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1. Insurgent Alliances in Afghanistan

Author:
Mallory Sutika Sipus
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
One of the contributing factors to Afghanistan’s civil conflict has been the fluidity within military alliances at the sub-national level. This brief examines the circumstances of military alliances between insurgent commanders—what factors play into an alliance and how they are maintained, with assessments resulting from research from the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies and supported by USIP.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Political Violence, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Central Asia

2. Compounding Uncertainty in Afghanistan: Economic Consequences of Delay in Signing the Bilateral Security Agreement

Author:
Casey Garret Johnson, William A. Byrd, and Sanaullah Tasal
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The still unsigned Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the United States provides the legal basis for continuing U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. In addition to its substantive importance, the BSA is also a confidence-building mechanism. The delay in putting it in place is compounding uncertainty and further diminishing economic confidence during Afghanistan's already challenging and uncertain transition. Afghans' responses include, among others, hedging behavior (legal and illegal), personal decisions on whether to come back to or stay in Afghanistan, delays in investments, incipient job losses, declining demand for goods and services and real estate prices, and farmers planting more opium poppy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Democratization, Development, Treaties and Agreements, Insurgency, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Asia

3. Last Chance: The International Community and the 2014 Afghan Elections

Author:
Scott S. Smith
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Afghanistan's democratic development has taken place within the tight embrace of international support and the conception of "free and fair" elections that comes with it, but Afghan and inter-national views on what to expect from elections have diverged in the past, leading to a deepening of distrust between the Karzai-led Afghan government and the international community. The run-up to the 2014 presidential elections has been shaped by this distrust. Nonetheless, with the breakdown of the reconciliation effort with the Taliban and uncertainty about the result of the transition process due to President Hamid Karzai's unexpected refusal to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), the April 5 election is the only remaining opportunity for a political resolution of the continuing crisis in Afghanistan. A more complete understanding of the 2009 elections—how they were and were not a disaster—can help to narrow the gap between Afghan and international expectations; and an understanding of some of the changes that have occurred in Afghan society since 2009 can offer reason for optimism that the election will at the least create space for political elites to address the root causes of the crisis.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Corruption, Democratization, Political Economy, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

4. Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Past

Author:
Deedee Derksen
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
A piecemeal approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan, with four DDR programs since 2001 each targeting specific groups, has yielded limited results, mostly due to an extremely adverse political environment. Comprehensive DDR is unlikely to work without a settlement that includes all armed groups. The success of such a deal would in turn hinge on the successful reintegration of commanders and fighters. Sequencing DDR in the conventional way may not work; reintegration might better precede disarmament.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

5. Documentation and Transitional Justice in Afghanistan

Author:
Patricia A. Gossman
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In Afghanistan, the social upheaval resulting from thirty-five years of war has created widely differing narratives of the conflict as various communities and political factions have reconstructed events through the lens of their experiences. Extensive dislocation of large segments of the population and poor communication throughout the war years meant that Afghans often had no way of knowing what was happening in different parts of the country. Although the war had several phases, earlier transitions—such as the collapse of the Najibullah government in 1992—failed to provide an opportunity for investigations into past human rights abuses because the conflict was ongoing. As a consequence, documentation remains thin. Conditions have made it difficult for human rights groups to function; additionally, many records have been either lost or destroyed. Since 2001, a number of initiatives were launched to investigate and document war crimes and human rights abuses. The relative openness of this period provided increased opportunities to document ongoing abuses occurring in the context of the Taliban insurgency and counterinsurgency effort. The most ambitious components of transitional justice, as envisioned by Afghan organizations and their international partners, however, appear to be indefinitely stalled given the failure of electoral vetting and the silencing of an Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission report that would have mapped all abuses in the three decades of conflict. No single report or archive can provide a definitive truth about the past. Such an archive, however, can serve, however imperfectly, as vital evidence in the effort to understand the complex array of factors that have played a part in conflict. Better documentation and access to other narratives could provide a counterweight to narrow or politically motivated interpretations of past events that could seed future conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Development, Islam, Terrorism, War, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

6. Electoral Offensive: Taliban Planning for Afghanistan's 2014 National Elections

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi and Casey Garret Johnson
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Taliban have more resources and are better organized to disrupt Afghanistan's 2014 national elections than was the case in any of the country's last four elections. Still, there are disagreements between insurgent leaders about carrying out a campaign of violence and intimidation. One group, led by Akhtar Mansur and tied to the Quetta Shura, favored, at least for some time, a more conciliatory approach and in the spring met informally with Afghan government officials to discuss allowing the polls to go forward. Another Group, led by Taliban military commander Zakir and the Peshawar Shura, favors disrupting the election. These upper-level divisions may have little consequence on the ground since rank-and-file fighters are either vowing to carry out attacks regardless or, as has happened in the past, may strike local deals with political entities to look the other way and allow voting to take place.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Democratization, Islam, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Taliban

7. The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance: Lessons for Transition

Author:
Frances Z. Brown
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The U.S. military and civilian surge into Afghanistan starting in late 2009 aimed to stabilize the country through interconnected security, governance, and development initiatives. Despite policymakers’ claims that their goals for Afghan governance were “modest,” the surge’s stated objectives amounted to a transformation of the subnational governance landscape. Three years later, the surge has attained localized progress, but it has not achieved the strategic, sustainable “game change” in Afghan subnational governance it sought. The surge has not met these objectives because its success depended upon three initial U.S. assumptions that proved unrealistic. First, surge policy assumed that governance progress would accrue as quickly as security progress, with more governance-focused resources compensating for less time. Second, surge policy assumed that “bottom-up” progress in local governance would be reinforced by “top-down” Afghan government structures and reforms. Third, surge policy assumed that “absence of governance” was a key universal driver for the insurgency, whereas in some areas, presence of government became a fueling factor. Once the surge was in motion, other miscalculations emerged: the confusion of discrete successes with replicable progress, the mistaking of individuals’ improvements with institution building, the confusion of “local” with “simple,” and the overreliance on technological solutions to address problems that were fundamentally political in nature. As the surge draws down, the U.S-Afghan Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement represents a promising opportunity for longer-term strategic planning. As the international community moves to transition, it should exert its remaining leverage to impact select systemic issues—such as by resolving district council makeup, improving line ministries’ recurring services, and bolstering provincial administrations—rather than tactical-level ones. The international community should also prioritize a few key, attainable efforts, such as providing training that is consistent with current Afghan government functions, while avoiding creating additional structures. Finally, all the usual Afghan local governance recommendations still apply: resolving Afghanistan’s subnational challenges requires long-term commitment and systematic execution.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Insurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Asia

8. Impact or Illusion? Reintegration under the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program

Author:
Deedee Derksen
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) aims to reintegrate insurgents in return for security, jobs and other incentives, but has seen limited results. Rapid implementation of the program has failed to address adequately a variety of political, employment and security concerns.
Topic:
Security, Islam, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

9. Istanbul and Bonn Conferences: Building Blocks of the Afghan Transition Process

Author:
Hodei Sultan
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Istanbul Conference slated for November 2, 2011 aims to bring to the discussion table issues relating to the transition in Afghanistan, including Afghan security, recruitment, training and equipment of Afghan security forces, as well as the reconciliation process. The conference will also focus on regional economic cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Peace Studies, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

10. From Militants to Policemen: Three Lessons from U.S. Experience with DDR and SSR

Author:
Alison Laporte-Oshiro
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Consolidating the legitimate use of force in the hands of the state is a vital first step in post-conflict peacebuilding. Transitional governments must move quickly to neutralize rival armed groups and provide a basic level of security for citizens. Two processes are vital to securing a monopoly of force: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and security sector reform. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) involve disbanding armed groups that challenge the government's monopoly of force. Security sector reform (SSR) means reforming and rebuilding the national security forces so that they are professional and accountable. U.S. experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo yielded three crosscutting lessons: go in heavy, tackle DDR and SSR in tandem, and consolidate U.S. capacity to implement both tasks in a coordinated, scalable way.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Liberia

11. Constitutional Interpretation and the Continuing Crisis in Afghanistan

Author:
Scott Worden and Sylvana Q. Sinha
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The recent controversy in Afghanistan over the outcome of the 2010 parliamentary elections ultimately resolved the question of who sits in Parliament, but left a more fundamental question unanswered: "Who has the power to interpret the Afghan Constitution?" Ambiguities in the language of the Constitution make it difficult to determine who has the legal authority to interpret it. The Supreme Court maintains that the Constitution gives it the power of judicial review, but the Constitution also calls for the Independent Commission on the Supervision of Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC), which the Parliament has mandated to decide constitutional issues instead. Without political and legal consensus over who has final authority to decide different types of constitutional claims, Afghanistan cannot achieve a rule of law where government activities are subject to consistent and transparent rules. Afghanistan must establish clear and unambiguous rules for constitutional interpretation to avoid damaging crises about political leadership and the separation of powers as the security transition and Presidential election approach in 2014.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Democratization, Islam, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

12. Afghan Civil Society and a Comprehensive Peace Process

Author:
Lisa Schirch
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
A successful, legitimate and sustainable approach to peace in Afghanistan requires the inclusion of Afghan civil society and their interests. For the most part, Afghan peace negotiations exclude representatives of civil society and center on a narrow agenda featuring concerns of armed groups. Attempts at a quick fix settlement could compromise the foundations of durable peace, resulting in more costs to the international community, and more death and destruction on the ground. Half of all peace agreements fail. One of the reasons why they fail is that too few people support them. Building a national consensus requires participation by and support from civil society. Afghanistan requires a peace process that is both wide and deep, with structured mechanisms for participatory deliberation and decision-making involving diverse stakeholders from the top, middle and community levels of society. Based on examination of successful peace processes, there are four broad models of public participation in peace processes relevant for Afghanistan. These include direct participation in local peace processes, a national civil society assembly, representation at the central negotiation table and a public referendum to vote on a final agreement. The international community, the Afghan government and Afghan civil society can each take steps to ensure a comprehensive, successful and sustainable peace process.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil Society, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

13. Promoting Stability and Resolving Provincial Disputes in Afghanistan

Author:
Noah Coburn and Shahmahmood Miakhel
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Currently numerous disputes at the local level are unresolved in Afghanistan, leading to local instability, a growing distance between the government and people and encouraging communities to turn to the Taliban. In March 2010, USIP began working with local elders, government officials (particularly governors and officials from the Ministry of Tribal Affairs) and religious figures to address a range of disputes in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces in eastern Afghanistan. These networks of elders, working closely with government officials and, in some cases, the international military, have addressed conflicts that include land disputes, criminal cases, and disputes involving the Taliban. Since 2010, USIP's Dispute Resolution Project has participated in and recorded the resolution of over 120 cases. The project suggests several methods for facilitating dispute resolution that rely on flexible networks of locally legitimate political figures which will strengthen the government, promote rule of law and decrease the appeal of the Taliban.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban

14. Afghan High Peace Council Fails to Reflect Afghan Civil Society

Author:
Patricia Gossman
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The Afghan public, along with the international community, appears increasingly supportive of opening negotiations with the Taliban to end the war. The Karzai administration also supports this, as reflected by the June 2010 Peace Jirga held in Kabul and the 70-member High Peace Council that was formed thereafter. In spite of the talks, no one in Washington or Kabul has clarified what reconciliation means in practice, particularly with respect to accountability for abuses that occurred during the rule of the Taliban as well as those that occurred when rival factions fought with each other before the Taliban came to power. On November 10, 2010 representatives from Afghan and international NGOs, as well as the UN, gathered for a one-day Conference on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice in Kabul to revitalize public discussion on peace and reconciliation among the government of Afghanistan, the international community, and Afghan civil society. The discussions revealed a troubling disconnect between the High Peace Council and Afghan civil society representatives who strongly criticized the Council\'s inclusion of former militia leaders among its members, the lack of transparency in its activities, and the lack of clarity in its objectives. These criticisms indicate that for a peace process to have broad, popular support, the Afghan government and the international community must make greater efforts to engage local leaders in a dialogue and account for the interests of communities and interest groups that are not represented in the High Peace Council.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Human Rights, Islam, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

15. Navigating Negotiations in Afghanistan

Author:
Matt Waldman
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
There are reasons for skepticism about government-insurgent talks, especially as both sides are known for abusive, unjust and discriminatory policies. However, given the constraints of counterinsurgency, obstacles to an anticipated security transition, and the threat of worsening conflict, the potential for negotiations should be explored. Field research indicates that the coalition's military surge is intensifying the conflict, and compounding enmity and mistrust between the parties. It is therefore reducing the prospects of negotiations, which require confidence-building measures that should be incremental, structured and reciprocal. Strategies should be developed to deal with powerful spoilers, on all sides, that may try to disrupt the process. The form of pre-talks, and the effectiveness of mediators and “track two” interlocutors, will be critical. Pakistan provides assistance to, and has significant influence over, the Taliban. Talks require Pakistan's support, but giving its officials excessive influence over the process could trigger opposition within Afghanistan and countermeasures from regional states. The perceived threat from India is driving Pakistan's geostrategic policies, thus concerted efforts are required to improve Pakistan-India relations. Negotiations could lead to a power-sharing agreement, but implementation would be highly challenging, especially due to multifarious factional and other power struggles. An agreement could also involve constitutional or legislative changes that curtail fundamental civil and political rights, especially those of women and girls. Genuine reconciliation efforts are required to build better relations between hostile groups. For legitimacy and viability, any settlement must be both inclusive and just: it should therefore seek to reflect the aspirations of all elements of Afghanistan's diverse society. It should also seek to address underlying causes of the conflict, especially the abuse of power.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and India

16. Humanitarian Space Shrinking for Health Program Delivery in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Author:
Leonard S. Rubenstein
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, humanitarian space has shrunk as the Taliban and other insurgent groups have stepped up attacks on civilians, especially international aid workers, contractors and local leaders. Health programs continue to operate, but the ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to recruit and retain staff and to travel outside Kabul has suffered. The United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and other groups have sought to persuade the Taliban and other armed groups not to impede or interfere with humanitarian aid activities. These efforts have had some success where the aid is administered by Afghans, but they have not limited attacks on international staff, who along with all foreigners, remain at high risk of attack. Many NGOs act as implementing partners in the government's strategy to implement a comprehensive primary care system in Afghanistan under the direction of the Ministry of Public Health. They have managed to maintain those services with local staff despite their association with the government of Afghanistan, so long as they operate with impartiality and community engagement. The vulnerability of their staff to attack appears to be a product of generalized insecurity or the presence of foreign aid workers, rather than a result of collaboration with the Ministry.NGOs report that military activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and military involvement in the medical sector, have contributed to the shrinkage of humanitarian space. The military's provision of health services through Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other mechanisms, though well-intended, sometimes sows confusion about the allegiances of U.S. and other Western aid workers and creates tensions with humanitarian principles the agencies rely on to operate in conflict environments. The conduct of the Afghanistan National Army and Police and the Pakistan military in entering facilities to gain access to arrest insurgents or gather information also leads to greater insecurity for NGO personnel.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian Aid, Islam, Non-Governmental Organization, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Afghanistan