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1161. Ukraine’s European Integration: The Russian Factor

Author:
Hanna Pashkova and Halyna Balanovych
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
The pace and effectiveness of Kyiv’s European integration course depends on many internal and external factors. The key ones being the political will of Ukrainian government, ability to implement and dedication to real pro-European changes in the country that would be tangible for Ukrainian citizens. This is the internal factor that is the main issue on the path to integration into the European community. That being said, European integration is a two-way street. The quality and level of Kyiv-Brussels relations to a great extent depend on the position and engagement of the European side, including EU’s internal processes and trends, which are rather complex, controversial and sometimes centrifugal in their nature at the moment. We are talking about an increased sentiment of restoring partnerships with Russia in the “business as usual” format inside the EU’s business and political circles. Russian hybrid aggression is a dangerous factor. For the Russian leadership that views post-Soviet countries as its zone of “privileged” interest, an independent Ukraine headed towards Europe and NATO is both a challenge and a threat. Firstly, Kyiv’s successful European integration is an incentive for other post-Soviet countries to step up, which means a failure for Russia’s plans of “forced” reintegration of Eurasian countries. Secondly, Kyiv achieving success in its European project is a model for Russian citizens and a convincing evidence of the inability of Russia’s authoritarian regime to offer an attractive democratic model of social development. This is why the Russian regime is using all of its available “hybrid warfare” to prevent Ukraine from integrating into Europe – from political and diplomatic pressure, economic blockade, information warfare to military intervention – occupation of Crimea and Donbas. Currently, Ukraine is a training ground and a testing area for Russia’s massive purposeful expansion into the EU territory. In particular, this includes discrediting the unifying European values and institutions, disorienting public opinion, interfering with elections, formation of pro-Russian lobby within the European establishment, support of radical movements, etc. The goal of this influence is to disintegrate the EU, reform Europe’s political system in line with the Russian scenario. An important factor is the EU member states’, institutions’ and other countries’ assistance and solidarity with Ukraine, as well as sanctions introduced by the West. Regrettably, over the period of almost six years, the sanctions have failed to stop Russia’s war against Ukraine, failed to change the nature of Kremlin’s aggressive foreign policy. Yet it is certainly crucial that the EU and other countries uphold a common course of conduct in regard to Russia, maintain and strengthen the “sanctions frontline”. At the same time, assessing the current confrontation in the notional Ukraine-EU-Russia “triangle”, it is worth noting that these problems have been temporarily overshadowed by the global COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic has affected internal and external priorities of different countries, has shaken the global economy. On the other – it has “hit the pause button” for Ukraine’s European integration, made adjustments to EU-Ukraine Association Agreement implementation plans. Obviously, the problems that have been temporarily postponed will later resurface again – this time in the new circumstances and in the new form.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Conflict, Regional Integration, and Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

1162. Forward to the Past? New/Old Theatres of Russia’s International Projection

Author:
Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The Covid-19 emergency will likely exacerbate many longstanding vulnerabilities that Russia has been facing for years: excessive dependence on energy exports, clashes with the West, demographic problems, and a constant foreign policy overreach. On foreign policy, however, Russia is not expected to take a step back. Today's Russia is back in many “old” theatres where the Soviet Union was actively engaged. More than a quarter of a century after the fall of the USSR, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has made restoring his country's great power status a primary goal of his 20 years in power. What are the elements of continuity and change between Russia’s foreign policy and the Soviet Union’s? What are the political, historical, military and economic dimensions of Russia’s return to old Soviet theatres of influence? And how does this interact with Moscow's long-standing narrative of a return to a multipolar world?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, COVID-19, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia

1163. Mapping the International Presence of the World’s Largest Arms Companies

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Alexandra Marksteiner, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Arms companies have a presence that reaches far beyond the countries in which they are headquartered. This is the result of the international­ization of the arms industry. This paper uses a new data set to examine the results of this internationalization in terms of the international presence of major arms companies. It presents a mapping comprising 400 foreign entities linked to the world’s largest arms companies. The mapping shows that the international presence of major arms companies continues to be influenced by geopolitical divisions and ties, and generally mirrors the geographical locations of the world’s biggest arms import markets. It also reveals that the international presence of major Chinese arms companies and the one Russian company included in the study remains limited.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Global Focus

1164. Central Europe in the new Millennium: The new Great Game?

Author:
Šárka Waisová
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
After the fall of communism, Central Europe (CE) was a region with relatively high US interest and support. Washington supported the NATO membership of CE countries, provided financial as well as technical assistance to the region and several American high-positioned political representatives visited the region. However, during the last few years, it is evident that CE is a space where the Russian and Chinese presence and influence have been risen. The present article analyses several questions aiming to scrutinize the Russian and Chinese presence and activities in CE, particularly, when and how Russia and China penetrated into CE, what are the consequences of the rising Russian and Chinese influence and who are the supporters and opponents of Moscow and Beijing in CE. The article concludes that, the main competing actors in CE are Washington and Russia, while China profits from the US-Russia clash. While the US and Russian interests are dominat in security and political issues, China aims to penetrate CE economics.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, Politics, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Europe, and United States of America

1165. OPEC+ as a new governor in Global Energy Governance

Author:
Rafał Ulatowski
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article tries to evaluate the roots of the OPEC+ agreement, how it operates, and its prospects for the future. It argues that OPEC+ is a new governor in the Global Energy Governance (GEG) “regime complex”. It grew out of a convergence of the interests and capabilities of OPEC and non-OPEC exporters. The article shows that the emergence of OPEC+ is a consequence of over three decades of competition and occasional cooperation between exporters united in OPEC and those outside the organization. That cooperation was always a consequence of the price war and the demand of OPEC members for cooperation with non-OPEC exporters. Intensive consultations and three agreements on production cuts between both groups of countries in the years 2016-2019 made it possible to begin the institutionalization of cooperation among them. Cooperation within the OPEC+ agreement is nonformalized, based on government-to-government negotiations, and flexible. The signatories to the OPEC + agreement decided to avoid founding any formal IGO, and OPEC + continues to exist as a summit process.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Oil, Governance, and OPEC
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

1166. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

1167. Conceptualizing Foreign Interference in Europe

Author:
Kristine Berzina and Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe has been at the forefront of confronting asymmetric attacks from foreign adversaries. Disinformation campaigns have been used against the European public since the Soviet era, and with the advent of social media platforms, they have become a regular phenomenon across the continent. Cyber-attacks have become a frequent occurrence too, particularly since 2007, when Russia conducted a campaign of cyber-attacks on Estonia.1 Even so, it was the 2016 U.S. presidential election that accelerated European measures against interference in democracies. National governments across Europe have launched holistic efforts to counter interference. In 2018, France announced the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, which calls for cooperation to “prevent malign interference by foreign actors.”2 Over one thousand national and local governments, civil society, and industry groups have signed on, and multi-stakeholder communities have formed to advance the principles laid out in the Paris Call. Sweden is applying the concept of “total defense” to educate and protect its population. Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency sent a booklet to all households in 2018 with guidelines on how citizens should protect themselves from false information and cyber-attacks as well as many other threats.3 Finland and Latvia are applying the same “total defense” strategy in their own political systems. Increasingly, European Union institutions are also turning their attention to interference. The newly elected European Parliament passed a resolution in October denouncing foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and European democratic processes.4 And European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has given her commissioners a mandate to protect democratic systems and institutions from “external interference.”5 Amid this burgeoning activity, however, one thing is missing. There is little consensus on what exactly “interference” is, and how the term “interference” is similar or different from other related concepts, such as “influence.” The lack of a common framing of “interference” across Europe can delay or complicate lawmakers’ initiatives and muddy civil society’s efforts to build awareness and rally opposition against incursions into democratic processes. Defining interference comes with risk. Policymakers can create a definition that is either too broad,6 which could inhibit the freedom of expression or put undue burdens on political participation, or one that is too narrow to cover certain forms of malign behavior in a quickly evolving field, inhibiting democracies from protecting themselves because an attack does not “fit” within said definition. Establishing a definition that merely catalogues commonly-used tactics (for example: cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and malign finance) would also prove inadequate because any definition of interference should be flexible enough to capture new technologies and approaches. Moreover, a list of tactics fails to explain the underlying factors driving interference activities. To contribute to the definition-setting debate, this paper addresses why a definition could be helpful for countering interference, lays out the state of play in the EU on defining interference, provides a review of existing government and academic definitions related to interference, and discusses the concept of legality and interference. Finally, this paper suggests two core criteria to assist in the determination of whether any given activity constitutes interference: (i) intent (including the factors of timing, coordination of behavior, and scale of effects), and (ii) transparency. An act does not need to match both criteria to constitute interference, but they are certainly mutually reinforcing.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Interference, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

1168. Five Authoritarian Pandemic Messaging Frames and How to Respond

Author:
Naďa Kovalčíková and Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus pandemic has spread around the world, authoritarian actors have engaged in robust information-manipulation campaigns. China—where the virus originated and spread due to the government’s initial cover up and mismanagement—became the champion of these efforts. Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia, followed its lead, seeking to shift the global conversation from China’s and their own failures to confront the disease head on. They have also tried to place the blame to the United States and Europe, portraying these democracies’ responses as inadequate and highlighting their shortcomings. Their efforts have contributed to a coronavirus infodemic, which the World Health Organization has defined as “an over-abundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.” This infodemic has fueled the ongoing public-health crisis by further undermining trust in democratic institutions, the independent press, and facts and data. The coronavirus infodemic is likely to continue to evolve, given that the fight against the pandemic is far from over, but its contours have already been drawn, making it possible to assess the information-manipulation efforts undertaken by malign actors during the last months. Understanding how and why they have engaged in information manipulation leads to an initial set of recommendations on how to contain the infodemic as well as how to prevent similar efforts that could stymie responses to future public-health pandemics. We identify five messaging frames used by China, Russia, and Iran in the first six months of the pandemic with implications for public health, democracy and governance, and transatlantic relations and offer recommendations to address them. Every crisis goes through several stages, and it is necessary to detect and monitor evolving tactics and frames used by malign actors in the globalizing information space early on. By doing so, democracies can ensure a more effective mitigation, robust preparedness, rapid response, and as painless a recovery as possible when facing public-health emergencies or potential economic, security, or environmental crises.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

1169. Covert Foreign Money: Financial Loopholes Exploited by Authoritarians to Fund Political Interference in Democracies

Author:
Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In addition to more widely studied tools like cyberattacks and disinformation, authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China have spent more than $300 million interfering in democratic processes more than 100 times spanning 33 countries over the past decade. The frequency of these financial attacks has accelerated aggressively from two or three annually before 2014 to 15 to 30 in each year since 2016. We call this tool of foreign interference “malign finance,” defined as “the funding of foreign political parties, candidates, campaigns, well-connected elites, or politically influential groups, often through non-transparent structures designed to obfuscate ties to a nation state or its proxies.” A typical case involves a regime-connected operative funneling $1 million to a favored political party, although buying influence in a major national election costs more like $3 million to $15 million. Rather than start our analysis by focusing on any given policy area, we review open-source reporting in 16 languages to identify malign finance cases credibly attributed to foreign governments. Finding that approximately 83 percent of the activity was enabled by legal loopholes, we catalogue the resulting caseload into the seven most exploited policy gaps. Broader than just money flowing through straw donors, shell companies, non-profits, and other conduits, malign finance includes a range of support mechanisms innovated by authoritarian regimes to interfere in democracies, from intangible gifts to media assistance. As such, policy strategies to address these vulnerabilities are not limited to campaign finance reforms, but also include greater transparency requirements around media funding, corporate ownership, campaign contacts with foreign powers, and other issues. In addition to identifying loopholes, our case study informs the scope of our recommended policy solutions, which are meant close off channels for foreign financial interference without infringing upon the speech rights of domestic political spenders or jeopardizing bipartisan support. Each of our recommendations balances these trade-offs differently based on empirical, legal, political, and administrative considerations vetted in consultation with more than 90 current and former executive branch officials, Congressional staffers from both parties, constitutional law scholars, and civil society experts. This report is organized around each of the seven U.S. legal loopholes that need to be closed, starting with the most urgent priorities, plus an eighth chapter on the need for stronger governmental coordination.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Finance, Foreign Interference, and Dark Money
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

1170. Leaks, Lies, and Altered Tape: Russia’s Maturing Information Manipulation Playbook

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Amber Frankland
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In 2016 the Russian government and its proxies interfered in the U.S. presidential election in a “sweeping and systematic” fashion. Thanks to multiple bipartisan investigations and the work of researchers and journalists, rich detail about that operation—and the tools Russia’s disinformation agents used to execute it—are available to the public. In 2020 Americans are again preparing to elect a president. As the U.S. intelligence community assessed, and FBI Director Christopher Wray confirmed in recent testimony before Congress, Russia is conducting a “very active” interference campaign. Since 2016, Russia’s interference activity in the United States, and elsewhere around the world, has not abated. That’s because elections are a flashpoint for Russian information operations, but not the start or endpoint of this activity, which targets a broad range of polarizing or contentious political events. Over the past four years, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) the Russian government and its proxies use to manipulate information and carry out deceptive campaigns have matured. These include: Co-opting authentic domestic voices and institutions, often by co-locating trolls within a target population, renting social media accounts of local actors, entrapping local leaders in “interviews” with purported journalists, recruiting real activists to foment protests, or mimicking or appropriating the names of local groups; Exploiting the anticipation of manipulation to claim that manipulation has occurred, often through false flag operations, or the amplification of homegrown conspiracy theories; Practicing tailored influence, by working through micro-influencers and in closed groups; Exploiting the full information ecosystem to launder a narrative, by seeding it with authentic domestic actors, deploying quasi-transparent Russian-supported media properties, and exploiting data voids. Broadly speaking, we are witnessing a marked shift toward harder to detect, more targeted information operations that cover greater swaths of the information ecosystem, likely carried out by Russian military intelligence. That is a very different challenge than the one policymakers faced in 2016, when the threat was not yet fully comprehended, and in 2018, when the threat appeared to be largely driven by Internet Research Agency (IRA) trolls. While it is important to glean lessons from those experiences, it is also important that policymakers not overlearn them, and in doing so, miss the consequential changes to Russia’s information manipulation strategy that are now underway. These changes are occurring partly to evade increasingly sophisticated detection capabilities and policies on the part of social media platforms. But they are also occurring for a more fundamental reason: the Russian government and its proxies do not need to rely on large quantities of troll farm content to upend U.S. domestic politics with corrosive narratives that undermine trust in democratic institutions and belief in the existence of truth itself. The fire is already raging—it needs only a nudge here or there to be redirected to good effect. This paper is not meant to be a taxonomy of Russian TTPs generally, but to highlight evolving trends with relevance to policymakers. It is an effort to help stakeholders of all types—journalists, regulators, and researchers—look beyond individual campaigns to see the full picture of Russian activity as it is changing and to anticipate what might be to come.
Topic:
Elections, Disinformation, Foreign Interference, and Leaks
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia