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1. Brinkmanship and Nuclear Threat in the Ukraine War

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Western leaders and Kyiv pledge to “stay the course” despite Russian nuclear threats. But does western brinkmanship in the Ukraine war depend on denying there is a brink? This short article examines “nuclear threat denialism” and its function in war policy. It explores Moscow’s most likely but occluded nuclear option and the unique danger it represents. And the post examines the relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the current conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The “Stable Nuclear Deterrent” collapses in the Ukraine War

Author:
Charles Knight
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The comforting narrative of a dependable and stable nuclear deterrence between the US and Russia has been thrown into disarray by the War in Ukraine. This narrative, propagated widely in the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, held that both the Super Powers fully appreciated that they could not “win” a nuclear battle and, therefore, would avoid direct conventional warfare, which might then quickly escalate into nuclear war. In a necessary corollary, it was thought that Russia and the US would make every effort to avoid a conventional war in Europe. Why? Because there are so many paths to escalation to nuclear war in Europe. Elsewhere in the world, US and Russian interests were more diffuse and, therefore, not so vital.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

3. Turkey’s Soft Power in the Balkans Reaching its Limits

Author:
Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
With the EU putting the Western Balkan countries in an undefined waiting room, there was more room for maneuver for non-EU players. Turkey among others used this space to broaden its influence in the Balkans from politics to the economy, from culture to military cooperation, albeit from a very low starting point. The bilateral relations with all countries of the region are rather good, President Erdogan enjoys the recognition he is often lacking in other parts of the world. While the pandemic further harmed the EU’s image, it was mostly China and Russia who could fill the void with their own vaccines. Lacking its own vaccine so far, Turkey was much less visible. However, in the long-run, Turkey is not interested in an EU-Turkey confrontation over the Western Balkans, but that these countries join the EU. Through this, Turkey would increase the number of allies in a bloc where friends have become few.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, and Balkans

4. Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Why Did the Kremlin Mass Its Forces Near Ukraine This Spring?

Author:
Rob Lee
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
During March and April 2021, the Russian military conducted a large-scale buildup in its regions bordering Ukraine, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. Scores of videos appeared on TikTok, Telegram, Twitter, and other social media sites showing Russian military equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and air defense systems, moving toward or appearing in the vicinity of Ukraine’s borders. The United States Department of Defense’s spokesperson John Kirby told reporters that the Russian buildup was even larger than during the peak of the fighting in 2014. Ukrainian officials estimated that the Russian military buildup would reach a total of 120,000 Russian troops with more than fifty-six battalion tactical groups (BTG). United States defense officials gave a lower estimate that 48 BTGs had moved into the border area and 80,000 Russian troops were in Crimea or elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders. To put this in perspective, the Russian military has approximately 850,000-900,000 servicemembers in total, and 168 constant readiness BTGs, according to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. If these estimates were accurate, the Russian military massed roughly 10-15% of its total manpower and approximately one third of its BTGs near Ukraine’s borders. In response to the buildup, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and President Joe Biden all called their Russian counterparts to discuss the situation. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) raised its alert status to its highest level. The buildup also coincided with an increase in fighting along the line of contact, with at least 36 Ukrainian servicemen killed thus far in 2021. The movement of Russian forces led to intense speculation about Russia’s intentions, including fears of a large-scale ground invasion. However, U.S. intelligence indicated that a large-scale ground invasion was unlikely because of a lack of prepositioned spare parts, field hospitals, ammunition, and other logistics necessary for such an operation. Likewise, EUCOM commander General Tod Wolters said on April 15 that there was a “low to medium” risk of a Russian ground invasion of Ukraine in the coming weeks. On April 22, after the end of a large-scale exercise at the Opuk training area in Crimea, which included an amphibious landing, a helicopter air assault operation with two companies, and a multi-battalion airborne operation with more than two thousand paratroopers and sixty vehicles parachuted from forty Il-76MD transport aircraft, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the winter verification tests for the Western and Southern Military Districts had been a success and the troops would return to their permanent bases. However, he indicated that equipment from Central Military District’s 41st Combined Arms Army, which included BM-27 Uragan multiple launch rocket systems and Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems and other heavy equipment, would remain at the Pogonovo training area in Voronezh near Ukraine’s border until the Zapad 2021 strategic exercise in September. Furthermore, Shoigu did not state clearly whether all of the equipment and units deployed near Ukraine’s borders outside of Crimea would also return to their bases, nor how those units were employed during the snap inspection. Two weeks after Shoigu’s announcement, U.S. defense officials said that Russia had removed only “a few thousand” troops and that there were approximately 80,000 servicemen near Ukraine’s borders, despite Shoigu’s order for most of those units to return to their permanent bases by May 1. Thus Russia can still escalate rapidly in Ukraine in the future, though the immediate threat of a serious escalation of fighting in the Donbas appears to have passed with Shoigu’s announcement.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

5. Countering Zero-Sum Relations in the Middle East: Insights from the Expert Survey

Author:
Flavio Fusco
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Building on emerging debates on the need to develop de-escalation mechanisms for the Middle East, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), with support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, launched a one-year research and outreach project entitled “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”. Connected to the research, an expert survey targeting European, US, Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese experts and practitioners was conducted on key themes, principles and approaches associated with a potential new security architecture for the region. The results of the survey – first published in an edited book volume jointly published by IAI and FEPS in November 2020 – are analysed below, complete with tables and infographics on key themes associated with the research project and the search for new, inclusive mechanisms for dialogue and de-escalation in the Middle East.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

6. Reducing Russia-NATO Tensions: Codes for Unplanned Encounters at Sea

Author:
Liselotte Odgaard and Sune Lund
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report first analyzes the use of CUES in the South China Sea, which is the region they initially were designed for as an instrument to prevent unwanted escalation. In what sense have CUES in the South China Sea set a precedent for reassurance measures in other regions? Second, we discuss whether CUES could be useful to lower tension levels between Russia and NATO in their ongoing conflicts over spheres of interest, strategic space, and appropriate deterrence measures in maritime Europe. The analysis draws on the first-hand experiences of personnel engaged in implementing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). This allows us to go beyond rhetorical announcements of intention and understand how de-escalation instruments are used at the level of implementation and whether they have any effect. Third, we conclude by discussing the caveats to and advantages of adopting CUES in the Euro-Atlantic area and how they should be designed to take the specific strategic context of this area into account.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and United States of America

7. El islam en Rusia: desafíos a la seguridad y respuestas estratégicas (Islam in Russia: Security Challenges and Strategic Responses)

Author:
María José Pérez del Pozo
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
El islam forma parte de la historia y de la cultura rusas desde el siglo VII, colaborando activamente en el proceso de construcción del Estado, desarrollando relaciones con otros grupos sociales, con los que ha compartido espacios, historia y políticas de asimilación. Sin embargo, la comunidad musulmana ha tenido un papel asimétrico frente a otros grupos étnicos y culturales del Estado, ocupando, durante largos periodos históricos, una posición periférica en asuntos políticos, militares y económicos. A lo largo de los años 90, la religión se convirtió en un elemento de reivindicación nacionalista contra el poder federal, incentivado por la entrada de un islam transnacional radical importado de los países de Oriente Medio de predominio sunita. Las dos guerras chechenas y la posterior gestión de la zona por parte de Moscú han favorecido la aplicación de un nuevo esquema de análisis basado en la etnicidad-seguridad, que generaliza una interpretación negativa del islam en Rusia. La división de las instituciones religiosas musulmanas tampoco ha facilitado la interlocución interétnica ni la relación con el Kremlin. El estudio de las estrategias rusas frente al desafío del islam se ha orientado tradicionalmente al análisis de la dimensión de seguridad, enfocándose en las respuestas militares de los órganos de seguridad del Estado ruso, ya que, la propia disfuncionalidad del sistema político y la ausencia de políticas basadas en al respeto a los derechos individuales ha impedido la aparición de otras iniciativas que consideren la convivencia interétnica e interreligiosa en un Estado declarado laico. Sin embargo, podemos estudiar también las iniciativas rusas aplicando el enfoque del estudio de la política exterior de los Estados para analizar la utilización de la diversidad religiosa en la obtención de determinados objetivos de política exterior. En este sentido, el trabajo aborda la función de los grupos militares procedentes del Cáucaso, integrados en las fuerzas federales rusas, dentro del conflicto sirio. Finalmente, los programas vinculados a la Prevención del Extremismo Violento (PEV) en el Cáucaso Norte, con sus limitaciones, muestran también un cierto cambio en la implementación y gestión de nuevos métodos para frenar la insurgencia regional.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Islam, and Transnational Actors
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and North Caucasus

8. Is It a Nuke?: Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation

Author:
James M. Acton
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Ambiguity about whether a weapon is nuclear-armed prior to its launch is an underappreciated, serious, and growing danger. Rising geopolitical tensions and the decay of arms control are exacerbating the risk that such pre-launch warhead ambiguity could lead to nuclear use in a crisis or conflict. Recent developments in technology—as well as potential future advances, such as the development of ambiguous intercontinental missiles—further add to the danger. A first step toward reducing these risks is to enhance awareness among decisionmakers of the causes and potential consequences of ambiguity. Unilateral and cooperative risk-mitigation measures could further reduce the danger of escalation, including in conflicts between the United States and Russia or the United States and China.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

9. Gulf Security: The Arab Gulf States Have No Good Options

Author:
James M Dorsey
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
The coronavirus pandemic and its economic fallout may rewrite the security as well as the political and economic map of the Middle East. The crisis will probably color Gulf attitudes towards the region’s major external players: the US, China, and Russia. Yet the Gulf States are likely to discover that their ability to shape the region’s map has significantly diminished.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Security, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

10. Four Scenarios for the Crisis in Belarus

Author:
András Rácz, Cristina Gherasimov, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
As protests continue to galvanize Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko is consolidating his grip on power. Volatile domestic dynamics – and Russia’s reactions to them – will shape the discredited regime’s future. This paper outlines four possible scenarios for Belarus up to one year from now. They include options for Russia and the EU, whose strategic objectives differ, but whose short-term interests align: preventing bloodshed, avoiding open geopolitical conflict, and preparing for a post-Lukashenko transition.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, European Union, Geopolitics, Protests, and Transition
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus