Political Geography: Iraq - CIAO Search Results

401. Women in Jihadist Organizations: Victims or Terrorists

Author:: Hamoon Khelghat-Doost
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:: Many scholarly works on women in jihadi organizations emphasize women’s lack of agency. Authors of these works argue women have fallen victim to these male-dominated organizations and thus have lost control over their actions. However, certain groups of women in some jihadi organizations—for example, Islamic State (or IS), Jaish al-Fatah, and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham—enjoy a degree of agency within the scope of their duties. This policy brief examines the extent to which women in jihadi organizations have agency—that is, to which extent they are able to make independent decisions. Understanding the conditions under which women have agency, allows policymakers to recognize the diversity of roles and contributions of women within jihadi organizations and design appropriate policy responses.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Islam, Terrorism, Women, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

402. The Evolving Terrorism Threat from Nixon to Trump

Author:: Edward Marks and Michael B. Kraft
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: The issues that faced the Obama administration and will face the Trump administration—as well as the basic policies and programs—had roots in previous generations, some of them going back to the 1970’s and President Richard Nixon’s administration. Many programs conceived and developed during previous administrations continued, evolved, and were expanded during subsequent administrations. These programs include antiterrorism training for American and foreign law enforcement officials, the interagency Counter Terrorism Financing (CTF) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, and the ever pressing need for improved international cooperation and intelligence sharing. They are likely to continue, in one form or another, as ongoing efforts. This article is adapted from a draft of a forthcoming book: U.S Counterterrorism efforts, from Nixon to Bush. (CPC Press/Taylor&Francis Group).
Topic:: Science and Technology, History, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and 9/11
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

403. Sociopolitical Movements and the Development of Non-Violent Civil Resistance: A Conversation with Ches Thurber

Author:: Ches Thurber and Austin Bowman
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Ches Thurber is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois University. He was previously a research fellow at the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism at the University of Chicago and at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His current book project, Strategies of Violence and Nonviolence in Revolutionary Movements, examines why political movements seeking to overthrow the state embrace strategies of either armed insurgency or civil resistance.
Topic:: Security, Islam, Non State Actors, Sectarianism, Social Movement, Conflict, and Interview
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

404. ISIS and Reporting: A Conversation with Graeme Wood

Author:: Graeme Wood and Eli Stiefel
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: Graeme Wood is a correspondent for The Atlantic. He was the 2015 - 2016 Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and is a lecturer in political science at Yale University. He was formerly a contributing editor to The New Republic and books editor of Pacific Standard. He was a reporter at The Cambodia Daily in Phnom Penh in 1999, then lived and wrote in the Middle East from 2002 to 2006. He has received fellowships from the Social Sciences Research Council (2002-2003), the South Asian Journalists Association (2009), the East-West Center (2009-2010), and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Center for the Prevention of Genocide (2013-2014). He has appeared many times on television and radio (CNN, ABC, BBC, MSNBC, et al.), was the screenwriter of a Sundance Official Selection (2010, short film), and led a Nazi-hunting expedition to Paraguay for a History Channel special in 2009.
Topic:: Security, Non State Actors, Islamic State, and Journalism
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

405. Merchants of Men: How Jihadists and ISIS Turned Kidnapping and Refugee Trafficking into a Multi-Billion Dollar Business, by Loretta Napoleoni

Author:: Loretta Napoleoni and Karen Jacobsen
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: This book is a lively journalistic read, filled with stories and details of encounters between jihadists, smugglers, organized crime, drug smuggling across the Sahara, kidnapping of rich tourists, and European ransoms. The author, an Italian journalist, describes herself as a ‘chronicler of the dark side of the economics of globalization’ and has written several books on ISIS, terrorist financing, and money laundering. In Merchants of Men, Napoleoni argues that the proliferation of failed states and the breakdown of law and order in regions like the Sahel, accelerated by the burgeoning cocaine business in the region, have enabled a rapid increase in trafficking and kidnapping. The profits of these merchants of men have flourished, aided by the secrecy of European governments surrounding the ransoming of their citizens (notably, the U.S. does not, publicly at least, pay ransoms). Napoleoni raises these and a number of intriguing issues in the preface. She points to the “false sense of security about the globalized world” that allows both “young, inexperienced members of the First Nations Club” and humanitarian aid workers to explore the world and bring aid to conflict zones — and become the primary target of kidnappers. She gives (unsourced) statistics about the growth of the kidnapping industry and its mirror, private security companies, and asks whether “the economics of kidnapping are immune from the laws of economics,” because as competition has increased between kidnappers and private security firms, prices have gone up instead of down. She argues that when the migrant crisis erupted in Europe in 2015, the business of hostage taking — already set up with “a sophisticated organizational structure in place and plenty of money from trading hostages” — switched to trafficking in migrants and refugees. The profits of these merchants of men have continued to increase since then.
Topic:: Crime, Refugees, Islamic State, Book Review, and Journalism
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, Middle East, Syria, Global Focus, and United States of America

406. Partnering for Solutions

Author:: Vicki Valosik
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: CCAS, in partnership with the University of Kurdistan, brought together 40+ researchers this spring to discuss durable solutions to forced displacement in Iraq. Iraq has suffered from massive internal displacement for several decades, but with the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) the numbers of those displaced have grown drastically. More than three million Iraqis—or ten percent of the country’s population—currently live as internally displaced persons (IDPs). In an effort to address this crisis, the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) and the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) at Georgetown recently joined efforts with the University of Kurdistan, Hawler (UKH) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to host the conference “Migration and Displacement in Iraq: Working Towards Durable Solutions.”
Topic:: Migration, Islamic State, Displacement, Kurds, and Higher Education
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North America, and Kurdistan

407. R2P Monitor, Issue 36, 15 November 2017

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the Responsibility to Protect lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 36 looks at developments in Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Sudan, Burundi, Philippines, Afghanistan and Somalia.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Philippines, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Somalia, Burundi, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Central African Republic

408. R2P Monitor, Issue 35, 15 September 2017

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the Responsibility to Protect lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 35 looks at developments in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Myanmar (Burma), South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan, Burundi, Philippines, Afghanistan and Somalia.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Philippines, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Somalia, Burundi, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Central African Republic

409. R2P Monitor, Issue 34, 15 July 2017

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the Responsibility to Protect lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 34 looks at developments in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Myanmar (Burma), South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Philippines and Kenya.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:: Kenya, Iraq, Sudan, Philippines, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Burundi, Myanmar, and South Sudan

410. R2P Monitor, Issue 33, 15 May 2017

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the Responsibility to Protect lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 33 looks at developments in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Myanmar (Burma) , South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Philippines and Central African Republic.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:: Iraq, Sudan, Philippines, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Burundi, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Central African Republic

411. R2P Monitor, Issue 32, 15 March 2017

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the Responsibility to Protect lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 32 looks at developments in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Myanmar, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Philippines and Central African Republic. Issue 32 also includes an insert regarding states that have endorsed the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians. For more information on the Kigali Principles, see: Improving Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Peacekeeping, Civilians, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:: Iraq, Sudan, Philippines, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Burundi, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Central African Republic

412. R2P Monitor, Issue 31, 15 January 2017

Author:: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:: R2P Monitor is a bimonthly bulletin applying the Responsibility to Protect lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 31 looks at developments in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Myanmar (Burma), South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Philippines, Central African Republic and Nigeria.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocities
Political Geography:: Iraq, Sudan, Philippines, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Nigeria, Burundi, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Central African Republic

413. ISIS’s Future in Africa after Iraq and Syria

Author:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: After losing territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has affirmed its intention to expand its operations into Africa. A review of militant group activity on the continent, however, suggests that ISIS will be challenged to do so.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Violent Extremism, ISIS, and Militant Islam
Political Geography:: Africa, Iraq, Middle East, North Africa, and Syria

414. All For One and One For All: Toward A Coordinated EU Approach on Returnees

Author:: Colin P. Clarke
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: As European authorities watched thousands of aspiring jihadists leave their countries to fight in Iraq and Syria in 2012 and 2013, few laws were in place to prevent them from “taking a holiday in Istanbul,” a well-known euphemism for jihadists seeking to travel to Syria. As law enforcement and intelligence agencies prepare for the return of some of those who left, European officials may be wondering whether they have the policies, authorities and capabilities to effectively deal with any threats returnees may present.
Topic:: Law, Violent Extremism, Citizenship, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and European Union

415. The Hashd al-Shaabi and Iraq: Subnationalism and the State

Author:: Dylan O'Driscoll and Dave Van Zoonen
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This report views the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces, PMF) as having played an intrinsic role in the provision of security in Iraq since the dramatic rise of the Islamic State (IS). However, through the lens of nationalism it analyses the negative role the PMF may play once IS is defeated. The report therefore presents suggestions to deal with the perceived threat of the PMF in the short to medium term. The various groups within the PMF essentially represent a number of subnationalisms, which to a different extent act as competition to the state. The leaders of the various militias use their own particular brand of nationalism in their attempts to gain and maintain power and in doing so they dilute any prospect of national unity or loyalty to the state. Through providing security they act as competition to the Iraqi army which directly impacts on the perception of the state and is used by members of the PMF for political gain. The multiple competing subnationalisms in Iraq do little for the fostering of Iraqi unity or the functioning of Iraq as a state, and are likely to result in the continuation of violent conflict. Therefore, dealing with the challenges surrounding the PMF will be one of the most pressing issues in Iraq following the defeat of IS. The ultimate solution to this problem would be the incorporation of these forces through demobilisation and integration into the conventional ISF. Having one inclusive army, police force and border patrol operating under unified command structures and accountable to civil bodies of oversight is not only an important symbol in aiding national reconciliation and promoting cooperation between different communities, it is also a primary prerequisite for the effectiveness of the security sector as a whole. However, the current situation on the ground, in terms of security, reconciliation, and political will, precludes an aggressive, straight-forward pursuit of this objective. This necessitates an initial phase in which significant progress in these areas is made before incorporation of most PMF units can realistically take place. The government of Prime Minister Abadi needs to use its time following IS’ defeat to build a solid political platform based on shared citizenship, unity and reform. This platform has to include serious reforms in the areas of security and national reconciliation. At the same time, an assistance programme will have to be set up for individual militia members wishing to either integrate into the ISF or make the transition from fighter to civilian immediately following IS’ defeat. This joint process will allow for the gradual dissolution of the PMF as the functioning of the Iraqi state improves, cooperation and unity is advanced, and the army grows in strength. During this time the government can stop colluding with the PMF and begin incorporating, containing, and eventually suppressing the various groups within the PMF based on the level of loyalty to the state that the group holds. Only then can a comprehensive demobilisation and reintegration programme based on formal agreements with all militias be launched as an ultimate solution to Iraq’s problem with militias and subnationalisms. It is crucial that this programme is adapted to fit the local context and that the government of Iraq can exert primary control over it. Accordingly, some conventional standards of DDR programming may have to be deviated from in order for this programme to be successful.
Topic:: Security, Nationalism, Military Strategy, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Baghdad

416. Planning Post-IS Iraq: Competing Visions Within the Shia Block?

Author:: Irene Costantini
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: On Monday 20 February, Muqtada al-Sadr announced a 29-point roadmap for governing Mosul after the eventual liberation from Islamic State (IS), which appears closer than ever considering the ongoing offensive in the western part of the city. In October last year, Ammar al-Hakim proposed a political reconciliation plan, the “Historical Settlement”, as a template for governing Iraq in view of the defeat of IS. Though both are drawn from the Shia leadership and represent the Shia electorate, the two leaders and their constituencies have noticeable differences. A third pole is represented by the non-reconciliatory vision of Nuri al-Maliki, who has so far obstructed any dialogue in the country. In light of the Sunni’s weak political leadership and the Kurds being distracted by internal discordance as well as talks about independence, the Shia Block is realistically the key determinant for national reconciliation to occur in Iraq. However, its internal divisions make it a problematic and non-unitary interlocutor for national, regional, and international initiatives. This policy brief analyses what the common and competing positions of the plans that have been announced so far within the Block are. The major shortcoming of both al-Sadr’s and al-Hakim’s initiatives is the political heritage that they attach to a national reconciliation plan. Free from such heritage, al-Abadi, the fourth pole in the Shia Block, has yet to reinvigorate his initial push for reconciliation and articulate it in a comprehensive plan, one that may find support among a broader spectrum of domestic and international actors. Competing positions A key difference between al-Hakim’s and al-Sadr’s plans is first of all their political inception. Al-Hakim is the key promoter of the “Historical Settlement”, but the plan is, in theory, the expression of the National Iraqi Alliance, the large but loose Shia Block holding the majority of parliamentary seats. Elected as chairman in September, after years of tensions over the Block’s leadership, al-Hakim will hold the position for a year based on the rotational presidency arrangement struck upon his election. In contrast, al-Sadr’s plan is an expression of his own political will. Al-Sadr’s political block, al-Ahrar, has boycotted NIA since spring 2016 and rejoined in October in what was most probably a political calculation when talks about provincial elections were underway. There is so far no indication that al-Sadr is promoting the plan among Iraqi parties and it has received almost no traction, but the announcement itself can be seen as another sign of competing visions within the Shia Block. A second key difference is their scope. Al-Hakim’s plan (based on leaked versions of it, as no official document was released) is intentionally vague. In all, the plan sets principles, parameters and steps forward, which participating parties must adhere to before a dialogue could start under the auspices of the UN. So far, the UN has repeated that “there is no UN draft or UN initiative. It is still an Iraqi national initiative”, waiting most probably for the document to gain traction among the Iraqi leadership. On the other hand, al-Sadr’s plan calls for a number of initiatives, which include a national dialogue, but extend to measures targeting socio-economic issues and the security apparatus, most of them as vague as the ones in the “Historical Settlement” document. The two plans are also different with relation to a number of specific points. Al-Sadr sets as a condition the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country. The document is explicit in calling for ending Turkish presence in the country (by diplomatic means, or otherwise) but also for ensuring “the exit of all occupying forces and the “friendly” ones, so to speak, from Iraqi lands”. This is in line with al-Sadr’s past position on opposing foreign presence in Iraq, including through armed struggle. However, the leader allows for UN engagement in settling the dispute with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and eventually supervising the political process in the liberated areas. The engagement of the UN is more pronounced in al-Hakim’s plan, which gives the UN the role of submitting a detailed strategy based on consultation with key representatives, and in collaboration with Jordan, a key country hosting the Sunni opposition to the current Shia-dominated government. Another difference in the documents concerns whether any plan for the future of Iraq should occur within or outside the electoral process. Al-Sadr asserts that a dialogue for national reconciliation, as he sees it, “should not be based on political and electoral grounds but on grounds that guarantee civil and social peace”. In al-Hakim’s document, instead, the “binding recognition of the results of free and fair elections” indicates the opposite attitude. This point is certainly important considering next year’s election and it may reflect the two parties’ electoral weight in the country. Furthermore, in al-Hakim’s document the call for refraining from “the practice of duplication in attitudes towards the legitimacy of the Iraqi political system (a foot in the government and a foot in the opposition), including the cessation of instigation against the legitimacy of the existing political system internally and externally” is something that al-Sadr could take quite personally, given his confrontation with the current government. Converging positions The reaffirmation of Iraq’s unity is shared by both plans. According to al-Hakim’s, “the aim of the initiative is “to maintain and strengthen Iraq as an independent state that enjoys sovereignty, unity, federalism and democracy and that brings all of its people and components together.” The same necessity is recognised in al-Sadr’s roadmap as preserving “the unity, security, and sovereignty of Iraq”. Al-Hakim’s Historical Settlement goes perhaps even further, by affirming as one of the parameters: “faith and commitment in words and deed to the unity of Iraq … and reject its division under any circumstances”. This is a point that is certainly problematic for the KRG’s aspiration for independence. Al-Hakim and al-Sadr therefore present a similar vision on a number of other issues. First, they both envision the involvement of tribal leaders, social elites, religions, sects, minorities, and ethnic groups in the process of settling the ethno-sectarian tensions that have brought the country to the verge of collapse. They both exclude from the process Baathists and terrorists, al-Hakim extending this exclusion to Takfiri groups, defined as groups who label others as apostates. A key difference on this point could, however, emerge in the final draft of the document. Indeed, al-Hakim excludes the “Baath Party”, potentially leaving the door open to some Baathists to be involved in their personal capacity. Al-Sadr, instead, has referred so far to the Baathists as a whole, most probably excluding any form of consultation with them. With regard to the security situation, al-Sadr’s plan expresses the need not to interfere in neighbouring countries, alluding to the involvement of Iraqi elements within the Hashd al-Shaabi in the fight against IS in Syria (such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Saraya al-Khorasani), something al-Sadr is opposed to. The need for non-interference is also explicitly mentioned in al-Hakim’s document. Their position on the domestic role of the Hashd al-Shaabi is, however, less clear, with al-Sadr, for instance, calling for integrating the “disciplined elements with the Hashd in the security forces”. The law regulating the Hashd al-Shaabi (November 2016) has already caused a harsh reaction from Sunni elements strengthening the rejection of al-Hakim’s plan by the National Forces Alliance, the biggest Sunni block in the parliament. Identifying shortcomings and conditions for national reconciliation There are many things lacking in both documents. One of these missing elements is the result of the avoidance of concretely addressing the governing mechanisms in Nineveh in the future, a point which will be key in settling reconciliation within the governorate but also countrywide. Secondly, despite calls for an inclusive process, the “Historical Settlement” as well as al-Sadr’s roadmap appear to be too focused on party politics, and so far there appears to be little engagement with bottom-up initiatives, another fundamental condition for national reconciliation to succeed. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear time framework, any reconciliation initiative runs the risk of becoming trapped in the electoral game in the midst of the next parliamentary and provincial elections which are likely to be scheduled for April 2018. Not only will this not serve the purpose of reconciliation, it will further discredit similar mechanisms in the eyes of the population, making reconciliation even more difficult. Most importantly, al-Hakim and al-Sadr only represent part of the Shia Block, whose cohesion has been undermined over the last years by personal projects; polarisation within the electorate; and more recently the presence of armed groups––the Hashd al-Shaabi––partly a product of existing and perhaps newly forming political parties. The brokers of the two plans are far from being perceived as super partes actors, as both al-Hakim and al-Sadr were active (and problematic) parts in the political makeshift of Iraq after 2003. Beside these two brokers, the third pole, the Dawa Party, is still commanding political power within the Block and in the country. Al-Maliki is certainly not a realistic candidate under whom any reconciliation plan will succeed. He has already labelled the “Historical Settlement” as “treason against the Iraqi people”. Despite the Dawa Party’s nationalistic credentials still being strong, at least among a segment of society, al-Maliki is associated with the dark days of the advancement of IS, something that inevitably weakened his position. Despite coming from the same party, al-Abadi has the credentials of having faced, so far successfully, IS and retaken important swathes of Iraqi territories. Al-Abadi had already come to office with a commitment to pursue a national reconciliation project. The passing of the General Amnesty Law in August 2016 is an indication of this commitment together with the work of the National Reconciliation Committee in the Prime Minister’s Office (NRC). By revitalising his initial push for reconciliation, al-Abadi has the opportunity to build upon common positions in existing plans and reconcile them with other demands coming from the Iraqi society. A comprehensive plan coming from al-Abadi would certainly have a more likely chance of finding support among a broader spectrum of domestic and international actors.
Topic:: Elections, Islamic State, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Mosul

417. Competing Interests in Shingal District: Policy Recommendations for Defusing Tensions

Author:: Tomáš Kaválek
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This report concerns the political and security situation in the district of Shingal after the summer of 2014. Specifically, it focuses on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) presence in the area. In August 2014, the Peshmerga forces hastily withdrew from Shingal district due to the IS (Islamic State) advance. The Yazidi population of the district was then exposed to atrocities at the hands of IS. These events damaged trust between the Yazidi population and the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government). The PKK entered the stage in Shingal district and aided Yazidis at the onset of IS’ advance. It capitalised on its image of being the saviour of Yazidis and promptly began to build governance and armed structures in the district. The area has thus become an arena of competition between the KRG (especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party– KDP) and Baghdad. PKK’s increasing presence challenges the KDP’s strong influence in the district. The ongoing power struggle in Shingal district also takes place against a background of wider regional competition. The report utilises Zachariah Mampilly’s theoretical framework in order to analyse the effectiveness of rebel governance. It is argued that the model used for PKK-linked political and armed structures in Shingal district follows the PKK’s governance model as it is established in PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological works and is currently in place in Rojava, run by PKK-affiliated actors. Furthermore, building upon Anna Arjona’s typology of rebel governments, it is asserted that the PKK-linked governance in Shingal district has become, since the summer of 2014, increasingly effective and entrenched despite certain shortcomings stemming mainly from lack of resources to satisfy all the needs of the population. Ultimately, the PKK-linked civilian governance structures represented by the Self-Administration Council and the armed structures of the Sinjar Protection Units find fertile ground among the Yazidi population for their project of self-administration and self-defence for Yazidis in Shingal district. The PKK-linked forces’ influence goes beyond a mere military presence and thus poses a new reality in which the PKK-linked forces are indeed actors which must be taken into consideration in future political arrangements in Shingal district. While outlining the competing interests in the district of Shingal, the paper provides a set of recommendations to the PKK, the PKK-linked actors in the district, the KRG, the GoI, Turkey, and the US with an aim of promoting stabilisation and the well-being of the local population. The best case scenario would include at least partial demilitarisation of the situation in the district while shifting the competition for the population between the GoI, the PKK-linked forces and the KRG into a non-violent domain, instead focusing on trying to win the hearts and minds of the population. Competition within the scope of Iraqi law with an aim of generating as much genuine popular support as possible in the upcoming elections in Iraq is the way forward. In the long-term, the PKK-linked forces should engage in democratic electoral competition with the KRG and aim for integration into governance and administrative structures as per Iraqi law. Both sides could then work on improving their standing electorally.
Topic:: Governance, Democracy, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

418. Turkmen in Tal Afar: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict

Author:: Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: With the military defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in Mosul city, the task to liberate Tel Afar continues to loom large. The fall of Tal Afar to IS on 16 June, 2014 has severely damaged the already strained Sunni/Shia relations in the area, as well as Turkmen relations with other ethno-religious communities. Most of Tal Afar’s Sunni and Shia population were displaced during the crisis. However, some Sunni Turkmen decided not to flee and remained in Tal Afar. Although much is still unclear, it is widely believed that a number of Sunni Turkmen from Tal Afar joined IS and stand accused of having committed war crimes in their name. Reconciling communities and repairing social ties are critical needs in ensuring stability and preventing the onset of renewed cycles of violence in the future. Such processes however, can only be advanced through consultation with local populations regarding their needs and vision for the future. The focus of this report is therefore on Turkmen perceptions of needs, opportunities, and obstacles to reconciliation within their own community as well as with other communities. The report finds that Turkmen from Tal Afar overwhelmingly conceptualise reconciliation as a security objective that is important for enabling the safe return of the displaced. At least in the short term therefore, participants prioritised reconciliation between the Sunni and Shia Turkmens over reconciliation with other communities living elsewhere.Interviews revealed strongly overlapping views on how sectarian violence had emerged and escalated in the past, and how it should be addressed in the future. Because reconciliation in Tal Afar requires communities to reject and actively combat extremist ideologies, the process must encompass mechanisms to enable these communities to resist the influence of radical organisations. According to the majority of both Sunni and Shia participants, the first step in this process is the inclusion of Sunnis in the security sector. Creating an inclusive, formal security sector comprised of all elements of society is seen as the main need for enabling reconciliation in the future. Serious issues of distrust, however, appears to stand in the way. The process of building trust between Sunni and Shia Turkmen faces additional challenges stemming from the fact that both communities continue to perceive each other as serving an exogenous agenda. While Shias suspect Sunnis of alignment with Turkey, Sunnis for their part see the Shias as an extension of Iranian interests in the area. Nonetheless, both communities clearly labelled security sector reform as the first step in stabilising the area after liberation, and expressed the hope that any process would not be thwarted by external actors. In terms including Sunnis in the security sector, Shias expressed concerns about infiltration of government institutions by extremist elements. This obstacle can partly be overcome by recruiting Sunnis in the force tasked with liberating Tal Afar. For the Shias, Sunni participation constitutes a vetting mechanism which can identify those who are committed to peaceful relations and oppose extremist ideologies. Sunni inclusion in the operation to liberate Tal Afar will also increase inter-group contact and cooperation, thus contributing to the formation of shared experiences and long-term objectives. Although intra-community reconciliation is clearly prioritised over reconciliation with other communities, participants also reflected on ways to improve relations with the neighbouring Eyzidi community. The liberation of Tal Afar will present opportunities for doing so. Criminal investigations into the crimes committed by IS as well as other actors should be initiated promptly. Sunni tribal leaders must strongly condemn crimes committed by members of their tribe and cooperate closely with law enforcement to ensure accountability can be imposed. However, it is equally important to publicise positive stories of Turkmen from Tal Afar who have risked their own lives to resist IS and help free some Eyzidi captives. Highlighting these accounts can serve an important role in countering perceptions of collective guilt towards the Sunni Turkmen community in Tal Afar.
Topic:: Islamic State, Ethnicity, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Mosul

419. The Sabean-Mandaeans: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict

Author:: Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: The Sabean-Mandaean community in Iraq is threatened with extinction. As a result of unabated kidnappings, robberies and killings, much of the community has been displaced from Baghdad and areas in the south of Iraq to the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk. Considering the particular vulnerability of the community,and the continued security threats present in their areas of origin, community members are currently not considering going back. After the defeat of the Islamic State, the Iraqi government should seize the window of opportunity to promote coexistence, religious pluralism and citizenship. In the short term, however, the Kurdistan Regional Government can play an important role in supporting the continued survival of the Sabean-Mandaean community by adopting a long-term vision towards their settlement in the Region and facilitate their integration in Kurdistan society. The international community who are concerned with religious pluralism in Iraq should seek to support the KRG in its approach and improve the community’s connectedness with its diaspora by reducing restrictions on visiting visas for countries hosting a large number of Sabean-Mandaeans.
Topic:: Security, Democracy, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Baghdad, and Kurdistan

420. Kurdistan: a potential strategic partner the US deserves

Author:: Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This year is the 25th anniversary of the election of the first Parliament and government of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq(KRI). Thanks to the safe haven that the United States and its European allies created in 1991 to protect the displaced Kurdish population from Baghdad’s brutal attacks, the Kurds turned a crisis into an opportunity to build a forward-looking nation with democratic aspirations. The journey was a tough one, with many successes and failures, but U.S.-KRI relations grew stronger and developed into a mutually rewarding partnership. The United States continued to protect the Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1990s and ensured that they would have their fair share in the post-Saddam Iraq. The U.S. once again came to the rescue of the KRI in the face of the Islamic State (ISIS) onslaught in 2014 and continued its support to date. The Kurds have reciprocated with unreserved loyalty and solid support for U.S. policies in Iraq. Peshmerga forces became indispensable partners in the U.S.-led global coalition and instrumental in the ultimate military defeat of ISIS in Iraq. Some consider this KRI-U.S. partnership a tactical and temporary one, not only because ISIS is being defeated, but also because the United States will ultimately stop relying on the Kurds due to their inability, like the rest of Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries, to promote the rule of law and good governance, and to control corruption, which runs unacceptably deep. However, the U.S. and the KRI can prove otherwise. For a start, the United States continues to need strategic partners in the ever-changing Middle East, where its vital interests will remain at stake. In a region that is in turmoil and where terrorism is on the rise, the U.S. and Europe face much-reduced space, presence and leverage for driving and shaping events. Regional state and sub-state actors (like the KRI) have grown in influence across borders. A multitude of nonstate actors, legitimized or not, have become increasingly influential in driving events. The KRI, lying in the heart of the Middle East, is just what the United States needs, where it is most needed. The Kurds have proven themselves skillful and dynamic survivors in a conflict zone that is overwhelmed by powerful rivals. They have strong, collaborative, love-hate relations with the Shia political elite of Iraq. They share a long border with the previously ISIS-occupied Sunni Arab territories, where the challenge of stabilization is greatest. They accommodated the majority of the displaced Sunni Arabs and other ethnic and religious minorities during the ISIS war. Internationally, despite the complexity and sensitive nature of the Middle East’s politics, the political parties of the KRI have actively engaged and maintained relatively good neighborly relationships with both Iran and Turkey. Being a Muslim-majority country and having been part of Iraq, the KRI leaders have had unhindered access to most of the Arab countries. On the issue of KRI’s internal governance challenges, the United States can help a great deal via constructive engagement. The KRI, as a small, emerging nation, remains vulnerable in the world’s toughest neighborhood. This gives the U.S. plenty of leverage that it has never used effectively. In fact, the U.S. has the same kind of leverage with all of its allies in the Middle East but was never willing to use it in fear of negative reactions. On the contrary, the previous U.S. administration chose to almost totally disengage with the region, particularly Iraq, and virtually abandoned its obligation to spread the values of liberty and the rule of law in the Middle East. The consequences were disastrous, forcing the U.S. to return and face a war against the most radical of terrorists. It might be rare for politicians to request or accept conditional help, but the KRI leaders do when such requests come from trusted friends. They are, and have been, responsive to terms and conditions that are linked to good governance, designed to help their country become a better, stronger and more prosperous place. KRG leaders viewed these conditions as incentives and opportunities to reform. Many used them to convince their fellow leaders to endorse change. In short, tough love works with the Kurds and the United States should help the KRI become the partner it deserves, and the partner KRI deserves to be.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

421. The Shabaks: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict

Author:: Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: With the complete military defeat of IS in Iraq underway, the process of the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) faces enormous challenges. IS’s swift seizure of control of vast swathes of territories created new fissures and exacerbated old animosities and grievances among the variegated communities of the Nineveh Plain. Members of certain communities joined IS, while others showed sympathy to the group, causing rising social tensions among the communities. The war against IS also prompted certain communities to form their own armed forces, which can now be used to challenge rival communities and impose one-sided solutions by virtue of force. While no rigorous plan for the post-IS situation is available, and with Iraq facing economic and political hardships, the region’s dynamics are likely to continue to be conflictual, and communal relations may worsen further. Understanding how communities perceive reconciliation and conflict is a key element to ensure the return of IDP’s in the future. This report focuses on the Shabak community, an abstruse ethno-religious group living on the Nineveh Plain just east of Mosul, and how they perceive reconciliation and conflict. Various international minority rights organisations recognise Shabaks as one of the five main minority groups most affected by the recent conflict beginning in June 2014. At present, the Shabak community is comprised of both Sunni and Shi’ites, yet the community’s religious identity has significantly evolved over time, moving from a distinctly heterodox to a more orthodox set of beliefs and rituals. This, combined with their geographic location in the disputed territories in close proximity to various other minorities, make their views on conflict and reconciliation particularly relevant for future coexistence in Nineveh. One of the main findings of this report is that the Shabak community suffers from four main conflicts. Two relate to relations with other ethno-religious communities, namely Sunni Arabs and Christians, and the other two concern divisions within the community itself, that is, religious and ethnic identity. The rise of IS has impacted conflict dynamics in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it has led to a proliferation of armed groups, significantly increasing the possibility of a violent escalation. On the other hand, the complete rupture of the pre-2014 status quo has resulted in an intensification of identity discussions, which is linked to the settlement of the administrative status of disputed territories on the Nineveh Plain. The community’s perception of justice and security is also explored in this report. Interviews reveal that the community is fearful of forced displacement and revenge acts after their areas are liberated, while some expressed doubts about the ability of the security forces and the judiciary system in place to deal with the post liberation environment.
Topic:: Religion, Islamic State, Conflict, and Recovery
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, and Middle East

422. Universities are rising from ruins of war

Author:: Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: Since the 1960s, successive governments in Baghdad considered the Kurdish-majority areas of Iraq a war zone, and deprived them of investment. So when, in 1992, Kurds elected their first parliament and government, the politicians inherited a half-ruined country, with more than 4,000 destroyed villages and just one small university to serve a traumatised population of more than 4 million. Educationally, the biggest priority for the Kurdistan regional government (KRG) was to rapidly expand school capacity. New universities and technical institutes with diverse programmes were also established de novo. Currently, 14 public and 15 private universities are fully operational, accommodating 165,414 students in 2016, compared with 10,166 in 1992. Investing in quality was the next big challenge. In 2010, the Kurdish government that I was part of introduced a comprehensive system of quality assurance and accreditation, including a performance assessment of all staff and institutions that later became the basis for the annual ranking of KRI universities. Previously, no such system had existed in Iraq, and standards were on the decline – especially after the Iraqi regime change in 2003. Continuing political, security and economic crises, as well as poorly designed policies, corruption and over-politicised administrations were partly to blame. As in other Middle Eastern countries, the Iraqi and KRI governments make all senior university appointments and manage university budgets. This inevitably permits external interference in academic affairs, at the expense of quality and efficiency. There have been serious attempts to move towards making universities totally independent from government, but it has not been easy to accomplish. However, we have succeeded in making the KRI university admissions system electronic and transparent, to ensure equal opportunity. Curricula and teaching methods have been modernised, with greater emphasis on critical thinking, scientific debate, mastering information technology and learning other languages, particularly English and Arabic. The rapid proliferation of educational institutions and the subsequent increase in student populations threatened to outpace the system’s ability to prepare an adequate number of teaching staff. This is where research-intensive universities and other centres of excellence in Europe and America helped. In 2010, it was mandated that all PhD candidates should spend up to 18 months in international centres abroad. And the KRG launched a $400 million programme to send more than 4,500 talented graduates to study for higher degrees at prestigious universities abroad. Meanwhile, existing faculty were given incentives to take sabbatical leave, spend time in prestigious universities abroad and to co-publish with colleagues there. Such arrangements can be mutually beneficial. While the local academics and institutions have great needs in terms of connectivity, sense of direction and research leadership, they can offer scientific material, data and unique insight into their local issues. Academic leaders of post-conflict countries need first-hand exposure to best practice in higher education and research. They need to understand how independent universities work in a democracy. They need help to become research-active and to produce high-impact publications. They need to think globally and act locally, solving their countries’ problems through collaborative research. Countries such as KRI are resource-rich and can sustain the funding of their side of collaborations. In addition to its full-fee paying scholarship and sabbatical programmes, the KRG also pledged in 2010 to match-fund external grants for research projects in the KRI. These have led to numerous joint projects, publications and supervision of research students. Many of the external supervisors have become external examiners and assessors of university performance in the KRI. The current security and economic crises have slowed progress, but this is a transient phase. These investments must be maintained as the situation eases. Without strong higher education, Kurdistan will never stand tall even as it moves towards full nationhood.
Topic:: Development, Education, Political stability, and Higher Education
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

423. Is Kurdistan Independence Inevitable?

Author:: Yerevan Saeed
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: On 25 September, residents of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) will cast their votes in a referendum that may trigger an official process of separating Kurdistan from Iraq. International friends and foes alike have opposed the controversial Kurdish move, contending that the referendum will fuel further instability in Iraq, and cause repercussions across the Middle East. The Kurdish bid for independence is not unique, however. Ethnic groups in Asia, Europe, and Africa have in the past pursued their own dreams of statehood — some with success, while others ended in failure. Whatever the outcome, the process is often costly in terms of both its human toll and economically. For that reason, the secession of any region from its parent state has to be justified on strategic, political, and economic terms. For their part, Kurdish leadership asserts that Baghdad’s mentality of power monopoly has not changed and the long-term potential for future violence against Kurds remains high. For them, the only viable, albeit risky, path is to seek complete sovereignty. The stakes are high all round, and the international community could have a constructive role to play. Conversely, international disengagement leaves both Baghdad and Erbil exposed to greater uncertainty in the near future. Iraq and Kurdistan could follow the model of Kosovo, East Timor, or South Sudan, all of which realised their statehood but to varying degrees of stability; or, instead, the catastrophic pathways taken by the Biafra region of Nigeria and Katanga in Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Though South Sudan is still reeling from its civil war and ongoing territorial disputes, international intervention has been key in preventing clashes between Khartoum and the new state. Some important steps included the signing of the North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, and the active participation of the United Nations in the referendum process in 2011. Likewise, international support was a determinant in amicable separation of East Timor from Indonesia in UN-sponsored referendum in 1999, as well as the separation of Kosovo from Serbia in 2008. By the same token, instead of mounting further pressure on Erbil to cancel the poll, it could be more constructive for all stakeholders to assist Baghdad and Erbil to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. This is likely to be beneficial for all sides. A deal would mitigate the chance of violent conflict between Kurdish forces and the Iraqi army, and could save the UN and major powers from investing blood and treasure in case of a potential later conflict. It would also remove Kurdistan from international legal limbo and provide a more viable route for diplomatic recognition. In contrast to these experiences, the anticipated absence of international engagement means a unilateral declaration of independence by Erbil could prove costly for all sides. This is evidenced by the declaration of independence of the Biafra Region in Nigeria in 1967–1970. The Igbo-dominated region of Biafra did not hold a referendum to pursue its dream of statehood. Instead, the 300 members of the joint Consultative Assembly of chiefs and elders voted in favour of secession from Nigeria on 26 May, 1967. The following day, the same Consultative Assembly passed a binding resolution, forcing the head of the Eastern region of Nigeria, Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, to declare independence unilaterally on 30 May, 1967. Despite some international support from African and European countries, the move was met with harsh military and economic warfare against the infant republic by the Nigerian government, leading to a three year conflict. One million people, including many civilians Biafrans civilians died, primarily from starvation. Further evidence of the potential danger can be found in the case of Katanga. When Moise Tshombe declared Katanga province as an independent republic from Congo on 11 July, 1960, the move was initially supported by Belgium, and came just two weeks after the Congo’s independence. Tshombe famously said, “We are seceding from chaos,” referring to the messy state of affairs of postcolonial Congo. However, the republic, located in the mineral heartland of Congo, failed to receive diplomatic recognition — even from Belgium, and faced strong opposition from Congo and the international community. The events descended into political turmoil, and forced the UN to deploy peacekeeping forces. In addition, the competing interests and support for different groups from the US, Soviet Union, Belgium, and other powers further complicated the crisis from 1960–1965. It took three years to defeat Tshombe and reintegrate Katanga into Congo, with a high human and economic toll . Beyond these examples and above all, the right of the Kurds to pursue statehood can be historically and legally justifiable. At the dawn of the last century when the Ottoman Empire crumbled, Kurds were deprived of statehood by the Great Powers. They were subject not just to marginalisation, but to genocide as well. Even so, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdish leaders actively participated in the political processes in Baghdad, helping rebuild the Iraqi state and contributing to the defeat of terrorism. From their point of view, Baghdad has not lived up to its commitments to the 2005 constitution. Furthermore, the Kurds in Iraq believe they have strong grounds legal for a Kurdish state. Under the UN Charter, they have the right to self-determination. Finally, legal scholars argue that the principle of “territorial integrity” — enshrined in the UN Charter — is not unbreakable, should a country oppress a particular ethnic group and refuse to provide equal citizenship. International and regional powers have expressed understanding for the Kurdish aspirations for statehood, but are concerned the result could lead to violence. However, if instability is the concern, they are well-positioned to facilitate an amicable outcome between Erbil and Baghdad. Kurdish leaders have said that they have reached a point of no return with regard to their status quo within Iraq. Yet, they have shown flexibility in a willingness to postpone the referendum, should the international community offer alternatives or agree to officially support a legally binding referendum in the future. Indeed on 14 September, 2017, envoys of the US, UK and UN, in coordination with Baghdad, presented an ‘alternative to the referendum’ to the KRG President. Details of the ‘alternative’ is not known but short of providing political and economic incentives and security assurances, it is hard to see the current momentum for the referendum coming to an end
Topic:: United Nations, Election watch, Conflict, and Independence
Political Geography:: Africa, Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

424. The Christians:Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict

Author:: Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This report is about perceptions of reconciliation and conflict among the Christians in Iraq. Being a religious minority group in a country that has been fraught with conflicts and instability, this community, like other minorities in Iraq, endured suppression, displacement, and degradation. This, in addition to the weakening rule of law, has had an inverse impact on their communal relations, causing many to migrate. Furthermore, the Islamic State’s (IS) invasion of large swathes of land in the Nineveh Plain, where large numbers of Christians live, was yet another severe blow inflicted upon this community. The findings of this study reveal that the Christian community has had a conflictual relationship with the Shabaks, another minority group, in the Nineveh Plain well before IS’s emergence in 2014. The interviewees claim that the Shabaks encroached on their lands in an attempt to undermine the Sunnis in Mosul, serve external agendas and change the demography of the area. This report also shows that the Christians have disagreements with the Sunni Arabs, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the Central government of Iraq (CGI). In order to fend off the rising Shia dominance in the Nineveh Plain, Sunnis are partly blamed for increasing the level of violence in the area. Many Christians held grievances against KRG’s policies in the Nineveh Plain before 2013. They argue that in its attempts to shield influence against Baghdad, the KRG caused friction and fragmentation among the Christians. As for the CGI, the interviewees expressed mistrust since it was unable to protect them from IS’s onslaught. In the eyes of Christians, the security situation after liberation does not portend well. The Shia Shabaks are thought to pose a security concern in the Nineveh Plain because of their involvement with Shia armed forces while there are Christian armed groups as well. Baghdad and Erbil have not engaged in debating future control of the security of the Nineveh Plains. Therefore, they see the potential for eruption of violence which may inflict great damage on reconciliation efforts. In short, the dynamics in Nineveh Plain were not stable before June 2014. Inter and intra-communal relations were strained, the political landscape was divisive and the quality of services was poor. The KRG and Baghdad are usually blamed for the overall pre-crisis climate as they were competing for hegemony. The ramifications of that unhealthy competition were manifold. Polarisation, neglect, underdevelopment, and strained relationships are just some. IS’s invasion strained the relations further and a return to the status quo ante means protracted conflicts and further instability. The bigger danger is that more and more Christians would leave the country should the situation remain unchanged.
Topic:: Religion, Islamic State, Christianity, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

425. After the Kurdistan Referendum: Iraq’s Road to Reconciliation

Author:: Yasir Kuoti
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: On 25 September 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a historic, if contentious, referendum in the three Kurdistan Region’s provinces (Erbil, Duhok, and Sulimanyiah) and disputed territories, including Kirkuk. Notwithstanding the moral grounds for Kurdish self-determination, and despite the Kurds having voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence, the unilateral move was met with strong backlash form varied opponents, for varied reasons. The Iraqi government, parliament and Supreme Court in Baghdad come out against the referendum calling it “illegitimate,” “unconstitutional,” “destabilizing” and “untimely”, as did Turkey, Iran, many western countries and international institutions including the United Nations and European Union. In a retaliatory response, Baghdad moved to impose a host of punitive measures against the KRG. These included the decision by the civil aviation authority of Iraq to halt international flights to and from Erbil and Sulimanyiah airports on September 29, 2017. Now a month into the referendum, Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, a perceived moderate Shiite, continues to face a mounting pressure from Iraq’s parliament and political parties to take tougher measures against the KRG. In exact, the issue of disputed territories took a center stage as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), backed by the Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU), moved to reinstitute federal authority in Kurdish-held areas in Kirkuk, Nineveh, Salahddin, and Diyala governorates. The referendum and post-referendum events grew fast over the past few weeks, and it is difficult to undo them for a host of legal and political considerations. Playing the blame game now is not only frustrating, but also impeding to progress. Therefore, it is more constructive that Baghdad and Erbil take steps to calm down emotions and pave the path for meaningful dialogue. Irrespective of what Baghdad leaders think of the referendum or its legality, they cannot take away from the fact that millions of Kurds cast their votes in favor of independence. The Kurds have legitimate fears about the sectarian direction in which the country is heading, a view that is also shared by non-Kurdish Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs and many Shiite Arabs, including Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Such fears need to be acknowledged and dealt with, not dismissed. Baghdad should also take measures to improve communications with the KRG, to mitigate future fears by Kurds. Certainly, a drive behind the timing of the referendum was the fear, real or perceived, by some Kurds that with the defeat of IS, Baghdad will turn focus to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to deprive it of its gains. Erbil must recognize that Iraq’s constitution of 2005, which Kurdish voters have largely backed, gave a broad autonomy to Kurdistan Region and unequivocally affirmed that federal authorities have the constitutional duty to “preserve the unity [and] integrity…of Iraq and its federal democratic system.” Kurdish leaders, and many Iraqis too, have issues with the constitution and the political process it stipulated, but in the absence of a better framework, it remains the law of the land. Erbil should also take a leading role in mitigating the fallout from the referendum. The KRG leaders should accept that the referendum has backfired where the best outcome, for the short term at least, is negotiations with Baghdad for a democratic and federal Iraq. Therefore, the KRG might choose to publically demand the implementation of Iraqi constitution. This does not take away from the strategic and aspirational value of the referendum, which is expedient for pushing Kurdish demands over disputed areas, broader autonomy, and other issues. Meanwhile, the KRG leadership would benefit form focusing on its internal challenges including the need to address intra-Kurdish rivalries among political parties, empowering institutions, strengthening the rule of law, and initiating economic reforms. Such political and economic reforms will improve KRG’s negotiating positions with Baghdad. The referendum has given rise to unprecedented political and military tensions between the federal government of Iraq and the KRG. With the mobilization of the ISF, backed by the PMUs, to reclaim federal control over disputed territories, the situation risks igniting an armed confrontation between the two sides in one disputed area or another, especially if Baghdad decides to swing the pendulum too far. Given these developments, the only sensible way forward is for Baghdad and Erbil to make negotiations a priority. It is essential that talks focus not only on procedural and technical issues such as budget, oil sales, and fair distribution of resources, but, more importantly, on the primary issue that divided Baghdad and Erbil and helped trigger the referendum: corruption and sectarianism in the Iraqi state. Iraq’s political system is increasingly turning into an ethno-sectarian battle, which has been the feature of post-2003 Iraq except that it has become much more abrasive in recent years. Political parties throughout Iraq are structuring themselves to whip up sectarian and ethnic divisions to varying extents of extremism. Under the system, each party has become associated with its identity where there is little to no space to an overarching Iraqi national identity. Parties have become accustomed to not only make their constituents polarized along ethnic and sectarian lines, but also make them fearful of fellow countrymen. This state of affairs calls for an urgent action; else cycles of disputes and violence are likely to resurface. Interestingly, the fallout from the referendum has also provided opportunities for dialogue between the KRG and Baghdad. Indeed, the KRG Cabinet in its meeting of 19 October reemphasized the need for negotiations without pre-conditions and that the KRG is ready for dialogue. If and when reconciliations efforts take place, it is critical they address revising the constitution and structure of government. Negotiations are far better when they are outcome-driven with defined timelines, addressing the need for a non-sectarian and non-divisive arrangement. Prime Minister Abadi must seize on his successes to steer the country’s ship toward a unified vision that can bring about the will to address problems rooted in the political system, which feeds on ethno-sectarian divisions and is the greatest barrier to development. The international community, particularly the United States, has historic opportunities to positively influence the future of Iraq by articulating a peaceful settlement to the crisis and encouraging meaningful negotiations between Baghdad and the KRG. Furthermore, the U.S. should promote dialogue within the major political parties in the KRI while leveraging its influence to redirect attention toward liberating remaining IS strongholds in western Iraq. The U.S is also encouraged to provide Iraq with legal and technical assistance needed to launch reforms and national reconciliations initiatives. The U.S and Iraqi leaders need to work together to dispel fears held by minorities, encouraging them to integrate into a better version of federal and democratic Iraq. Being part of the coalition government in Baghdad, Kurds have a key role to play in making progress toward national reconciliations and reforms.
Topic:: Self Determination, Democracy, Independence, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Baghdad, and Kurdistan

426. Perceptions of EU Crisis Response in Iraq

Author:: Khogir Wirya, Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, and Kamaran Palani
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: This policy paper provides a bottom-up analysis of the impact of the European Union’s (EU) crisis response policies in Iraq. It examines how the EU’s engagement in crisis response is received and perceived by different local actors throughout the conflict cycle. The EU’s engagement in Iraq is multifaceted and encapsulates, but is not limited to, the fields of reform; capacity building; rule of law; security sector reform; humanitarian assistance; and development aid. Furthermore, this study seeks to unpack whether the EU’s responses correspond to the needs of target groups, perceived as conflict-sensitive and geared to the needs of vulnerable groups. Although the findings indicate that general attitudes towards the EU are favourable, we suggest the following policy recommendations: The EU should place more emphasis on its image as a contributor in crisis response in Iraq. The data indicate that a significant number of participants were unaware of the EU’s efforts in this perspective. The EU should also increase awareness about its roles in the fields of security sector reform, rule of law and development aid. The results show that these sectors are less known than the others. The EU should do more in the areas of security sector reform, development aid and rule of law. Participants have shown inconclusive satisfaction levels about these sectors. With an increasingly weak rule of law, limited capacities and widespread insecurity, expectations of increased EU engagement in these sectors are evident. The EU should identify the causes behind the partial satisfaction with its assistance scheme in responding to the crisis In Iraq. A sizeable share of the respondents stated that the EU’s support had not improved their status in the crisis. This should warrant an investigation into the effectiveness of the EU’s contributions and programmes in various fields.
Topic:: Security, Humanitarian Aid, European Union, Crisis Management, and Development Aid
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Baghdad

427. Shifting Gears in Iraq-Saudi Arabia Relations

Author:: Yasir Kuoti
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:: Relations between Iraq and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) have remained largely cold or nonexistent since the 2003 Iraq War, an outcome of the war itself that saw the empowerment in Iraq of Riyadh’s regional archrival, Iran. Since January 2017, however, bilateral relations improved considerably as Saudi officials flocked to Baghdad to meet Iraqi counterparts. Iraqi officials and public figures reciprocated, in speed, with their own visits to the KSA. The surprising rapprochement agenda have thus far resulted in, among other things, restoring Saudi diplomatic representation in Iraq, opening al-Jadidah Arar border-crossing on the Saudi northern borders with Iraq, and inaugurating the Saudi Arabia-Iraq Coordination Council, opening a new era of strategic ties between the two countries. Iraqi media now reports that the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman will start an official visit to Iraq in November. In the process, he will become the highest-level Saudi official to do so since 1990. What explains the timing of this rapprochement policy?
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

428. Iraq’s Fifth Column: Iran’s Proxy Network

Author:: Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: As Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (I.R.G.C.) campaigns against ISIS, the Islamic Republic is strengthening its Shiite militia proxy networks in Iraq. The I.R.G.C.’s expeditionary wing, the Quds Force, is using political connections in the Iraqi government and historical links to veteran Shiite groups to influence Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (P.M.U.s). P.M.U. groups that express support for Khomeini’s wilayat-al faqih and hold the closest ties to the Quds Force are led by commanders that worked with the Quds Force as fighters in the Islamic Resistance of the 1980s and 1990s. However, Iran’s extensive Shiite militia network does not extend to all P.M.U.s. Differences amongst P.M.U. groups will shape the future of Iraqi Shiite socio-political development as P.M.U. groups transition from active militia activity to participation in mass politics.
Topic:: Politics, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

429. Al-Qaeda versus ISIS: Competing Jihadist Brands in the Middle East

Author:: Charles Lister
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The 2011 political unrest in the Middle East provided al-Qaeda and ISIS with an unprecedented opportunity for growth. While both groups share the goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate, they approached the goal with different strategies and to differing degrees of success. Al-Qaeda responded to the instability by attempting to soften its image. The group specifically instructed its affiliates to situate themselves in local conflicts and to slow down the implementation of Sharia law. ISIS, on the other hand, focused on seizing territory and violently disrupting state-building efforts. By the close of 2017, al- Qaeda’s rebranding has successfully allowed the group to expand its footprint in a number of Middle Eastern civil wars at the cost of its central authority. ISIS, meanwhile, has lost most of its territory but retains the ideological strength to inspire attacks abroad.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Ideology, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

430. Wartime Economies in the Middle East A Look into Libya, Syria and Iraq

Author:: Tim Eaton, Lina Khatib, Renad Mansour, and Paul Salem
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:: The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted Chatham House experts Tim Eaton, Lina Khatib, and Renad Mansour for a discussion on the collapse of central authority and its economic impacts across states in the Middle East and North Africa. MEI senior vice president for policy analysis, research, and programs Paul Salem moderated. The panel explored the development of the war economies of Syria, Libya, and Iraq, examined the commonalities and differences in the three cases, and discussed the challenges of combating the economic power of armed insurgents.
Topic:: War, Non State Actors, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Libya, and Syria

431. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 10: The Defeat of IS & the Southeast Asian Terrorist Threat

Author:: Rohan Gunaratna, Paul Hedges, Jasminder Singh, and Muh Taufiqurrohman
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: October 2017 has been a fateful month for the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group. In Syria, its de facto ‘capital’ Raqqa has fallen to an alliance of Kurdish and Arab fighters backed by the US-led coalition. Earlier in Hawija, the last remaining IS stronghold in northern Iraq, about 1,000 IS fighters surrendered to Iraqi forces rather than fighting for ‘martyrdom’. Over in Southeast Asia, the Philippines authorities announced the liberation of Marawi after a five-month battle and the killing of IS top leaders, Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute. The string of losses suffered by IS since 2016 nullifies and invalidates the IS slogan of ‘remaining and expanding’ and constitutes a huge symbolic blow to its standing as leader of the global ‘jihadist’ movement. It is likely that the fall of Raqqa was expected by the top leadership of IS and that plans have been made well in advance for al-Baghdadi and his senior commanders to go into hiding, and for the ‘jihadi’ struggle to persist in some form in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. This is already evident from IS’ decentralisation of its ‘jihad’ and ‘virtualisation’ of its so-called caliphate (from a territory-based entity). The ‘decentralisation of jihad’ through its various wilayats and online presence (including videos and publications), is similar to Al-Qaeda’s post-9/11 franchising strategy. IS has been urging its affiliates in different parts of the world to continue the so-called ‘caliphate’ project by granting them more autonomy and freedom to mount operations. Against this backdrop, Southeast Asia has to contend with the threat of IS and other terrorist groups engaging in recruitment and proselytisation, and planning attacks through the online domain. This context necessitates close monitoring of hotspots in Southeast Asia, including Marawi in the Philippines, Rakhine in Myanmar and the southern provinces in Thailand. In the Philippines, security forces have successfully managed to contain, isolate and eliminate the IS threat in Marawi. Although the battle is almost over with the deaths of IS Philippines leaders Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute, the threat of terrorism in the region is far from over. Rohan Gunaratna discusses the situation in Marawi, the activities of the militants, the government’s response and future trends. Despite the elimination of top leaders and fighters in Marawi, IS will prevail in Southern Philippines and pose a security threat to Southeast Asian countries as the leadership outside Mindanao remains intact. In addition, other militant groups are joining IS’ East Asia Division, indicating efforts to expand from the Philippines to Northeast and Southeast Asia. While IS has failed to hold territory, it has been successful in cyberspace, with regular online publications of battle news, ‘religious’ articles, showing exploits of IS fighters and propaganda videos. In this connection, Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani discuss the unprecedented appearance of a Singaporean national in an IS-propaganda video last month and its possible implications. In the midst of IS decline in the Levant, the video attempts to rally the ‘jihadists’, boost their morale, and gives the false impression that IS will prevail. The video underlines the need for continued high-level vigilance against extremist teachings and ‘jihadist’ propaganda and radicalisation in the real world and the murky cyber world. Muh Taufiqurrohman et al. examine the issue of jihadist radicalisation and activities in Indonesia’s prisons at Nusa Kambangan. They observe that lax security measures, understaffed prison facilities, low budgetary provisions and overworked prison guards have enabled high-profile jihadists such as Aman Abdurrahman, Iwan Darmawan, Abdullah Sonata and Abu Hanifah to recruit, preach, communicate, plan and execute attacks without hindrance. They recommend placing terrorist inmates in special prisons or solitary confinement, employing full-time religious counsellors, recruiting more qualified prison guards and increasing the prisons’ operational budget. On the issue of radicalisation, a better conceptual understanding of the subject is required. Paul Hedges explores and clarifies key issues associated with the term radicalisation. He argues that radicalisation is largely linked to socialisation and that there is no commonly accepted personality profile nor a linear pathway to radicalisation; basically, the landscape and trajectory of terrorism in terms of recruitment and evolution are both changing and fluid. In order to counter the booming youth ‘jihadist’ cultural milieu, he argues that it is necessary to have credible moderate role models and voices messages that are packaged to appeal to the youth. He added that any response to address the issue of trajectories into violence needs to be measured, targeted, evidence-based, and empathetic to the communities involved.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Philippines, Syria, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

432. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 07: ‘IS Ingress in Southeast Asia‘

Author:: Rohan Gunaratna, Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi, and Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: As the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group evolves into the next phase of its life cycle, it is operationalising its so-called wilayats (governorates) in different parts of the world. In June, with the loss of ground in Iraq and Syria, IS has made significant territorial gains in the Philippines along with carrying out a high profile terrorist attack in Indonesia. The operational strength and sophistication exhibited in these latest developments in Southeast Asia is concerning for three particular reasons. First, IS will stay alive and relevant through its wilayats notwithstanding its defeat in the Middle East. This could result in higher levels of violence and radicalisation in the regions where IS might turn its attention. The ability of the so-called Caliphate to operate in the online and offline spheres has already provided the group a virtual sanctuary to survive and stay relevant despite real world defeats. Second, with the seige of Marawi in the Philippines by IS, the city and surrounding areas may emerge as a new hub for IS supporters, sympathizers and lone-wolf fighters. In its latest issue of Rumiyah, the terror group has encouraged its supporters to relocate to Marawi if they cannot migrate to Iraq or Syria. This might galvanise a new wave of pro-IS fighters in Southeast Asia. IS has already prepared them for the setbacks in the Levant and provided them with sufficient religious grounds to press on with their ‘struggle’ through its propaganda machinery. The porous and heavily forested terrain and cluster of small islands with almost no control of the government in southern Philippines suits IS designs to fortify and consolidate its footprint in the region. It will require concerted efforts under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to counter IS gains in the region. Even though Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have done remarkably well to check the security challenge posed by IS, more needs to be done in places like the Philippines and Thailand with coordinated operational efforts and timely intelligence sharing. Third, IS online followers, supporters and sympathisers are now moving from open social media platforms to encrypted ones such as Telegram, Whatsapp and WeChat. This adds a new layer of complexity to keep track of vulnerable segments of youth susceptible to radicalism and disrupt any terrorist plots that may be planned and executed through communication in encrypted social medial platforms. Various Social Media Companies (SMCs), law enforcement agencies, academia and civil society organisations (SCOs) will have to team up and redouble their efforts to discuss how to deal with the challenge of cyber radicalism. Further procrastination in operationalising stronger social media strategies to counter violent radicalism will hamper efforts to curtail the spread of extremist propaganda and avert terrorist attacks. Equally important is the realm of counter-ideology and promotion of religious moderation. A strong rebuttal of Sunni extremist groups’ exploitation of Quranic verses and other religious texts to further their narrow agendas serves to de-legitimise their efforts. Once the ideological appeal of these groups is neutralised, it will be easier to counter them operationally. Terrorist groups can survive loss of sanctuary and decapitation of the top leaders, but ideological de-legitimization deprives them of the moral support they enjoy among the vulnerable social segments. These are some of the issues which the current issue of CTTA discusses at length highlighting: a) Marawi: A Game Changer in Terrorism in Asia by Rohan Gunaratna, b) The Evolution of Online Extremism in Malaysia by Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin, c) A Rebuttal of Al-Qaeda and IS’ Theological Justification of Suicide Bombing by Muhammad Haniff Hassan and d) Abrogation and the Verse of the Sword: Addressing Sunni Extremists’ Misappropriation of Concept and Verse by Mahfuh Halimi
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, Indonesia, Middle East, Philippines, Syria, Singapore, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

433. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 05: May Issue

Author:: Rohan Gunaratna, Bilveer Singh, Mohammed Sinan Siyech, Patrick Blannin, and Farhan Zahid
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: The Islamic State (IS) terrorist group that emerged victorious in Iraq in 2014 has lost its eminence. Presently, it is on the defensive, struggling to retain its strongholds in Iraq and Syria. This contrasts with the situation in 2014 when the group was on the rise. It was expanding territorially, producing shockingly brutal videos with cinematic flare, and proclaiming its revival of the so-called ‘caliphate’ and implementation of Sharia to beguile local and foreign Muslims and fellow jihadists. In recent months, IS has suffered several setbacks, including loss of territory, which is the focal point of its jihadist strategy. The group is also facing diminishing numbers of foreign fighters, depleting finances and high casualties of its commanders and foot-soldiers. Given the above, will IS remain relevant to the global jihadist landscape in future? The answer resides in the international community’s ability to end the conflict in Iraq and Syria and ensure post-conflict political stabilisation. Failure on these two fronts will give IS enough space to recuperate and revive. IS will seek sanctuary among pockets of politically-disgruntled Sunnis, regroup and resort to guerrilla warfare as a military strategy to fight the powerful adversaries. This is not the first time IS – earlier known as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) – is facing such a challenging situation. In 2006, when ISI leader Abu Musaab Al-Zarqawi was killed, it suffered huge setbacks. The group went underground and re-emerged in 2010 by defeating the Sahwa Movement, the Sunni tribal uprisings against the group. ISI exploited the Arab uprisings in 2011, and expanded into Syria to eventually become the IS in June 2014. On the international front, IS’ declining influence and appeal and the vacuum created by its retreat have rendered the leadership of global jihad as a contested domain, once again, opening up the possibility of Al Qaeda’s (AQ) return to the top of the jihadi pyramid and merger between the two old jihadi allies. Iraqi Vice President Ayad Allawi recently stated that ‘discussions and dialogue’ have been taking place between Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi’s representatives and AQ chief Ayman Al Zawahiri. Any rapprochement between the two rivals is likely to further complicate the jihadi landscape in Iraq, Syria and beyond. Against this backdrop, the latest issue of CTTA provides a snapshot of jihadist activities in Pakistan, India, the Philippines and Indonesia and the resulting security threat. Strategically, there is a weak correlation between defeating IS-central and its outlying wilayats and enclaves in Africa, Pakistan, the Philippines and elsewhere. Unless each pro-IS entity is defeated physically in its respective area of operations, the fight against the Middle Eastern Salafi jihadist group will remain incomplete. Specifically, if the conditions and root causes that gave birth to IS and its militant affiliates from countries stretching across Nigeria to the Philippines are not addressed, the international community might have to prolong its battle against them or fight new extremist groups in the future. This is why ideological de-legitimisation through robust counter-narratives, conflict stabilisation in Iraq, and finding a viable political solution to the Syrian civil war are central to defeating the jihadist by-products of these conflict-hit areas. In this issue, Rohan Gunaratna discusses the recent high-profile terrorist attacks in Manila and highlights the threat posed by IS East Asia Division in the Philippines. He argues that the recent attacks, unifications of various militant groups under the IS umbrella and the clashes between Filipino security forces and IS-affiliates in Bohol point to IS’s growing influence in the Philippines, and a stark reminder that the group is trying to expand northwards. The article contends that the IS threat is likely to increase in the future, and warns that the creation of an IS nucleus in the Philippines presents not only a domestic but a regional and international threat that needs to be addressed swiftly. In the next article, Bilveer Singh discusses the revival of Al Qaeda’s affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), in Southeast Asia. The author argues that JI’s present low profile and non-militant approach may change as more hard-line JI leaders and members are released from detention in the coming months and years, and as more well-trained and ideologically-hardened fighters from Iraq and Syria return to Indonesia. Farhan Zahid details the rise of IS in Pakistan since the group’s formation in 2014, and the extent of its activities in all four provinces of the country. IS has managed to increase its clout by forming tactical alliances with like-minded local militant groups. He argues that IS is likely to assert its dominance through local affiliates in urban centers of Pakistan, specifically the Punjab province. Patrick Blannin examines IS multiple sources of funding and some counter-mechanisms deployed by the global anti-IS coalition. The paper analyses how IS exploits the volatile political and security situation across the Middle East and North Africa to generate funding, and exposes the dichotomy between the terrorist group’s religious rhetoric and its criminal enterprises. Lastly, Mohammed Sinan Siyech’s article examines IS footprint in India in the wake of the group’s suspected involvement in the recent bombing of a passenger train in Madhya Pradesh (MP) state. Although IS recruitment and presence in India is not as strong in numbers in comparison to other countries, it remains concerning given various vulnerabilities and fault-lines that exist in the country. Given the current volatile environment triggered by the rise of right-wing Hindu extremism or the Hindutva movement, another terrorist attack could contribute to communal tensions, leading to spate of violence.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, North Africa, Syria, Southeast Asia, and Global Focus

434. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 03: ‘IS Terrorist Attacks and Battlefront Losses’

Author:: Iftekharul Bashar, Remy Mahzam, and Marcin Styszynski
Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: In the last several weeks, the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group and its affiliates have demonstrated their continued ability to direct and conduct high-casualty and high-impact attacks in and outside their strongholds in Iraq and Syria. On 10 February, a car bomb struck Baghdad killing 10 people and wounding 33 others. Six days later, a suicide bombing at a Sufi shrine in Sindh (Pakistan) killed over 80 people and injured 250. The latest (8 March) is the attack on a military hospital in central Kabul which killed 49 people and injured over 60. The global terrorism situation remains grim as IS continues to plot more attacks and exploits social media to subvert the alienated and disgruntled to its jihadist cause. On the battlefields in Iraq and Syria, however, IS is on the retreat, pounded by the US-led Coalition as well as Russian and Syrian forces. The Coalition forces are making significant progress in their offensive to retake western Mosul, capturing its airport, military base and main government complex. IS fighters are outnumbered and experts expect western Mosul to fall in coming months. On the Syrian front, IS has lost Palmyra again, after recapturing it in December last year, and is coming under attack in its de facto capital Raqqa. Some 400 US Marines have been sent to assist in the allied operation to retake Raqqa. It would not be long before more comprehensive, co-ordinated and forceful plans are implemented to defeat IS as well as other jihadist groups. With the likely imminent defeat of IS on the battlefronts, it is timely to discuss the global threat landscape in a post-caliphate scenario. Marcin Styszynski, in his article, highlights four factors that will influence the threat trajectory: the strategic withdrawal of IS into smaller Sunni strongholds to carry out operations and attacks, the expansion of threat frontlines by IS’ associated networks and returning fighters, the rise of sectarian and religious tensions, as well as the competition between Al Qaeda and IS. The author concludes by emphasising the need to address the root causes of political conflict and instability if the significant successes of the Coalition forces in the last two years are not to be in vain. This March issue also examines IS jihadist propaganda and information warfare in cyberspace. Remy Mahzam highlights the great emphasis IS places on online propaganda, and the significance of its propaganda magazine Rumiyah (Rome). He looks at IS calls for various forms of attacks to be executed, and attempts to influence specific groups of readers through exploitation of religious texts and powerful emotional and spiritual messaging. He concludes by spelling out what needs to be done to counter IS digital warfare. Iftekharul Bashar looks at the threat in Bangladesh, six months after the Dhaka Café attack and argues that even though the security establishment has weakened IS through hard approaches, the group is far from eliminated. In his view, the current administration needs to adopt a long-term approach to tackle the broader issue of radicalisation and the diverse threat emanating from IS, Al Qaeda and other associated groups in the country.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Iraq, South Asia, Middle East, North Africa, Syria, Southeast Asia, and Global Focus

435. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 01: 'Annual Threat Assessment 2017'

Author:: Rohan Gunaratna, Remy Mahzam, Iftekharul Bashar, Mohammed Sinan Siyech, Abdul Basit, Sara Mahmood, Nodirbek Soliev, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff, Vikram Rajakumar, and Shahzeb Ali Rathore
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: 2016 saw the so-called Islamic State (IS) in retreat following sustained bombardment and military attacks and airstrikes by the US-led coalition as well as Russian and Syrian forces. It has conceded large swathes of territory, towns and cities, and lost some of its top commanders and strategists and more than 25,000 fighters. The group‘s revenue has declined and so has the flow of new fighters. It has to contend with desertions, in-fighting and scarce resources. Its fall-back wilayats (provinces) in Libya have been lost and many in the liberated areas of Iraq and Syria are jubilant at its ouster after holding sway for more than 20 months. Its declaration of the caliphate is rejected by the Muslim world, which has denounced its acts of violence and misreading of religious texts. Since its formation, IS remains the object of condemnation and denunciation by the whole world. Even so, the terrorist threat posed by IS and its decentralised networks in 2016 shows no sign of abatement. Throughout the year, IS‘ active worldwide networks demonstrated the ability to plan, direct, train, recruit and radicalise from abroad, operating with impunity and surpassing the threat from Al Qaeda‘s old guard. The year saw a number of IS-directed or IS-inspired attacks by terror cells or ‘lone wolves‘ in major cities like Brussels, Nice, Orlando, Istanbul, Dhaka, Jakarta and Berlin resulting in thousands of casualties. Its propaganda machinery and online presence remain formidable, exploiting technology for communications, recruitment, finance, training and terrorist operations. IS has caused the displacement of millions and triggered a humanitarian crisis among refugees and in the battle zones. The group‘s extremism and violence have contributed to inter-religious tensions and discord, and strengthened anti-Islamist movements in the West. The stage is therefore set for 2017 to be a portentous and decisive year for IS and countries afflicted by the threat of terrorism. As IS loses control of Mosul and Raqqa in coming months, it will change strategy, focus and priorities. How it will change and what the impact will be are issues addressed by Rohan Gunaratna in his article on Global Threat Forecast, as well as in accompanying articles on the terrorism situation in selected countries and regions. As IS continues to lose ground in Iraq and Syria, it will transform itself from a caliphate-building entity to a terrorist organisation. It will seek refuge in its many wilayats and enclaves, and consolidate, expand and use them as launching pads to mount terrorist attacks. The group will continue with its strategy of expanding the ‘battlefield‘ to the West and elsewhere, and hit ‘soft‘ and easy targets. Overall, the terrorist threat will endure in the New Year and will continue to require effective counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism measures.
Topic:: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Iraq, South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, South America, Syria, Asia-Pacific, and North America

436. Iraq: Years of Post-Saddam Internal and External Developments

Author:: Pavlo Ignatiev
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: Iraqis very important for the world community because of its strategic position at the crossroads between the Persian Gulf, theMideteraneanSeaand theRed Seaalong with huge oil and mineral wealth. Moreover, Iraqi case illustrates all aspects of the US Middle Eastern policy since the end of the Cold War. The article analyses political and economic processes in Iraq after the demise of Saddam Hussain’s regime, evaluates the efficiency of post-war reconstruction of this Arab country in security and economic fields, singles out the reasons behind the civil war between Sunni and Shia followers, explains the paradox of semi-independent status of Iraqi Kurdistan as well as foreign policy of official Baghdad towards important neighbours – Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The rise of Islamic State of Iraq andLevantcapitalizing on sectarian devide and an attempt of Iraqi leadership to neutralize this threat also has become the part of analyzis.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Baghdad, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan

437. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Lessons Learned

Author:: Nathan Packard, Joseph A. Lore, Jonathan Wong, James E. Fanell, and Kerry K. Gershaneck
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: U.S. government agencies and military Service branches produce numerous reports and briefs each year that fall in the category of lessons learned. These institutional reports, and the effort that goes into them, play an important role for groups who are responsible for many lives and the nation’s resources. Some of these documents come after extensive investigations related to accidents, such as the loss of the space shuttle Columbia in 2003, or as a part of regular operations, such as after action reports. Moreover, all of the Services set up divisions dedicated to collecting lessons learned reports for internal and external inquiries, including the Army with its Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Navy’s Lessons Learned Information System, whose title mirrors the Joint Lessons Learned Information System, and the Air Force Lessons Learned Program. The United States Marine Corps is, as always, aligned with its sister Services in its efforts to write, publish, and disseminate doctrinal publications. At Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, home of Marine Corps University (MCU), the Corps supports several divisions that house lessons learned. The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) produces a variety of documents to support training and planning for Marine Corps exercises and operations, but also for the warfighting capability development process. Their Marine Corps Campaign of Learning Information System keeps these documents secured and available for those with suitable credentials. The History Division’s Archives Branch, located in the Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons Marine Corps History Center, is designated by Records, Reports, Directives, and Forms Management (ARDB) to collect, hold, and transfer command chronologies filed by units semiannually (monthly when deployed), which in turn are reported to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and become permanent records of the United States. Command chronologies stand as the official record of a unit and its activities for the reporting period and are used by Headquarters Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, Congress, and other governmental and nongovernmental entities to understand the activities, procedures, processes, and lessons learned by units. The Archives Branch holds all submitted unit command chronologies from 1976 to the present. In addition, it maintains after action reports, special action reports, and reports on lessons learned for units deployed during World War I, World War II, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Archives also maintains reports on major Marine Corps amphibious exercises from 1921 to 1980, major developments in amphibious doctrine between 1935 and 1990, and the development of amphibious technology from 1930 to 2000, many of which contain insight into lessons learned from those activities. These resources, once deposited with the Archives Branch, are useful to commanders and historians, and despite difficulties obtaining high-quality documents, History Division staff encourage Marines to write and deposit command chronologies regularly. Mention the term lessons learned to any Marine, soldier, sailor, or airman, and they will joke about lessons captured, observed, unlearned, or the so-called black box where these reports disappear. There may be some validity to their criticism, yet all of the Services continue to record lessons learned with good reason. Without a record of facts, it is impossible to reflect on how to improve operations from the tactical to the logistical. For this issue of the MCU Journal, the editors—with the guidance of the editorial board and numerous peer reviewers—have assembled different interpretations of lessons learned. Indeed, the authors of these four articles address diverse topics in the pursuit of increasing military readiness and effectiveness. Dr. Nathan Packard looks to the Corps’ relations with Congress, identifying how the Marine Corps, more so than other Services, has gained a reputation with and sometimes the criticism of members of Congress. Colonel Joseph A. Lore, however, sees room for improvement in supporting military efforts by revising a staple in any Marine officer’s library—the Small Wars Manual. Dr. Jonathan Wong extends Packard’s civilian-military relations theme, recommending that the Department of Defense learn from its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq by adopting some of the rapid acquisition techniques used during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to guarantee the future warfighter’s ability to engage in the next generation of war, which will undoubtedly strain the nation’s resources as the fight against terrorism and insurgencies continues.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Government, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Occupation, History, and Vietnam War
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Iraq, Asia, Vietnam, and United States of America

438. The Kurdish Referendum – A Strategic Mistake

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: It would have been better for the Kurds to settle for strengthening their autonomous region in Iraq rather than challenging their stronger neighbors.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Independence
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and Kurdistan

439. Cobalt 60 Sources in Mosul: Recovery and Lessons for the Future

Author:: Institute for Science and International Security
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Case Study
Institution:: Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:: Two years ago, in the summer of 2015, the Institute decided to investigate whether Daesh controlled dangerous radioactive material in Iraq or Syria. The result of a few months of study by Sarah Burkhard, a young scientist, and other staff surprised us all. Their investigations found that there were apparently two sources of radioactive cobalt in Mosul that posed a risk of being used in a radiological dispersal device. We could not know if Daesh was aware of these sources and their potential, or had already taken possession of them. We produced a confidential research study that we used to alert the United States and other friendly governments of the situation as we knew it, most of which were also monitoring the situation. At the same time, we decided not to publish any of our results. As we learned more, we updated our study, which remains a confidential report due to its sensitivity. We are very relieved that these two, older albeit still dangerous, cobalt 60 sources were not found and used by Daesh. They were recovered intact recently. We want to thank in particular Joby Warrick at The Washington Post, who we had alerted early on for assistance in researching the fate of these sources. He understood the importance of digging into this story while delaying its publication until the radioactive sources were in safe hands. He and his colleagues at The Washington Post recently added greatly to this important story.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Mosul

440. Women in Violent Extremism: Lessons learned from Kosovo

Author:: Rudina Jakupi and Vesë Kelmendi
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: The report, among others, finds that there are a set of push and pull factors that drive women from Kosovo to join these organizations. These motives include ideological factors, socio – economical factors, personal motives and the lure by the recruiters. While most of the women who have joined violent extremists organizations are seen as victims rather than perpatrors, it is also true that there are women who see joining the conflicts in Syria and Iraq as empowering. The purpose of this research is to shed light on the women from Kosovo who participate in violent extremists organizations and potential consequences deriving from their role. While the report will be solely focused on Kosovo, it will bring international knowledge in treating this phenomenon having in mind that Kosovo marks no general exception when compared to other countries. The goal is to particularly identify who these women are, why would they participate in these conflicts, and what is their role. Share
Topic:: Violent Extremism, Women, Radicalization, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Syria

441. Migrants, Housewives, Warriors or Sex Slaves: AQ’s and the Islamic State’s Perspectives on Women

Author:: Andrea Sjøberg Aasgaard
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Connections
Institution:: Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:: Why do young Muslim women from the whole world join the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, despite the fact that the group is notorious for conducting terrible sexual violations against women? Through comparing how al-Qaeda (AQ) and IS are positioning women in their ideological literature, this article sheds light on IS’ appeal to women. This is interesting, as AQ in a historical perspective only attracted a handful of European women to physically join the group. The comparison highlights that AQ and IS position women in different ways: as housewives, migrants, warriors and sex slaves. Both groups’ ideologies agree that a woman’s primarily role is to be a housewife and mother, and exclude in principle women from the battlefield. However, only IS is emphasizing that Muslim women have a right and duty to migrate to its territory. Through using ideological arguments in its literature, IS convinces its supporters that it is a religious duty to enslave women the group defines as idolaters. For this reason, IS’ brutality against non-Muslim women will not discourage its female supporters from joining the group.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Migration, Sex Trafficking, Islamic State, and Sexual Violence
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

442. Islamic State Enters Al-Qaeda’s Old Hotbed: Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:: Mona Kanal Sheikh
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Connections
Institution:: Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:: The Islamic State (IS) movement has opened a new chapter in the Afpak region, changing the landscape of militant movements in the area. This article looks at the patterns of rivalry and collaboration between the Islamic State on one side and Al-Qaeda and Taliban-related movements on the other. It also surveys the way Al-Qaeda has developed during the past years where most of the international attention has been devoted to the formation of IS in Iraq/Syria, and shows that Al-Qaeda is still active, though it has become more locally oriented. Finally, the article looks at the prospects for the further expansion of IS especially in Pakistan where, on one side, a range of sectarian anti-Shia movements that resonate with parts of the IS agenda while, on the other side, there is no ideological tradition for embracing the kind of caliphate-jihadism that the IS advocates.
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Al Qaeda, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

443. Countering Sexual Violence in Conflict

Author:: Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Armies and armed groups often subject noncombatants—particularly women and children—to conflict-related sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage. Despite international recognition of this devastating abuse as a crime against humanity, sexual violence continues to plague conflicts from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Syria. This practice has also proliferated among extremist groups, including Boko Haram in Nigeria and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, sexual violence has tarnished the operations of peacekeepers charged with protecting civilians, thereby undermining the integrity and effectiveness of international peacekeeping institutions across the globe. Sexual violence in conflict is not simply a gross violation of human rights—it is also a security challenge. Wartime rape fuels displacement, weakens governance, and destabilizes communities, thereby inhibiting postconflict reconciliation and imperiling long-term stability. Combating conflict-related sexual violence merits a higher place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Although the U.S. government has taken modest steps to address sexual violence in conflict under successive Republican and Democratic administrations, more action is needed. To counter such violence, the Donald J. Trump administration should require training on conflict-related sexual violence in U.S. security cooperation efforts; expand the number of women serving in militaries, police, and peacekeeping forces around the world; increase accountability for the crime of sexual violence; and undermine terrorist financing streams raised through the abduction of women and children. These steps will help the United States and its allies respond effectively to the security threat posed by conflict-related sexual violence and advance U.S. interests in peace and stability.
Topic:: Human Rights, Gender Based Violence, Conflict, and Sexual Violence
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, and Congo

444. ICTs in Humanitarian Response: A learning review of a three-year, five-country programme

Author:: Amy O'Donnell
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: The Scaling Humanitarian ICTs Network (SHINE) funded by Sida, set out with the theory of change that the quality and efficiency of humanitarian aid can be improved in a variety of contexts through the adoption of Information Communications Technologies (ICTs). With applications in Ethiopia, DRC, Mali, Indonesia and Iraq, ICTs were introduced to enable digital registrations, mobile data collection, cash/voucher programming and systems for accountability. While ICTs hold promise for saving time, money and improving accuracy, this learning report sets out to unpack these benefits and identify the conditions that need to be in place in order for ICTs to significantly add value to humanitarian response.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, Accountability, Humanitarian Crisis, and Data
Political Geography:: Africa, Iraq, Indonesia, Middle East, Asia, Ethiopia, Mali, and Democratic Republic of Congo

445. Gender and Conflict Analysis in ISIS Affected Communities of Iraq

Author:: Simone E. Carter and Luisa Dietrich
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: This gender and conflict analysis of ISIS-affected communities of Iraq aims to improve understanding of gender dynamics in the context of conflict and displacement. The report sets out to identify the differential impact of ISIS occupation on women, girls, men and boys in order to explore shifts in prevailing gender norms held by study participants in Anbar, Salah Al Din and Nineveh governorates of Iraq. The objective is to enhance the understanding of the social pressures women and men experience when aiming to conform to context-specific gendered expectations of masculinity and femininity, in order to derive concrete recommendations for gender-responsive and conflict-sensitive humanitarian and recovery programming.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Terrorism, ISIS, Conflict, Local, and Community
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

446. We Have Forgotten What Happiness Is: Youth perspectives on displacement and return in Qayyarah sub-district, Mosul

Author:: Antonio Massella
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:: The current internal conflict in Iraq, its ensuing displacement and emerging returns, coupled with political and economic crises facing the country, are just the latest in a series of ongoing upheavals that Iraq’s youth are experiencing. This is a grim set of circumstances for any young person, and is particularly troubling in Iraq where pre-crisis figures indicate that 61% of the population is below the age 24 and 20% between the ages of 15 and 24. With the support of ECHO, Oxfam conducted an in-depth qualitative study of youth perspectives on experiences of displacement and return in newly retaken areas around Mosul. The main objective of this study is to investigate how circumstances for youth in Iraq may spur further conflict and shape displacement and return experiences; inform current policies around stabilization; influence the development of a durable solutions framework for displacement in Iraq; and support further development of conflict-sensitive programming as Oxfam moves its response from humanitarian to early recovery.
Topic:: Education, Displacement, Youth, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

447. Iraq politics: A goody and Abadi

Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

448. Iraq/Turkey politics: Quick View - Turkish prime minister visits Baghdad

Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Turkey

449. Iraq/Kuwait politics: Quick View - Agreement made to import Iraqi gas

Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Kuwait

450. Iraq politics: Iraqi forces reach the Tigris in Mosul

Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

451. Iraq/Jordan politics: Quick View - Iraqi and Jordanian prime ministers discuss reopening border

Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Jordan

452. Iraq politics: Quick View - Islamic State ejected from Mosul's east bank

Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

453. Middle East and Africa politics: Democracy Index 2016: a year of political stagnation in MENA

Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Israel, Libya, Palestine, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Oman

454. Middle East and Africa politics: Quick View - Trump bars many Muslims from entering the US

Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Kuwait, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Tunisia, Somalia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Mauritania

455. Middle East and Africa politics: Middle East lacks unified position on US travel ban

Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Tunisia, Somalia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, and Mauritania

456. Iraq politics: Mosul after Islamic State

Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

457. Iraq politics: Quick View - GE power plant deal overshadowed by US travel ban

Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

458. Iraq/Kuwait politics: Quick View - Agility dispute adds to Kuwait-Iraq tensions

Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Kuwait

459. Iraq politics: Quick View - Sadrist protest in Baghdad turns violent

Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

460. Iraq politics: Quick View - Deadly car bombings rock Baghdad

Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

461. Iraq politics: Quick View – West Mosul operation launched

Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

462. Iraq/Saudi Arabia politics: Quick View - Saudi foreign minister visits Iraq for first time since 2003

Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Saudi Arabia

463. Iraq politics: Quick View - Iraqi forces advance in western Mosul

Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

464. Iraq/Syria politics: Quick View - HTS claims Damascus bombing of Iraqi pilgrims

Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Syria

465. Iraq politics: Quick View - Trump pledges more support for Iraq in meeting with Abadi

Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

466. Iraq politics: Quick View - Civilian casualties escalate in west Mosul advance

Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

467. Middle East and Africa politics: Hizbullah faces up to new threats

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq, Israel, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria

468. Iraq politics: Quick View - Militias oppose integration into national army

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

469. Iran/Iraq/US politics: Who runs Iraq?

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, and Iran

470. Iraq politics: KRG makes plans for independence referendum

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

471. Iran/Iraq politics: Quick View - Former military adviser appointed Iran's ambassador to Iraq

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Iran

472. Qatar/Iraq politics: Quick View - Qataris released after 16 months as hostages in Iraq

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Qatar

473. Middle East and Africa politics: Regional conflicts to bring US and Saudi Arabia closer

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

474. Middle East and Africa politics: Quick View - Turkish air strikes hit Kurdish positions

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq, Turkey, and Syria

475. Iraq politics: Quick View - Iraqi forces make gradual gains in Mosul

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

476. Iraq/Jordan politics: Quick View - Iraqi authorities look to revive Jordan trade route

Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Jordan

477. Iraq/Saudi Arabia politics: Quick View - Sadr meets Salman in Saudi Arabia

Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq and Saudi Arabia

478. Iraq politics: Shia parties make their moves before elections

Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

479. UK/Iraq politics: A history lesson

Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

480. Iraq/UAE politics: Quick View - Sadr visits crown prince in Abu Dhabi

Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: International Relations, Politics, News Analysis, and Forecast
Political Geography:: Iraq and UAE

481. Iraq politics: Quick View - International concern voiced over independence referendum

Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Iraq

482. Iraq politics: Quick View - Tal Afar offensive begins

Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Iraq

483. Saudi Arabia/Iran/Iraq politics: Saudi Arabia attempts to woo Iraq away from Iran

Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia

484. Iraq politics: Quick View - PKK calls for Sinjar autonomy

Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Iraq

485. Iraq politics: Quick View - Government plans next offensive after Tal Afar victory

Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Iraq

486. Iraq politics: Quick View - Tribal clashes intensify around Basra

Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics, News Analysis, Forecast, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Iraq

487. Iraq politics: Kurdish parties begin to bridge differences

Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Country Data and Maps
Institution:: Economist Intelligence Unit
Abstract:: No abstract is available.
Topic:: Politics and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Iraq

488. Iraq Situation Report

Author:: Patrick Martin
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:: ISIS is waging a renewed offensive campaign in recaptured areas that could exploit vulnerabilities in the Iraqi Government’s ability to respond amidst accelerating political competition before upcoming elections.
Topic:: War
Political Geography:: Iraq