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2381. A Change in the Winds for Software Piracy

Author:
S. Michael Impink Jr.
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Depending on the industry, piracy either stifles economic growth or fosters innovation. In many technology and pharmaceutical industries, piracy impedes innovation because of its deleterious effect on profits, whereas in the fashion industry, piracy drives participants to produce the latest, trendiest designs. The business strategy of software producers, intellectual property owners, and computer device manufacturers has a substantive impact on piracy, not fully captured in the current literature. My research focuses on how business factors—the competitive landscape of device manufacturers, the evolving strategy of intellectual property owners, and the shift away from traditional licensing models—affect intellectual property rights and software piracy in high-growth countries.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Piracy, and Business
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

2382. The Cold War’s Endless Ripples

Author:
John Laidler
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
As an international historian, Faculty Associate Odd Arne Westad may be best known for bringing a fresh interpretation to the Cold War in which he argues that the era began much earlier and extended much farther than popularly thought. Those and other themes are explored in detail in a comprehensive new history of the Cold War written by Westad, the S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations at Harvard Kennedy School. In The Cold War: A World History, Westad traces the broad history of the era, including what he sees as its origins and its far-flung effects. The Harvard Gazette spoke to Westad about his perspective on the Cold War, including the forces that brought about and sustained the epic confrontation, and how it continues to reverberate decades after ending.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America

2383. Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests

Author:
Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Chinese firms, both private and state-owned, have in recent years invested billions of dollars in the U.S. technology industry, raising concerns that a powerful rival has gained or could soon gain access to sensitive and, in some cases, critical technologies that underpin American military superiority and economic might. At the workshop entitled “Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests,” held in San Francisco, on July 18, 2017, CFR convened nearly thirty current and former government officials, academics, bankers, investors, and corporate executives to explore whether the large and growing early-stage Chinese investment in critical U.S. technology poses a threat to U.S. national security, and, if so, to outline policies that mitigate the risks of unbridled Chinese investment and to bolster U.S. competitiveness.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

2384. China and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Promoting a Trilateral Dialogue

Author:
Heung-kyu Kim
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As the Republic of Korea faces an increasing threat from North Korea, evolving U.S.-China relations are becoming important to Seoul’s strategy for dealing with Pyongyang. The United States and China are competitors, but they also seek cooperation on a range of global issues. And although South Korea seeks to have good relations with both great powers, it is increasingly being pushed to take sides in the ongoing U.S.-China competition. As the U.S.-China relationship becomes more complex, South Korea needs to carefully evaluate its policy toward China in order to find the best ways to ensure Chinese cooperation on the North Korean issue, particularly taking into account China’s evolving view of North Korea. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is profoundly changing its foreign policy, including its relations with the United States and the two Koreas. With more confidence in its own diplomatic, military, and economic capacity to protect its national interests, China under Xi’s leadership has begun to regard the entire Korean Peninsula as part of its sphere of influence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2385. The Challenge From North Korea

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro and Ettore Greco
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
A nuclear-armed North Korea is a threat to the fragile strategic equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula and to international security at large. Emboldened by a nuclear arsenal, the highly militarized regime of President Kim Jong-un could be tempted to embark on aggressive acts. Meanwhile, the United States could opt for preventive military action. Even if neither party seeks a military confrontation, conflict could ensue due to miscalculation or simple misreading of each other’s intentions. Limited military exchanges could spiral out of control, eventually involving not only North Korea, the United States, and its allies in the region—Japan and South Korea—but also China. The repercussions of North Korea’s nuclear challenge may not be limited to Northeast Asia, not least because the nonproliferation regime, a pillar of international security, would be dealt a serious, if not fatal, blow if regional adversaries sought to meet it by acquiring their own nuclear arsenals. The destabilizing effects of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programs on regional and international security cannot be overestimated. In devising a response to the North Korean challenge, regional actors should remain committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but they should also implement security measures with observable results short of full denuclearization. Specifically, the United States and its allies should concentrate on sanctioning North Korea and on diplomatic action, actively seeking the involvement of China and Russia, while employing a strategy of deterrence and containment.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

2386. Writing New Rules for the U.S.-China Investment Relationship

Author:
Jennifer M. Harris
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Chinese outbound investment is on the rise, and much of it is finding its way into the United States. Be- tween 2010 and 2015, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the United States grew by an average of 32 percent annually.1 Within the past two years alone, Chinese foreign investment inflows to the United States increased four-fold, and available data suggests 2017 will see the second highest annual investment on record, after 2016.2 This is not a two-way street: the United States and other foreign investors do not enjoy similar open market access in China. China maintains a dizzying assortment of formal and informal barriers to for- eign investment—from outright restrictions and quotas to mandatory joint ventures, forced localization measures, and domestic licensing regimes. Despite years of negotiations, these barriers are, if anything, growing more cumbersome in many sectors. U.S. firms paint a darkening picture of the business climate they face in China. U.S. FDI in China has slowed considerably in recent years: after growing roughly 180 percent from 2002 to 2007 (albeit from a low baseline), U.S. FDI flows into China have declined since 2012.3 The one-way surge of Chinese investment into the United States comes against a backdrop of strategic mistrust between Washington and Beijing. Ongoing accusations of state-sponsored cyber predation of U.S. firms, Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness over territorial disputes, its systematic efforts to under- mine the U.S. alliance system in Asia, and mounting tensions over North Korea all contribute to a dark- ening mood in the U.S.-China relationship. And, like so much involving China, this investment is simply different. Rarely, if ever, has the United States seen an increase in investment of this magnitude—espe- cially from a non-ally and especially from one where the lines between state ownership and private own- ership are so inherently blurred. For all the concern surrounding Japanese investment in the United States in the 1980s—coming as it did amid fierce economic competition—those debates ultimately re- mained under the umbrella of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. All of this raises questions about whether the United States needs to tighten its stance on Chinese in- bound investment; proposals to that effect have bipartisan support in the Congress. The Donald J. Trump administration has signaled its desire for a tougher approach in its economic dealings with China, which U.S. businesses seem to welcome. One foundation for such an approach is the principle of reciprocity. Roughly two dozen sectors in China—construction, mining, banking, insurance, and so on—remain effectively off-limits to American investment, because the Chinese government protects its domestic companies through regulations and financial subsidies. Even in sectors that technically allow foreign investment, discriminatory industrial policies tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese firms. Until this changes, Washington would be justi- fied—even obligated—to limit Chinese investment in the U.S. market. However, U.S. policymakers do not have a consensus on what a policy of reciprocity would entail, and different policy interpretations could spell quite different economic and foreign policy consequences for the United States. The United States should aim for a version of reciprocity that allows it the flexibility to maximize pressure on the broad range of Chinese industrial policy concerns while leaving a clear route to negotiations. The United States should also encourage European and other Western countries, many of which are seeing similar increases in Chinese investment, to adopt this new approach.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

2387. Common Ground for the United States, Japan, and China in Southeast Asia

Author:
Brian Harding
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Southeast Asia’s economic and geopolitical profile in the world has risen dramatically. Its $2.5 trillion economy is a rare bright spot for global growth.1 Plus, the increasingly integrated Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, is a rare example of a regional political structure writing its own destiny—in this case, the agenda for the emerging regional security architecture of the Asia-Pacific.2 The region has also emerged, however, as a nexus for a range of transnational threats, ranging from trafficking in illicit goods to extreme weather events that are a result of climate change.3 Yet the region’s vital sea lanes have only grown more important, with more than half of the world’s merchant tonnage and one-third of global maritime traffic transiting the region every day on their journey from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to the economic powerhouses of Northeast Asia.4 The world has taken note of the opportunities presented by increased involvement in Southeast Asian affairs, as well as the challenges the region faces. Governments and multinational companies across the world are ramping up engagement with the region bilaterally with individual countries and multilaterally with ASEAN. Southeast Asian countries wholeheartedly welcome this global interest for both economic and strategic reasons. Economically, despite the region’s promise, all but Singapore and Brunei are developing countries in desperate need of foreign investment to continue their upward trajectories. Most critically, the region faces a multitrillion-dollar infrastructure gap that constrains economic growth and perpetuates inequality.5 With indigenous capital and even the commitments of international development banks unable to meet demand on this scale, investment by major powers is essential for the region to achieve its potential. Strategically, Southeast Asian countries welcome engagement by a wide range of outside powers to ensure that the region’s partnerships are highly diversified. As a grouping of small countries with modest military and economic power, robust partnerships with a range of actors ensure that no single outside power can dominate regional affairs. In essence, the region prefers a balance of power—or in Indonesian parlance, dynamic equilibrium. While welcoming and encouraging international involvement in regional affairs, Southeast Asian nations also naturally seek to do so on their own terms. For countries making national decisions regarding foreign investment or security cooperation with an outside power, these smaller countries can often find themselves in a position of weakness relative to the outside power. However, collectively, ASEAN provides a platform that allows each country to punch above its weight, providing a venue to make certain issues ASEAN issues rather than national issues for the purpose of creating greater leverage with outside powers. Quite remarkably, despite its flaws, the bloc has managed to maintain its position in the region as the driver of Asia-Pacific regionalism, while outside powers routinely reiterate the importance of “ASEAN centrality.”6 This report outlines findings from a recent trilateral dialogue, organized by the Center for American Progress, of Southeast Asia experts from the United States, Japan, and China. It describes the current state of U.S., Japanese, and Chinese engagement in Southeast Asia and presents four areas for potential U.S.-Japan-China collaboration with Southeast Asian partners on shared challenges.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

2388. The U.S.-Japan Alliance in an Age of Elevated U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Brian Harding
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The U.S.-Japan alliance has been an extraordinary public good for more than half a century. Since the beginning of the Cold War, it has provided stability in a potentially volatile region and enabled Japan and its neighbors to forge the most dynamic regional economy in the world. Today, the alliance remains rooted in shared values and interests and continues to make the region and the world more secure and prosperous, with cooperation ranging from countering North Korean missile threats to development coordination in Africa.1 But the U.S.-Japan alliance is now far from the only relationship of substance for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Most notably, relations with China have become an enormous focus for U.S. policymakers in recent years and will continue to be a high priority for the foreseeable future.2 While fundamentally different from the U.S.-Japan relationship, the elevation of U.S.-China relations as a major focal point for U.S. foreign policy raises a critical question: How can policymakers ensure that the rise of U.S.-China relations does not come at the expense of the U.S.-Japan relationship?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2389. Everything You Think You Know About Coal in China Is Wrong

Author:
Melanie Hart, Luke Bassett, and Blaine Johnson
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
China’s energy markets send mixed signals about the nation’s policy intentions and emissions trajectory. Renewable energy analysts tend to focus on China’s massive renewable expansion and view the nation as a global clean energy leader; coal proponents and climate skeptics are more likely to focus on the number of coal plants in China—both in operation and under construction—and claim its climate rhetoric is more flash than substance. In December 2016, the Center for American Progress brought a group of energy experts to China to find out what is really happening. We visited multiple coal facilities—including a coal-to-liquids plant—and went nearly 200 meters down one of China’s largest coal mines to interview engineers, plant managers, and local government officials working at the front lines of coal in China. We found that the nation’s coal sector is undergoing a massive transformation that extends from the mines to the power plants, from Ordos to Shanghai. China is indeed going green. The nation is on track to overdeliver on the emissions reduction commitments it put forward under the Paris climate agreement, and making coal cleaner is an integral part of the process. From a climate perspective, the ideal scenario would be for China to shut down all of its coal-fired power plants and switch over to clean energy full stop. In reality, China’s energy economy is a massive ship that cannot turn on a dime. The shift toward renewables is happening: China’s Paris commitment includes a promise to install 800 gigawatts to 1,000 gigawatts of new renewable capacity by 2030, an amount equivalent to the capacity of the entire U.S. electricity system.1 While China and the United States have roughly the same land mass, however, China has 1.3 billion people to the United States’ 325 million.2 It needs an electricity system that is much larger, so adding the renewable equivalent of one entire U.S. electricity system is not enough to replace coal in the near to medium term. To bridge the gap, China is rolling out new technologies to drastically reduce local air pollution and climate emissions from the nation’s remaining coal plants.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Green Technology, and Coal
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2390. Getting Real on Sanctions Is Key to Pressuring North Korea

Author:
Melanie Hart and Renee Ding
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
As the Trump administration’s approach to North Korea appears to shift back and forth between saber rattling and hints of diplomacy—with leading administration officials at times sending contradictory signals—it is clear that the administration needs an overarching strategy for addressing the North Korean threat. That strategy must include a tough, smart, and carefully targeted sanctions offensive. However, given President Donald Trump’s fiery exchanges with Kim Jong Un, and the drumbeat of White House statements and media opinion pieces discussing potentially imminent military action, one can be forgiven for having the impression that the United States has already run its best sanction plays against North Korea. In reality, that effort has only just begun, and if the United States can stay the course, it has the potential to turn this crisis around. Chinese diplomats often claim that it is pointless for China to cut off its economic ties with North Korea because Kim Jong Un would rather let his people starve than give up his nuclear program.1 They give an impression that there is no middle ground: If China pushes North Korea economically, the regime will resist until it collapses, triggering a massive security crisis on the Korean Peninsula.2 There is an equal amount of hand-wringing on the U.S. side. American observers tend to view the past decade of apparently ineffective U.N. action as evidence that sanctions are a dead end and military action will eventually become inevitable. In truth, there is a middle road on sanctions and it runs in two directions: through China and through North Korea’s gateways to the international financial system. The reality is that North Korea is much more exposed than many observers recognize, and the United States has only just begun to target the regime’s biggest weak spots. Instead of blowing hot and cold with China and exchanging blustery rhetoric with North Korea—two approaches that give China maneuvering room to avoid action—the United States needs to double down on a strategy that deals an economic blow against North Korea on par with the blow that brought Iran to the negotiation table in 2013.3
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America