Political Geography: Europe / Publication Year: within 5 Years and within 10 Years

601. Istanbul Journal of Economics: Volume 72 Issue 1

Author:: Gökhan Karabulut
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:: Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:: Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi is an open access, peer-reviewed, scholarly journal published two times a year in June and December. It has been an official publication of Istanbul University Faculty of Economics since 1939. The manuscripts submitted for publication in the journal must be scientific and original work in Turkish or English. Being one of the earliest peer-reviewed academic journals in Turkey in the area of economics, Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi aims to provide a forum for exploring issues in basicly economics and publish both disciplinary and multidisciplinary articles. Economics is the main scope of the journal. However, multidisciplinary and comparative approaches are encouraged as well and articles from various social science areas such as sociology of economics, history, social policy, international relations, financial studies are welcomed in this regard. The target group of the journal consists of academicians, researchers, professionals, students, related professional and academic bodies and institutions.
Topic:: Debt, Development, Economics, Budget, Finance, Investment, Trade, Unemployment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

602. Istanbul Journal of Economics: Volume 72 Issue 2

Author:: Gökhan Karabulut
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Istanbul Journal of Economics
Institution:: Istanbul University Faculty of Economics
Abstract:: Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi is an open access, peer-reviewed, scholarly journal published two times a year in June and December. It has been an official publication of Istanbul University Faculty of Economics since 1939. The manuscripts submitted for publication in the journal must be scientific and original work in Turkish or English. Being one of the earliest peer-reviewed academic journals in Turkey in the area of economics, Istanbul Journal of Economics-İstanbul İktisat Dergisi aims to provide a forum for exploring issues in basicly economics and publish both disciplinary and multidisciplinary articles. Economics is the main scope of the journal. However, multidisciplinary and comparative approaches are encouraged as well and articles from various social science areas such as sociology of economics, history, social policy, international relations, financial studies are welcomed in this regard. The target group of the journal consists of academicians, researchers, professionals, students, related professional and academic bodies and institutions.
Topic:: Economics, Islam, Religion, Communications, Natural Resources, Finance, Internet, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Currency, Unemployment, Sustainability, COVID-19, BRICS, Labor Market, Economic Stability, Consumer Behavior, Rent-seeking, Energy, and Wages
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

603. Unrest in French Overseas Territories and Corsica: Analysis of Violent Demonstration Trends From 2020 to Early 2022

Author:: Adam Miller, Timothy Lay, and Niki Papadogiannaki
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:: On 24 April 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron secured re-election, defeating far-right candidate Marine Le Pen. Despite his re-election to the presidency, dissatisfaction with Macron has been reflected by his relatively poor performance in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, with notable swings to both the political far-right and hard left (France24, 20 June 2022). During the presidential election, Macron lost electoral support in several regions of France and the overseas territories, with Le Pen comfortably outperforming Macron in Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, Mayotte, and Réunion (Guardian, 25 April 2022). Moreover, Macron’s Ensemble coalition lost its absolute majority in parliament during legislative elections on 12 and 19 June. Ensemble lost seats to the New Ecologic and Social People’s Union (NUPES), the left-wing coalition formed by hard-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and Le Pen’s far-right National Rally (Euronews, 20 June 2022). While National Rally did not win any parliamentary seats in the territories, several Macron-supporting incumbent politicians lost their seats to NUPES or regionalist candidates (Le Monde, 19 June 2022). Most significantly, Secretary of State for the Sea Justine Benin lost her parliamentary seat in Guadeloupe to NUPES-supported Christian Baptiste (20 Minutes, 19 June 2022). These political developments follow more than a year of heightened levels of demonstration activity across mainland France, overseas territories, and Corsica. Driven by opposition to coronavirus restrictions, demonstrations across mainland France,1 overseas territories,2 and Corsica surged throughout 2021, with demonstration levels remaining elevated ahead of the presidential election in April. Although demonstrations spiked throughout French territory, analysis of this trend sheds light on complex regional dynamics. Most notably, since the beginning of 2020,3 demonstrations have been far more likely to involve violent activity, destructive activity, and/or barricades4 in French overseas territories and Corsica compared to mainland France. While violent demonstration levels have increased across the board, root issues vary. In Corsica, the violent death of a Corsican prisoner renewed calls for greater autonomy, while in the Americas, coronavirus restrictions rekindled discontent rooted in systemic inequality. Violent demonstration activity in the territories and Corsica reflects an underlying disconnect with the government in Paris. This report examines the regional trends that have emerged out of increased demonstration activity in mainland France, the overseas territories, and Corsica.
Topic:: Political Violence, COVID-19, and Demonstrations
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Corsica, and French Overseas Territories

604. EU Security and Defence After Ukraine

Author:: Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The first brief looks at the Union’s immediate response to the war: its direct assistance to Ukraine and its sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Belarus

605. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:: Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

606. EU Defence After Ukraine: France’s Presidency

Author:: Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The third brief considers France’s 2022 Presidency of the Council of the EU, a presidency whose term was dominated by Russia’s war in Ukraine and whose successes in EU defence matters were somewhat overshadowed by President Macron’s high-profile attempts to broker peace.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Peace, Emmanuel Macron, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and France

607. EU Defence After Ukraine: Denmark’s CSDP U-Turn

Author:: Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The final brief looks at Denmark’s decision to abandon its opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy which, while not as significant as Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO, will bring greater strategic coherence to northern Europe.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

608. German-US Relations and the Security of the Baltic States

Author:: Marko Mihkelson
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In the fourth brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, we turn our attention to the meaning of Germany’s bilateral relationships. Here, Marko Mihkelson examines the German-US relationship. The health of this relationship is vital for Baltic security, but it has sometimes been turbulent. Berlin’s refusal to support Washington’s invasion of Iraq caused a deep and long-lasting fracture. More recently, their relations have been troubled by Donald Trump’s attacks on Germany, especially over defence spending and the trade imbalance, and by energy politics. To the surprise and disappointment of the Baltic states, President Biden, looking to restore US-German relations, cancelled the Trump administration sanctions that had prevented the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. With Russia again threatening Ukraine, what to do with Nord Stream 2 is now a question for Germany’s new chancellor. Meanwhile, there is little to suggest that Berlin will meet Washington’s expectations for improving defence spending any time soon and diverging US and German policies towards China present fresh challenges to their relationship. It Is vital that Germany recognises, when it deals bilaterally with the US, that it is unavoidably acting as a representative of its European allies too.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, United States of America, and Baltic States

609. Germany, Russia, and Energy Politics

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In the fifth and final brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, Kalev Stoicescu examines another of Germany’s key bilateral relationships—with Russia. Relations between Germany (or historical German and German-led states) and Russia have greatly influenced the Baltic region for centuries. In recent years, what the Baltic states see as Germany’s over-reliance on Russian gas supplies, even as they themselves have tried to secure energy independence from Russia, has been a source of tension. The Nord Stream pipelines, which Germany claims are a business project, but which the Baltic states regard as a security risk, have been particularly problematic. But at the same time, the Baltic states recognise that Germany has since 2014 adopted a resolute approach towards Russia regarding sanctions; even if they are sceptical that Berlin’s ambiguous policies towards Moscow, being both firm and conciliatory, will change Russia’s behaviour. With the appointment as foreign minister of Annalena Baerbock, who has opposed Nord Stream 2 and strongly criticised Russia’s misconduct, Olaf Scholz’s new government may stand closer to Baltic perceptions and interests and become a more principled and difficult counterpart for Russia. The Baltic states might be encouraged to trust Germany more in its dealings with Russia, but the new government must first prove itself in its words and actions.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Gas
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

610. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy

Author:: Kristi Raik
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

611. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Kremlin’s Aims and Assumptions

Author:: Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The first brief in a new series “Russia’s War in Ukraine” discusses Russia’s war aims. These are not limited to the destruction of Ukraine’s statehood, or even of the Ukrainian nation, its culture and language, but include altering Europe’s security architecture by undermining NATO and the European Union. Kalev Stoicescu, Research Fellow at the ICDS, also examines Russia’s extensive preparations domestically and abroad (versus Ukraine, the West, and China), and evaluates where Russia’s assumptions were right and wrong, as proved by the course of events after 24 February 2022. Stoicescu concludes that Vladimir Putin’s regime has an inclination for miscalculation and apparently an appetite for future adventures. The risks are thus far from over.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Organization, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

612. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War in Cyberspace

Author:: Dmytro Dubov
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The second brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war in cyberspace. Dmytro Dubov, Head of the Information Security and Cyber Security Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, examines Russia’s methods of cyber attack against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure facilities, and their impact. He discusses the close coordination between Russia’s cyber and propaganda activities and highlights future challenges for Russia in the IT realm that, if left unaddressed, will degrade its competitiveness in cyberspace. He concludes that Russia has so far failed—at least in part due to Ukraine’s progress in cyber security and defence—to deliver the effects it desired in its cyber attacks against Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Propaganda, Cyberspace, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

613. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Early Air War

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The fifth brief of the series looks at the early air war. Russia’s failure to conduct a devastating air offensive and secure air superiority, despite having all the advantages on paper at the start of its war in Ukraine, was a great surprise to observers and had major strategic impact. In this brief, ICDS research fellow Tony Lawrence describes the recent historical context for Russia’s air campaign, its failures in the air in Ukraine, the role of Western assistance, and the importance of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles. The intertwining of the air war and information war is a common theme throughout.
Topic:: War, Air Force, Information Warfare, Military, Aerospace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

614. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War at Sea

Author:: Bill Combes
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The sixth brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war at sea. Captain USN (ret) William “Bill” Combes, the Director of the Department of Leadership and Management Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, examines the activities and the role of Russia’s Black Sea Navy since 2014, and particularly after 24 February 2022, including the blockade against Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s naval and coastal defence. He assesses that the loss of the air defence and command functions associate with the flagship Moskva and the damage to other ships that carry land-attack missiles has eroded Russia’s ability to maintain sea control and reduced its naval-based strike capabilities. He concludes that what Ukraine really needs is direct naval assistance.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Navy, Maritime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic Sea

615. Russia’s War in Ukraine: WMD Issues

Author:: Richard Weitz
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In the eighth brief of our “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series, Hudson Institute’s Richard Weitz examines issues related to weapons of mass destruction. Throughout the war, Russia has regularly threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and against Western states. Analysts are divided on the credibility of these threats and on the risk that the war in Ukraine may escalate to the nuclear level, but Russia’s careless rhetoric is at least likely to set back prospects for nuclear arms control and increase the incentives for nuclear proliferation. While the nuclear taboo has remained unbroken, Russia’s use of hypersonic missiles and its readiness to disrupt civil nuclear operations may have created precedents with huge future consequences. Although Russia’s hypersonic missile attacks—a world first—have not been game-changing, they have sent important signals and, no doubt, advanced Russia’s quest to operationalise these weapons. Of more immediate concern have been Russia’s readiness to ignore basic safety protocols at Chornobyl and its recklessness in conducting offensive military operations near the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Meanwhile, its disinformation about Ukraine’s chemical and biological capacity has raised the spectre of the use of chemical or biological agents in a war in Europe. Weitz concludes that the non-use of weapons of mass destruction in the Ukraine War has contributed to emboldening Western states in their supply of advanced weapon systems to Ukraine.
Topic:: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Hypersonic Weapons, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

616. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Propaganda War

Author:: Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The ninth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns Russia’s propaganda war. Igor Gretskiy, a Research Fellow of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the ICDS, examines key elements of Russia’s propaganda and disinformation that were crucial in the years long preparation of the invasion of Ukraine. He describes how the Kremlin’s official narratives were used to pave the way for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, and how Russia’s propaganda has changed as the war has progressed. He states that the Kremlin began to prepare the Russian public for the invasion of Ukraine after the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva on the 30th of June 2021. He analyses Moscow’s language of war and concludes that Soviet-style narratives about Nazism and Western anti-Russian conspiracies became the main premises of the propaganda offensive. He also concludes that Russia’s president most likely began to plot the outright aggression after his re-election in 2018. Gretskiy further states that the Russian mainstream media failed to provoke the populations and local authorities in eastern Ukraine into mass defections to the Russian side and lost the battle for the Ukrainians’ hearts and minds. It rather intensified the Russian domestic neo-imperial narrative.
Topic:: Propaganda, Disinformation, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

617. Baltic States’ Expectations Regarding Germany’s Role in Baltic Security

Author:: Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: ICDS is introducing a series of policy briefs “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States”. In the first brief, introducing the series, Toms Rostoks sets out in broad terms what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would like Germany to contribute to Baltic security and assesses the prospects for achieving this. Germany plays a major role in the security of the Baltic region and, especially, of the Baltic states. Although the Baltic states would favour Germany taking an even more prominent role, there are obstacles to this due to its very different views on issues such as military power, Russia and European defence integration. Germany’s military power is, by policy choice, limited. Its willingness to use that power, even for the purposes of deterring Russia, is still more limited. More broadly, Germany seems to assume that the worst excesses of Russia’s behaviour can be tamed through dialogue and interdependence. European defence cooperation, however, offers an opportunity for Germany to build a stronger military without raising concerns about its actions. In the long term, the Baltic states expect Germany to play a robust role in the region and to more efficiently counter Russia’s policy, but in the short-term their objective would be to ensure that Germany’s commitments to their security do not decrease.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Europe, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

618. Baltic Perspectives on Germany’s Role in NATO

Author:: Justinas Juozaitis
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: In the second brief in our “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States” series, Justinas Juozaitis considers Germany’s contribution to NATO from a Baltic perspective and looks at what might change under Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Germany’s contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, including in the Baltic region, is substantial, but does not match what might be expected given its economic strength. The Bundeswehr already struggles to meet its commitments to the Alliance and recent increases in the defence budget have not translated into major improvements in capability. Germany will most likely not meet in full the promises it has made to enhancing collective defence. Even then, the new government will have to face decisions that will be unpopular with the public, and within their own coalition. Germany’s continued political support for deterrence in the Baltic region will likely continue, but its own military contribution will probably be smaller than promised.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Economy, Regional Integration, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

619. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

620. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:: Chris Miller
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

621. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: After six weeks of combat, where is the Russo-Ukrainian War going? Modern technology both facilitates and hampers the answer to that question. Every day, this war is evaluated from every angle and perspective, but modern technology provides only a soda-straw view of the war’s entire canvas. This article will try to discern that larger canvas of the war, including a focus on casualties, information operations and morale, and logistics to see how they and the tactical correlation of forces may influence several possible strategic outcomes.
Topic:: Conflict, Military Tactics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

622. Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine

Author:: Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The United States and its allies in the West have been unable to use the threat of military force to coerce Russia into stopping its war in Ukraine. In part, this is because the West is more concerned about escalation than Russia. Further analysis using Alexander L. George’s framework of coercive diplomacy, however, suggests the problem is more complex and deep-rooted: Few of the historical conditions or factors that favor coercive diplomacy are present in Ukraine. This analysis reveals three things the United States and its allies should do to revive the prospects of ending the war in Ukraine through coercive diplomacy. First, they should take smaller, more achievable steps which are less likely to inspire Russia to double-down. Second, they should exploit Russia’s deteriorating position through a mixture of carrots and sticks. Finally, the West should seek to minimize the intensity of its wider confrontation with Russia and focus on strategic stability as an end in itself. This will be challenging because of the gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. But it may help end the war through coercive diplomacy, and avoid a serious miscalculation with Russia.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Conflict, Coercion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

623. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:: Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

624. The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape

Author:: Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine is poised to bring into being a new European security order. Although the last eight months have been full of surprises, that new order may very well be marked by unstable standoffs, buildups, and dangerous activities and incidents between both Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Ukraine’s Western backers. These will risk ever more dangerous crises, all with the threat of nuclear war looming. The last eight years of military deployments, near-simultaneous exercises, and other proximate activities by Russia and NATO offer some hints as to what this future may look like. These, notably, were undertaken not to prevent an escalation in Ukraine but to deter NATO from attacking Russia and vice versa. During this time, discussions about a return to conventional arms control in Europe to mitigate the dangers of military activities gained little traction with policymakers, and the agreements and arrangements that had been in place continued to deteriorate and dwindle. In late 2021, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the West offered Russia a return to conventional arms control solutions. Russia countered with demands that NATO return to its 1990s-era force posture and eschew any further enlargement, and then proceeded to roll its tanks into Ukraine. During the tense months prior to Russia’s invasion, the conventional arms control mechanisms that remained, such as the Vienna Document, made it possible to call out Russia’s buildup, but not reverse it or prevent attack. Although there is little logic and less appetite for new arms control deals now, an end to fighting in Ukraine will create new imperatives to make Europe safer than it is today. While sanctions can limit Russian capacity to some extent, they may well be inadequate to prevent substantial buildups. For this reason, NATO members and their partners should be thinking in advance about how they could limit Russian capabilities via negotiated arrangements with robust verification measures and repercussions for violations. Once the shooting stops in Ukraine, deals such as these could make a more secure Europe, bolstered by more reliable deterrence, attainable.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

625. Pari Passu Lost and Found: The Origins of Sovereign Bankruptcy 1798-1873

Author:: Marc Flandreau
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: Verdicts returned by modern courts of justice in the context of sovereign debt lawsuits have upheld a ratable (proportional) interpretation of so-called “pari passu” clauses in debt contracts which, literally, promise creditors they will be dealt with equitably. Such verdicts have given individual creditors the right to interfere with payments to others, in situation where the sovereign had failed to make proportional payments. Contract originalists argue that this interpretation of pari passu clauses has no historical foundation. Historically, they claim, pari passu clauses never granted individual creditors a unilateral right to block payments to other bondholders assenting to a government debt restructuring proposal. This article shows this claim is incorrect. Drawing on novel archival research, it argues that pari passu clauses find one potent historical origin in the operation of a now forgotten sovereign bankruptcy tribunal, the London stock exchange. Under the law of the stock exchange, departure from ratable payments did create a unilateral right for individual creditors to interfere with sovereign debt discharges. In fact, ratable distributions provided the touchstone for the stock exchange sanctioned sovereign debt discharge system. What is more, sophisticated contract drafters availed themselves of the logic. The result was a weaponization of pari passu clauses, and their inscription into sovereign debt covenants in the 19th century. The article concludes that the modern debate on the role of clauses in sovereign debt contracts cannot be held without thorough reconsideration of the history of sovereign bankruptcy.
Topic:: Finance, Banking, Stock Markets, and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, and England

626. Separating electricity from gas prices through Green Power Pools: Design options and evolution

Author:: Michael Grubb and Drummond Pike
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: This paper develops a detailed proposal for an efficient way to channel the value of large-scale renewables, which have become much cheaper than gas-driven wholesale electricity prices, to consumers at ‘cost-plus’ prices. This would reduce the fiscal pressure on governments for market- wide subsidies and offer more stable support for consumers most in need. We detail how this ‘green power pool’ approach could interact with the wholesale market to ensure firm power, also bringing transparency to the cost of balancing the variable renewables output, and maintaining incentives for efficient supply and demand responses. We illustrate the approach with reference to the cost and volume trajectories of UK renewables backed by government CfDs, targeted initially to particular consumer groups, as a first step in a wider transition towards direct consumer access to cheap renewables.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, Green Technology, Renewable Energy, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

627. CPLP: the first twenty-five years

Author:: Joseph Marques
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:: Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:: The decision by Conjuntura Austral to dedicate a special issue to the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) is to be commended. The uniqueness of the organization justifies a timely review of a small sample of its activities to date. Created in 1996, the CPLP adopted three main vectors of activity:1) the promotion and dissemination of the Portuguese language; 2) cooperation in a wide array of domains (i.e., education, health, science and technology, defense, agriculture, public administration, communication, justice, public safety, culture, sport and social communication, sustainable development, etc.); and 3) political and diplomatic coordination, especially in multilateral forums. The organization also agreed to adhere to several fundamental political principles such as the respect of the sovereignty of each member country; non-interference in domestic issues; reciprocal treatment; peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights, and social justice; territorial integrity of each member state; and the commitment to the promotion of development and cooperation. In addition to a common language and shared cultural heritage, the uniqueness of the CPLP results from the union of nine non-contiguous member states into a privileged geocultural space – the lusosphere – dedicated to the active promotion of its three main goals across four continents. It is a privileged forum for a “pluricontinental dialogue” in Portuguese. In addition, each country contributes by bringing its history, its unique interpretation of the “lusosphere” as well as its regional context (i.e., membership in the European Union, Mercosur, Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of West African States, etc.) as well as economic opportunities to the group. By joining, member countries reinforce the group’s collective projection onto the world stage as well as the opportunity to expand each member country’s diplomatic footprint. While each member had different reasons to join (i.e., maximize politicaldiplomatic cooperation, language promotion, widen access to technical cooperation, etc.), all believe that the CPLP can bolster the group’s overall political and diplomatic prestige while enhancing their collective and individual prospects. This special issue consists of six articles ranging from language to health, security and defense issues, business negotiations and civilian-military relations. It covers but a few topics from a long list of issues which, after the first twentyfive years of this new international organization, warrant the attention and critical review of academic scholars.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Health, Business, Language, Indigenous, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Brazil, South America, Southeast Asia, and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)

628. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:: Rajan Menon
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

629. NATO Should Defend Europe, Not Pivot to Asia

Author:: Jan Gerber
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: In 2021, the U.K., France, and Germany deployed 21 naval ships to the Indo-Pacific with a stated aim of helping the U.S. shoulder the burden of collective security and sustaining the “rules-based international order.” Naval deployments by the U.K., France, and Germany are symbolic and unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia. A European pivot to the Indo-Pacific draws scarce attention and resources away from defense issues in Europe. Instead of encouraging Asian forays, the U.S. should encourage its European allies to assume primary responsibility for European security, freeing the United States to focus on the Pacific, if needed.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, France, Germany, and Indo-Pacific

630. To Prevent War and Secure Ukraine, Make Ukraine Neutral

Author:: Stephen W. Van Evera
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The U.S.-NATO-Russia-Ukraine crisis could be resolved by a grand bargain among the parties that defines Ukraine as a neutral state. Neutrality deals worked well in the past to forestall Franco-British conflict over Belgium in the 1830s and East-West conflict over Finland and Austria in the Cold War. The Belgian, Finnish, and Austrian neutrality deals enhanced the security of the states they made neutral. Neutrality was an asset for Belgium, Finland, and Austria, not a handicap. Major powers never calmly accept the close approach to their borders of unfriendly powers or alliances. Russia is no exception. It will not accept a settlement that leaves open the possibility of Ukraine in NATO or NATO in Ukraine. Hence, a neutrality solution is both sufficient and necessary to resolve the current crisis. Ukraine is not worth a costly confrontation for the U.S. Hence, U.S. leaders should be open to compromise. If compromise proves elusive, the U.S. should not pay high costs or run large risks to impose a deal on its terms, as it has higher priorities at home and elsewhere.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

631. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:: Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

632. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:: Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

633. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe

634. The EU Green Deal. A new momentum for democratic governance in the MENA region?

Author:: Dina Fakoussa
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: Dysfunctional governance and repression lie at the heart of social, economic and political challenges and crises in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The nature of governance, whether autocratic, corrupt, crony capitalist, highly centralised, patriarchal and/or merely incompetent, led to alarming socioeconomic and political grievances. These grievances accumulated over decades sparking region- wide protests in 2010, 2011 and subsequent years. Without major improvements in the quality of democratic governance,1 further crises are inevitable, and sustainable stability will remain unattainable, with major negative repercussions for the European Union (EU) itself. Naturally, climate change is augmenting these challenges and increasing the pressure on government performance. The EU Green Deal addresses this uniquely urgent matter in need of assertiveness, namely climate change with its worldwide palpable repercussions and impact for all. The deal has serious implications for economies and hence societies in MENA countries. At the same time, it could and must serve as a vehicle for improved democratic governance in the region. This is also in the interests of the EU’s green ambitions, as lasting environmentally sound and socially just policies in countries beyond the EU will hardly materialise without improvements in the area of democratic governance. The two subject areas are mutually dependent; hence, the durable success of climate policies is unlikely without being buttressed by democratic components. This understanding needs to be mirrored in all EU policies and programmes targeting the region by interweaving climate policies with democratic governance.
Topic:: Climate Change, Governance, European Union, Democracy, Repression, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

635. Youth unemployment in the South of the Mediterranean: A chronic challenge to development and stability

Author:: Hussein Suleiman
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: Unemployment among youth, aged 15 to 24 years old according to the International Labour Organization (ILO)’s definition, is the highest in the south of the Mediterranean, and in the larger Middle East and North Africa (MENA), compared to other regions in the world. This problem is exacerbated by very low labour force participation rates for this age group in the region, also compared to other regions. Furthermore, this issue of high youth unemployment is not a recent development but has been chronic in the region for at least the last three decades, as shown in detail further on. Youth unemployment south of the Mediterranean is a major challenge, and a symptom of deeply-rooted problems in the region’s labour markets. Unemployment is largely a youth unemployment issue. The problem is mainly one of new entrants’ transition from school age to work (Assaad & Krafft, 2016) but with consequences that could easily shape the entire life trajectories of individuals in the region and also have widespread impacts on their societies and even neighbouring countries. Such worrying and chronic challenges in the region’s labour markets have been largely shaped by structural deeply-rooted issues, reflected in the rise of work informality as a result of falling public employment, and a slow growth of formal private employment in the region throughout the last few decades, which will be discussed in detail in the paper. This paper aims to provide policy recommendations to address such chronic problems in the region, focusing mainly on Southern Mediterranean countries in North Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, excluding Libya because of the exceptional impact of the civil war on its labour market during the last decade. The paper first explores some prominent implications of low employment among the youth, for their own lives and their societies. It then proceeds to examine the magnitude of the problem in the selected countries and its development across the last three decades, relying mostly on ILO estimates, which, unlike national estimates, have a few missing entries in that extended period, and also allow for disaggregation by age groups and gender that might not always be available for national estimates. Next, the paper highlights the now-established explanation of the youth employment problem in the region and how it developed, before finally moving to the recommended policy measures, both domestic and through regional cooperation, to address this chronic problem that has played a major role in the radical political and social shocks in the region in the last decade.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Employment, Youth, and Unemployment
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

636. Developing EU Trade Incentives: A Support Tool for Refugee Self-Reliance and Host Community Resilience in Turkey

Author:: Basak Kale
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) is developing innovative mechanisms to investigate the root causes of migration in order to offer better socioeconomic opportunities both to migrants and host communities. These mechanisms and actions require multi-country bilateral and regional assistance tools to support different partner countries. Innovative and out-of-the-box ideas include multiple countries and various stakeholders. They are developed to provide cooperation solutions in different regions to have a wider impact on the causes and implications of migration. Despite these efforts, political, social, economic and environmental causes continue to generate human mobility around and beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. The Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria have been creating human mobility in the EU neighbourhood. The war made approximately 7 million Syrians flee to neighbouring countries. Turkey is hosting around 3.7 million Syrians and another half a million asylum seekers and refugees from other regions (DGMM, 2021; UNHCR, 2021). The presence of Syrians in Turkey, together with other refugees benefitting from international protection, has become protracted. The efforts to create durable solutions in the form of “voluntary return, resettlement or local integration” have not yet successfully provided sustainable solutions. Turkey does not pursue an official state integration policy to integrate asylum seekers, refugees and the Syrians under temporary protection (STP). However, STPs, asylum seekers and refugees are becoming increasingly integrated into their host communities through informal and local integration mechanisms (Kale & Erdoğan, 2019). The delay in the access to formal employment and challenges in receiving formal employment permits aggregate the difficulties in the inclusion of refugees into formal employment schemes. Summer 2015 has shown that when there is a lack of economic and employment opportunities for asylum seekers, refugees and persons under temporary protection the incentive to have onward movement to other countries persists and the possibilities of integration in host communities stay low. It is clear that resilience-building and livelihood support through formal work is essential for vulnerable populations to have dignified living conditions in host countries. The EU-Turkey Statement in 2016 triggered the development of changes in the legal framework of international protection and migration policy. The Statement paved the way for the preparation of regulations on work permits for persons under temporary and international protection (Official Gazette, 2016). Legal developments targeted the acceleration of the economic integration of refugees into the Turkish labour market through formal employment. However, the difficulties in getting formal work permits resulted in only 132,000 issued until 2019. This indicates that approximately 4% of the STP working population has formal employment (UN Turkey, 2020). This percentage more or less matches the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimations (ILO, 2020). As a result, the majority of the refugee population is working informally, underpaid (Balkan & Tümen, 2016), without formal social and health security mechanisms, in unskilled jobs that are not wanted by Turkish citizens (Sunata, 2017). Informal employment has been a key element contributing to the lack of durable solutions and a protracted process. In Turkey, informal employment is widespread even among the host community members. It is estimated that there is about 30% of labour in host community among all sectors working unregistered. Informal employment is higher in sectors such as agriculture but significantly lower in the industrial sector. The COVID- 19 pandemic has also aggravated the increasingly poor state of the Turkish economy (Akay Ertürk, 2020). Previously, there were continuous efforts through FRIT (Facility for Refugees in Turkey) and 3RP (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan) projects with programmes focusing on improving the employability of refugees in the Turkish labour market as well as support for the entrepreneurship capacities of the refugees in accessing the formal labour market. However, under the current economic conditions these projects are failing to generate a significant long-term impact on employment for refugees (Özçürümez & İçduygu, 2020). These projects provide short-term trainings or restricted employment possibilities while including a very limited number of participants. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic conditions have shown that these livelihood support arrangements when they are not based on rights-based approaches overtime can transform back into humanitarian aid services (Kale & Yavçan, 2020). Long-term policy planning needs to include other incentive mechanisms that will cover multi-country and multi-region solutions. In the long run, if vulnerable populations in the host societies turn into the most vulnerable requiring humanitarian and emergency aid, the incentive for secondary movements to third countries can be high.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and International Community
Political Geography:: Europe and Turkey

637. Could the EU’s New Agenda for the Mediterranean Turn Climate Change from a “Threat Multiplier” into an “Opportunities Multiplier”?

Author:: Desirée A.L Quagliarotti
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: The Mediterranean countries are characterised by evident gaps in terms of demographic growth, socioeconomic conditions and natural resources availability, which undermine the process of Euro-Mediterranean cohesion and create a situation of structural weakness that makes them extremely vulnerable to destabilising events. In just over a decade, the Mediterranean region has been affected by major changes that, at first glance, do not seem to be related to each other. The wave of pro-democracy protests called the “Arab Spring” that has plagued the regimes of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 2010 has shown how climate-driven crop failures in major food exporting countries may contribute to driving up international food prices and to amplifying social and political destabilisation, especially in food-import dependent countries (Werrell & Femia, 2013). The “Arab unhappiness” that spurred the popular uprisings has not faded over the years, giving rise to what has been referred to as the “Arab Spring 2.0”. This new round of turmoil, in which protesters demand a better quality of life, has been exacerbated by 2020s COVID-19 pandemic, clearly demonstrating, once again, the close interconnection between human well-being and planetary health.[1] In the same time frame, in the Northern Mediterranean Countries (NMCs), the migrant-refugee crisis, characterised by new migration waves triggered by traditional as well as unconventional push factors linked to the effects of climate and environmental changes, is becoming one of the most important and divisive issues in recent European politics, adding a new layer of instability to the already shaky European Union (EU) (Pawel & Roland, 2018).
Topic:: Climate Change, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: Europe and Mediterranean

638. From a Fragmented Cooperation to an Integrated Approach – The Emergence of the Maghreb and Sahel Region and its Consequences for the European Union

Author:: Erzsébet N. Rózsa and Viktor Marsai
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: The history of the European Union (EU)’s foreign and security policy has been characterised by a continuous develop- ment and a process of adaptation to the realities on the ground and the experi- ences gained. This was manifest in the gradual change from bilateral relations to regional/multilateral structures, from trade through three-basket/three-pillar structured relations to the integrated ap- proach as introduced by the 2016 EU Global Strategy, and the institutionalisa- tion thereof. “Internal and external secu- rity are ever more intertwined: our secu- rity at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surround- ing regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world” (EEAS, 2016). The present pa- per argues that, in order to be able to halt the increasingly complex threats fac- ing the EU and maintain its global actor status, the EU should introduce further – sectorial and regional – flexibility, in- cluding, among others, definitions of the widening geographical scope underlying its strategic vision. Therefore, this paper first asks how the EU and its member states should recon- sider their regional approach. How can the EU implement the existing frame- works and/or develop a more effective and adaptive strategy towards its south- ern neighbourhood fitting the new reali- ties on the ground better?
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Sahel

639. The EU as a Soft Power Superpower: Why a Green Marshall Plan for the Sahel Is Imperative

Author:: Friso Stevens and Dortih Kool
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: This research paper argues that the European Union should roll out a European Green Marshall Plan for ecosystem restoration and local governance in the Sahel region, located between the Sahara to the north and the Sudanian savanna to the south. Ecological degradation and related climate change put mounting pressure on the region. In combination with cyclical resource-related conflicts and the presence of terrorist and insurgent groups, this has created an increasingly volatile situation. European security and stability are indirectly at stake. The EU’s ‘Old War’ footing and support for illegitimate, corrupt, and autocratic governments to ‘mow the lawn’ of terrorists and insurgents fails to address and often undermines fundamental human security needs in the region. The authors propose a remodelling of EU foreign and security policy to shift focus from current securitization efforts towards facilitating a green, bottom-up transition that empowers local communities’ ecological stewardship by using their existing knowledge, skills, and dynamics, and Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR). Failure to make these changes toward a human security-centred approach means the EU’s current security and climate-related policies risk further undermining rather than contributing to regional security.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

640. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:: Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

641. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

642. France Should Embrace the Transatlantic Relationship—and Help Lead It

Author:: Angélique Talmor
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion three years ago that the transatlantic alliance was “braindead” rings as utterly misguided today.1 The resurgence of war in Europe has reinforced NATO’s raison d’être and forced Europeans to face the fact that there is no realistic alternative to transatlantic cooperation. Further, more European policy leaders recognize China’s increasing threat,2 which bolsters the case for Western “friend shoring” on defense and other issues. This process will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. France, the largest military power in the European Union and the second-largest EU economy, is more reluctant to embrace Atlanticism than most of its NATO counterparts. This hesitance risks limiting the success and scope of efforts to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, in the evolving geopolitical context, France’s best shot at preserving its interests and influence would be through embracing Atlanticism and helping lead the reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation in the realm of defense and beyond. American policymakers should encourage and extend a hand to their oldest ally to embrace such a shift.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

643. Upholding a Rules-Based Order: Reinforcing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Author:: James J Przystup
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This study is focused on regional order in the Indo-Pacific, as set out in the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and on the policies that the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and European allies have adopted to support this rules-based order in the face of multifaceted challenges posed by the rise of a powerful and assertive China. This study considers the evolution of the foundational elements of a free and open Indo-Pacific, the conceptual origins as set out in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s first government by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, the increasing alliance-based cooperation between and among alliance partners, the development of alliance-based strategic partnerships across the region, the evolving multilateralism as reflected in the emergence of the Quad (the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), and the increasing engagement of European allies. The free and open Indo-Pacific—as advanced by Foreign Minister Aso and Prime Minister Abe, and later adopted by the US—set out a framework for regional governance and order based on democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, the market economy, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and opposition to force or coercion to change the status quo. To support this vision, alliance ties have strengthened across the Indo-Pacific. Today, the US-Japan alliance is at a historic high point, having moved toward the strategic alignment of its respective policy documents. Meanwhile, the US and Australia have made the Indo-Pacific the focal point of the alliance, and Japan-Australia security ties have deepened, as underscored by the 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement. At the same time, the Quad has engaged on wide-ranging economic and security issues relating to the region in support of a rules-based free and open Indo-Pacific. And European engagement in the Indo-Pacific has continued to grow, as underscored by the United Kingdom’s “tilt” toward the region and participation in the AUKUS arrangement. Europe’s expanding engagement is well outlined in the Indo-Pacific strategy documents of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the European Union—all reflecting the recognition of Europe’s growing economic, political, and security interests in the Indo-Pacific. This study also considers the implication of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the response of Western powers for international order in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Against a background of contemporary doubts about the staying power of the international order, the response of Western democracies, in both Europe and Asia, has been striking in their support of the rules-based international order. In Europe, NATO’s support for Ukraine has been constant. At the same time, Indo-Pacific allies, concerned about the implications of Ukraine for regional security, have joined in sanctions against Russia. Quad leaders meeting to discuss Ukraine also reaffirmed their support for a free and open Indo-Pacific, with Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida asserting that challenges to the international order, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “should not be allowed in the Indo-Pacific.” The pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific order and reaffirmation of a rules-based order in both Asia and Europe now increasingly overlap. Then Foreign Secretary Liz Truss underscored to the Atlantic Council the importance of sustaining Western unity in the face of challenges to the international order—in Europe and in Asia. In her words, “Conflict anywhere threatens security everywhere. The Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are indivisible.” The challenges going forward will be to sustain Western unity to support an international rules-based order—in Asia, this means reinforcing the free and open Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Order, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

644. US Needs to Play Larger Role as Swing Producer of Oil and Gas in the Current Crisis

Author:: Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, European nations have drastically reduced imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas from Russia. The 2021 levels of these energy imports were around 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, 1.2 mbd of refined products, and 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas on an annual basis.In addition to extreme difficulties in obtaining new sources of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, the price increases throughout Europe since the onset of the war have been of historic proportions. In the days following the invasion, natural gas prices shot up by 62 percent, and UK energy prices were up by 150 percent. The full impact of the war, along with the related need to rein in the highest inflation numbers in over 40 years, has pushed Europe into a recession that threatens households and small businesses as well as European manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive. As a result, if the region cannot quickly assemble alternative supplies, the European commitment to assist in containing Russian aggression may weaken.
Topic:: Economics, Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Supply Chains, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

645. Attracting and retaining talents in the EU What role can the EU play in ensuring a sustainable and competitive ecosystem for labour migration?

Author:: Marcel Muraille
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: When the European Commission unveiled its New Pact on Migration and Asylum in September 2020, one of its most decried shortcomings was the lack of specific initiative to develop legal avenues of arrival in the EU, especially in the area of labour migration. On 27 April 2022, the Commission presented a new package of initiatives which aims at both reducing irregular immigration and addressing labour shortages by simplifying aspects of the legal routes and stays into the EU, and proposed a number of steps to operationalise the Talent Partnerships, a unique framework to stimulate mutually beneficial international mobility and to match labour market demands and skills needs between Member States and third countries. The EU Talent Partnerships will build on previous experiences and lessons learnt from a handful of EU-funded pilot projects on labour mobility that were launched following the adoption of the Joint Valletta Action Plan in 2015. While these pilot projects have offered an opportunity to experiment with different options on how to meet labour market demands in the EU, they have only achieved relative success due to the difficulty of mobilising the private sector and, more generally, the competitiveness of EU labour markets. Despite its fragmented competences on labour migration, the EU still has room to play to increase the attractiveness of its Member States’ labour markets and to facilitate the involvement of the private sector in recruiting candidates internationally. This policy brief seeks to provide insights into the role of the EU to improve private sector engagement and develop a sustainable and competitive ecosystem for future labour mobility schemes.
Topic:: Migration, Regional Cooperation, Labor Issues, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

646. Europe’s Energy and Resource Challenge The Arctic Is Part of the Solution

Author:: Marie-Anne Coninsx and Karen van Loon
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The EU’s increased climate ambitions require unprecedented growth in renewable energy and a diversified supply of critical raw materials. Building long-term partnerships and investing in innovation will be vital to pave the way for a clean and secure energy future. With energy being used as a prominent geopolitical weapon and energy prices soaring, the need for enhanced energy security and reliable resource suppliers is essential. The EU has realized it must reduce its natural resources’ dependence to ensure its prosperity, safeguard its interests, and reinforce its strategic autonomy. Especially the European Arctic region should be taken into account when considering the role it can play as a provider of renewable energy, sustainable development, and a reliable supplier of critical raw materials. Despite the specific challenges and costs associated with its cold and vulnerable climate, the region has certain advantages over parts of the world where political instability or low environmental standards are problematic. With its available resources, expertise, and technological innovations, the Arctic, which is often called an innovative testbed and a high-tech knowledge hub, can be instrumental for the EU to realize its Green Deal objectives, end its dependence on fossil fuels, strengthen its autonomy, and ensure its prosperity.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Arctic

647. Stabilizing the European Continent Reflections on the Future of EU Enlargement

Author:: Jean De Ruyt
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Since the decision to accept Croatia as a candidate member in 2011, the debate in the European Union about its enlargement has been rather subdued. But in 2022, after the bloody invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops, the new European security architecture that the EU (and NATO) tried to build after the end of the cold war has been profoundly shaken. We thought we could manage our ambiguous relationship with Russia and the European members of the ex-Soviet Union through dialogue and economic partnerships. We underestimated the urgency of stabilizing the Western Balkans through EU accession. After membership was offered to Croatia, gestures have been made – more bureaucratic than political – to negotiate the accession of other Western Balkan countries. But ‘enlargement fatigue’ fast developed – ignoring the fact that Russia and China were growing as non-democratic competitors and that Turkey was drifting out of the Western values system. Time has come now to redraw the map. The EU, NATO and the G7 reacted to the Russian aggression in Ukraine with a spectacular show of unity. In the European Council of June 24, 2022, candidate status has been offered to Ukraine and Moldova as well as a membership perspective to Georgia, and a meeting with the leaders of all Balkan countries has revived their hope for a reinvigoration of their own accession. Even if the war in Ukraine is still ongoing, it is time to prepare public opinion in the EU to this new approach to enlargement policy – starting with the fulfilment of the promises we made to the Western Balkans countries as early as in 2003 at the Thessaloniki summit. Looking also where the enlargement of the EU should end, in order to restore as best as possible ‘stability’ on the continent, the aim of the European project from the start. The basic premise that has to be kept in mind from the outset, is that the launching of the European community, its transformation into a Union, and its step by step enlargement, contrary to what Vladimir Putin pretends, has nothing to do with imperialism – nor a secret American plot to prolong or revive the cold war. It aims only at reinforcing the stability of the continent. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate this premise through the history of EU enlargement, and to look at how future steps in this direction could make this happen.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

648. Beyond the Brussels Effect: Supporting the International Case for a Value-based Digital Market

Author:: Susanna M. Sprague
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Building a strong European Single Market represents a major effort and challenge to the European Union. It must encompass and respond to the dramatic ways in which digital technologies are changing our businesses, societies, and behaviors. The EU is not alone in its need to grapple with issues such as privacy, misinformation, consumer protection, and anti-competitive practices online while protecting fundamental rights. However, the EU also has an important and unique position as a major market, with many international partners. It is determined to ensure its economy will be based on its values as reflected in its laws.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, European Union, Regulation, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Europe

649. Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU An Everlasting Candidate Between Delusion and Realities

Author:: Jean-Francois Drevet
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The relationship between Turkey and the European Union has never been easy. It is now affected by the activism of Ankara’s foreign policy, conducted in disregard of international law. Turkey remains, however, an important partner for the EU, as it is still officially a candidate for membership (since 1987) and in the Customs Union (since 1995). It impacts the EU, both in its internal (immigration, trade, other common policies) and external policies (through its gunboat diplomacy against two Member States (Greece and Cyprus) and countries eligible to the European Neighbourhood Policy). Moreover, the impact of the war in Ukraine will affect relations between Brussels and Ankara. In the face of Turkish activism, the EU lacks the capacity to anticipate and react, a problem that concerns not only its relations with Turkey, but its overall neighbourhood and association relations with its periphery. In the framework of the work on the neighbourhoods of the European Union (EU) carried out by the Institute for European Studies of the University of Saint-Louis and following its Annual Conference, with the aim of contributing to a better account of the Union’s relations with its periphery, the working group “Turkey” presents its elements of analysis in the run-up to 2023, which will be marked both by the centenary of the Republic and by long-awaited elections. Although much of this work was done before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (24 February 2022), it has lost none of its relevance. One might even think that a stronger EU attitude towards Turkey in 2018-2020 might have made the Kremlin think twice. Faced with Turkish bellicosity in the eastern Mediterranean, the weakness of European reactions may have convinced Moscow that it could act with impunity against a country that is a member of neither the EU nor NATO.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe and Turkey

650. European Council Conclusions

Author:: Jim Cloos
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Ever since its creation in 1974, the European Council has dominated the EU agenda, even though at first lacking any legal status and devoid of formal decision-making powers. EUCO meetings elicit huge media interest. Hundreds of journalists cover every summit. Following those meetings is the best way to understand what goes on in the EU and where it is headed. That is why it is worth looking more in detail at how the EUCO expresses itself, namely via its conclusions. Those conclusions are heard because they emanate from the most powerful representatives of the 27 Member States and the President of the European Commission. They take on a life of their own. The Lisbon treaty stipulates in Article 15 (1) that the EUCO “shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions.” This loosely worded definition leaves a margin of maneuver for the EUCO. It caters for what the EUCO has done since its inception: agreeing on major decisions shaping the future of the EU, including treaty changes (Article 48 TEU) and conditions of eligibility for countries wanting to join the EU (Article 49 TEU); negotiating the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) packages; setting out political positions on key policies; tasking the Council and other institutions to progress with work on given files; commenting on major political developments outside the EU; reacting to acute crises and setting the framework for handling them.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:: Europe

651. Why Belgium Needs a Cyber Command

Author:: Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On 19 October 2022, the Belgian Ministry of Defence declared the Initial Operating Capability of its new Cyber Command. Responding to the trend of states seeking competitive advantages in a new operational domain – as illustrated by several high-profile cyber-attacks on Belgian State institutions – the choice for developing a new instrument of statecraft has been made. This Egmont Policy Brief outlines the growing importance of developing cyber defence capabilities, discusses the organisational set-up for this Cyber Command, and finally zooms in on the challenges ahead.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

652. Refining the EU’s Geoeconomic Approach to Trade Policy

Author:: Sjorre Couvreur
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The great powers are adapting their policies to a new geoeconomic context. When looking at the EU’s strongest external policy tool, trade policy, one could ask if the EU is doing enough? This policy brief makes recommendations on how to improve the buy-in of Member States for trade-security initiatives, advance cooperation between DG Trade and the EEAS, and avoid escalation in an age of geoeconomics.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

653. The War against Ukraine and European Defence: When will we square the circle?

Author:: Bruno Angelet
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: After the end of the Cold War, Europe’s harvesting of the peace dividend was fed by wrong assumptions and led to a persistent underinvestment in defence. Today, problems are three-fold: too small stocks, inadequate, insufficient capabilities, and very low industrial production capacity. In many cases, stocks went well below accepted NATO standards, putting many European military units in serious difficulty to achieve NATO and EU readiness-levels. Strategic enablers were in further decline over the last 20 years, and many European countries dismantled their stocks of heavy weaponry. Both in Libya (2011) and in Afghanistan (until the withdrawal of NATO troops, in August 2021), European armed forces were unable to sustain combat, or evacuate, without support of US military hardware. On the eve of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the intelligence gap left Europeans in disbelief when US intelligence proofed almost entirely correct. The European Defence industry is fragmented and overprotected by exemptions to the Single Market regulations for reasons of “national security”. Companies face shrinking export markets (due to stringent export-criteria) and reduced production capacity, often by more than half. They became easy prey for foreign take-overs. The war against Ukraine propels those problems to the critical edge: the rush to arm Ukraine has depleted national stocks. Heavy weaponry needed for Ukraine’s territorial defence (and for ours) is missing or already sold to private stores. The European industry cannot not ramp-up production without a long term prospect of sustained demand for Europe’s Armed Forces.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

654. Keeping the OSCE Alive

Author:: Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: From September to December 2022 Belgium is chairing the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation. Whilst political gridlock has plagued the organisation before, the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine has now plunged the OSCE in an existential crisis. This bodes badly for the European security architecture and the multilateral rules-based order in general. This Egmont Policy brief reviews the risk of a full breakdown in the functioning of the OSCE, analyses the multiple reasons for keeping the organization alive, and discusses several avenues by means of which the Belgian chairpersonship can contribute to such an outcome. Irrespective of the way in which the Russian-Ukraine war eventually concludes, the OSCE provides a unique framework for managing the post-war aftermath and reconstituting a novel arms control regime over the longer term.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe and Belgium

655. The New Force Model: NATO's European Army

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: At the June 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO leaders gave the green light to transition to a New Force Model (NFM) in the course of 2023. The avowed aim is to create a pool of 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness (as opposed to some 40,000 today), and to pre-assign these to specific defence plans. This is very ambitious (as well it should be), all the more so because these will mostly be European troops. Is NATO building a European army? The rationale behind the NFM is that to be able to respond to all eventualities, the NATO military commander, SACEUR, requires a better view of the available forces, and their state of readiness, beyond the 40,000 currently on rotation at any one time in the NATO Response Force (NRF). Hence the NFM provides for the organisation of forces in three tiers: 100,000 troops in tier 1 should be available within 10 days; 200,000 more in tier 2 within 10 to 30 days. Adding to the existing scheme of pre-deployed battlegroups in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, some additional tier 1 and 2 forces will be pre-deployed on NATO’s eastern flank, on a rotational basis, but probably not substantially so. More importantly, NATO aims for all tier 1 and 2 troops to be assigned to specific geographic defence plans for which they can then train. Tier 3, finally, provides for at least 500,000 troops more within one to six months.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe

656. Russian Spring 2022 Recruitment Cycle

Author:: Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In May 2022, we published our Egmont Paper 116 entitled The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited, in which we suggested, “The current spring recruitment cycle (1 April-15 July 2022) may be considered a more accurate indication of popular support for Putin’s war in Ukraine than the results of public opinion research as we know it. Therefore, the 2022 spring recruitment cycle may be regarded as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine with the voenkomati as its voting stations.” Near the end of this recruitment period, it is time to return to this statement. How did the spring recruitment cycle go, and which conclusion can we draw from it? A critical review.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Civil-Military Relations, Recruitment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

657. Preventing the Critical Minerals Crisis

Author:: Tobias Gehrke and Mart Smekens
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: From fighting climate change to limiting dependencies on systemic rivals – radically shifting towards a green economy has become a strategic imperative to secure European autonomy, prosperity, and security. The catch: the EU’s dependence on minerals and metals at the heart of green technologies foreshadows looming geoeconomic and geopolitical crises. In the long-term, recycling and technological advances will scale and become key measures for decreasing supply vulnerabilities. But preventing a looming crisis also requires a bold foreign policy agenda to boost global mineral capacities, ease bottlenecks, and ensure sustainability standards. The Global Gateway can offer an important blueprint for strategic upgrading of hard and soft infrastructure along the green mineral supply chain and, especially in tandem with American partners, can be a real gamechanger to shift towards green economies.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Regional Cooperation, Infrastructure, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

658. Tanks versus Banks: Russian Military versus EU Geoeconomic Power

Author:: Bernard Siman, Sven Biscop, and Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: War is an instrument of policy. Those who lose sight of the policy objectives, or keep shifting them, rarely do well in war. The European Union and its Member States (and NATO) are not directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, but they have unleashed a major geoeconomic offensive in response to Putin’s geopolitical gambit. They too, therefore, have to define precise objectives, and prepare for the new geoeconomic and geopolitical world that will inevitably result from this war. First, rerouted supply chains will create new challenges and dependencies for the EU. Second, instability in other states, as a consequence of the disruptions in the global economy, may indirectly also affect the EU. Finally, long-term relations with Russia obviously have to be reassessed, but relations with China and the alliance with the US are evolving too.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Civil-Military Relations, and Banking
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

659. A European Defence Summit in May 2022: From Compass to Capabilities

Author:: Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: By launching a war against Ukraine, right on the borders of the European Union, Russia has unleashed the strongest push to strengthen Europe’s defence since the end of the Cold War. Only its initial, 2014 invasion of Ukraine came close to having such effect. NATO has activated its defence plans and deployed forces on the borders with Russia. Just about every state in Europe has announced increased defence spending. And the EU finalised its Strategic Compass, its first ever defence strategy, with a much increased sense of urgency and purpose. The role of the EU in linking up national announcements and NATO targets is crucial, in fact, by providing a framework to align the efforts of the EU Member States, and by ensuring that the EU’s own indispensable targets are incorporated.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

660. A Brussels Declaration for an “Ever Closer Union”

Author:: Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: What is valuable, is vulnerable. So it is for peace, democracy, and the ability to lead the good life. They are never permanently gained, but remain a permanent aspiration. Throughout history, it has always been thus. At this very moment, Europe is once again witnessing a war on the continent. How did we act after the Second World War to ensure that Europe would no longer be a continent constantly plagued by war? We aspired to an “ever closer European Union”. Panta rhei – everything flows. Today once more we see an acceleration of history; perhaps we are even reaching a tipping point. To be fit for purpose in this new geopolitical context, we must accelerate the construction of the EU as well. More than ever, we must not just react, but act, with foresight. European management must give way to European leadership. That does require, among other steps, a revision of the European Treaties – that is for the medium term. What follows, was originally conceived before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is a plea for a Brussels Declaration, subscribed by all EU Member States, to achieve an “ever closer Union”. What might, before 24 February, have been seen as revolutionary, may now be seen as an evident next step, which is revolutionary only in its simplicity. A step to complement the 11 March 2022 Versailles Declaration.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Leadership
Political Geography:: Europe

661. Putin Is Creating the Multipolar World He (Thought He) Wanted

Author:: Sven Biscop, Bart Dessein, and Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Up until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s and China’s worsening relations with the European Union and the United States meant that the world order was at risk of falling apart into two rival blocs, as during the Cold War: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese. Since 24 February 2022, that is not so clear anymore. The more Russia escalates the violence in Ukraine, but also the strategic anxiety (by putting its nuclear forces on alert), the more difficult it becomes for other powers to stay completely aloof, let alone to simply align with Russia. The more EU and US sanctions reverberate throughout the global economy, the more it becomes impossible for other powers to avoid going at least partially along. China in particular has in fact already made a defining choice.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Social Order, Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

662. US-China geoeconomic rivalry intensifies: A risk or an opportunity for European companies?

Author:: Jana Titievskaia
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: As the US and China balance between the pursuit of strategic security interests and ambitions to attain economic growth, novel sources of risk are emerging for globally active businesses, ranging from sanctions to export controls. The Biden presidency will offer only moderate respite from the escalation of this geoeconomic rivalry, even as US-China trade recovers in the aftermath of the pandemic. In the face of US-China rivalry, the EU and its member states have opted for the third way of “open strategic autonomy”, including a range of trade instruments that will allow the EU to support the competitiveness of its companies more effectively. European companies need to closely monitor their risk exposure in various transmission channels and stay attuned to unexpected opportunities that can materialise in the form of market entry possibilities and the development of new niches.
Topic:: Hegemony, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, and Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

663. Turkey in Central Asia: Possibilities and limits of a greater role

Author:: Toni Alaranta and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Turkey’s long-term search for strategic autonomy, shifting global power relations, and Central Asian governments’ desire to foster multi-vector foreign policies have prompted Turkey to successfully intensify its activities in Central Asia. From the 1990s onwards, Turkey’s activism in Central Asia has strengthened cultural, trade, and diplomatic relations. Its multilateral coordinating body, the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, is being further institutionalized into the Organization of Turkic States. Turkey’s potential for acquiring a greater role in the region is limited. Its economic engagement remains modest, and Central Asian states’ responses to the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan indicate that Russia and China remain the region’s preferred security partners. Although Turkey, China, Russia, and other external actors compete in Central Asia, no full-fledged confrontation has taken place in the region so far. Turkey’s new initiatives are unlikely to change this dynamic, as long as they are conducted in the spirit of inclusive multipolarity.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Power
Political Geography:: Europe, Central Asia, Turkey, and Asia

664. Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’

Author:: Sinikukka Saari and Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012, geopolitical competition has also become rooted in the Nordic region, and small states’ room for manoeuvre in security policy has shrunk. In Russia’s view, maintaining ‘good neighbourly relations’ is primarily the responsibility of small states that always need to negotiate the limits of their sovereignty with great powers, such as Russia. From the Nordic point of view, the relations may require walking on eggshells. Prior to 2014, Norway was often mentioned among Russia’s ‘good neighbours’, but now Russia regularly calls off its policy of ‘reassurance and deterrence’. There are increasing signs that, in Russia’s view, a ‘good neighbour’ should refrain from extensive security collaboration and training with NATO and the US. Hence, Finland and Sweden cannot wholly avoid political tension with Russia merely by staying outside of the Alliance.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

665. Schengen reform and the instrumentalisation of asylum-seekers: New Commission proposals legitimate states’ existing practices

Author:: Saila Heinikoski
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The European Union lacks a consistent asylum and migration policy, which makes it vulnerable to the instrumentalisation of asylum-seekers, most recently visible in the Belarusian actions at its borders with EU countries. In December 2021, the European Commission published proposals on tackling the instrumentalisation of migrants and reforming Schengen rules, but they appear to miss their targets. Instead of addressing the hostile third country, the instrumentalisation proposal weakens the rights of asylum-seekers at the border. Schengen reform proposes the possibility of an indeterminate period of reintroduced internal border controls, legitimating the years-long border controls in six Schengen countries (France, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Sweden and Norway). Asylum and migration policy is also progressing, as the 18-month-old proposal for the New Pact on Migration and Asylum is expected to move forward, contributing to the badly needed harmonisation of policies.
Topic:: Migration, Reform, Asylum, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe

666. The EU´s quest for geoeconomic power: Pursuing open strategic autonomy

Author:: Niklas Helwig and Mikael Wigell
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU is adapting its policy toolkit under the heading of ‘open strategic autonomy’, which combines the Union’s market-liberal preferences with more assertive economic policies. While the EU is largely deploying defensive measures to protect itself from unfair trade practices and economic coercion, it is also increasingly moving towards a more strategic use of economic tools. The EU’s economic defence capabilities include initiatives to improve competitiveness in key strategic sectors (such as cloud computing, semi-conductors, and pharmaceuticals) as well as instruments to deter, block or retaliate against distortive or coercive measures by other powers. The strategic policies of the EU include trade and investment instruments for economic ‘binding’, such as the new ‘Global Gateway’ initiative, as well as means for leveraging the attractiveness of access to the single market to promote the EU’s norms and interests. The EU’s recent sanctions against Russia demonstrates the Union’s coercive capabilities in the economic domain, and its potential as a geoeconomic power.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, European Union, Strategic Interests, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

667. Germany’s shifting policy towards Russia: The sudden end of Ostpolitik

Author:: András Rácz
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: A reassessment of Germany’s relations with Russia started after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and was catalyzed by several offensive actions taken by Moscow, including hacking attacks against the national parliament, disinformation campaigns, as well as an attempt on the life of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny. The new German government, formed following the September 2021 Bundestag election, is different from its predecessors in all important respects regarding foreign policymaking towards Russia. The Chancellor, the governing coalition, as well as the composition of the parliament have all changed. These changes have been pushing Germany towards a gradual reconsideration of its traditional Ostpolitik, which perceived mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Moscow as a guarantee of stability and predictability in Europe. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February, marks the point of no return. The war made Berlin cross several important red lines of German foreign policy, such as agreeing to very heavy sanctions against Russia, halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and delivering weapons to Ukraine. This de facto marks the end of Ostpolitik.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Germany

668. France in the Eastern Mediterranean and the MENA region’s geopolitical competition: French grandeur or European sovereignty?

Author:: Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The global rivalry between the US and China, as well as geopolitical competition and instability in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, are perceived by France as urgent matters requiring stronger EU foreign policy, conceptualized as European sovereignty. The French foreign policy elite are still largely committed to the idea of France’s exceptional role in the world, and to the extent that the EU as a whole fails to live up to the tasks presumed by France, continue their attempts at forging coalitions of the willing. France has in recent years built a web of strategic partnerships, for example with Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, through which it aims to govern the instability in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. The aim is also to deter regional adversaries such as Turkey, a strategy that needs to be re-evaluated due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. France often equates its national interests with those of the EU. While this can be seen to enhance European sovereignty, it also risks increasing the perception that the EU would be a participant in various Middle Eastern conflicts. This undermines the EU’s ability to function as an objective broker and anchor of norms.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, Foreign Interference, and Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, France, North Africa, Mediterranean, and MENA

669. European politics in times of crisis: Developments in Germany, France and Italy, and consequences for the EU

Author:: Marco Siddi, Niklas Helwig, and Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine and the long-term consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic have put the spotlight on important political developments in the three largest EU members, Germany, France and Italy. In Germany, the new coalition government led by Olaf Scholz is trying to adapt the country’s foreign, energy and fiscal policies to the new international scenario, relinquishing some of its long-term tenets. France has just re-elected Emmanuel Macron as President, who is likely to advocate more flexibility in EU fiscal rules and strategic autonomy in foreign, defence and energy policy. Mario Draghi’s government has attempted to steer Italy out of the economic and health crisis and has sought closer cooperation with France. Italy will hold a general election by June 2023, with four parties vying for pre-eminence. In the wake of Brexit, Berlin, Paris and Rome have tried to revive the integration process. In the near future, it is expected that they will continue to drive EU politics, even if sometimes with different priorities, in close consultation with European partners.
Topic:: Politics, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Leadership, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Germany, and Italy

670. Western financial warfare and Russia’s de-dollarization strategy: How sanctions on Russia might reshape the global financial system

Author:: Maria Shagina
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since 2014, Russia’s de-dollarization plan has been guided by security and geopolitical considerations. By dumping the US dollar from its foreign currency reserves, Russia diverted from the traditional approach where liquidity and the credibility of the issuer determine the choice of currency. In 2022, Russia has doubled down on its efforts to de-dollarize the economy. What started as de-dollarization in 2014, transformed into full-blown rouble-ization in 2022. Following the dynamic of an emerging multipolar world order, the global financial system is also gravitating towards fragmentation and currency multipolarity. The overuse of sanctions could strengthen revisionist countries’ desire to increasingly conduct their trade in non-dollar currencies in an attempt to avoid US oversight. If current trends continue, the de-dollarization effort could gain ground and undermine the primacy of the US dollar.
Topic:: Monetary Policy, Sanctions, Finance, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Global Focus

671. Inclusion and Exclusion in International Ordering: An Interview with Glenda Sluga

Author:: Glenda Sluga and Daniel R. Quiroga-Villamarín
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:: The image of two men, sitting awkwardly across each other in a solemn conference table, suddenly sprouted everywhere in my Twitter feed last winter. As a terrifying war erupted over competing visions of eastern Europe’s place in the international order, this somewhat surreal picture of the rulers of France and Russia conferencing offered little respite. It was precisely at this time that I had the pleasure to converse with the incoming Toynbee Prize Foundation President Glenda Sluga about her most recent monographThe Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon (Princeton University Press). As the so-called international order comes under increasing pressure in Ukraine and beyond, Sluga’s timely book invites us to engage with the “two centuries of multilateral principles, practices, and expectations” to understand the promises and limits of our contemporary arrangements (p. xi). It places the recent meeting between Macron and Putin in the context of the rise and consolidation of “a new professional, procedural, and bureaucratic approach to diplomacy, based on the sociability of men” (p. 6). After all, our modern notions of international “politics” or “society” were forged in the aftermath of a previous European-wide conflagration that had France and Russia at its helm: the Napoleonic wars. Sluga’s account does not aim to blindly celebrate nor to categorically condemn this modern political imaginary of international ordering. Others have dismissed the post-Napoleonic diplomatic constellation as reactionary or have lauded it as protoliberal. Sluga, above all, is interested in questioning it. She invites us to: reflect on for whom this order has been built; push against the ways it narrows our perspective; and grapple with its inner tensions and contradictions (p. 282). At the heart of the book, I would suggest, lies a concern about the paradoxical record of European modernity: a project that “has offered an expansive horizon of political expectations but delivered a voice only for some” (p. 7). By taking women, non-Europeans, and “non-state” actors seriously as political agents, she shows how bankers, Jews, or ambassadrices were ironically crucial in the making of a system that came to exclude them from the historical record. And, unsurprisingly, these exclusions lead to tensions that threaten to upend international order from within and without—from 1821, 1848, or 1853 to 2022. In our conversation, we attempt to make sense of these paradoxes, contradictions, and ambiguities of international ordering.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Politics, History, Exclusion, International Order, and Inclusion
Political Geography:: Europe

672. Russia’s connectivity strategies in Eurasia: Politics over economy

Author:: Kristiina Silvan and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia has been attempting to strengthen connectivity within Eurasia since the early 2000s as a part of its policy to “pivot to the East”. Yet due to limited resources and political will, the tangible effects of its connectivity strategy have remained limited. The Russian Far East would greatly benefit from an improved connectivity infrastructure, given its proximity to Asian markets and the abundance of natural resources in the region. However, the attempts to accelerate regional socio-economic development by strengthening the region’s connectivity have failed to make a difference. In post-Soviet Central Asia, Russia adopted a passive approach to connectivity in the 1990s and 2000s, which meant focusing on maintaining and protecting the links inherited from the Soviet Union. It was only the pressure of external actors – both China and the West – that prompted Moscow to take a more active stance in the region in the 2010s. The launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative pushed Russia to promote its own grand vision of trans-continental connectivity, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, designed to reaffirm Moscow’s great-power status and its equal standing with China. While it lacks economic and administrative foundations and its implementation is highly implausible, it has fulfilled a symbolic role as Russia’s grand connectivity project for Eurasia.
Topic:: Economics, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Rivalry, and Resource Allocation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

673. A policy agenda for Finland’s entry into NATO: From ‘one for one’ to ‘one for all’

Author:: Edward Hunter Christie
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: At the NATO Madrid Summit in June 2022, Allies invited Finland and Sweden to join the NATO Alliance. In preparing for its membership, Finland will need to go through a reflection process on how it intends to contribute to NATO’s core tasks and make the most of its membership. Finland should consider making substantial contributions to the deterrence and defence posture in the Baltic Sea region, including in the Baltic states, and elsewhere on the Eastern Flank. In parallel, Finland should also ensure it contributes to the Southern Flank. Finland should aim to hit the ground running into the next cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and fulfil all relevant capability targets. Finland should also aim to “start strong to stay strong” on all existing NATO Pledges, notably those on defence investment, cyber-defence, and resilience. It is typical for individual NATO Allies to seek a salient role when it comes to certain specific topics. For Finland, the Arctic (Northern Flank) and resilience seem most promising.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and Finland

674. The EU’s strategic multilateralism: Global engagement in an era of great-power competition

Author:: Niklas Helwig
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The crises of previous years and the rise of strategic competition have put the EU’s traditional approach to multilateralism under pressure. The EU’s pledge for “a more stringent and strategic approach to multilateralism” has become even more relevant with Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Three adjustments to the EU’s approach to multilateralism signify a more strategic approach. In a move towards a more instrumental engagement, the EU is using international cooperation as an avenue to protect its interests in the global competition. The EU is displaying more willingness than before to leverage its power bilaterally and through its work in international organisations. It is also more willing to focus on ad hoc frameworks in order to preserve the effectiveness of global cooperation and extend it to new areas of governance. Strategic multilateralism comes with certain risks attached. It can undermine the legitimacy of the formal multilateral system and the global protection of fundamental rights. The EU needs to weigh the benefits of a more strategic approach against the risks of global fragmentation.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, European Union, Multilateralism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe

675. NATO’s Nordic enlargement and Turkey’s reservations: Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding in the context of Turkey’s wider strategic interests

Author:: Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: With the signing of the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Turkey dropped its initial objection to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership, but has since argued that the conditions agreed in the MoU have not yet been fulfilled. In addition to requiring Sweden and Finland to take a more vigorous stance regarding the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its extension in Syria, Turkey has used Nordic NATO applications as a tool to raise these issues on NATO’s agenda, pressuring the US in particular for a change in its Syria policy. Turkey’s reservations need to be conceptualized within its determined search for strategic autonomy, increased room for manoeuvre, and an ideological decoupling from the West. Turkey’s strategic interests have increasingly diverged from the rest of the alliance, likely leading to a more permanent intra-alliance opposition position in the coming years, part of which are the ongoing trilateral talks between Turkey, Finland and Sweden.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and North America

676. A Roundtable on Heather Dichter, Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport’s Cold War Battle with NATO

Author:: Jenifer Parks, Anne M. Blaschke, Kevin B. Witherspoon, John Soares, and Richard Kimball
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:: When Heather Dichter embarked on writing Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games, she could not have anticipated how prescient her study would be upon publication. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has found a renewed unity and sense of purpose, and sport has again become a key arena for diplomatic policy. In the 1960s, the focus was on Germany which lay at the heart of a divided Europe, and NATO, the Soviet bloc, and the international sporting community struggled to solve the “German question” of how to handle the existence of two separate German states. Dichter’s book takes the reader through the many intricacies of that question, demonstrating not only how the politics of the Cold War influenced sport, but how international sports in turn influenced Cold War international relations. The “German problem” came to a head when the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) adopted a new flag and anthem and constructed the Berlin Wall. The erection of the wall, effectively cut off East German athletes from the West, and in response, NATO enacted what amounted to a ban on East German athletes traveling to international competitions in NATO countries. International sports organizations responded by downgrading competitions where East German athletes were excluded or moving competitions from NATO countries to neutral or Warsaw Pact countries, depriving host nations of the soft- power benefits of hosting major sports competitions. Meanwhile, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) deliberated whether to recognize a separate East German Olympic Committee or continue to insist on a unified German team. Once the IOC demanded a guarantee that any city hosting the Olympic Games would allow the free travel of East German athletes to the Games, NATO countries with cities bidding for 1968 Winter and Summer Games, namely the USA, Canada, France, and Norway, pressured the alliance to alter its policies on East German travel. East German officials’ attempts to use sport to legitimize their regime ultimately succeeded, and international sports precipitated the official recognition of a separate German Democratic Republic, which would go on to compete in the 1972 Summer Games in Munich under their own flag and anthem as a fully-fledged member of the Olympic Movement. How this unfolded makes for a fascinating read and a compelling discussion.
Topic:: NATO, Cold War, Diplomacy, and Sports
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

677. The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly

Author:: Zachary Jonathan Jacobson
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:: Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.2 In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky’s artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the “soft powers” of persuasion.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

678. Migration restrictions in the West: Some ethical concerns

Author:: Emmanuel Comte
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Migration policies have divided the world in two groups: the walled world of Western countries and the rest. The EU system of migration control is the most extensive, given that Europe is surrounded by a series of regions with high migration potential. Migration restrictions do not enhance and may serve to reduce the opportunities of the worse-off and, as such, are at odds with international fairness. Negative externalities from richer to poorer countries, triggered by migration policies themselves or monetary or climate policies, make migration restrictions even more unfair. The growth of the migration control system ends up threatening human rights within Western countries. It is necessary to explore all possible ways to reverse migration restrictions and promote more open migration policies.
Topic:: Human Rights, Migration, Border Control, European Union, and Refugees
Political Geography:: Europe

679. German strengths and weaknesses in the Russo-Ukrainian war

Author:: Emmanuel Comte
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The Russian attack on Ukraine has activated a series of tropes about the international balance of power in Europe. Most mainstream opinion outlets have published criticisms of Germany for supposedly being dependent on Russia and threatening the European security system by hesitating when decisive action is required. The following points serve to reintroduce some facts into the conversation. The current war in Ukraine is primarily the result of German-Russian rivalry. The war is a case of an established power, Russia, miscalculating in its efforts to prevent a rising power, Germany, from absorbing a nation within its sphere of cooperation: Ukraine. Germany’s strategy has been subtle, seeking to manage through economic interdependence an international conflict predicated upon balance of power considerations. Since circa 1900, Turkey has also played a key role in the German security system in the Black Sea region. With the benefit of hindsight, Germany’s strategy has been the most appropriate to the situation, given that Russia has been completely isolated while Germany is surrounded by allies. Germany’s problems today are not in its Russian policy, but rather in self-defeating ideologies which include the “Green” movement and economic statism.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

680. Nationalism, enmity and reconciliation: Turkish party supporters’ polarized views on Greece

Author:: Evangelos Areteos
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Supporters of the current government in Turkey have significantly stronger nationalistic attitudes towards Greece and Greeks than the supporters of the opposition parties. Turkey is extremely polarized along party lines. Religion and education significantly shape perceptions in both Turkey and Greece. In Greece, the levels of nationalism towards Turkey are significantly higher than they are in Turkey towards Greece, but vary far less across the political spectrum.
Topic:: Nationalism, Public Opinion, Reconciliation, AKP, and Polarization
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Greece

681. The Digitalization of EU Public Diplomacy: the pandemic crisis and beyond

Author:: Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos and Eleftheria Spiliotakopoulou
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This paper explores the digitalization of diplomacy and attempts to shed light on the adaptation level of the European Union by presenting the European External Action Service’s activity on social media and selected Public Diplomacy initiatives during the covid-19 pandemic. The main research questions posed in the study are: a) in what ways has the European Union used digital tools to respond to the coronavirus crisis; and b) what are the (recurring) challenges facing the European Union in its efforts to improve its image in a changing world and enhance its role as a leading global actor? The paper concludes that while the European Union is highly competent in terms of digitalization, it does face challenges, which are partly inherent in the sui generis nature of the European Union as an International Organization. These include the need for deeper integration, better coordination between member states, and further dialogue with the Union’s citizens, and must be met if the EU is to enhance trust and build solidarity, as well as a clearer and more solid European identity.
Topic:: Diplomacy, European Union, Regional Integration, COVID-19, Digitalization, and Adaptation
Political Geography:: Europe

682. The return of inflation: Can we protect real incomes?

Author:: Manos Matsaganis and Sotiria Theodoropoulou
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: High inflation, virtually unknown in advanced economies since the 1980s, has made a comeback. In this policy paper, we first explain where inflation comes from, and describe how the policy context for dealing with it was shaped after Keynesian demand management proved unable to defeat stagflation. We then critically examine the various policy options. Generally speaking, policy makers may attempt to (i) contain inflation by raising interest rates or, more directly, by controlling prices, (ii) alleviate the impact of inflation on household budgets through price subsidies or income transfers, and (iii) protect workers’ real incomes via wage indexation and social pacts. We conclude by assessing the merits, costs, and distributional implications of each option in turn.
Topic:: Economy, Inflation, and Income
Political Geography:: Europe and Global Focus

683. Fuel of the Future: A Blueprint for a Mediterranean Market for Emission-Free Hydrogen

Author:: Jorgo Chatzimarkakis
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The Mediterranean Green Hydrogen Partnership (MGHP) should be developed from the outset into a supranational governing structure for the intercontinental hydrogen market around the Mediterranean Basin. The supranational model will ensure optimal ownership for all members while delivering compelling and binding decisions on the production, certification, transportation and distribution of clean hydrogen. It will also serve as a stepping stone to the application of supranational decision-making to future global hydrogen governance on the basis of rules and regulations enacted by the world’s leading hydrogen producing region. Maximising the clean hydrogen potential of all the states encompassed by the MGHP will make the organisation the global leader in a transparent and democratic market for a key future global energy source.
Topic:: Partnerships, Carbon Emissions, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe and Mediterranean

684. Cooperation against the odds: Getting small firms to work together in unfavourable circumstances

Author:: Kira Gartzou-Katsouyanni
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: How can we get small firms to work together in order to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes, despite adverse circumstances? This policy paper provides an answer to this question that could be useful both to policymakers and to local stakeholders seeking to undertake innovative, cooperative economic activities in their area. Based on evidence from eight case studies within the Greek agri-food and tourism sectors, I argue that a small group of local actors, whom I call ‘institutional entrepreneurs’, usually play a key role in catalysing the emergence of cooperation at the local level. Their strategies and experiences carry valuable insights. I also outline the characteristics that macro-level institutional frameworks need to have if they are to facilitate local cooperation. These characteristics can inform the design of institutions at both the domestic and the EU level. The paper’s findings could be relevant to people interested in local development, but also to those concerned with boosting the productivity and export orientation of the Greek economy as a whole. After all, cooperation can improve the performance of small firms, and it is thus an important ingredient for inclusive growth in countries with a lot of small firms, such as Greece.
Topic:: Development, Economy, Business, and Production
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

685. The European Union’s uneasy journey through the energy crisis

Author:: Alekos Kritikos
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The European Union revealed rapid reflexes when it came to imposing sanctions on Russia and supporting Ukraine, but has been extremely slow when it comes to taking measures to relieve its own citizens and businesses. At three fruitless summits in the first two months of the crisis, numerous member states’ repeated requests for a joint fiscal response mirroring that adopted vis-à-vis the pandemic were not even informally tabled. In May, the Commission presented the REPowerEU programme, which aims to transition to clean energy and end the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The two European Councils in May and June agreed on new sanctions against Russia, further assistance for Ukraine, and joint EU supplies of defence equipment. However, no decision was made to impose a cap on the price of natural gas and the issue of a joint fiscal response to the crisis was not even discussed. Despite repeated requests, the Commission continued to not submit proposals to this effect. But pressure was mounting for decisions to be made. Fifteen countries signed a joint letter in September 2022 calling for a cap on gas prices. In a joint article, Commissioners Thierry Breton and Paolo Gentiloni have also called for a joint fiscal response. The two Councils of Energy ministers in September 2022 resolved on a series of measures, but these are national responses rather than a joint European initiative. The price cap was absent once again from the decisions made. The informal Prague summit did not reach any conclusions either, though it did table all the outstanding issues in question. Europe’s successes in dealing with the pandemic came with “collateral damages”, institutional and otherwise, and the bloc has continued to sustain further collateral damages during the current energy crisis.
Topic:: European Union, Crisis Management, Fossil Fuels, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

686. Using RRF resources to kick-start a job-rich recovery in Greece

Author:: Manos Matsaganis and Georgios Manalis
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is a golden opportunity for those member states that were most badly hit first by the debt crisis then by the pandemic. Greece, one of the largest beneficiaries in per capita terms, is due to receive very significant resources that can help arrest the decline of the 2010s. Can these resources be spent wisely and efficiently enough to kickstart the process of inclusive and sustainable growth? This paper briefly reviews the Greek National Recovery and Resilience Plan (Greece 2.0), assessing its potential contribution to upgrading the economy’s growth model, enhancing skills, and boosting employment. In 2007-19, total investment in Greece shrank by a stunning 70% in real terms. Over the same period, public investment fell by 62%, business investment by 44%, and household investment (on housing, mostly) by 89%. Under-investment constrains growth and undermines the future prospects of the Greek economy. The Recovery and Resilience Facility offers Greece a unique opportunity to bridge the investment gap, giving a boost to the sustainable recovery of the Greek economy. Technically, Greece 2.0, the country’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan is competently drafted, as its favourable reception by the European Commission indicates. Still, critical issues abound. In this sense, Greece 2.0 embodies the contradictions of the current juncture. On the one hand, there is a consensus that the Greek economy should rebalance, by pursuing a growth strategy that relies much more on exports than in the recent past, and much less on domestic consumer demand fuelled by debt. On the other hand, the legacy of the past weighs heavily on social and political actors, limiting their room for manoeuvre. The list is daunting. It remains to be seen how the above will play out over the next few years.
Topic:: Debt, Economy, Crisis Management, Resilience, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

687. Georgian-Greek Relations: Building a Strategic Dimension

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Mariam Gugulashvili
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The cordial bilateral relations between Greece and Georgia are mostly centered on the culture and education domains, with less progress achieved in the areas of the economy, foreign policy, and security. Greece can emerge as Georgia’s key supporter in its EU membership aspirations, with Greek experts and diplomatic circles contributing their experience to the country’s EU integration process. This support can be realized at both high and low levels, through EU Twinning projects and results-oriented memoranda between state institutions to import best practices, so Georgia can successfully carry out the required democratization reforms and implement the EU Association Agreement effectively. As the international system becomes more multipolar and the strategic significance of the Black Sea and Caucasus regions increases, Greece and Georgia should work to deepen their ties and build interest-oriented synergies in order to forge a strategic alliance. The promotion of Western and European interests can be significantly aided by a democratic Georgia on the road to European integration and a resurgent Greece with a stronger regional presence in the Black Sea and Caucasus.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:: Europe, Greece, and Georgia

688. EU-Georgia Relations at a Critical Juncture: A Case for European Strategic Autonomy

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Mariam Gugulashvili
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Despite the substantial progress that Georgia has made in implementing the EU Association Agreement and related reforms, it has been experiencing democratic backsliding since 2018. The divergence of Georgia’s ruling party from a pro-European trajectory, as well as the political polarization that has been dominant in recent years, have contributed to the deterioration of ties between Georgia and the EU. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia, which was once seen as a “reform pioneer,” was not given candidate status in June 2022. Georgian public opinion has always supported membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions, with more than 80% of Georgians today being Euro-enthusiasts and overwhelmingly in favour of joining the EU. The EU is Georgia’s largest donor and trading partner. Georgia’s key strategic option boils down to Russia vs. the West. Georgia should foster closer relations with certain EU member states that could provide key support for its EU membership aspirations.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, European Union, Trade, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe and Georgia

689. Threats, Instability and Disruption in Europe’s South

Author:: Marc Pierini
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2016 turned out to have much broader objectives. The development of air and naval bases provided Moscow with platforms for operations in the Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The delivery of S-400 missile systems to Turkey added another major strategic gain. The European Union is faced by broad challenges on its South, with a sharp decline in rule of law, political instability, and a surge in authoritarianism. Wider phenomena such as climate change, demographic trends, and criminal activities of human trafficking networks add to the challenges. ISIL is still a threat too. Turkey’s choice of disruptive policies has perplexed EU and NATO leaders in the recent past. Tensions with the EU have risen due to challenges to maritime boundaries and sovereignty of Cyprus and Greece. Although largely a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union’s major foreign policy initiatives in 2022 have marked a watershed moment and constitute a useful precedent for the Union’s policies with third countries. In the near future, the EU will have to invent a new format, distinct from accession, for its relationship with the countries of ‘Wider Europe’ and to use its now diversified ‘foreign policy toolbox’ in a coherent and effective fashion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, European Union, and Instability
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Southern Europe

690. Explaining immigration restrictions using a sequential path dependency model

Author:: Emmanuel Comte
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This paper, by Emmanuel Comte, Senior Research Fellow, Ariane Condellis European Programme, analyses immigration restrictions by discussing major recent debates of historical political economy and proposing a new explanatory model. The conclusions in recent research on the subject of immigration restrictions converge in highlighting the natives’ fear of economic costs as a potent factor in immigration restrictions, despite evidence proving that actual costs are small and circumscribed, while the aggregate impact of immigration is generally positive. This paper develops existing scholarship to explain the magnitude of current immigration restrictions in Europe and North America by proposing a sequential path dependency model based on both historical insights and the insights of institutionalist theories of path dependence. In this model, the fears of adverse economic effects held by specific segments of the national workforce interact with a power structure dominated by the state and with the agency of union leaders and policymakers initiating a series of policy cycles that lead to complete restrictions on low-skilled immigration.
Topic:: Political Economy, Immigration, and Border Control
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

691. Local community views on Marine Protected Areas on Greek islands

Author:: Lydia Avrami, Nicolas Demertzis, Antonis Armenakis, and Dmitra Syrou
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are usually designated in areas with intense human activity. An MPA is therefore a complex socioeconomic system whose success and/or failure, and ability to deliver environmental, social and economic benefits, depend on local communities and their sensitivities. This paper examines how recently designated MPAs on three islands in the Cyclades group (Kythnos, Milos and Santorini), with differently structured local economies and levels of touristic development, are perceived by their local communities. Data are drawn from a phone survey of local residents, and the results show that the awareness, attitudes and perceptions of the local groups differ significantly depending on the area and their stake in the MPA. How much local communities know about the MPA regulatory framework and its location, past experiences and socioeconomic factors are deemed good predictors for the local communities’ behaviors towards the MPAs. The positive interplay between the operation of an MPA and the development of scuba diving is also acknowledged, although the perceived trade-off between marine protection and fishers’ revenue remains the main challenge facing MPA implementation. The paper’s findings highlight the urgent need to deal with the information and knowledge deficit, and to bridge the gap between the perceptions and expectations of local communities and the MPAs’ actual output. Applying a participatory approach to MPA decision-making and operation would build capacity for effective implementation. Thus, the delimitation of the protection zones within the MPAs, and the provision of specific constraints, should be based on both ecological and socioeconomic criteria.
Topic:: Environment, Natural Resources, Public Opinion, Regulation, and Ecology
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

692. The Second Phase of the EU Southern Gas Corridor: Which role for Azerbaijan?

Author:: Marika Karagianni
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The operation of the Southern Gas Corridor marks the first attempt of the EU to diversify its pipeline gas supplies and routes beyond Russia. The 2nd Phase of the Corridor, which involves the operation of several gas interconnectors in South Eastern Europe, is being promoted, while the EU is looking for additional supply sources, namely LNG. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, coupled with the intense energy crisis in Europe, has reinforced these trends. Field development in Azerbaijan and future prospects for LNG exports, primarily from the US, are discussed in this article as realistic options for alternative supply sources for Europe.
Topic:: Development, European Union, Gas, Exports, and Pipeline
Political Geography:: Europe, Central Asia, and Azerbaijan

693. Parti Socialiste: the end of the cycle – The collapse of the French Socialists and the future prospects of the Left in France

Author:: Nikolas I. Tzimos
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste – PS), once the main government party of the Left, has been in rapid decline since 2014; since 2017, it has been struggling for its life. Its electorate shrank due to President François Hollande’s poor management and growing political unreliability during his term in office. Signs of internal crisis were evident from the early 21st century. The Socialist Party has been losing traditional social bastions and organizational resources since the 2014 municipal elections. The 2022 presidential elections already appear lost for the Socialist Party. Anne Hidalgo, the mayor of Paris and the Socialist candidate for the presidency, is from the PS’s vast pool of local authority cadres. She was reelected as mayor in harsh times, back in 2020. A predominantly cosmopolitan candidate, Hidalgo has failed to rally the PS’s forces. She is shedding votes towards the Center and the radical Left. The PS is currently experiencing the inversion of the phenomenon of 21 April 2002. To avoid two undesirable candidates in the second round, potential PS voters are “forced” to vote tactically (vote utile) for candidates that are better equipped to get beyond the first round. Can the PS survive if it puts in a good performance in the upcoming parliamentary elections? The French two-round electoral system requires cooperation to secure seats. A new Épinay is necessary, but is it possible?
Topic:: Domestic Politics, History, Political Parties, and Socialism
Political Geography:: Europe and France

694. Europe after Putin’s War: EU Foreign and Defence Policy in the new European security architecture

Author:: George Pagoulatos and Spyros Blavoukos
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a game changer for Europe and the global system and a call for the EU to emerge as a coherent security actor. Any EU discussion about an autonomous EU military capacity becomes irrelevant in the face of a systemic global security challenge, such as Russia, which cannot be dealt with through the existing or envisaged EU military instruments. Faced with a security challenge on a global scale, NATO remains the only game in town. The EU ambition of developing its strategic autonomy becomes practically meaningful only within the transatlantic alliance. EU member-states should take advantage of the existing clauses that enable significant steps to be taken towards foreign and security integration. The existing Treaty framework provides legal space for significant advances in the field of foreign and security integration, even though all relevant Treaty Articles contain strong ‘brakes’ which enable member-states to retain control of the process. Enhanced cooperation in EU foreign and security policy remains an important way forward, even though there are significant safety clauses. The ‘mutual defence’ or ‘mutual assistance’ clause (Article 42(7) of TEU) and the ‘solidarity clause’ (Article 222 of TFEU) are the closest things the EU has to security guarantees. Adding teeth to 42(7) should be an EU priority. Supporting EU ‘coalitions of the willing’ (Article 44 of TEU) also provides the opportunity for swifter military action under the EU aegis. The modality of cooperation between such coalitions and the EU rapid deployment capacity, which is also envisaged in the Strategic Compass and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), has still to be worked out. Transition to qualified majority voting (QMV) in EU foreign policy decision-making presents both advantages and disadvantages, both from the standpoint of the EU and of the dissenting member states. The EU cannot become a credible global power if it cannot reach collective decisions on EU foreign and security policy. Moving towards QMV would address structural weaknesses and serve the objective of European sovereignty. However, smaller member-states need a strong and explicit reassurance that they can always use the existing emergency brakes when they consider an issue which is to be decided on by QMV to be a matter of national security. Transition to QMV should be the result of the gradual forging of a common foreign policy understanding on the major security challenges facing the EU. Human rights issues and sanctions are a good place to start when building momentum towards QMV. In the meanwhile, the current reform effort should be focused on investing in the institutional framework of EU foreign and security policy and making good use of existing instruments.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

695. Achieving qualitative superiority: Greek conscription and the Turkish threat

Author:: Antonis Kamaras and Nikos Stournaras
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This policy paper argues that, by emulating its peer countries, wealthy, small to medium sized democracies facing national security threats, in Northern Europe and the Middle East (namely Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Israel), Greece can modernize its conscript component and thus attain qualitative superiority over the Turkish Army. Turkey’s conscript model is riven by deep-seated class, geographical and ethnic cleavages, giving to Greek political and military leaders the opportunity to gain a qualitative military edge through judicious modernization of the Greek conscript model. Such a modernization is eminently feasible today as Greece’s economic crisis has created the political space to overcome resistance to the reform of conscription. By contrast, Greece’s main national security threat, Turkey, belongs to that group of authoritarian or illiberal countries which have suboptimal conscription models, featuring evasion of conscript service by the well-educated, inefficient training and harsh, counterproductive treatment of those conscripts who do serve. Greece, also due to its post WWII illiberalism or authoritarianism, and not unlike Taiwan which has a similar legacy, has not infused its conscript component with demanding training and operational standards, roles and missions. The time is ripe, due to the resurgence of the Turkish threat and Greece’s economic crisis, which has removed many of the country’s outdated shibboleths, to modernise Greek conscription, as its peer countries have done, and thus acquire an Army qualitatively superior to that of Turkey. By doing so, Greek policy-makers will decisively strengthen Greece’s deterrence and produce positive externalities for the consripts themselves . Indeed, the more effective conscription becomes in operational terms for the Greek Armed Forces, the greater the benefits to be reaped in civilian life.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Conscription
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Greece

696. Household Wealth Inequalities in the wake of the Greek Debt Crisis

Author:: Apostolos Fasianos
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Despite the renowned interest in wealth disparities, the distribution of wealth in Greece is largely understudied. This study maps the levels, dynamics, and composition of household wealth using data from the three waves of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey for Greece for the period after the debt crisis of 2009-10 till 2017. The evidence suggests that the richest 1% of the population holds roughly as much wealth as the poorest 50%, while the richest 10% holds about four times the wealth of the poorest 50%. Most inequality indicators employed indicate increasing trends in wealth disparities between 2009 and 2017. During this period, average and median wealth holdings decreased by about one third, and the share of financially fragile households increased by about 20%. Estimates from factor inequality decompositions suggest that, although relatively evenly distributed, housing asset holdings explain much of the increase in overall wealth inequality in Greece, followed by self-employment business equity; financial assets play a negligible role. Financial wealth inequality is much more pronounced than housing wealth inequality in Greece. The findings of the paper carry important implications for the design of appropriate policies aiming at reducing wealth inequalities and strengthening financial resilience.
Topic:: Debt, Income Inequality, Economic Crisis, and Wealth
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

697. EU-Africa relations ahead of the EU-AU Summit: Taking stock, looking forward

Author:: Pavlos Petidis
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The European Union’s (EU) development policy is a broad field of activity that has undergone multiple significant modifications in both its definitions and its goals. The external relations of the European Union have long included development policy, resulting in an asymmetrical relationship with Africa. Since the turn of the century, the scope of the EU-Africa relationship has expanded to cover new challenges including climate change, terrorism, trade liberalization, and migration. EU development policies reveal a long-term shift in EU development priorities away from fundamental development goals and toward a wider array of ambitions, actors, and methodologies. Identifying and prioritizing the International Organizations on which it and its member states should best focus their diplomatic and political capital is a challenge. Given the political clout and relevance of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) for the continent’s economic development, the EU can concentrate its efforts on encouraging its implementation by deepening its Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Working together to strengthen multilateralism and support the implementation of the European Green Deal and the AfCFTA form the axis of a new articulated African agency.
Topic:: Climate Change, Development, Diplomacy, Migration, Terrorism, European Union, Partnerships, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa and Europe

698. Who are the populists and how to respond to them: Evidence from mainstream European Parliament parties

Author:: Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The main research questions of this paper are how mainstream European Parliament parties conceptualize populism, and how they respond to the rise of populism. The paper, which has come out of the Horizon 2020 project “Demos”, is based on semi-structured interviews with top officials of non-populist parties in the European Parliament (“Europarties”), such as the ALDE, EPP, the Party of European Socialists and the European Greens. The research technique of the paper is thematic analysis, performed on the responses obtained from the aforementioned interviews. Europarty officials identified populist parties by associating them with core themes such as anti-migration, Euroscepticism, and the tendency to make undeliverable policy promises. As for the effectiveness of anti-populist strategies, the interviewees converged on the idea that the problems posed by populists cannot be ignored and that clear and concrete policy solutions are what mainstream parties need, if they are to defend themselves against the evasive political discourse of populist parties. Non-populist parties in the European Parliament may use three strategies to prevent the rise of populists, namely clashing with, marginalizing, or co-opting the populists. Non-populist parties may prefer to incorporate selected questions raised by the populists into their political agendas, and provide non-populist replies to them. Mainstream parties seem aware that while populists may not win arguments over concrete policy measures, they might win voters’ hearts.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, Populism, Domestic Politics, and European Parliament
Political Geography:: Europe

699. Turkey’s “anti-colonial” pivot to Mali: French-Turkish competition and the role of the European Union in the Sahel

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Dawid A. Fusiek
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Turkey’s rising foreign policy ambitions have been best reflected in its pivot to Africa. One of the tropes used by the Erdoğan administration to advance its cause are references to the colonial heritage of the European Union (EU) and its member states. The AKP and its officials have employed this discourse to challenge the French influence in Mali since the 2020 coup d’état. As this paper shows, Turkey uses anti-colonial discourse to exploit postcolonial sentiments with a view to challenging the political and economic power of Western actors, to portraying Turkey as a legitimate and “anti-colonial” ally and partner and, in the long run, to establishing a robust Turkish presence in Mali, the Sahel and beyond. In order to counter Turkish influence, the EU needs to promote fair cooperation with Mali and West Africa, to assist with political and economic development in the region, and to mobilise Member States which are unencumbered with a colonial past.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Anti-Colonialism, and Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, France, Mali, and Sahel

700. Transparency policy in Greece: From citizen empowerment to anticorruption and open data

Author:: Calliope Spanou and Manto Lampropoulou
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This paper aims to provide an overview of the transparency policy in Greece with a focus on public administration. To this end, we explore and critically analyse the origins and the state of play of transparency policy in line with the key components of the current policy agenda, namely: open government, access to documents and digital information, internal audit, and lobbying activities. The goal is to identify (i) the way by which transparency policy has been embedded in the domestic agenda of state reform and evolved over time and (ii) the processes and mechanisms through which transparency policy is currently formulated, implemented and evaluated. The findings of the analysis show that the focus of the transparency policy has shifted over time and has included a wide range of both symbolic and pragmatic initiatives, such as citizen empowerment and participation (1980s), control of public administration (1990s-2000s), open/ digital governance and open data (2000s), anti-corruption (2010s) and public sector digitalization (2020s). In this respect, the term “transparency” seems to have embraced a wide variety of concerns, objectives, procedures, and institutions. Like other policy domains, the fragmentation of the legislative framework and competent institutions has been a constant feature of the domestic transparency policies, which has hampered policy coherence and co-ordination over time. Accordingly, the formulation, implementation and monitoring of the transparency policy implicates multiple actors across central government together with the growing influence of external experts during the past years. Τhe role of civil society and citizen participation in transparency policy remain weak. Recently, an effort has been put forth to centralize control mechanisms and interconnect existing platforms in order to alleviate the observed weaknesses. Yet, beyond the institutional and technical improvements, the role of transparency for democracy and accountability remains in question and needs to be brought back into the debate.
Topic:: Corruption, Citizenship, and Transparency
Political Geography:: Europe and Greece

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS