Search

Begin New Search Topic International Security Political Geography United States

1. New Frontiers for Security Cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
With a new Democratic administration, Washington is almost certain to moderate its demands that Japan and South Korea pay more for American forces on their soil. This should ease tensions with Seoul to Tokyo. To strengthen security relations with Japan and South Korea, though, more will be required. Rather than simply increase their conventional military deployments, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo will need to collaborate in new ways to enhance allied security. This will entail working more closely on new military frontiers, such as enhancing allied command of outer and cyber space as well as in underwater warfare. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo will also want to carve out new functional areas of cooperation to make existing energy sources more secure, communications more reliable, data sharing easier and safer, and allied economic assistance to developing nations in strategic zones more effective. Enhanced collaboration in each of these areas has begun but is not yet locked in or fully institutionalized. It should be. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo need one another to deal with China and North Korea. Yet, how each currently strategically views Beijing and Pyongyang differs. Nor is America’s preferred military approach to deterring Chinese and North Korean adventurism — by preventing Beijing and Pyongyang from projecting military strikes against their neighbors — all that easy to achieve. Adding new, more tractable items to America’s Asian security alliance agenda won’t immediately eliminate these misalignments. But it will strengthen the security ties they have as liberal democracies — bonds Beijing and Pyongyang are straining to fray.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, International Security, Military Affairs, Cyberspace, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, and South Korea

2. The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future

Author:
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Despite the Biden administration’s push to revitalize U.S. alliances, U.S. relations with NATO are due for a reset. The United States should incentivize European members of NATO to take on additional responsibilities for their defense. Encouraging the European allies to take initiative will help the United States focus on its other domestic and international priorities and may facilitate improving relations with Russia. This approach will also prove attractive to European states concerned about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. Recalibrating the U.S. role in Europe would conform with the United States’ post–World War II efforts to stabilize European security — and stand as the fruit of Washington’s success in this regard.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Global Focus

3. Responsible Statecraft Requires Remaking America’s Foreign Relations Tool Kit

Author:
Gordon Adams
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
To meet today’s foreign policy challenges, the United States needs to end its overreliance on military superiority and intervention and instead put creative and persistent diplomacy in the lead to promote locally owned solutions to national, bilateral, and regional security issues and to address global challenges not amenable to military force. This rebalancing will not succeed if civilian statecraft is dysfunctional and unprepared. More funding and more diplomats will not solve this problem. What is needed is fundamental reform of structures, processes, and personnel practices, particularly at the State Department. These include strategic planning, resource planning, institutional integration, clear authority over security assistance programs, and moving away from nation-building and toward conflict prevention. Far-reaching changes in the way diplomats are recruited, trained, and promoted are also required. Without such changes, there is substantial risk that our diplomatic tools will be ineffective, resulting in even greater militarization of U.S. foreign policy when diplomacy fails.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Grand Strategy, Alliance, and Statecraft
Political Geography:
United States

4. Stronger Together: NATO’s Evolving Approach toward China

Author:
Naďa Kovalčíková and Gabrielle Tarin
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
The rise of China poses a strategic challenge for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Alliance needs a comprehensive political, economic, and security strategy to deal with China’s growing global power. The more assertive a role China plays in world affairs, the more it could undercut NATO’s cohesion and military advantages by translating commercial inroads in Europe into political influence, investing in strategically important sectors, and achieving major breakthroughs in advanced digital technologies.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, International Security, Digital Cooperation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Europe

5. Deter and Normalize Relations with North Korea

Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. is strong and safe—North Korea is weak, deterred by U.S. power, and desperate for economic relief.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Sanctions, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
United States, Asia, North Korea, and Korea

6. U.S. Security Coordination and the “Global War on Terror”

Author:
Jeannette Greven
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Palestine Studies
Institution:
Institute for Palestine Studies
Abstract:
The U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) mission in Jerusalem was created in 2005 to help implement security sector reform within the Palestinian Authority (PA). With a single-minded focus on “counterterrorism,” Washington considered the USSC an ancillary mechanism to support U.S. diplomatic and political efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite upending long-standing U.S. policy and cutting all other forms of aid to the Palestinians, the Trump administration has maintained the USSC in the run-up to the “Deal of the Century.” This article draws on original interviews with security personnel responsible for enacting USSC interventions. It uses their insights to highlight how the mission tethered Israeli political aims to its remit, and the distorting ramifications that have ensued for Palestine and the Palestinians. In uncovering the full parameters of Washington’s securitization policy, this history also points to the ways in which the PA has consequently been woven into the U.S.-led “global War on Terror.”
Topic:
Security, Sovereignty, International Security, Military Affairs, Negotiation, and Settler Colonialism
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, Palestine, and Jerusalem

7. U.S. Nuclear Excess: Understanding the Costs, Risks, and Alternatives

Author:
Kingston Reif and Alicia Sanders-Zakre
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In a little-noticed comment before his controversial July 2018 summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, U.S. President Donald Trump characterized his government’s multi-hundred billion dollar plans to replace the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal as “a very, very bad policy.” He seemed to express some hope that Russia and the United States, which together possess over 90 percent of the planet’s nuclear warheads, could chart a different path and avert renewed military and nuclear competition. The Helsinki meeting, however, did not produce any agreement on nuclear weapons and Trump has so far shown little interest in a different nuclear spending path. Quite the opposite, in fact.“We have far more money than anybody else by far,” Trump said last October. “We’ll build [the U.S. nuclear arsenal] up until” other nuclear-armed states such as Russia and China “come to their senses.” Citing a deteriorating international security environment, the Trump administration is pursuing a significant expansion of the role and capability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In addition to continuing full speed ahead with its predecessor’s plans to replace the nuclear triad and its associated warheads on largely a like-for-like basis, the administration is proposing to broaden the circumstances under which the United States would consider the first use of nuclear weapons, develop two new sea-based, lowyield nuclear options, and lay the groundwork to grow the size of the arsenal. At the same time, key U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control agreements, which serve to regulate the nuclear balance and prevent unconstrained nuclear competition, are now in serious doubt. The Trump administration has announced the United States will leave the landmark 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 unless Russia returns to compliance with the pact, and expressed hostility towards extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). New START expires in 2021 but can be extended by up to five years subject to the agreement of Washington and Moscow. In short, the Trump administration is preparing to compete in a new nuclear arms race while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of such a contest. The projected cost of the proposed nuclear spending spree is staggering and it is growing. The United States currently plans to spend nearly $500 billion, after including the effects of inflation, to maintain and replace its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, according to a January 2019 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report. This is an increase of nearly $100 billion, or about 23 percent, above the already enormous projected cost as of the end of the Obama administration. Over the next 30 years, the price tag is likely to top $1.5 trillion and could even approach $2 trillion. These big nuclear bills are coming due as the Defense Department is seeking to replace large portions of its conventional forces and internal and external fiscal pressures are likely to limit the growth of—and perhaps reduce—military spending. “We’re going to have enormous pressure on reducing the debt which means that defense spending—I’d like to tell you it’s going to keep going up—[but] I’m not terribly optimistic,” Alan Shaffer, deputy under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said in February 2019. This report outlines the ways in which the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy is unnecessary, unsustainable, and unsafe. It describes three realistic options to reduce spending on nuclear weapons while still maintaining a devastating nuclear deterrent. Scores of billions of dollars could be saved or redirected to higher priorities by eliminating, delaying, or scaling back the administration’s proposals for new delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Nonproliferation, Denuclearization, and Arms Race
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

8. Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

Author:
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

9. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices

Author:
Elizabeth N. Saunders
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When and how do domestic politics influence a state's nuclear choices? Recent scholarship on nuclear security develops many domestic-political explanations for different nuclear decisions. These explanations are partly the result of two welcome trends: first, scholars have expanded the nuclear timeline, examining state behavior before and after nuclear proliferation; and second, scholars have moved beyond blunt distinctions between democracies and autocracies to more fine-grained understandings of domestic constraints. But without linkages between them, new domestic-political findings could be dismissed as a laundry list of factors that do not explain significant variation in nuclear decisions. This review essay assesses recent research on domestic politics and nuclear security, and develops a framework that illuminates when and how domestic-political mechanisms are likely to affect nuclear choices. In contrast to most previous domestic arguments, many of the newer domestic-political mechanisms posited in the literature are in some way top-down; that is, they show leaders deliberately maintaining or loosening control over nuclear choices. Two dimensions govern the extent and nature of domestic-political influence on nuclear choices: the degree of threat uncertainty and the costs and benefits to leaders of expanding the circle of domestic actors involved in a nuclear decision. The framework developed in this review essay helps make sense of several cases explored in the recent nuclear security literature. It also has implications for understanding when and how domestic-political arguments might diverge from the predictions of security-based analyses.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Domestic Politics, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Iran, and North Korea

10. How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95

Author:
M.E. Sarotte
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Newly available sources show how the 1993–95 debate over the best means of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unfolded inside the Clinton administration. This evidence comes from documents recently declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library, the Defense Department, and the State Department because of appeals by the author. As President Bill Clinton repeatedly remarked, the two key questions about enlargement were when and how. The sources make apparent that, during a critical decisionmaking period twenty-five years ago, supporters of a relatively swift conferral of full membership to a narrow range of countries outmaneuvered proponents of a slower, phased conferral of limited membership to a wide range of states. Pleas from Central and Eastern European leaders, missteps by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and victory by the pro-expansion Republican Party in the 1994 U.S. congressional election all helped advocates of full-membership enlargement to win. The documents also reveal the surprising impact of Ukrainian politics on this debate and the complex roles played by both Strobe Talbott, a U.S. ambassador and later deputy secretary of state, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister. Finally, the sources suggest ways in which the debate's outcome remains significant for transatlantic and U.S.-Russian relations today.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Security, and Clinton Administration
Political Geography:
Russia and United States