1. Why Cyber Operations Do Not Always Favor the Offense
- Author:
- Rebecca Slayton
- Publication Date:
- 02-2017
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Bottom Lines: Creating unnecessary vulnerabilities. Making offensive cyber operations a national priority can increase instabilities in international relations and worsen national vulnerabilities to attack. But because the skills needed for offense and defense are similar, military offensive readiness can be maintained by focusing on defensive operations that make the world safer, rather than on offensive operations. Managing complexity. The ease of both offense and defense increases as organizational skills and capability in managing complex technology improve; it declines as the complexity of cyber operations rises. What appears to be offensive advantage is primarily a result of the offense’s relatively simple goals and the defense’s poor management. Assessing kinetic effects. It is often more expensive for the offense to achieve kinetic effects—for instance, sabotaging machinery—than for the defense to prevent them. An empirical analysis of the Stuxnet cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities shows that Stuxnet likely cost the offense more than the defense and was relatively ineffective.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and North America