Search

Begin New Search Topic Economics Political Geography Europe

41. US Needs to Play Larger Role as Swing Producer of Oil and Gas in the Current Crisis

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, European nations have drastically reduced imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas from Russia. The 2021 levels of these energy imports were around 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, 1.2 mbd of refined products, and 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas on an annual basis.In addition to extreme difficulties in obtaining new sources of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, the price increases throughout Europe since the onset of the war have been of historic proportions. In the days following the invasion, natural gas prices shot up by 62 percent, and UK energy prices were up by 150 percent. The full impact of the war, along with the related need to rein in the highest inflation numbers in over 40 years, has pushed Europe into a recession that threatens households and small businesses as well as European manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive. As a result, if the region cannot quickly assemble alternative supplies, the European commitment to assist in containing Russian aggression may weaken.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Supply Chains, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

42. Russia’s connectivity strategies in Eurasia: Politics over economy

Author:
Kristiina Silvan and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia has been attempting to strengthen connectivity within Eurasia since the early 2000s as a part of its policy to “pivot to the East”. Yet due to limited resources and political will, the tangible effects of its connectivity strategy have remained limited. The Russian Far East would greatly benefit from an improved connectivity infrastructure, given its proximity to Asian markets and the abundance of natural resources in the region. However, the attempts to accelerate regional socio-economic development by strengthening the region’s connectivity have failed to make a difference. In post-Soviet Central Asia, Russia adopted a passive approach to connectivity in the 1990s and 2000s, which meant focusing on maintaining and protecting the links inherited from the Soviet Union. It was only the pressure of external actors – both China and the West – that prompted Moscow to take a more active stance in the region in the 2010s. The launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative pushed Russia to promote its own grand vision of trans-continental connectivity, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, designed to reaffirm Moscow’s great-power status and its equal standing with China. While it lacks economic and administrative foundations and its implementation is highly implausible, it has fulfilled a symbolic role as Russia’s grand connectivity project for Eurasia.
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Rivalry, and Resource Allocation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

43. Rethinking EU economic governance: The foundation for an inclusive, green and digital transition

Author:
Francesco De Angelis, Laura Rayner, and Frederico Mollet
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
The European Union is undertaking a comprehensive review of its economic governance framework, to address longstanding criticisms, respond to the impact of COVID-19, and prepare for the challenges posed by the twin green and digital transitions. This Discussion Paper represents the final instalment of an EPC Task Force series that examined the current approach and proposes 10 concrete policy recommendations to make EU economic governance stronger, greener and fairer: Establish a central investment capacity for green and digital investments (including associated social investments) or, alternatively, a golden rule modelled on the governance of the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Introduce a single net expenditure rule with a country-specific debt target based on nationally designed expenditure and debt plans to enhance political ownership. Shift to a multiannual supervision and assessment framework and introduce fixed medium-term budgetary plans, with a control account tracking deviations. Reform the sanctions regime to increase proportionality, perceived fairness and political enforceability. Differentiate country-specific supervision based on a clear risk threshold. Introduce ‘National Reform and Investment Plans’ modelled on the National Recovery and Resilience Plans, using a commitments-based approach to operationalise social, fiscal, macroeconomic and structural country-specific recommendations. The plans’ components with strong links to fiscal sustainability should govern the use of Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) flexibilities. Reform the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) to focus more on the investment composition of national fiscal plans and their link to broader policy objectives. Introduce an opinion on the individual and joint impact of the SCPs on imbalances into the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure to strengthen its link with the SGP. Introduce new processes into the European Semester to assess non-macroeconomic structural risks, such as climate and environmental risks. Build on the success of the temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) programme to create insurance-based mechanisms to support national fiscal policy during downturns.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, European Union, and Digital Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

44. How Its War on Ukraine Killed Russia’s Hydrogen Ambitions

Author:
Aliaksei Patonia
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Hydrogen looks like the fuel that can facilitate global decarbonization because it can be used in diverse applications—such as heat and power generation, transport, and manufacturing—without any carbon emissions. But, while many countries (including in Europe) view renewables-based, zero-carbon hydrogen as the ultimate goal in transitioning to a hydrogen economy, today most hydrogen is produced from natural gas. Thus, it is unlikely that the hydrogen transition will happen without relying on this fossil fuel. Russia is the country with the world’s largest natural gas deposits, and it has been exploring ways to adjust its energy sector to the needs of the emerging global hydrogen one. In 2021, it announced the goal of capturing up to 20 percent of the world’s hydrogen market by 2030. This came after all the major importers of Russia’s energy products had developed their hydrogen strategies, and its key energy companies started to explore new opportunities. Having signed memoranda of understanding with some of the world’s major energy companies to jointly develop Russia’s hydrogen export potential, they focused on Europe as the key destination. Some of Asia’s hydrogen pioneers and most promising future importers, such as Japan and South Korea, were also included among Russia’s potential partners. These steps could have resulted in long-lasting and fruitful collaborations generating large profits for Russia, but its ambitions have been jeopardized by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This has led to Russia losing key political and economic partners in Europe and also in Asia, which—in combination with being the target the toughest sanctions in its history—is likely to cripple its nascent hydrogen sector. Having planned to convert its natural-gas pipelines to transport hydrogen to future buyers in Europe, Russia is unlikely to be able to use this infrastructure for this purpose anymore. The EU will be an unlikely buyer of Russian hydrogen for the foreseeable future. Turning to Japan and South Korea would not be a success either, since they have joined the sanctions regime against Russia and, like the EU, have been officially labeled as unfriendly by Moscow. This will make the transfer of the technologies critical for the production of low- and zero-carbon hydrogen from the world leaders to a technologically backward Russia very problematic. Europe will also feel long-lasting repercussions of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the energy and hydrogen sectors. With no steady supplies of cheap Russian gas or hydrogen, Europe’s decarbonization efforts and building up its hydrogen industry will be inhibited and require a lot more effort and money. Russia will have to seek alternative markets for its energy commodities and it will seek deals with China, the only country whose energy consumption can rival that of Europe. But, as one of the world’s largest producers of electrolysers and of conventionally manufactured hydrogen, China probably will not need to import Russia’s hydrogen to build up its own hydrogen sector. Possessing critical technologies of its own, it will instead increase imports of Russian primary energy sources (such as natural gas) that it can use for producing hydrogen. The influx of huge volumes of cheap Russian feedstock will speed up China’s transformation from a country with a nascent hydrogen sector into a dominant player on the global hydrogen market. If the EU or the United States—the only two actors comparable to China in economic, technological, and geopolitical strength—do not develop similarly strong hydrogen sectors, Beijing could end up dominating the global energy landscape. To avoid the geopolitical consequences of this and for global balance to be maintained, further cooperation between the EU and the United States will be needed to speed up the creation of strong hydrogen sectors for both.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Business, Trade, Hydrogen, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

45. Cutting Putin’s Energy Rent: ‘Smart Sanctioning’ Russian Oil and Gas

Author:
Ricardo Hausmann, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Axel Ockenfels, Ulrich Schetter, Simone Tagliapietra, Guntram Wolff, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, major sanctions have been imposed by Western countries, most notably with the aim of limiting Russia’s access to hard international currency. However, Russia remains the world’s first exporter of oil and gas, and at current energy prices this provides large hard currency revenues. As the war continues, European governments are under increased pressure to scale-up their energy sanctions, following measures taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. This piece argues that given the inelasticity of Russia’s oil and gas supply, for Europe the most efficient way to sanction Russian energy would not be an embargo, but the introduction of an import tariff that can be used flexibly to control the degree of economic pressure on Russia.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Sanctions, Exports, Currency, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

46. Regional Diffusion of Foreign Demand Shocks Through Trade and Ownership Networks

Author:
Lionel Fontagné and Gianluca Santoni
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
International demand shocks are transmitted within the trade and ownership firms' networks and impact directly or indirectly domestic firm productivity and labor misallocation. Considering manufacturing firms for Italy, Spain and France over the period 2009-2017, we quantify these transmission channels from the global economy to the domestic firms, and within the domestic economy across locations, sectors and firms. We compute in a shift share fashion international demand shock at the district-sector-year level as plausibly exogenous to individual firms. Our results confirm that global shocks are transmitted through trade networks and that this transmission is largely mediated by firms' ownership networks both across and within the borders of the three countries.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Demand, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Spain, and Italy

47. Current Account Balances’ Divergence in the Euro Area: an Appraisal of the Underlying Forces

Author:
Emmanuelle Faure, Carl Grekou, and Valérie Mignon
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
This paper revisits the crucial issue of current account imbalances and focuses on the determinants of their gaps between eurozone Member States. We conduct robust estimations of the current account balances for a panel of ten founding euro area economies and construct a measure that allows us to diagnose why some countries have started to diverge from the eurozone mean in the last two decades. Our findings show evidence of remaining differences in countries’ economic development, meaning that real macroeconomic convergence has failed in the zone. Price and cost competitiveness, as well as fiscal balances, have also participated in this growing macroeconomic divergence. Overall, while the European authorities cannot influence the part of the current account gaps due to demographic factors, the role of fiscal redistribution and investment at the euro area level could help achieve macroeconomic convergence and thus reduce current accounts’ divergence in the zone.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Eurozone, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe

48. University Participatory Budgets. From Municipalities to Higher Education?

Author:
Mariusz Poplawski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The participatory budget is an important element of the catalogue of tools for involving residents in the local decision-making. The positive effects of involving many citizens in the decision-making process slowly bear fruit in attempts to transfer p.b. into other spheres. This article analyses how these well-known patterns are adapted to new conditions – at universities. Several of them decided to introduce their own participatory budget. A comparative analysis of the local government model and solutions adopted by three universities provides the answer to this question. The hypothesis assumes that the civic budget at universities and polytechnics is, for the most part, a modification of the model used in cities with district status. As shown, the municipal participatory budget is a proven basis for creating its own regulations. However, the available schemes should be modified.
Topic:
Economics, Higher Education, Participation, and Schools
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

49. Istanbul Journal of Economics: Volume 72 Issue 1

Author:
Gökhan Karabulut
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:
Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:
Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi is an open access, peer-reviewed, scholarly journal published two times a year in June and December. It has been an official publication of Istanbul University Faculty of Economics since 1939. The manuscripts submitted for publication in the journal must be scientific and original work in Turkish or English. Being one of the earliest peer-reviewed academic journals in Turkey in the area of economics, Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi aims to provide a forum for exploring issues in basicly economics and publish both disciplinary and multidisciplinary articles. Economics is the main scope of the journal. However, multidisciplinary and comparative approaches are encouraged as well and articles from various social science areas such as sociology of economics, history, social policy, international relations, financial studies are welcomed in this regard. The target group of the journal consists of academicians, researchers, professionals, students, related professional and academic bodies and institutions.
Topic:
Debt, Development, Economics, Budget, Finance, Investment, Trade, Unemployment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia

50. Istanbul Journal of Economics: Volume 72 Issue 2

Author:
Gökhan Karabulut
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:
Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:
Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi is an open access, peer-reviewed, scholarly journal published two times a year in June and December. It has been an official publication of Istanbul University Faculty of Economics since 1939. The manuscripts submitted for publication in the journal must be scientific and original work in Turkish or English. Being one of the earliest peer-reviewed academic journals in Turkey in the area of economics, Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi aims to provide a forum for exploring issues in basicly economics and publish both disciplinary and multidisciplinary articles. Economics is the main scope of the journal. However, multidisciplinary and comparative approaches are encouraged as well and articles from various social science areas such as sociology of economics, history, social policy, international relations, financial studies are welcomed in this regard. The target group of the journal consists of academicians, researchers, professionals, students, related professional and academic bodies and institutions.
Topic:
Economics, Islam, Religion, Communications, Natural Resources, Finance, Internet, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Currency, Unemployment, Sustainability, COVID-19, BRICS, Labor Market, Economic Stability, Consumer Behavior, Rent-seeking, Energy, and Wages
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia

51. EU carbon border adjustment mechanism faces many challenges

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Megan Hogan, and Jisun Kim
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This Policy Brief assesses the evolving EU Emissions Trading System and EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and explains objections within Europe and from major trading countries likely to be affected by the proposed CBAM import levies. While EU officials have sought to ensure that the CBAM is consistent with obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), key aspects of the CBAM could violate WTO rules and are likely to be contested, taking years to play out. Meanwhile, several other countries will adopt new carbon-inspired border restrictions, adding to global trade frictions. Major carbon-emitting countries, therefore, need to act cooperatively instead of unilaterally to both advance the fight against climate change and update the rules-based global trading system. Two-thirds of greenhouse gas emissions result from nontraded activities, such as road transport, electricity generation, and home and office heating. Countries can curb emissions in these activities, while developing guidelines for carbon abatement in traded sectors.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization, European Union, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe

52. Is South Korea vulnerable to EU and US carbon border restrictions?

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
South Korean exports, especially carbon-intensive products like steel, are increasingly vulnerable to both the European Union’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)—set to begin on January 1, 2023—and the proposed Clean Competition Act (CCA) before the US Congress. Schott and Hogan caution that Korean exporters should not count on Korea’s decade-old EU and US free trade agreements (FTAs), nor on the multilateral trading rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to protect them from new carbon-based import barriers in key foreign markets. The WTO and the FTAs have broad and loosely defined exemptions for environmental protection. Nor is Korea likely to be shielded by its own cap-and-trade emissions trading system (the K-ETS), because of extensive use of free allowances and large differences between EU and Korean carbon prices. While the threat the EU CBAM poses to Korean exports is imminent, passage of the CCA faces major legislative obstacles. But US imports of Korean steel and other carbon-intensive goods are still subject to climate-related duties at the US border under US unfair trade statutes. The US Department of Commerce has ruled that free allowances issued under the K-ETS (and EU ETS) are implicit subsidies that can be offset by countervailing duties. These charges are in addition to the harsh tariff-rate quotas on imported Korean steel applied under the “national security” authority of Section 232 of US trade law, which are more restrictive than measures imposed against European and other steel exporters. The authors suggest relaxing these US barriers, as they have been for shipments from Europe, in return for Korean participation in the nascent US-EU talks to establish a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum.”
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Exports, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

53. Will economic statecraft threaten western currency dominance? Sanctions, geopolitics, and the global monetary order

Author:
Carla Norrlof
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The return of great power rivalry is stoking renewed fears of weakening Western currency dominance. Financial sanctions are becoming the preferred economic tool for accomplishing geopolitical goals. These instruments are especially popular with the United States and Europe. In response, rival great powers, notably China and Russia, are diversifying away from Western currencies and developing counterstrategies to maintain economic and foreign policy autonomy. As other countries are hit by increasingly punishing Western sanctions, the incentive to join Russia and China’s alternative international monetary order increases. New analysis, published in this report, shows early signs that some countries may be trying to diversify away from the dollar. A growing circle of countries attempting to evade the Western-centric financial and currency order may over time erode the dollar and the euro’s sizeable lead, though will likely fall well short of ending their global dominance. This report analyzes these trends and quantifies the extent of reserve diversification following Russia’s 2022 war on Ukraine. It also assesses the polarity of the international currency order since the onset of the euro in 2002. Reserve diversification out of the dollar, and into the euro, has been modest, though Chinese renminbi reserves grew after Russia’s February offensive in Ukraine. Dollar unipolarity declined acutely in 2017 as the number of countries sanctioned by the United States increased and the US President Donald J. Trump threatened to revoke alliance commitments. Using economic statecraft while retaining global economic influence will require the United States to keep its economic house in order and allies close, if the current unipolar currency order is to survive.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

54. The Business Case for the Sustainable Development Goals: An Empirical Analysis of 21 Danish Companies' Engagement with the SDGs

Author:
Michael W. Hansen, Henrik Gundelach, and Erik Johnson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
This paper explores why business engage with the SDG agenda, with a view to understanding the business case for the SDGs. Building on and extending the responsibility literature’s discussion of the business case for responsibility, the paper develops a conceptual framework for analyzing why business engage with the SDGs. This framework is employed to analyze why a sample of 21 Danish companies decided to engage with the SDG agenda. The analysis finds that most companies view the SDGs as a platform for achieving rather conventional business goals such as mitigating risk, saving costs, and differentiating products and services. However, in a few cases, companies use the SDGs as a lever for carving out uncontested positions in future markets. The paper concludes that companies overwhelmingly view the SDGs as a business opportunity rather than as a business responsibility, something that fundamentally may distinguish the SDG agenda from previous responsibility agendas. The paper fills a gap in the extant literature on business responsibility by developing and validating a classification of the business case for the SDGs based on economic value drivers, and by deepening the empirical understanding of, what precisely this business case may be.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Sustainable Development Goals, Business, and Social Responsibility
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

55. ‘Impactful projection’: long-range strike options for Australia

Author:
Marcus Hellyer and Andrew Nicholls
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Australian Government has stated that the ADF requires greater long-range strike capability. This was first stated by the previous government in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU), which emphasised the need for ‘self-reliant deterrent effects’. The present government has endorsed that assessment: Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has stated that ‘the ADF must augment its self-reliance to deploy and deliver combat power through impactful materiel and enhanced strike capability—including over longer distances.’ He’s coined the term ‘impactful projection’ to describe the intended effect of this capability, which is to place ‘a very large question mark in the adversary’s mind.’ The term may be new, but the concept is not. To us, it’s a restating of the concept of deterrence by denial; that is, having sufficiently robust capabilities to convince an adversary that the cost of acting militarily against us isn’t worth any gains that might be made. But the need for the ADF to have those kinds of capabilities has become much more urgent. As the 2020 DSU noted, we no longer have 10 years of warning time of conventional conflict involving Australia. Moreover, this is not just the prospect of conflict far from Australia’s shores. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force-projection capabilities have grown dramatically in the past two decades and include long-range conventional ballistic missiles, bombers and advanced surface combatants that have already transited through Australian waters.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Economics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

56. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:
Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

57. Enclosing the English Commons: Property, Productivity and the Making of Modern Capitalism

Author:
Charlie Harris
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Oxford Centre for Global History
Abstract:
Legend has it that Alfred the Great awarded Oxford’s Port Meadow to the freemen of the city as a token of thanks for participating in the defence against Danish invaders. Historians dispute the account – but regardless, the Domesday Book indicates that the Oxford freemen have managed the meadow and used it as free pasture since the Saxon era. It still bears the evidence of thousands of years of community use, from Bronze Age burial mounds right up to regular horse racing in the 17th and 18th centuries. Port Meadow is one of Oxford’s few remaining “commons” – a parcel of land upon which local inhabitants retain their ancient common land rights. These include drawing water and fuel, rights of passage, fishing the River Thames and grazing animals. To this day, mingling amongst students and ramblers, horses and cattle roam freely. For millennia, most of England’s arable land fell under the category of “commons”; it was only a gradual process that created our modern arrangement of exclusive, unitary land ownership. This process was called enclosure. In a nutshell, enclosure was the legal mechanism which expropriated the commons (also known as common lands or waste lands) from England’s commoners, aggregated them and put them to new use. It revolutionised private property as a concept, largely introduced the concept of land as a commodity, and came to define the economic priorities of the last five hundred years. It catalysed the Industrial Revolution and English urbanisation. In terms of economic development, it was somewhat akin to the invention of the wheel, if rather more contentious.
Topic:
Economics, Capitalism, Enclosure, and Commons
Political Geography:
Europe and England

58. Germany’s Economic Security and Technology: Optimizing Export Control, Investment Screening and Market Access Instruments

Author:
Tyson Barker and David Hagebölling
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Technological development and increasingly fraught US-China competition have geopolitical consequences for technology access. The erosion of post-Cold War multilateral dual-use technology export control regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, and investment and other control frameworks have led to na-tional, EU, and ad hoc measures, such as the restrictions on Russian semiconductor access following the invasion of Ukraine. The German government must integrate technology access and control instruments – export controls, FDI screening, critical infrastructure access, research protection, and outbound investment– in its Digital Strategy and National Security Strategy. The former currently neglects critical technology access and control; the latter must address it comprehensively. German – and EU – dual-use export and FDI screening reforms have been updated and are now in place. Capacity building and alignment with EU and NATO partners now deserves greater attention. Measures could include more robust, institutionalized information-sharing and consultations on dual-use technology export, import, investment, and research controls in a Multilateral Technology Control Committee born out of the G7 or TTC. The commit-tee should also establish the capacity to deny end-user access to German technology through its own Foreign-Direct Product Rules and Entity List.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Science and Technology, Investment, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

59. A German Digital Grand Strategy: Integrating Digital Technology, Economic Competitiveness, and National Security in Times of Geopolitical Change

Author:
Tyson Barker and David Hagebölling
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
This report systematically outlines the state of play in digital policy and Berlin’s current policy approach. It provides 48 recommendations for strengthening Germany’s efforts to build a confident, high-performing European digital economy embedded in an open, democratic, and rules-based digital order.
Topic:
Economics, National Security, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

60. Don’t Get Caught in the Middle: A Geo-Economic Strategy for Germany to Survive US-Chinese Rivalry

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The economic fallout from the war in Ukraine has been very significant. The consequences of a war in East Asia involving the United States and China would be much worse. And even if a Sino-US military confrontation can be avoided, geo-economic conflict between the two powers is going to intensify. Washington will put increasing pressure on Germany and Europe to align their policies with Washington’s geo-economic strategy.
Topic:
Economics, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Germany, North America, and United States of America