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141. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:
Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

142. Time to Recalibrate America’s Middle East Policy

Author:
Raphael BenLevi and Michael Doran
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Our understanding of reality in the Middle East has changed significantly in the last seven years. At a conference on US-Israel relations in 2016, then Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted, now famously, the impossibility of Israel making peace with the Gulf states. In an obvious reference to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his associates, Kerry said, “I’ve heard several prominent politicians in Israel sometimes saying, ‘Well, the Arab world is in a different place now. We just have to reach out to them. We can work some things with the Arab world, and we’ll deal with the Palestinians.’” Kerry dismissed Netanyahu’s thesis with total certainty: “No. No, no, and no. I can tell you that I’ve talked to the leaders of the Arab community. There will be no advanced and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. That is a hard reality.” Just two years later, Netanyahu refuted Kerry’s view of reality by, with the help of President Donald Trump, signing the Abraham Accords with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani and Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But the flaws that Trump and Netanyahu revealed were not Kerry’s alone. Nor were the flaws limited to thinking about Arab-Israeli relations. Trump and Netanyahu were attacking the entire strategic belief system of the Obama administration, which had identified reconciling with Iran and brokering a Palestinian-Israeli peace as the two top priorities of the United States in the Middle East. In the Trump-Netanyahu conception, the Abraham Accords were the cornerstone of a regional alliance that aimed not just to improve relations between Israel and its neighbors but also to contain Iran militarily and to prevent it, through the application of hard power, from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With a Middle East staff consisting almost entirely of veterans of the Obama administration, the Biden administration intended to prove the utility of Obama’s effort to reconcile with Iran. It therefore rejected the Trump-Netanyahu view of the accords as a key component of an Iran-containment strategy. However, the accords have fashioned a new “hard reality” of Arab-Israeli coordination that the administration cannot ignore. That reality includes formal Israeli representation at US Central Command, the military’s combatant operations command responsible for, among other things, deterring Iran. In other words, beneath the umbrella of the United States military, the Israeli military and its Arab counterparts are now liaising daily. Weren’t Trump and Netanyahu pursuing this outcome? The simple answer is no. To prevent trilateral military cooperation among the Arab states, Israel, and the United States from turning into a coalition designed to pressure Iran regarding the aggression of its proxy forces and the expansion of its nuclear weapons program, the Biden administration instructed CENTCOM to focus exclusively on defensive measures and integrated missile defense, and to avoid any offensive countermeasures against Iran. But defending against an aggressor with only a shield is impossible. Arming oneself with a sword is also necessary. Enter Raphael BenLevi, the director of the Churchill Program for Strategy, Statesmanship and National Security at the Argaman Institute of Tikvah Fund Israel. BenLevi is at the forefront of a new generation of foreign policy strategists in Israel who have come of age in an era when what seemed like a “hard reality” to the generation of John Kerry is now obviously history. In this article, he lays out a strong case for the potential of the kind of trilateral cooperation to which the Biden administration, under the weight of stale ideas, has turned a blind eye.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

143. Greater than the Sum of Its Parts: Abraham Accords Free Trade Area

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Abraham Accords provide an unprecedented opportunity to increase trade and investment among its members significantly by establishing a regional free trade area that would ensure progress toward their aspirations, preserve the integrity and stability of global markets, fuel growth, and constrain China’s predatory trade practices. Signatories to the accords committed to a shared vision of peace and prosperity and recognized that economic integration can enable members to achieve their long-term economic goals. The accords have paved the way for comprehensive partnerships on a variety of issues related to security, trade, investment, the environment, innovation, tourism, energy, and other key sectors. While the growth in bilateral trade is of great significance, the true transformative power of these peace agreements lies in expanding regional integration and cooperation. This is already underway. Israel concluded a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in December 2022 and is currently negotiating a free trade agreement with Bahrain. Both will significantly accelerate economic development and provide incentives for others to follow suit. Israel's new foreign minister, Eli Cohen, recently stated that the volume of trade with Arab countries that normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords in 2020 exceeded $2.8 billion dollars in 2022. While progress has been remarkable, its potential is far greater. According to RAND analysis of the potential of bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) between Israel and current signatories, the accords could create 46,000 new jobs and $24 billion in new economic activity for Israel's four partners. The benefits of a multilateral FTA encompassing current signatories would triple the overall benefit, creating more than 150,000 new jobs and new economic activity exceeding $75 billion. A multilateral FTA among an expanded number of potential signatories to the accords could create as much as 4 million new jobs and $1 trillion in new economic activity through 2030. This potential is not lost on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP represents one of the most significant threats challenging the United States and its partners and allies. China’s state-directed economic policies, predatory lending, cyber intrusions, theft of intellectual property, illicit technology transfer and other coercive practices, industrial subsidies, and market access restrictions on key sectors of China’s economy constitute the most significant threats of the coming century. Several trends exacerbate the need for integrating markets aligned toward common goals. The global pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Brexit, tariff tensions, political instability, protectionist policies, and regulatory uncertainty have threatened global trade by disrupting established supply chains and their underlying constellation of business models and trade relationships. As is often the case, these complex and interrelated challenges constitute an opportunity to realign our trade to safeguard the integrity of global markets and pursue US goals and objectives in collaboration with our partners and allies. The Abraham Accords offers just such an opportunity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Free Trade, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

144. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

145. Xi Jinping’s Vision for the Middle East

Author:
Yair Albeck
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Chinese leader Xi Jinping clearly aspires to establish a new global economic order centered around Beijing, not Washington. However, a new global economic order cannot be built in a day. The immensity of this challenge has forced Xi to set his sights on a set of interim goals. These include cementing the Communist Party’s control of the Chinese economy and shielding supply chains, capital flows, and strategic bilateral and multilateral relationships from hostile American policies. These goals equate to the creation of a Sinocentric global economic subsystem. This would be partially integrated into the current Western-led system but would be sufficiently decoupled from the West to protect the pillars of the Chinese Communist Party’s political economy. In Beijing’s grand design, the Middle East plays an indispensable role. But Western analysts have often misjudged China’s interests in the region as purely commercial. While Xi values the region for its economic potential, he sees it as one of the most important arenas of competition with the United States. Yet when United States National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently discussed American leadership of the global economy, he focused on Europe and the Indo-Pacific and mentioned Africa and Latin America. He did not mention the Middle East once.1 Washington’s persistent blind spot in the Middle East has obscured its view of Beijing’s global ambitions. If the US does not rectify this mistake, it risks losing more influence in the region and aiding China’s effort to supplant the US atop the global economic order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Middle East

146. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

147. Saudi-Houthi Talks Sow Cracks in Coalition – The Yemen Review, January & February 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Ongoing bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the armed Houthi movement have renewed optimism that a negotiated political settlement in Yemen might yet be possible. But the talks are an exclusively Saudi initiative and threaten to serve only the narrow interests of their current participants. To date, their primary effect has been the easing of restrictions on imports to Hudaydah, a development quickly weaponized by the Houthis, who have sought to coerce traders to use the port exclusively, which would deprive the internationally recognized government of much-needed customs revenue. Importantly, the talks include neither the government, whose sidelining does little for its popular legitimacy, nor Saudi Arabia’s primary coalition partner, the UAE. On the heels of its massive military reengagement in Yemen over the last eighteen months, the UAE has so far rejected Houthi overtures. The divergent interests of the coalition have come to the fore in Hadramawt, where the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council has sought to extend its influence by agitating against forces affiliated with the Islamist Islah party. This has come up against resistance from local tribal groups, increasingly supported by Saudi Arabia, who are now recruiting thousands of local fighters and protesting outside interference. Increased Saudi involvement in Hadramawt is a blow to the aspirations of the STC and has been compounded by the formation of the new Nation’s Shield forces under President Rashad Al-Alimi. Paid directly by Saudi Arabia, the force could go some way toward enshrining Alimi’s administration; unlike most other members of the council, he previously had no military forces of his own.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

148. Saudi-Houthi Talks Move Toward Ceasefire – The Yemen Review, March 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks regained traction over the course of March, and the announcement of a ceasefire is expected as Riyadh looks to wind down its direct military involvement in Yemen. At month’s end, Presidential Leadership Council chief Rashad al-Alimi and his government were summoned to the Saudi capital to be briefed on the negotiations. Despite the flurry of activity, there has been little information given on how the Saudis intend to resolve some of the longstanding issues that have bedeviled earlier rounds of talks. The negotiations have not forestalled continued fighting, with clashes escalating clashes across multiple frontlines. The Houthis made gains in southern Marib and along the Al-Bayda-Shabwa border, and heavy fighting took place in Al-Dhalea and southern Hudaydah. Taiz Governor Nabil Shamsan, Minister of Defense Mohsen al-Daeri, and Chief of Staff Saghir bin Aziz survived separate assassination attempts in Taiz governorate believed to have been undertaken by Houthi forces. The Houthi-controlled parliament in Sana’a has banned the payment of interest as a “usurious transaction,” in an attempt to Islamicize the financial sector. Implementation could have disastrous effects on Yemen’s faltering economy, contributing to its isolation and discouraging international investment. The law could rapidly limit the ability to finance basic imports and cut off access to foreign financing.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

149. Saudis Visit Sana’a as Warring Parties Conduct Prisoner Exchange

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks in Sana’a during Ramadan failed to produce a final agreement on a roadmap for final status peace talks and a permanent ceasefire. Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) leaders in Riyadh were left out of the loop although the Saudis continued to insist that the Houthis co-sign any deal with the internationally recognized government. A major prisoner exchange took place in mid-April following a deal reached in March in which the government and Houthis agreed to the release of 973 detainees. Included among the prisoners released were former defense minister Mahmoud al-Subaihi, Nasser Mansour Hadi, the brother of former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and Samira Marish, a woman accused of planning several bombings and assassinations on behalf of the Houthi movement. A senior government military commander, Faisal Rajab, was released in a separate deal following a mediation in Sana’a between an Abyan tribal delegation and Houthi officials. Fighting continued on several frontlines, most significantly in Marib governorate, where Houthi forces are trying to capitalize on their gains in March. On the economic front, the government-held port of Aden received a commercial ship without it being subject to inspection in Jeddah, and more than 500 types of goods were removed from a list of banned products, including fertilizers and batteries. The government is still struggling to cover the cost of public sector salaries after losing oil revenues following Houthi drone attacks late last year and Houthi pressure on importers to redirect shipments from Aden to Hudaydah, while the Houthi authorities drew in revenue from various informal taxes and duties imposed during Ramadan.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

150. A Southern Reshuffle – The Yemen Review, May 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Political news in May was dominated by the reorganization and resurgence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Seemingly sidelined by the Saudi-Houthi talks and the Kingdom’s support of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi, the Emirati-backed group extended its influence through the recruitment of powerful politicians, an internal reorganization, and a conference resulting in a new ‘Southern National Charter.’ Saudi-Houthi negotiations appear to have stalled over disagreement on a number of long-standing issues, but the recent involvement of China could bring additional resources and leverage to the table. The STC’s revived fortunes have led to renewed political and military mobilization in Hadramawt. The Nation’s Shield forces, paid for and supplied by Saudi Arabia, but under the nominal control of President Al-Alimi, increased their presence in the governorate, and were visited by the Saudi coalition commander before assuming control of an important border crossing. For their part, STC-affiliated forces took up positions on the strategic Ataq-Al-Abr road linking Hadramawt and Shabwa, including a key stretch used by Islah-affiliated forces. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula also stepped up its activity, conducting at least two drone strikes in Shabwa as it publicly condemned the easing of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Houthis launched their latest offensive in the economic war, banning the sale of domestically produced cooking gas in favor of imports. Imported gas is more expensive, but the brunt of the impact will be felt by the internationally recognized government and its production facilities in Marib. Having shut down the government’s oil exports and rerouted trade to deprive it of customs fees, the sanction will further cripple the government’s finances. It is already having trouble purchasing sufficient fuel to keep the lights on – May saw an extension of rolling blackouts in Aden as a Saudi grant has expired without extension. Summer sees the highest demand for electricity, but a number of generators in the interim capital have already shut down due to the shortage.
Topic:
Economy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations