welcomed the term as part of its foreign policy projection, which developed its unique perspective or interpretation, including inclusivity, a rule based on international law, and ASEAN’s centrality and cooperation for regional growth. This study would answer the question of how the concept of Indo-Pacific will be interpreted within Indonesia's unique context compared to other countries. Thus, this research aimed to describe several key factors in constructing the Indonesian perspective on the Indo-Pacific concept, particularly under President Jokowi’s leadership. This research applied qualitative with library methods from the primary and secondary data sources. This paper argued six factors that constructed Indonesia’s perspective on Indo-Pacific: maritime historical legacy; the “Bebas-Aktif” principle; ASEAN values; geographical position; and democratic values. The research concluded that Indonesia is one of the major countries that consistently championed the term “Indo-Pacific” within the regional and international spheres, with a “moderate” status in terms of its foreign policy implementation, which is mainly characterized by inclusivity and cooperation in the economy by constructively engaging all countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

99. MILITARY SANCTIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN

Author:
Jonathan Honig
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
States frequently find themselves disbursing or receiving military aid, cooperation, and access to military products. Using foreign policy options like "military sanctions" (the suspension of military projects, aid, cooperation, and access) is a desirable, widely publicized way for one state to express its discontent to another while presumably influencing desired policy changes in the client state. However, the small amount of evidence on military sanctions indicates that they are ineffective, short-lived, and may even be counterproductive. This analysis attempted to elucidate this subject by advancing a theory stating that states will impose military sanctions in response to domestic audience pressures shortly after high-profile examples of undesirable behavior by client states. However, military sanctions will be eased as time progresses and public attention has waned. This analysis qualitatively examined Uzbekistan and its relationship with the US, finding support for this theory. It concluded that following high-profile incidents and periods of undesirable behavior by an aid-recipient state, military sanctions would likely be employed by the state providing the military aid and programs. Further, military sanctions are eased or scrapped as time moves from public incidents and attention involving human rights abuses.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, War on Terror, and Military
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Uzbekistan

100. HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY STRATEGY FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES AND ITS EFFECT ON JORDAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

Author:
Emad Ayasreh
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
This research examined the effect of Jordan’s humanitarian diplomacy strategy for Syrian refugees on its foreign policy and attempted to determine whether the strategy is financially sustainable. Humanitarian diplomacy is persuading decision-makers and leaders worldwide to act at all times and in all circumstances in the best interest of vulnerable populations by completely respecting fundamental humanitarian principles. Jordan has allowed many Syrian refugees to cross over and settle in Jordan. This study used a qualitative systematic literature review and quantitative data from the UNHCR to determine the effect of the strategy on Jordan’s foreign policy and whether the strategy could be sustained. The findings showed that Jordan’s stature in terms of its foreign policy has grown, leading to bilateral agreements and participation in international negotiations. However, its humanitarian strategy may not be sustainable with the current level of funding. The funding from foreign countries and international organizations has been insufficient to support the growing number of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The literature on this topic is limited, and comprehensive quantitative research is recommended to determine the future effect of the strategy on health care and education for Syrian refugees in Jordan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Jordan