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12. Who Lends to Africa and How? Introducing the Africa Debt Database
- Author:
- David Mihalyi and Christoph Trebesch
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- Africa’s sovereign debt markets are not well understood, partly due to a lack of data. This paper introduces the Africa Debt Database (ADD), the most granular and comprehensive dataset on external borrowing by African governments thus far. Our project moves beyond existing aggregate datasets and instead releases information on individual loans and bonds, in particular on the financial terms of each instrument. Taken together, we cover nearly 7000 loans and bonds between 2000 and 2020, with a total volume of 644 billion USD. Using this data, we study Africa’s record lending boom of the 2010s in detail. The debt boom was mainly driven by large sovereign bond issuances in London and New York, as well as growing lending by Chinese state-owned banks. The micro data also reveal a large variation in lending terms across countries, time, and creditors. Sovereign external bonds have interest rates of 6 percent, on average, Chinese banks charge 2-4 percent, and multilateral organizations just 1 percent. Strikingly, many governments in Africa simultaneously borrow large amounts from both private and official creditors, at vastly different rates. The large differences in debt servicing costs are indicative of a cross-creditor subsidy, as cheap concessional loans can be used to pay the high interest to private or Chinese creditors.
- Topic:
- Economics, Foreign Aid, Credit, and Influence
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia
13. A Survey of Importers: Results of a Survey Conducted in Collaboration with the Ethiopian Economics Association
- Author:
- Ricardo Hausmann, Tim O'Brien, Tim Cheston, Nikita Taniparti, and Ibrahim Worku Hassen
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Ethiopia suffers from a chronic shortage of foreign exchange (forex).[1] The resulting lack of access to imports prevents firms from accessing imported inputs required for production. This creates a vicious cycle as exporters are constrained by this same problem, which further reduces overall supply of foreign exchange in the Ethiopian economy. The inability to reliably access foreign exchange for imports affects firm decisions on sourcing, capacity, and output. While the cost of this constraint is known to be high on the Ethiopian economy and firms are known to use a range of measures to attempt to bypass this constraint, quantitative assessments of the problem and response actions by firms are limited. It is in this context that an importer survey was conducted with the goal of informing policy decisions. A total of 202 firms with an active importing license were interviewed in March-April 2022. These firms were randomly sampled from firms registered with an importer license. All firms interviewed reported that they were operating below capacity, often well below capacity. Foreign exchange shortages were the main reason respondent firms cited for not operating at full capacity (63% of firms reporting this as their biggest constraint). Forex shortages far surpass the second and third reasons cited for not operating at full capacity — constraints due to the conflict (13%) and COVID-19 restrictions (11%). Firms operating below capacity cited forex shortages as the main constraint, regardless of whether they imported or not in the previous year. This was the most pressing constraint reported by firms of all sizes and sectors surveyed. It was the most pressing constraint faced by exporters and by foreign-owned firms as well as non-exporters and domestic firms. Amongst the total sample of firms with a renewed importer license, more than one-third of respondent firms (37%) had not imported in FY2020-21. Overall, 74% of firms reported experiencing challenges in accessing forex. Access to forex was reported as most challenging for manufacturing firms and smaller firms but impacted all sectors and firm sizes. The losses attributed to forex scarcity at the firm level were largest for agricultural firms, for micro-firms, and for firms that did not import at all in the previous year. In general, the larger the firm sales, the higher the likelihood that they were able import. The survey found different types of imports for different sectors. Manufacturing firms imported a large share semi-finished goods as imports as compared to agricultural firms that primarily imported finished goods. The survey results find that foreign exchange shortages and an inability to import are most severe for the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, small and micro-sized firms, and all non-exporters. However, the constraint is also the top problem facing all firm types in the survey, including exporters and foreign-owned firms. The primary means of accessing foreign exchange where it did occur was through specialized forex accounts or ‘diaspora’ accounts. The second most common means of accessing foreign exchange was through retention accounts available to exporters. The black market featured in many responses, but questions across the survey suggest that self-reported use of the black market by survey participants is underreported versus actual usage. The ability to source foreign exchange differed significantly by firm size. Exporting firms primarily used retention account earnings, as compared to non-exporters, which relied more on forex accounts. For faster access to forex, most firms reported that they approach banks, followed by turning to the black market. Friends and family abroad also served as a source of forex for one-quarter of firm respondents, and that foreign exchange was often used immediately. Foreign exchange access from banks is nevertheless a major pain point for firms. Most firms (55%) requested forex from a bank in the past year. On average, fulfilled forex requests took three months to be processed when they were fulfilled, but many firms reported that they have an unfulfilled request that has been in the system for more than a year. These firms are especially likely to report foreign exchange access as their top challenge. The survey finds that individual firms do not tend to use both official and black-market foreign exchange sources but rather tend to access all their forex at the (lower) official rate or all at the (higher) black-market. Large firms import most of their products at the official rate. By contrast, most small and micro firms import through other means. Manufacturing firms are also more likely to import all their production through other means and outside of the banking system. Non-exporting firms tended to import through other means than the official rate and outside of the banking system at a higher prevalence than exporting firms. The survey gleaned new insights on the implicit exchange rate that firms face as they navigate official and black-market channels of foreign exchange access. The survey does not allow for a precise estimate of the transaction-weighted exchange rate facing the economy but finds firm-level estimates align with previous macro-level estimates. The implicit exchange rate was higher for non-exporting firms, which show a greater willingness to pay a higher exchange rate to access imports. This signals the importance of the retention account for exporters to guarantee an import price closer to the official exchange rate. When asked about the maximum rate firms would pay to guarantee access to forex, some groups of firms were willing to pay higher amounts, including all non-exporters, firms that imported in the past year, and those that declared forex access a challenge. When compared to the implied rate they paid in the past year, many firms are willing to pay more than the implied rate to guarantee access to forex. Firm perspectives on policy changes to the exchange rate underscored challenges faced by policymakers. Current policy has been one of a crawling peg, with changes within the last several years to increase the rate of devaluation. The survey asked respondents about their support for faster devaluation, for a one-off movement to unify the official rate with the black-market rate, or about alternative exchange rate systems such as a floating exchange rate. Most respondents (71%) opposed maintaining the current regime, yet no option received majority support. Most firms appear to want both a stronger exchange rate and easier access to foreign exchange despite a tradeoff between these two priorities. The largest share of support for policy change was to adjust the exchange rate such that the official rate matches the black-market rate.
- Topic:
- Development, Economics, Imports, and Collaboration
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Ethiopia
14. Unravelling Africa’s raw material footprints and their drivers
- Author:
- Albert Kwame Osei-Owusu, Michael Danquah, and Edgar Towa
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United Nations University
- Abstract:
- This paper applies an environmentally extended input–output analysis, leveraging the Eora database, to estimate the global raw material footprints of 51 African nations from 1995 to 2015. It employs least absolute shrinkage and selection operator and panel regression models to quantify the effects of diverse variables on Africa’s raw material footprints. The findings show that the raw material footprints of Africa’s production and consumption soared by 41 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, from 1995 to 2015, mainly driven by biomass and construction materials. They show that Africa outsources 25 per cent of its raw material footprints from consumption, while over 60 per cent of its footprints from production arise from its exports. Our findings beckon African governments to reduce the excessive focus on exploitation and concentrate on combatting corruption and extreme rent-seeking while decoupling Africa’s raw material footprints from rising public debt, carbon emissions, income levels, and population.
- Topic:
- Economics, Carbon Emissions, Public Debt, Income, Raw Materials, and Input-Output Analysis
- Political Geography:
- Africa
15. Determinants of corporate cash holdings in South Africa
- Author:
- Ewa Karwowski, Hanna Szymborska, Keagile Lesame, and Tlhologelo Thoka
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United Nations University
- Abstract:
- Globally, corporate cash holdings have risen since the 1980s. In South Africa, some commentators have accused corporations of engaging in an ‘investment strike’, while others see corporate liquidity as a precaution against systemic uncertainty. We use the unique South African Revenue Service/National Treasury firm-level dataset to scrutinize corporate liquidity, using panel analysis. Relative to GDP, corporate cash and liquidity holdings have not increased between 2010 and 2017. However, corporate cash is high in international comparison and has grown at the firm level. We do not find evidence for the hypothesis that companies are engaging in an investment strike. Cash and liquidity are shaped by idiosyncratic and sectoral risk factors. In the short run, heightened uncertainty might reduce corporate cash and liquidity as firms struggle to adjust to an unexpected economic situation. In the medium run, we find a strong association between political uncertainty and corporate cash and liquidity holdings.
- Topic:
- Economics, Corporations, Liquidity, and Cash
- Political Geography:
- Africa, South Africa, and Global Focus
16. The Emergence of African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement and Lessons from the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement
- Author:
- Samuel Igbatayo
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- Africa’s regional integration agenda arrived at a cross roads in 2019, with the adoption of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. The AfCFTA framework came into force on 30th May, 2019, with its ratification by The Gambia, which brought the total number of African Union (AU) member state ratifications to twenty-two, the minimum threshold for AfCFTA implementation (Baker McKenzie 2019). As of May; 2022, forty-three of the 55 African countries have ratified the AfCFTA agreement (African Union 2018). The 12th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Niamey on 7th July; 2019, witnessed the launching of AfCFTA’s operational phase, which is governed by five instruments, namely: the rules of origin, the online negotiating forum, the monitoring and elimination of non-tariff barriers; a digital payment system and the African Trade Observatory. In addition, the beginning of trade under the terms of the agreement was set for July 1, 2020 (TRALAC 2020). A free trade agreement (FTA) can be aptly described as a pact between two or more countries on areas in which they agree to lift most or all tariffs, and other barriers to imports and exports among them (Barone 2019). Under a free trade framework, goods and services can be traded across international borders, with little or no government tariffs, quotas, subsidies, or prohibitions to inhibit their exchange. The theory of free trade Agreements is rooted in classical economics, dating back to the era of Adam Smith. During this period, David Ricardo (1772-1823), a British political economist, was acknowledged with pioneering thoughts on free trade as a key instrument for wealth accumulation. The evolution of preferential trade agreements is traceable to the rise of European countries after World War II, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, a development that eventually culminated in the creation of the European Union (EU) (Johnston 2019). Spurred by the success of regional bodies with free trade agreements and Africa’s poor trading performance; estimated at a paltry 3% of annual global trade, the African Union embarked upon the creation of the AfCFTA agreement as a tool for Intra-Africa trade and regional integration.
- Topic:
- Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Regional Integration, and Free Trade
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Asia-Pacific
17. How Innovative Financing Models Can Support the Scaling of Supply Chain Innovations
- Author:
- Allie Dichiara and John Simon
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Substantial progress has been made toward achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3: Health and Well-Being for All. However, progress is plateauing as global health development funding decelerates, and much of the remaining gaps are among the hardest to address, especially for the most vulnerable and hardest-to-reach communities. A key element to reigniting progress toward SDG 3 is significantly improving the effectiveness of the current fragmented health commodity supply chain, through which billions in spending—approximately $6 billion in donor funds in 2015 and $50 billion in overall spending in 2017—flow each year to low- and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs). Fortunately, there is a growing number of innovative supply chain solutions available across sub-Saharan Africa that could have the potential to dramatically improve the underperforming status quo.
- Topic:
- Economics, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Supply Chains
- Political Geography:
- Africa
18. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence
- Author:
- Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia
19. Estados Unidos y África. Historia de una no-política
- Author:
- Pablo Rey-García and Pedro Rivas Nieto
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- En este artículo se estudian las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y África, desde los puntos de vista económico, político y de seguridad. Son, estos tres campos, interdependientes, pero a la vez enormemente dinámicos, tanto por la inercia política estadounidense, como por los condicionantes propios de África (déficit en desarrollo, pobreza, inseguridad o inestabilidad política) como por el contexto internacional. En este último aspecto, cobra especial relevancia la invasión rusa de Ucrania o la emergencia de la ambición militar China, pues ambos países compiten con Estados Unidos por tener una mejor posición en el continente africano.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Development, Economics, National Security, and Terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, China, Asia, North America, Sahel, United States of America, and Horn of Africa
20. Beyond 2025: The Future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act
- Author:
- Daniel F. Runde and Sundar R. Ramanujam
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Over the past two decades, the United States has provided assistance and support for sub-Saharan Africa’s efforts to transform its economic and trade relationships, centered around the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). First enacted into law on May 18, 2000, AGOA was designed to significantly enhance designated sub-Saharan African countries’ market access to the United States by providing duty-free treatment for specific import categories. The legislation’s primary goal was to promote economic growth through good governance and free markets. To qualify and remain eligible for AGOA, countries were expected to demonstrate progress toward market liberalization and to improve the rule of law, human rights protections, and core labor standards. More than 20 years later, AGOA continues to provide preferential treatment to 44 countries in the region, spanning over 6,500 tariff lines. Since May 2000, AGOA has been amended four times, mostly to clarify preferential treatment terms, technical standards, and sunset deadlines. The act was initially designed to be valid for eight years, expiring at the end of September 2007. In July 2004, however, President George W. Bush signed the AGOA Acceleration Act, extending it to 2015. Toward the end of his second term, in June 2015 President Barack Obama extended its validity by signing the Trade Preferences Extension Act, under which AGOA is set to expire in 2025. The global political and economic landscape has changed profoundly since AGOA was enacted in 2000, even before the Covid-19 pandemic created new disruptions and accelerated several ongoing changes. The mobile telephony revolution has created new opportunities for millions to participate in the digital sphere, use mobile banking and payments systems, and receive commercial, educational, and medical services via the internet. Even as the sub-Saharan African region’s middle class continues to grow, it is also set to experience a youth population boom in the next three decades—which, under the right conditions, could pay a demographic dividend and avert a social crisis. Meanwhile, the United States has also entered an era of great-power competition with China. With China’s influence in sub-Saharan Africa rising significantly, this competition is also playing out through the region’s political and economic institutions. Considering these opportunities and challenges, leaders in Washington (and their constituents across the United States) ought to look at Africa as a prospect for deepening commercial partnerships, not as a continent that needs to be “saved” through foreign assistance. Accordingly, the United States can consider one of the three following scenarios in response to AGOA’s current expiration timeline
- Topic:
- Development, Economics, International Cooperation, and International Trade and Finance
- Political Geography:
- Africa