Political Geography: Russia / Publication Year: within 25 Years

201. Diplomacy and the War against Ukraine

Author:: Ferdinando Nelli Feroci
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Normally, diplomacy is meant as the set of rules and processes that preside over international relations to prevent or resolve disputes and conflicts, or even as a special skill in dealing with complex issues and finding compromises. If this is the case, one may be tempted to conclude that diplomacy has so far failed with respect to the year-long conflict in Ukraine. But perhaps it is worth analysing the issue more closely.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

202. The War against Ukraine and Its Lessons for NATO Militaries: Food for Thought

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: One year of full-fledged conventional war fought on the European continent between two large countries, including a nuclear power, is obviously a historical watershed for NATO and the whole Euro-Atlantic area, whose strategic implications are yet to be fully assessed. The conflict has already destroyed a number of expectations widely shared in Western Europe, including the ideas that Putin would not have invaded the whole of Ukraine, that Western sanctions would have paralysed his ability to wage a prolonged military campaign, or that Europeans would have diminished their military support to Ukraine over the first wartime winter. Given the ongoing “fog of war” and uncertainty about future scenarios, it is perhaps too early to identify lessons for allies and their militaries. Still, the following elements may be considered food for thought for the Western defence policy communities, cum grano salis.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

203. The Existential Value of Ukraine’s Freedom

Author:: Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned the international spotlight back onto the value of democracy and the contrast between liberal democracies and authoritarian systems. However, it has done so by adding nuance and emotional power to what was previously a rather sterile debate. When Joe Biden was elected President of the United States, putting an end – at least for the time being – to the traumatic years for US democracy epitomised by Donald Trump’s presidency, international politics reacquired a distinctively normative, if not ideological, taste. Powers like Russia and China should be opposed, not “only” because of their aggressive or unfair behaviour – be it in the South China Sea, Taiwan, Ukraine, cyber, energy, technology or trade – but because that malign behaviour, so the argument went, is intrinsically linked to the nature of their political systems: it’s democracy versus autocracy, stupid.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Democracy, Freedom, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

204. Italy’s Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Nona Mikhelidze
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In line with the EU’s policy, former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and current Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have taken a strong stance in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine by firmly condemning the invasion and offering their full support for Kyiv’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

205. Fighting Against Internal and External Threats Simultaneously: China’s Police and Satellite Cooperation with Autocratic Countries

Author:: Chisako T. Masuo
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: What direction will the Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy take over the coming years, and how will that affect the existing international order? The Chinese Communist Party harbours a strong sense of crisis about the internal and external threats colliding to supposedly destabilise its regime, and thus aims to strengthen cooperation with developing countries in order to prevent such danger. The Xi administration is consequently strengthening police and law-enforcement cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes Russia. Besides, China has launched a new initiative of collaborating with Moscow on satellite systems to monitor the entire Earth, in order to accumulate big data on various issues. The current Chinese foreign policy, which pursues a cultivation of deeper relations with autocratic countries by providing them with surveillance technologies, is likely to deepen the global divide with liberal democracies.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, International Order, and Satellite
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

206. Let’s Learn Judo with Putin. Sport, Power and Masculinity in 21st-Century Russia

Author:: Leo Goretti and Sofia Mariconti
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Dedication to sport and physical prowess have been key elements in the construction of Vladimir Putin’s image since his rise to the Presidency of Russia. Domestically, the Kremlin has promoted a public representation of the President as a strong, energetic, decisive leader who is ‘fit for the job’. Constant emphasis has been placed on how sports – especially judo and those harking back to the Soviet past, such as sambo – forged the manly qualities of Putin, turning him into the living paradigm of Russian hegemonic masculinity. At the international level, Putin’s vigorous and masculine leadership has been turned into a proxy for Russia’s restored status: in the early 2000s, to mark a neat break from the ‘decadence’ of the 1990s; subsequently, to suggest the return of Russia to its great-power status. Hostility against human – especially LGBT – rights in sport has become central to this discourse, not only because they are suggestive of alleged Western decadence, but also because they threaten the gender norms and public image on which Putin’s leadership has been built.
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Sports, Leadership, and Masculinity
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

207. Women, Peace and Security and the 2022 National Security Strategy

Author:: Hans Hogrefe and Cassandra Zavislak
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Our Secure Future
Abstract:: This brief examines the inclusion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy, and compares it to the ways in which the Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy addresses the full participation of women in our national security interests.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Women, Inequality, Peace, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

208. Can Israel mediate an end to the Ukraine war?

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel is well positioned to again become a go-between between Russia and Ukraine, an effort that could further elevate its international status
Topic:: Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Israel

209. Evolution of the World Order and Russia’s Ideas About the Outside World

Author:: A. Bogaturov and O. Lebedeva
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The idea of the outside world and the role that Russia plays in it has undergone radical changes in Moscow’s official worldviews since 2014. The degradation of the international security situation indicates a deep crisis in the existing world order, which was formed in the spirit of the US’s unipolar hegemony after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Attempts are being made to turn the UN, the only universal platform for reaching collective decisions on an inclusive and equal basis, into a tool of the collective West for pressuring “revisionist states.” The decline in the culture of global-level dialogue leads not only to the aggravation of military-political conflicts but also to the inability to effectively respond to new challenges and transnational threats.
Topic:: Partnerships, Geopolitics, ASEAN, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Global Focus

210. Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future in Turkey and India, and Iran and Russia

Author:: Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: The institutions and practices necessary for open and fair competition for political power are eroding across the world. In some countries, such as Turkey and India, the democratic dividend of electoral competition has been steadily undermined by majoritarian autocrats who have proved adept in campaigning for office and winning elections. In others, such as Russia and Iran, political leaders have marginalised or suppressed electoral processes, reducing them to closely managed performances that seek to demonstrate public consent. At least some traces of the mechanisms of electoral competition often remain in place, however, even where genuine public consent has been almost extinguished. This leaves open the possibility that the trend away from competitive electoral politics could be at least partially reversed in future, in the context of political succession or the electoral defeat of incumbents. In June 2023, LSE IDEAS brought together experts from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and other institutions to examine the potential for restoring the democratic dividend of competitive politics in four major countries. Turkey and India were selected for their timeliness—national parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Turkey in May 2023, and national parliamentary elections are due in India in April 2024—and for their similarities: both political systems are characterised by powerful elected leaders with a strong record of performance in national elections, each backed by large political parties based on an appeal to national and religious identity. Iran and Russia were chosen as examples of two states where competitive electoral politics had been temporarily enabled by significant political change—respectively, an impasse in Iran’s theocracy in the 1990s, and the end of the Soviet Union—only to be undermined by the reassertion of autocratic power. Two assumptions underlay the planning of this discussion on ‘Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future’. The first is that the characterisation of political systems as either democratic or autocratic provides an insufficient basis for explaining many differences in the workings of political institutions, or for guiding policy. The second assumption is that while certain institutions and practices appear to be essential to maintaining open competition for political power—including for example, freedom and diversity of comment in major channels of communication like broadcast television, radio, newspapers, and social media—there is no useful empirical example or theoretical formulation of an ideal or perfect democratic political system. The exclusion from the discussion of countries with longer established forms of competitive politics, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, was not intended to suggest an implicit comparison with ideal types of functioning democracies. On the contrary, there are grounds for concern about the maintenance of open competition for political power in every country professing to be a democracy. As David Runciman has said of the future of democratic practices: ‘The question for the twenty-first century is how long we can persist with institutional arrangements we have grown so used to trusting, that we no longer notice when they have ceased to work.’ He warns that ‘democracy could fail while remaining intact’.
Topic:: Elections, Political stability, Autocracy, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, India, and Asia

211. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: One Year On

Author:: LSE Ideas
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update summarises a roundtable discussion held at LSE IDEAS in July 2023. Contributors to the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Stuart Austin, Professor Gordon Barrass, Professor Christopher Coker, Tom McKane, Hugh Sandeman, Susan Scholefield, and Peter Watkins. None of the content of the Strategic Update is attributable to any one individual. One year on from NATO’s Madrid 2022 summit, this Strategic Update address the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and its implications for the future, especially regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. The paper addresses the misalignment between preparations for defence and the real state of its armed forces, the UK’s symbolic support for Ukraine versus its capability, the concepts of resilience and deterrence, and finally the future of NATO’s relationship with Russia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

212. Defunding the War Against Ukraine: Economic Strategies for Countering Russian Aggression

Author:: David Cortright and Anna Romandash
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:: The sanctions imposed by the United States and many of its allies on Russia since 2022 have been unprecedented. The current financial, economic, trade, and other restrictions aim to constrain Russia’s ability to continue its aggression. Imposed by most developed countries, the sanctions and export controls have the potential to diminish Russia’s war-making capacity, weakening state finances and eroding its military technological base. The measures have imposed significant costs on Russia, but to date they have not achieved their objectives due to Russia’s elaborate circumvention and preparatory strategies and the lack of compliance by many countries and companies. The success of sanctions as a means of constraining Russian aggression will depend on closing channels of evasion and tightening the enforcement of these measures. This report reviews the sanctions and export controls enacted to date and the effects they are having on Russia’s industrial economy. It also examines the principal gaps in sanctions enforcement that Russia has exploited. It identifies actions by companies and countries that are profiting from sanctions circumvention and are enabling Russia to continue its illegal war and annexation of Ukrainian territory
Topic:: Sanctions, Exports, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

213. Russia’s Cultural Heritage Can Be a Bridge to the Future

Author:: Robert Cox
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: Russia has become Europe’s ogre. Beyond the brutality of Moscow’s onslaught on Ukraine looms a harsher ideological backdrop. Too many Russian citizens have been enticed into seeing this invasion as a defence of Russia’s security, national pride and identity, history, Weltanschauung, international standing, and imperial stature. They eulogise Russia’s national church as a defensive shield despite its abuse of spiritual humanity, its soldiers as crusaders. Europeans, in response to this baggage respond with a mixture of fear or unease. Anger, too, along with frustration and ultimately something akin to hatred. With all this comes an inclination in the western world to reject everything Russian. This rejection of a rich culture risks tarnishing our mindset and that of our children. Russian orchestras, dancers and sopranos have been banned from western stages—largely on the pretext that they have not condemned Putin and his acolytes. Ultimately Russian culture risks being airbrushed out of western European mentalities. It is worth pausing for a moment and just looking at what we are rejecting, perhaps unconsciously. Hitherto—and for many Europeans still —Russian culture has had an important place in our education and upbringing. Tchaikovsky, Borodin, Rimsky Korsakov, Shostakovich and the sublime Prokofiev have delighted our concert audiences for decades. Marc Chagall’s imagination has stimulated ours. Ballet in Europe—or the US, for that matter—would not be what it is without the great influence of the ballet russe. Nor, in a related world, would we be so intellectually rich without the heritage of Russian scientists, physicists and mathematicians.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Culture, Literature, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

214. Public Diplomacy Challenges in Reaching Russian Audiences

Author:: Mark G. Pomar
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: U.S. government broadcasters—Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)—have always faced challenges in reaching Russian audiences, both during the Cold War and today. Just as we did during the Cold War, today’s VOA and RFE/RL must give exiled Russians the opportunity to speak directly to their compatriots and to challenge the lies and distortions in Russian media. Shortly after joining RFE/RL in 1982 as the Assistant Director of the Russian Service, I met with senior RL editors and visiting former dissidents to discuss the most effective ways of reaching Soviet citizens during the coldest years of the Cold War. I began by laying out several key points of the Reagan administration’s approach to public diplomacy, primarily the need to treat Russians as victims of Soviet communism and encourage them to take pride in the major accomplishments of Russian culture, philosophy, and religious traditions that had been ignored or distorted by the Soviet regime. As I cited examples of Soviet suppression of religion, the banning of conservative philosophers, and the exiling of nationalist writers such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, I could tell by the quizzical expressions on the faces of my interlocutors that my passionate advocacy for a new form of public diplomacy was falling on deaf ears. Finally, one of the older editors who had spent time in the gulag said: “Look, we understand the need to present Russian culture that has been suppressed by the Soviet authorities and, yes, we know that Russians have suffered under Soviet repression, but Russians cannot be seen strictly as victims nor can their political culture be treated in the same way that we would treat Ukrainian, Georgian, Baltic or other national cultures of the USSR.” He stressed that Communism was a dying ideology, but an aggressive form of Russian nationalism was rapidly gaining strength, especially in the KGB and miliary services, and the West would rue the day when that surging Russian imperialism would merge with brutal Soviet practice. Quite presciently, he predicted an evolving Russian State that would assert its dominance over the other nationalities of the USSR in the name of imperial greatness, and not communism.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Ideology, Soft Power, and Public Diplomacy
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

215. Vladimir Putin’s Mistrust of the West Runs Deep

Author:: Andrew Goodman
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: While most Western analysts and commentators place responsibility for the war in Ukraine squarely on Vladimir Putin, a few contend that NATO’s enlargement provoked the Russian invasion. Based on my personal interactions with Putin while serving as a U.S. diplomat in St Petersburg in the 1990s, I would argue that a collision between the West and a revisionist Russia led by Putin was virtually inevitable.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

216. Ending Wars: When Does Diplomacy Have a Role?

Author:: Raymond F. Smith
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: When, whether and under what conditions to enter into negotiations to end the war in Ukraine is one of the thorniest international issues of the moment. My objective in this article is to look briefly at the role diplomacy has played, or not played, in ending several of the most destructive wars in European history and then to explore what role it might play in ending the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

217. Brinkmanship and Nuclear Threat in the Ukraine War

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: Western leaders and Kyiv pledge to “stay the course” despite Russian nuclear threats. But does western brinkmanship in the Ukraine war depend on denying there is a brink? This short article examines “nuclear threat denialism” and its function in war policy. It explores Moscow’s most likely but occluded nuclear option and the unique danger it represents. And the post examines the relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the current conflict.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

218. Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

219. Aerial Drones in the Ukraine War: An Assessment of Russian Capabilities

Author:: Samuel Bendett
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are now working with groups of drones launched against adversary positions. This often involves different drone types working in pairs—such as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) drone directing and guiding a loitering munition to a target. There is growing evidence that Ukrainian forces are using these tactics to identify and target Russian positions. A typical group raid on the Russian trenches involves one drone to draw the attention of a counter-UAV unit, exposing their position, while other drones subsequently attack exposed soldiers.
Topic:: Intelligence, Weapons, Drones, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

220. Is there Eurasian Connectivity without Europe?

Author:: Niva Yau
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Tucked between Russia, Iran, and China, Central Asia is now desperately looking for solutions to cushion the impacts of global tension on its fragile economies, which are deeply tied to sanctions against Russia and a local production slowdown as China recovers from its zero COVID policy. While European diplomacy has come at a crucial time, its Central Asian policy is ambiguous, and commitments misplaced. Central Asia is continuously perceived by the EU as a region in need of developmental assistance, which leads to European regional policies that focus on digitalization and climate issues. What Central Asia needs is the establishment of concrete logistical connectivity that will enable efficient flow of products across Eurasia.
Topic:: Climate Change, Diplomacy, Economics, European Union, Connectivity, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

221. Can Back Channels Prevent Direct Military Conflict Between Russia and NATO?

Author:: Yury Nadtochey
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Against the background of ongoing war in Ukraine few options remain to escape the worst scenario of tensions between Russia and the West in Eastern Europe and beyond. We might point out three possible ways on how this disastrous future can be avoided: 1) unilateral steps taken by the conflicting parties in order to de-escalate; 2) enhancing existing communication lines; 3) back channel diplomacy
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Communications, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

222. Chinese and Russian Efforts to Undermine the Global Internet

Author:: Justin Sherman
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Beijing and Moscow’s prevailing term was (and is) cyber “sovereignty.” Underpinning this perspective in China is an emphasis on the importance of “sovereignty” broadly and the importance of multilateralism, where governments are the driver of decision-making, over multistakeholderism (the current global internet governance approach), where academics, members of civil society, companies, and others have a voice alongside governments. The Russian government’s perspective draws on the Russian concept of “information security,” its belief in the importance of “sovereignty” to security, and its officials’ paranoia about “color revolutions” in other countries like Ukraine; Putin believes these events are the result of foreign interference and could occur in Russia. Although there are many general similarities between the two, Chinese and Russian officials do not view the global internet in exactly the same way.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Internet, Multilateralism, and Information Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

223. The Ripple Effect: A U.S. Diplomatic Strategy for a Changing World Order

Author:: Chester A Crocker and Barbara K. Bodine
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine upended what policymakers thought they knew about the world and territorial military aggression. The ensuing war has brought destruction to Europe unlike anything since the Second World War. Regardless of how the war ends, several strategic trends, whether entirely new or preexisting and now reinforced, have set in a motion a new strategic environment in which the United States must compete. Ultimately, the new strategic environment is being defined by a global diffusion of power, where the agency of middle powers and their importance in solving geopolitical problems rise in tandem. In the spring of 2023, ISD convened two New Global Commons/Schlesinger Strategic Surprise working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group identified key trends and potential strategic surprises emanating from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, honed in on the issues that would affect the strategic environment regardless of the war’s outcome, and put forth policy guidelines and recommendations for the United States as it seeks to navigate a more diverse geopolitical landscape in the coming years.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

224. Enemies Foreign and Domestic: Confronting Kleptocrats at Home and Abroad

Author:: Kelly M. McFarland
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: As Putin and his kleptocratic regime of oligarchs wage a devastating war in Ukraine, the costs of corruption have never been so starkly visible. Beyond Russia, recent examples of corruption in China, Afghanistan, the Northern Triangle, the Solomon Islands, and elsewhere, prove that rampant corruption poses a significant threat to aspirations for a greener, healthier, more peaceful, and more democratic world. Countries such as Russia and China have elevated their brand of corruption into a distinct and powerful aspect of their foreign policy. They employ this strategic corruption abroad to stunt economic growth; prop-up fellow authoritarian regimes; exacerbate social inequality; erase political trust; accelerate pandemics and degrade healthcare systems; exploit the environment; and propel state oppression. As U.S. policymakers seek to counter this strategic corruption, they must first recognize the extent to which domestic laws and actors within the United States enable this corruption to fester. In the fall of 2021 and spring of 2022, ISD convened a series of New Global Commons working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group crafted workable definitions of corruption, evaluated the unique political and related threats posed by corruption and kleptocracy, assessed Russia and China’s use of strategic corruption, and developed principles and recommendations for government and non-government entities to build a global, sustained, anti-corruption response.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Corruption, Diplomacy, Authoritarianism, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

225. A Strategic Challenge: A Peddling Peril Index Analysis of Countries’ Restricted Russia Trade

Author:: David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: National trade control systems and sanctions enforcement across the globe have been particularly challenged by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the unexpected types and number of goods to control, the need for rapid control of those items, and Russia’s determination to thwart others’ trade controls. The Russian situation demonstrates that even countries with strong strategic trade control systems have vulnerabilities. • In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the results of the Peddling Peril Index (PPI) for 2021/2022 provide a method to assess a total of 31 countries identified by their respective roles in the transshipment of restricted goods or the supply of dual-use goods used by the Russian military. • The purpose of this study is to identify patterns in these countries’ scores and lessons in finding ways of thwarting Russia’s success in violating sanctions and export controls.
Topic:: Sanctions, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

226. Visible Progress at Russia’s Shahed Drone Production Site: Satellite Imagery Update and Call for Action

Author:: David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Nearly three months after the Institute and The Washington Post publicly revealed detailed information on the plans of JSC Alabuga1 (“Alabuga”) to produce thousands of deadly Shahed136 kamikaze drones on Russian soil, satellite imagery indicates that plans are progressing at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone. Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga, and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. The information in internal documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, reveals not only detailed timelines for Alabuga’s production of weaponized drones and the establishment of mass production with Iranian assistance, but also multiple pressure points and vulnerabilities. Now, not later, is the time for the U.S. government to take the lead, work with partner governments and industry, and use leverage against those less inclined to cooperate, to hinder Alabuga from succeeding in providing the Russian military with thousands of Shahed-136 drones. With winter fast approaching, and Alabuga’s Shahed output increasing, Russia can be expected to accelerate its Shahed-136 attacks against Ukraine’s vital energy infrastructure, causing brutal living conditions for the civilian population. A key, overdue first step is for the United States and its allies to sanction JSC Alabuga and its associated companies
Topic:: Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

227. Electronics in the Shahed-136 Kamikaze Drone

Author:: David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, filled with Western electronics, continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran 2, are produced and assembled at JSC Alabuga facilities inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with assistance from Iran. Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga,1 and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. Information in internal Alabuga documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, show a remarkable ability to acquire sophisticated electronic components from the West and build modules aimed at defeating Ukraine’s ability to jam Shahed-136 drones and require Ukraine and its allies to keep deploying additional or more advanced jamming systems. The detailed information on the Shahed-136’s electronic components, with part numbers and manufacturer, provide a valuable opportunity to thwart exports of these specific parts to Russia and its partner Iran, which has to date supplied most of these electronic parts to Alabuga for use in the Shahed-136 drone. Starting next year, however, Alabuga has committed to outfit Shahed136 drones with electronic components it acquires on its own. The danger posed by Alabuga should mobilize governments to apply sanctions and other restrictive measures to Alabuga and the associated companies revealed in the documents. Sanctions on Alabuga would not only be helpful in disrupting Alabuga and associated companies’ procurement efforts, but they would cause stress to a giant drone factory that has to produce thousands of Shahed-136 drones on a tight schedule, with little previous experience with drone production, hundreds of new employees on its payroll, and under financial pressure to prove itself as a capable supplier to the military.
Topic:: Sanctions, Weapons, Drones, and Private Sector
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

228. Russian Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone Filled with Foreign Parts: Western Parts Enable Russian Lancet-3 Drone to Have Advanced Targeting and Anti-jamming Capabilities.

Author:: Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed open-source images and information found on the internet, identifying several key Western parts, commonly available on the commercial market, used in the Russian Lancet-3 kamikaze drone. - The Lancet-3 is an effective combat drone that has been successful in combat operations against Ukrainian systems, including Western supplied armor and artillery. - This report follows a series of reports published in the last year by the Institute on Russian drone systems and its acquisition of foreign technology. - Russia is increasingly relying on large quantities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to identify, target, and attack Ukrainian positions, vehicles, and structures. - Russia has a limited capability to design and produce advanced strategic commodities. To build these UAVs, Russia depends on extensive procurement networks to acquire strategic commodities produced by foreign countries, particularly the United States. - Because of the use of civilian Western components in Russian military systems, the United States and its partners are intensifying controls on critical items used in Russian drones, but more needs to be done.
Topic:: Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

229. Satellite Imagery Update on Alabuga Shahed-136 Drone Factory

Author:: David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Victoria Cheng
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Iranian-designed Shahed-136 kamikaze drones continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran-2, are produced and assembled by JSC Alabuga inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with critical assistance from Iran. Recent commercial satellite imagery appears to show that the buildings making the drones continue to operate, and at higher levels than other facilities located at the SEZ. The image, taken on a Wednesday morning in late November, shows a winter scene of the SEZ, with all the visible buildings covered in snow, except the two buildings making the Shahed-136 drone. The heat generated by the Shahed-136 buildings’ interior appears to have melted the snow on their roofs, implying ongoing operation.
Topic:: Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

230. New Bahrain Poll Reveals Support for Russia, Entente with Iran, Split on Israel

Author:: David Pollock
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On Iran, Bahrainis (especially among the country’s Shia majority) mostly favor rapprochement, and oppose military action or cooperation with Israel against it. Popular acceptance of business ties with Israel is steady, at around 40% in this small yet strategic island nation that joined the Abraham Accords in late 2020. But other measures show strong anti-Israel sentiment, probably in part because the survey was taken during Ramadan, a time of heightened tension with the Palestinians.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Public Opinion, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Israel, Bahrain, and Gulf Nations

231. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:: Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

232. Turkey’s Growing Ukrainian and Russian Communities

Author:: Sude Akgundogdu and Collin Trissel
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Since the 1990s, Turkey has become a major destination for tourists and migrants from Ukraine, Russia, and other former Soviet states. Yet Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine set into motion an even greater wave of migrants from both countries. Those fleeing the crisis have used myriad channels to enter and remain in Turkey, from obtaining “golden visas” to applying for protection. Going forward, their presence could have a sizable effect on future socioeconomic ties between the three countries.
Topic:: Economics, Migration, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

233. Niger Coup Threatens U.S. Strategy on Counterterrorism and Russia

Author:: Ben Fishman, Anna Borshchevskaya, and Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On July 26, Nigerien president Mohamed Bazoum was detained by members of his special guard and put under house arrest, where he remains under harsh conditions. Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani has since declared himself head of the so-called “National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland” and appointed a twenty-one-person cabinet on August 8. The coup comes in the wake of military takeovers in Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Sudan over the past three years, demonstrating regional anti-democratic trends amid trans-regional instability. Diplomatic efforts to quell the crisis have failed to date. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has made repeated calls to Bazoum, reflecting a commitment to securing his release and returning to “constitutional order.” Bazoum was a close American security partner prior to his arrest and was accorded a prominent role during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington last December. Blinken has also reached out to former president Mahamadou Issoufou, who has better personal ties to the junta; he was once an ally of Bazoum but had recently broken with his successor’s anti-corruption initiatives. This call followed Acting Deputy Secretary Victoria Nuland’s unsuccessful August 8 visit to Niamey, where she was prohibited from meeting with Bazoum or Tchiani. Instead, she spoke with Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, a longtime U.S. security partner who serves as the military’s new chief of staff but would not offer so much as an assurance of Barzoum’s safety, let alone his release or restoration. With the junta rejecting all U.S. and regional diplomatic initiatives, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has threatened military intervention. The alliance’s leaders met on August 10 and agreed to deploy a standby force, though how quickly it can be assembled remains unclear. In neighboring Algeria, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune strongly condemned the junta but said any military intervention in Niger would represent “a direct threat” to his country, declaring, “There will be no solution without us. We are the first people affected.” In Libya—another neighbor keenly attuned to Niger’s stability given persistent smuggling—the Government of National Unity condemned the junta, while the eastern-based warlord Khalifa Haftar condemned the threats by ECOWAS. Elsewhere, Egypt has remained largely silent about the crisis, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates quickly denounced the coup and called for Bazoum’s restoration (in part because he is Niger’s first Arab president). The UAE also sent some military vehicles to neighboring Chad, providing additional border security and signaling their growing bilateral relationship.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, West Africa, Niger, and United States of America

234. The No Limits Partnership: PRC Weapons Support for Russia

Author:: Martin Purbrick
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, there is growing concern about the possible involvement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in supplying Russia with weapons, munitions, and various other technology that could have dual-use applications. Notably, no significant provision of large-scale military hardware from the PRC to Russia is evident, as such equipment would have been easily identified on the battlefield amongst the major equipment losses suffered by Russian forces. There are, however, consistent reports substantiating the claim that Chinese companies are providing military and dual-use equipment to Russia. In the PRC’s political system, this type of transaction would be difficult to conduct without the government’s tacit approval or—at the very least—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities turning a blind eye. In February 2022, following a meeting ahead of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the dimensions of their two countries’ strategic partnership (Global Times, February 5, 2022). Xi and Putin reiterated that “friendship between the two states has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation, [and the] strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries” (The Kremlin, February 4, 2022). The closing ceremony for the Beijing Winter Olympics was held on February 20. Four days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Since then, there has been widespread speculation that the PRC leadership knew about the Russian invasion. Additionally, there have been heightened concerns regarding the extent of Chinese support for Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine. In July, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported on the “Support Provided by the People’s Republic of China to Russia”, with indications of increased Russian reliance on the PRC (ODNI, July 2023). In 2022 total Russian imports from the PRC increased by 13 percent to $76 billion. In the same year, PRC chip exports to Russia increased by 19 percent. Many of these transactions were facilitated by shell companies in Hong Kong acting as agents of secondary sales from international suppliers via the PRC to Russia. The ODNI report stated that “the PRC is providing some dual-use technology that Moscow’s military uses to continue the war in Ukraine, despite an international cordon of sanctions and export controls. The customs records show PRC state-owned defense companies shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology, and fighter jet parts to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies” (ODNI, July 2023). French diplomats further corroborated this report, notifying the public of intelligence indicating that the PRC has been supplying Russia with dual-use technologies as well as non-lethal assistance equipment, such as helmets and body armor (SCMP, July 22). When asked if the PRC is assisting Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine, French presidential advisor Emmanuel Bonne responded by saying “there are indications that they are doing things we would prefer them not to do” (SCMP, July 22). The PRC government has emphatically denied allegations that it has provided any weapons or military assistance to Russia. Former PRC Foreign Minister Qin Gang was reported by his own ministry as saying that “China does not sell weapons to parties involved in the Ukraine crisis and prudently handles the export of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations. Normal exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and Russian enterprises should not be affected” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 10). The second part of Qin Gang’s statement is significant, as he clearly states that exchanges between Chinese and Russian enterprises—such as commercial ties—are not be impacted by the war in Ukraine. Upon closer examination, his comments appear to suggest that dual-use technologies and equipment could be subject to the PRC government turning a blind eye.
Topic:: Partnerships, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

235. Beyond Arms and Ammunition: China, Russia and the Iran Back Channel

Author:: Sine Ozkarasahin
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Along with Iran’s increasing involvement in supplying Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, a potential increase in Chinese support for Russia presents a challenge for both Kyiv and NATO (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 6). Indeed, Western governments have recently expressed alarm over China’s potential provision of dual-use or military equipment to Russia (U.S. Department of Defense, February 28). According to U.S. intelligence, Chinese arms transfers to Russia would probably take the form of artillery and drones (Straits Times, February 26). As both items are badly needed by Russia to sustain its war efforts, the entry of Chinese arms on the Ukrainian battlefield may drastically shift the balance of power in the ongoing conflict. However, in addition to trackable military aid packages, Chinese assistance is manifesting itself more subtly in ways that are often overlooked. Consequently, a forthcoming Chinese aid package to Russia is likely to take several forms.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Arms Trade, and Investment
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Eurasia, Middle East, and Asia

236. Iran-Saudi and China Trilateral Agreement: Reshaping the Global World Order

Author:: Rana Eijaz Ahmad, Mahnoor Mansoor, and Muhammad Sajid
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: This research paper explains the changing global world order under the leadership of China. The qualitative method with secondary sources describes the Chinese struggle for peace and interdependence in the post-Covid-19 era, maligned with the Russia-Ukraine war and American support to Ukraine under the banner of NATO. The theory of meditated realism (a third kind of realism, which results from contemplation and introspection, which leads to being proactive instead of reactive.) is used in the paper to explain the trilateral agreement. China is heading towards more alliances and agreements with Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa. It is reshaping the global world order and striving to replace the dollar with the yuan. It may start a new financial war between China and the U.S.
Topic:: NATO, Treaties and Agreements, and Realism
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

237. Substitute to War: Questioning the Efficacy of Sanctions on Russia

Author:: Brent Lawniczak
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Western nations enacted harsh sanctions against Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, sanctions are rarely successful and policy makers should not expect sanctions to coerce Russia into a withdrawal. This article examines several concepts including the instrumental effectiveness of sanctions, the significance of state identity, the pitfall of mirror imaging, and aspects of prospect theory as they relate to the effectiveness of sanctions. Additionally, the weakness of sanctions used for moral signaling and the notion of sanctions as an act of war are considered. Recommendations are offered should policy makers continue to view economic sanctions as an attractive policy choice.
Topic:: Sanctions, State, Identity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

238. The Russian Bloodletting Strategy in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: From Success to Hubris

Author:: Spyridon N. Litsas
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The article focuses on the role of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in shaping the balance of power in the Lesser Caucasus as a prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It argues that Russia implemented a “bait and bleed” strategy to discipline Armenia for its pro-Western agenda. In addition, it focuses on Turkey’s role as a supportive apparatus for Azerbaijan’s military efforts against Armenia, evaluating the connection established between Moscow and Ankara. The Nagorno-Karabakh case marked a new manipulative Russian strategy to influence the balance of power in regions with geostrategic significance for the Kremlin.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

239. Plan Z: Reassessing Security-Based Accounts of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Alex Hughes
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The debate on the origins of the Russia-Ukraine War is at an impasse. Many prominent realist scholars argue that Russia’s government chose to invade Ukraine as a last resort to reverse Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, which it viewed as a major or “existential” national security threat. Critics of this contend that Ukrainian accession did not seriously threaten Russian security, and that Putin launched the invasion in the hope of achieving one or more nonsecurity objectives. This article surveys the current debate, before evaluating one of Moscow’s key stated security concerns. It then identifies four empirical issues on which security and nonsecurity accounts make substantially different predictions. It concludes that in each case, the available evidence is difficult to reconcile with a primarily security-seeking interpretation of the Russian government’s war aims.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Imperialism, Realism, Russia-Ukraine War, and Preventive War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

240. Tackling Russian Gray Zone Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era

Author:: Ryan Burkholder
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: To undermine U.S. military strength, state actors are increasingly operating in the ambiguous environment between peace and war known as the “gray zone.” These actions test U.S. response by exploiting the West’s rigid notion of conflict. Soviet actions toward the United States and other nations during the Cold War shared many similarities with contemporary Russian strategy. There is no current uniform definition of the gray zone, and the United States has not developed doctrine to address this challenge. Russia has adapted Soviet Cold War techniques for the digital and globalized age and effectively integrates instruments of power against the United States by targeting seams within culture, maintaining ambiguity, and controlling narratives. Countering these tactics requires that the United States modify its mindset toward conflict and improve integration of its own instruments of power.
Topic:: Cold War, Politics, Conflict, Gray Zone, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

241. The Devil's Advocate: An Argument for Moldova and Ukraine to Seize Transnistria

Author:: Anthony II. Roney
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article outlines the policy suggestion for Moldova and Ukraine to bilaterally invade the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) to strengthen their respective national security interests. The article examines the historical background of Moldova and the PMR, otherwise known as Transnistria, to provide context for the relationship between the two actors. As the PMR has acted as a tool of covert foreign influence for Russia, it is recommended that Moldova and Ukraine act now to eliminate the risk of Russian influence and interference from posing a larger threat in the future for these states. This article conveys the reasons, risks, and benefits for a joint invasion of Transnistria. It details the justifications for such a proposed action, but it also outlines its possible consequences. The policy suggestion is further justified when viewed under the lens of defensive realism, contrasted with Russia’s aggressive expansionist actions under President Vladimir Putin. Finally, the article gives basic strategic and tactical suggestions on how to accomplish this task.
Topic:: Conflict, Military, Defensive Realism, Foreign Influence, and Offensive Realism
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Transnistria

242. The Cold War Computer Arms Race

Author:: Bryan Leese
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The Cold War computer arms race illustrates the military’s role in strategic competition. The Soviets bought and stole, versus creating computer technology themselves. A U.S.-led coalition integrated economic, diplomatic, and information mechanisms, embargoing computer technology to disadvantage the Soviets. President Ronald W. Reagan’s offset strategy integrated military power, openly demonstrating computer-infused weapons lethality that jeopardized Soviet quantitative military advantage. President Reagan’s use of the computer arms race shows a way to conduct and integrate a strategic competition campaign of deterrence that includes coercive diplomacy with diplomatic efforts that can deter China and Russia while encouraging them to reverse harmful foreign and domestic policies.
Topic:: Cold War, Science and Technology, Deterrence, Espionage, Embargo, Coercion, Competition, and Computers
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

243. The Ethical Character of Russia's Offensive Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Testing the Principle of Double Effect

Author:: Ian A. Clark
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Cyber weapons have the potential to achieve strategic military aims in a manner that reduces physical harm, but they can also be used to enhance and expand the lethality of conventional weapons and tactics. When designed to collect private data, cyber weapons can facilitate assassination, kidnapping, torture, and other severe violations of human rights and international law. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not the first time that cyber weapons have been deployed for military purposes; however, it is likely the first example of cyber warfare tactics being deployed in a sustained and strategically significant manner in the context of conventional war. To assess the ethical character of Russia’s offensive cyber operations against Ukraine, it is helpful to leverage the principle of double effect, which enables a more precise evaluation of the relationship between the intentions that motivate an act and the effects of the act once it has been taken. Drawing on this principle, this article argues that Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine represent an unjust use of force and proposes ways of enhancing the ethical character of cyber warfare in future conflicts.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Ethics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Just War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

244. Revisiting the Global Posture Review: A New U.S. Approach to European Defense and NATO in a Post-Ukraine War World

Author:: Maxwell Stewart
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article revisits the 2021 Global Posture Review’s determination for a status quo European force posture in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Considering the poor Russian performance and attrition in the war, and the likely frozen conflict that will emerge, the article lays out the process by which the United States can draw down its permanent presence in Europe to refocus on the Pacific and restructure its relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all while maintaining alliance unity. The article has two main recommendations. The first is a time line for a reduced U.S. force posture in Europe from the present to 2035 while placing more emphasis on a European role in NATO leadership. The second is focused on how to maintain strategic flexibility while reassuring NATO allies of U.S. commitment. It then identifies and provides mitigations for the anticipated risks associated with the recommendations.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Rebalancing
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

245. Enemy at the Gates: A Strategic Cultural Analysis of Russian Approaches to Conflict in the Information Domain

Author:: Nicholas H. Vidal
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: When studying the strategic behavior of a foreign adversary, the act of mirror imaging one’s own conceptual frames often risks producing inaccurate assessments. To avoid such outcomes, some scholars promote the study of strategic culture as a framework for generating more empathetic analyses of foreign state decision-making. This article maintains that strategic cultural approaches are particularly useful for conceptualizing contemporary Russian understandings of confrontation in the information domain. To this end, it is argued that while contemporary Russian thinkers view information as a crucial asset in their country’s ongoing “struggle” with the West, Moscow’s use of informational nonmilitary means remains ultimately a critical, albeit subordinate element of a broader multidomain coercive strategy.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Strategic Culture, and Information
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

246. Russia's Nuclear Strategy: Changes or Continuities

Author:: Arushi Singh
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Contemporaneous events such as the invasion of Ukraine in 24 February 2022 by Russia has brought to the front debates and discussions concerning nuclear weapons and their potential uses in warfare that encompass nuclear strategy, tactics, and doctrines. The current nuclear strategy of Russia has been informed by the nuclear strategies under different leaders of its predecessor state, the Soviet Union. This article attempts to understand the evolution of the USSR’s nuclear strategy and its continuation toward Russia’s strategy; to assesses the reasons behind the changes in Russia’s nuclear strategy in the twenty-first century; to study the major factors that influence the nuclear strategy of Russia under Vladimir Putin; and to evaluate the possible geopolitical implications of the current Russian nuclear strategy.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

247. Russia's War in Ukraine: Two Decisive Factors

Author:: Gilbert W. Merkx
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The various stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and of Ukrainian responses, are analyzed in terms of two decisive factors: 1) force structures and 2) command and control. Both these factors are in turn conditioned by characteristics of the governing political regime and the evolution of that regime.
Topic:: Command and Control, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

248. The Human Weapon System in Gray Zone Competition

Author:: Bonnie L. Rushing and Kyleanne Hunter
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: Russia’s experience in Ukraine highlights the importance of the human weapon system in next generation warfare. They show that despite technological superiority and investment in sophisticated weapons and equipment, such as hypersonic missiles, people are the core of a successful military strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in kinetic and largely conventional warfare, the human weapon system is essential across the range of military operations, particularly in gray zone operations. There may be no place where the human weapon system is more important; strategic and meaningful management of the human weapon system for use in countering gray zone activities may prevent escalation into kinetic operations.
Topic:: National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Employment, Diversity, Gray Zone, Strategic Competition, Hybrid Warfare, and Inclusion
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

249. The Deficiency of Disparity: The Limits of Systemic Theory and the Need for Strategic Studies in Power Transition Theory

Author:: Athahn Steinback and Steven Childs
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article synthesizes power transition theory (PTT) at the grand strategic scale with military studies methods at lower levels of analysis. We analyze the Russo-Japanese War, the recent Afghan War, and the ongoing war in Ukraine as conflicts where political-military specificities enabled outmatched powers to win or force a stalemate. These cases demonstrate the decisive influence of power projection, doctrine, geopolitical constraints, and readiness on conflict outcomes. Finally, the authors operationalize PTT at the grand strategic scale alongside military studies methods at the operational level to propose U.S. responses to Chinese regional revisionism.
Topic:: Geopolitics, History, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Japan, China, South Asia, Ukraine, and Taiwan

250. Sovereignty, Cyberspace, and the Emergence of Internet Bubbles

Author:: Eldar Haber and Lev Topor
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The cyber domain emerged as a perfect platform for international struggle over power and influence. International powers are actively engaged in cyber proxy warfare due to the relatively low risk of escalation, various enforcement challenges, and the vagueness of international law within this realm. These indirect conflicts might lead some global powers to close or restrict their virtual borders to avoid or reduce the plausibility of cyber proxy warfare or unwanted foreign influence in general. The formation of such restricted networks, articulated in this article as “internet bubbles,” is already shaping within the realm of actors like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The authors argue that liberal democracies like the United States might be at a severe disadvantage to fight against cyber proxy warfare due to legal and constitutional barriers. But at the same time, the emergence of platform governance and self-regulation might be proven as a new force within these proxy wars and reshape its boundaries.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Cybersecurity, Internet, Proxy War, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

251. One year of war in Ukraine

Author:: Christian Leffler
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: It has been just over one year since Russia began its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. In that year, the EU has stepped up and provided copious amounts of support to Ukraine – economic and military, as well as providing a safe haven for millions of Ukrainians who have fled the fighting. As the conflict has now entered its second year, this CEPS Explainer dives deep to analyse what has defined the first year and then expands on what the EU needs to concretely do in the second if Ukraine is to have any hope of triumphing over the invaders. This will require vision, courage and boldness from European leaders. The alternative if they fail? A rules-based international order replaced by a ruthless multipolar world defined by competing spheres of influence.
Topic:: European Union, Armed Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

252. De-colonising the Azerbaijan-Armenian Conflict: Breaking the Knot of Security and Dependence

Author:: Leila Alieva
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The recent military operation in the Nagorno Karabakh area reflects a broader regional transformation. Its essence is in the second attempt (with the first one in Azerbaijan 30 years ago) of changing the security paradigm, this time in Armenia, leading to de-colonisation of relations in the region. The core of this change is liberation from the dependence on Russia’s almost two centuries old patronage, with Nagorno Karabakh conflict evolving as a tool of this dependence. With all the contradictions over the territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and difference in current political systems, the countries seem at last to arrive to the same conclusion of Russia and her control of the Karabakh elite being one of the obstacles to the peaceful relations, reforms and integration in the West. The power balance in the region, affected by such factors as Turkey’s greater involvement, distraction of the West, Russia’s increasing isolation, besides power change in Armenia, has also contributed to the “window of opportunity” for a change of paradigms. The role and influence of the EU and the US in this process, including in deterring potential military developments, will be dependent on the perception of them by the parties as non-partisan brokers, promotion of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as independent subjects of international relations and consistency in support of democracy.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Mediation, and Interdependence
Political Geography:: Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

253. Turkey’s Watershed Elections: A Matter of Leadership

Author:: Alessia Chiriatti
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: It has been said numerous times in the last months that the upcoming 14 May elections in Turkey will be a historical watershed for the country. A crunch point that has not yet been widely explored in these months, though, is that of leadership mechanisms and the consequences of a possible change at the helm of the country, for both its democratic transition and the trust that regional allies (EU and NATO countries above all) can place in the country. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s erratic leadership appears to be on a tightrope, challenged by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the head of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), the largest opposition party leading the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı). Due to the osmotic relationship between domestic (related to social cleavages) and regional (mainly securitised) dynamics, what the new leadership of Turkey will be, will also affect the future posture of the country and the willingness (or lack thereof) of other States to establish a trusting relationship with it.
Topic:: Elections, Leadership, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Domestic Policy, and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

254. The EU and the Transformed Nuclear Context since the War in Ukraine

Author:: Clara Portela
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has entirely transformed the European security landscape, bringing war to the European Union’s doorstep. Importantly, the war features a nuclear dimension that manifests itself in consequential ways, including Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling and its denunciation of the last surviving nuclear arms control treaty. This unleashed intriguing reactions, like a surprisingly tough resort to sanctions by the EU, or the shrinking of neutrality on the continent. However, while support for nuclear deterrence has increased in some NATO countries, support for arms control remains strong too. Meanwhile, nuclear disarmament advocates have not shifted their stance as a result of the crisis.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

255. Reinventing Soft Power: The Strong Impact of China’s Soft Power “Shortcomings” on the Global South

Author:: Tanina Zappone
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: After being introduced into the Chinese academic debate in the 1990s, the notion of soft power has undergone such a process of “Sinicisation” that some scholars now wonder if the original concept has been gradually “reinvented” in China. Given worsening opinions about the PRC in the US and Europe over the last years, many analysts have stressed the weakness of China’s soft power, pointing to its state-centred approach and lack of an attractive set of values to be emulated as the main shortcomings. However, China’s growing influence in the Global South shows that these analyses have misevaluated the real goals and motivations of China’s soft power. The Russia-Ukraine war provides telling examples of the successful dynamics of China’s “defensive” or “negative” version of soft power and suggests it has significant impact in the least industrialised countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, and Global South

256. The changing face of Russia’s information war against Ukraine and other democratic countries: Lessons and recommendations. Interview with Professor Sinan Aral

Author:: Sinan Aral
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: Aral: Pre-2020 strategies of misinformation and disinformation have evolved over the last 5 years but they have not been any less intense. In fact, they have potentially been at least as intense and sometimes more intense. The tactics have changed. Before 2020, the western world was not as cognisant or prepared to deal with Russian dis- and misinformation online. And so, Russian tactics were much more overt. In particular, what they would do was use bots and human trolls and sock pockets to spread mis- and disinformation. And bots were a big part of it.3 I think that now what you see more of is the amplification of real voices because those are harder to take down. So instead of putting a false narrative out there, they would do a search for real people creating the narrative they want to promote and then amplify that narrative through reshares, retweets, likes, and amplifications as best as they can. And when the platforms look at that, they say ‘we can’t take this down because the originator of the post is a real human being that we can verify as real, not a Russian spy etc.’
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Social Media, Disinformation, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

257. Conclusions from the use of aviation in the first half of the first year of the Ukrainian-Russian war

Author:: Sylwester Lubiejewski
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The aim of the article is to suggest a desirable direction in which the Polish air force, and indeed the air forces of other NATO countries, should develop so that they are better prepared for the challenges identified in the conflict in Ukraine so far. In order to achieve the aim of the research and answer the formulated research question, the collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents, observation and interviewing took place. In order to have the ability to deter and gain air superiority during a defensive operation, the Polish air force, and air forces of other NATO countries, should have a large resource of fighter, multi-role, and fighter-bomber aircraft. An object-oriented multi-layer air defence of every military airfield needs to be organised and certain roads reconstructed as runways in the event of war. In turn, helicopter aviation units should be able to organise forward arming and refuelling points for helicopters to effectively support land forces. Attack helicopters should also have integrated fire systems that allow them to attack from a distance beyond the range of man-portable air-defence systems. All warplanes should be equipped with proven and modern systems of active and passive self-defence to make them less susceptible to enemy influence. To sum up, in light of the war in Ukraine, the article explains what aviation equipment is necessary and what actions should be taken to increase both Polish air force’s ability and other NATO air forces’ ability to perform tasks during wartime.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Air Force, Aviation, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

258. Integrating Earth observation IMINT with OSINT data to create added-value multisource intelligence information: A case study of the Ukraine–Russia war

Author:: Ioannis Kotaridis and Georgios Benekos
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 heralded a new “social media war” era. This “hybrid warfare” extends beyond the military landscape and includes attacks in cyberspace and fake news with the aim of destabilising governments. The goal of this paper is to present a high-level of architecture based on imagery intelligence (IMINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) using geographic datasets and state-of-the-art methods. Integration with intelligence information (like Open-Source Intelligence [OSINT]) produces multiintelligent knowledge for security and defence decision-making end users. The results depict a harmonious and creative collaboration between IMINT, OSINT, and GEOINT. OSINT data helps to identify and describe the meteorological conditions that are present, contributing to the procedure’s responsiveness. Weather and dense cloud cover above Ukraine poses a challenge for optical imaging satellites, but synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensor satellites can operate at night and overcome the problem. We carried out OSINT and IMINT analysis, monitoring the situation shortly after the invasion. OSINT data helped in the choice of an appropriate area of interest. Using the right Earth observation satellite system and artificial intelligence/machine learning algorithms is the best way to keep an eye on many different sites over long periods, send out alerts about unusual activity, and find new places where incoherent changes might be happening.
Topic:: International Security, Artificial Intelligence, Hybrid Warfare, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

259. Conventional and Hybrid Actions in the Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Craisor-Constantin Ionita
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The paper aims to analytically present the existing data and information regarding notable aspects of the ongoing war in Ukraine, notably through lessons identified in the political-military field, both conventionally and hybrid. The article hypothesis starts from the consideration that even the war is not over, there are some lessons identified that should be considered for the future security of Europe and the international environment. The author uses the analytical method of research to explain the cause-effect relationship between the war itself and its future influence for the European security and world order, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. It will also theoretically test those implications to determine whether they fit the specified hypothesis. The conflict itself has deepened the international consequences of almost two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. It magnified the disastrous security situation not only in Europe, but all around the world, by creating additional energy (gas) and food (cereal) crises. Therefore, the Russian – Ukrainian War has significantly modified regional and international security environment and there are tendencies to challenge the current World order. What happened in Ukraine in the past year has and will continue to have direct implications for the European and Euro-Atlantic security, going down to European nations living at the edge of this conflict. Therefore, this paper is significant for advising the political-military decision-makers on better understanding the modern operational environment and addapting future defence capabilities to face 21st Century Warfare.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

260. Hazardous Drinking in Privatized Industrial Towns of Russia

Author:: Alexi Gugushvili, Aytalina Azarova, Darja Irdam, and Lawrence King
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: Hazardous drinking, defined as the consumption of homemade, unofficially made alcohol and non-beverages, is prevalent and accounts for a high proportion of alcohol-related deaths in Russia. Individual-level characteristics are important explanations of hazardous drinking, but they are unlikely to explain spatial variation in this type of alcohol consumption. Areas that attracted insufficient attention in the research of hazardous drinking are the legacy of industrialization and the speed of economic reforms mainly through the privatization policy of major enterprises in the 1990s. Applying multilevel mixed-effects logistic regressions to a unique dataset from 30 industrial towns in the European part of Russia, we find that in addition to individual-level characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, education, social isolation, labor market status, and material deprivation, the types of towns where individuals resided such as industrial structure and speed of privatization also accounted for the variance in hazardous alcohol consumption among both males and females.
Topic:: Privatization, Alcohol, Public Health, and Industry
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

261. The Return of US Leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia Crisis

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In dealing with Russia’s aggressive policies towards Ukraine, US President Joe Biden has put up a powerful display of competent crisis management. While it may not be enough to stop President Vladimir Putin from escalating, Biden’s policy has nonetheless re-affirmed US leadership in Europe.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Vladimir Putin, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Caucasus, Balkans, and United States of America

262. Europe’s Post-Cold War Order Is No More

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to recognise the independence of the self-styled separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas may very well be the beginning of the end of Ukraine as an independent nation. For Ukraine, a nation of almost 44 million people, catastrophe looms large on the horizon. For Europe, these events are the harbinger of the end of an era. Europe’s post-Cold War order is no more.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Caucasus, Balkans, and United States of America

263. Putin’s Use and Abuse of History: Back to the 19th Century?

Author:: Leo Goretti
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: “Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.” This is how Putin introduced the “decisions being made” in his 55-minute address to the nation on 21 February 2022, which paved the way for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Several commentators noted how Putin’s speech was replete with historical references: as historian Benjamin Nathans pointed out, Vladimir Putin seems to be “quite obsessed with history. So part of our attention […] should be looking at how Putin is using history”. Indeed, almost one-quarter of Putin’s speech was devoted to a rather erratic and convoluted discussion of pre-1991 Russian and Soviet history, departing from the assumption that this was necessary “to explain the motives behind Russia’s actions and what we aim to achieve”.
Topic:: Nationalism, History, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, and Balkans

264. The EU is Reluctantly Getting Tougher with Putin

Author:: Emmanuel Navon
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Europeans surely remember what happens when you let an autocrat get away with grabbing territories hoping that the last bite will be the last one
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

265. Understanding the Russia-Iran-Israel Triangle

Author:: Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: As Tehran invests efforts to improve relations with Russia, Israel will have to maintain a dialogue with Moscow to safeguard its military and diplomatic freedom of action.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

266. Could Biden construct a new world order through détente with Russia?

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Such a scenario would give the US a leg up against China’s totalitarianism and expansionist aims, and bridge the age-old schism with Russia
Topic:: Diplomacy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

267. The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:: Seung-soo Hyun
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: What is the impact of the war in Ukraine on North Korea’s unprecedented military provocations? Seung-soo Hyun, a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification, points out that Moscow’s defense of Pyongyang at the UN Security Council has emboldened North Korea. However, considering the low economic compatibility between the two countries and tight international sanctions against Russia after it invaded Ukraine, the bilateral economic cooperation would hardly help Pyongyang to develop its economy. Dr. Hyun claims that conflicts between Northeast Asian countries show signs of polarization and highlights the importance of monitoring how the war in Ukraine will reshape global strategic dynamics among Russia, China, and the U.S.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and North Korea

268. President Yoon's Trip to Madrid: Rethinking Seoul's Policies toward Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, and Pyongyang

Author:: Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: In this Commentary, Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at the East Asia Institute (EAI), explains the objectives behind the U.S.’ invitation of its key allies the Indo-Pacific to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit. He posits that the U.S. aims to establish a highly institutionalized cooperative mechanism that combines the capacities of existing alliances among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, the author stresses the need for South Korea to address the implications of the Russia-Ukraine War, the emerging Chinese threat, and reestablish ROK-Japan relations. Lastly, Dr. Kim proposes that the administration should carefully consider how it might restore international cooperation on the North Korea issue and resume the denuclearization process.
Topic:: International Relations, NATO, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

269. The geopolitical implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Paul Dibb
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The eminent Harvard University professor of Ukrainian history, Serhii Plokhy, observed that Russia’s occupation of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 raised fundamental questions about Ukraine’s continuing existence as a unified state, its independence as a nation, and the democratic foundations of its political institutions.1 This created a new and dangerous situation not only in Ukraine but also in Europe as a whole. For the first time since the end of World War II, a major European power made war on a weaker neighbour and annexed part of the territory of a sovereign state. This unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine threatened the foundations of international order—a threat to which, he said, the EU and most of the world weren’t prepared to respond. Two years later, Plokhy published a book called Lost kingdom: a history of Russian nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin 2 in which he observed—correctly, in my view—that the question of where Russia begins and ends, and who constitutes the Russian people, has preoccupied Russian thinkers for centuries. He might have added that Russia has no obvious or clear-cut geographical borders. Plokhy also stated that the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict is only the latest turn of Russian policy resulting from the Russian elite’s thinking about itself and its East Slavic neighbours as part of their joint historical and cultural space, and ultimately as the same nation. He asserts that the current conflict reprises many of the themes that have been central to political and cultural relations in the region for the previous five centuries. Those include Russia’s great-power status and influence beyond its borders; the continued relevance of religion, especially Orthodox Christianity, as defined in Russian identity and the conduct of Russian policy abroad; and, last but not least, the importance of language and culture as tools of Russian state policy in the region. Moreover, the conflict reminds the world that the formation of the modern Russian nation is still far from complete. Plokhy concludes that this threat is no less serious than the one posed in the 19th and early 20th centuries by the German question—the idea of uniting all the German lands to forge a mighty German Empire.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

270. Deciding the future: the Australian Army and the infantry fighting vehicle

Author:: Albert Palazzo
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The aim of this report is to inform government decision-makers and the public on the ability of Project LAND 400 Phase 3—the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) acquisition—to meet the needs of Australia. I examine a number of factors that provide context for the government’s upcoming decision, whenever that may take place. Those include how IFVs fit into the Australian strategic environment, the ease with which the ADF can deploy them, their vulnerability to threats, and the ongoing utility of armour in the light of lessons unfolding from the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian War. To set the information into a useful context, this report explains the nature of contemporary land warfare and speculates how the Australian Army is likely to fight in a future conflict. To further assist those making the IFV decision, this report offers a number of scenarios that outline potential operations that the government may direct the ADF to undertake. It also identifies current gaps in ADF capability that will need remediation if the IFV is to achieve its potential, as well as the other opportunities that might not be taken up because of the focus on this investment. The report’s analysis results in some key questions for decision-makers to consider as they decide on the infantry fighting vehicle acquisition: Does the government believe that its IFV investment will deliver an appropriate balance of protection, lethality and mobility (both tactical and operational)? Does the government agree with the requirement for an infantry vehicle with STANAG 4569 Level 6 force protection and equipped with an active protection system? Is the government confident that the number of the IFVs obtained will generate a deployable and sustainable force that represents a sufficient return on the investment? Does the government accept that the IFV options under consideration will enable the ADF to offset existing gaps in capability and allow it to conduct operations in a contested maritime environment, including sea and airlift, long-range fires and logistics? Is the government confident that the Army’s combined arms system is deployable in contested environments, particularly in a maritime scenario? Does the government believe that the IFV will provide utility in the range of contingencies that the government envisages the ADF will need to meet? Does the government agree that the IFV will contribute to the requirement that the ADF be able to shape, deter and respond to threats as mandated in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU)?
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, United Nations, Economy, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Australia, and United States of America

271. ‘Impactful projection’: long-range strike options for Australia

Author:: Marcus Hellyer and Andrew Nicholls
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The Australian Government has stated that the ADF requires greater long-range strike capability. This was first stated by the previous government in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU), which emphasised the need for ‘self-reliant deterrent effects’. The present government has endorsed that assessment: Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has stated that ‘the ADF must augment its self-reliance to deploy and deliver combat power through impactful materiel and enhanced strike capability—including over longer distances.’ He’s coined the term ‘impactful projection’ to describe the intended effect of this capability, which is to place ‘a very large question mark in the adversary’s mind.’ The term may be new, but the concept is not. To us, it’s a restating of the concept of deterrence by denial; that is, having sufficiently robust capabilities to convince an adversary that the cost of acting militarily against us isn’t worth any gains that might be made. But the need for the ADF to have those kinds of capabilities has become much more urgent. As the 2020 DSU noted, we no longer have 10 years of warning time of conventional conflict involving Australia. Moreover, this is not just the prospect of conflict far from Australia’s shores. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force-projection capabilities have grown dramatically in the past two decades and include long-range conventional ballistic missiles, bombers and advanced surface combatants that have already transited through Australian waters.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, and Economics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

272. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:: Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

273. The bear in the room: Russia's role in the UN Security Council - and what It means for the West

Author:: Elias Götz and Jonas Geji Kaas
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The Kremlin attaches great importance to its role in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This provides an opening for Western countries to use the Council as an arena for diplomatic competition with Russia. At the same time, the body serves as a much-needed venue for discussion and crisis management at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, UN Security Council, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

274. With energy at play in the Ukraine war, everybody pays

Author:: Izabela Surwillo and Veronika Slakaityte
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Despite sustained efforts to turn towards the West, as a major transit country dependent on cheap gas, Ukraine has been particularly vulnerable to Russian pressure. Now, with the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the EU’s problematic dependence on the Russian petrol state is under stress, as diversification of energy supply from non-Russian sources in the wake of war will incur high economic costs for the EU in the near future. The Russian attack on Ukraine has put the EU’s lenient policy towards Russia into question and has highlighted its problematic overdependence on Russian oil and gas. On the 12th day of the war in Ukraine, with Russia under tough Western sanctions, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated: ‘We have every right to take a matching decision and impose an embargo on gas pumping through the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline.’ The International Energy Agency (IEA) has urged the EU neither to extend nor to sign new contracts with Gazprom. Meanwhile the EU is exploring policy options for diversification of gas supply. Russia currently supplies over 40% of the EU’s gas and nearly a third of its oil, leaving the EU exposed to economic and political pressure. Energy blackmail primarily concerns gas supply, as replacing Russian gas with other sources cannot be executed immediately due to insufficient gas infrastructure and market conditions (i.e. limited availability of liquified gas). While oil can be transported by land and sea, meeting the EU’s energy demand will nevertheless require both diversification of energy supply routes and speeding up of its energy transition. This process will prove challenging and costly. Phasing out the EU–Russia energy cooperation after the Russian invasion of Ukraine also marks a major shift in continental energy politics that affects all the parties. For Russia, the loss of the European market implies a huge loss of revenue and a deepening future dependence on China. Ukraine finds itself once again caught in the middle. For years Ukraine increasingly sought greater energy independence from Russia and deeper integration with the EU energy market. Meanwhile, the construction of pipelines such as Nord Stream 2, circumventing Ukraine as a transit state for Russian gas, made Ukraine even more vulnerable because it sent a clear signal to Moscow that energy trade with Europe would not cease, even following the annexation of some Ukrainian territories by Russia in 2014. During the current war, Moscow is claiming that Russia is doing ‘everything in its power’ to keep the flows through Ukraine to the EU stable. However, the damage being done to Ukrainian energy infrastructure and its economy at large is still hard to estimate.
Topic:: Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

275. Russia´s comprehensive approach and the increased use of the Wagner Group challenges the West in Africa

Author:: Karen Philippa Larsen and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In the 2010s, Russia gradually returned to the African continent, where the Soviet Union was an influential actor for decades. The culmination of Russia’s public reorientation to Africa so far has been the high profile Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi in October 2019. In his opening address to the Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted how “representatives of all 54 African states and leading regional organizations are gathered here. This is indeed the first meeting of such a scale, and this is a convincing testament to the mutual desire to develop contacts in all directions, to strengthen the multifaceted partnership”. Russia has many interests in Africa. One fundamental interest relates to the international distribution of power. As a self-defined great power with an ambition to extend its influence still further beyond its immediate regional setting, Russia is almost compelled to attempt to gain a stronger presence in Africa. Both trade and the exploration of energy and minerals support this ambition, but its other tools include economic support (including by writing off debt), military support (for instance through the provision of training assistance or even the deployment of troops), as well as political support (for instance by using Russia’s weight as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to publicly defend regimes under pressure or even to prevent the passing of critical statements or the introduction of sanctions). To illustrate, in January 2022, the Russian delegation to the United Nations strongly opposed the introduction of new sanctions against the interim government in Mali, noting that “we have always been guided by the principle of African solutions to African problems”. Other interests relate to trade (with a turnover of USD 20bn in 2020) and to the exploration of natural resources. Within the field of trade, Russian arms exports stand out. In the years 2016-2020, Russian arms exports to African states accounted for 18 per cent of all Russian arms exports, a 23 per cent increase over the period of 2011-2015. By contrast, Russia’s share of the global arms market decreased by 22 per cent in the decade of 2011-2020. This latter development is a clear sign of a very competitive market, and it suggests that emerging markets, such as Africa, will become increasingly important to Russian arms producers. The main importers are Egypt, Algeria, and Angola (where Russian producers supply 41 per cent, 69 per cent, and 64 per cent, respectively, of national imports).
Topic:: Wagner Group, Military, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Denmark

276. Rising from the Ashes: The Future of Arms Control

Author:: Victor Mizin and Yue Yuan
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: This paper employs a comparative approach to provide an initial comprehensive analysis of the political interactions, contemporary nuclear policies, and military strategies and capabilities of China, Russia, and the United States in the context of the unstable international security landscape. At a time when the global arms control regime is teetering on the brink of disintegration, the authors aim to offer practical and feasible policy recommendations for remodeling the arms control regime from the Chinese and Russian perspectives. The authors stress the need to revive “traditional” arms control and advocate the search for ways to control emerging military technologies. This paper endeavors to present a two-pronged vision proposed by representatives of two major global players.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

277. Latin America Reacts to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Ariel González Levaggi and Nicolás Albertoni
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:: The post-Cold War international order drastically changed after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Now Latin America must face an international order marked by competition between great powers, fragmentation, and crisis. Latin American countries' relationships with Russia will bear an additional cost. Although Moscow will lose political, economic, and diplomatic influence, observers should not overlook the Russian push to strengthen its military presence in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Latin America

278. The impacts of the pandemic on investment flows in BRICS countries: a preliminary analysis based on UNCTAD global investment reports

Author:: Ana Garcia, Rafaela Mello, Victor Fernandes, Maria Eduarda Lopes, João Carmino, and Felipe Queiroz
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:: In 2020, with the advent of the pandemic, the lockdown and social isolation actions implemented by governments in order to contain the contagion of the virus had an impact on the economies, reducing the speed of execution of existing investment projects and hindering the prospect of new ones. In this sense, the flow of direct investments around the world fell by 35% in 2020, reaching US$ 1 trillion, compared to US$ 1.5 trillion in the previous year, according to UNCTAD. Based on this observation, the present research aims to understand the main trends around the investment flow related to the BRICS countries, in order to assess how the Covid-19 pandemic impacted the dynamics of investments in the world, and especially, in emerging economies. To this end, the reports produced by UNCTAD from 2019 to 2022 regarding global investment flows were analyzed, in order to understand how the scenario was before the pandemic and what dynamics were underway before the health crisis, but it also allowed to understand what transformations occurred with the course of the pandemic, in addition to signaling paths and trends for the future.
Topic:: Economy, Investment, COVID-19, BRICS, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

279. Geoeconomics of Polarisation: Can BRICS eclipse western global economic power?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The 14th BRICS summit concluded on June 24 amid Western sanctions on Russia and rising tension between China and the US over Taiwan. The two-day event took place via video and was hosted by Beijing.
Topic:: Economy, BRICS, Polarization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, and United States of America

280. The Russian Role! The domestic and regional dimensions of the military coup in Burkina Faso

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: In January 24, 2022, members of the army in Burkina Faso announced their seizure of power and the dismissal of Burkinabé President Roch Marc Kaboré. One of the officers who seized power delivered a statement on state television, signed by Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, Head of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), announcing the overthrow of the government, thus joining Burkina Faso to Mali and Guinea, in the third military coup in West Africa in just eight months.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Coup, and Military
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, France, and Burkina Faso

281. Realising the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:: Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: When the European Union’s Strategic Compass had almost been completed in late February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Consequently, the language on Russia in the Compass text was adapted to a more bellicose content. However, the military level of ambition remained unchanged as it had already been agreed informally by the EU member states. At the end of March, when the Council formally adopted the Compass, the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) became the new focal point for crisis management tasks in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the attention of strategists, defence planners and armaments experts has shifted further towards strengthening collective defence as a result of the war in Ukraine and the outcome of the NATO Madrid Summit, instability in the areas to Europe’s south and south-east remains the norm rather than the exception. The EU RDC has to provide the EU with the military capability to be deployed in crisis situations when needed, also taking into account that the United States (US) is less likely to act in Europe’s southern neighbourhood in the future. Ambitious targets have been set with regard to the flexible composition of the RDC and to the timeline of its initial operational status in 2025. This policy brief examines the milestones to be reached towards the year 2025 – in other words ‘what should be done in the near future’. Three aspects are given particular attention: the question of using the existing format of the EU Battlegroups as building blocks for the RDC; the issue of how to speed up decision-making; and the question of capability shortfalls. This is followed by conclusions on the opportunities and pitfalls that the EU and its member states may encounter up until 2025 and beyond.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Troop Deployment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

282. The instrumentalization of migration: A geopolitical perspective and toolbox

Author:: Monika Sie Dhian Ho and Myrthe Wijnkoop
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: As armies and weapons cross borders, geopolitics re-enters the western mindset. With his full-scale invasion of Ukraine President Putin attempts to redraw the borders in Europe, and carve out a Russian sphere of influence. Whereas his armies’ achievements on the battlefield fall short of Putin’s initial expectations, they did succeed in making his fears relevant. They more tightly united the West, increased support for further enlargement of NATO, convinced Europeans that massive defence investments make sense and energy dependency is a strategic mistake. This is a geopolitical turn that was deemed impossible only one year ago. After the COVID-19 shock, the Russia-shock has made western countries realize in full that economic globalization and interdependence create vulnerabilities (e.g. dependence from medical masks imported from China, and gas imported from Russia). Adversary states can use these economic vulnerabilities as geopolitical weapons. The growing awareness and scrutiny of our vulnerabilities extends to the field of migration as well. As Ukraine is fighting back, millions flee to Europe. UNHCR has counted almost 4.8 million refugees from Ukraine that have registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in EuropeSee https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine. Last updated: 29 November 2022. as a direct consequence of Putin’s geopolitical aspirations. The indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Ukraine reminds one of the Russian strategy in the war in Syria. NATO’s top commander in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, warned back then that Putin and Assad were trying to create a massive displacement of people. He suggested that refugees are the war, and the target of this destabilisation strategy was Europe. That interpretation of the indiscriminate bombing is deemed farfetched by some, but recent examples of the instrumentalization of migration abound. Libya used it against EU Member States, Morocco against Spain, Turkey against Greece, and Belarus against EU Member States. In this context there is an increased interest in understanding the phenomenon of the instrumentalization of migration. The aim of this paper is to use a geopolitical perspective to better understand the phenomenon of instrumentalization of migration. Such a perspective is helpful to analyse the points of vulnerability of target countries, and to initiate a discussion about possible strategic responses to prevent, deter and combat its use. These insights could contribute to more resilience of potential target countries and better protection of potential victims.
Topic:: Migration, European Union, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

283. Strict and Uniform: Improving EU Sanctions Enforcement

Author:: Kim B. Olsen and Simon Fasterkjær Kjeldsen
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: For as long as the EU has been using sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, countering violations has been a challenge. With the EU rapidly expanding the breadth and depth of its sanctions, its institutions and member states must find ways to ensure stricter and more uniform enforcement to deter violations, enhance efficiency, and ensure a more level playing field for economic actors. The stakes are high: the success of the EU’s response to Russia’s military aggression hinges largely on effective sanctions, and the long-term legitimacy of the tool itself depends on its enforcement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

284. North Africa Can Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas by Transporting Wasted Gas Through Existing Infrastructure

Author:: Mark Davis, Perrine Toledano, and Thomas Schorr
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:: North Africa can reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas by transporting wasted gas through existing infrastructure.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

285. What Does $40 Billion in Aid to Ukraine Buy?

Author:: Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Congress has approved $40 billion in aid for Ukraine and other countries affected by the conflict―the sixth aid package since the war began. A major change is that this package looks ahead months rather than weeks. The aid package provides $19 billion for immediate military support to Ukraine, continuing the effort that has been vital to sustaining Ukrainian resistance, and $3.9 billion to sustain U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The package also contains about $16 billion for economic support to Ukraine, global humanitarian relief, and a wide variety of international programs as well as $2 billion for long-term support to NATO allies and DOD modernization programs. Although some elements of the aid package will be available quickly, many will take years to fully implement. This raises questions about why long-term elements could not have gone through the regular congressional authorization and budget processes.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

286. The Challenge of European Political Will

Author:: Rachel Lutz Ellehuus and Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In this follow-on report to 2021’s Europe's High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities and Missions, the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and International Security Program examine the other side of the coin of European military effectiveness: the political will of European countries to conduct military missions and operations. The report identifies the endogenous and exogenous factors constraining or increasing political will and maps them onto six country case studies. Four prototypes of political will emerged from the analysis: global partners, international activists, constrained partners, and minimalists. The report then assesses the political will of European allies and partners to conduct fifteen types of military missions and operations worldwide, from peacekeeping to large-scale combat. It concludes with a summary of key findings. First, it finds that internal and external factors—such as strategic culture and alliance dependence, respectively—will continue to constrain European political will in many cases, even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Second, European states are more likely to have the political will to engage in military missions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum (such as maritime patrol missions) and less likely at the higher ends of the spectrum, except in cases of significant collective or national defense.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

287. U.S. Strategy: Rebalancing Global Energy between Europe, Russia, and Asia and U.S. Security Policy in the Middle East and the Gulf

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has already shown how dangerous it is for the U.S. to assume that it can rebalance its forces to one region and count on a lasting peace or detente in others. It now is all too clear that U.S. strategy must continue to focus on Europe as well as China. What is less clear is the extent to which the Ukraine War is an equal warning that the U.S. must have a truly global strategy – and one that continues to focus on other critical regions like the Middle East. The sudden escalation of the Ukraine crisis into a major regional conflict and the need for political and diplomatic support in the UN as well as for sanctions are warnings that much of the U.S. success in deterrence and defense lies in creating long-term global diplomatic and political support as well as true and lasting strategic partnerships.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

288. Bridging U.S.-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective

Author:: Luis Simon
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Although U.S. strategic competition with China and Russia is often presented as a challenge with two separate fronts, this brief argues that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters are increasingly linked. Insofar as preserving a favorable balance of power in these two regions hinges largely on U.S. power, and as long as they both continue to exercise a significant pressure on U.S. defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures should be looked at from an inter-theater perspective. Thus, optimally managing atwo-front challenge would require a serious effort to bridge U.S.-led alliances in both regions.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Hegemony, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

289. International Legal Options for Prevention and Justice in Ukraine

Author:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:: This March 2022 Fact Sheet presents international legal options for international criminal justice and prevention in Ukraine.
Topic:: United Nations, Accountability, Justice, International Criminal Court (ICC), and Universal Jurisdiction
Political Geography:: Russia and Ukraine

290. WILL NATO MILITARY EXERCISES DETER RUSSIAN EXPANSION?

Author:: Brian Blankenship
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: As concerns that Russia might try to seize additional territory from Ukraine have mounted in recent weeks, policymakers in the United States and NATO have considered how best to shore up the alliance and discourage a Russian offensive. These efforts are hardly new. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the NATO alliance has attempted to dissuade Russia from further attempts to encroach on the territory of neighboring countries. These attempts have included the creation of a “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force” capable of deploying to crisis areas within 72 hours, as well as the “Enhanced Forward Presence” consisting of four multinational battalions stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland on a rotational basis. Additionally, NATO members have conducted a variety of military exercises with members around the alliance’s eastern flank, as well as some with Ukraine itself.
Topic:: NATO, Deterrence, Vladimir Putin, Joe Biden, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, United States of America, and Baltic States

291. ARE RUSSIA’S THREATS CREDIBLE?

Author:: Stephen Shulman and Stephen Bloom
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: The current crisis in Europe is a head-to-head battle of policies of coercive diplomacy: compellence by Russia and deterrence by the West. Russia’s demands focus on permanently reversing the expansion of Western military power into Ukraine, backed by the threat of military attack on Ukraine in the absence of compliance. Western policy seeks to deter such an attack by threatening painful economic sanctions and arming Ukraine to make such an attack more costly to Russia. How credible is the Russian threat?
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

292. HOW GERMANY’S COALITION CHANGE CONTRIBUTED TO PUTIN’S STRATEGIC MISCALCULATION IN UKRAINE

Author:: Debra Leiter and Rebecca Best
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Vladimir Putin almost certainly failed to anticipate that Germany would be willing to sacrifice the benefits of cheaper Russian gas to punish Russian aggression in Ukraine. But Tuesday, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz indefinitely paused certification of the completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline to “reassess” the situation. While the move didn’t stop Putin from invading Ukraine—by that point Putin already had too much skin in the game to risk the loss of face from backing down—it has substantially raised the costs for Russia. Why did Germany do this, and why didn’t Putin see it coming?
Topic:: NATO, Oil, War, Gas, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

293. CONTAINMENT 2.0: SANCTIONS FOR THE LONG HAUL

Author:: David A. Lake
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: The West is not imposing coercive sanctions on Russia to stop its current aggression. No one seriously expects that the sanctions will cause President Putin to withdraw from Ukraine. NATO made clear before the war that its members will not defend Ukraine with military force. The European members have also, as expected, carved out exceptions to the sanctions regime for oil and gas so as not to impose too much pain on their own economies. Putin anticipated the general scope of the sanctions likely to be imposed on Russia and decided it was worth invading Ukraine anyways. While he may have been surprised by the extent of the sanctions and unity of NATO so far, this is not enough to alter his calculus. Indeed, he is doubling down on the original plan. He also knows that he has other weapons and forms of coercion against the West up his sleeve. Rather, we are seeing the birth of a possible Containment 2.0, a forced decoupling of Russia from the Western international economy. This is a long-term, not a short-term, strategy. The point is to undermine the Russian economy, stifle its technological progress, deny Russians a standard of living comparable to that of the West, and break support for the regime over time. In doing so, the West undermines Russia’s ability to compete militarily, aiming to forestall further Ukraines, and weakens Putin’s hand at home and abroad.
Topic:: NATO, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Economy, and Containment
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Global Focus, and United States of America

294. WILL NATO FIGHT RUSSIA OVER UKRAINE? THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX SAYS NO

Author:: Andrew Kydd
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Many observers of the current war between Russia and Ukraine have expressed concern that NATO support for Ukraine could escalate the conflict to a direct major conventional war between NATO and Russia, and that from there it could easily escalate to a nuclear war. A group of foreign policy experts have proposed that NATO impose a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine, while other analysts have decried the escalatory potential of such a move. In a recent poll of international relations scholars, 40 percent thought a no-fly zone would lead to large-scale conventional war between NATO and Russia and 13 percent thought it could lead to nuclear war.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, War, Escalation, and Instability
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

295. CAN ISRAEL REMAIN BOTH NEUTRAL AND PART OF THE WEST?

Author:: Michael Barnett
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Israel is getting some unwanted attention because of its reluctance to outrightly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. No one believes that the failure to condemn translates into support for the attack. But Israel’s reticence has placed it in an awkward situation—one that might, in fact, translate into a loss of support from Western countries when Israel needs it most.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Conflict, Neutrality, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, and Eastern Europe

296. WHY A SETTLEMENT IN UKRAINE REMAINS OUT OF REACH

Author:: Valerie Sticher
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: The Russian invasion and unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine show the limits of diplomacy. Despite warning of an impending invasion, efforts to stop the war failed. And despite the high costs on all sides, efforts to stop this horrific war remain elusive. Why is this the case?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

297. HOW HISTORICAL ANALOGIES WOKE UP THE WEST

Author:: Eric Mosinger
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Policymakers, activists, and ordinary people often make analogies between past and present, for example, by labeling 9/11 “the Pearl Harbor of the 21st century.” In doing so, people hope to better understand surprising events and develop a plan of action for themselves and others. Vladimir Putin employed historical analogies to justify his invasion of Ukraine, while Western leaders drew on their own understanding of World War II history to mobilize a surprisingly muscular response to Russian aggression.
Topic:: War, History, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

298. WHY OFFSHORE FINANCE LIMITS U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA

Author:: Menevis Cilizoglu and Chelsea Estancona
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: More than 1,000 individuals and entities have now been targeted with sanctions since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including more than 50 oligarchs close to Putin and their families. These measures include the freezing of assets in international banks, seizure of yachts, private jets, and luxury real estate, and travel bans. Western policymakers hope that targeting a wide network of Russian political and economic elites, including oil executives, steel tycoons, media moguls and high-level intelligence officers will isolate Putin and pressure him to reverse course. The million-dollar question is, can these targeted measures actually hurt Russian oligarchs, let alone pressure Putin?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, War, Sanctions, Offshore Finance, and Shell Companies
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

299. Israel’s Ukraine policy: ‘Right side of history’ vs national interest

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: History has no right side and it does not evolve according to moral imperatives.
Topic:: Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

300. Russia, Ukraine and international Law

Author:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russian actions in Ukraine since 2014, and the tensions to which they have led, obscure the legal aspects of these attacks thereby opening the way to propaganda and approximations. To contribute to a better understanding of what is at stake, this contribution is limited to the legal aspects of an otherwise eminently political issue. This in fact heralds a spectacular break in the international order and a violation of commitments and treaties signed by a member of the Security Council of the United Nations that have not been witnessed since the Second World War[1].For a long time, Russian diplomacy was attached to the strict and formal respect of the rules of international law, sometimes "clinging" to them in a bid to resist the demands made by the different populations. Even during the succession of the USSR, this constant was respected. However, the actions in Crimea and Donbass since 2014 have marked the abandonment of this formalism, while the Kremlin's diplomacy is promoting the need to conclude new treaties with the United States and European states so that Russia can endorse its claims.
Topic:: International Law, Conflict, Norms, Annexation, and Disputes
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS