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402. A Crash Test: EU Strategic Autonomy in the Foreign Policy of France
- Author:
- Łukasz Maślanka
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- France uses the idea of EU strategic autonomy as a tool in its own foreign policy. France’s aim is to redefine the Union’s partnership with the U.S. and NATO. Hence, the activity of President Emmanuel Macron in emphasising the differences between the positions of the U.S. and the EU, especially in relations with China and Russia. Macron’s rhetoric worries other European countries and hides the real problems in EU security policy, such as insufficient financing of the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the lack of a clear definition of strategic autonomy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, France, and United States of America
403. At the Nexus of Participation and Protection: Protection-Related Barriers to Women’s Participation in Northern Ireland
- Author:
- Catherine Turner and Aisling Swaine
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Peace Institute
- Abstract:
- The protection of women in armed conflict and their participation in peace and security activities are central pillars of the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda. Overall, however, the WPS agenda has overlooked the relationship between participation and protection. This perpetuates a false binary between the participation of women as leaders with agency and the protection of women as victims of conflict. It also misses the gendered, context-specific, and conflict-related protection risks that accompany women’s participation. Finally, it overlooks the critical link between the harms women experience and their low levels of representation. This paper considers the intersection between women’s participation and protection in the context of Northern Ireland. While often assumed to be free of “global policy” concerns such as WPS, Northern Ireland starkly illustrates the intrinsic connections and tensions between women’s leadership and protection in conflict and post-conflict situations. After providing an overview of these connections and tensions more broadly, this paper examines the participation and protection of women in Northern Ireland since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. It draws from twenty-five semi-structured interviews with women in leadership positions in Northern Ireland. The paper concludes that gender inequalities and gendered insecurities intersect with sectarianism, the legacy of violence, and political crises arising from power-sharing arrangements under the peace agreement. These, in turn, intersect with emerging technologies such as social media to stymy women’s participation across all areas of post-conflict political life. While these findings underscore the continued relevance of the WPS agenda, they also signify that deeper engagement with gendered protection issues is required if the agenda is to substantively advance women’s equality and participation in the longer term.
- Topic:
- Security, Gender Issues, Women, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Northern Ireland
404. NATO's Eastern Flank: Retooling the US-Baltic Security Link
- Author:
- Andris Banka
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- In recent years NATO has markedly increased its presence in the Baltic states. Relatively “light”, yet highly diverse multinational forces have been placed across the Alliance’s frontline with an underly- ing objective: to deter Russia. In this effort, the United States has served as a critical ballast. The Pentagon has directed sophisticated military exercises and rotated US service members throughout the region. These mea- sures, however, often did not align with US President Donald Trump’s spoken words nor written tweets. This obvious dichotomy disoriented Allied governments and shook bedrock assumptions about US security commitments. As political power changes hands in Washington, this lends an opportunity for a retooling of the transatlantic partnership. Domestically, incoming US President Joe Biden ran on the platform “Build Back Better”. In the spirit of that slogan, this Policy Brief lays out policy cor- rectives that both sides of the Atlantic could pursue to strengthen the US-Baltic security link.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Atlantic, and North America
405. Providing security in Iraq - what do Iraqis think?
- Author:
- Maria-Louise Clausen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Denmark assumed leadership of NATO Mission Iraq in late 2020. The Iraqi people’s perceptions of their personal security and of those who provide it can impact the success of this mission. A recent survey provides new insights. At a time of political turmoil and insecurity in Iraq, NATO has vowed to step up its commitment in the region. This happens at a time of increased resistance to the US presence in Iraq, and a deteriorating security situation due to the escalation of the conflict between the US and Iran taking place on Iraqi soil, as well as signs of an Islamic State resurgence. Security is a major concern in Iraq. When respondents were asked to select their most important concern for the Iraqi government to address, the most common choice was ‘maintaining security and stability’ (30.5%), closely followed by the job situation (27.5%), and corruption (26.2%). This should be read in conjunction with the fact that 71.7% of respondents stated that they experience their personal security as currently either only partially or not at all ensured. This was most pronounced among the surveyed Shias, with only 18.8% indicating that they feel fully or partly secure in contrast to 46.7% of Sunni respondents.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Democratization, Diplomacy, International Organization, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Denmark
406. Small states’ security strategies need an international energy dimension: What can be learned from the Danish Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe negotiations?
- Author:
- Trine Villumsen Berling
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Denmark encountered a number of unforeseen obstacles when negotiating the Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe gas pipelines, and the country ended up standing exposed and alone. A better politics of energy alliances and better strategic preparation are key lessons for small states like Denmark when dealing with the problematic combination of security and energy. RECOMMENDATIONS: Small states should include energy in strategic documents pertaining to foreign and security policies, as energy is a tool in the security toolbox of the great powers. Self-sufficiency in energy does not mean that a country is shielded from the dynamics of international energy. Small states should strive to build enduring political alliances focused on energy. Small states should prioritise sending experts to the NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security in order to stay on top of the international security situation concerning energy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, European Union, Gas, and Minerals
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Denmark, and Baltic States
407. European strategic autonomy: From misconceived to useful concept what can we learn from the Northern outlook?
- Author:
- Christine Nissen and Jessica Larsen
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The concept of ‘European strategic autonomy’ is girdled by myths and resistance. These common misconceptions can be overcome by member states to strengthen the EU in the face of today’s challenging security environment. RECOMMENDATIONS: Ways forward for the concept of strategic autonomy: Level of ambition: strategic autonomy should not be seen as an end in itself but as a means to protect and promote common values and interests across strategically important EU policy areas. Geography: strategic autonomy should enable the EU to undertake activities, in particular in the immediate European neighbourhood. Policy scope: strategic autonomy should encompass the entire spectrum of foreign and security policy, and not just defence.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Denmark
408. Opportunities for Danish stabilisation policy to engage with climate- and livelihood-related conflict: New approaches to fragility in the Horn of Africa and Sahel
- Author:
- Peer Schouten
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The Horn of Africa and the Sahel are among the most fragile regions in the world: poor, lacking basic infrastructure and state presence across much of their respective territories, and both form hotbeds of conflict and political instability compounded by climate change. This DIIS Working Paper focuses on identifying evolving notions of fragility that could strengthen Danish stabilisation efforts in the Horn and Sahel. It foregrounds notions of fragility that move away from a focus on strong state institutions towards the adaptive capacities of populations in the hinterlands of the Horn and the Sahel to deal with conflict and climate variability. The paper gives an overview of this rapidly evolving field and distils key insights, challenges and future options by exploring the question, how can we support people in the Sahel and Horn to re-establish their responsibility for their respective territories and the management of their natural resources? The paper addresses this question by exploring the implications of recent climate change and livelihoods research on how we approach fragility and, by extension, stabilisation. On the basis of such research, the Working Paper advocates a move away from a sector-based understanding of fragility towards a way of working that is more in line with contextual realities, alongside the ‘comprehensive approach’ to stabilisation that Denmark promotes. The key message is that, programmatically, Danish stabilisation efforts across both regions could benefit from a more explicit focus on supporting the variability that dominant livelihood strategies require and that need to be considered if sustainable security and development outcomes are to be achieved. Failing to do this will only serve to marginalise key communities and may drive them further into the arms of radical groups.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Democratization, Development, Environment, Radicalization, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, and Justice
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, Denmark, and Horn of Africa
409. What about China? Differences between US and European policies on China
- Author:
- Carla Freeman and Cengiz Günay
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- THIS EVENT WAS PART OF THE "A BRAND NEW WORLD? SHIFTING POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OIIP ONLINE SERIES. Ever since President Obama’s "pivot to Asia" it has become clear that the US foreign and security policies are increasingly focused on China’s regional and global ambitions as a challenge to US interests in the Asia-Pacific. The Trump administration extended US security policy vis a vis Beijing to the economic arena through a protracted trade war, also banning several online apps and platforms such as TikTok, as well as the telecommunications giant Huawei. The European Union and its member states have remained silent and refrained from harsh rhetoric and policies towards China. What is the difference between US and European policies? What might change or remain the same under the Biden administration and what can be expected from China in the near future? We will discuss these and more questions with Carla Freeman, Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Institute and Associate research professor in China Studies at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Conversation with: CARLA FREEMAN Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Moderated by: CENGIZ GÜNAY Austrian Institute for international Affairs. Supported by the U.S. Embassy Vienna.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Trade Wars, and Telecommunications
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
410. What threatens NATO – and what members can do? The case of Norway and Poland
- Author:
- Jakub M. Godzimirski
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- This research paper examines the critical external and internal challenges that faced NATO at its 70th anniversary, and how the policies of two members – Norway and Poland – can influence the internal cohesion of the Alliance and thus its ability to provide security to all its members. The survival of NATO as a viable security actor will depend on its capacity to maintain internal cohesion, a crucial factor influencing its ability to address external risks, challenges and threats in the increasingly turbulent international environment. This study places the debate in the broader context of discussion on alliance survivability in general, maps the external and internal challenges facing the Alliance after seven decades of its existence, and examines possible risks that the policies of Norway and Poland may pose to NATO’s internal cohesion and thus its ability to react to external challenges.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Norway, and Poland
411. Resilience in the age of crises
- Author:
- Mathilde Tomine Eriskdatter Giske
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- This research paper examines the concept 'resilience' as a response to the constantly changing environments and turbulence of the world. While resilience is used by several international organisations and nation states, there is still a lack of consensus regarding what the concept really means – it denotes both resisting change and being willing to adapt at the same time. This paper offers some clarity and argues that a temporal dimension is needed when applying the concept of resilience.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, International Organization, European Union, Pandemic, Resilience, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Europe
412. On Total Defense
- Author:
- Giorgi Surmava
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- Recently, the world has faced new threats and challenges which have revitalized "total defense," somewhat forgotten after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc. Russia's military activities (in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria) and other challenges have made some states rethink this concept and total defense has once again become a topical issue. In general, in its essence, total defense is not a novelty - the Great Patriotic War waged by the Soviet Union was an example of mobilizing all of the available resources of the state to win the war. However, the challenges, threats and conceptual approaches of the Cold War period and, especially, of the first decade of this century significantly differ from that of the previous ones. During the Cold War, European countries, especially northern states, gained some experience in total defense and developed new approaches to this concept. Their experience was shared by the Baltic countries which later developed their own methods. Recently, due to the current situation, the issue of a comprehensive approach to security has become topical in Northern Europe; it is based on the doctrine of total defense developed during the Cold War and combines military and non-military components of national security. A multifaceted approach to security is a way to maintain the resilience of the state and society in the event of external pressure and war. It also implies the provision of the best possible environment for the operation of the armed forces. Along with the traditional approach, this involves creating additional capabilities to respond to threats that were hard to perceive in the past (e.g., cyber threats).
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, History, Crisis Management, and Soviet Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eurasia, Georgia, and Singapore
413. Critical Infrastructure Protection in Europe: Strengthening Resilience Under Article 3 of The Washington Treaty
- Author:
- Megi Benia
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
- Abstract:
- NATO is a major military organization responsible for security in the Euro-Atlantic space. Consequently, the current security environment in the world and, especially, in Europe stimulates debates about NATO’s readiness to resist an armed attack. However, these debates are normally held around the Alliance’s Article 5 as a key component of collective defense and in this process, the principles of Article 3 are ignored, something which is a wrong approach. NATO’s Article 3 states that: “In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (NATO, Resilience and Article 3 2020). Therefore, fulfilling obligations under Article 3 is a crucial part of the organization’s main idea of collective defense as it enables NATO to fulfil the obligations of Article 5. However, one must remember that in today’s unpredictable security situation, “capacity to resist armed attack” (NATO, Resilience and Article 3 2020) means not only military readiness. To be able to deploy rapidly during operations or a potential armed attack, military forces need the support of transport systems, satellite communications and power supplies, etc. However, it is a well-known fact that these systems are highly vulnerable during an attack in both peace and war.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Infrastructure, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
414. The EU’s Strategic Compass for security and defence: Squaring ambition with reality
- Author:
- Dick Zandee, Adaja Stoetman, and Bob Deen
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- The European Union (EU) is developing a Strategic Compass for security and defence, to be ready by March 2022. The first semester of 2021 is the phase of the ‘strategic dialogue’ with the member states and institutions of the EU, including the involvement of think tanks and other stakeholders. Commissioned by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, the Clingendael Institute delivers its contribution to the strategic dialogue on the Strategic Compass by focussing on defining more precisely the military level of ambition of the EU and what it implies for capability development and the relationship with NATO. The EU faces a wider set of challenges and threats than ever before. In the global power rivalry between China, Russia and the United States, it is ‘Europe’ that runs the danger of becoming irrelevant and the object of great power actions rather than being a global actor. The arc of instability around Europe is unlikely to turn into an arc of stability. The challenges posed by state and non-state actors – the latter in particular in the southern neighbourhood – require the EU to respond to external conflicts and crises, to support partners to provide security for their own population and to protect the Union and its citizens – the three strategic priorities for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as defined five years ago in the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. While the EU has made progress in many areas – trade policies, partnerships, civilian crisis management – its military tools have remained weak as a result of a lack of political will and the absence of adequate military means. The Strategic Compass offers the opportunity to close the gap between ‘too much rhetoric’ and ‘too little action’ that have characterised the EU’s security and defence efforts so far. In recent years, new instruments have been created to improve European defence cooperation – such as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) – but these are what they are: without strategic direction instruments tend to become bureaucratic tools rather than the rails on which the train travels to its destination. In the Strategic Compass the EU has to define more precisely its military level of ambition and what it implies for capability development and partnerships. In short, the report tries to answer two questions: (1) what should the EU be able to do, and (2) what is needed to get there? The relationship with NATO has to be taken into account in answering these key questions.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Europe
415. Russian Foreign Policy in 2020: Strengthening Multi-vectorialism
- Author:
- András Rácz and Milan Nič
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- In 2020, DGAP’s Strategy Group on Russia focused on Moscow’s long-term efforts to diversify its foreign policy portfolio, turn away from Europe, and build-up other non-Western vectors in its diplomacy. Against this background, this report assesses Russia’s relations with the EU, China, and the United States. While Russian relations with the West are unlikely to improve in 2021 – especially ahead of this fall’s Duma election – there is still a chance for limited engagement on issues of mutual interest.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Democracy, and International Order
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America
416. The Logic (and Grammar) of US Grand Strategy: Implications for Germany and Europe
- Author:
- Markus Jaeger
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Although President Biden has made US foreign policy more predictable, its medium- and long-term direction and concomitant implications for transatlantic relations are less certain. This report presents three scenarios of how US strategy might evolve. They provide insight into how the United States behaves in the spheres of security and international economy under different conditions and why, suggesting ways for the EU and Germany to preemptively mitigate risks and positively influence future policy.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Grand Strategy, Risk, and Transatlantic Relations
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America
417. Cooperation in Tertiary Prevention of Islamist Extremism
- Author:
- Sofia Koller
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- In tertiary prevention of Islamist extremism, civil society and governmental exit programs support individuals (and their families) who wish to disengage from violent extremist groups and distance themselves from extremist ideologies. Exit work and successful reintegration into society involves security agencies as well es very practical elements provided by municipal actors, public services, and civil society organizations. Effective cooperation between civil society and governmental actors including statutory bodies is crucial but can be challenging.
- Topic:
- Security, Civil Society, Government, Violent Extremism, and Islamism
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Germany, Belgium, and Netherlands
418. De-Securitising and Re-Prioritising EU-Iraq Relations
- Author:
- Flavio Fusco
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Located at the heart of the Middle East, connecting the Levant to the Persian Gulf, Iraq has always been at the centre of regional dynamics. Yet, the country is today reduced to a quasi-failed state fundamentally damaged in its political, social and economic fabric, with long-term consequences that trace a fil rouge from the 2003 US-led invasion to the emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) and the country’s current structural fragility.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America
419. Countering Zero-Sum Relations in the Middle East: Insights from the Expert Survey
- Author:
- Flavio Fusco
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Building on emerging debates on the need to develop de-escalation mechanisms for the Middle East, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), with support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, launched a one-year research and outreach project entitled “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”. Connected to the research, an expert survey targeting European, US, Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese experts and practitioners was conducted on key themes, principles and approaches associated with a potential new security architecture for the region. The results of the survey – first published in an edited book volume jointly published by IAI and FEPS in November 2020 – are analysed below, complete with tables and infographics on key themes associated with the research project and the search for new, inclusive mechanisms for dialogue and de-escalation in the Middle East.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, and Politics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America
420. “The Montreux Petition” and Creeping Islamization of the Turkish Military
- Author:
- Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- A storm over a petition by retired naval officers once again has revealed longstanding tensions between the civilian Turkish government and the Turkish military, and Erdogan’s plans for advancing pro-regime Islamists in the military.
- Topic:
- Security, Religion, Military Strategy, and Civil-Military Relations
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, and Asia
421. The New US-EU Energy Security Agenda: Roundtable Report
- Author:
- Jonathan Elkind
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- On June 3, 2021, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs), in cooperation with the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and the European Union (EU) Delegation to the US, cohosted a private virtual roundtable focusing on energy security issues during a period of heightened action on climate goals. This document summarizes the June 3 roundtable, which was conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Participants in the roundtable included just over 50 senior corporate executives, civil society representatives, academic and think tank experts, energy analysts, and government officials from the European Union and United States. In June 2021, President Joe Biden traveled to Europe, his first overseas trip since his inauguration as president, and he met with European heads of state and government in the context of a British-hosted G7 meeting, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, and a US-EU Summit.[1] The journey signaled a concerted effort by the United States and the European Union to rebuild bilateral relations, which were battered during the Trump administration. Protecting the global climate and accelerating the transition to clean energy are objectives that unify top leaders on both sides of the Atlantic today. The European Union has a legislated mandate of climate neutrality by the year 2050 and is implementing its comprehensive European Green Deal and elaborating a corresponding legal and regulatory framework for an enhanced 2030 target. In the United States, the Biden administration reentered the Paris climate agreement and announced plans to reach net-zero emissions by midcentury, though climate protection still faces significant political challenges in the US Congress and in certain states. If the European Union and the United States proceed as these plans indicate, their energy systems face a period of accelerating, unprecedented, and sustained change—new technologies, new supply chains, new business models, and new interdependencies between economic sectors.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, International Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America
422. EU sets new course for the Arctic
- Author:
- Laurent Mayet
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- The European Union's strengthened engagement in the Arctic, presented on 13 October, marks two new directions in the Union's diplomatic positioning: a strategic and security turn, and the absolute priority given to the fight against climate change.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Diplomacy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Arctic
423. Syria and Libya’s Contributions to the Evolution of the Turkish “Forward Defence” Doctrine
- Author:
- Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- In the last decade, there have been considerable changes in Turkey’s regional policies, especially in terms of the increasing use of hard power. Such changes are largely in response to regional rivalry, refugee flow from Syria and the revival of Kurdish issues, as well as strained relations with Turkey’s traditional allies, such as the United States and the European Union, among other factors. In the first decade of its rule, the AKP government moved away from Turkey’s traditional approach to foreign policy by adopting soft power in its relations with the states in the Middle East region. However, following the Arab Spring, and especially 2016, the AKP government embraced a “forward defence” doctrine, reminiscent of the security policies of the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey reoriented its defence posture around a security-oriented approach due to its geostrategic location. This defence posture was based on the belief that Turkey has an unstable but strategically important location and hence needs powerful armed forces to employ hard power to protect its interests and security. Naturally, security threat perceptions reached their peak in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey came to the brink of using military force against several states such as Greece, Cyprus and Syria. Modernisation of armed forces and development of national defence industry were among the policies adopted during this era. The forward defence doctrine is key to Turkey’s policy in Syria and Libya. Given the dominant role played by Turkey in Syria, AKP has intensified its military activities beyond the Syrian border with the aim of preventing the expansion of the YPG and advance of the Syrian army into Idlib, which would trigger a large influx of refugees. Maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean intertwined with geopolitical tensions and rivalry between Turkey and its regional rivals such as France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. In response to its regional isolation and to block these developments, Turkey signed two Memoranda of Understanding, on maritime delimitation and on security cooperation, with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. The recent shift in Turkey’s security policy is in line with the basic principles of the AKP government’s grand strategy, which seeks to reposition Turkey as a central state in the international and regional system.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, and Syria
424. The post-Brexit EU-UK relationship: an opportunity or challenge for cyber security?
- Author:
- Ellie Templeton and Robert Dewar
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- With multiple post-Brexit pathways that could still be pursued following the recent adoption of the new security agreements, the EU-UK cyber security relationship is still evolving. Value must be placed on collaboration to tackle shared cyber threats, the role EU institutions play in bringing cyber security actors together, and Britain’s former contribution to European security. These factors strongly indicate that, although new opportunities may present themselves, there will likely be irreversible losses for collective cyber resilience due to Brexit. In order to work towards a new, valuable relationship model, it is recommended that both the EU and UK uphold professional, transparent and non- political security cooperation going forward, whilst remaining open to flexible operational support in the unpredictable and ever-changing cyber threat landscape. Ultimately, within an international system affected by “instability, insecurity and uncertainty”,61 it remains to be seen what opportunities and challenges arise, and if the resulting relationship, whether based on one specific pathway or a combination of all three, could constitute an effective EU relationship model for non-EU entities in the cyber security field.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
425. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?
- Author:
- Antoine Got
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North America
426. The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex
- Author:
- Raluca Csernatoni
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Is the European Union (EU) about to rise as a defense technological actor on the world stage? According to conventional wisdom, attempts at greater European integration in security and defense were not likely to amount to much, given that such policy fields have long been considered the reserved domain of the EU member states or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This working paper goes beyond this traditional state-centered approach by looking at past and recent institutional efforts to consolidate European security and cooperation on defense industry and technology. Such efforts have continued despite the disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic, owing to the bloc’s willingness to become a stronger security and defense actor on the global stage. The timing of this shift was facilitated by a set of circumstances that triggered a new European defense momentum. Contributing factors include the geopolitical pressures of Brexit, an unreliable transatlantic partner in the United States, concerns within European defense industries regarding dwindling national defense budgets and fierce global technological competition in high technology areas, and the European Commission’s growing supranational role in security and defense. This impetus was also facilitated by the privileged relationship between various EU institutions, European defense industrial actors, transnational interest and lobby groups, and organized expert bodies. In this respect, the defense industry and high-level expert and interest groups have occupied a central position in shaping EU policy processes, funding priorities, and security and defense research programs. Such a rapprochement between EU institutional structures and the European defense industry has allowed for the emergence of a so-called European defense technological and industrial complex (EDTIC). This European defense industrial ecosystem encompasses a wider variety of transnational actors beyond the political, military, and industrial groups typically present in national military-industrial complexes. It presents a dense, multilevel network of EU institutions and agencies; security and industrial stakeholders; national public authorities; and interest and expert groups, all of which both compete and cooperate to shape and set policy agendas. However, this rapprochement is also characterized by the absence of strong democratic control mechanisms and little political and public accountability concerning the surge in and direction of the European defense technological and industrial integration process. These transformations have the potential to make the union a more capable and strategically autonomous global defense technological actor. At the same time, they challenge existing EU democratic governance structures and processes. The EU’s security and defense policies remain tough areas for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight. The EU’s policymaking institutional machinery has been finely tuned to mediate power, keep things as technical and bureaucratic as possible, and to create package deals for certain defense industrial interests and member states’ political agendas. Yet, for real European integration in the field of security and defense, more political and democratic trust is needed across the continent.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Europe
427. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion
- Author:
- Luke Patey
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark
428. The pandemic has overturned our old understandings of security
- Author:
- Trine Villumsen Berling, Ulrik Pram Gad, Karen Lund Petersen, and Ole Waever
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- On 11 March 2020, the Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, addressed the nation in a press conference broadcast live from the ’Hall of Mirrors’ in the Prime Minister’s Office. The setting was grandiose, the tone was serious, the future gloomy. The coronavirus pandemic was here, and it was threatening Danish citizens, the healthcare system and the welfare state. Frederiksen announced an immediate two-week lockdown of Denmark. Now was the time to show ‘community spirit.’ Every citizen was called upon to work collectively to protect vulnerable individuals, societal cohesion and the survival of the Danish state. Gone were the threats of climate change, which dominated the general election less than a year earlier. If border control was relevant, the reason was no longer the migrants and refugees whose ‘influx’ and ‘failure to integrate’ had fundamentally re-configured the Danish party system over the last decades. Some would argue that this was a classic act of securitization requiring the concentration of all attention and resources on emergency measures to fight off an existential threat. However, what happened was much more complicated. What we saw was a complex web of translations of this security message into the daily practices of government agencies, private companies and citizens.
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Crisis Management, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Denmark, and Sweden
429. Greenland obviously has its own defense policy
- Author:
- Sara Olsvig and Urik Pram Gad
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Historically, Danish decisions have not always put Greenlandic interests first. Although defense policy is formally under Danish jurisdiction, decisions only have the legitimacy necessary if Greenland participates in the decision-making processes. Because in Greenland, military activities and installations interfere intimately with civic society. Increased rivalry between the great powers in the Arctic produces challenging issues for the constitutional community consisting of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark. Denmark and Greenland must make the role they each want to play in the international community clear and rethink the responsibilities and coordination procedures of the community. Otherwise, Greenland and Denmark risk contributing to increased tension in the Arctic – and Greenland risks missing out on potential gains from the growing attention from the great powers.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Denmark, and Greenland
430. Global rivalry in the Red Sea: A ‘Geopolitical’ European Union should encourage cooperation in the Red Sea region
- Author:
- Fabrizzio Tassinari and Mehari Taddele Maru
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Geopolitical competition in Africa is here to stay, and the question for the EU is not if but how to position itself in this global competition. In the case of the Red Sea region, the EU should support regional initiatives to build effective regional maritime governance and promote global public goods such as maritime security and the blue economy. Under the Presidency of Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission has branded itself a ‘Geopolitical Commission’. With regard to geopolitics, the Red Sea has for years been seen as a primary focus of action, a point the European Council stressed in July 2021, when it identified the region as a ‘geostrategic priority’. In 2018, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, finding that there was ‘renewed geopolitical competition on both shores of the Red Sea’. The EU further stressed that ‘at stake are the preservation of the security of the Bab el Mandeb maritime route through which a significant proportion of trade to and from Europe passes; the harnessing of irregular migration flows; the containment of terrorist threats; and the prevention of instability in the EU’s wider neighbourhood’.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, International Organization, Governance, European Union, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, and Red Sea
431. The COVID-19 Pandemic and European Security: Between Damages and Crises
- Author:
- Alessandro Marrone
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic will negatively affect the defence field from a budgetary, industrial and politicostrategic point of view, particularly in Europe. Depending on the pandemic’s duration, its economic consequences and national and EU responses, effects may range from contained damages to a much wider European security crisis.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Crisis Management, and Coronavirus
- Political Geography:
- Europe and European Union
432. Europe Needs a Regional Strategy on Iran
- Author:
- Cornelius Adebahr
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The rift between Europe and the United States over Iran is deepening. To regain leverage, the Europeans should engage all eight Gulf states in talks about regional security and nonproliferation. The rift between Europe and the United States over Iran is deepening. Two years of U.S. maximum pressure on Tehran have not yielded the results Washington had hoped for, while the Europeans have failed to put up enough resistance for their transatlantic partner to change course. Worse, the U.S. policy threatens to destabilize the broader Persian Gulf, with direct consequences for Europe. To get ahead of the curve and regain leverage, the European Union (EU), its member states, and the United Kingdom have to look beyond their relations with the Islamic Republic and address wider regional security challenges. The United States’ incipient retreat as a security guarantor and Russia’s increased interest in the region make it necessary for Europe to engage beyond its borders. Despite being barely alive, the 2015 international nuclear deal with Iran offers a good starting point. The Europeans should regionalize some of the agreement’s basic provisions to include the nuclear newcomers on the Arab side of the Gulf. Doing so would advance a nonproliferation agenda that is aimed not at a single country but at the region’s broader interests. Similarly, the Europeans should engage Iran, Iraq, and the six Arab nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council in talks about regional security. Rather than suggesting an all-encompassing security framework, for which the time is not yet ripe, they should pursue a step-by-step approach aimed at codifying internationally recognized principles at the regional level.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
433. Finnish foreign policy during EU membership: Unlocking the EU’s security potential
- Author:
- Matti Pesu, Tuomas Iso-Markku, and Juha Jokela
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- This FIIA Finnish Foreign Policy Paper looks at the evolution of Finnish foreign and security policy during the country’s 25 years as an EU member. The paper aims to trace how – and with what kind of consequences – Finnish foreign and security policy has interacted with EU foreign policy during the membership period. More specifically, the study examines the interlinkage between Finnish and EU foreign policy in relation to three different topics: the policy towards and relations with Russia, security and defence, and Finland’s broadening international agenda. The paper argues that the Finnish policy vis-à-vis the three domains is marked by different patterns of continuity and change. However, the rise of a protective agenda in the Finnish policy towards Russia, Finland’s increased boldness in advancing the EU’s security and defence dimension, and the recent emphasis on the Union’s role as a bulwark against geo-economic threats all indicate that the EU’s role in enhancing Finnish security has become a top priority. Indeed, Finland is currently endeavouring to unlock the EU’s potential as a security community.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia
434. Government reports on Finnish foreign and security policy: Relevant but not without problems
- Author:
- Henri Vanhanen
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The government reports on foreign and security policy have become a well-established and recognized practice in which the Government of Finland issues a report generally once during the parliamentary term. The reports can be regarded as comprehensive and strategic documents, whose purpose is to signal the strategic directions of Finland’s present and future policy for both domestic and foreign readers. Regardless of the government reports’ institutionalized role in Finnish foreign and security policy practices, they are not without problems. The main issue with the current report process is linked to the quickly changing operational environment. Thus, a more frequent process such as an annual announcement on foreign and security policy to support the government reports should be considered. It is relevant to ask whether the current tradition of producing reports is the most effective way to outline or signal Finland’s overall foreign and security policy. In order to address the issues of the reporting process, alternative methods to support and evaluate Finland’s foreign and security policy should be considered.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia
435. The Crisis of Nuclear Arms Control and its Impact on European Security
- Author:
- Lukasz Kulesa
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The collapse of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 was the most recent chapter in the process of the erosion of the cold war-originated system of nuclear arms control. This paper argues that the European Union (EU) member states and the EU itself have already been negatively affected. Thus far, however, European states have remained observers rather than active players. Instead of focusing only on praising the past achievements of nuclear arms control and lamenting its demise, a new European approach is needed—one that identifies how best to address the major nuclear security threats and challenges facing Europe through arms control instruments. This paper examines the legacy of nuclear arms control, recent developments and the causes of the current crisis; and analyses the impact on European security. Finally, it presents options on how the EU and its member states might become better engaged in rethinking the nuclear arms control architecture.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Europe
436. EU Security Perspectives in an Era of Connectivity: Implications for Relations with China
- Author:
- Ian Anthony, Jiayi Zhou, and Fei Su
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- This SIPRI Insights Paper assesses EU security perspectives on connectivity, alongside and in relation to its evolving relationship with China. The EU’s relations with China have undergone an important shift in recent years, with a strengthened emphasis by the EU on the challenges to bilateral cooperation. In addition, since 2014, EU and EU member states’ security perspectives have undergone a wider reassessment, one that has increased the prominence of the military dimensions of connectivity, including military mobility, in EU security planning. The EU and China are currently pursuing synergies between their separate connectivity initiatives, namely the Belt and Road Initiative and the Connecting Europe programme. However, there remain barriers to sustainable cooperation that will need to be addressed between them moving forward. This Insights Paper outlines a number of those security concerns from the EU perspective, within the transport and digital sectors specifically.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
437. The Arms Control–Regional Security Nexus in the Middle East
- Author:
- Tytti Erästö
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The erosion of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement poses a risk for both Middle East regional security and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it highlights the need to build a more sustainable regional foundation for conflict resolution and arms control in the Middle East. This paper argues that the arms control– regional security nexus should be better reflected in European policy. While maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and preventing further US–Iranian escalation should be the European Union’s (EU) first priority, the paper urges the EU to develop a more comprehensive approach in support of regional security, arms control and disarmament in the Middle East. In addition to resolving inconsistencies in current EU policies on regional security, arms control and arms exports to the Middle East, the EU should consider throwing its political weight behind two emerging processes that could provide a much-needed opening for regional cooperation: security dialogue in the Gulf and the annual Middle East weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone conferences at the United Nations. If it involved regional non-proliferation cooperation, the former process could also help manage the negative consequences of the potential collapse of the Iran nuclear agreement.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, and Disarmament
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, and Middle East
438. Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk
- Author:
- Dr Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Peter Topychkanov, Fei Su, and Peldán Carlsson
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- This report aims to offer the reader a concrete understanding of how the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) by nuclear-armed states could have an impact on strategic stability and nuclear risk and how related challenges could be addressed at the policy level. The analysis builds on extensive data collection on the AI-related technical and strategic developments of nuclear-armed states. It also builds on the authors’ conclusions from a series of regional workshops that SIPRI organized in Sweden (on Euro-Atlantic dynamics), China (on East Asian dynamics) and Sri Lanka (on South Asian dynamics), as well as a transregional workshop in New York. At these workshops, AI experts, scholars and practitioners who work on arms control, nuclear strategy and regional security had the opportunity to discuss why and how the adoption of AI capabilities by nuclear-armed states could have an impact on strategic stability and nuclear risk within or among regions.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, South Asia, East Asia, Sri Lanka, and Sweden
439. Increasing Member State Contributions to EU Civilian CSDP Missions
- Author:
- Timo Smit
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- European Union (EU) member states established the Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Compact in 2018 to strengthen civilian CSDP missions. Among other things, they committed to increasing the number and share of seconded personnel in these missions. Both had been decreasing in previous years. The number of seconded personnel started to increase in 2019, driven by the expansion of several missions. It increased from 712 in August 2019 to 773 in April 2020. The increase discontinued thereafter, most likely as a consequence of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Meanwhile, the share of seconded personnel continued to decrease both overall—from 66 per cent when the compact was established to 62 per cent in August 2020—and in most missions. In order to ensure the delivery of the CDSP Compact, EU member states should, among other things, continue expanding their capacity to second more personnel to missions in the medium term and increase their contributions in the short term to prevent missions becoming more dependent on contracted personnel, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. The European External Action Service should, for example, introduce indicators based on the retention and recruitment of seconded and contracted mission personnel and analyse the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on these two issues.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Europe
440. Will a European Security Council Bring Strategic Relevance?
- Author:
- Jo Coelmont
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Europe is looking to be a global player rather than just a global playground. To achieve this, it needs a security council. This is essential for gaining strategic relevance. Europe needs to have recourse not only to international fora but also to a series of instruments of hard and soft power. Swift decision making at the appropriate level is of paramount importance. Such a security council should meet a number of requirements: it must be representative, be able to both achieve unity of vision and undertake action smoothly, and keep going until the desired end-state has been achieved. Several proposals have been made as to the composition of such a body. I will look into the four most discussed options. Are we spoilt for choice?
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Atlantic, and North America
441. Beyond Corona: Getting EU Economic Security Right
- Author:
- Tobias Gehrke
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- The corona crisis, the US-China great power competition and lacklustre international rules vividly demonstrate the vulnerability of economic interdependence. Interdependence is a power struggle, not a mutual aid society. For the vast benefits of a globalised economy to continue to outweigh its risks, policies to build greater resilience are necessary. For the EU, the unprecedented events also offer an opportunity to forge a new economic security approach to better manage its dependencies in strategic sectors.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Europe, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America
442. Russian pipelines and EU energy security: Utilizing the externality elements of the EU’s regulatory framework
- Author:
- Michalis Mathioulakis
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Russia and the EU have been entangled in the harsh effects of asymmetrical interdependence and the security threats it generates. Russia’s economy is linked directly to the form and volume of trade directed from the EU towards the Russian economy, while the EU economy is linked to the flow of Russian gas and oil directed towards European businesses and households. Growing concerns on EU’s dependency on energy imports led the European Commission to release its Energy Security Strategy (2014), aiming to secure stability and abundancy of energy supply while simultaneously examining the effects of discrepancies from Russian gas imports to the European energy systems. In contrast, Russia’s primary concern is to secure the necessary energy revenues that could enable Moscow to project and exercise its hard power to areas with strategic interest by striving to gain greater leverage within the European energy markets. Russia’s security objectives in relation to its energy export capacity are expressed primarily through materialisation of two major natural gas pipeline systems, namely the Nord Stream 2 and the TurkStream pipelines. This paper by Michalis Mathioulakis, Research Associate of ELIAMEP; Energy Strategy Analyst and Academic Director of the Greek Energy Forum, examines the strive between the two international actors in redetermining their future relations and the role of Russian gas pipelines and the EU’s regulatory framework in shaping the two actors’ common future.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, European Union, and Regulation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Eurasia
443. Towards an EU Hydrogen Economy: Policy and Energy Security Perspectives
- Author:
- Mariana Liakopoulou
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Hydrogen is positioned as a strong candidate for fulfilling the carbon-neutrality objective set out in the European Green Deal, provided that it is able to compete on a level-playing field with other technologies favoring sector coupling. Pushing the envisioned hydrogen economy past its tipping point necessitates a conducive EU regulation, repurposing of existing large-scale EU networks, along with additional investments, as well as strategic partnerships with the EU’s third-country suppliers. This paper aims to outline the role of hydrogen as a component of the decarbonization of the European natural gas sector, in the context of an integrated energy system.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, Economy, and Hydrogen
- Political Geography:
- Europe
444. Greek-American relations: what next?
- Author:
- George Tzogopoulos
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- With President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis scheduled to meet early this January, Dr. George Tzogopoulos, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP, outlines the course of Greek-American relations from 2015 onwards. Dr. Tzogopoulos argues that Athens and Washington DC have entered a period of strong cooperation that can be further consolidated in 2020. Defense, energy and trade are the main focal points. The agenda includes the need to create a new security environment in the Mediterranean – with Greece playing a key role. The excellent status of Greek-American relations creates new opportunities for closer bilateral cooperation on defense, energy and trade. The region of Northern Greece becomes of gradually higher significance for the US. US foreign policy towards Greece reflects its interest in restraining Russian influence. While anti-Americanism in Greece is declining, there is widespread concern in the domestic public sphere on whether the US will support Greece in the case of a crisis with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. US support to the trilateral cooperation of Greece-Israel-Cyprus will be reinforced through the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act. The US-Greece Strategic Dialogue and NATO Mediterranean Dialogue are useful instruments for strengthening Greece’s role in the South, contributing towards a new security landscape.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Greece, North America, and United States of America
445. Greek-Russian Relations: A Potential to Mend Strained Ties
- Author:
- George Tzogopoulos
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- The relationship between Greece and Russia requires a careful management following the diplomatic crisis of the 2018 summer. The visit of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Athens offers an opportunity for a sincere dialogue between the two countries. Greece and Russia can either agree on their disagreements or search for a new way forward based on realism and common interests. A sincere dialogue should leave illusions aside and concentrate on joint interests.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Greece
446. The Transformation of the European Union: The Impact of Climate Change in European Politics
- Author:
- Xira Ruiz-Campillo
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- It is evident that climate change has impacted our lives and our environment. Without any doubt, it was developed countries the most responsible for accelerating that change in our climate although developing countries are increasingly greatly contributing to it. It is our responsibility as human beings to leave future generations with a better world or, at least, not one worse. We are not the owners, but only the casual dwellers of a planet that has given us the opportunity to live and to enjoy a breathtaking environmental wealth that we must preserve. It is the duty of all countries and citizens to take care of what we have been given for the years we are here, and it is our responsibility to analyse the best way of doing that. This is the introduction to a book that is a collective effort made by eight women concerned and united by the research on climate change, sustainability and cooperation policies within the European Union. This work tries to shed light on the evolution the European Union has experienced since 1992 in its fight against climate change in the search of a more sustainable Europe. Without wanting to be exhaustive, the book aims to depict the evolution of the European Union’s policies on climate, cooperation, sustainability, security, economy and energy with the final aim of being a trustworthy and reliable actor at the international level. The impact that international agreements on climate, cooperation and sustainability have had on European policies is analysed in different chapters.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Sustainability
- Political Geography:
- Europe
447. Visegrad Group as institution for Central European cooperation: Ups and downs of small international organizations
- Author:
- Jaroslav Ušiak
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Central Europe has always been an integral part of all processes on the European continent. Nowadays, more than 30 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, Central Europe has broad opportunities for cooperation in all areas and is fully integrated into various regional and international organisations. Using qualitative methods—analysis and comparison with combination with the theory of social constructivism—help us understand the social phenomena of cooperation among states. Based on social constructivism theory, our article elaborates on the factors of cooperation between individual states, focusing on the cooperation of the Visegrad Four (V4) countries in Central Europe. We examine the factors leading to the establishment of V4 cooperation, its form, and specific features related to the European Regional Security Complex, as well as future challenges.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, and Visegrad Group
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Central Europe
448. War’s Elusive End – The Yemen Annual Review 2019
- Author:
- Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The Yemen Review – formerly known as Yemen at the UN – is a monthly publication produced by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. Launched in June 2016, it aims to identify and assess current diplomatic, economic, political, military, security, humanitarian and human rights developments related to Yemen. In producing The Yemen Review, Sana’a Center staff throughout Yemen and around the world gather information, conduct research, and hold private meetings with local, regional, and international stakeholders in order to analyze domestic and international developments regarding Yemen. This monthly series is designed to provide readers with contextualized insight into the country’s most important ongoing issues.
- Topic:
- Security, Human Rights, Politics, United Nations, European Union, Drones, Conflict, Houthis, and Coalition
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America
449. The War Over Aid – The Yemen Review, January/February 2020
- Author:
- Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The Yemen Review Launched in June 2016, The Yemen Review – formerly known as Yemen at the UN – is a monthly publication produced by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. It aims to identify and assess current diplomatic, economic, political, military, security, humanitarian and human rights developments related to Yemen. In producing The Yemen Review, Sana’a Center staff throughout Yemen and around the world gather information, conduct research, hold private meetings with local, regional, and international stakeholders, and analyze the domestic and international context surrounding developments in and regarding Yemen. This monthly series is designed to provide readers with a contextualized insight into the country’s most important ongoing issues.
- Topic:
- Security, Human Rights, Politics, United Nations, Foreign Aid, Conflict, Houthis, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America
450. War and Pandemic – The Yemen Review, April 2020
- Author:
- Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- The Yemen Review Launched in June 2016, The Yemen Review – formerly known as Yemen at the UN – is a monthly publication produced by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. It aims to identify and assess current diplomatic, economic, political, military, security, humanitarian and human rights developments related to Yemen. In producing The Yemen Review, Sana’a Center staff throughout Yemen and around the world gather information, conduct research, hold private meetings with local, regional, and international stakeholders, and analyze the domestic and international context surrounding developments in and regarding Yemen. This monthly series is designed to provide readers with a contextualized insight into the country’s most important ongoing issues.
- Topic:
- Security, Human Rights, Politics, United Nations, Food Security, Economy, Conflict, COVID-19, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America
451. The trip from Donbas: Ukraine’s pressing need to defend its veterans
- Author:
- Lauren Van Metre and John Boerstler
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The war in the Donbas is entering its sixth year no less violent, and no closer to a peace agreement, than when it began. When Russia invaded in 2014, the Ukrainian army was wholly unprepared. Many officers were corrupt, had long-standing relations with the Russian military from their days in the Soviet army, and lacked combat experience.1 Maidan revolutionaries became volunteer soldiers, and private-security-turned-militia groups sped to the front to stop the Russia-led separatist offensive. Six years later, Ukraine struggles to care for and reintegrate the 385,000 Donbas veterans and volunteer combatants, thirteen thousand of whom are legally disabled.2 A lack of support for veterans creates a critical void in Ukraine’s national security and hobbles its transition to democracy. Ukraine’s new Ministry of Veterans Affairs (MVA) consolidates approximately twenty disparate social services for veterans. With its establishment, politicians and civil society leaders agree that the country needs a comprehensive strategy for veterans care. The lack of care exacerbates several crises confronting veterans, including high rates of suicide, under- and unemployment, divorce, and domestic violence.3 It also leaves them alone to counter disinformation targeted at veterans by Russia. They are also vulnerable to recruitment by right-wing and oligarch-sponsored security services, as they seek employment and to recreate the unit solidarity of the front.4 An unfit veterans support network that provides little care risks veterans’ political and social disaffection, declining levels of recruitment and retention for the military, and the fracturing of families. Setting up a responsive veterans care system furthers Ukraine’s democratic transition. Citizen soldiers make up half of the army’s recruits. Architects, engineers, teachers, accountants—citizens from all walks of Ukrainian life—enlist on a regular basis for time at the front. The Ministry of Veterans Affairs needs to reinforce Ukraine’s emerging democratic political culture that honors citizen service and places constituent needs at the heart of governance. Care and protection for Ukraine’s veterans is also in the strategic interest of the United States, the European Union, and NATO, which seek a peaceful, stable, and undivided Europe. NATO continues to support Ukraine’s efforts to bring its security and defense sector closer to Alliance standards and practices, including strengthening civilian control and democratic oversight over the sector, improving planning and budgeting processes, and reforming the nation’s security services. Reform of Ukraine’s veterans policies bolsters NATO efforts by providing a roadmap for civilian oversight of veterans affairs and security service reform in the form of post-deployment transition and reintegration support for soldiers. A robust, comprehensive veterans support program aids recruitment and retention, leading to a stronger Ukrainian military more prepared for its combat operations in the east—a war whose outcome will determine European security for decades.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Veterans
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and Donbas
452. Security Sector Capture in Serbia – An Early Study
- Author:
- Predrag Petrovic and Jelena Pejic Nikic
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Report on state capture in Serbia is BCSP genuine and pioneering work aiming to document and deconstruct ongoing process of state capture in the security sector through presentation of mechanisms, actors and consequences of this process. For several years now, various international indexes have been measuring the stagnation and decline of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms in Serbia. Although the country is still formally in the process of European integration, the European Commission noticed back in 2018 that there are elements of state capture in the entire Western Balkans region. Due to the significance and ubiquity of this phenomenon in Serbia, the BCSP has embarked upon a pilot research project that aims to establish the main factors and conditions, as well as the mechanisms and actors, involved in state capture in the security sector. The capturing of the police, the security services and the defence sector in Serbia is analysed in this early study. Furthermore, it was necessary to situate the analysis in the country’s political context, and special chapters cover parliamentary oversight and control and the security sector financing. The research was conducted from May 2019 to April 2020 and is based on insights gleaned from both primary and secondary sources.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Democracy, Rule of Law, and Regional Integration
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Serbia
453. Boosting Armament to Fight Demographic Decline, Crime and Corruption – Public Opinion on Security
- Author:
- Marija Pavlovic
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- The main finding of this study is that the Serbian public have conflicting views on national and personal security and their relationship with the country’s institutions. On the one hand, people instinctively recognise that the main security threats are internal and are related to poor governance – such as organised crime and corruption and low levels of trust in institutions that serve the interests of politicians – which is why they rely on themselves and their own good conduct, from which they derive a sense of personal security. On the other hand, under the influence of media messaging and dominant narratives about threats to national security, presenting a maelstrom of great power rivalry and adversarial actors in the region, they continue to believe that hard power is the best response to security issues. Therefore, they see solutions mainly in the continued strengthening of the country and investment in the security sector. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that public opinion is diametrically opposed to the threats and risks defined by the official National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy adopted last year. Both documents place (the relatively unlikely events of) armed aggression and separatist tendencies within the country in first place on the list of threats to Serbia’s security – threats that only appear in the lower half on the list of priorities in the eyes of the public, who see human security issues as the priority problems. This discord between public perception and the strategic documents is a consequence of the almost complete lack of public debate during the adoption process of these documents. At the same time, it is testimony to the wrongheaded priorities of Serbia’s security policy, which is clearly at odds with the needs of the public, even though the National Security Strategy cites their subjective feelings in defining national security.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Corruption, Crime, and Public Opinion
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Serbia
454. Serbia in the Jaws of the COVID-19 Pandemic
- Author:
- Srdan Hercigonja
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- The public opinion poll conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in October 2020 shows that the society is divided, both when it comes to measures taken in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and regarding the reaction of the competent institutions to the health crisis. Although no less than a third of the Serbian citizens do not believe in or have serious doubts about the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the vast majority of them are of the opinion that the health crisis will have serious economic consequences, while a third are convinced that it has affected the level of democracy in Serbia. Most people see the pandemic as a threat to human and national security, but they are divided over how this crisis has affected their everyday lives. Polarisation was identified in relation to the level of trust in state institutions. Citizens trust the health care system the most, which is not surprising since the health care system commonly occupies a very high position in general surveys conducted to measure trust in all institutions. The reason for the high level of trust in the health system is the fact that it is the entire health system – not just the specialised COVID departments – that is bearing the brunt of the pandemic. As for other institutions, the percentage of trust in the President of the Republic and the Crisis Task Force for the Protection of the Population from the Infectious Disease COVID-19 stands at almost fifty-fifty, which again reflects the broader picture of citizens’ (dis)trust in these permanent and temporary institutions. One of the reasons for the division in the perception of disease as a threat to the personal safety of citizens is poor informing and reporting on the course and consequences of the pandemic (frequent contradictory messages provided by the Crisis Task Force and the authorities), which has been identified in the survey as one of the biggest problems of pandemic management. An enormous number of citizens perceive China as the largest financial and humanitarian donor during the period of the pandemic, which also influences – in the general survey – positive opinions about foreign countries, where China ranks first. Despite the fact that it was in fact the European Union that helped Serbia the most in the fight against the Coronavirus, in both financial and humanitarian terms, in the eyes of the citizens China still convincingly holds the first place.
- Topic:
- Security, Public Opinion, Health Care Policy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Serbia
455. Is the “show-the-flag” strategy relevant for Visegrad countries in securing the EU?
- Author:
- Hana N. Hlaváčková
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- The European security environment has changed and the EU has become more independent in its security policy. New threats faced by the EU in 2014 (the migration crises) and other remaining threats (such as terrorism, organised crime, piracy) need solving by its greater involvement in the region. One problem that the EU tries to solve is the inconsistency of member states in security issues. In this article, we focus on the V4 group and their opinions towards EU security. This article examines strategies adopted by small/new EU member states to protect European borders and European territories and regions outside the EU that affect their security. For a long time, the V4 countries only participated sporadically in EU missions. The article shows what changes took place and what were the reasons for the decision to participate or not in the EU activities. The article raises the question of whether the showthe-flag strategy adopted by the V4 countries and their participation in EU missions is relevant for ensuring European security nowadays.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Politics, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and United States of America
456. Challenges for Security and Defence Cooperation in Central Europe: Will the EU be able to manage the crisis in the EU periphery?
- Author:
- Jaroslav Ušiak and Dominika Trubenová
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Europe has undergone various security changes in the past and needs to prepare itself for managing the present and future security challenges appearing on the horizon. Within Central Europe, we can see a significant change in its security orientation and a gradual development by continuous involvement in security initiatives such as the current EU-led PESCO. This article aims to show the present Visegrad Group (V4) interest in maintaining an autonomous European security, as well as to analyse the current possibilities and security capabilities of Central European countries. The V4 countries are an important part of NATO and the European Union, even though they are small to medium-sized countries with limited security capabilities. Participation in the creation of collective security under NATO has a stable, several-year position in the countries, but the European Union is on the rise in its security agenda, and that is assumed by the V4 countries with its participation in EU initiatives such as PESCO and the integrated involvement of the V4 in ongoing military projects.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Central Europe
457. Changing Roles of the EU and ASEAN on Peace in the Korean Peninsula
- Author:
- Sangmin Bae and Martyn de Bruyn
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- Continuing tension and competition among Northeast Asian countries complicate the degree to which North and South Korea can actively garner support from regional powers. The involvement of regional powers has not been effective means to overcome the status quo. Bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States, while critical for tension reduction in the region, have not been able to produce an agreement. Instead, international institutions from outside the region may be able to help negotiate a peace agreement that brings acceptable levels of security to all parties involved. This article examines the past and future roles of international institutions located outside of the region -- notably the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Exploring the relations of the EU and ASEAN with the two Koreas, the article assesses their potential as mediators in the process of creating a lasting peace between the Koreas.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Peace, Strategic Competition, and ASEAN
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America
458. Moldova Cybersecurity Governance Assessment
- Author:
- Natalia Spinu
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
- Abstract:
- This report is a two-factor analysis of cybersecurity, including the legislative framework and key national actors in cybersecurity. The report presents the main cybersecurity threats in Moldova and the needs arising from national security objectives. After analysing the national cybersecurity strategy for Moldova, an identification and need for the main actors within the state who would be responsible for the implementation of the national strategy on cybersecurity was undertaken. A national action plan for cybersecurity was designed. It was understood that for a responsible and developed society there is a necessity to collaborate with the private sector and academia, and thus a robust cooperation and communication mechanism was described to include all the relevant stakeholders. The report reflects the conclusions and final remarks that have made the operational cybersecurity architecture in Moldova an elaborate framework.
- Topic:
- Security, National Security, Governance, Cybersecurity, and Private Sector
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Moldova
459. Directions of Poland’s Energy Security Policy in the Natural Gas Sector
- Author:
- Malgorzata Kamola-Cieslik
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Polish Political Science Yearbook
- Institution:
- Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
- Abstract:
- Poland has insufficient natural gas resources to satisfy its needs. That is why it has been dependent on the imports of that raw material. One of the challenges facing the Polish government is limiting Poland’s dependency on Russian gas. The objective of the paper is to present the directions of the Polish government’s energy security policy in terms of natural gas in the years of 2015-2018. Particular attention was paid to the assumptions and the implementation of the government’s gas policy in terms of the situation in the European Union gas market. An attempt was made to answer the question: To what extent have the assumptions of policy of the government of the Law and Justice party regarding Poland’s gas security been realized? In an attempt to answer the question so formulated, the following methods were used in the study: a decision-making method, formal-legal method, statistical and comparative methods. On the grounds of the conducted research, it needs to be concluded that after 2015, as a result of the government’s policy, the imports of natural gas from the east to Poland were reduced with a simultaneous diversification of the direction from which this raw material was delivered. The resignation from the deliveries of Russian gas to Poland after 2022 will be possible thanks to putting Baltic Pipe gas pipeline into operation and raising the flow capacity of Świnoujście LNG terminal. The implementation of these investments will have a positive impact on the improvement of Poland’s gas security. Failure to launch the investments and an increase of gas consumption in Poland will make it necessary to conclude a short-term Polish-Russian agreement for imports of that fuel to Poland.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Natural Resources, European Union, and Gas
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Poland
460. Changes in the Electoral Code and Their Impact on the Security of the Election The Origin for Discussion Based on Selected Comments
- Author:
- Karol Pachnik
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Polish Political Science Yearbook
- Institution:
- Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
- Abstract:
- After the local government elections in Poland in 2018, the adopted solutions aimed at increasing the security of the elections were reviewed. Some of the solutions adopted so far have been abandoned, such as transmissions from the polling station, while others have been minimized (the division of the precinct electoral commissions in the precinct electoral commission for voting in the region and the precinct electoral commission for determining the results of voting in the region). In public opinion polls, the National Electoral Commission achieved record of confidence.
- Topic:
- Security, Elections, Democracy, and Local
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Poland
461. 5G Security: The New Energy Security
- Author:
- Kristine Berzina
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
462. Biowar next? Security implications of the coronavirus
- Author:
- Karsten Friis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- What are the possible short-, medium- and long-term implications of the coronavirus for global security and defence? In this Strategic Update, Karsten Friis investigates the pandemic's potential consequences for the world, its armed forces, the integration of Europe, US-China relations, as well as the concept and practice of 'war' more broadly. Although much remains uncertain, the disruptions which are beginning to emerge demand a reckoning with a changed world -- and world order.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, War, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
463. The Strategic Implications of Chinese-Iranian-Russian Naval Drills in the Indian Ocean
- Author:
- Syed Fazl-e Haider
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- China Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In early December, Major General Shao Yuanming (邵元明), the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), traveled to the Islamic Republic of Iran for rare high-level military meetings. These meetings were held for the purpose of organizing a series of unprecedented joint naval drills between China, Iran, and Russia, which were held in the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman from December 27–29. The drills took place just as escalating tensions between the United States and Iran reached a crisis point at the end of 2019. The exercise also signified a deepening relationship between Iran and the PRC in economics, diplomacy, and security affairs. China and Russia have both increased military and economic cooperation with Iran in the year and a half since the U.S. government pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, while Iran’s government has repeatedly touted its deepening relations with China and Russia as a show of diplomatic strength, its allies have been less public about the growing relationship. In December, Iranian officials lauded the trilateral exercises—titled “Marine Security Belt”—as proof that Iran can outlast crippling sanctions with aid from its non-Western allies, and declared that the drills signaled a new triple alliance in the Middle East (Tasnim News, December 29, 2019). [1] By contrast, officials from Russia and the PRC were more restrained, framing the joint exercises as part of routine anti-piracy operations, highlighting their peacekeeping priorities and seeking to depoliticize the drills (South China Morning Post, September 23, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), October 2, 2019).
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Navy, Maritime, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia
464. Uncharted Territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence
- Author:
- Daniel Fiott
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe. Behind the EU’s mosaic of various national strategic cultures lie profound differences between geopolitical interests and strategic histories. As the 2017 French Defence and National Security Strategic Review observes, ‘[g]eography and history remain important factors in the manner in which European states rank threats and risks, and more generally, in the diversity of their strategic cultures.’ Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Defining ‘threats’ is not an easy task and it has split security scholars. Nevertheless, member states have stressed the need for a strategic reflection on security and defence based on ‘a shared assessment of threats and challenges.’ This echoes the EU Global Strategy, which stated that ‘European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges.’
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Planning
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Global Focus
465. Digitalising Defence: Protecting Europe in the age of quantum computing and the cloud
- Author:
- Daniel Fiott
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Any discussion about the digitalisation of defence is hampered by the imprecision of associated terms and words. ‘Cyber’, ‘the cloud’, ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT), ‘block chain’ and ‘quantum computing’ are widely used but their exact meaning or application can be quite fuzzy. The truth is that we may be intellectually ill-equipped to understand the full intricacies and implications of digitalisation, even if the economic rationale for digitalisation is clear. In fact, some estimates show that the digitalisation of products and services could add more than €110 billion to industrial revenue in Europe over a relatively short time frame of five years, so it is easy to see why the economic rationale for greater digitalisation is so powerful. Yet digitalisation is clearly not just about economics and the geopolitical ramifications of a proliferation of digital technologies is becoming a mainstay of international politics today. The assumption is that the competition to control new technologies (both hardware and associated software and algorithms), and the willingness to use them to gain an advantage over other states, underlines the growing importance of ‘digital power’. It is for this reason that the European Commission has stated that it is imperative for the EU to establish ‘technological sovereignty’ in areas of key strategic importance such as defence, space, mobile networks (5G and 6G) and quantum computing.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and Quantum Computers
- Political Geography:
- Europe
466. China’s policy towards Belarus and Ukraine: A limited challenge to Sino-Russian relations
- Author:
- Ryhor Nizhnikau and Marcin Kaczmarski
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- China traditionally pursued a pragmatic foreign poli- cy in the post-Soviet region, which was never seen as a priority in Beijing. It primarily based its policies on economic engagement with the local elite, who sought sources of politically unconditional loans and invest- ment, as well as the possibility to hedge their foreign policies vis-à-vis other regional powers. A growing economic presence promoted Chinese core interests in the region without challenging Russia’s political pre-eminence in the region and jeopardizing Rus- sia-China relations. However, in recent years, two factors have afect- ed the status quo and have led to greater engagement in the region by China. First, the region became an important part of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, and Belarus and/or Ukraine became a transport hub between China and the EU. Second, Russia’s policies turned more assertive towards its neighbourhood, whereas the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood policies lost steam after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine confict in 2014. Te new regional environment and domestic instabilities duly increased the importance of China for local elites. This Briefing Paper overviews the evolution of China’s cooperation with Belarus and Ukraine since 2013. One of the results has been a growing contrast in Chinese relations with Belarus and Ukraine. While China-Ukraine relations were driven by economic co- operation and a tremendous growth in bilateral trade, their political relations stagnated. China-Belarus rela- tions, on the other hand, have increasingly prioritized enhanced political and defence cooperation, despite consistent attempts by the Belarusian side to build up a Chinese economic presence in the country. Te paper argues that China deliberately opts to steer clear of power competition in the region and chooses to recognize both Russian special interests in the region and countries’ own foreign policy choices, be they integration with the EU or Russia. In Belarus and Ukraine, Beijing seems to exercise self-restraint in its policy, taking Russia’s interests into consider- ation. However, its growing presence in economic and cultural spheres as well as local elites’ increasing interest in engaging China in manoeuvring in the EU-Russia confict creates a window of opportunity for Beijing to apply its increasing economic and po- litical resources for political ends in the long-term perspective.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Belarus
467. GENDER AND PEACEMAKING STRATEGY
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- European Institute of Peace (EIP)
- Abstract:
- The European Institute of Peace is scaling up its efforts to incorporate the Women, Peace and Security Agenda across its work. In order to do this the Institute has developed a “Gender and Peacemaking” Strategy. This will contribute to achieving our vision of a world where people live in safety and peace because conflicts and grievances are resolved through inclusive dialogue and lasting political agreements. The Institute is committed to ensuring that gender perspectives, women’s meaningful participation and protection of their rights are a central component of our work. By using the Women, Peace and Security Agenda as a framework for a localised and rights-based approach to conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding we can contribute to international efforts to prevent conflict and create a more sustainable peace.
- Topic:
- Security, Gender Issues, Women, Peace, and WPS
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Global Focus
468. No Pain, No Gain: Taking PESCO to the Gym
- Author:
- Tania Latici
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- It is fair to assume that at least one out of three readers of this paper have at some point in their life accepted to join a group of friends to do regular sporting activities together. While this idea sounds great in principle (we become fitter while building our friendships), when the day comes, only a few of those who committed actually show up. Excuses abound: more important commitments; too busy; jealous friends who were not invited in the first place. This is why a much more effective method of keeping commitments is through peer- pressure: having a designated buddy keeping tabs on you, making sure you show up and help you do the work. Vice versa, you are responsible for helping and motivating another friend, until the square is circled. So, what does Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) have to do with becoming fitter? Everything.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, European Union, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Europe
469. A new transatlantic bargain: An action plan for transformation, not restoration
- Author:
- Julien Barnes-Dacey, Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, Ellie Geranmayeh, Mark Leonard, Theodore Murphy, Janka Oertel, Nicu Popescu, and Tara Varma
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The election of Joe Biden marks a new era in the transatlantic relationship – in upholding the liberal international order, America wants a Europe that is a sovereign partner, not a helpless dependent. Washington will look to the EU to support the US lead in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China, while also wanting Europe to take more responsibility for security and stability in eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In exchange, the EU and member states should propose a new transatlantic bargain that encompasses cross-cutting global issues such as health policy, trade, security, climate change, and the defence of democracy. The Trump years galvanised Europeans’ efforts to strengthen their own sovereignty; they now need to agree concrete offers they can make to the new administration. This will require nothing less than a fundamental change in mindset for Europeans, who will have to suppress any hankerings for the old order and decide how they will help build it anew.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Human Rights, International Cooperation, European Union, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
470. Promoting European strategic sovereignty in Asia
- Author:
- Janka Oertel and Andrew Small
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The continuing rise of China and the onset of the pandemic have made asserting European strategic sovereignty in Asia ever more complex and difficult. Both developments mean that economics, security, and technology issues in Asia are becoming ever more intertwined. On the one hand this leaves Europe exposed – its dependencies on China have grown, and the security framework that has enabled Europe’s burgeoning economic ties with the wider region is under strain. Yet as other Asian powers, and the United States under the new Biden administration, increasingly assess the emerging strategic competition through a geo-economic prism, Europe’s leverage and its opportunities for partnership have also grown. Europe should upgrade its security activities, and seize the moment to push multilateral institutions up the agenda. But it will be Europe’s connectivity agenda that provides the golden thread running through its foreign policy and its environmental, industrial, trade, development, values, and security objectives in the region.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, European Union, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Asia
471. Sovereign Europe, dangerous world: Five agendas to protect Europe’s capacity to act
- Author:
- Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- In the last year, Europe has begun to recognise the need to defend its sovereignty in a threatening world. Covid-19 has revealed and exacerbated many of Europe’s existing vulnerabilities; the European Union and its member states remain unable to act autonomously in key areas of national life. Based on ECFR research, we propose five sovereignty agendas in health, economic, digital, climate change, and traditional security, all designed to promote a more sovereign Europe on that issues that matter most to Europeans. Europe must not relinquish its rules-based approach or lapse into protectionism. But, to protect the open, multilateral order they so cherish, Europeans need to promote new rules permitting them to take action against countries that undermine the international system. The EU’s €750 billion pandemic recovery fund offers the chance to underwrite this ambition – but, ultimately, Europeans need to master the art of acting as a geopolitical force in the world.
- Topic:
- Security, Climate Change, Economics, Health, Sovereignty, European Union, and Digital Policy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
472. Gulf of difference: How Europe can get the Gulf monarchies to pursue peace with Iran
- Author:
- Cinzia Bianco
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- The Gulf monarchies face a core dilemma: advancing their security interests through deterrence or through promoting a new diplomatic process. The arrival of the Biden administration in Washington, and the perception of US disengagement from the region, offers an opportunity for Europeans to help de-escalate tensions between GCC states and Iran. The European interest lies in supporting a return to the Iranian nuclear deal and a regional dialogue between the Gulf monarchies and Iran, an approach that is more likely to promote lasting stability. Europeans can support this process by strengthening their own regional security posture and confronting head-on the geopolitical tensions at the heart of regional rivalries.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Dialogue
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, United States of America, and Gulf Nations
473. Combat Air Systems for the 21st Century: A Shared Stake for Europe
- Author:
- Renaud Bellais
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Air dominance was the strength of Western military powers from the early 1990s until the mid-2010s. The proliferation of air defence systems, notably Russian S300 and S400 missile systems, has created a major challenge. This is the reason why acquiring an up-to-date combat air system is crucial to restore the level playing field. Europeans seem to have become aware of the stakes, but they respond in a scattered manner.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Air Force
- Political Geography:
- Europe
474. Dealing with Russia: Towards a Coherent Belgian Policy
- Author:
- Alexander Mattelaer and Laura Vansina
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Belgo-Russian relations are mired in paradox. For several years, the relationship between the Russian Federation on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other has been characterized by mistrust. As a founding member of these multilateral organisations, Belgium has been a full part of the decision-making process that has formulated a hardening stance towards the Russian Federation. Yet on a bilateral level, Belgium has pragmatically upheld what is left of commercial cooperation and cultural exchanges. In order to deal with this paradox, Belgium should formulate a more coherent approach towards Russia that focuses on upholding the European order and security whilst maintaining dialogue and engaging the Russian Federation. This requires the new Belgian government to engage in a delicate balancing act that can be articulated in the forthcoming National Security Strategy, in the Belgian positions in the EU and NATO, and in the bilateral relationship with Moscow. This Egmont Paper aspires to provide both analytical background and novel ideas which can be used to such a purpose. When analysing Russian foreign policy, it can only be acknowledged that the annex- ation of Crimea in 2014 fundamentally challenged the rules-based international order. Yet to understand Russian behaviour, it is imperative to reach back in time to the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ever since, Russia’s main goal on the international stage has been the re-establishment of its Great Power status. To this end, it has sought to consolidate security buffers in the form of geographical and psychological depth. Most notably, it involved the promotion of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir), the conduct of operations in the grey zone between war and peace, and a fair dose of strategic opportunism. Whilst perhaps understandable, this assertive foreign policy has negatively affected Belgian interests in a variety of ways. Belgo-Russian relations constitute a true kaleidoscope ranging from cooperation to conflict. Bilateral trade has largely recovered from the 2014-2015 shock resulting from the sanctions regime – even if the trade balance remains a negative one. Cultural and academic exchanges continue, in line with the little-known 1993 Belgo- Russian Treaty on Understanding and Cooperation. Yet politically, conflict has been on the increase. Russia has been actively challenging and contesting the multilateral framework that Belgium holds dear. In addition, Belgium has become the target of Russian disinformation and other grey zone operations. As it is unlikely that Russia will tone down its assertive foreign policy anytime soon, Belgium would do well to articulate a more coherent approach. This needs to clarify Belgian policy priorities, communicate Belgian positions towards the Russian government, and educate the domestic audience about the evolving relationship with the Russian Federation.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Belgium
475. Biden’s World? Views from the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union
- Author:
- Alexey Gromyko and Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the annual joint seminars that since a few years the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations organise in Moscow and Brussels. But the coronavirus cannot interrupt academic exchange; a dialogue that is more than ever necessary in a world of increasing tensions between the great powers. We continue our collaboration through this joint publication, therefore, for which we have invited prominent scholars from Russia and the European Union as well as China and the United States to share their analysis of the impact of Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential elections on international politics.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
476. Belgium Should Not Change Strategy on Her Contribution to NATO's Nuclear Role Sharing
- Author:
- Didier Audenaert
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- In this policy brief, the author focusses on NATO’s nuclear dimension. He highlights key challenges in the European security environment and explains essential charac- teristics of NATO’s deterrence and collective defence, and its contribution to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. He then briefly describes the contributions of NATO’s nuclear states (and in particular France’s) to collective security and defence. All Allies (except France) participate in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), NATO’s senior body on nuclear matters. NATO’s nuclear role sharing is at the heart of this policy brief: US nuclear weapons carried by European dual-capable aircraft (DCA). The author argues emphatically as to why American nuclear weapons should be kept on European soil and the current DCA countries should maintain the status quo. Tangible recommendations follow on in terms of Belgian’s foreign security policy and defence, many of which are also highly likely to apply to other DCA countries.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Belgium, and North America
477. Ambassador Richard Morningstar on Energy and Geopolitics in the Caspian Region
- Author:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs and Richard L. Morningstar
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- On November 18, the Georgetown School of Foreign Service welcomed former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Richard Morningstar for a conversation on energy security in the Caspian region. Prior to the event, GJIA sat down with Ambassador Morningstar to discuss the intersection of energy and geopolitics, legacies from the Soviet Union, and energy security challenges facing Central Asian states.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, and Interview
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Central Asia, Soviet Union, Caspian Sea, and United States of America
478. China Global Security Tracker, No.6
- Author:
- Helena Legarda
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- China hits back after NATO calls it a security challenge, dormant Chinese hacking group resumes attacks, and more.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Diplomacy
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Beijing, Asia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka
479. The Normandy Negotiations Renewed: Divisions at Home and Opportunity Abroad
- Author:
- David Carment
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
- Abstract:
- After three years of limited discussion, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine renewed their peace talks to resolve the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas). Efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Donbas began five years ago with the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. This framework, developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), attempted to facilitate a dialogue between Russia and Ukraine through the mediation of an impartial actor, and it culminated in the Minsk I (September 2014) and then Minsk II (February 2015) agreements. The Minsk II agreements comprised a 13-point peace plan, chief among which is an arrangement specifying support for the restoration of the Ukrainian-Russian border. While the implementation of the military portions of the Minsk II agreements were finalized within three months of signing, the political and security portions remained unresolved. Though President Vladimir Putin has declared his intent to protect the Russian-speaking peoples of the region, he has also stated he has no interest in reclaiming Eastern Ukraine. Not surprisingly, since Russia’s ultimate goal is undeclared, the conflict has proved very difficult to resolve.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Territorial Disputes, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, France, Germany, and United States of America
480. Georgia’s Road to NATO: Everything but Membership?
- Author:
- Marion Kipiani
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Institution:
- Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
- Abstract:
- The ongoing crisis in Ukraine continues to jolt the architectural plans of Euro-Atlantic security developed over the past 25 years. Predictions of a “new Cold War,” and anxiety over Russia’s ambitions in its neighborhood, have led to calls for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to step up efforts to ensure security on the European continent and protect its newer members in close geographic proximity to the Russian Federation. After more than two decades, during which NATO was transforming into a military alliance fo- cused on out-of-area missions, the collective defense at the heart of the 1949 Washington Treaty has suddenly appeared to regain its relevance. Since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the escalation of military conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region a year ago, NATO has demonstrated its commitment to the security of its Eastern European member states through reassurance measures that have included increased air and maritime patrols, as well as the rotation of ground forces. There are however countries partnering with NATO – but not covered by its collective defense protective umbrella – which fall into a gray zone of influence between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic allies. These countries, including Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine itself, are particularly concerned by Russia’s strategic objective of keeping a sphere of i
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Georgia, and North America
481. The Kaliningrad Region – Key to Security in East-Central Europe
- Author:
- Krzysztof Zegota
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Institution:
- Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
- Abstract:
- Political transformations in East-Central Europe after 1989, and the advancing pro- cesses of integration, have resulted in a significant increase in the importance of the Ka- liningrad region of the Russian Federation for the stabilisation of this part of Europe in two dimensions: the Kaliningrad region provides a unique example and a specific “testing ground” for cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Russia, and also plays a crucial geopolitical role for the southern part of the Baltic Sea region. For the Russian Federation, this region has become especially important in view of the integration pro- cesses occurring in East-Central Europe over the last twenty-five years. The European integration process has been ongoing, with significant milestones marked by two stages of the EU expansion in 2004 and 2007, when a series of East-Central European states gained membership. An increase in the cohesion of this part of Europe was also affected by progressive Euro-Atlantic integration, a subsequent step of which was the eastward expansion of NATO in 1999 and in 2004. Thus, the area of European and Euro-Atlantic inte- gration significantly neared the borders of the Russian Federation. It is important that the Kaliningrad region has entered into intensive interactions with various entities from the EU member states, becoming involved – to some extent – in the network of relations with the EU: through the integration of local governments, universities, non-governmental organi- zations, and by utilizing various cross-border cooperation programmes.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe
482. Shaking the Foundation: the Trump Administration and NATO’s East
- Author:
- Metthew Bryza
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Institution:
- Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
- Abstract:
- Ultimately though, my very last remarks are ultimately optimistic, because President Trump lacks geopolitical vision, lacks historical insight or, really even, frankly – I don’t mean to be disrespectful, but – curiosity about history. Everything is about the deal. One and one, the individuals, the people – that’s why he had nobody in a room which is what Putin wanted, besides Rex Tillerson and the interpreter when they met. And so, what’s inevitably going to happen is he will start up with a grand bargain, where something hap- pens in Ukraine mostly cut over the heads of the Ukrainians. But thank goodness with Am- bassador Volker there, I know he’s no fool and will fight against that, but probably though there will be an agreement which I know that the Trump administration, from my own contacts within, has been cooking up, hoping for, for a longtime, whereby President Putin gets what he needs. He gets an excuse to exit Donbass, because that’s a failed operation, the uprising that he expected never happened, Russian troops are dying, it’s an economic albatross around the neck of Russia. But he can’t just leave, he can’t just pull out Russian troops, because that would really hurt him domestically, politically. So, okay, he says: “We’ve reentered the geopolitical stage, we’re at the center of it with President Trump”. Putin will say “We’ll pull out of Donbass, we’re never leaving Crimea”, That will be the deal I think. Donbass – if the Ukrainian government offers autonomy – will have a sort of a frozen political conflict, troops gone, heavy weapons pulled back on the Russian side, Crimea still what it is – anschlussed by Russia. And then the other area where there will be coopera- tion is in Syria. And we’ve already seen in Southeastern Syria there is a modest cease-fire that seems to be holding – that’s great, may it work, however it also provides U.S. bless- ing for Russian troops to base deeper in the Middle East, and that has never happened before. But leave that aside, maybe it will bring peace. Eventually that cooperation in Syria will collapse. Russia has no history of successfully establishing peace and rebuilding economies and complex cultures. It used brutality in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, to build the Soviet Union, but it doesn’t have the finesse to rebuild something on the scale of Syria. And so, Trump is going to be disappointed with President Putin. President Putin will inevitably overplay Russia’s hand, and finally at that point my last remark – if the EU and NATO have maintained their cohesion, remain strong, maintain the geopolitical vision of President Duda and Secretary of State Szczerski, then we have a chance to take these positive developments and push away the lack of clarity, the dalliance with Putin and the security services on the part of team Trump, and finally wake up – just as Obama woke up, just as President Bush woke up and realized he that he hadn’t see Putin’s soul, and then maybe we can rebuild. So, the key to all this is that you all are doing exactly what you’ve said, Mr. Secretary of State – taking the strategic reins in your own hands, pursuing initia- tives like the Three Seas, changing the geopolitical facts on the ground so that when the U.S. does finally wake up – we know which way to move. Thank you very much!
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Leadership
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America
483. Remarks on Regional Security
- Author:
- Graeme P. Herd
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Institution:
- Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
- Abstract:
- I am delighted to be in Warsaw on this panel. In 1994 when I graduated with a PhD, and held my first academic post, the first international conference I went to was in Wrocław, and obviously I had to travel through Warsaw. So, it’s really nice to be back in Poland and have the opportunity to present in the capital when older and wiser. Today, I am going to try and look at how we understand the rationality, the logic of Russia’s foreign policy, particularly the destabilization efforts against neighbours and come to a conclusion has to how sustainable and long-term this approach will be. Will it gradually diminish or is it set to stay as it is or even increase? To try and understand Russia’s foreign policy, we need to look into the domestic eco- nomic, political, and social system created by a system-forming figure that is President Vladimir Putin. The two key data points here really are two strategic vulnerabilities that Russia has to deal with. The first is the hydrocarbon dependence, 50% of GDP and 70% of exports, and 98% of corporate tax. The vulnerability is that Russia is dependent on hy- drocarbon revenues but cannot affect the price of oil globally (which sets the price of gas). Oil can be priced at $110pb or at $25pb and the shift can take place over a matter of months. The second vulnerability is the popularity of the president. When Putin has de-modernized Russia, de-institutionalized and de-globalized Russia it means that if his popularity decreases then you have an existential crisis within the federation. The destabi- lizing question is: “If not Putin, then whom?” There are no contingency plans, no succession mechanism to replace the leader. So, essentially we are looking at Russia’s foreign policy operating in a context where the economy is in the toilet as reflected in a 0.2% average GDP growth since 2009; 2012 – 0% growth and since 2012 when Kudrin resigned from the government. Normally, the popularity of a president – as was the case in the first 8 years of Putin’s presidency from 2000 to 2008 – tracks the economy, or maybe lags a little bit behind. As economic performance increases and revenues distributed to the population, so the popularity of the president. So, this is very abnormal politics.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Regional Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
484. Turkey and East Central Europe: idealism, pragmatism, misperception or clash of interests?
- Author:
- Konrad Zasztowt
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Institution:
- Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
- Abstract:
- Turkey is Russia-centric in its East European policies. This approach is a legacy of the Cold War, when the Communist bloc countries were regarded not as sovereign states, but merely the Soviet Union’s “satellites”. Even when they regained full independence after 1989, from Turkey’s point of view, they constituted rather a kind of Russia’s backyard and were generally little known to the Turkish public. Obviously the newly independent states established after the collapse of the Soviet Union were to an even greater extent than the post-communist states perceived in Turkey in the sphere of influence and special interests of Russia. These clichés were shared by Turks and with many in Western societies, as Tur- key remained on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Turkey
485. The Balkan Front in the New Cold War
- Author:
- Gordon S. Bardos
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Institution:
- Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
- Abstract:
- As relations between Russia and the U.S.1continue their downward spiral, the Balkans have become another front in what scholars such as Stephen F. Cohen and Robert Leg- vold have dubbed “the New Cold War.”2 Yet the return to cold war, as Legvold notes, in- volves numerous opportunity costs for both countries—and considerable collateral dam- age as well. One of the areas in which the collateral damage will be most severe is the Balkans. Indeed, the costs of the new confrontation between Washington and Moscow are already evident in the democratic backsliding that has occurred throughout the region over the past decade. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2016, shows that of the nine countries in southeastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croa- tia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia), only one (Bulgaria) showed any improvement, one (Albania) showed no improvement, and the remaining sev- en all regressed in terms of their democratic development.3 Freedom House’s Nations in Transit and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index have similarly shown significant demo- cratic backsliding in the Balkans since 2008.4
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Balkans
486. Nord Stream 2 Current State of the Project and its implications for European Energy Security
- Author:
- Nicola Mellere
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
- Institution:
- Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
- Abstract:
- Nord Stream 2 is a planned pipeline through the Baltic Sea within the project Nord Stream. The pipeline Nord Stream 2 would flank the already existing Nord Stream 1 in transporting natural gas over 1,220 km from the large reserves in North-Western Russia to the German Baltic coast. In particular, Nord Stream 2 is expected to link Ust Luga in Russia with Greifswald in Germany. The project is planned to double the existing Nord Stream 1 pipeline, with the total volume of both ventures being a maximum of 110 bcm per year. In- deed, Nord Stream 2 is expected to transport annually 55 billion cubic metres (bcm), which is the same amount of Nord Stream 1. The history of Nord Stream project began in 1997, when the Finnish-Russian consor- tium “North Transgas Oy” was established to explore the possibilities of transporting gas from Russia to Europe. In 1999 the consortium concluded the exploration stating that an offshore route through the Baltic Sea is the best option from economic, technical and en- vironmental points of view. Then, in 2000 the EU recognized the need for a new pipeline. In 2005, the North Stream consortium was formed with the participation of Gazprom, the German companies Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas. Later two other companies joined the consortium: the Dutch company Gasunie and the French GDF SUEZ SA. The construction of the lines of Nord Stream 1 lasted from April 2010 until October 2012, when Line 2 of Nord Stream 1 officially became operational.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Nord Stream 2
- Political Geography:
- Europe
487. Global Health Security and Pandemics: The Politics of Loneliness in Pandemic Britain
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
- Abstract:
- In this episode, Professor Barbara Taylor, Professor of Humanities in the Schools of History and English & Drama discusses the loneliness crisis that has engulfed Britain during the pandemic and highlights how individuals have turned to each other in acts of kindness to fulfil social obligations that are not necessarily being met by Government.
- Topic:
- Security, Mental Health, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
488. Global Health Security and Pandemics: The UK Government Response to COVID-19
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
- Abstract:
- n this video, Dr. Jonathan Kennedy (Queen Mary University of London) discusses the response of the UK Government to the Coronavirus pandemic and what lessons can be learned from other nations, such as China and Italy.
- Topic:
- Security, Health, Governance, Leadership, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
489. Data Is Dangerous: Comparing the Risks That the United States, Canada and Germany See in Data Troves
- Author:
- Susan Ariel Aaronson
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for International Governance Innovation
- Abstract:
- From posting photos and videos to tracking physical activity, apps can do almost anything, but while they may seem like harmless fun, they may also pose a threat to personal data and national security. This paper compares the different responses of the United States, Canada and Germany to data risks posed by popular apps such as FaceApp, Facebook, Strava, TikTok and ToTok. These apps and many others store troves of personal data that can be hacked and misused, putting users (and the countries in which they live) at risk.
- Topic:
- Security, Digital Economy, Social Media, and Data
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, Canada, Germany, and North America
490. The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank”
- Author:
- Eoin Micheál McNamara
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute of International Relations Prague
- Abstract:
- Eoin Micheál McNamara in his Policy Paper called The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank” expresses the argument that there is considerable scope for the V4 states to improve their contribution to NATO’s collective defence posture. Based on this fact, he argues the different strategic positions of each V4 member within the NATO membership related to Russian influence.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
491. China's Rise as a Global Security Actor: Implications for NATO
- Author:
- Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- In December 2019, for the first time, NATO leaders recognised China as a new strategic point of focus for the Alliance. This reflects growing concern among NATO members surrounding China’s geopolitical rise and its growing power-projection capabilities, as well as the impact that these may have on the global balance of power. Today, China is not only taking a central role in Indo-Pacific security affairs but is also becoming an increasingly visible security actor in Europe’s periphery. As such, the question of how to deal with an increasingly global China has been an important part of Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 reflection process. China poses a wide range of challenges to NATO. Beijing sees the Alliance as a United States-centric outfit that may be used by Washington to contain China, and has therefore tried to influence individual NATO members’ decisions in order to weaken the Alliance’s unity. Close ties between China and Russia, especially in the security and military spheres, have also been a source of concern for NATO allies. Besides the Chinese and Russian navies’ joint exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, there is also the potential for the two sides to further coordinate – or at least align their behaviour – on issues of relevance to the Alliance, including hybrid warfare and cyber espionage, arms-control issues, and their approach to Arctic governance, among others. China’s defence spending and military-modernisation process, along with the growing strength of its defence industry, have led to the proliferation of more advanced military platforms around the world. Beijing is also expanding its stockpile of missiles, some of which have the range to reach NATO countries. China’s military-power-projection capabilities have likewise edged towards Europe as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded its international presence over the last few years. While NATO allies may have agreed that China presents a number of challenges to the Alliance’s security, they have yet to achieve consensus on how to address them. Some of these issues lie beyond NATO’s traditional areas of competence and will require expertise best provided by partners of the Alliance rather than the Alliance itself. NATO allies will need to prioritise how, when, where and with which partners to use their combined resources to deal with them. At the same time, the Alliance acknowledges that China is not its adversary. NATO thus must find areas of common interest where it can continue to cooperate with China, albeit with a more clear-eyed approach than it has done in the past. Addressing the opportunities and problems posed by China as a cohesive alliance will be more important than ever.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America
492. Turkey-Greece Relations: Growing Tensions and Implications for Transatlantic Relations
- Author:
- Oya Dorsun-Özkanca
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Turkey-Greece bilateral relations exemplify a stereotypical security dilemma. Since the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the eastern Mediterranean, the bilateral tensions between Turkey and Greece have been exacerbated through enhanced regional geostrategic competition. Against the background of renewed tensions in the eastern Mediterranean and the newly emerging regional alliances, it is in the interest of all parties to de-escalate the tensions in order to preserve regional peace and stability as well as the coherence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Conflict, and Transatlantic Relations
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Greece, and Mediterranean
493. Alliance power for cybersecurity
- Author:
- Kenneth Geers
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- There is only one internet and only one cyberspace connecting individuals, enterprises, and nations all over the world. Ever more frequently, this shared space is coming under attack from malicious actors, both state and non-state, who are seeking to exploit cyberspace’s shared infrastructure for their own ends. Addressing cybersecurity threats is therefore an international problem that requires an international solution. But given the myriad of threats faced in the cyber domain and the ambiguous borders that exist there, how can states best address these challenges and ensure the safety of their own networks and people? In this new report from the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, Cyber Statecraft Initiative senior fellow Kenneth Geers argues that the best way for democratic states to defend their own cyber networks is to leverage the multinational strength of political and military alliances like NATO and the European Union. Alliances like NATO give democracies an advantage over their authoritarian rivals by providing already established mechanisms for multinational cooperation. Alliances are therefore better equipped to tackle the inherently international challenges of cybersecurity. To illustrate the impact of alliances on cybersecurity, Geers uses events in Ukraine as a case study, comparing the Ukrainian government’s efforts to defend against Russian cyberattacks shortly after the 2014 revolution with measures taken in cooperation with partners to defend the 2019 presidential election. Geers illustrates how collective action in 2019 produced improved security outcomes compared to efforts taken by Ukraine alone. Building on these lessons, Geers argues that the only structures likely to produce tangible results in cybersecurity are those within political and military alliances. Indeed, the only credible cyber superpower is a robust alliance. The report then offers a series of recommendations on how NATO and the EU can promote trust and collaboration among Allies and partners to build a more effective cyber alliance.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Non-Traditional Threats
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Northern Europe
494. A strategic concept for countering Russian and Chinese hybrid threats
- Author:
- Lauren Speranza
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Tackling hybrid threats, particularly from state actors such as Russia and China, remains one of the greatest challenges for the transatlantic community. Hybrid threats have gained more traction among policymakers and publics across Europe and the United States, especially in a world with COVID-19. Over the last five years, Euro-Atlantic nations and institutions, such as NATO and the European Union (EU), have taken important steps to respond to hybrid issues. But, as hybrid threats become more prominent in the future, policymakers must move toward a more coherent, effective, and proactive strategy for countering Russian and Chinese hybrid threats. To develop such a transatlantic counter-hybrid strategy for Russia and China, this paper argues that two major things need to happen. First, transatlantic policymakers have to build a common strategic concept to guide collective thinking on hybrid threats. Second, transatlantic policymakers need to take a range of practical actions in service of that strategic concept. In a strategic concept for countering Russian and Chinese hybrid threats, Lauren Speranza offers five strategic priorities that could form the basis of this strategic concept and presents a series of constructive steps that NATO, the EU, and nations can take, in cooperation with the private sector and civil society, to enhance their counter-hybrid capabilities against Russia and China.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Resilience, and Non-Traditional Threats
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia
495. Geometries of deterrence: Assessing defense arrangements in Europe’s northeast
- Author:
- Hans Binnendijk and Conor Rodihan
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The conventional military threat from Russia towards Europe most acutely affects a number of frontline Nordic and Baltic states from the Barents Sea in the Arctic through the Baltic Sea region: Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and Sweden. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, these countries, in concert with other Euro-Atlantic allies and partners, have concentrated on strengthening their own defenses and on developing and enhancing eight sets of different defense cooperation arrangements. As the only two non-NATO and militarily nonaligned nations in the region, Finland and Sweden’s role in regional security and their level of cooperation with these and other partners poses challenges as well as opportunities for deterrence and defense in Europe’s northeast. These two countries have particularly emphasized cooperation with partners as they seek to build an interlocking web of security relationships to improve defense in the region. The core arrangements within this network include: The Finnish-Swedish bilateral defense relationship; Nordic Defense Cooperation; Nordic-Baltic Eight; The Northern Group; NATO Partnerships; The European Union; Ad hoc arrangements such as the Joint Expeditionary Force; Framework Nations Concept, and European Intervention Initiative; Finnish-Swedish-US trilateral and bilateral defense cooperation. These “geometries of deterrence” vary in scope, scale, and membership, but taken together, they enhance a range of important components of deterrence. In Geometries of Deterrence, Hans Binnendijk and Conor Rodihan assess the contributions of each of these arrangements against an ideal or “gold standard” for conventional military deterrence, before evaluating the arrangements collectively and offering recommendations to further strengthen deterrence for Finland, Sweden, and indeed for all of Northeastern Europe.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Partnerships
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Northern Europe
496. Russia’s exotic nuclear weapons and implications for the United States and NATO
- Author:
- Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- In 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced five new nuclear-capable, strategic weapons systems. These systems include a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarine drone. What does Russia have to gain from developing these novel and exotic nuclear weapons? And what should the United States and NATO do about it? This new Atlantic Council issue brief, Russia’s Exotic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for the United States and NATO, answers these questions. Informed by a workshop convened by the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Los Alamos National Laboratory, authors Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti evaluate the potential utility, motivations, and consequences of these new systems. Among other conclusions, the most significant may be that great-power competition has returned, and with it, the importance of nuclear weapons in international politics.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Power, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America
497. Small States can Take Small but Important Steps to Improve UN Peacekeeping: Action needed for peacekeeping in distress
- Author:
- Louise Riis Andersen and Richard Gowan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- UN peacekeeping is in need of change. Missions struggle to fulfil ambitious mandates in hostile environments. To improve performance and regain global trust, the UN needs tangible support and engagement from its member states, including smaller states with specialized military capabilities. RECOMMENDATIONS Smaller member states can contribute to UN peacekeeping operations by: ■ offering critical enablers (intelligence expertise, tactical air transport, medical services) and working with larger troop contributors to enhance their capacity in these areas. ■ developing guidance materials, technological tools and additional training for troop contributors, e.g. on medical support, prevention of sexual abuse and data analysis. ■ if aid donors, triangulate with the UN and the World Bank to identify projects to sustain security in countries where UN forces are drawing down.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, and United Nations
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Denmark, and Global Focus
498. Asia Beyond China: Developing a European Indo-Pacific Strategy for a Changing Global Order
- Author:
- Luke Patey
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Much of Europe’s attention to Asia is currently being captured by China. However, if the European Union and its member states are serious about maintaining a rules-based global order and advancing multilateralism and connectivity, it should increase its work in building partnerships across Asia, particularly in the Indo-Pacific super-region. To save multilateralism, go to the Indo-Pacific. RECOMMENDATIONS: ■ Multilateralism first. Unpack and differentiate where the United States and China support the rules-based order and where not, but also look to new trade deals and security pacts with India and Southeast Asia partners. ■ Targeted connectivity. The EU should continue to offer support to existing regional infrastructure and connectivity initiatives. ■ Work in small groups. EU unanimity on China and Indo-Pacific policy is ideal, but not always necessary to get things done. ■ Asia specialists wanted. Invest in and develop career paths for Asia specialists in foreign and defence ministries and intelligence services.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Emerging Markets, International Organization, Science and Technology, Power Politics, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
499. U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- U.S.-China strategic rivalry is intensifying – and nowhere more so than in the Indo-Pacific. This is likely to result in new US requests to close allies like Denmark to increase their security and defense policy contributions to the region. French and British efforts to establish an independent European presence in the Indo-Pacific present Denmark with a way to accommodate US requests without being drawn directly into the US confrontation with China. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ The importance of the Indo-Pacific region for Danish security and defense policy is likely to grow in the coming years. The focus and resources should therefore be directed towards strengthening Danish knowledge of and competences in the region. ■ Several European states, led by France and the UK, are increasing their national and joint European security and defense profiles in the Indo-Pacific by launching new initiatives. Denmark should remain closely informed about these initiatives and be ready to engage with them. ■ Regarding potential requests to the Danish Navy for contributions to the Indo-Pacific, Denmark should prioritize the French-led European naval diplomacy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, and Power Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, Denmark, North America, and United States of America
500. Together or Alone? Policy Brief The need for increased Albanian-Dutch cooperation to fight transnational organised crime
- Author:
- Alban Dafa and Wouter Zweers
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- In recent years the Netherlands has voiced security-related concerns about the involvement of Albanians nationals in organised crime in the Netherlands. These concerns culminated in a request to the European Commission to suspend visa-free travel for Albanians to the EU. This policy brief argues that the current Dutch approach does not provide the best means to address issues of organised crime, such as drug trafficking, related to Albanian nationals. It identifies several inadequacies in the crime data used to substantiate the Dutch position and the way Dutch authorities publicly communicate them. It posits that greater bilateral cooperation beyond the EU accession framework could improve efforts to fight transnational organised crime effectively. The opening of EU accession negotiations with Albania may offer a window of opportunity to formulate a constructive agenda of cooperation beyond the formal EU enlargement framework. This policy brief was written by Alban Dafa from the Institute for Democracy and Mediation and Wouter Zweers (the Clingendael Institute).
- Topic:
- Security, Law Enforcement, Transnational Actors, and Organized Crime
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Albania, and Netherlands