Political Geography: Europe / Publication Year: within 5 Years / Topic: NATO

1. Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation: How Member States Matter

Author:: Pınar Atakara
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: “Understanding EU-NATO Cooperation: How Member States Matter” by Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters conducts a distinctly member-state based theoretical examination of interorganizational cooperation between the EU and NATO. Ewers-Peters mainly intends to demonstrate member states’ foreign/security policy orientations, roles and positions affecting the functionality and dys-functionality of Euro-Atlantic security, between the period of the end of the Cold War and 2021. The book is composed of seven chapters including conclusion and implications. By providing 28 face-to-face semi-structured interviews carried out in Berlin and Brussels between February 2017 and February 2018, with different member states’ representatives (see Appendix A.), as well as document analysis of primary and secondary sources, the book relies on well-designed qualitative research.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, European Union, and Book Review
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

2. Goodbye to Russia, Russia and Russia!1: Finland’s New NATO Chapter Within the Framework of Shelter Theory

Author:: Yeliz Kulali Martin
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: One significant impact on the international system of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has been Finland’s NATO membership. This article suggests that Baldur Thorhallsson’s shelter theory is the most suitable explanation for Finland’s decision. According to the theory, an alliance relationship with NATO will remedy the lack of hard security shelter of a state categorized as a small state in the literature. Many experts believe that this is a pragmatic choice by Finland against the Russian threat. On the other hand, Finland has a long history with Russia and is known for its neutral and peaceful policies, trying to establish a balance between East and West. For the above-mentioned reasons, membership in NATO is a much more difficult decision than it seems on the surface. In this framework, this article will first explain the place of Thorhallsson’s theory in International Relations. Then, Finland’s general foreign policy choices will be examined in light of current shelter relationships. Finally, in presenting the country’s history with NATO, it will focus on the potential consequences of the membership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Behavior, Russia-Ukraine War, Shelter Theory, Small States, and Hard Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Finland

3. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:: Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:: NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. WHY DEMOCRACIES AREN’T MORE RELIABLE ALLIANCE PARTNERS

Author:: Mark Nieman and Doug Gibler
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: ussia’s invasion of Ukraine set off a security spiral in Europe. Despite US President Biden’s pledge to “defend every inch of NATO territory,” Poland increased its military budget by a whopping 60 percent and asked to have US nuclear weapons based on its territory. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia also announced sizable defense increases, with Latvia re-instating compulsory military training. Why didn’t Biden’s pledge reassure these NATO members? Is the alliance’s famed Article 5 promise—that an attack on one member is an attack on all—a less than ironclad guarantee?
Topic:: NATO, Democracy, Alliance, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

5. How Sweden Can Use its EU Presidency to Build the Civilian Security Dimension of the Eastern Partnership

Author:: Michal Baranowski, Mikołaj Bronert, Maximilian Kaminski, and Elene Kintsurashvili
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) lacks a security dimension and this is an urgent reform need. In particular, the EU should become the leading provider of civilian security support in the EaP countries, particularly Ukraine. But significant weaknesses in this policy field inhibit its capability to do so. Sweden’s long-term focus on the EaP, its experience in augmenting domestic cyber and hybrid resilience as well as in placing the civilian aspect at the heart of its national security, and it its leading contribution to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions put it in a unique position to be a champion of the security dimension of the EaP during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Sweden can do so by pushing for: a EU-NATO memorandum of understanding on the EaP; the provision of a rapid financing mechanism to assist EaP countries in nonmilitary defense; a more coordinated training, planning, and implementing process for CSDP missions between EU actors and the EaP countries; a more targeted approach towards EaP countries; and prioritization of deepening of cooperation with EaP countries in the domain of hybrid threats.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Central Europe

6. Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: Concept, Ideology, Objectives, Means, Consequences

Author:: Plamen Pantev
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: The study tries to outline interim conclusions about the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the tools used by the Russian federation in this barbaric war of attrition against Ukraine – a war of a nuclear superpower against a smaller neighbouring country. The study does not aim to analyse the strange way the war is developing – Russians carry on military attacks in both a regular and terrorist manner 7 on the whole territory of Ukraine, while the Ukrainians are deterred to counter-attack the aggressor on the latter’s own territory and to fight with longer-range arms even on their own land. The author understands how many issues from the theoretic fields of international relations, foreign, security and defense studies need to be considered to understand in a holistic way the final result of the interaction of domestic Russian, international, political, economic, governance, psychological and other problems that led to launching an aggressive and devastating war in the European continent by Moscow. The purpose of the study is not to outline the avalanche of mistakes in the policy of the collective West towards a showing for decades signs of revenge imperialist Russia. Neither it aims to point to the multitude of military mistakes by the aggressor in the last year. The aim of the study is to outline and discuss the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the means of the Russian aggression. Revealing the Nazi-like behaviour of the Russian leadership and its armed forces could serve to construct the broader picture of the developing conflict and learn how to prevent a similar invasion by Moscow. The study aims to prove that the legal and moral consequences of the war will be the conviction of the aggressor for the genocide and the war crimes. This would be the only possibility for normalising the life of the Ukrainians and the Russians as well as of the broader international relations system.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, NATO, Imperialism, Sovereignty, European Union, Conflict, Ideology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. European Security and Defence: Don’t Get Your Hopes Up Just Yet

Author:: Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: “2022 will be the year of European defence”.[1] These were the words of European Council President Charles Michel in October 2021. When he gave his speech at the Charlemagne Prize Award Ceremony in Aachen, no one expected that his statement would materialise in the way it did. Yes, headway was to be expected with the adoption of the Strategic Compass and European countries demonstrating commitment to investing more in defence cooperation. Although there is still a world of difference between ambitions and reality, the degree of progress accomplished in the past twelve months was not foreseen.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Politics, European Union, and Institutions
Political Geography:: Europe

8. The War against Ukraine and Russia’s Position in Europe’s Security Order

Author:: Stephen Blank
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Russia’s aggressions against its neighbours since 2008 – first Georgia, then Ukraine twice – impel the urgent reconstruction of European security. While articulating a post-war European security order and Russia’s place there is easy, implementing it is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, in Ukraine, Russia has unilaterally, and unprovokedly, violated or broken at least eight major international treaties and accords, ranging from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, according to which Moscow had pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits nuclear threats against non-nuclear states.[1] It has also broken NATO’s (and especially Washington’s) conventional deterrence.[2]
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. Turkey vis-à-vis Russia’s War against Ukraine

Author:: Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Characterising Turkey’s policy towards Russia’s war on Ukraine is not an easy task. Elements of both support for Ukraine and neutrality have emerged in the past year. An analysis of the fundamentals of Turkey–US relations and Russia–Turkey relations is thus helpful.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

10. The War against Ukraine and Its Lessons for NATO Militaries: Food for Thought

Author:: Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: One year of full-fledged conventional war fought on the European continent between two large countries, including a nuclear power, is obviously a historical watershed for NATO and the whole Euro-Atlantic area, whose strategic implications are yet to be fully assessed. The conflict has already destroyed a number of expectations widely shared in Western Europe, including the ideas that Putin would not have invaded the whole of Ukraine, that Western sanctions would have paralysed his ability to wage a prolonged military campaign, or that Europeans would have diminished their military support to Ukraine over the first wartime winter. Given the ongoing “fog of war” and uncertainty about future scenarios, it is perhaps too early to identify lessons for allies and their militaries. Still, the following elements may be considered food for thought for the Western defence policy communities, cum grano salis.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

11. Reach for the Stars: Bridging Italy’s Potential in Space with Its Foreign and Security Policy

Author:: Karolina Muti
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Italian capabilities, expertise and potential in the space sector are not widely known. Among state actors, Rome has actually been a pioneer in the field, boasting a long tradition that started in 1964 when Italy became the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United States, to send a nationally manufactured satellite into orbit.[1] From an industrial standpoint, Italy is among the few countries whose companies cover the whole space value chain.[2] In Europe, Rome is ranked second for total number of assets in orbit and is currently the third contributor to the European Space Agency (ESA).[3] An Italian astronaut, Samantha Cristoforetti, has recently become the first European woman to take command of the International Space Station (ISS).[4]
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

12. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:: Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

13. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:: Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

14. Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China

Author:: Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Set against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the June 2022 Madrid NATO Summit set the tone for the next decade of the Alliance’s shared future. Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Allies laid out actions to be taken across the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Now the Alliance must implement those responses. Beijing will be watching closely.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

15. Erdoğan's Re-election as President Raises Concerns among Allies

Author:: Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s win in the presidential election and ministerial appointments promises to further weaken democracy, move Türkiye further away from EU standards, and continue so-called personal diplomacy and transactionalism in foreign policy. This could prolong the Turkish parliament’s ratification of Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Sweden

16. What is the Significance of Prigozhin's Revolt for Russian Security Policy?

Author:: Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: On the night of 23-24 June, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group private military company, which has been fighting in Ukraine and operating elsewhere, stood up to the Russian Ministry of Defence and began an armed march on Moscow. However, in the end he and his forces did not storm the capital, officially as a result of negotiations led by Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenka. Prigozhin’s actions will worsen the morale of Russian soldiers and mercenaries fighting in Ukraine but will not change Russia’s hostile actions towards NATO countries.
Topic:: NATO, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. China Adapts Policy in Response to Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China perceives the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expression of resistance to the U.S. and NATO hegemony and an important element of building a new international order that marginalises the West. Based on this, China is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, striving to weaken the international position of the U.S., the EU, and their partners, while testing reactions to a possible escalation of Chinese actions towards Taiwan, for example. President Xi Jinping expressed this policy course during his March visit to Russia. At the same time, China is trying to gain support from the countries of the Global South. This approach means a continuation of China’s assertive policy towards the European Union, among others.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

18. From East to North: New Frontiers for the EU-NATO Arctic Defence

Author:: Luca Cinciripini
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: After a geopolitical phase of peace and international cooperation, the Arctic is witnessing renewed military tensions, particularly between Russia, NATO, and European Union (EU) member countries. The multilateral governance that has so far governed the fate of the Arctic is being challenged by the confrontation between Russia and the West. In addition, climate warming opens up new trade routes. It provides access to immense deposits of raw materials, accelerating competition among actors partly by including external players such as China. To assess the future trajectory of European defense governance on the northern flank, it is necessary to view the Arctic and Baltic as a single region in light of common critical factors.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

19. Why Romania is a NATO "Model Ally?"

Author:: Petre Roman
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: NATO’s eastward expansion was a fundamental geopolitical process that allowed countries to be prepared for the worst, the Russian revanche, by pursuing the best, the most successful path for democracy. Romania, which emerged from the tremendous communist Ceausescu regime, strongly wanted NATO membership and, after the first encouraging meetings in 1990, officially entered in 2004. However, Romania has been already back then contributed to many Western missions. Due to its geographical position, Romania is central to all NATO objectives. Now, Romania and Poland are the pivots of NATO’s defensive complex in the “postsoviet space”: Poland protects the Baltic Sea, Romania the Black Sea, where the Russian old-imperial appetites remain; Romania still defends the precious grain corridor. Furthermore, Romania is a “model ally”. There is a solid pro-Atlantic and pro-American sentiment in the country.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe and Romania

20. Towards a Fuzzy World Order: What Role for NATO

Author:: Richard Higgott and Simon Reich
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Bi-polarity, multi-polarity, the end of globalization, or Cold War v. 2.0. New explanations of world order abound. Often, they are asserted rather than reasoned by pundits looking for their 15 minutes of fame. This paper is much more modest. It eschews grand statements about world order. Rather we demonstrate that the future is far less clear cut and predetermined. Yes, a global binary is emerging around U.S.-China competition, but it is what we describe as fuzzy bifurcation. If our analysis is accurate, then it affects the behavior of other actors differently than a tight bi-polar system. In this paper we look at the implications of a fuzzy bifurcation of world order for that most important of alliances – NATO.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

21. How to rebuild Europe’s security architecture?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine is overturning the European security order in place since the end of the Cold War. The Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), the 1992 Helsinki Summit, as well as the fragile acquis of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to build and maintain a system involving all countries of ‘Greater Europe’, including the Russian Federation. For at least two decades, Russia has expressed discomfort regarding its perceived status in a ‘concert of nations’ dominated, in its perception, by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Still referring to a conception of security based on spheres of influence, it has considered NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to its national security (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015, 15). “Only during ‘critical junctures’ – relatively rare watershed moments marked by rapid change and upheaval – are security architectures likely to be fundamentally reconfigured” (Hyde-Price, 2014, 105). The war in Ukraine is already listed as such a turning point in history. ln addition to continuing efforts to support Ukraine and stabilize the situation on the battlefield, the time seems ripe for an in-depth assessment of Europe’s security regime. Many might argue that it makes little sense to discuss architecture while the house is burning. I answer that it is our responsibility to stress our preparedness and explore all opportunities. Just increasing military expenditures cannot be the only option. We need a ‘Code of Conduct’ for the 21st Century that would allow no more – real or perceived - ‘security vacuums’. This is in no way intended to accept the Russian narrative. Even during the Cold War, European countries were able to progress in building a common security architecture through dialogue and negotiations. It was less than a month after the brutal military suppression of the Prague Spring by the Warsaw Pact States, in 1968, that the Finnish Government initiated the process that ended up in the Helsinki Final Act.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

22. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

23. Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China

Author:: Rob York, David Camroux, Kelly Grieco, and Bradley Jensen Murg
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order. As it approaches its one-year anniversary the outcome of the Ukraine war is still far from clear, as is precisely how the alliance will respond to the challenge that looms beyond it: the People’s Republic of China, with its growing military might, and its economic influence. And there is broad agreement on the appropriateness of the term “challenge”—the US Department of Defense, which calls Russia an “acute threat,” uses the noun “pacing challenge” to describe Beijing. Meanwhile NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept used the verb form, declaring the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The forcefulness of these words should not have come as a surprise: US partners in the European Union have been every bit as outspoken about human rights in China as Washington has, as well as against its “malicious cyber activities.” Differences in priority remain, informed by economics, history, and geography (especially considering how much more imminent a threat Russia represents to Europe than the United States), but opinions on both sides of the Atlantic have shifted regarding the PRC, and for many of the same reasons. That shift, and what policies should follow, is the subject of Pacific Forum’s edited volume “Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China” and its accompanying webinar. With a grant from the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Pacific Forum brought together three distinguished scholars—one to discuss the evolution of views toward the PRC in the United States over the past decade, one to chart the same change in Europe, and a third to discuss how the two sides should best work together in meeting this shared challenge. Describing the US position, Bradley Jensen Murg argues that increasing American skepticism of Beijing’s intentions is not, as is frequently argued, a unipolar action driven by the insecurity of one great power being replaced by another. Instead, he argues that it is a multifaceted evolution driven by generational change, increased awareness of the PRC’s human rights record, and the failure of international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization) to contribute to PRC liberalization. He further notes that the United States’ views on Beijing are no international outlier but are broadly shared, especially in Europe. Regarding the European perspective, David Camroux notes that the thinking shifted in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Once a destination for European investment the PRC, thanks to its rapid recovery from the crisis and growing domestic capacity, increased its own financial presence on the European continent, arousing increasing concerns. Subsequent revelations about Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and the suppression of Hong Kong’s protest movement further alienated Europe. He stresses, though, that Europe’s views will likely remain distinct from Washington’s to an extent—Europe does not consider Beijing a “hard security challenge” nor does it possess the hard security capabilities to meet them. Instead, it will continue minilateral engagement with regional powers such as Tokyo, Seoul, Delhi, and Canberra, to reduce dependency on the PRC in a non-confrontational way and avoid direct alignment with Washington in the emerging Great Power Competition. Concluding the edited volume, Kelly Grieco notes the increasing comity in US and EU positions regarding the PRC, but states that, as the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” NATO faces practical limitations in terms of projecting power in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than working to confront Beijing militarily, European countries’ most beneficial contribution to NATO would be to increase their security commitments in Europe—thus reducing the burden faced by the United States there—and to use their “diplomatic clout and economic, financial, and technological resources to form an effective coalition to balance against [PRC] power and influence.” Pacific Forum hopes that these scholarly insights will find a wide audience in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, and that NATO will remain an effective partnership—not to defend Euro-American hegemony and primacy, but the values that underpin the rules-based order and its promise of a fairer, more prosperous global community. Pacific Forum also hopes that, amid their shared defense of rules and values, NATO and its partners will find avenues for some cooperation with China—at the governmental and people-to-people level—and that people from China continue to feel welcome to work, study, and live in the United States and Europe. No one—American, European, Asian, or otherwise—should mistake our disputes with specific PRC policies and actions for antipathy toward the people of China.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and North America

24. The war in Ukraine: Adapting the EU’s security and defence policy

Author:: Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine is violating the rules-based international order and poses a significant threat to European security. The EU and NATO have responded by taking coordinated action. The measures taken have varied from unprecedented sanctions on Russia to assisting Ukraine with the delivery of arms and ammunition. The war in Ukraine has led to an even stronger focus on collective defence, which was already put in motion after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the European security architecture has witnessed a significant change with Finland (and later this year Sweden) joining the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Vilnius Summit (11-12 July 2023), NATO has taken new decisions to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture
Topic:: NATO, European Union, International Order, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. From “Forward Presence” to “Forward Defense”: Germany Must Strengthen NATO’s Northeastern Flank in Lithuania

Author:: Aylin Matlé
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Issues of deterrence and defense along NATO’s northeastern flank have been a greater focus of NATO members since the Russian attack on Ukraine began. Particularly in the Baltic States, there is a determination to protect every inch of the Alliance’s territory against a possible Russian attack. To prevent such a scenario, NATO is making military adjustments to which Germany will have to increase its contribution.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, Lithuania, and Germany

26. Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Until NATO Membership, Extending the Joint Expeditionary Force Is the Best Option

Author:: Benjamin Tallis
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: There are no security “guarantees,” but NATO membership is as close as it gets – and has long proven its effectiveness in deterring Russian aggression. It is thus the only real option for Ukraine – and for wider European security. Addressing the lack of political will to recognize this, especially in Washington and Berlin, means finding an interim solution that provides credible, collective security in the meantime and fosters more durable, fairly delivered European security in the long term.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

27. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:: Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

28. Incivility in Diplomacy as a Reflection of the Crisis in Foreign Policy Culture

Author:: V. Chumakov
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:: East View Information Services
Abstract:: The 2020s have been characterized by a profound crisis of confidence in international relations and world politics manifested in the use of political, psychological, and rhetorical methods and techniques that are atypical of traditional diplomatic practices and do not correspond to generally recognized norms of diplomatic protocol. Such manifestations include, for example, the use of unverified information and disinformation, the dissemination of deliberately false information (“fake news”), the unilateral disclosure of confidential face-to-face or telephone conversations to the media, and the publication of diplomatic correspondence not only as an unofficial translation but also as direct copies of informational documents (notes, letters, telegrams, and attachments to them). We also see the use of undiplomatic expressions (accusations, insults, namecalling, threats, blackmail, jokes) against counterpart or senior foreign or international officials, albeit primarily behind their backs, as well personal correspondence between such individuals on publicly available electronic mail services, instant messengers, and social networks.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, OSCE, New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

29. Prescription for Military Paralysis: Wartime Reactor Meltdowns (Occasional Paper 2305)

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: More than 15 months into the war, Russian attacks against Ukraine’s nuclear plants have yet to release any radiation. As the likelihood of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant reopening quickly declines and Putin’s desire to distract the world from his declining political and military standing increases, some experts fear he may want to induce a radiological release from the plant. In any case, Putin’s military assaults against the Zaporizhzhia plant have already set a worrying precedent. Last December, NPEC held a wargame, the results of which The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists just published, to examine what might happen in a future Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this reinvasion in 2037, Russia targets power reactors in Ukraine, Poland, and Romania. The United States plans to build scores of new reactors in these countries. What if Russian missiles targeted them in a future war? NPEC tapped the expertise of Ukrainians, Romanians, NATO officials, Poles, US security experts, and Hill staff to find out. It hosted five sessions over two weeks and ran a three-move wargame. The game’s play revealed how the uncertainties and dangers of military attacks against nuclear power plants can paralyze decision-making and fundamentally alter the course of wars. The military disruptions these uncertainties introduce may far outstrip the safety issues any reactor radiological release might otherwise present. The game’s play revealed three reasons why.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, War Games, Nuclear Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. NATO in the North: The emerging division of labour in Northern European security

Author:: Matti Pesu
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian war of aggression has rendered Northern Europe an increasingly significant region for Euro-Atlantic security. A stable and secure Northern Europe is a critical precondition for a safe and stable Euro-Atlantic region. The alliance should treat Northern Europe as a strategic whole although the different subareas of Northern Europe have their distinctive security dynamics and concerns. NATO is currently improving its deterrence and defence posture. It is simultaneously shifting its military strategy from a model of deterrence by reinforcement to one of deterrence by denial. NATO’s evolving posture and strategy in Northern Europe should be underpinned by a more explicit division of labour. The regional allies and stakeholders can be divided into four categories in terms of their role in regional security: frontline nations, hubs, security providers and the ultimate security guarantor. The regional frontline nations include the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, which can also play a role as hubs and even security providers along with the United Kingdom and Germany. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are first and foremost hubs. The United States remains the ultimate security guarantor of the area.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

31. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:: Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

32. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:: Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

33. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

34. British Nuclear Policy

Author:: Peter Watkins
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Nuclear deterrence has been a major pillar of British defence policy since the mid-1950s. The United Kingdom maintains a minimum, credible, independent strategic nuclear deterrent force, assigned to the defence of NATO. Its purpose is purely defensive: to deter the most extreme threats to the security of the UK and to that of her NATO allies. Potential adversaries must thus take into account the UK’s nuclear capabilities when facing UK conventional forces deployed as part of NATO’s forward deterrence and defence posture, not least the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia. The UK does not see a contradiction between cooperation with allies and having an “independent” deterrent – its nuclear force is operationally independent and only the UK Prime Minister can authorise the use of the UK’s nuclear weapons, even as part of a wider NATO response. Today, the Soviet Union is gone – yet a weaker but more dangerous Russia as well as an increasingly powerful China create a potential “two peer” nuclear challenge. The UK is currently renewing its nuclear deterrent as the existing capability is aging – but continues to seek opportunities for multilateral nuclear disarmament as the strategic circumstances allow. In light of the international security environment, the 2021 change to the warhead ceiling reflected that. But the UK needs to ask itself whether bigger changes will be needed for the future.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and Estonia

35. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation

Author:: Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

36. NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region

Author:: Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO has paid much less attention to global security issues, such as China’s potentially menacing activities in the Indo-Pacific region. But there too, the deteriorating geopolitical environment calls for NATO to take a stronger cooperative and consultative role. This brief explores why NATO is deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific partners. It discusses both NATO’s and individual Allies’security concerns in the region and compares them with those of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (the AP4).1 It also outlines the development of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships with the AP4 as part of its cooperative security agenda, from the early 2000s to the present day. Finally, it considers how NATO’s cooperative security dialogue is likely to develop in the future and what might be expected at the forthcoming Vilnius Summit.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Strategic Planning, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

37. Military Command and Control

Author:: Gintaras Bagdonas
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO's current military Command and Control (C2) structure was designed for forces engaged in crisis management and expeditionary operations, not territorial defence. It will thus not be suitable for implementing NATO’s new regional defence plans, or for building credible deterrence and defence. A new military C2 structure that clarifies the geographical areas of responsibility of the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and treats the Baltic Sea region as indivisible is needed. NATO must also improve C2 at the tactical level through the establishment of tactical- (component-) level commands, perhaps building upon the existing corps headquarters. The Baltic states, meanwhile, are establishing divisional structures which will further develop their military capabilities and give them new opportunities to act with Allies under corps command. They may, however, face challenges in implementing these ambitious plans due to a shortage of resources.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Military, and Command and Control
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

38. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:: Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

39. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. Defence Spending

Author:: Margarita Šešelgytė
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted Europe’s military weakness. But the changes to threat assessments that followed Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion have also created an opportunity for European Allies to reassess their defence spending. If they are serious about defence, they will need to address the impact of decades of persistent underinvestment, not least because higher defence spending will be key to the credibility of the new defence plans to be agreed at the Vilnius Summit. Allies should thus review and revise their defence investment pledge. If they do not do this now, it will be more difficult once the war in Ukraine ends.
Topic:: NATO, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

41. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

42. The Wagner Group’s Expanding Global Footprint

Author:: Raphael Parens, Colin P. Clarke, Christopher Faulkner, and Kendal Wolf
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: 1. The sanctions discussion needs to be expanded, as such designations should aim to shame Wagner’s state partners. 2. Sanctions lists should expand to include actors in third-party countries, such as Broker Expert LLC, a Russian-owned company widely reported to be shipping heavy machinery to support Wagner Group forestry activities in CAR, and First Industrial Company, a business owned by Wagner operator Dimitri Sytyi which concocts cheap “Russian” alcohol in Cameroon and sells it in CAR. 3. Perhaps one of the more important lessons for countering Wagner and other Russian PMCs is the importance of multilateralism. 4. NATO must also continue to consider proactive tools to counter Russian and other PMCs. 5. NATO should work to amplify efforts to push the adoption of the 2008 Montreux Document—an international agreement designed to reaffirm the legal obligations of states where PMCs originate and for those who hire them. 6. The Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs require consideration within a larger great power discussion, particularly as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has firmly aligned Europe and the US against Russia. 7. US senior leaders should demonstrate a greater diplomatic commitment to African allies and put pressure on other African leaders considering, or currently contracting, the Wagner Group and other Russian PMC operations. 8. International bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and the East African Community (EAC) should reevaluate their approaches to peacekeeping and instability. 9. Exploiting the friction between Wagner’s financier and the MoD should also be considered a worthwhile policy option. 10. Last, NATO members must formalize methods of blocking contact with the Wagner Group through their international activities.
Topic:: NATO, Sanctions, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

43. Why the West Should Stick with Conventional Arms Control in Europe for Now

Author:: Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez and Alexander Graef
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: After Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) formally enters into force on November 7, 2023, the remaining twenty-nine member states need to decide whether they want to keep the Treaty or dissolve it for good. The CFE Treaty no longer corresponds to the present state of European security, but its transparency and verification regime can still provide limited security advantages for NATO members and strengthen deterrence. A formal dissolution of the Treaty would undermine Western normative commitments to military transparency. In the long run, it could lead to a loss of expertise on how to conduct inspections and information exchange, which might become relevant again in the context of ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Topic:: NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

44. Seven Ways to Deepen NATO-Ukraine Relations at the Vilnius Summit

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: NATO will hold a major summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, from July 11 to 12, and Ukraine will undoubtedly be a top agenda item. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba recently said that the summit should present “a clear plan on when and how Ukraine will enter [NATO].” Meanwhile, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that “there is no alternative to Ukraine's accession to NATO.” With expectations high, NATO leaders and policymakers need to start developing a plan to keep Ukraine on the path to eventual membership while deepening NATO-Ukraine relations. With some creative thinking and political will, the summit could serve NATO’s interests and meet the Ukrainian government’s reasonable and understandable expectations.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

45. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine

Author:: Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

46. How Would Europe Defend Itself?

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Achieving greater European defensive autonomy is unlikely to be quick or easy. While there are alternatives, adapting NATO to this end is arguably the most realistic path. Pointing out the significant challenges to European defensive autonomy should not be construed as an endorsement of the status quo. Contending demands for limited U.S. military resources in Asia and elsewhere augur a reduced U.S. role in NATO regardless of Europe’s capacity to defend itself. Given current deficiencies with European capabilities and the failure of many NATO members to meet basic funding obligations, significant spending increases are likely needed to actualize greater independent European military capabilities. Smaller coalitions within NATO could achieve more effective solutions at the regional level, as opposed to trying to achieve full defensive autonomy among all 29 European members. In particular, defense of the Nordic-Baltic region could be an important test case. Nuclear issues will be particularly difficult to navigate. Reliance on either British or French nuclear forces as NATO’s primary deterrent comes with important challenges. Likewise, retaining the U.S. nuclear umbrella absent U.S. ground forces in Europe could prove unworkable. Russia’s capacity to rebound long term and pose a more robust threat to Europe should not be discounted. This underscores the importance of working through the difficult issues associated with European defensive autonomy in the current strategic window of Russian weakness.1
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

47. Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has put military mobility on top of the EU and NATO agendas. The return of traditional military threats and a renewed interest in territorial defence call for greater attempts to eliminate obstacles preventing armed forces from swiftly moving across EU borders. This Policy Brief maps the actions taken at the EU level to develop military mobility over the past years, with emphasis on the EU Action Plan 2.0. It identifies and analyses current EU objectives, outlines key challenges, and provides recommendations to enhance military mobility in Europe. Several challenges are analysed by the author, which should be urgently addressed by the EU and the member states, especially in relation to the Action Plan 2.0. These include limited funding for dual-use transport infrastructure projects at the EU level, administrative and regulatory barriers, and the lack of political will in the member states to enhance military mobility. Furthermore, the paper provides a SWOT Analysis of military mobility in Europe and the following recommendations are put forward: The commitment to advancing military mobility needs to be long-term. Military mobility needs to be complemented by a civilian dimension. EU member states should urgently prioritise developing military mobility plans. Undergo a lessons-learned process from the movement of military equipment in the context of EU and allies’ support to Ukraine. Regions and cities’ network of exchanges at the European level should include discussions on funding and dual-use infrastructure. Consider setting up an EU-NATO Centre of Excellence dedicated to military mobility in Europe.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. Soldiers out, civilians left behind: EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: This is the introduction to a three-part Report that reviews the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. Even if Europe’s security debate has moved on to this bigger and more pressing challenge, the EU must heed the lessons from Kabul as it reviews its crisis management architecture and implements the Strategic Compass. The exact conditions of the Afghanistan evacuation might not be seen again for many years. Still, the EU must consider a range of other scenarios: European soldiers or citizens in danger needing evacuation from failing states or war zones, military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or even short-term stability support to governments and initial entry missions. This requires a commitment to, and building of, EU rapid deployment capacities that are effectively ready to be used, associated with appropriate crisis management structures for EU decision-making. These are the questions that have interested this project, whose examination is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:: Security, NATO, and European Union
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Europe, and South Asia

49. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 2 – Critical factors in the failure to prepare for evacuation

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: The EU has yet to engage in a comprehensive ex-post evaluation of the factors of failure ahead of and during the critical summer months in 2021. By failing to deal with the past, one also does not learn about the future. Building on the preceding chapter’s analysis of the events leading up to and during the evacuation of Kabul, this paper identifies three main factors in the West’s Kabul fiasco: a collective failure of anticipation, NATO groupthink and dependence on the US, and the absence of European will and capabilities. This is the second Paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:: NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, Crisis Management, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Europe

50. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat

Author:: Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden

51. Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its nuclear rhetoric has become more permissive, more inconsistent, and more instrumental. Russia has also placed greater emphasis on military exercises involving nuclear-capable weapons, and it has altered policies and planning for its nuclear forces. Although it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions as the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the lessons that Russia draws from it uncertain, the changes in Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons since its invasion suggest that Russia is likely to adopt a more assertive nuclear force posture, especially with respect to its non-strategic nuclear weapons, in order to signal that the country will no longer be a status quo power and increase the credibility of its nuclear threats. Russia is also likely to increase its efforts to test NATO cohesion—potentially through greater nuclear provocations and/or by signaling an insincere willingness to engage in forms of arms control or cooperative threat reduction—and continue to look for opportunities to leverage nuclear weapons to signal great-power status. In a future war with NATO, Russia would likely perceive the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, either to seek victory against superior NATO conventional forces through nuclear first use on the battlefield, or to prevent defeat by those NATO forces. Moreover, since 2022, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. and Russian policymakers to discern each other’s red lines, raising the risk of unintended escalation. Heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric at home could also alter the public’s views of acceptable nuclear use, eroding a potential constraint on Kremlin decision-making. Finally, changes since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate both reduced Russian commitment to nonproliferation as its image increasingly becomes that of a rogue actor in international affairs, and diminished opportunities for nuclear arms control, for now.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

52. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: One Year On

Author:: LSE Ideas
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update summarises a roundtable discussion held at LSE IDEAS in July 2023. Contributors to the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Stuart Austin, Professor Gordon Barrass, Professor Christopher Coker, Tom McKane, Hugh Sandeman, Susan Scholefield, and Peter Watkins. None of the content of the Strategic Update is attributable to any one individual. One year on from NATO’s Madrid 2022 summit, this Strategic Update address the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and its implications for the future, especially regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. The paper addresses the misalignment between preparations for defence and the real state of its armed forces, the UK’s symbolic support for Ukraine versus its capability, the concepts of resilience and deterrence, and finally the future of NATO’s relationship with Russia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

53. The Energy Crisis Requires a Military Solution that Compels NATO to Spend like Estonia

Author:: Leon Hartwell and Guillemette Guicherd
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In this LSE IDEAS Strategic Update, the authors focus on the intimate relationship between the Russia-Ukraine war and the energy crisis, both for Ukraine and the rest of Europe. It is argued that although Western sanctions against Russia’s energy sector have been a welcome political statement, they have so far been inadequate. Moreover, in the absence of expanding Ukraine’s defence systems, supplying the country with critical equipment to rebuild its energy sector while it is under constant Russian bombardment has limited impacts. Consequently, the authors argue that to solve the energy crisis, both for Ukraine and the rest of Europe, NATO and its allies need to “spend like Estonia.” Spending like Estonia would, among others, entail ramping up support for Ukraine to 1.1% of each member state’s GDP. Such an approach could help Ukraine to decisively win the war in 2023, and it would help to avert a potential energy crisis during the next winter. 
Topic:: NATO, Crisis Management, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Estonia

54. Vladimir Putin’s Mistrust of the West Runs Deep

Author:: Andrew Goodman
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: While most Western analysts and commentators place responsibility for the war in Ukraine squarely on Vladimir Putin, a few contend that NATO’s enlargement provoked the Russian invasion. Based on my personal interactions with Putin while serving as a U.S. diplomat in St Petersburg in the 1990s, I would argue that a collision between the West and a revisionist Russia led by Putin was virtually inevitable.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. Ending Wars: When Does Diplomacy Have a Role?

Author:: Raymond F. Smith
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: American Diplomacy
Institution:: American Diplomacy
Abstract:: When, whether and under what conditions to enter into negotiations to end the war in Ukraine is one of the thorniest international issues of the moment. My objective in this article is to look briefly at the role diplomacy has played, or not played, in ending several of the most destructive wars in European history and then to explore what role it might play in ending the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

56. Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

57. Revisiting the Global Posture Review: A New U.S. Approach to European Defense and NATO in a Post-Ukraine War World

Author:: Maxwell Stewart
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article revisits the 2021 Global Posture Review’s determination for a status quo European force posture in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Considering the poor Russian performance and attrition in the war, and the likely frozen conflict that will emerge, the article lays out the process by which the United States can draw down its permanent presence in Europe to refocus on the Pacific and restructure its relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all while maintaining alliance unity. The article has two main recommendations. The first is a time line for a reduced U.S. force posture in Europe from the present to 2035 while placing more emphasis on a European role in NATO leadership. The second is focused on how to maintain strategic flexibility while reassuring NATO allies of U.S. commitment. It then identifies and provides mitigations for the anticipated risks associated with the recommendations.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Rebalancing
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

58. Intermediate Force Capabilities: Countering Adversaries across the Competition Continuum

Author:: Peter Dobias and Kyle Christensen
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article outlines the relevance of intermediate force capabilities as a key enabler for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the gray zone.1 NATO adversaries, well aware of the NATO thresholds for employment of lethal force, intentionally operate in a way that limits the alliance’s options in crisis and conflict situations. At present, these options are often restricted to two extremes of mere presence or the use of lethal force. Summarizing almost two decades of NATO research into nonlethal/intermediate force capabilities, the article examines the applicability of these capabilities across the competition continuum. Finally, the article makes two key observations. First, it identifies future modeling and simulation requirements to represent employment of intermediate force capabilities, and second, it identifies possible promising research and development of subdomains in directed energy nonlethal weapons.
Topic:: NATO, Military Affairs, Gray Zone, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

59. Future-proofing EU security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Stefania Benaglia, and Linus Vermeulen
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Russia’s war against Ukraine has led policymakers to re-prioritise the European security architecture and the EU’s neighbourhood, including a positive reassessment of NATO’s role as a reliable security provider. As the transatlantic relationship and the Indo-Pacific are inherently intertwined, this once again highlights the imperative of the EU making the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority. This presents the EU with an opportunity to project its values, interests and power, though hampered at present by political infighting and the mushrooming of conflicts in and around Europe. Still, the time has come for the EU to assess how it should adjust its approach to Indo-Pacific security. How can the EU effectively strike a balance in security and defence cooperation with partners to uphold key principles of international law and order without endorsing the idea that ‘might makes right’ in the Indo-Pacific?
Topic:: Security, NATO, International Cooperation, International Law, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe and Indo-Pacific

60. European Security, Eurasian Crossroads?

Author:: Zachary Paikin and Christos Katsioulis
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The NATO summit in Vilnius taking place from 11 to 12 July 2023 marks another step towards deepening the relationship between Ukraine and the collective West. When paired with the EU’s reinvigorated enlargement process, there is a growing tendency to assume that Washington and Brussels can – or even must – set the terms of the European security order without input from Moscow. However, in a world of ‘mega-regions’ and competing visions of international order, cooperative security remains relevant if the EU wishes to salvage some degree of rules-based order in the space that connects Europe with Eurasia. As first steps in this direction, the EU should work to keep the OSCE operational, launch a limited dialogue with Belarus on arms control, and envision a future for the European Political Community that someday includes Russia.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and International Order
Political Geography:: Europe and Eurasia

61. Net spills among NATO allies: Theory and empirical evidence from dynamic quantile connectedness

Author:: Panagiotis Palaios, Anna Triantafillou, and George Andrew Zombanakis
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: The paper draws on the economic theory of alliances to stress the importance of considering both benefits and costs arising from the 0interaction between member states of a military alliance in terms of defence expenditure on equipment. We expand the theory of alliances to incorporate the spills that stem from the obligations of each ally by introducing the notion of spill-outs and net spills, the latter measured as the difference between spill-in and spill-out effects. To assess the net spills contribution of each of the members to the alliance, we test for empirical evidence of net spills among a group of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, applying time-varying Dynamic Quantile Connectedness analysis. The results that stem from our model considering the cost of spill-outs suggest that there are strong incentives among the allies for free-riding behaviour. In line with our theoretical model, our empirical analysis shows that it is only during crisis period that NATO member-states contribute actively to the alliance, something that has become increasingly clear since the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:: NATO, International Security, Alliance, Economic Security, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

62. Introduction to Special Issue on Navigating NATO dynamics: Addressing various challenges in the international security environment

Author:: Bert Chapman, Jarosław Gryz, and George Andrew Zombanakis
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:: War Studies University
Abstract:: As the international security environment undergoes significant changes, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) capacity to adapt shows how alliances can evolve from focusing on military defence to encompassing a wider spectrum of regional security challenges in an integrated manner. Russia’s violation of international law in 2014, followed by the war in Ukraine, has drawn the attention of NATO to the fact that apart from diplomatic measures, there might be a need to resort to more dynamic means in order to safeguard its members’ interests, especially when the security of the alliance’s eastern flank is threatened. NATO’s evolving role in the international security landscape reflects the alliance’s strategic adaptation to contemporary geopolitical challenges. The 2022 Strategic Concept embodies this change, emphasising NATO’s primary purpose of ensuring collective defence through a comprehensive approach focused on deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security (Calmels, 2020; North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2022). This change occurs within a complex geopolitical context, further complicated by evolving public opinion. For example, recent trends in the United States, particularly among younger Republican congressional representatives, reveal evolving attitudes towards the support for Ukraine. With growing disapproval of President Biden’s management of the Ukraine crisis, and varying opinions on the level and duration of support for Ukraine, it is evident that public sentiment is divided and evolving (Cerda, 2023; Langer, 2023). These findings reveal the complexity of the US involvement in the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the need for policymakers to consider these diverse viewpoints when shaping the future foreign policy decisions. The shifts in public opinion can also have significant implications for the ongoing conflict (Fisher, 2020), which is expected to continue for an extended period. This dynamic international security situation and shift in public opinion have set the stage for the ongoing challenges that NATO member states face in addressing the war in Ukraine. Consequently, there has been a significant surge in literature exploring these issues, examining them in terms of geopolitics, economics, and even psychology. Thoroughly investigating complex conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, requires an integrative research approach, drawing on multiple research sources, including scholarly journal articles, government information resources from multiple democratic countries and international organisations, datasets, public policy research institute materials, multiple social media platforms, and public opinion polls. Researchers must navigate the strengths and weaknesses inherent in these resources while adopting an interdisciplinary methodology to comprehensively analyse these events.
Topic:: NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, Hybrid Warfare, Adaptation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

63. “It is high time to light up Europe’s stars again”

Author:: Paolo Levi
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: You grew up in Rome and have lived in Paris for several years, you are Italian and resolutely proEuropean. How do you reconcile these different identities? My three identities, Roman because in my country you are first and foremost linked to your city, but also Italian and European, are completely complementary. They are the same roots, the same culture that I find everywhere. In Paris everything speaks to me of Rome and in Rome everything speaks to me of Athens; when I see the Madeleine church I think of the Parthenon and the temples that were later built in Italy. There are, of course, differences between us, but these differences are our wealth because they are based on a foundation of common values. It is the same civilisational movement that began with Plato and has been passed down to us; you cannot sing the praises of Rabelais without knowing Dante, you cannot sing the praises of Kant without knowing Plato. I have been fortunate enough to travel a lot in Europe and I have seen that what unites us is much more important than what divides us. It is up to us to carry the message of Simone Veil who, after having lived through the horror of the camps, made the choice of Franco-German reconciliation and of European hope. With Putin’s war, the ideal of the European Union - «never again war» - is in now jeopardy. We cannot remain indifferent: it is up to each of us to defend the values that that are ours. The twelve stars of the European Union must show us the way.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Italy

64. Countering Terrorism on Tomorrow’s Battlefield: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 2)

Author:: Sarah J. Lohmann, Lucas M. Cox, Denise Feldner, Trevor P. Helmy, and Katherine L. Kuzminski
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Every day, malicious actors target emerging technologies and medical resilience or seek to wreak havoc in the wake of disasters brought on by climate change, energy insecurity, and supply-chain disruptions. Countering Terrorism on Tomorrow’s Battlefield is a handbook on how to strengthen critical infrastructure resilience in an era of emerging threats. The counterterrorism research produced for this volume is in alignment with NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept, which details how NATO Allies can transform and maintain their advantage despite new threats for the next two decades. The topics are rooted in NATO’s Seven Baseline requirements, which set the standard for enhancing resilience in every aspect of critical infrastructure and civil society. As terrorists hone their skills to operate lethal drones, use biometric data to target innocents, and take advantage of the chaos left by pandemics and natural disasters for nefarious purposes, NATO forces must be prepared to respond and prevent terrorist events before they happen. Big-data analytics provides potential for NATO states to receive early warning to prevent pandemics, cyberattacks, and kinetic attacks. NATO is perfecting drone operations through interoperability exercises, and space is being exploited by adversaries. Hypersonic weapons are actively being used on the battlefield, and satellites have been targeted to take down wind farms and control navigation. This handbook is a guide for the future, providing actionable information and recommendations to keep our democracies safe today and in the years to come.
Topic:: NATO, Climate Change, Terrorism, Infrastructure, Elections, Drones, Pandemic, Resilience, Supply Chains, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

65. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)

Author:: Carl V. Evans, Chris Anderson, Malcom Baker, Ronald Bearse, and Salih Biçakci
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: In 2014 NATO’s Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) launched the inaugural course on “Critical Infrastructure Protection Against Terrorist Attacks.” As this course garnered increased attendance and interest, the core lecturer team felt the need to update the course in critical infrastructure (CI) taking into account the shift from an emphasis on “protection” of CI assets to “security and resiliency.” What was lacking in the fields of academe, emergency management, and the industry practitioner community was a handbook that leveraged the collective subject matter expertise of the core lecturer team, a handbook that could serve to educate government leaders, state and private-sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, academicians, and policymakers in NATO and partner countries. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency is the culmination of such an effort, the first major collaborative research project under a Memorandum of Understanding between the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), and NATO COE-DAT. The research project began in October 2020 with a series of four workshops hosted by SSI. The draft chapters for the book were completed in late January 2022. Little did the research team envision the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February this year. The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, successive missile attacks against Ukraine’s electric generation and distribution facilities, rail transport, and cyberattacks against almost every sector of the country’s critical infrastructure have been on world display. Russian use of its gas supplies as a means of economic warfare against Europe—designed to undermine NATO unity and support for Ukraine—is another timely example of why adversaries, nation-states, and terrorists alike target critical infrastructure. Hence, the need for public-private sector partnerships to secure that infrastructure and build the resiliency to sustain it when attacked. Ukraine also highlights the need for NATO allies to understand where vulnerabilities exist in host nation infrastructure that will undermine collective defense and give more urgency to redressing and mitigating those fissures.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Alliance, Crisis Management, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

66. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:: Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

67. The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Grace Hwang
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: NATO countries have already provided massive amounts of military aid to Ukraine, deployed additional forces to support the NATO countries that share a border with Russia, improved the Alliance’s ability to rapidly deploy forces forward in a crisis, and worked with key powers like Poland to strengthen its capabilities. NATO has accepted Finland and Sweden as future members of the Alliance, and it has made numerous other short-term adjustments to its force posture that enhance its deterrence and defense capabilities. NATO faces a future, however, where it cannot predict how much territory Ukraine will lose and where it must now view Russia as an ongoing major threat at virtually every level from the limited conventional threats Russia poses to the NATO countries on its border to the major increases in its threat of strategic nuclear forces. NATO cannot continue to treat Russia as a potential partner, and that seems to be an unlikely path forward so long as Putin or anyone like him is in power. NATO also cannot ignore the rise in China’s military and economic power or the prospects of closer Russian and Chinese strategic cooperation. The challenge NATO faces goes far beyond Ukraine. The days in which NATO countries could keep taking peace dividends by cutting their forces, failing to modernize, and failing to adopt new forces of tactics and interoperability are over. NATO cannot deal with the Russian threat in terms of half-measures or by continuing to focus on empty and virtually meaningless force goals like spending 2% of national GDP on defense and 20% of defense expenditure on equipment. NATO needs to act now to look far beyond the short-term priorities of the Ukraine conflict. It needs to revitalize its entire force planning progress. It needs to create effective levels of deterrence and defense capability, while it modernizes its forces to deal with radically new requirements like joint all-domain operations (JADO), emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), new precision-strike capabilities, changes in air and missile warfare and defense, and the revival of Russian naval power and the growth of a Chinese blue-water navy. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy has prepared a report, entitled, The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise, that examines how NATO must approach an effective force planning exercise that can give its new strategy real meaning. This report documents the pointless character of NATO’s present emphasis on burdensharing, and it examines the real-world shifts in spending and forces in NATO since 2014, as well as how these changes have affected the national forces in given sectors of Europe.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

68. WHO ATTACKED MONTENEGRO? THE MORAL AND STRATEGIC HAZARDS OF MISASSIGNING BLAME

Author:: Erica Lonergan and Maggie Smith
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: A few weeks ago, Montenegro—a NATO member—was hit with a cyber attack that targeted government servers. Montenegro’s outgoing Prime Minister, Dritan Abazovic, initially hedged about potential responsibility for the attack, stating on August 26: “We do not have clear information about the organizers… Security sector authorities couldn’t confirm that there is an individual, a group, a state behind [the attack].” Nevertheless, later that same day officials from Montenegro’s national intelligence agency attributed the attack to Russia. They also implied that the attack was related to Montenegro’s support for Ukraine and push for membership in the European Union. Yet, the extent of Russian involvement in the cyber attack remains ambiguous, which poses significant political and strategic challenges.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, Montenegro, and United States of America

69. MANAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RIVALS

Author:: Elizabeth Radziszewski and Jeremy Berkowitz
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Sweden’s and Finland’s recent decisions to join NATO marked a historic moment for the two Nordic states known for their neutrality. The move not only reflects evolving security concerns about Russia’s aggression in Ukraine but marks a shift that is set to end decades of accommodation toward Russia. It also sheds light on a broader question about why some rival countries—or those that have a history of tensions—sustain policies of accommodation over the years, and what pushes them to abandon such policies. Why would Sweden and Finland refrain from alienating Russia for years only to break suddenly with this tradition with their unprecedented decision to apply for NATO membership?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Asia, Spain, North Africa, Sweden, Morocco, and United States of America

70. Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?

Author:: Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew "BINCS" Zublic
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone operations are underway, and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine. In this effort, Russia’s playbook will test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter further Russian aggression.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and Baltic States

71. EU Security and Defence After Ukraine

Author:: Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The first brief looks at the Union’s immediate response to the war: its direct assistance to Ukraine and its sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Belarus

72. EU Defence After Ukraine: Denmark’s CSDP U-Turn

Author:: Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The final brief looks at Denmark’s decision to abandon its opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy which, while not as significant as Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO, will bring greater strategic coherence to northern Europe.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

73. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy

Author:: Kristi Raik
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

74. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Kremlin’s Aims and Assumptions

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The first brief in a new series “Russia’s War in Ukraine” discusses Russia’s war aims. These are not limited to the destruction of Ukraine’s statehood, or even of the Ukrainian nation, its culture and language, but include altering Europe’s security architecture by undermining NATO and the European Union. Kalev Stoicescu, Research Fellow at the ICDS, also examines Russia’s extensive preparations domestically and abroad (versus Ukraine, the West, and China), and evaluates where Russia’s assumptions were right and wrong, as proved by the course of events after 24 February 2022. Stoicescu concludes that Vladimir Putin’s regime has an inclination for miscalculation and apparently an appetite for future adventures. The risks are thus far from over.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Organization, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

75. Baltic Perspectives on Germany’s Role in NATO

Author:: Justinas Juozaitis
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In the second brief in our “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States” series, Justinas Juozaitis considers Germany’s contribution to NATO from a Baltic perspective and looks at what might change under Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Germany’s contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, including in the Baltic region, is substantial, but does not match what might be expected given its economic strength. The Bundeswehr already struggles to meet its commitments to the Alliance and recent increases in the defence budget have not translated into major improvements in capability. Germany will most likely not meet in full the promises it has made to enhancing collective defence. Even then, the new government will have to face decisions that will be unpopular with the public, and within their own coalition. Germany’s continued political support for deterrence in the Baltic region will likely continue, but its own military contribution will probably be smaller than promised.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Economy, Regional Integration, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

76. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

77. The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape

Author:: Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine is poised to bring into being a new European security order. Although the last eight months have been full of surprises, that new order may very well be marked by unstable standoffs, buildups, and dangerous activities and incidents between both Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Ukraine’s Western backers. These will risk ever more dangerous crises, all with the threat of nuclear war looming. The last eight years of military deployments, near-simultaneous exercises, and other proximate activities by Russia and NATO offer some hints as to what this future may look like. These, notably, were undertaken not to prevent an escalation in Ukraine but to deter NATO from attacking Russia and vice versa. During this time, discussions about a return to conventional arms control in Europe to mitigate the dangers of military activities gained little traction with policymakers, and the agreements and arrangements that had been in place continued to deteriorate and dwindle. In late 2021, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the West offered Russia a return to conventional arms control solutions. Russia countered with demands that NATO return to its 1990s-era force posture and eschew any further enlargement, and then proceeded to roll its tanks into Ukraine. During the tense months prior to Russia’s invasion, the conventional arms control mechanisms that remained, such as the Vienna Document, made it possible to call out Russia’s buildup, but not reverse it or prevent attack. Although there is little logic and less appetite for new arms control deals now, an end to fighting in Ukraine will create new imperatives to make Europe safer than it is today. While sanctions can limit Russian capacity to some extent, they may well be inadequate to prevent substantial buildups. For this reason, NATO members and their partners should be thinking in advance about how they could limit Russian capabilities via negotiated arrangements with robust verification measures and repercussions for violations. Once the shooting stops in Ukraine, deals such as these could make a more secure Europe, bolstered by more reliable deterrence, attainable.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

78. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:: Rajan Menon
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

79. NATO Should Defend Europe, Not Pivot to Asia

Author:: Jan Gerber
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: In 2021, the U.K., France, and Germany deployed 21 naval ships to the Indo-Pacific with a stated aim of helping the U.S. shoulder the burden of collective security and sustaining the “rules-based international order.” Naval deployments by the U.K., France, and Germany are symbolic and unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia. A European pivot to the Indo-Pacific draws scarce attention and resources away from defense issues in Europe. Instead of encouraging Asian forays, the U.S. should encourage its European allies to assume primary responsibility for European security, freeing the United States to focus on the Pacific, if needed.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, France, Germany, and Indo-Pacific

80. To Prevent War and Secure Ukraine, Make Ukraine Neutral

Author:: Stephen W. Van Evera
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The U.S.-NATO-Russia-Ukraine crisis could be resolved by a grand bargain among the parties that defines Ukraine as a neutral state. Neutrality deals worked well in the past to forestall Franco-British conflict over Belgium in the 1830s and East-West conflict over Finland and Austria in the Cold War. The Belgian, Finnish, and Austrian neutrality deals enhanced the security of the states they made neutral. Neutrality was an asset for Belgium, Finland, and Austria, not a handicap. Major powers never calmly accept the close approach to their borders of unfriendly powers or alliances. Russia is no exception. It will not accept a settlement that leaves open the possibility of Ukraine in NATO or NATO in Ukraine. Hence, a neutrality solution is both sufficient and necessary to resolve the current crisis. Ukraine is not worth a costly confrontation for the U.S. Hence, U.S. leaders should be open to compromise. If compromise proves elusive, the U.S. should not pay high costs or run large risks to impose a deal on its terms, as it has higher priorities at home and elsewhere.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

81. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:: Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

82. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:: Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

83. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe

84. Stabilizing the European Continent Reflections on the Future of EU Enlargement

Author:: Jean De Ruyt
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Since the decision to accept Croatia as a candidate member in 2011, the debate in the European Union about its enlargement has been rather subdued. But in 2022, after the bloody invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops, the new European security architecture that the EU (and NATO) tried to build after the end of the cold war has been profoundly shaken. We thought we could manage our ambiguous relationship with Russia and the European members of the ex-Soviet Union through dialogue and economic partnerships. We underestimated the urgency of stabilizing the Western Balkans through EU accession. After membership was offered to Croatia, gestures have been made – more bureaucratic than political – to negotiate the accession of other Western Balkan countries. But ‘enlargement fatigue’ fast developed – ignoring the fact that Russia and China were growing as non-democratic competitors and that Turkey was drifting out of the Western values system. Time has come now to redraw the map. The EU, NATO and the G7 reacted to the Russian aggression in Ukraine with a spectacular show of unity. In the European Council of June 24, 2022, candidate status has been offered to Ukraine and Moldova as well as a membership perspective to Georgia, and a meeting with the leaders of all Balkan countries has revived their hope for a reinvigoration of their own accession. Even if the war in Ukraine is still ongoing, it is time to prepare public opinion in the EU to this new approach to enlargement policy – starting with the fulfilment of the promises we made to the Western Balkans countries as early as in 2003 at the Thessaloniki summit. Looking also where the enlargement of the EU should end, in order to restore as best as possible ‘stability’ on the continent, the aim of the European project from the start. The basic premise that has to be kept in mind from the outset, is that the launching of the European community, its transformation into a Union, and its step by step enlargement, contrary to what Vladimir Putin pretends, has nothing to do with imperialism – nor a secret American plot to prolong or revive the cold war. It aims only at reinforcing the stability of the continent. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate this premise through the history of EU enlargement, and to look at how future steps in this direction could make this happen.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

85. The New Force Model: NATO's European Army

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: At the June 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO leaders gave the green light to transition to a New Force Model (NFM) in the course of 2023. The avowed aim is to create a pool of 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness (as opposed to some 40,000 today), and to pre-assign these to specific defence plans. This is very ambitious (as well it should be), all the more so because these will mostly be European troops. Is NATO building a European army? The rationale behind the NFM is that to be able to respond to all eventualities, the NATO military commander, SACEUR, requires a better view of the available forces, and their state of readiness, beyond the 40,000 currently on rotation at any one time in the NATO Response Force (NRF). Hence the NFM provides for the organisation of forces in three tiers: 100,000 troops in tier 1 should be available within 10 days; 200,000 more in tier 2 within 10 to 30 days. Adding to the existing scheme of pre-deployed battlegroups in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, some additional tier 1 and 2 forces will be pre-deployed on NATO’s eastern flank, on a rotational basis, but probably not substantially so. More importantly, NATO aims for all tier 1 and 2 troops to be assigned to specific geographic defence plans for which they can then train. Tier 3, finally, provides for at least 500,000 troops more within one to six months.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe

86. A policy agenda for Finland’s entry into NATO: From ‘one for one’ to ‘one for all’

Author:: Edward Hunter Christie
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: At the NATO Madrid Summit in June 2022, Allies invited Finland and Sweden to join the NATO Alliance. In preparing for its membership, Finland will need to go through a reflection process on how it intends to contribute to NATO’s core tasks and make the most of its membership. Finland should consider making substantial contributions to the deterrence and defence posture in the Baltic Sea region, including in the Baltic states, and elsewhere on the Eastern Flank. In parallel, Finland should also ensure it contributes to the Southern Flank. Finland should aim to hit the ground running into the next cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and fulfil all relevant capability targets. Finland should also aim to “start strong to stay strong” on all existing NATO Pledges, notably those on defence investment, cyber-defence, and resilience. It is typical for individual NATO Allies to seek a salient role when it comes to certain specific topics. For Finland, the Arctic (Northern Flank) and resilience seem most promising.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and Finland

87. NATO’s Nordic enlargement and Turkey’s reservations: Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding in the context of Turkey’s wider strategic interests

Author:: Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: With the signing of the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Turkey dropped its initial objection to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership, but has since argued that the conditions agreed in the MoU have not yet been fulfilled. In addition to requiring Sweden and Finland to take a more vigorous stance regarding the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its extension in Syria, Turkey has used Nordic NATO applications as a tool to raise these issues on NATO’s agenda, pressuring the US in particular for a change in its Syria policy. Turkey’s reservations need to be conceptualized within its determined search for strategic autonomy, increased room for manoeuvre, and an ideological decoupling from the West. Turkey’s strategic interests have increasingly diverged from the rest of the alliance, likely leading to a more permanent intra-alliance opposition position in the coming years, part of which are the ongoing trilateral talks between Turkey, Finland and Sweden.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and North America

88. A Roundtable on Heather Dichter, Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport’s Cold War Battle with NATO

Author:: Jenifer Parks, Anne M. Blaschke, Kevin B. Witherspoon, John Soares, and Richard Kimball
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:: When Heather Dichter embarked on writing Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games, she could not have anticipated how prescient her study would be upon publication. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has found a renewed unity and sense of purpose, and sport has again become a key arena for diplomatic policy. In the 1960s, the focus was on Germany which lay at the heart of a divided Europe, and NATO, the Soviet bloc, and the international sporting community struggled to solve the “German question” of how to handle the existence of two separate German states. Dichter’s book takes the reader through the many intricacies of that question, demonstrating not only how the politics of the Cold War influenced sport, but how international sports in turn influenced Cold War international relations. The “German problem” came to a head when the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) adopted a new flag and anthem and constructed the Berlin Wall. The erection of the wall, effectively cut off East German athletes from the West, and in response, NATO enacted what amounted to a ban on East German athletes traveling to international competitions in NATO countries. International sports organizations responded by downgrading competitions where East German athletes were excluded or moving competitions from NATO countries to neutral or Warsaw Pact countries, depriving host nations of the soft- power benefits of hosting major sports competitions. Meanwhile, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) deliberated whether to recognize a separate East German Olympic Committee or continue to insist on a unified German team. Once the IOC demanded a guarantee that any city hosting the Olympic Games would allow the free travel of East German athletes to the Games, NATO countries with cities bidding for 1968 Winter and Summer Games, namely the USA, Canada, France, and Norway, pressured the alliance to alter its policies on East German travel. East German officials’ attempts to use sport to legitimize their regime ultimately succeeded, and international sports precipitated the official recognition of a separate German Democratic Republic, which would go on to compete in the 1972 Summer Games in Munich under their own flag and anthem as a fully-fledged member of the Olympic Movement. How this unfolded makes for a fascinating read and a compelling discussion.
Topic:: NATO, Cold War, Diplomacy, and Sports
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

89. Threats, Instability and Disruption in Europe’s South

Author:: Marc Pierini
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2016 turned out to have much broader objectives. The development of air and naval bases provided Moscow with platforms for operations in the Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The delivery of S-400 missile systems to Turkey added another major strategic gain. The European Union is faced by broad challenges on its South, with a sharp decline in rule of law, political instability, and a surge in authoritarianism. Wider phenomena such as climate change, demographic trends, and criminal activities of human trafficking networks add to the challenges. ISIL is still a threat too. Turkey’s choice of disruptive policies has perplexed EU and NATO leaders in the recent past. Tensions with the EU have risen due to challenges to maritime boundaries and sovereignty of Cyprus and Greece. Although largely a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union’s major foreign policy initiatives in 2022 have marked a watershed moment and constitute a useful precedent for the Union’s policies with third countries. In the near future, the EU will have to invent a new format, distinct from accession, for its relationship with the countries of ‘Wider Europe’ and to use its now diversified ‘foreign policy toolbox’ in a coherent and effective fashion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, European Union, and Instability
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Southern Europe

90. Europe’s moment of truth: United by adversity?

Author:: Fabian Zuleeg and Janis Emmanouilidis
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Inaction is not an option for the Union. It must demonstrate both unity and ambition along a concrete reform path, specifically across 10 strategic areas. The EU27 must decide whether the integration project can once again become a success story – this time in reaction to the watershed moment we are experiencing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a major transgression against, and tragedy for, a sovereign country and its people wanting to determine their own future. There is no justification for this war of aggression and the war crimes that Russian troops have already carried out – all driven by revisionist ideology and the neo-imperial ambitions of President Putin and his supporters.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Regional Integration, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

91. NATO and Societal Resilience: All Hands on Deck in an Age of War

Author:: Edward Hunter Christie and Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Prior to 2022, NATO and the European Union were already moving toward more comprehensive approaches to resilience. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine heightens the need for such work, with a sharper focus on scenarios of armed attack. In view of decisions taken at NATO’s recent Madrid summit and the evolution of EU legislation, all alliance members will benefit from close liaison work and reciprocal briefings between relevant NATO and European Commission officials as well as through the NATO Resilience Committee and the European Critical Entities Resilience Group. Three new functions should be added to the NATO baseline requirements: payment systems, psychological defense, and continuity of data and infrastructure software. The forthcoming membership of Finland and Sweden will provide NATO with particularly valuable national best practices, notably in terms of coherence, robustness, quality of cooperation across government and society, and engagement with the population.
Topic:: NATO, Resilience, Society, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

92. NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Liana Fix and Steven Keil
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the culmination of its increasingly militarized foreign policy centered around a small cast of decision-makers primarily in the military and security services close to the president. Its approach is aggressive, risk-tolerant, and deeply revisionist, spanning domains and leaning heavily on brutal tactics to achieve victory. NATO is now forced to return to its original mission—to defend Europe against an aggressive and highly militarized Russian foreign policy. NATO-Russia relations relatively normalized in the immediate post-Cold War context, resulting in waning European investments in defense capabilities. NATO only began reversing this trajectory in 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, and must now significantly speed up its efforts. Key priorities include transitioning from forward deterrence to forward defense, augmenting NATO’s capabilities in Europe and creating a greater role for Europe, strengthening regional partnerships, reestablishing risk-reduction mechanisms to manage a potential escalation between NATO and Russia, and considering long-term stabilization scenarios.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

93. NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security

Author:: Merle Maigre
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace.
Topic:: NATO, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

94. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:: Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

95. NATO’s Resilience: The first and last line of defence

Author:: Johnny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Ahead of NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, Hugh Sandeman and Jonny Hall confront the political challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the alliance’s 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment, especially in creating collective standards when resilience remains the responsibility of individual member states. The authors find that resilience is a psychological mindset as well as a material factor, and NATO’s ‘whole-of-society’ approach should be framed within the concept of ‘deterrence by denial’ to potential threats. This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in January 2022 on ‘How can NATO define and develop practical objectives for enhancing the resilience of member states?’ Participants in the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Dr Tomas Ries, Susan Scholefield, Peter Watkins, Professor Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Professor Christopher Coker, and Tom McKane. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

96. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:: Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

97. NATO and the South after Ukraine

Author:: Pierre Morcos
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine will have a pervasive impact on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is set to adopt a new strategic concept at the upcoming Madrid summit in June 2022. There is little doubt that adapting the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture in Eastern Europe will be a strategic priority on the road to Madrid. However, the alliance should not neglect other challenges and priorities, including preserving stability in its southern neighborhood. Spanning from North Africa and the Sahel to the Balkans and the Middle East, NATO’s “South” remains fraught with growing vulnerabilities—and is not impervious to the broader strategic competition with Russia and China. Rather than transforming NATO into a unidirectional entity, the future strategic concept offers the alliance an opportunity to reimagine its approach toward the South.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, North America, and Global South

98. The Impact of Finland's and Sweden's Accession to NATO on the Security of the Alliance

Author:: Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO will increase the Alliance’s ability to conduct collective defence missions in the Baltic Sea region and to deter Russia. Therefore, the gains from the enlargement of the Alliance will far exceed the costs, which may include the need to create a new command responsible for missions on the Northern Flank of NATO. However, Türkiye’s opposition may prolong the accession process and increase the risk associated with the intensification of Russia’s provocative actions against the candidates.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Finland, North America, and Sweden

99. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:: Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

100. Strategic Shifts and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:: Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO currently faces a fundamental challenge. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO adopted a de facto strategy of political, geographical and functional extension, welcoming new members, launching operations in new regions and multiplying its activities to address new low-intensity security threats.1 However, the pillars on which this strategy rested are now weakening. Today, strategic competition has returned and NATO’s military primacy is eroding, as much due to China’s impressive military modernization as because of the diffusion of military power enabled by globalization.2 Likewise, the liberal international order which allowed NATO to endure an uncertain military balance and a competitive international system during the Cold War is also under pressure. Free trade is under attack, democracy is receding, financial stability is harder to maintain and, last but not least, a seismic redistribution of wealth and power away from the Euro-Atlantic area and towards the Asia-Pacific is underway.3 Lastly, the non-traditional security threats which characterized the post-Cold War era remain, having even expanded in number and intensity.4
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

Search

Search Constraints

Search Results

Refine your search

Topic

Political Geography

Content Type

Journal

Publishing Institution

Author

Publication Year

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS