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441. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Western Military Assistance

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The tenth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the Western military assistance to Ukraine. Tony Lawrence, the Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Programme at the ICDS, examines donor dilemmas, and how the Western military assistance has changed the course of the war. He highlights the steps made by Western Allies even before the 24th of February, and their considerations regarding “offensive” and long-range weapons, as well as Russia’s efforts to discourage donors. He concludes that most weapons can be used for both offence and defence, and therefore the Allies earlier argued about self-imposed restrictions. He states that the offensive-defensive dilemma was largely resolved when the war shifted to the east. Donor dilemmas include fear of escalation, the apparently limited capacity of manufacturers to produce replacements, and ensuring that Ukraine is provided with what it needs. Lawrence concludes that the West’s military assistance, far from being historically unprecedented, has been uneven and broadly cautious. Ukraine’s victories are Ukraine’s alone, but they could not have been achieved without Western assistance. The outcome of the war will depend to a large extent on Western supply of weapons and equipment to Ukraine, as Russia’s military strength degrades.
Topic:
Conflict, Foreign Assistance, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

442. EU Security and Defence After Ukraine

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The first brief looks at the Union’s immediate response to the war: its direct assistance to Ukraine and its sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Belarus

443. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

444. EU Defence After Ukraine: France’s Presidency

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The third brief considers France’s 2022 Presidency of the Council of the EU, a presidency whose term was dominated by Russia’s war in Ukraine and whose successes in EU defence matters were somewhat overshadowed by President Macron’s high-profile attempts to broker peace.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Peace, Emmanuel Macron, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and France

445. EU Defence After Ukraine: Denmark’s CSDP U-Turn

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The final brief looks at Denmark’s decision to abandon its opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy which, while not as significant as Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO, will bring greater strategic coherence to northern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

446. Germany, Russia, and Energy Politics

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the fifth and final brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, Kalev Stoicescu examines another of Germany’s key bilateral relationships—with Russia. Relations between Germany (or historical German and German-led states) and Russia have greatly influenced the Baltic region for centuries. In recent years, what the Baltic states see as Germany’s over-reliance on Russian gas supplies, even as they themselves have tried to secure energy independence from Russia, has been a source of tension. The Nord Stream pipelines, which Germany claims are a business project, but which the Baltic states regard as a security risk, have been particularly problematic. But at the same time, the Baltic states recognise that Germany has since 2014 adopted a resolute approach towards Russia regarding sanctions; even if they are sceptical that Berlin’s ambiguous policies towards Moscow, being both firm and conciliatory, will change Russia’s behaviour. With the appointment as foreign minister of Annalena Baerbock, who has opposed Nord Stream 2 and strongly criticised Russia’s misconduct, Olaf Scholz’s new government may stand closer to Baltic perceptions and interests and become a more principled and difficult counterpart for Russia. The Baltic states might be encouraged to trust Germany more in its dealings with Russia, but the new government must first prove itself in its words and actions.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

447. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy

Author:
Kristi Raik
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

448. Geopolitics of Europe’s Hydrogen Aspirations: Creating Sustainable Equilibrium or a Combustible Mix?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Tomas Janeliūnas, Andrian Prokip, Iliya Kusa, Alan Riley, Andrei V. Belyi, Pier Paolo Raimondi, and Miguel Sainz de Vicuña
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Discussions about hydrogen’s role in the transition to carbon-neutral economies and the EU’s Green Deal seldom include consideration of geopolitical aspects and/or national security imperatives. However, given the importance of energy as a factor in global and regional geopolitical trends and national security, hydrogen development will reshape not only energy relations between countries but will also alter the broader geopolitical picture. While elevating new aspects of geopolitical interplays, such as the importance of technology and regional clusters, hydrogen development might also unwittingly transplant present-day challenges—such as excessive dependence on the energy supply from hostile powers—into the carbon-neutral future. Since Europe’s energy sovereignty and geopolitical role in its neighbourhood could be at stake, the nexus of geopolitics, energy security and hydrogen development should be given serious attention. At the same time, the transformative socioeconomic impact of energy transition will create winners and losers within and between nations, which in some cases will have national security implications; hydrogen development could offer ways to mitigate this. This report focuses on exploring the impact that the European Union’s ambitions and plans for hydrogen development—including an expansion of its infrastructure in the form of the European Hydrogen Backbone—on its geopolitical position up to 2040. It first looks into the greater detail of the EU Hydrogen Strategy and how it links with the Energy Union, as well as with European strategic autonomy and energy sovereignty issues. It finds that hydrogen development—alongside the growth of the renewable energy sector—offers a great opportunity to reduce the current exposure to hostile actors through the energy sector that often hampers Europe’s ability to act as a geopolitical force in its neighbourhood. However, it also warns that the lack of unity and coherence currently afflicting the Energy Union, and manifest in such recent controversies as the Nord Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia to Germany before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, could potentially weaken such a positive geopolitical impact of hydrogen. Although hydrogen development requires Europe to draw upon external suppliers, the fact that this supply can come from many countries provides a significant opportunity for diversification and reducing the potency of energy supply as a geopolitical weapon. In this regard, two directions stand out in the EU’s neighbourhood—Ukraine in the east, and the Mediterranean along with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to the south. Both have huge potential for playing major roles in the European hydrogen supply chains, and their cultivation by the EU would provide many opportunities both to strengthen the EU’s influence in its neighbourhood and to build new partnerships. Certainly, neither of those directions comes without risks and downsides: political instability and armed conflicts, poor governance, unstable investment environment, water scarcity, and in some cases dependence on the hydrocarbons industry for income will be significant factors hampering the efforts to unlock their potential. Ukraine in particular will require sustained reconstruction efforts to tackle the massive devastation caused by Russia’s war. This will divert resources and attention, but transforming its energy sector and developing its hydrogen production base could still be important strands of these efforts. Europe’s own potential for domestic hydrogen production is another direction that this report looks into as a way to disentangle from the present-day geopolitically toxic dependencies and enhance its energy sovereignty. The Baltic states and Finland represent an interesting case study on how hydrogen could underpin a regional cooperation cluster with a high degree of integration—one of the new characteristics of the hydrogen era that will have geopolitical implications. The report, however, finds that different national perspectives on hydrogen, lack of coordination, and certain issues of trust arising from recent failures of solidarity and unity when tackling the regional nexus of energy security and geopolitics might hamper future regional cooperation in hydrogen. The hydrogen economy also offers some important benefits in managing national security challenges at the national level. In Estonia, the loss of the fossil fuel-based industry in the highly sensitive north-eastern region of Ida-Virumaa will be a socioeconomic blow to the local population. This report highlights how the vulnerability of the region, dominated by the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities who are already highly exposed to Russia’s malignant influence activities, could imperil Estonia’s energy transition and its national security. Creating a national hydrogen cluster in this region, drawing upon its industrial infrastructure and human capital, could mitigate the consequences of decarbonisation and energy transition. However, these considerations do not seem to receive sufficient attention from the government and energy businesses when drawing Estonia’s hydrogen map of the future. The report recommends that various stakeholders in the EU—including those behind the European Hydrogen Backbone—continuously monitor and assess the geopolitical risks, especially in terms of their impact on European energy sovereignty, when creating and managing new hydrogen-related interdependencies with the regions and countries outside the EU. The report urges the EU to support energy transition and necessary market and governance reforms in post-war Ukraine and the MENA countries to facilitate their emergence as crucial and reliable partners in hydrogen value chains. The report also recommends closer coordination and common planning between hydrogen stakeholders of the Baltic states and Finland when forming a regional cluster of hydrogen supply that would contribute to European energy sovereignty. Last but not least, it suggests that, for national security and resilience reasons, Estonia should focus more attention on the Ida-Virumaa region when developing its national hydrogen roadmap.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa, and Baltic States

449. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Kremlin’s Aims and Assumptions

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The first brief in a new series “Russia’s War in Ukraine” discusses Russia’s war aims. These are not limited to the destruction of Ukraine’s statehood, or even of the Ukrainian nation, its culture and language, but include altering Europe’s security architecture by undermining NATO and the European Union. Kalev Stoicescu, Research Fellow at the ICDS, also examines Russia’s extensive preparations domestically and abroad (versus Ukraine, the West, and China), and evaluates where Russia’s assumptions were right and wrong, as proved by the course of events after 24 February 2022. Stoicescu concludes that Vladimir Putin’s regime has an inclination for miscalculation and apparently an appetite for future adventures. The risks are thus far from over.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Organization, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

450. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War in Cyberspace

Author:
Dmytro Dubov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war in cyberspace. Dmytro Dubov, Head of the Information Security and Cyber Security Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, examines Russia’s methods of cyber attack against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure facilities, and their impact. He discusses the close coordination between Russia’s cyber and propaganda activities and highlights future challenges for Russia in the IT realm that, if left unaddressed, will degrade its competitiveness in cyberspace. He concludes that Russia has so far failed—at least in part due to Ukraine’s progress in cyber security and defence—to deliver the effects it desired in its cyber attacks against Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Propaganda, Cyberspace, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

451. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russian Military Logistics

Author:
Ronald Ti
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the third brief of the series, Dr Ronald Ti examines Russia’s failures in planning and executing logistics operations for its war in Ukraine. In large part, these failures can be attributed to systemic weaknesses such as its ‘push’ (rather than ‘pull’) approach to expeditionary logistics, overly centralised command, a lack of non-commissioned officers, and a culture of bullying and corruption. Ronald Ti, PhD candidate at War Studies Department of King’s College London, cautions that Baltic and other planners should not assume that the Russian military will repeat their poor performance in Ukraine against other adversaries in the future, but also notes that Russia’s military culture is highly resilient and therefore difficult to change.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Logistics, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

452. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Large-Scale War and NATO

Author:
Martin Hurt
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the fourth brief of the series, Martin Hurt analyses the achievements of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and compares them with the NATO’s existing forces and capabilities. Martin Hurt, Research Fellow at the ICDS, briefly compares Ukraine’s military capabilities with those of some Allies and cautions against making any hasty conclusions about NATO’s ability to rapidly reinforce and defend its smaller member states in a potential war. He concludes that NATO should deploy its forces and capabilities along the borders of Russia, ready to defend Alliance territory as well as providing all necessary support to Ukraine, enabling it to significantly degrade the Russian forces.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

453. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Early Air War

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The fifth brief of the series looks at the early air war. Russia’s failure to conduct a devastating air offensive and secure air superiority, despite having all the advantages on paper at the start of its war in Ukraine, was a great surprise to observers and had major strategic impact. In this brief, ICDS research fellow Tony Lawrence describes the recent historical context for Russia’s air campaign, its failures in the air in Ukraine, the role of Western assistance, and the importance of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles. The intertwining of the air war and information war is a common theme throughout.
Topic:
War, Air Force, Information Warfare, Military, Aerospace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

454. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War at Sea

Author:
Bill Combes
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The sixth brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war at sea. Captain USN (ret) William “Bill” Combes, the Director of the Department of Leadership and Management Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, examines the activities and the role of Russia’s Black Sea Navy since 2014, and particularly after 24 February 2022, including the blockade against Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s naval and coastal defence. He assesses that the loss of the air defence and command functions associate with the flagship Moskva and the damage to other ships that carry land-attack missiles has eroded Russia’s ability to maintain sea control and reduced its naval-based strike capabilities. He concludes that what Ukraine really needs is direct naval assistance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Navy, Maritime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic Sea

455. Russia’s War in Ukraine: When Russia Went to War

Author:
Konrad Muzyka
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The seventh brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns Russia’s military and political preparations for attacking Ukraine through the prism of indicators of possible intent to conduct large-scale combat operations. Konrad Muzyka, an independent analyst and the Director of Rochan Consulting, which provides consultancy and advisory service on the Russian and Belarusian armed forces, examines the subsequent phases of the massive build-up of the Russian forces close to Ukraine since March 2021. He analyses particularly the prepositioning and moving of Russian forces to assembly and staging areas by the border, including in Belarus, from October 2021 to January 2021, that was not consistent with the intent to merely conduct exercises. Muzyka states that Russia used political negotiations as deception: “Russia’s participation in diplomatic discussions during its build-up of forces was not intended to avert war, but to produce false hope that war was avertable.” He concludes that Russia’s preparations for war against NATO might follow a different pattern. The build-up of forces might not take 11 months, as in the case of Ukraine, and they might not be spread thousands of kilometers, but be rather concentrated along the borders of the Baltic states and Poland. However, a surprise, large-scale, ground attack on NATO is improbable. Russia’s readiness to attack other countries in the future depends on how its war against Ukraine ends.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

456. Russia’s War in Ukraine: WMD Issues

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the eighth brief of our “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series, Hudson Institute’s Richard Weitz examines issues related to weapons of mass destruction. Throughout the war, Russia has regularly threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and against Western states. Analysts are divided on the credibility of these threats and on the risk that the war in Ukraine may escalate to the nuclear level, but Russia’s careless rhetoric is at least likely to set back prospects for nuclear arms control and increase the incentives for nuclear proliferation. While the nuclear taboo has remained unbroken, Russia’s use of hypersonic missiles and its readiness to disrupt civil nuclear operations may have created precedents with huge future consequences. Although Russia’s hypersonic missile attacks—a world first—have not been game-changing, they have sent important signals and, no doubt, advanced Russia’s quest to operationalise these weapons. Of more immediate concern have been Russia’s readiness to ignore basic safety protocols at Chornobyl and its recklessness in conducting offensive military operations near the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Meanwhile, its disinformation about Ukraine’s chemical and biological capacity has raised the spectre of the use of chemical or biological agents in a war in Europe. Weitz concludes that the non-use of weapons of mass destruction in the Ukraine War has contributed to emboldening Western states in their supply of advanced weapon systems to Ukraine.
Topic:
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Hypersonic Weapons, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

457. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Propaganda War

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The ninth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns Russia’s propaganda war. Igor Gretskiy, a Research Fellow of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the ICDS, examines key elements of Russia’s propaganda and disinformation that were crucial in the years long preparation of the invasion of Ukraine. He describes how the Kremlin’s official narratives were used to pave the way for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, and how Russia’s propaganda has changed as the war has progressed. He states that the Kremlin began to prepare the Russian public for the invasion of Ukraine after the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva on the 30th of June 2021. He analyses Moscow’s language of war and concludes that Soviet-style narratives about Nazism and Western anti-Russian conspiracies became the main premises of the propaganda offensive. He also concludes that Russia’s president most likely began to plot the outright aggression after his re-election in 2018. Gretskiy further states that the Russian mainstream media failed to provoke the populations and local authorities in eastern Ukraine into mass defections to the Russian side and lost the battle for the Ukrainians’ hearts and minds. It rather intensified the Russian domestic neo-imperial narrative.
Topic:
Propaganda, Disinformation, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

458. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

459. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

460. Russian Perceptions of Military AI, Automation, and Autonomy

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
President Vladimir Putin declared 2021 to be the Year of Science and Technology in Russia, with November named as the month of artificial intelligence (AI), signaling Russian leadership’s strong interest in this umbrella term. The Russian defense sector is particularly captivated by the opportunities associated with AI-based technologies. In recent years, AI, robotics, as well as the further integration of automation and autonomy into weapons systems and military decision-making have all been highlighted as priorities for modernizing the Russian armed forces. In 2017, Putin famously said that “artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind … Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” Quoting these words, analysts often attribute Russia’s development, testing, and use of weaponized AI to the necessity of competing in the so-called global AI race or the global tech race with the current leading AI developers: the United States and China. While the perceived need to compete and catch up is part of Russia’s motivations, its interest in military AI should not only be attributed to a quest for relative power. Understanding the depth and complexity of the debates surrounding AI, autonomy, and automation in Russia requires an examination of discussions about its strategic implications for the Russian army, the perceived benefits and risks of autonomy, and, more broadly, the importance of technological modernization and innovation for Russia’s place in the world. This report aims to provide an overview of the different conceptions and motivations, both oriented towards domestic and international audiences, that have been and are guiding Russian political and military leaderships in their ambitions to pursue weaponized AI. First, it outlines the various factors, both external and internal, behind the quest for pursuing AI, autonomy, and automation in the Russian military. Second, it presents some of the Russian plans in this area, what is known about their capabilities, and the challenges to strengthening them. Third, it dives into Russian debates on autonomy, and especially autonomous weapons systems, as well as discussions on the ethics of developing so-called “killer robots,” or autonomous combat robots (боевые роботы, or военные роботы), a term often used in the Russian-language literature. The analysis is based on a survey of open-source materials, including media reports, press releases, official statements and speeches, peer-reviewed articles and think tank reports, as well as publications in Russian military journals. The author would like to present it as the first step in an ongoing doctoral research project, as well as a contribution to the emerging English-language literature on how weaponized AI is perceived in Russia.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, Automation, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia