Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Russia Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 10 Years

101. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:
Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Arctic

102. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:
Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

103. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:
Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

104. Nuclear deterrence in the Ukraine war: Diplomacy of violence

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s nuclear blackmailing has been the primary reason why NATO has not intervened in the Ukraine war. However, the US nuclear deterrence has allowed the West to resist Russia’s nuclear coercion, which has resulted in an unprecedented delivery of military aid to Ukraine. The US has reacted to Russia’s nuclear coercion by emphasizing its readiness to retaliate if Russia uses nuclear weapons. The war progresses in line with the historical tradition of limited wars where the opposing sides regulate the conflict by issuing threats in a game of nerves. Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is failing because it uses nuclear deterrence for something it is not suited for: as a coercive tool in a protracted war of conquest. As long as such threats can be countered with a threat to retaliate, their credibility is low because the benefits cannot outweigh the costs in the vast majority of circumstances. The deterrence dynamic still allows more room for manoeuvre for the supporters of Ukraine. The West should increase the military aid delivered to Ukraine with the goal of defeating Russia.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

105. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:
Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

106. In a State of Denial: The Air War in Ukraine

Author:
Francesca Verville and Catarina Buchatskiy
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Ukraine’s ability to repel one of the world’s leading military powers has surprised the world. Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, neither Russia — despite its superiority in numbers and capabilities — nor Ukraine has been able to establish air superiority. With fewer and less capable air domain assets, Ukraine has instead been obliged to adopt the less costly and inherently defensive strategy of ‘air denial.’ However, for it to remain successful will require Ukraine to sustain continuous air defence operations and the West to commit to a steady supply of military assistance. Mutual air denial is essentially an attritional form of warfare from which Russia is likely to draw greater benefits and a strategy which forces Ukraine to make difficult choices regarding the targets it wants to deny. The F-16, albeit not a silver bullet, offers the prospect of enabling Ukraine’s air forces to more effectively exploit openings in Russia’s defences and to strike Russian forces and their logistics. However, unlike previous provisions of Western military assistance, the decision to give Ukraine F-16s moves past the more short-term view of helping it meet the immediate needs of the war. The effort spent training Ukrainian pilots, ground crews, and logisticians will have long-term value in supporting Ukraine’s air defence needs and deterring any renewed Russian aggression.
Topic:
Air Force, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

107. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

108. The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?

Author:
Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Having been crumbling already for years, international arms control architecture is now in a perilous state. Existing arrangements have either been losing their effectiveness or outright failing due to Russia’s non-compliance, whilst Russia’s aggression against Ukraine might have delivered the final blow to this system. Even after the war in Ukraine has ended, it will take years to re-establish the level of trust necessary to, again, engage with Russia on arms control. The return to the pre-war ‘business as usual’, where the dialogue will resume as if never interrupted, is unlikely. Arms control dialogue with Russia ‘at any cost’ cannot produce an acceptable result. Arms control as we have known it, with its legally binding and verifiable agreements, may have come to an end. The trends emerging from the expert discussions are more focused on a different set of instruments, such as political commitments, risk reduction, or transparency and confidence building measures. Development of new technologies, proliferation of new weapon systems, the rise of China as a global player, and increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russian and Chinese military doctrines will all have an impact on global arms control. The fate of the New START Treaty will have a decisive effect on the future of arms control and the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime already under immense pressure. This report attempts to summarise the developments in arms control architecture over the last decades and accentuate the trends that might be consequential when designing the arms control system of the future. The year 2023 has already demonstrated that arms control is less relevant in Russia’s security thinking. Moscow exploits the existing arrangements mainly as leverage to influence the US and NATO’s policy towards Ukraine or obtain concessions regarding its proposals on the new European security arrangements. The role of arms control in European security might be in decline, but the key elements of European security architecture are still in place, and most states continue to implement them. NATO allies – when discussing and designing arms control or confidence-building measures – shall consider how these instruments advance the security of allies. Under the current circumstances, the priority is to strengthen defence and deterrence of the Alliance. This is the only way to lay the groundwork for a constructive arms control dialogue with Russia.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

109. The EU’s Magnitsky Act Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Despite the mounting evidence of the most serious of human rights violations being conducted by Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, the EU has chosen not to use its new Magnitsky Act to blacklist the perpetrators and their commanders. Instead, the EU has preferred to respond to Russia’s ‘dumb’ bombs with increasingly ‘dumb’ sanctions. This Brief explains why, after decades of work to smarten up its restrictive measures, the politicisation of human rights sanctions and the high threshold of evidentiary standards make it very hard for the Council to rely on evidence gathered from transition countries where the justice sector is still vulnerable to widespread corruption and political cronyism.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

110. Is There Life in the Desert? Russian Civil Society After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
By the end of 2021, all leading independent NGOs and individual human rights activists had been completely suppressed, and all issues deemed inconvenient for the Kremlin had been removed from the agenda of those still operating. This report focuses on the state of Russian civil society at the outset of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as on how it was affected by the war and what are the prospects for its development in the future. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has been moving along the path of creating a fully state-controlled civil society in which the political potential of independent civil activism would be completely undermined. To achieve this goal, the Kremlin pro-actively advanced its network of government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) while simultaneously limiting foreign funding for NGOs. Those who did not abide by the Kremlin’s rules were systematically discriminated against and persecuted under the so-called “foreign agent” laws. Meanwhile, local authorities have stopped all formal and informal interaction with “politicised” civil actors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added further impetus to these trends and strengthened the Kremlin’s resolve to root out any sources of potential defiance. The independent professional NGOs that remained were in a deep crisis. Since February 2022, they have switched to survival mode. In all likelihood, they will either be co-opted by the state through a centralised system of financial support or cease to exist in the near future. The niches that they have left – including in the field of human rights advocacy – are being quickly filled by GONGOs. With their colossal resources, wider media access, and connections in the government, GONGOs are able to attract more young people to join their ranks. In many regions, even the scanty of organised independent civic activism that existed before the war was neither there nor likely to re-emerge in the coming years. In Russia, the level of involvement in NGOs has always been low and the population at large indifferent to the problems of civil society. Therefore, one should be wary of inflated expectations when contemplating the future of Russian civil activism. Even if Putin’s regime collapses, one can hardly anticipate a quick transition towards a truly independent and vibrant civil society. The study was conducted on the basis of interviews with representatives of independent NGOs from various regions who, as of February 2022, were based in Russia. The geography of this survey was expanded as much as possible to make the study more reliable and better reflect the content of the processes underway in the country. This analysis also shows that representatives from Moscow, large provincial cities, and the North Caucasus differ significantly in their perception of the current situation with civil society, whereas their visions for the future diverge considerably. A profound lack of communication among them only amplifies the divisions and fragmentations in Russia’s civil society. The situation in the North Caucasus is of particular note. Albeit being severely weakened, local independent NGOs and activists are – in contrast with the rest of Russia – more disapproving of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine but more optimistic about the future of their home regions. They pin their hopes on the revival of indigenous languages and cultures with the help of diasporas abroad and the emergence of civil society.
Topic:
Civil Society, Human Rights, Politics, War, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

111. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

112. Defence Spending

Author:
Margarita Šešelgytė
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted Europe’s military weakness. But the changes to threat assessments that followed Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion have also created an opportunity for European Allies to reassess their defence spending. If they are serious about defence, they will need to address the impact of decades of persistent underinvestment, not least because higher defence spending will be key to the credibility of the new defence plans to be agreed at the Vilnius Summit. Allies should thus review and revise their defence investment pledge. If they do not do this now, it will be more difficult once the war in Ukraine ends.
Topic:
NATO, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

113. NATO’s Posture on the North-East Flank

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, the Allies agreed to bolster enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) by deploying “additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control”.1 The Baltic states had fought hard for a more robust NATO military presence to deter Russia and to provide a realistic chance of defending every square inch of NATO territory against a Russian attack. It has turned out, however, that moving from battlegroups to brigades—and thus towards forward defence— has been more difficult than the Baltic states anticipated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

114. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:
Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

115. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

116. How Russia Brings Its Aggression Against Ukraine to The Global South

Author:
Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
2022 was a wake-up call for the West. The response by the Global South to the war in Ukraine highlighted Russia’s enduring strengths in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This report explores the evolution of Russia’s relations with the countries in the Global South and the ways Russia cultivates these relationships in pursuit of its foreign policy agenda. Moscow’s current interactions in the Global South are driven by the demands of its war of aggression, as well as by its long-term goal: to challenge the international order. The latter dictate several manoeuvres found throughout such engagements: strategic communications, market substitution and sanctions evasion, and regime sheltering. This report presents three case studies meant to illustrate how Russia’s relations with the Global South have evolved since 2022. First, Tunisia exemplifies a superficial partner, with Moscow’s main tool in the country being strategic communication aimed at shaping public opinion in its favour. Second, India is illustrative of a strategic partner whom Moscow tries to engage in order to substitute for lost energy markets and evade sanctions. Third, Myanmar represents a hierarchical relationship, in which the local regime depends on Moscow for diplomatic support and arms deliveries. Notwithstanding varied perspectives on and responses to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, countries in the Global South have generally sought to prioritise their economy and security by attempting to strike a balance between Russia and the West. Aware of such desires, Moscow has been exploiting this situation to maintain its influence internationally. Challenging Russia in the Global South will put pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to conduct aggressive foreign policy – and wage war against Ukraine. The report concludes with six recommendations on how to counter Russia in the Global South.
Topic:
Cold War, Markets, Science and Technology, Communications, Arms Trade, Defense Industry, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Asia, Tunisia, Myanmar, United States of America, and Global South

117. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

118. Putin the Green? The Unintended Consequences of Russia’s Energy War on Europe

Author:
Mitchell Orenstein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Both before and during its re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia cut energy supplies to Europe in an effort to force the continent to abandon Ukraine. Instead, Vladimir Putin accelerated Europe’s transition to green energy, decimating a key market for Russian exporters. Over the long term, Europe is well-positioned to win the energy war with Russia.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Markets, Renewable Energy, Energy Crisis, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

119. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Gas, Political stability, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

120. The Roots of Russian Military Dysfunction

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
An unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority and a failure to communicate accurate information are the most consequential weaknesses at the state level that have contributed to the Russian military’s subpar performance to date in the war with Ukraine. These characteristics are exacerbated by other historic factors found throughout Russian society, which also permeate the military as a reflection of that society. They include an imperialist national identity, endemic corruption, and societal brutality. To these systemic problems must be added the inherent difficulties of what the Russian military was supposed to achieve in its first major peer conflict since World War Two and elements of simple military incompetence. The unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority is symptomatic of over five centuries of Russian autocracy. It is why Russia lacks an effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps and has a top-down command-and-control system, which is slow to provide timely direction to forces at the front. This is exacerbated by a failure to communicate accurate information, especially at the strategic level, which results in decision making based on faulty information and reinforces bad decisions due to inaccurate feedback. These two characteristics create a command, control, and communications system unsuited for modern warfare but congruent with a Russian way of war that has been influenced by a culture of imperialism, corruption, and brutality. Imperialism prevented Russian national security elites from seeing agency in other peoples, which led them to underestimate possible Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve. Corruption compounded personnel and supply challenges for the Russian military. A reliance on brutality to control its own soldiers and assert control over occupied populations exacerbated factors in the Russian military that are detrimental to good order, discipline, morale, and unit cohesion and provided additional motivation to Ukrainians to resist Russian aggression. These are not really “weaknesses” of the Russian system but consequences of that system. Furthermore, despite their detrimental impact on military effectiveness, these factors have sometimes “worked” for Russia and provided, counterintuitively, advantages such as the political will to conduct attrition warfare at a cost that no Western society would accept. This is significant because all the above factors are endemic to Russian social and political culture and will continue, barring a major social revolution in Russia of the scale of 1917. This means there will be no permanent solution to the war in Ukraine even if a peace treaty is signed. These cultural factors will eventually drive Russia to regain its military capacity and renew its aggression against Ukraine and hostility to the West. As long as Russia is autocratic with a propensity for self-deception and imperialism, it will try again to assert hegemony over Ukraine and other portions of its former empire. That future war will likely resemble the war in Ukraine, a high-intensity war of attrition where Moscow is willing to make brutal sacrifices to outlast its foes. This is not a case of predicting that history will repeat itself, but that Russia’s basic political nature will. Only if Russia overcomes its history and changes internally, will it ever behave differently externally.
Topic:
Corruption, Autocracy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

121. The Wagner Group’s Expanding Global Footprint

Author:
Raphael Parens, Colin P. Clarke, Christopher Faulkner, and Kendal Wolf
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
1. The sanctions discussion needs to be expanded, as such designations should aim to shame Wagner’s state partners. 2. Sanctions lists should expand to include actors in third-party countries, such as Broker Expert LLC, a Russian-owned company widely reported to be shipping heavy machinery to support Wagner Group forestry activities in CAR, and First Industrial Company, a business owned by Wagner operator Dimitri Sytyi which concocts cheap “Russian” alcohol in Cameroon and sells it in CAR. 3. Perhaps one of the more important lessons for countering Wagner and other Russian PMCs is the importance of multilateralism. 4. NATO must also continue to consider proactive tools to counter Russian and other PMCs. 5. NATO should work to amplify efforts to push the adoption of the 2008 Montreux Document—an international agreement designed to reaffirm the legal obligations of states where PMCs originate and for those who hire them. 6. The Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs require consideration within a larger great power discussion, particularly as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has firmly aligned Europe and the US against Russia. 7. US senior leaders should demonstrate a greater diplomatic commitment to African allies and put pressure on other African leaders considering, or currently contracting, the Wagner Group and other Russian PMC operations. 8. International bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and the East African Community (EAC) should reevaluate their approaches to peacekeeping and instability. 9. Exploiting the friction between Wagner’s financier and the MoD should also be considered a worthwhile policy option. 10. Last, NATO members must formalize methods of blocking contact with the Wagner Group through their international activities.
Topic:
NATO, Sanctions, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

122. Russia’s Military Industry Forecast 2023-2025

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the arms expenditures and military budget of Russia skyrocketed and continue to grow for the foreseeable future. However, the military industry is under threat Despite the additional massive financial inflow. The military industry could not—with few exceptions—increase the production capacity significantly nor solve its other major problems of workforce deficit and annual net losses. Moreover, the Western embargo on the supply of components, industrial equipment, and technologies makes the further development of the Russian military industry doubtful. Even reverse engineering has become an impossible task. However, the Kremlin’s choice in this situation would be in favor of more arms expenditures and extending the practices of the command economy.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Budget, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

123. The War as an Accelerator

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine laid bare the problems with Russia’s domestic governance. The war caught the federal and regional governments unprepared and exacerbated existing bottlenecks in fields such as infrastructure and state capacity. Even before 2022, Russia’s domestic policymaking had prioritized the short-term political interests of a shrinking ruling class and made long-term thinking and deep structural reforms impossible. The invasion completely eliminated long-term policy planning and subordinated policymaking to war aims. One year after the invasion, these problems are causing frictions and elevating domestic political risks for the Kremlin. The botched invasion and subsequent economic sanctions have caused irreversible losses and put significant upfront costs on the Russian state. This stretches Russia’s peculiar, highly centralized system of fiscal and political governance to its limits. In particular, the interlocking challenges of reorienting trade towards Asia without the necessary infrastructure in place, improving an inflexible multi-level public administration system, and turning Russia into a digital securocracy, show how, by starting the invasion, Russia’s rulers contributed to the destabilization of their own country. They also demonstrate how international sanctions impact Russia by increasing domestic risk factors from the Kremlin’s point of view.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Trade, Domestic Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

124. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Critical Vulnerabilities to Russia’s Military Operations and Systems

Author:
Rob Lee and Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Some of the critical vulnerabilities to Russia’s military operations and systems—revealed during the war in Ukraine—are due to its military culture and poor strategic choices at the beginning of the war including overly ambitious strategic aims. Deficiencies in Russian military culture include a highly centralized decision-making process, a disregard for the welfare of its soldiers, and flagrant dishonesty. Certain aspects of Russia’s military culture, especially the disconnect between front-line soldiers and senior officers, complicate the Russian military’s ability to adapt, develop solutions to obvious deficiencies, and institutionalize lessons learned from the battlefield. Other critical Russian military vulnerabilities are not inherent to its military culture but to Russia’s national demographic and industrial capabilities. Limits in these areas make it difficult for Russia to regenerate military power by either increasing the size of its military or increasing the quality of its weapons systems. Even if Russia’s military culture experiences a post-war military renaissance, its ability to regenerate military power lost in Ukraine will be limited by its declining population and industrial bases as well as Western sanctions on high technology.
Topic:
Sanctions, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

125. Russia’s Nuclear Policy After Ukraine

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The recent mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary force, generated international concern about the control of Russian nuclear weapons and Russia’s future nuclear policy.[1] Therefore we must ask, will Russia change its nuclear policy due to contemporary strategic developments? This question correctly assumes that the war in Ukraine and all its ramifications, despite their undoubted importance, are not the only factors influencing Russian decision-making on nuclear policy. Accordingly, we analyze those factors—including, among others, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—that will likely influence the direction and nature of Russia’s nuclear policy. Those factors influencing policy, itself the outcome of myriad domestic and foreign pressures, also include Russia’s overall security policies, the global strategic environment, and the lessons Russia learns from recent wars—most prominently its aggression against Ukraine. Russian national security strategy and policy originate in what Carl Schmitt called the presupposition of unceasing conflict.[2] Since the U.S. is Russia’s principal interlocutor, it also is its primary antagonist. Russian security policy is inherently adversarial. It postulates a state of permanent conflict with Washington and its allies where Washington seeks to undermine, if not destroy, the Russian state and prevent it from restoring its empire (i.e., global great power status). As Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakov recently stated, “Russia’s foreign policy interests as a great power have a global projection. Our country plays a stabilizing role in various regions of the world.”[3] Allegedly the U.S. employs nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and advanced conventional weapons that could negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent to frustrate Russia’s policies.[4] Thus it is an article of faith in Moscow that its nuclear weapons are the main guarantees of Russia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, great power status, and the factor that deters the West from intervening against Russia in Ukraine.[5] Moreover, those weapons, when deployed abroad, also deter NATO’s potential, largely maritime, threats to Russia. Therefore, Russia must conduct a global military—i.e., an expeditionary, nuclear, and military policy.[6] Indeed, Putin has recently and revealingly called nuclear weapons, “the key guarantee of Russia’s military security and global stability.”[7] Russian nuclear strategy and behavior also derive from a cognitive universe wholly unlike and unfamiliar to American strategic thought. Identical words often mean entirely different things to Russians and Americans; much Russian rhetoric is politicized, deliberately deceptive, or opaque, and invariably follows state requirements. Yet, despite voluminous and even insightful commentary on war, Russian forces often do not fight as its doctrine stipulates, adding to the difficulties involved in determining what its policy is.[8] Simultaneously, however, Russian strategy and policy are also inherently evolutionary—i.e., they respond to changes in the strategic environment that are then incorporated into doctrine, strategy, official statements, exercises, procurement, and policy. Finally, despite our own difficulties in understanding Russia, either willfully or because it cannot help itself due to the deep-seated paranoia in its political culture, equally misreads the West, wholly misunderstands the West, and habitually ascribes the worst motives to U.S. and Western policies.[9] This misreading of the West repeatedly generates worst-case threat assessments that frequently lead to Russian nuclear threats or procurements. Taking all these factors into account, including Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, it is quite likely if not certain that Russian nuclear strategy and policy will change in the wake of the war in Ukraine, win, lose, or draw. Unfortunately, in most potential outcomes to the war save defeat and collapse of the government, that change points to an enhanced role of nuclear weapons in Russian policy with no letup in hostility toward the West. The war in Ukraine has been instrumental in fostering still more animosity toward the West and an enhanced role for nuclear weapons.[10]
Topic:
National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

126. Fighting to Win: Ukraine, Russia, and the War for Survival

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Both the Kremlin and Ukrainians see the war as an existential conflict, even as a “holy war,” and are prepared to fight for years to achieve victory. Russian war aims vis-à-vis Ukraine have morphed into creating a “frozen conflict” to maintain its land bridge with Crimea. However, its primary war aim remains weakening NATO to regain its sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states. To achieve this, Russia will conduct a prolonged strategic defense in Ukraine to demonstrate that Ukraine will never regain its territorial integrity and to show that American support will eventually end as it has for other client states. Ukraine’s primary war aim of restoring its territorial integrity is shared across its society. To achieve this, Ukraine’s strategy is to break the will of the Russian army and then reclaim Crimea, even if that takes several years. Ukrainians do not fear a long war but an inconclusive one that reignites in five or ten years. They want to settle this conflict with Russia once and for all, and see NATO membership as the only way to prevent it from happening again. For US policymakers, the dangers arising from the war overshadow opportunities. One opportunity is a Russian defeat that can serve both as a brake against further Kremlin aggression and as a catalyst for Russia to possibly change her imperial identity. Another opportunity is the chance to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces and geographic position to give it an overwhelming advantage against any possible future Russian aggression. For that to happen, Ukraine must enter the alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

127. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

128. Takeaways from Russia’s Regional and Municipal Elections

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Kremlin, for the most part, engineered the results it desired in Russia’s 2023 regional and municipal elections. However, the campaigns showed that a positive portrayal of the war in Ukraine is not necessarily popular among Russian voters. In the occupied territories in Ukraine, elections demonstrated that Russian power remains firm, even in the face of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Since independent observers had virtually no access to these votes and they were held illegally, it is both impossible to verify the authorities’ claims and futile to analyze the results as if real elections had been held. In many regions, the elections saw the demise of the Communist Party as the largest “alternative” party to Vladimir Putin’s ruling United Russia party. A notable exception was the Siberian region of Khakassia, where the incumbent communist governor was able to see off a threat from his Kremlin-supported opponent. The extensive use of a still-opaque online voting system, along with the overt intimidation of election observers and opposition personalities, suggests that the Kremlin is eager to evolve and test its manipulation toolkits ahead of the 2024 presidential election.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

129. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

130. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Gas, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

131. Moscow’s Mind Games: Finding Ideology in Putin’s Russia

Author:
Olga Khvostunova
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Debates about the nature of the Putin regime have intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some experts argue that Russia has turned fascist. While such claims are understandable in the face of Russian aggression, they obfuscate the complexity of the problem and distract from identifying the regime’s actual ideological predisposition. In fact, the Putin regime is conservative, authoritarian, and reactionary, and its core beliefs include anti-Americanism, ressentiment, and Russian messianism. These beliefs operate under the guise of patriotism, Russia’s official national idea, which is used by the regime to rally public support and secure its grip on power.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, Ideology, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

132. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

133. When Diplomats Are Undiplomatic

Author:
Charles Ray
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The US ambassador to South Africa recently accused South Africa of shipping arms to Russia. The ambassador was criticized by some—including the South African government—for breaking with diplomatic protocol by so openly condemning his host government. However, maintaining an effective working relationship does not mean that a diplomat must never say or do anything that the host country might not like. Far from it. Effective diplomacy is built on trust, honesty, and respect, and the diplomat who never disagrees or who comes across as a sycophant, will be neither trusted nor respected. On the other hand, a diplomat who is consistently honest, but who strives to be polite and considerate, might not be universally liked, but will earn respect.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Africa, and United States of America

134. Russian Disinformation in Africa: No Door on this Barn

Author:
Dan Whitman
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Recent gains by Russian disinformation in Africa make up one of the quickest propaganda victories in history. Wagner Group-Kremlin narratives work to Russia’s material advantage, and to Africa’s strong disadvantage. Understandably, Western governments are skittish toward employing underhanded tactics to counter Russian lies. An alternative to inaction could be to marry Western government resources with the work of non-governmental organizations in Africa and elsewhere. As is sometimes said about climate change, it may already be “too late” to mount efforts to remedy the situation. But that is hardly a reason for doing nothing.
Topic:
Climate Change, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Eurasia

135. Biden’s Bombs: The Dance of Ethics and Interests

Author:
Dominic Tierney
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On the same day in July 2023, the Biden administration destroyed America’s last chemical weapon, and also, controversially, announced the supply of cluster bombs to Ukraine. The story of the two bombs shows how America’s view of ethics in war is shaped by an underlying strategic logic. The focus on humanizing war by banning certain weapons may do more to help America on the battlefield than to protect civilian lives.
Topic:
Ethics, Weapons, Civilians, Joe Biden, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

136. Wagner’s Head is Dead, Now Bury the Body

Author:
Marcel Plichta, Christopher Faulkner, and Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The core of Wagner leadership was effectively decapitated with the deaths of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitri Uktin, but the group’s fingerprints won’t disappear quickly. Although the Kremlin may attempt to appoint new leadership, semi-nationalize Wagner, or attempt a full takeover, a Wagner descendant organization will continue causing problems for the West. The Wagner model of weaponizing private military companies to use as a foreign policy tool, will continue as well. U.S. and European authorities should avoid complacency by intensifying efforts to counter Wagner and its employees, so that Wagner members cannot slip into anonymity amidst Russian gray zone warfare.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

137. The Eagle in the South Caucasus: Armenia Tests Alternative Geopolitical Waters

Author:
Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The US-Armenia “Eagle Partner” joint military exercise from September 11–20 may signal the beginning of a shift in the foreign policy direction of Armenia, historically a close ally to Russia. Armenia has been growing frustrated at the lackluster response of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to its appeals for assistance in the deepening conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it would be difficult to imagine a wholesale change in the geopolitical orientation in Yerevan, given the strong military, economic, energy, and cultural ties between Armenia and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, North America, South Caucasus, and United States of America

138. Why the West Should Stick with Conventional Arms Control in Europe for Now

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez and Alexander Graef
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) formally enters into force on November 7, 2023, the remaining twenty-nine member states need to decide whether they want to keep the Treaty or dissolve it for good. The CFE Treaty no longer corresponds to the present state of European security, but its transparency and verification regime can still provide limited security advantages for NATO members and strengthen deterrence. A formal dissolution of the Treaty would undermine Western normative commitments to military transparency. In the long run, it could lead to a loss of expertise on how to conduct inspections and information exchange, which might become relevant again in the context of ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

139. Russia’s Military Expenditure During Its War Against Ukraine

Author:
Julian Cooper
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This SIPRI Insights paper is devoted to an analysis of military spending by the Russian Federation during its war against Ukraine, and the sources of funding for that spending. Russia’s total military expenditure has increased since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but not dramatically. Despite difficulty in accessing information on budget spending, total budgeted military spending in 2023 can be estimated at 6648 billion roubles. This represents 4.4 per cent of forecast Russian gross domestic product. While military spending in early 2023 seemed to accelerate beyond the budgeted amount, the rate of spending can be shown to be similar to that in early 2022 and does not suggest any unusual surge. The Russian government is attempting to restrain spending on the war to minimize the domestic impact and enable the pursuit of policy goals set before the invasion. The Russian economy can afford this level of spending notwithstanding severe sanctions, while leaving open the possibility of increased war-related funding if the government considers it necessary in the future.
Topic:
War, Budget, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

140. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

141. The Missing Pieces of a Kerch Bridge Strike: Give Ukraine What It Needs to Isolate Crimea and Gain the Initiative

Author:
Bryan Clark and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture both on the ground and in the capitols of Ukraine’s main supporters. Aid to Kyiv is now a point of contention in the United States Congress, which had to remove Ukraine support from a short-term funding package to avoid a government shutdown. Overseas, China’s intensified aggression toward its neighbors and Hamas’s terror campaign against Israel are beginning to stretch US attention and resources across multiple theaters. With half of Ukraine’s post-invasion military and humanitarian assistance coming from the United States, softening support in Washington could cause other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to pare back their contributions as well. To sustain US and NATO support and put Russia on the defensive going into winter, Ukraine’s military will need to change the dynamics of a counteroffensive that has been slow to retake Russian-held territory. Cutting off Crimea from Russia and forcing Moscow’s troops to protect an isolated peninsula is the kind of change that would prove Ukraine is able to win the war, rather than merely fight to a draw. With the “land bridge” across southern Ukraine already under attack, the Kerch Strait bridge carries much of the ammunition and supplies going into Crimea. If the bridge were impassable, Russia would need to redouble its efforts to defend southern Ukraine, drawing troops away from the east and north and potentially enabling Kyiv to make more rapid gains along those fronts before winter. Ukraine has already attacked the Kerch Bridge several times during the war, with air-launched missiles, drone boats, and semisubmersibles. The most successful strike, via a truck bomb, damaged the bridge but did not stop its use. Eliminating the 12-mile-long span as a factor in the war will require a sustained series of long-range strikes structured to defeat Russian defenses and supported by a few new pieces of Western military hardware.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Missile Defense, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

142. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:
Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

143. A New Black Sea Strategy for a New Black Sea Reality

Author:
Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
With Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there is a new geopolitical reality in the Black Sea region. Following the capture of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in May, Russia has effectively turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake and is also seeking maximum control of the Black Sea. Turkey has reminded the world of Ankara’s regional importance by closing the Turkish Straits to the belligerent parties’ vessels (in practice the Russian Navy, except for the platforms home-ported in the Black Sea), which it carried out under authority granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Despite the overwhelming odds, Ukraine has been able to deliver significant blows to the Russian Navy—most sensationally by sinking the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva missile cruiser and by striking Russian platforms with unmanned surface combatants in October. Black Sea geopolitics is a complex phenomenon. Any comprehensive regional political-military policy must therefore offer a multidomain strategy. This report will focus on the maritime agenda. Future reports will present findings on air warfare and land warfare trends in the broader Black Sea region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Black Sea

144. America’s Response after Russian Suspension of New START

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Marshall Billingslea
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This week’s news that Russia will suspend participation in the New START nuclear treaty follows the State Department’s January announcement that Russia is in breach of New START and its obligation to allow inspection activities on its territory. Since the Cold War, the United States has led efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and to create a transparent and stable dynamic between Moscow and Washington regarding our nuclear weapons forces. But the Russians have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of our agreements. While the United States has sought to decrease our reliance on nuclear weapons in our military strategies, Russia has gone the other way. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding new delivery systems within traditional categories like road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. But it has also developed novel systems like nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles that raise questions about their intent. And its large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons remains outside the bounds of any treaty. As we’ve seen in Ukraine, Russia uses the threat of nuclear employment to coerce nations in wars of aggression that Russia has chosen. Moscow appears to have lowered the nuclear threshold. The best path for peace is for the United States to maintain credible deterrence options. This provides incentives for our adversaries to engage in diplomacy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Military, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, and United States of America

145. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

146. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

147. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

148. Keeping the lights on: The EU’s energy relationships since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, the EU has sought to rapidly reduce its dependence on Russian gas and oil. Many alternative major suppliers to Europe stepped up as ‘friends in need’ in the first year of the war, helping the EU plug the gap. The EU’s climate goals direct it to encourage the development of renewable energy sources – meaning it must also cultivate ‘friends indeed,’ which can supply clean energy as well as gas and oil. The countries best able to fulfil both short-term needs and long-term ambitions are Norway and the US, which have stable supplies of gas and are making progress in clean energy. The EU and member states have the instruments and investment resources to advance the potential of other supplier countries as well – to help them too transform from ‘friends in need’ to ‘friends indeed.’
Topic:
Climate Change, Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

149. Steppe change: How Russia’s war on Ukraine is reshaping Kazakhstan

Author:
Marie Dumoulin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came as an additional shock for Kazakhstan, which had already experienced serious domestic unrest in January 2022. Kazakhstan has consistently distanced itself from Russia’s aggression and diversified its relationships with various countries, while preserving its bilateral relationship with Moscow. The war has further highlighted the need for political reforms in Kazakhstan, yet complicated the government’s ability and willingness to implement them. Kazakhstan is now cautiously navigating political change both domestically and in its foreign policy. The EU has shown interest in engaging more with Kazakhstan. It can help the country to overcome this critical juncture by encouraging and supporting its genuine domestic transformation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

150. The art of vassalisation: How Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed transatlantic relations

Author:
Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed Europeans’ profound dependence on the US for their security, despite EU efforts at achieving “strategic autonomy.” Over the last decade, the EU has grown relatively less powerful than America – economically, technologically, and militarily. Europeans also still lack agreement on crucial strategic questions for themselves and look to Washington for leadership. In the cold war, Europe was a central front of superpower competition. Now, the US expects the EU and the UK to fall in line behind its China strategy and will use its leadership position to ensure this outcome. Europe becoming an American vassal is unwise for both sides. Europeans can become a stronger and more independent part of the Atlantic alliance by developing independent capacity to support Ukraine and acquiring greater military capabilities.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

151. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

152. United West, divided from the rest: Global public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:
Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A new poll suggests that Russia’s war on Ukraine has consolidated ‘the West;’ European and American citizens hold many views in common about major global questions. Europeans and Americans agree they should help Ukraine to win, that Russia is their avowed adversary, and that the coming global order will most likely be defined by two blocs led respectively by the US and China. In contrast, citizens in China, India, and Turkiye prefer a quick end to the war even if Ukraine has to concede territory. People in these non-Western countries, and in Russia, also consider the emergence of a multipolar world order to be more probable than a bipolar arrangement. Western decision-makers should take into account that the consolidation of the West is taking place in an increasingly divided post-Western world; and that emerging powers such as India and Turkiye will act on their own terms and resist being caught in a battle between America and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

153. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine

Author:
Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

154. Democratic defence: How Italy can lead the fight against Russian disinformation

Author:
Gabriele Carrer, Teresa Coratella, and Silvia Samorè
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
New research for ECFR suggests pro-Russia and pro-China narratives are present in online and traditional forms of discourse in Italy. It finds that forms of anomalous activity spiked just ahead of the country’s 2022 general election. Despite the shock to Italian foreign policy caused by Russia’s war on Ukraine, economic ties between the countries remain. Moreover, the political environment in Italy remains conducive to Russian influence, with the leaders of four of the five largest parties in parliament prone to echoing talking points favourable to Moscow or advocating for “peace” while suggesting the withdrawal of military support to Ukraine. Italy has been slow to put in place the structures needed to combat foreign influence. The new governing coalition appeared to place little value on tackling the problem, but it has now started to build on the more considerable progress made under former prime minister Mario Draghi. Italy should seize opportunities to strengthen the battle against disinformation, such as: encouraging the next European Commission to incorporate this task into its mandate; and placing the topic in Rome’s forthcoming G7 presidency programme.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democracy, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

155. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world

Author:
Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

156. Feeling the chill: Navigating Arctic governance amid Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:
Joanna Hosa
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has highlighted the strategic importance of the Arctic and upended structures of cooperation between the western Arctic states and Russia, including the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council includes six organisations of indigenous peoples alongside the eight Arctic states, providing a platform for inclusive governance and the recognition and representation of the Arctic’s indigenous population. The participation of indigenous peoples in Arctic governance is key to upholding Europe’s values-based foreign policy and effective governance in the region, particularly against the backdrop of Russia’s values war with the West. The war has divided the Arctic into two camps – one including the Western Arctic states and the other comprising the Russian Arctic – with both sides exploring alternative avenues for cooperation. In this uncertain context, European governments need to preserve indigenous peoples’ participation in existing and emerging forums of cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Governance
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Arctic

157. Culture clash: Russia, Ukraine, and the fight for the European public

Author:
Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is a test of Europe’s values of openness, freedom, solidarity, and individual responsibility. According to ECFR’s research, European sentiment is strong in the EU today; the public holds positive attitudes towards the EU and Europe; and most governments are dedicated to European cooperation. European citizens and governments have shown unprecedented support for Ukraine, but European leaders face various dilemmas about how to handle Russian culture, disinformation, and people in the context of the war – and their responses to these challenges have consequences for European sentiment. Their approach can either reassert European values, helping to sustain European unity and support for Ukraine. Or it can undermine these values, presenting the EU as weak and hypocritical, and eroding Europeans’ confidence in the EU and solidarity with Ukraine. Rather than follow their protective instincts, European governments should display confidence in liberalism and in the European civil society which, over the past year, has demonstrated its resilience.
Topic:
Culture, Public Opinion, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

158. EU – Pacific Talks: EU – Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia

Author:
Tomáš Moudrý
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia, here you can read the report from the debate written by Tomáš Moudrý. During the debate, it was discussed, for example, that despite the considerable geographical distance, the EU and the Indo-Pacific region are now more interconnected than ever before and both sides are seeking to strengthen their partnership in many areas, with security policy now one of the most important due to many factors.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

159. Assessing Realist and Liberal Explanations for the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Many commentators have claimed that the Russo-Ukrainian War invalidates or refutes core aspects of realist international relations (IR) theory. However, the opposite is the case: many realists correctly predicted the war, and realism offers a compelling explanation for its causes, while explanations based on liberal IR theory are weak and often inconsistent with the evidence. By focusing on factors like the balance of power and the security dilemma, the realist explanation for the Russo-Ukrainian War emphasizes Russian security concerns in the face of NATO expansion and Western-sponsored regime change. Liberal explanations, by focusing on the internal attributes of states and their decision-makers, instead attribute the war to the pathologies of the Russian government. The dominant liberal narratives regarding the causes of the war are that Russian President Vladimir Putin has always been intent on reincorporating Ukraine into Russia and/or that the democratic example set by post-Maidan Ukraine would threaten President Putin’s own autocratic rule at home. Neither of these explanations stand up to scrutiny. For decades, a long list of policymakers, diplomats, and scholars warned against Western encroachment on Russia’s borders and cautioned that a crisis like the current war could erupt due to continued NATO enlargement. These predictions are consistent with realist theory and the explanations for the war offered by realists. Liberal IR theory encourages a crusading, messianic, and highly militarized foreign policy that consistently produces outcomes inimical to U.S. interests. Realist IR theory offers a better framework through which to understand international politics and encourages a more prudent foreign policy that defends fundamental U.S. security interests while avoiding unnecessary conflicts with other powers.
Topic:
International Relations, Realism, Liberalism, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

160. The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
William D'Ambruoso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Recent developments in international affairs and military technology have led some analysts to conclude that the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect—that the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella. This conclusion is wrong; technological change has not meaningfully shifted the political calculus pacifying relations between nuclear weapons states. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued strength of nuclear restraint: while Russian President Vladimir Putin is risk-acceptant and brutal, he did not attack a country protected by U.S.-extended deterrence, and, like NATO members, he appears deterred by the possibility that a Russia-NATO war could escalate out of control. North Korea provides another example of the endurance of mutual deterrence: Despite heated rhetoric and a barrage of missile tests, North Korea remains deterrable, and its small arsenal has also been able to deter the United States. Because the chances of nuclear war are usually low but never zero, the nuclear age should continue to be an era of great power restraint. Traditional foreign policy approaches emphasizing strategic ambiguity and arms control, including with China, remain useful tools to help keep the peace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, Deterrence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

161. Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether via the NATO alliance or some lesser means. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Those dangers are why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia today, and they would induce similar caution if the United States guaranteed Ukraine’s security. Lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine will be unserious and unbelievable. Fake security guarantees for Ukraine might have some deterrent value, despite their lack of credibility, given the terrible risks involved for Russia in testing those promises. However, fake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine’s security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. Announcing plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security once the war ends would encourage Russia to continue fighting. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees or fighting for Ukraine and sparking an immediate nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

162. El lugar de Venezuela en las restricciones chino-estadounidenses: una mirada desde la prensa española en el marco de la invasión rusa a Ucrania

Author:
Iván Luis Alonso Peláez
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El artículo hace un recorrido histórico para conocer cuál ha sido el papel de Venezuela en el marco de las relaciones chino-estadounidenses, especialmente los cambios ocurridos a partir de 1999 con los gobiernos de Hugo Chávez y Nicolás Maduro. Acorde con lo descrito por la abundante bibliografía sobre el tema, se constata que se ha producido un cambio de roles en el que China progresivamente ha ido ocupando en Venezuela el espacio comercial preferente que tradicionalmente había ostentado Estados Unidos desde el restablecimiento de la Democracia en 1958. A través de un análisis informativo utilizando como fuente un grupo de textos periodísticos publicados en los seis principales diarios de circulación nacional editados en España, se valora cómo la invasión rusa a Ucrania promueve un todavía incipiente deshielo en el curso de las sanciones impuestas por Washington a la industria petrolera venezolana.
Topic:
Oil, Sanctions, Energy Crisis, Newspapers, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, South America, Venezuela, and United States of America

163. Russian influence on the European Integration process of the Western Balkan countries: A comparative analysis

Author:
Alfred Marleku and Dafina Aliu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article explores the correlation between Russian influence and the European Union (EU) integration process in the Western Balkans. The focus is on analyzing the impact of Russian influence expressed through political, economic and cultural means on the region’s integration into the EU. The article argues that the Russian foreign policy toolkit inhibits the EU accession process for the six countries of the Western Balkans, as it interferes with the internal functioning of these countries, which, in turn, affects their ability to fulfill EU requirements. Using a comparative case approach this study has found evidence that Russian cultural, political and financial support negatively affects the Western Balkans’ European integration process, hindering progress towards accession. Additionally, the findings support the argument that Western Balkans countries with Slavic populations are more susceptible to Russian influence. The article highlights the significant impact of Russia on the EU integration process in the Western Balkans and underscores the need for EU policymakers to address this issue to ensure a smooth and successful accession process for the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Balkans

164. La invasión rusa de Ucrania bajo el prisma de las teorías de control reflexivo

Author:
Arturo Esteban Ceballos
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El presente artículo analiza las causas del fracaso de la fase inicial de la invasión rusa de Ucrania de febrero de 2022 desde el prisma de la teoría del control reflexivo. Esta teoría fue formulada en los años sesenta por el matemático y psicólogo Vladimir Lefebvre, y constituye hoy día una de las fuentes de inspiración de la moderna doctrina político militar de Rusia. Para ello, se ha utilizado un método hipotético deductivo sobre la base de una hipótesis que relaciona este fracaso con el manejo inadecuado de los marcos de información por parte de Rusia. Dado que la moderna doctrina militar de Rusia descansa en gran parte en las teorías del control reflexivo, el fracaso de este último provocó que no se alcanzasen las condiciones decisivas del enfrentamiento en las fases iniciales del conflicto. Ucrania había resistido las medidas activas rusas, lo que ocasionó un error de cálculo en el diseño estratégico inicial del Kremlin.
Topic:
Intelligence, Military Strategy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Reflexive Control
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

165. Dimensión digital de la guerra de Rusia contra Ucrania: perspectivas endógenas en situaciones de emergencia

Author:
Jacinto Gómez-López, Jesús Miguel Flores-Vivar, and Ángel Gómez de Agreda
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Los conflictos armados provocan disrupciones en las redes de comunicaciones y su empleo malicioso por parte del enemigo. Si bien las causas que lo originan son distintas, las consecuencias son, a menudo, similares a las que se producen en emergencias de la sociedad civil. El establecimiento de protocolos y mecanismos que fomenten la resiliencia de las redes y aplicaciones tecnológicas existentes y que prevean el uso de otras alternativas es una parte fundamental en el correcto funcionamiento de los servicios de emergencia. El artículo presenta algunas reflexiones y resultados preliminares para la mejora de estos servicios, basadas en las enseñanzas extraídas del conflicto en Ucrania-Rusia. Se recogen acciones para la mejora de las actuaciones en las redes sociales y en aquellos servicios que estas habilitan.
Topic:
Communications, Propaganda, Disinformation, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Emergency Services
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

166. El modelo de intervención militar ruso-soviético

Author:
Alberto Priego
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Desde comienzos del siglo XX, Rusia y la URSS ha promovido un modelo de intervención militar que responde más a su visión imperialista que a sus necesidades de seguridad. Este hecho ha provocado que salvo cuando la intervención consistiera en una operación relámpago de cambio de gobierno, las aventuras militares hayan acabado en fracaso. Además, la incapacidad de Moscú para modernizar de facto sus doctrinas militares, unido a su atraso tecnológico, ha convertido al ejército ruso en una estructura ineficaz donde el factor humano no es valorado. Este trabajo pretende elaborar un modelo de intervención ruso-soviética que se repite en todas las aventuras militares rusas desde los años cincuenta hasta hoy mismo.
Topic:
Security, Imperialism, History, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Soviet Union, Chechnya, Hungary, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Czechoslovakia

167. Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has put military mobility on top of the EU and NATO agendas. The return of traditional military threats and a renewed interest in territorial defence call for greater attempts to eliminate obstacles preventing armed forces from swiftly moving across EU borders. This Policy Brief maps the actions taken at the EU level to develop military mobility over the past years, with emphasis on the EU Action Plan 2.0. It identifies and analyses current EU objectives, outlines key challenges, and provides recommendations to enhance military mobility in Europe. Several challenges are analysed by the author, which should be urgently addressed by the EU and the member states, especially in relation to the Action Plan 2.0. These include limited funding for dual-use transport infrastructure projects at the EU level, administrative and regulatory barriers, and the lack of political will in the member states to enhance military mobility. Furthermore, the paper provides a SWOT Analysis of military mobility in Europe and the following recommendations are put forward: The commitment to advancing military mobility needs to be long-term. Military mobility needs to be complemented by a civilian dimension. EU member states should urgently prioritise developing military mobility plans. Undergo a lessons-learned process from the movement of military equipment in the context of EU and allies’ support to Ukraine. Regions and cities’ network of exchanges at the European level should include discussions on funding and dual-use infrastructure. Consider setting up an EU-NATO Centre of Excellence dedicated to military mobility in Europe.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

168. EU-Ukraine wartime trade: Overcoming difficulties, forging a European path

Author:
Svitlana Taran
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
During the first year of Russia’s war in Ukraine, EU trade-liberalisation measures and EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provided Ukraine with alternative export routes and allowed the country to reorient part of its exports to the EU market. However, the insufficient logistics capacity and lack of adequate coordination and cooperation during the operation of Solidarity Lanes led to tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours. While a compromise between the European Commission and the Eastern European countries allowed the extension of temporary trade-liberalisation measures for a further year, resolving the immediate crisis, more is needed to ensure their smooth operation. This Discussion Paper provides recommendations on how the EU can further intensify efforts to facilitate Ukraine’s trade flows and prevent sudden trade disruptions and restrictions. These include: Enhance the strategic alignment and connectivity between Ukraine and the EU; Ensure security guarantees and increase the capacity of seaport corridors; Enhance coordination and unity between the Commission, EU member states and Ukraine; Avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lanes' disruptions; Protect critical port and export infrastructure from Russia’s attacks; Facilitate EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Trade Liberalization, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

169. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat

Author:
Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden

170. Russia-China Defense Cooperation

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

171. Charting a Transatlantic Approach to Russia: A Working Paper of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Although the United States and Europe are not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, Moscow clearly sees itself as being at war with the West. The United States and Europe, therefore, must be prepared for a period of what is likely to be prolonged confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of that confrontation. Successfully navigating this period of sustained confrontation requires continued cohesion and coordination between the United States and Europe to ensure they share a common picture of the challenge that Russia poses and the necessary response. Russia’s war in Ukraine has precipitated rapid and major changes in Europe and broader ripple effects that are altering political dynamics much farther afield. Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia itself is changing in still unknowable ways. Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking the country in a more authoritarian direction, Russian society is shifting, and the Russian military’s degradation in Ukraine means that the nature of the Russian threat is evolving. Russia’s war, therefore, requires the allies to re-examine long-held assumptions and understandings about Russia and its intentions and capacity, and it is those updated assessments that should guide the transatlantic partners’ future policy approach toward Moscow. There is no going back to the way things were with Russia prior to its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Western allies must build on ongoing efforts to constrict and constrain the Kremlin’s ability to sustain aggression in Ukraine and more broadly beyond Russia’s borders. It also will require the development of a long-term and sustainable approach to restoring peace and stability to Europe, increasing resilience to the Kremlin’s tools and tactics, and planting the seeds for a less confrontational relationship with a future Russia. In many ways, such an approach will resemble the containment strategy first set out in the 1940s, a strategy designed to apply steady and forceful counterpressure to a regime whose paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West, just as the Putin regime does today. Each of the transatlantic allies’ preferred policy approaches will reflect their own proximity to and history with Russia, as well as current political realities within their own borders. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus within the alliance that the unprecedented cohesion and coordination among allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion must hold. To that end, this working paper provides a starting point for the development of a transatlantic approach to Russia. It articulates expectations for relations with Russia that should guide the allies’ approach, outlines the broad objectives that a transatlantic Russia policy should seek to accomplish, and in some cases more specific near-term actions the allies can take. The analysis reflects two years of dialogue that CNAS has conducted through its Transatlantic Forum on Russia (TFR). It brings together and builds on previous work facilitated by the Forum, including policy papers, op-eds, articles, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, “What Comes Next for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” and other cited publications.1 The paper aims to provide fodder for policymakers and experts on both side of the Atlantic to debate and refine through continued dialogue, including through the future work of the TFR.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

172. Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its nuclear rhetoric has become more permissive, more inconsistent, and more instrumental. Russia has also placed greater emphasis on military exercises involving nuclear-capable weapons, and it has altered policies and planning for its nuclear forces. Although it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions as the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the lessons that Russia draws from it uncertain, the changes in Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons since its invasion suggest that Russia is likely to adopt a more assertive nuclear force posture, especially with respect to its non-strategic nuclear weapons, in order to signal that the country will no longer be a status quo power and increase the credibility of its nuclear threats. Russia is also likely to increase its efforts to test NATO cohesion—potentially through greater nuclear provocations and/or by signaling an insincere willingness to engage in forms of arms control or cooperative threat reduction—and continue to look for opportunities to leverage nuclear weapons to signal great-power status. In a future war with NATO, Russia would likely perceive the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, either to seek victory against superior NATO conventional forces through nuclear first use on the battlefield, or to prevent defeat by those NATO forces. Moreover, since 2022, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. and Russian policymakers to discern each other’s red lines, raising the risk of unintended escalation. Heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric at home could also alter the public’s views of acceptable nuclear use, eroding a potential constraint on Kremlin decision-making. Finally, changes since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate both reduced Russian commitment to nonproliferation as its image increasingly becomes that of a rogue actor in international affairs, and diminished opportunities for nuclear arms control, for now.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

173. CTC Sentinel: August 2023 Issue

Author:
Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, Abdul Sayed, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, Lucas Webber, and Alec Bertina
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
As we enter a new era of calibrated counterterrorism 22 years after 9/11, in this month’s feature article senior analysts at the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center provide a unique window into the U.S. government’s continuing efforts to suppress international terrorism. NCTC director Christine Abizaid writes: “It is clear to me that Americans at home and abroad would be confronted with a more severe terrorism threat if it were not for the sustained and focused efforts of the entire U.S. CT community over the past 22 years. As we approach another 9/11 anniversary, I asked senior analysts from NCTC to share more with the public and academic community about the constant, behind-the-scenes work of CT professionals across the government. It is my hope that, through this product, others can gain a greater degree of insight into what this community regularly confronts in its mission to protect innocent civilians from persistent terrorist adversaries.” In the second feature article, Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, and Abdul Sayed examine the enduring threat posed by Islamic State Khorasan (ISK). They write: “An analysis of ISK’s operations, outreach, and clashes with the Taliban indicate that the organization remains capable of strategic adaptation and is only broadening and deepening its influence in the region, posturing to become a truly regional organization. And while the Taliban have demonstrated some capacity in targeting ISK commanders, any security gains are unlikely to hold in the absence of sustained counter-ISK operations.” With the Islamic State earlier this month announcing the appointment of its fifth caliph, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, Aymenn Al-Tamimi examines what little is known about the group’s recent paramount leaders. He writes: “Despite the fact that the group’s caliphs are now very much ‘men of the shadows,’ there is little evidence pointing to the prospect of the group’s fragmentation in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere around the world, with the group’s affiliates seemingly willing to accept successor caliphs about whom little or nothing is publicly known.” Lucas Webber and Alec Bertina profile the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and its paramilitary wing, the Russian Imperial Legion (RIL), tracing their involvement in the Ukraine conflict since 2014. They write: “With the Wagner Group’s resources waning, there may be an opportunity for RIM/RIL to deepen its involvement in Russia’s efforts in Ukraine. This could bolster the group’s recruitment, paramilitary capabilities, and thus increase the broader threat it poses. However, the organization may face sanctions in the future from the Russian state if the Kremlin continues to clamp down on Russian pro-war ultra-nationalist elements.”
Topic:
Security, Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, 9/11, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Syria, North America, and United States of America

174. CTC Sentinel: April 2023 Issue

Author:
Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, Marcel Plichta, Paul Cruickshank, and Lucas Webber
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The late General Wayne A. Downing, a former distinguished chair of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, used to tell his colleagues at the Center, “Who thinks wins.” In this month’s feature article, Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, and Marcel Plichta argue that smarter counterterrorism in the Sahel, and across sub-Saharan Africa, can pay big dividends for the United States on the field of great power competition. They write that “the United States is at a critical juncture as it looks to adapt its counterterrorism mission. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Sahel region of Africa, where for the past decade, the United States has relied on France to serve as the counterterrorism lead. Those days are over, at least for now, and the United States is left attempting to balance its counterterrorism efforts in the frame of great power competition. However, too often these two strategic objectives are cast as zero-sum. In reality, U.S. counterterrorism in the Sahel, if appropriately reassessed, designed, and implemented, can generate real wins for the United States as it seeks to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Additionally, and most importantly, it can improve the prospects for stability and security for African states in desperate need of both.” Our interview is with two counterterrorism officials at the Catalan Police – Mossos d’Esquadra: Inspector Lluis Paradell Fernandez, head of the Central Analysis Unit, Intelligence and Counterterrorism Service, and Deputy Inspector Xavier Cortés Camacho, head of the Counterterrorism Central Area. They discuss lessons learned as a result of the 2017 Islamic State-inspired attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, the evolving threats Catalonia faces, and the importance of “a joined-up effort in working to prevent violent extremism.” Lucas Webber and Daniele Garofalo write that “the Islamic State’s leadership and central propaganda apparatus have been pushing to boost the Somalia branch’s profile, while pro-Islamic State-Somalia groups have been producing media content to help the movement’s message reach Somali, Amharic, Oromo, and Swahili speakers to boost fundraising, recruitment, and violent incitement efforts as well as to grow grassroot support in regions populated by these ethnolinguistic communities.” They argue that “these developments could have regional security implications if the Islamic State is able to strengthen the Somalia branch using these means. Bolstered transnational connections could enable violent incitement and attacks directed into neighboring countries.” Nodirbek Soliev examines digital terror financing by central Asian jihadis. He writes that “their online financing efforts tend to involve three stages. The first is the dissemination of fundraising propaganda and contacting prospective donors via online public accounts. The second is communication via encrypted messaging apps to identify a suitable mode of transaction and to provide security protocols. The third is the transaction itself. Understanding these mechanisms can help enhance relevant countries’ response strategies against terrorism financing risks.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Spain, North America, Somalia, Sahel, and United States of America

175. European energy solidarity: strengthening the EU’s crisibility

Author:
Aline Bartenstein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
By default, when the EU is hit by a crisis, member states tend to have a national sovereignty reflex. When Italy was hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic, the first reaction was to close its borders and restrict the export of urgently needed medical equipment. National interest superseded the call for European solidarity. Although member states have repeatedly managed to unite and – in the face of the polycrisis – developed a certain crisibility, no one would have been surprised if member states had preferred to seek their own advantage when Russia started the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Nearly one year later, member states are (still) united – some declaring this as never before – and a gas or electricity crisis has so far been averted. This unity, which certainly threatened to crumble in the face of Hungarian opposition, German hesitancy, and the different approaches to dealing with the war, leads us to the question of what is different this time? Certainly, the EU's identity has been profoundly challenged by the war since its peacekeeping credentials – the EU is even a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize – were perceived to be at risk. Was is this identity-threatening experience that united the member states? Or was it the recognition of Russia as a common foe that strengthened the bond between them?
Topic:
Sovereignty, European Union, Solidarity, Energy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Italy

176. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:
Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

177. Judging Putin

Author:
Arnaud De Nanteuil
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The publication of an international arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin on 17 March 2023 by the Second Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has caused a stir. Although the institution is far from immune from criticism (it has long been accused of being "strong with the weak and weak with the strong"), this is a major change in the Court's policy as it is the first warrant ever issued against the sitting leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council; a member who, moreover, in a chilling irony of history, played a key role in the Nuremberg Trial. In some respects, this is a gamble, given the many obstacles that stand between this historic event and a possible conviction of Vladimir Putin. But this arrest warrant is also a way to put the ICC back in the centre of the game, even though until now it seems to have been largely denied the possibility of judging the main perpetrator of the war of aggression against Ukraine and its disastrous humanitarian consequences.
Topic:
International Law, War Crimes, International Criminal Court (ICC), Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

178. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: the liberal power and its limits

Author:
Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. There was talk of a "paradigm shift" in France, of a "Zeitenwende" ("change of era") in Germany, of an "end to naivety". Across Europe, a surge of sympathy and solidarity for Ukraine and its suffering has gripped public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colours of the EU and Ukrainian flags being ostensibly displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has given massive economic aid to Ukraine (€20 billion already paid out, €20 billion planned for 2023) and has taken in 4 million Ukrainian refugees. At the June European Council, it accepted Ukraine's membership application, as well as that of Moldova, and a prospect of accession for Georgia. By adopting sanctions against Russia that were unprecedented since those taken against Serbia at the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has also demonstrated its capacity for "hard power". In the wake of its common defence policy, it delivered arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3 billion "peace facility". By almost completely depriving itself of Russian fossil fuels, it is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the enormous change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is undergoing a new existential crisis after the repeated shocks of the last few years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy that Europe would be built through crises and would be the sum of the solutions brought to these challenges. By defending its values against Russia, the European Union is asserting itself as a "liberal power". But it remains no less fragile beyond its response.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Liberalism, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

179. WHY DEMOCRACIES AREN’T MORE RELIABLE ALLIANCE PARTNERS

Author:
Mark Nieman and Doug Gibler
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
ussia’s invasion of Ukraine set off a security spiral in Europe. Despite US President Biden’s pledge to “defend every inch of NATO territory,” Poland increased its military budget by a whopping 60 percent and asked to have US nuclear weapons based on its territory. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia also announced sizable defense increases, with Latvia re-instating compulsory military training. Why didn’t Biden’s pledge reassure these NATO members? Is the alliance’s famed Article 5 promise—that an attack on one member is an attack on all—a less than ironclad guarantee?
Topic:
NATO, Democracy, Alliance, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

180. POWER, NOT PEACE: THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

Author:
Timothy D. Sisk
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The row between International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky over potential Russian and Belarussian athlete participation at Paris 2024 exposes the Achilles’ Heel of the Olympic Games: the peace-promising celebrations are inescapably ensnared in nation-state power politics. The IOC announced on January 25 a proposal to facilitate participation in the 2024 Olympic Games for individual athletes from Russia (and close ally Belarus) individually and neutrally in the Paris games. The statement reversed an IOC Executive Board decision from February 28, 2022, to impose more sweeping participation sanctions on Russia following the Ukraine invasion.
Topic:
Sports, Olympics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

181. Russia’s Ukraine Revanchism: Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism, and the Emerging World Order

Author:
Mohammad Ali Zafar
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
The Ukrainian conflict has paved the way to re-examine the geopolitical implications of Russian Neo-Eurasianism, which has challenged the Liberal International Order. The implications of such a development will have global implications for Russia. Indications of Putin's renewed mission, infused by restrategising the Russian position in Eurasia coupled with cultural exceptionalism based on messianic identity, are observable in recognition of Donbas and Luhansk as separate territories and the invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has allowed the US to lead as an Atlanticist player and regain its slipping position in the international system. Therefore, following exploratory research methodology, the paper examines Dugin’s geopolitical model based on neo-Eurasianism. The paper concludes that the model will observe major setbacks in the post-Ukrainian conflict order as the proposed alliances by Dugin’s model with Moscow, Tokyo, and Tehran face several challenges. Consequently, the invasion has pushed Atlanticist pre-eminence back on track across Eurasia.
Topic:
Conflict, Regionalism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

182. Mongolia Between Two Giants: Cold War Lessons and Today’s Realities

Author:
Batbayar Tsedendamba, Segey Radchenko, Morris Rossabi, and Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Ambassador Batbayar will discuss Mongolia’s effort to achieve a delicate balance between its two big neighbors, namely Russia and China, and between the Russian Federation and its so-called “third neighbor” [democratic partner] countries. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Mongolia has endeavored to stay as neutral as possible both between Russia and China, and between Russia and the West. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Mongolia was faced with intense confrontation between its two giant neighbors: Russia and China. At that time, Mongolia had no other choice but to enter into an alliance with Moscow. Today Mongolia is again facing the old dilemma about maintaining equidistance from its two giant neighbors: Russia and China. But unlike Cold War era, Mongolia has developed extensive relations with “third neighbor countries”; namely the USA, the EU, Japan and South Korea all have an enormous stake in Mongolia’s future as a democratic and prosperous country. Therefore, Ulaanbaatar has a great dilemma between short-term economic gains from ties with Moscow and Beijing or a long-term commitment to Western democracy and freedom.
Topic:
Cold War, Diplomacy, History, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Mongolia, and Asia

183. The Strategic Repositioning of LNG: Implications for Key Trade Routes and Choke Points

Author:
Leslie Palti-Guzman and Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
2022 saw the climax so far of the weaponization of energy. Following its geopolitical demise, Russia has undertaken its own gas amputation, moving from a super energy power status to a diminished role with uncertain prospects and only hard options left. Russia has cut off almost entirely pipeline gas supplies to the European Union (EU), first inflicting huge financial pain and collecting record high revenues, but then simply losing out its largest and best market with no realistic alternative, and no prospect of any significant return. However, the Kremlin could still further reduce some of the remaining pipeline gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and thus cause some tensions in the markets. Russia also retains leverage on oil markets, where the Kremlin managed to cope with the embargo as well as the price cap and maintain the relationship with Saudi Arabia which drives OPEC+ decisions. Meanwhile, in 2022, the European energy system has managed to surprisingly adapt on the supply and demand side to the three shocks: the decoupling from Russian energy supplies, the hydropower generation crisis, and the French nuclear electricity crisis. Liquefied natural gas has made a comeback in Europe and has been a savior of industries, governments, and populations. The LNG corridor between the EU and the United States (U.S.) has become the most dominant LNG trade route in 2022. This came at a huge cost though – EU’s gas import bill soared ten times from 2020 and three times from 2021 levels. For 2023, the European gas balance is much more fragile, as the demand reduction potential has reached its limits, same for the ability to attract additional non-Russian exports to Europe, at a time when missing Russian volumes will probably reach 120 billion cubic meters (bcm), instead of about 77 bcm in 2022. More moderate price levels since November 2022 have clearly overshadowed this fundamental mismatch, especially as the weather has been mild and China was still struggling with the pandemic. With an additional 30-40 bcm of missing Russian gas to offset in 2023 compared to 2022, Europeans can be expected to benefit from an extra gas of around 20-25 bcm left in storages thanks to mild weather and available LNG. They have no choice but to continue saving energy in a hurry, that is both on gas and electricity. Gas demand in power generation had increased in the first nine months of 2022 before falling in Q4 2022, and well over 15 bcm can be saved here in 2023 as more nuclear is available altogether, alongside more renewables, and some coal. It will be critical to reduce peak loads though. The key improvement is in terms of logistics, with the massive new LNG import capacity deployed across Europe. Overall, EU’s import situation will be very tensed and fragile for the next winter. The key challenge is that EU’s gas supply security ultimately depends on the weather in Europe, China’s and Japan’s LNG demand, and weather or technical outages in the Gulf of Mexico or in other producers. Any slight disruptions in supplies can have major impacts. As a last resort, bringing back some Groningen supplies, no matter how politically sensitive this would be, must be considered and prepared. Large financial compensations and effective governmental action would notably be required to offset the hardships.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Exports, Trade, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

184. Russia’s Mining Strategy: Geopolitical Ambitions and Industrial Challenges

Author:
Florian Vidal
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In addition to being a leading gas and oil power, Russia also possesses vast geological resources that place it among the world’s leading mining countries. Nevertheless, Russia’s largely privatized mining sector faces great and numerous restrictions relating to the obsolescence of its infrastructure, lack of investment and a shortage of qualified human resources in the industry, which may be further exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. To diversify its sources of revenue, whilst also obtaining new levers of geopolitical power, particularly in Africa, Moscow is seeking to revitalize this strategic industry. Russia may focus on several of its globally significant companies, particularly in the diamond, fertilizer and nickel sectors. It also plans to extend its mining activities by reinvesting in and modernizing historic sectors such as coal, or by developing new ones like lithium. In a context of growing global demand for critical metals and minerals in order to meet the challenge of the ecological and energy transition, what role can Russia play? Moscow intends to overcome the challenge of maintaining its economic and industrial autonomy in the face of the sanctions imposed by the West following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The future of Russia’s mining industry may depend upon a reorientation away from its traditional Western markets and towards Asian countries, such as India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have decided to retain their economic ties with Russia. Will Russia’s mining policy bolster the implementation of the “pivot to Asia” that Moscow has talked of for several years?
Topic:
Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Diversification, Mining, Modernization, and Industry
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

185. The Sino-Russian Partnership Assumptions, Myths and Realities

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced a “no limits friendship” at their February 2022 summit, the message was that Beijing and Moscow had reached a new peak in relations. Yet Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the limits of Sino-Russian partnership and highlighted their sometimes diverging interests. Far from being an authoritarian alliance, this is a classic great power relationship centered in realpolitik. China and Russia are strategically autonomous actors, with fundamentally different attitudes toward international order. The Sino-Russian partnership remains resilient. Both sides recognize that it is too important to fail, especially given there are no viable alternatives to continuing cooperation. Nevertheless, the balance of power within the relationship is changing rapidly. Russia’s geopolitical and economic dependence on China is greater than ever. Although predictions of a clientelist relationship are premature, this widening inequality represents a major long-term source of weakness. The challenges Beijing and Moscow pose to Western interests are largely separate and should be addressed individually on their merits. Equally, it is naive to imagine that reaching out to either side could help loosen their strategic partnership. Western governments should focus instead on upping their own game—from revitalizing democracy and the rule of law at home to addressing universal threats such as climate change and food insecurity. Bobo Lo is an Associate Research Fellow with the Russia/NIS Center at Ifri. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow with the Lowy Institute, Sydney, Australia; and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, and Deputy Head of Mission at the Australian Embassy in Moscow. Dr. Lo has written several books, including A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World (Penguin Australia, 2017); Russia and the New World Disorder (Brookings and Chatham House, 2015); and Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics (Brookings and Chatham House, 2008).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

186. The Technology Policies of Digital Middle Powers

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Digital technology is an element of power in the international system as well as an area for competition among countries. Considering the economic weight and political voluntarism of the U.S., China, and the EU, those three poles of power have received a lot of attention when it comes to their technology policies. This study aims to shift our gaze toward countries outside of the trio. Digital middle powers are those countries that are caught in the middle of the power play in an emerging multipolar international system where digital technology is a determining factor of power. It also refers to countries with established or growing clout in digital technology, and which are regional leaders or global ones in certain sectors. The study provides a qualitative comparison of the technology policies of nine of the digital middle powers: Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. It seeks to reflect the diversity of national technology policies, as well as to identify those countries’ convergences and divergences with Europe, the United States, and China. Each case study introduces national technology and digital innovation ecosystems, data policies, and the state of digital infrastructure. These elements serve to examine the strengths of the country’s private sector in technology, the government’s regulatory capacity, and the degree of digital development. The chapters then look at how the digital domain is embedded in the broader dynamics of their bilateral relations with the U.S., the EU, and China. A first conclusion is that digital middle powers can usefully be differentiated between rising digital powers and established ones. Established digital powers have well-developed ecosystems, regulations, and infrastructure, but they are all having to renew and re-focus their technology policies to remain relevant. By contrast, rising digital powers tend to have budding ecosystems in digital services and mobile applications, and large ongoing infrastructure development projects, albeit with limited or patchy regulatory capacity. When it comes to foreign relations, the study confirms well-identified trends whereby the EU’s influence occurs chiefly through the elaboration of norms; the U.S.’s via the strength of its digital services and private sector investment, as well as strong bilateral security ties; while China’s growing influence is underpinned by large infrastructure projects. All the countries studied are attempting to balance their relationships with U.S., China, and the EU. None, save for Russia, has outrightly “picked a side” and severed ties with one or two of the blocs.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Middle Power
Political Geography:
Kenya, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, India, Israel, South Korea, Brazil, and Nigeria

187. Russia at War and the Islamic World

Author:
Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
While Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a decoupling with the West on a scale not seen since the worst years of the Cold War, Russia has not been isolated from the non-Western world and has even reinvested its diplomatic energy toward the Global South. This paper focuses on Russia’s relationships with the Islamic world and how they have been transformed — or not — by the Ukraine war. It discusses both Russia’s “internal” Islamic realm and how the Middle East has reacted to the strategic tectonic shift unleashed by the war and Western sanctions. It explains that the role and place of Islam in Russia have been reinforced by the war context, as Islamic institutions and Muslims are seen by the Russian regime as among the most loyal constituencies. It concludes that the main Middle Eastern regional powers have been able to consolidate their transactional foreign policies and use the war to assert their autonomy toward Western actors so that Russia’s weakening does not result in the West’s increased influence but in a more multipolar order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islam, Multipolarity, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Middle East

188. How the War in Ukraine is Changing the Space Game

Author:
Guilhem Penent and Guillaume Schlumberger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has become a showcase for the new commercial paradigm emerging in the space sector (New Space). As such, it seems to confirm the relevance of adaptation efforts led by the United States – more specifically the Pentagon – since the mid-2010s. Thus, it highlights ongoing transformations and announces potential disruptions in the exploitation of orbits, particularly in the fields of satellite connectivity and remote sensing. It also shapes future tensions, while the structuring of international relations around the two poles constituted by the United States and China raises questions about the consequences on the safe, sustainable, secure, and stable use of space. With these developments, Europe is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Space, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

189. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

190. Integrating Cyber Into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict

Author:
Ariel Levite
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about cyber warfare in the lead-up to and the execution of the Ukraine war. Data are lacking, and the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Yet through monitoring and analysis of a single year in the first major war into which cyber has been extensively woven, we do know enough to be able to generate some tentative, high-level, generic propositions on the nature of cyber conflict. These propositions draw on wide-ranging press reporting and extrapolate from several superb pieces recently published by my colleagues Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Gavin Wilde, as well as Microsoft’s recent report on the cyber dynamics of the conflict.1 However, we must still tread cautiously. Our propositions draw on highly imperfect empirical knowledge of a single historical case that is still unfolding.2 Current and future antagonists are also constantly learning from their own and others’ analyses and enhancing their performance, which can render current assessments obsolete.3 For this and other reasons it is quite possible that some of the cyber dynamics unfolding in and around Ukraine may play out differently later in Ukraine as well as in other, future confrontations. As we have observed over millennia, the balance between offense and defense can shift over time; this dynamic may well play out in cyberspace as well. It is also important to note at the outset that widespread assessments disparaging the utility and expediency of Russian cyber operations in the Ukrainian conflict (and projections regarding future conflicts) are presently limited by far more than a lack of comprehensive and reliable empirical data. We also lack insights into the metrics and criteria that each of the protagonists uses to assess the success and failure of cyber’s overall performance in the conflict, and we have only fragmentary evidence of the role each party expected cyber operations to perform. Moreover, even if we had such information, Ukraine-specific answers might not apply elsewhere because the expectations for cyber and the metrics for assessing its performance may vary not only over time and between protagonists but also from one conflict to another. In this context it is important to underscore that some specific factors that possibly helped diminish the efficacy of Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine may not apply elsewhere. Three in particular deserve to be noted here: Russia’s unique approach toward cyber warfare; the level of external support that Ukraine received before and during the war from some leading national and multinational cyber powers; and the sophistication and battle-tested experience of Ukraine’s cyber warriors.4 Nevertheless, even if some of the cyber characteristics of the Ukraine conflict ultimately turn out to be sui generis, they are instructive given the novelty of the field and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. Hence, there is considerable value in advancing these propositions to focus attention on certain questions and facets of cyber conflict, facilitating their review and reassessment as more comprehensive and reliable information becomes available and developments on the battlefield evolve. But the reader should consider the interim observations and propositions offered here as hypotheses employed as a heuristic to encourage debate and invite feedback. All the propositions offered below pertain to our core conception of what cyber warfare is about. Some of the propositions we advance are novel; others reaffirm or refine tentative assertions made before the war. Taken together they suggest a more subdued view of the utility and impact of cyber warfare than was generally found in prewar speculations. More importantly, the Ukraine war reveals that nations diverge significantly in the role and aims they assign to offensive cyber operations as well as the institutional setup and operational modalities they use for conducting them. Most glaringly, the U.S. perspective and approach (emulated in whole or in part by several other Western nations) differs deeply from that of Russia, which makes it reasonable to expect similar divergence across similar regimes. We group our propositions under three temporal headings: the prewar period (starting in 2014);5 the war itself (beginning on February 24, 2022); and finally, the postwar period, after kinetic hostilities eventually die down. Obviously, we cannot know when this last phase will begin; nevertheless, analysis of trends that were manifest in the two earlier phases of the conflict provides a tentative basis for predictions as to what might be expected down the road. This broad scope is driven by two considerations. First, it is designed to underscore the considerable relevance of cyber operations across various phases and types of conflicts. And second, it highlights continuity as well as change between cyber action in peacetime, in wartime, and in grey area situations, as well as during the transitions between these states of confrontation.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

191. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:
Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

192. War in Ukraine: One Year On, Nowhere Safe

Author:
Nichita Gurcov
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ACLED records nearly 40,000 political violence events across the country. Three-quarters of these events are shelling, artillery, and missile strikes mostly affecting the northeastern, eastern, and southern regions of Ukraine. Quantifying the civilian toll of the conflict presents a challenge – especially in areas continuously engulfed by violence, like eastern Ukraine. In areas under Russian occupation, reports of abductions, forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial executions have been widespread, though the scale of violence against civilians becomes known only upon the liberation of territories, evidenced in the case of northern Ukraine and especially the Kyiv suburbs. Meanwhile, long-range strikes, including those deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, pose a permanent threat and continue to induce extreme hardship for communities even farther afield from the frontline.
Topic:
War Crimes, Conflict, Civilians, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

193. Russia’s Yes Vote on Syria Aid Will Come With a Price

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Moscow’s willingness to approve another UN extension has more to do with advancing normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime than helping Syrian civilians, who will remain hostage to Russian demands if nothing is done before the next vote this summer. On January 9, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2672 extending the provision of cross-border humanitarian aid into northwest Syria for another six months. In the immediate term, the vote is good news for Syrian civilians suffering through one of their worst energy crises since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. But the main problem persists—absent an alternative mechanism outside the Security Council, cross-border aid will remain bound to Russia’s increasing political and security demands in Syria, which are ultimately tied to the situation in Ukraine as well. Many were surprised by Moscow’s decision to approve the new resolution. Over the years, Russia has repeatedly threatened to veto previous resolutions, and the West has largely given in to its demands by steadily diluting the aid mechanism. From that perspective, this month’s vote appeared to be a welcome sign of the Biden administration’s willingness to stand its ground on Syria despite dealing with a complex Russian challenge in Ukraine. Moscow did not even resort to its frequent tactic of abstaining from the final vote in order to signal its displeasure with the mechanism.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, UN Security Council, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

194. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:
Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

195. Russia's Influence in MENA After a Year of War in Ukraine

Author:
Matthew Czekaj, Iulia-sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
MEI Managing Editor Matthew Czekaj speaks with scholars Iulia-Sabina Joja, Alex Vatanka, Yörük Işık, Charles Lister, and Roger Kangas on Russia's current standing in the Middle East a year since re-invading Ukraine. How has Russian aggression in Ukraine redrawn Moscow’s relationships in the MENA region? And as the Middle East increasingly becomes a key area of global great power competition, is Russia still a meaningful player there, politically, economically, militarily, and diplomatically?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa

196. The Monroe Doctrine as the Will and Idea of the United States of America

Author:
Boris Martynov
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, international relations entered a whole new stage of development affecting, albeit to varying degrees, practically all states, with no end in sight. On September 7, 2022, speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the world was experiencing “fundamental transformations.” Such transformations generally require several years to be completed. By the middle of the third decade of the 21st century, two highly important signs of a new situation have become absolutely clear: a crisis of the old institutions of global governance and the new rising and developing centers of power. At the same time, the opinion that the new is just the “well-forgotten old” is confirmed. This is especially true of the US and its policies.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, History, Governance, Law, Psychology, Identity, and Monroe Doctrine
Political Geography:
Russia, Global Focus, and United States of America

197. Reasons for the West’s Hatred of Russia

Author:
Yury Sayamov
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
Russia as a state and civilization and Russian statehood as an institution have acted for centuries as system-forming factors of the world order. They have, at various times, exerted influence of varying intensity and significance on the shape, character, and content of international relations, while also being influenced by them. The West’s hostility toward Russia arose, took shape, and began to actively manifest itself as one of the constants of this influence, occasionally reaching the level of outright hatred and spiraling into attacks against Russian statehood, which invariably mobilized the country’s peoples to rebuff the aggressors.
Topic:
History, Statehood, Information Warfare, Crusades, and Russophobia
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

198. Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: Concept, Ideology, Objectives, Means, Consequences

Author:
Plamen Pantev
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The study tries to outline interim conclusions about the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the tools used by the Russian federation in this barbaric war of attrition against Ukraine – a war of a nuclear superpower against a smaller neighbouring country. The study does not aim to analyse the strange way the war is developing – Russians carry on military attacks in both a regular and terrorist manner 7 on the whole territory of Ukraine, while the Ukrainians are deterred to counter-attack the aggressor on the latter’s own territory and to fight with longer-range arms even on their own land. The author understands how many issues from the theoretic fields of international relations, foreign, security and defense studies need to be considered to understand in a holistic way the final result of the interaction of domestic Russian, international, political, economic, governance, psychological and other problems that led to launching an aggressive and devastating war in the European continent by Moscow. The purpose of the study is not to outline the avalanche of mistakes in the policy of the collective West towards a showing for decades signs of revenge imperialist Russia. Neither it aims to point to the multitude of military mistakes by the aggressor in the last year. The aim of the study is to outline and discuss the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the means of the Russian aggression. Revealing the Nazi-like behaviour of the Russian leadership and its armed forces could serve to construct the broader picture of the developing conflict and learn how to prevent a similar invasion by Moscow. The study aims to prove that the legal and moral consequences of the war will be the conviction of the aggressor for the genocide and the war crimes. This would be the only possibility for normalising the life of the Ukrainians and the Russians as well as of the broader international relations system.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Imperialism, Sovereignty, European Union, Conflict, Ideology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

199. The War against Ukraine and Russia’s Position in Europe’s Security Order

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s aggressions against its neighbours since 2008 – first Georgia, then Ukraine twice – impel the urgent reconstruction of European security. While articulating a post-war European security order and Russia’s place there is easy, implementing it is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, in Ukraine, Russia has unilaterally, and unprovokedly, violated or broken at least eight major international treaties and accords, ranging from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, according to which Moscow had pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits nuclear threats against non-nuclear states.[1] It has also broken NATO’s (and especially Washington’s) conventional deterrence.[2]
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

200. Turkey vis-à-vis Russia’s War against Ukraine

Author:
Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Characterising Turkey’s policy towards Russia’s war on Ukraine is not an easy task. Elements of both support for Ukraine and neutrality have emerged in the past year. An analysis of the fundamentals of Turkey–US relations and Russia–Turkey relations is thus helpful.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America