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1. CAN DEBT RELIEF CONSTRAIN REPRESSIVE GOVERNMENTS?

Author:
Brett L. Carter
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The African continent is confronting the prospect of a new debt crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on government finances. The Russian government’s war against Ukraine has increased the cost of food and energy, and compelled investors to sell off government bonds in emerging markets. Rising interest rates in the United States will increase the cost of borrowing. The Chinese economy is struggling under the weight of Xi Jinping’s “Zero COVID” policy and accumulated real estate debt. In 2015, the International Monetary Fund announced that eight countries were in debt distress. By March 2022, 23 were. In June, public debt ratios reached a 20-year high. Africa’s debt-distressed governments “are unlikely to default” in 2022,” The Economist observed, “but face trouble by 2024.” There is some evidence that the debt crisis is especially acute for Africa’s non-democracies. The impending debt crisis coincides with a general sense that Africa is experiencing a democratic recession. Voters are increasingly subject to intimidation and violence. Incumbent presidents are removing term limits. The longstanding norm against military coups is fading.
Topic:
Cold War, Debt, World Bank, GDP, Repression, and IMF
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and United States of America

2. China: Rise or Demise?

Author:
John Mueller
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
China, even if it rises, does not present much of a security threat to the United States. Policymakers increasingly view China’s rapidly growing wealth as a threat. China currently ranks second, or perhaps even first, in the world in gross domestic product (although 78th in per capita GDP), and the fear is that China will acquire military prowess commensurate with its wealth and feel impelled to carry out undesirable military adventures. However, even if it continues to rise, China does not present much of a security threat to the United States. China does not harbor Hitler‐​style ambitions of extensive conquest, and the Chinese government depends on the world economy for development and the consequent acquiescence of the Chinese people. Armed conflict would be extremely—even overwhelmingly—costly to the country and, in particular, to the regime in charge. Indeed, there is a danger of making China into a threat by treating it as such and by engaging in so‐​called balancing efforts against it. Rather than rising to anything that could be conceived to be “dominance,” China could decline into substantial economic stagnation. It faces many problems, including endemic (and perhaps intractable) corruption, environmental devastation, slowing growth, a rapidly aging population, enormous overproduction, increasing debt, and restive minorities in its west and in Hong Kong. At a time when it should be liberalizing its economy, Xi Jinping’s China increasingly restricts speech and privileges control by the antiquated and kleptocratic Communist Party over economic growth. And entrenched elites are well placed to block reform. That said, China’s standard of living is now the highest in its history, and it’s very easy to envision conditions that are a great deal worse than life under a stable, if increasingly authoritarian, kleptocracy. As a result, the Chinese people may be willing to ride with, and ride out, economic stagnation should that come about—although this might be accompanied by increasing dismay and disgruntlement. In either case—rise or demise—there is little the United States or other countries can or should do to affect China’s economically foolish authoritarian drive except to issue declarations of disapproval and to deal more warily. As former ambassador Chas Freeman puts it, “There is no military answer to a grand strategy built on a non‐​violent expansion of commerce and navigation.” And Chinese leaders have plenty of problems to consume their attention. They scarcely need war or foreign military adventurism to enhance the mix. The problem is not so much that China is a threat but that it is deeply insecure. Policies of threat, balance, sanction, boycott, and critique are more likely to reinforce that condition than change it. The alternative is to wait, and to profit from China’s economic size to the degree possible, until someday China feels secure enough to reform itself.
Topic:
Government, GDP, Geopolitics, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America