Publishing Institution: / Political Geography: Russia / Publication Year: within 5 Years

301. Has Europe’s hour come?

Author:: Antoine Cibirski
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: “Europe’s hour has come”, said a Luxembourg minister in 1991 at the beginning of the Yugoslav wars. The context seemed favourable: an initially peripheral crisis, a relative lack of interest on the part of Russia, a green light from the United States which was even encouraging invention by the Western European Union (WEU), the majority of whose activities were taken over by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and later by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). America's 'pet project' at the time was not yet Asia, but rather the management of the decay of the Soviet world, without much interest in the Western Balkans. In response, some Europeans 'held back' and feared an unfavourable division of tasks: 'noble' collective defence missions reserved for NATO and peacekeeping missions, considered 'subordinate', for Europe. Strategic prescience! Four years later, we had witnessed the bombing of civilians, the siege of Sarajevo, broken ceasefires, failed mediations and Srebreniça. We had experienced the humiliations inflicted on a UN force (UNPROFOR) that had a timid mandate and overly restrictive rules of engagement. The British and French were in the field this time round, but not the Germans. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which only France calls "the Dayton-Paris agreement" (a formal concession by Bill Clinton to Jacques Chirac) was largely a Pax Americana. In the American camp, Richard Holbrooke had pulled the strings and decided everything, by ruthlessly relegating the European leaders, including Carl Bildt, Jacques Blot and Pauline Neville-Jones[1].
Topic:: European Union, Conflict, and Integration
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

302. World food crisis: between withdrawal and responsibility, Europe must choose

Author:: Emmanuelle Ducros
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The profound destructuring of world food markets as a result of Russia's war on Ukraine is forcing all of the world's agricultural powers to question their place on the world stage of satiety - or hunger. This is primarily the case in Europe.
Topic:: Food, Hunger, Armed Conflict, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

303. Energy Markets and the Design of Sanctions on Russia

Author:: Christof Ruhl
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: Sanctions against the citizens, institutions, and products of the Russian Federation are evolving rapidly. Energy sanctions started late, but the number of countries embargoing oil, gas, or coal imports from Russia is expanding. These sanctions are likely to increase global fuel prices while depressing the price of the sanctioned fuel. The experience to date suggests that the current, gradual approach of reducing oil and gas imports from Russia one country at a time may have room to go further. Before the invasion of Ukraine, the sweeping and unprecedented sanctions promised in the event of a Russian invasion were often conceived as a two-pronged pincer movement. The idea was to isolate Russia from the global financial system while limiting its commodity and energy exports. Both moves were aimed at the source of the financial strength of “fortress Russia,” namely, its persistent balance of payment surplus.
Topic:: Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Financial Markets, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

304. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:: Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

305. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

306. Russia in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from China, Russia, and the United States

Author:: Gaye Christoffersen, Ying Liu, Artyom Lukin, Elena Feditchkina Tracy, and Elizabeth Wishnick
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:: Russia’s role in the Indo-Pacific is an understudied topic—while much of the discussion of Russia in Asia typically focuses on its response to geopolitical rivalries, the volume addresses ideational factors in Russia’s relations with regional and global powers, the domestic drivers of Russia’s Asia-Pacific policy, as well as the complex iteration of regional identities in Asia-Pacific Russia and in the Sino-Russian partnership. Contributors to this volume are based across Russia, China, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the USA, drawing on a range of multinational perspectives and theoretical approaches. Panelists at this event will present views from Beijing, Vladivostok, and the United States.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

307. Government Internet Shutdowns Are Changing. How Should Citizens and Democracies Respond?

Author:: Steven Feldstein
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Governments worldwide continue to deploy internet shutdowns and network disruptions to quell mass protests, forestall election losses, reinforce military coups, or cut off conflict areas from the outside world. Data from the past few years show that incidences of global shutdowns have remained steadily high: 196 documented incidents in 2018, 213 incidents in 2019, and 155 in 2020. The first five months of 2021 recorded fifty shutdown incidents.1 Government-instigated internet shutdowns largely took place in relation to five event types: mass demonstrations, military operations and coups, elections, communal violence and religious holidays, and school exams. As Clément Voule, the United Nations special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, pointedly observes: “Shutdowns are lasting longer, becoming harder to detect and targeting particular social media and messaging applications and specific localities and communities.”2 Events in Russia have put a finer point on internet shutdown trends. On March 4, 2022, Roskomnadzor, the Russian internet regulator, announced that it would block Facebook and Twitter and would ban new uploads to TikTok.3 On March 14, it added Instagram to the banned list.4 Russian authorities have also restricted access to a slew of news websites, including the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. Roskomnadzor claimed these measures were enacted in response to new limits imposed by platforms on Russian propaganda outlets—accusing Facebook of “discrimination.”5 The Kremlin’s crackdown is an ominous signal about where the shutdown struggle is headed in authoritarian countries. Despite these bleak trends, there is a growing international consensus—at least among liberal democracies—that protecting internet access is integrally linked to freedoms of expression and association and forms a crucial part of the global democracy and human rights agenda. This paper picks up on this emerging norm and probes several key questions: What can citizens do to evade authoritarian controls and regain internet access? How can democratic governments support these efforts and push back against governments that shut down and block the internet? The short answer is that there is a multitude of responses available to democracies and civil society organizations to push back against internet blackouts and network disruptions. Democracies can exert meaningful pressure against repressive governments to ease internet blocks, and citizens are able to exercise creative options to circumvent internet controls. The paper walks through different tools available to citizens to evade internet controls. It examines where internet shutdown trends are headed and incentives for particular regimes to adopt new modes of censorship. It then presents a multifaceted strategy for democracies, civil society organizations, and technology developers and companies to counter internet shutdowns.
Topic:: Government, Science and Technology, Democracy, and Internet
Political Geography:: Russia and Global Focus

308. Ukraine on the Way To the EU: Realities And Prospects

Author:: O. Pashkov, K. Markevych, P. Stetsiuk, S. Chekunova, Mykola Sunhurovskyi, L. Shanghina, and O. Shnyrkov
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: National Security and Defence
Institution:: Razumkov Centre
Abstract:: The Ukrainian experience of European integration in the conditions of war is unique. The country resisting the large-scale armed Russian aggression, suffering huge human, financial and economic losses, acquired the status of a candidate for accession to the EU, continues European integration, deepens partnership with the EU in different sectors, implements recommendations of the European Commission and introduces provisions of the Agreement of Association into practice. The beginning of negotiations on accession to the EU, further implementation of pro-European reforms in different areas, adaptation to the European Union acquis, etc. are to follow
Topic:: European Union, Regional Integration, European Commission, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

309. Political and Ideological Orientations of Ukrainian Citizens in the Conditions Of The Russian Aggression

Author:: Yuri Yakymenko, A. Bychenko, V. Zamiatin, M. Mishchenko, O. Ruzumnyi, P. Stetsiuk, and L. Shanghina
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: National Security and Defence
Institution:: Razumkov Centre
Abstract:: The all-out Russian armed aggression against Ukraine that began on February 24, 2022, has fundamentally changed the situation in Ukraine and the world. Thousands of Ukrainians were killed, many fell victims to torture and inhuman treatment, millions left the country, saving their lives from the war, the aggressor forcibly deported from Ukraine thousands of adults and children.
Topic:: Politics, Public Opinion, Ideology, Civilians, Social Cohesion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

310. Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Author:: Nika Aleksejeva and Andy Carvin
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In the weeks and months leading up to Russia invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin media employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine. To research this report, the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) identified recurring pro-Kremlin narratives over two timeframes: the 2014–2021 interwar period and the seventy days leading up to the 2022 invasion. For the interwar period, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation. We then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets over the seventy-day pre-invasion period. To understand how these narratives evolved, we catalogued them by themes, sub-narratives, and relationships to pre-invasion escalatory events. This allowed us to produce a timeline of false and misleading Kremlin narratives encompassing the year leading to the invasion, showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war.
Topic:: News Analysis, Conflict, Narrative, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

311. BRICS and Global Health Diplomacy in the Covid-19 Pandemic: Situating BRICS’ diplomacy within the prevailing global health governance context

Author:: Candice Moore
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: BRICS have been cast as a bloc with the potential to make significant changes in Global Health. The management of the Covid-19 pandemic has shown divisions in the bloc and the limits of its ability to formulate policies or even act upon previously agreed positions. This paper employs an examination of BRICS Health Ministerial declarations and an analysis of power in International Relations to reflect on BRICS’ Global Health diplomacy during the Covid-19 pandemic, covering the key questions of vaccine research and development, vaccine nationalism, and travel bans. It finds that multiple dimensions of power matter in Global Health leadership.
Topic:: Health, International Cooperation, Governance, Pandemic, COVID-19, and BRICS
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, Asia, South Africa, Brazil, and South America

312. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:: Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

313. Space Traffic Management: Time for Action

Author:: Mir Sadat and Julia Siegel
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Outer space has long been characterized as “contested, congested, and competitive.” More than four thousand eight hundred active satellites currently orbit Earth, representing over forty nations, and nearly twenty-five thousand satellites are projected to join by 2030. Moreover, spacefaring entities are testing the limits of space exploration: Visionary space companies are aiming to launch space tourism programs and send humans to space within the decade, and governments and militaries are increasing activity in cislunar space—the sphere formed by the Earth-Moon radius—to leverage advantageous orbital regions. As humanity expands its frontiers deeper into the galaxy, the threats to US and allied space capabilities will continue to increase. Yet, despite the proliferation of space activity, the ability of international and national bodies to track and regulate space objects—often referred to as space traffic management (STM)—reflects a past era wherein few actors conducted limited operations in space. The current state of STM can be more aptly described as space situational awareness (SSA), or the mere knowledge of objects in orbit. Global actors (including national governments, corporations, and international organizations) track space objects and notify satellite operators when the probability of collision is notable. While collision avoidance maneuvers are standard when there is a one in ten thousand chance of collision, it is ultimately up to the operators to determine whether and when they will move. The limits of this decentralized approach to SSA were illustrated in September 2019 when a European Space Agency satellite veered off path to avoid a Starlink satellite whose operator missed an email notification signaling a high probability of collision.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, National Security, and Space
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

314. Beyond munitions: A gender analysis for Ukrainian security assistance

Author:: Cori Fleser
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: From the hospitals of Mariupol to the streets of Bucha, the Russian war in Ukraine has extracted an unacceptably high cost, while banding NATO allies and partners together in an unprecedented tide of support. In bilateral and multilateral security assistance packages, the transatlantic community has sent Ukraine javelins, High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), and all manner of weapons to defend against the Russian invasion. Still, Russia’s war continues against the nation of Ukraine and its people. So how should future military assistance account for the different impacts of the war on Ukrainian civilians? What strategies remain for NATO allies and partners to enhance their support beyond weapons and materiel? The answers lie in using gender analyses to zero in on the unique human security challenges facing Ukraine. When we overlook the role of gender in conflict, we miss the opportunity to both lead with our values and make our military support more effective. Applying a gender analysis to our security assistance is a solution that allies and partners have already agreed to implement in forums from the United Nations to NATO. In fact, it’s a tool that many allies have already developed within their own militaries. Now is the time to employ it in support of Ukraine. This starts with acknowledging the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. The WPS Agenda, passed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, and their critical role in reconstructing societies. Militaries can apply gender analyses to better understand and tailor assistance to the unique security environments in which they operate. To help policymakers think through how a gender analysis can shape what security assistance should look like—and, in many cases, how allied militaries can implement solutions at scale, and consistent with political decisions that have already been made—we are proud to offer this issue brief. Our intention is to demonstrate to global decision makers that incorporating gender can and should be integrated in real-time conflicts to achieve real results. Our support to Ukraine must not waver, but more can be done to mitigate the severe impact of Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people. Allies and partners already have the political mandate to integrate the WPS Agenda into their operations. They already have the tools, training, and technical expertise to implement it in the field. The next step is making this common practice. This issue brief spells out ten steps for how to do so in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Women, Partnerships, Resilience, Society, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

315. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

Author:: John R. Deni
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden

316. Advancing a framework for the stabilization and reconstruction of Ukraine

Author:: Patrick Quirk and Prakhar Sharma
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine has shattered peace on the European continent and created tectonic shifts in the transatlantic security architecture. The Kremlin’s invasion has decimated Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure, and left tens of thousands of innocent civilians wounded or dead as part of a war-crime ridden military campaign. At the time of writing, Kyiv is making slow advances in the South and East with the help of significant Western military and economic aid, yet the outcome of the conflict continues to hang in the balance. A prolonged stalemate and some variation of a negotiated settlement seem most likely, with a Russian victory remaining a distant possibility.1 Absent an absolute Kremlin victory, Ukraine will need to stabilize vast swathes of its territory and reconstruct the social and industrial infrastructure therein.2 Due to their proximity to Ukraine and long-standing economic, political, and social connections, transatlantic allies and partners will most likely be deeply involved in this effort and will be significantly affected by its end result. The purpose of this issue brief then is to help Ukrainian, North American, and European policymakers consider stabilization and reconstruction needs and have a playbook in place regardless of the circumstances or outcome.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Reconstruction, Economy, Business, Innovation, Resilience, Russia-Ukraine War, and Stabilization
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

317. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Author:: Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

318. tarr Forum: An Update on Russia's War Against Ukraine

Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: What is the status of Russia's invasion of Ukraine?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

319. Starr Forum: Energy as a Weapon of War: Russia, Ukraine and Europe in Challenging Times

Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:: How has Russia weaponized energy in this war? What have been the effects? How have Europeans responded to this weaponization of energy and what may be their responses this winter?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Military Strategy, European Union, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

320. Cyberattacks Integral to Russia's Political and Military Strategies

Author:: Aleksandra Kozioł
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: To destabilise democratic countries that support Ukraine, Russia employs cyberattacks on the target state’s public institutions and critical infrastructure. These activities have clearly intensified since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022 and is in line with the implementation of Russian military strategy. In this context, it would be beneficial within the EU and NATO to develop joint action plans to respond to future threats in cyberspace.
Topic:: NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Cybersecurity, Cyberspace, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

321. Russian Attacks May Prompt Increased Refugee Flows from Ukraine

Author:: Maria Piechowska
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia is continuing its intensive attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine. These are deliberate actions that violate international humanitarian law and are aimed at breaking the morale of Ukrainian society. Power outages mean that many towns and villages are not only without heating but also without water. Further devastation and the difficulty of repairs could trigger a humanitarian catastrophe. Most of the population will try to survive the winter in their current residences or by resettling in smaller towns. Increased refugee movement across borders, especially to Poland, is also possible.
Topic:: Refugees, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

322. The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine

Author:: Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: twitter The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine 174 08.11.2022 India has not condemned Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, which stems from historical ideological ties, as well as their strategic and military cooperation. However, the war has led to unfavourable changes from India’s point of view—the weakening of Russia, the collapse of its cooperation with the West, and a growing dependence on China. As a result, Russia is diminishing in importance as a key partner of India, including a supplier of weapons and technology. In the long run, closer cooperation between India and the U.S. and EU countries in the field of security and energy will help to move India away from Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and India

323. Facing War: Rethinking Europe’s Security and Defence

Author:: Serena Giusti and Giovanni Grevi
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: Russia’s attack on Ukraine has sent shockwaves across Europe and the world. While the current war is a geopolitical turning point, it remains unclear whether it will trigger a quantum leap forward for European defence policies and for the role of the European Union as a security provider. This Report investigates whether we can expect a further convergence of European strategic cultures, and on collaboration among Europeans to generate the required military capabilities and integrate their forces. Most importantly, it finds that the timely implementation of the EU’s Strategic Compass will be a decisive test to establish whether Europeans are rising to the challenge of taking more responsibility for their security and defence.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

324. The impact of the Ukraine crisis on international trade

Author:: Zsolt Darvas and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: We study the economic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, by scrutinising global trade volumes and commodity prices, trade balances and bilateral trade flows between major economic powers and Russia. We find that energy prices increased more in 2021 than in 2022, suggesting that the war and the sanctions were not the most important drivers. Nevertheless, International Monetary Fund forecast revisions from October 2021 to October 2022 suggest that the volume of global trade in goods and services declined by 3.4 percent, energy prices increased by about 100 percent, and the prices of non-energy commodities by 8 percent. The war could be an important driver of these forecast revisions, though other factors were also at play. While forecasts for important industrial production input costs were not revised, soaring energy prices deteriorated the trade balance of countries importing energy. Only half of the increase in Russia’s trade surplus was related to soaring energy prices. The other half resulted from the collapse of Russian imports, which will likely undermine the Russian economy’s productive capacity over time. Falling Russian exports of goods other than mineral fuels suggest Russia’s productive capacity has already weakened. Russia’s trade has been reoriented from advanced economies to China, India and Turkey, but this has only partially compensated for the decline in trade with advanced countries. We find that sanctions had an impact on trade. There is no evidence of European and US companies circumventing sanctions by re-routing sanctioned goods to Russia via China and Turkey. The UK and the US have already stopped importing fossil fuels from Russia, and such imports by the EU have declined. With the EU’s Russian seaborne crude petroleum import ban taking effect in December 2022 and the refined petroleum ban coming to effect in February 2023, Russia’s revenues from fossil fuel exports to the EU are set to shrink significantly, with limited options for redirecting exports to other countries. The three main policy-relevant implications from our research are: The war and the sanctions are not the most important drivers of energy price; The direct aim of sanctions seems to have been achieved; The capacity of the Russian state to finance the war from fossil fuel revenues is bound to shrink. The dataset used for most charts of this working paper is regularly updated and is available in the Russian foreign trade tracker
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Fossil Fuels, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

325. A European policy mix to address food insecurity linked to Russia’s war

Author:: Georg Zachmann, Pauline Weil, and Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The Russian war against Ukraine has put at risk a significant share of global food exports, and has contributed significantly to strongly rising global food prices. This has made poor, food-import dependent countries more vulnerable, with potentially serious humanitarian consequences. The crisis also has negative security, migration and foreign policy repercussions for the European Union. The EU and its members have a number of policy levers to address the crisis. These include agricultural, trade, environment, aid, energy, fiscal and foreign policy. However, in the complex interplay of local and global, agricultural and non-agricultural markets, apparently simple solutions can have significant unintended consequences and policy trade-offs must be taken into account. While EU agricultural policy can address the crisis directly by adjusting production, energy policies also have an impact on food security through the complex relationship between the food and energy systems. Energy is an input to food production but also, as bioenergy, competes for agricultural commodities. Fiscal policy can discourage inefficient food consumption and food waste, while trade policy and aid can improve the allocation of agricultural production factors (eg fertilisers) and products. Increasing information sharing on food stocks and building trust are prerequisites for trade policy and diplomacy to limit export restrictions, thus alleviating some of the price pressures on international markets. The crisis highlights food-system fragilities when confronted with global conflicts, climate change and economic shocks. Policies should seek to increase shock-resilience, for example by reducing structural rigidities in production, trade and consumption patterns, and by encouraging sustainable production in import-dependent countries. This is especially important considering that most food production is locally consumed. Only 20 percent of the global cereals volume is traded, making the current shock significant in terms of globally traded volumes (Ukraine represents 10 percent of the global grain market), but not relative to overall volume (Ukraine represents 2 percent of global grain production).
Topic:: European Union, Food Security, Exports, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

326. How have sanctions impacted Russia?

Author:: Maria Demertzis, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Ben McWilliams, Elina Ribakova, and Simone Tagliapietra
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a series of sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and others. Sanctions included restrictions on Russia’s financial industry, its central bank and its coal and oil exporters, in addition to general export controls. Meanwhile, foreign companies have withdrawn voluntarily from the Russian market as a result of a ‘self-sanctioning’ trend. We assess the impact these sanctions have had on Russia’s economy in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and more structurally. Russian fiscal revenues have not suffered from sanctions sufficiently to reduce the length of this war. Effective management by the Bank of Russia has prevented financial instability and has therefore also protected the real economy. However, this picture of economic containment is coming to an end. Russia’s fiscal revenues are now beginning to take a hit; given the breadth of sanctions, the economy will suffer in the medium to long term. The voluntary departure of a large number of western firms, eventual energy decoupling by the EU and Russia’s inability to find equal alternatives will damage the Russian economy severely. As the Russian economy closes in on itself, it will become harder to find reliable data to evaluate the extent of the hit. Still greater sanctions coordination across the globe is needed to isolate the Russian economy, limit the flow of income into Russian coffers and therefore help stop the war.
Topic:: Governance, Sanctions, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

327. Will Ukraine’s refugees go home?

Author:: Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: About 15 percent of the population has fled Ukraine since the start of the Russian aggression in February 2022. Nearly 4 million Ukrainians have already registered in European Union countries. Based in part on evidence that few refugees return voluntarily to poor countries once they settle in rich countries, even once security is re-established at home, it can be expected that large numbers of Ukrainian refugees are likely to remain in European host countries, and will likely be joined by others, including many men that remained to fight when the conflict is over. Ukraine already has a long history of emigration. Its shattered economy, the likelihood of a protracted conflict and significant uncertainty with regard to its final status reinforce the argument that most refugees will not return and many more will join them. EU nations must prepare for. There will be large short-term costs and long-term economic gains from Ukrainian immigration in Europe. The best way to help Ukraine, and to moderate the likely outflow of its people, will be to assist in the country’s reconstruction, and not to place artificial impediments to the immigration of individuals who have already suffered greatly.
Topic:: Migration, Governance, Reconstruction, Refugees, Economy, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

328. Geopolitical Consequences of the War in Ukraine

Author:: John Rennie Short
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine signals a new world order that has developed from the bipolar world of 1945 to 1991 and the brief unipolar interlude from 1991 to 2008. This new world order is dominated by a relatively declining U.S. and an emerging Sino-Russo anti American alliance, a renewed sense of the West as a counter to authoritarian regimes and reversal of the globalization trends of the past thirty years. We are moving into a deglobalizing, multipolar world.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

329. Russia's Assault on Ukraine: Fallout From the War

Author:: Dina R. Spechler and Martin C. Spechler
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The war between Russia and Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, has now gone on for more than four months. It has already taken a severe toll on much of the world and will cause much more harm the longer it continues. Moreover, it does not seem likely to end soon. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently declared that Russia has barely begun its military operation in Ukraine. He has clearly stated his goal of taking the entire Donbas. Success in that endeavor may motivate him to continue the fight for other objectives, including the major industrial center of Kharkiv, the key Black Sea port of Odesa, and perhaps even Kyiv and its environs. For his part, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly said his goal is to push Russia back to the line it occupied on 23 February. His Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba has spoken of winning back the entire Donbas and liberating “the rest of our territory.” The U.S. Director of National Intelligence has predicted that a “grinding struggle” may continue for a long time. This article will explore some of the consequences of the war already in evidence
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

330. Geopolitics, Geography an the Ukrainian Russian War

Author:: Serdar Ş. Güner
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The trigger of the Ukraine-Russia war is the enlargement of NATO, essentially a Western exploitation of Russian weakness emanating from Soviet Union’s dissolution. Russia has communicated her reactions to the enlargement peacefully until the prospect of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. The second wave of enlargement coming from the direction of neutral states such Finland and Sweden originates from Finnish and Swedish fears of being the next targets of Russian military campaigns. NATO enlargement to Ukraine has caused Russia-Ukraine war that in turn has caused some neutral states to leave their neutrality and become NATO members. Therefore, NATO expansion efforts has led to a further expansion through war. However, the exclusion of and warring with Russia only obliterates the opportunity to form a large alliance to balance China. The West should understand that it is not wise to create incentives for the formation of a Sino-Russian alliance.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Conflict, Geography, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

331. A Compass and a Concept: A Guide to the EU and NATO Strategic Outlooks

Author:: Ricardo Borges de Castro and Rita Barbosa Lobo
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 upended Europe’s security order. The invasion was a wake-up call that peace in the continent should not be taken for granted and a catalyst for change at European and transatlantic level. The EU adopted a long-term Strategic Compass for security and defense. NATO, no longer “braindead,” issued a new Strategic Concept for the coming decade and is expanding. While there is convergence in strategic outlooks, questions remain on how both organizations will cooperate and coordinate their actions, implement the investment, troops and capabilities’ goals set in each document as well as deal with countries such as China.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

332. Russia’s Partial Mobilization: Issues Pertaining Russian Migrants in Mongolia

Author:: Ariunbayar Bazarvaani
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:: The Kremlin recently announced a partial mobilization decree amid the continuing war between Russia and Ukraine. Along with the partial mobilization decree, the Kremlin also amended the Criminal Code that stipulates severe punishment for voluntary surrender and people who deserted from military service. While the Mongolian government holds an abstemious position towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Ariunbayar Bazarvaani, CEO of The Academy of Political Education, states that the non-governmental organizations in Mongolia are keeping an eye on the Russian migrants who had fled from Russia to evade mobilization. He also introduces a survey addressing Russian refugees` challenges and urges the Mongolian government to consider these issues and approach the crisis with an awareness of democracy, human rights, and freedom. Specifically, he argues that the Mongolian government should actively involve Mongolian NGOs to offer a favorable environment, including employment, and thus be recognized as a country that endorses democracy and human rights.
Topic:: Democracy, Migrants, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Mongolia, and Asia

333. The Threat of New Wars in the Caucasus: A Good Case for U.S. Restraint

Author:: Anatol Lieven and Artin DerSimonian
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The decline of Russian power due to military defeats in Ukraine risks leading to increased violence and instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The effects of this can already be seen in the flare–up of fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, inadequately checked by Russian peacekeepers. This shift in power creates a temptation for Washington to increase its involvement in the region in an effort to end Russian influence there. This temptation should be resisted. The United States has no vital national interest in this region — certainly not ones that are worth the risk of new wars. The conflicts in the southern Caucasus are deeply intractable, and have roots that long predate the Soviet collapse and indeed the Soviet Union itself. They were not created by Russia, and cannot be solved by the United States. Increased support for Georgia risks empowering a new attempt by Georgia to retake its lost territories by force, leading to another war with Russia, the outcome of which would be uncertain and highly dangerous. Increased support for Azerbaijan threatens Armenia and would create a fierce backlash in the Armenian–American community. Instead, the United States should continue to play a helpful but limited diplomatic role, aimed not at solving these disputes but at reducing tensions and preventing new eruptions of violence.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:: Russia, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

334. Russia Steps up its Campaign for Influence in Africa

Author:: Rina Bassist
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In our latest issue of Ifriqiya, Rina Bassist discusses Russian propaganda and paramilitary strategies used to gain influence in recent years in various countries in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Sahel, and Central African Republic

335. On the brink of Subsequent Sanctions Against Russia Implications for Azerbaijan

Author:: Emin Mammadov
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:: In response to Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and the scope of the current escalation against humanity and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, the European Council adopts the ninth package of new sanctions targeted to step up the existing pressure on Russia and its government. Since March 2014, the EU has progressively imposed prohibitive measures on Russia in this vein including individual sanctions, economic sanctions including energy, transport, and diplomatic sanctions of which multidimensional backgrounds are attributed to the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia’s military attack on Ukraine and illegal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions in the current year.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Azerbaijan

336. Building Bridges over Caspian: South Caucasus-Central Asia Cooperation

Author:: Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:: Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:: The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Building Bridges over Caspian: South Caucasus-Central Asia Cooperation” is dedicated to the new paradigms for peacebuilding and geopolitical gaps, as well as possible confrontation and cooperation matrices in the South Caucasus region with focus on security, economic, humanitarian, political and geopolitical aspects. The CSP’s new issue includes 7 articles and 1 book review. The CSP’s current authors analysed the EU’s increasing mediation role towards the South Caucasus region, the importance of the Middle Corridor for transregional connectivity, the recent processes in the South Caucasus region in the light of ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Türkiye’s engagement, as well as the US strategic interests in this region, the possibility of the potential threats for South Caucasus, etc.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, Peacebuilding, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Turkey, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, and Caspian Sea

337. Cultural Encounters: Istanbul and Refugees from the Russian Empire (1919-1923) - Welcome & Panel I

Author:: Özalp Birol, Ipek Cem Taha, Valentina Izmirlieva, Vladimir Alexandrov, and Edward Kasinec
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: The Encounter in Context: Istanbul Under the Armistice Chair: Holger Klein Valentina Izmirlieva (Columbia University), "The Four Paradoxes of Istanbul's Beyaz Ruslar Moment" Vladimir Alexandrov (Yale University), "Frederick Bruce Thomas and Being Black in Constantinople" Edward Kasinec (Hoover Institution, Stanford University), "American Elite Philanthropy, Anna V.S. Mitchell and The Constantinople/Istanbul Russians, 1920-1929"
Topic:: History, Culture, and Refugees
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Turkey

338. Cultural Encounters: Istanbul and the Refugees from the Russian Empire (1919-1923) | Panel III

Author:: Vladimir Alexandrov, Ayşenur Güler, Ekaterina Aygün, and Nadia Podzemskaia
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Artists in Transcultural Dialog Chair: Vladimir Alexandrov Ayşenur Güler (Independent Researcher, London) [Via Zoom], "Findings on Gritchenko's Sojourn in Istanbul (1919-1921)" Ekaterina Aygün (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich), "Union of Russian Painters in Constantinople (1921/1922-1923) as an Émigré Artists' Collective" Nadia Podzemskaia (ITEM, CNRS-ETS, Paris), "Constantinople/Istanbul in the First Half of the 1920s, through the Eyes of the Émigré Artists from the Russian Empire"
Topic:: History, Culture, Refugees, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Turkey

339. Cultural Exchanges: Istanbul and Refugees from the Russian Empire (1919-1923) - Panel II

Author:: Valentina Izmirlieva, Holger A. Klein, and Sergey A. Ivanov
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: The Byzantine Legacy Rediscovered Chair: Valentina Izmirlieva Holger A. Klein (Columbia University), "From Russia to Byzantium: Thomas Whittemore's Intellectual Formation and the Work of the Byzantine Institute of America" Sergey A. Ivanov (Moscow Higher School of Economics), "Byzantium as Seen by the White Russians in Constantinople"
Topic:: History, Culture, Refugees, and Byzantine Empire
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Turkey

340. Cultural Encounters: Istanbul and the Refugees from the Russian Empire (1919-1923) - Panel IV

Author:: Cengiz Kahraman
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Cengiz Kahraman (Istanbul Photography Museum) and Valentina Izmirlieva present two archives of Iraïda Barry's life and work - one in Istanbul, the other in New York.
Topic:: History, Culture, and Refugees
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Turkey

341. KAZAKHSTAN AMID UNREST AND INSTABILITY: MAIN IMPLICATIONS

Author:: Aram Terzyan
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: This paper explores the reasoning and implications of the unrest in Kazakhstan unleashed in January of 2022. This crisis was the most severe form of violence that Kazakhstan has endured since gaining independence. It distorted Kazakhstan’s image as a stable country. While the crisis was limited to the territory of Kazakhstan and developed mainly from domestic problems, it undeniably acquired an important international element. Kazakhstan’s appeal to the CSTO presented a drastic change in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and ensued in the shift in the balance of power in the greater Eurasian region. Although Russia played a relatively subtle role on the ground, Russia’s involvement was set to link the political future of Kazakhstan to Russia for an unspecified amount of time. The study concludes that Kazakhstan is faced with the challenges of undertaking significant reforms to lower the possibility of further instabilities while remaining true to its multi-vector foreign policy agenda amid Russian intrusion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Reform, Domestic Policy, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan

342. RUSSIA’S COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES ABOUT CRIMEA IN SPANISH-LANGUAGE SPUTNIK AND RUSSIA TIMES (2014-2018)

Author:: Ludmila Gonzalez Cerulli and Sybil Rhodes
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: We analyze Russia’s communication strategies in the period leading up to and following the seizure (2014-2018) of the Crimean Peninsula in the Spanish editions of its digital platforms, Sputnik and Russia Times. Drawing from theories of political communication, we show how Russia used storytelling and framing to build an international image and political brand consistent with, and try to justify, its foreign policy actions. Specifically, Russian messages transmit no room for doubt about the legality of any of its strategies in Crimea. We argue that this communication strategy is consistent with the concept of ‘sharp power’ to describe Russian projection in the world. Cultural and emotional appeals designed to generate positive emotions about Russia, i.e., ‘soft power’, were far less common. In recent years, Russian projection of sharp power appears to have increased in the Spanish-speaking world, particularly in South America. In addition to helping explain Russian foreign policy, our findings contribute to broader debates about political branding and truth in a ‘post-truth’, multipolar world.
Topic:: Communications, Media, Soft Power, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Crimea

343. Brothers in arms: The value of coalitions in sanctions regimes

Author:: Sonali Chowdhry, Julian Hinz, Katrin Kamin, and Joschka Wanner
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii) compare prospective coalition partners and; (iii) provide bounds for the sanctions potential — the maximum welfare change attainable — when sanctions are scaled vertically, i.e. across sectors up to an embargo, or horizontally, i.e. across countries up to a global regime. To gauge the significance of simulation outcomes, we implement a Bayesian bootstrap procedure that generates confidence bands. We find that the implemented measures against Iran and Russia inflicted considerable economic harm, yielding 32 – 37% of the vertical sanctions potential. Our key finding is that coalitions lower the average welfare loss incurred from sanctions relative to unilateral implementation. They also increase the welfare loss imposed on Iran and Russia. Adding China to the coalition further amplifies the welfare loss by 79% for Iran and 22% for Russia. Finally, we quantify transfers that would equalize losses across coalition members. These hypothetical transfers can be seen as a sanctions-equivalent of NATO spending goals and provide a measure of the relative burden borne by coalition countries.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Sanctions, Alliance, and Embargo
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

344. Nordic resilience: Strengthening cooperation on security of supply and crisis preparedness

Author:: Mikael Wigell, Mariette Hagglund, Christian Fjader, Emma Hakala, and Johanna Ketola
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 crisis and Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, crisis preparedness and security of supply have taken on a new urgency. The recent events have demonstrated the fragility of many of the international flows of critical goods, products and services on which the Nordics also depend. As one of the most interconnected regions in the world, it is only through cooperation that the Nordics can avoid supply disturbances and crises that cascade throughout the region. The Nordics are well placed to enhance such cooperation. Based on extensive comparative analysis, the report shows how the Nordics share key characteristics in their approach to crisis preparedness and security of supply. What this report calls the Nordic resilience approach thus also forms a solid basis for joint action at the regional level. Finland’s and Sweden’s pending NATO accession will further strengthen the potential for Nordic cooperation. It is with this potential in mind that the present report investigates Nordic crisis preparedness and security of supply models, reviews existing cooperation and provides practical recommendations on how to jointly strengthen Nordic resilience.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Regional Integration, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Finland, Sweden, and Nordic Nations

345. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:: Isabella Martin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

346. Filling the Geopolitical Void in Central Asia

Author:: Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: A new era in foreign policy is starting for the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—in which the role of former colonial master Russia is significantly diminished as Moscow concentrates its attention and resources on the debacle it created when it started a war on Ukraine. China also has considerable influence in Central Asia, but China has not indicated it is willing to fill the vacuums Russia is leaving in Central Asia’s security, finances, or trade. The Central Asian states of necessity are seeking new partners, but it is possible that as the Central Asian states develop new foreign partnerships, they will create new divisions regionally, and the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is possibly an example of what is come for Central Asia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Finance, and Trade
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

347. Will Russia Survive Until 2084?

Author:: Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: If the Russian army collapses in defeat in Ukraine, this could be the catalyst for political violence seeking regime or leadership change to extract revenge for humiliation on the battlefield and a ruined economy at home. However, as the number of armed groups in Russia grows (regular military, security services, private military companies, ethnic-nationalist military units, etc.), political violence initially focused on the Kremlin could unleash a broader struggle as each group vies for power against the other. If Russia’s central government, with a defeated army and weakened security services, is convulsed in an armed power struggle, this situation could motivate some ethnic republics within Russia to take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to secede, which would plunge the state into further chaos. Even if a defeat in Ukraine does not lead to disintegration within Russia itself, the former Soviet republics in what Russia considers its “near abroad” will continue to spin away from Moscow’s sphere of influence and reorient themselves towards other historic powers in their regions. This will be especially true in Central Asia and the Caucasus where Chinese and Turkish power has risen over the past several decades while Russia’s has declined. In Russia’s far east, the disparity between China’s and Russia’s relative strengths—military, economic, and demographic—is turning the balance of power in Beijing’s favor.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

348. Ecological Path to Peace Is Possible in Ukraine

Author:: Saleem H. Ali
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: A key stumbling point in trying to chart a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine has been an inability of both sides to consider hybrid solutions that recognize resource interdependencies that could benefit either side. Such a pragmatic view would not undermine American or Western principles and lead to a more durable peace agreement. The peace process in the Russian-Georgian War and the governance mechanism set up for the autonomous region of Adjara provide useful examples in this regard. Science diplomacy, particularly in the Arctic, could be a useful “ice-breaker” between Russia and the West, and the climate crisis makes such interaction even more urgent.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Governance, Peace, Ecology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

349. America’s Great-Power Challenge: Managing Russia’s Decline and China’s Rise

Author:: Thomas F. Lynch III
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Geopolitics today is characterized by an evolving multipolar great-power competition between China, Russia, and the United States. The zero-sum nature of bipolar Cold War competition logic does not apply so relative losses in power by Russia could help the relative power position of China, and harm long-term American strategic interests, unless carefully managed in Washington. Washington should learn from past multi-state great-power competitions. Great Britain’s approach to Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany in the early 20th century is especially instructive. Like London in 1905, Washington today must stay attentive to the balance of power between itself and China as it manages Moscow’s relative power decline from the military debacle in Ukraine. The United States should defend its interests in Eastern Europe without so undermining Russia that a new period of instability spreads across Eurasia or that China aggrandizes strategically significant relative power gains from Moscow’s infirmity.
Topic:: Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

350. Putin Is Doing Xi’s Dirty Work (and the West Is Helping Him)

Author:: William R. Spiegelberger
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Vladimir Putin’s diplomatic turn to China has been a disappointment for good reason: Beijing is more interested in advancing its own anti-Western interests than in helping Moscow. The more fruitful and natural partnership would be between Russia and the West, since both face a common threat from China and the infrastructure for mutual prosperity is already in place. The main impediment to improved Russian-Western relations is the continued rule of Putin, who is increasingly doing China’s bidding at Russia’s expense.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

351. Cyber Posture Trends in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:: Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: Current understanding of the cyber postures of China, Russia, the United States and the European Union (EU) merits re-evaluation. It is often assumed that China and Russia are aligned, yet this is not always the case. Unlike Russia, which has an ongoing focus on information security, China’s official documents incorporate both information security and cybersecurity concerns that are similar to those of the EU and the USA. Moreover, while often paired, the EU and the USA have differing regulatory structures in cyberspace. Further, both actors increasingly mirror Chinese and Russian concerns about the impact of information warfare on domestic stability. By examining key trends in each actor’s cyber posture, this SIPRI Research Report identifies points of convergence and divergence. Its conclusions will inform a broader SIPRI project that maps cyber posture trajectories and explores trilateral cyber dynamics among China, Russia and the USA to assist the EU in navigating future cyber escalation and enhancing global cyber stability.
Topic:: European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Information Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

352. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

353. Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia’s drift from Europe

Author:: Régis Genté
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Georgia’s relationship with the West has deteriorated over the last year and a half. The Georgian government’s actions have prevented the country from becoming a candidate for EU membership. Three-quarters of Georgians see themselves as pro-Western; only a tiny proportion of the population is pro-Russian. Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be largely responsible for this dissonance between Georgian foreign policy and public opinion. Through his control of the Georgian Dream party and the government, Ivanishvili may be attempting to manoeuvre Georgia into Russia’s sphere of influence. It is still possible for the EU to work with Georgia. But the bloc should condition the financial and political support it provides – starting with the 12 points that Brussels designated in June 2022.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, and Oligarchy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

354. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:: Kadri Liik
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

355. Cold winter: How the EU can help Moldova survive Russian pressure and protect its democracy

Author:: Andrew Wilson
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia has long used gas prices and supply to put pressure on Moldova. It did so again when the country elected pro-European president Maia Sandu in 2020 and her parliamentary majority in 2021. Moldova occupies a significant geostrategic position with regard to the war in Ukraine, as a key ally and neighbour to that country’s immediate west. The Moldovan government has made some progress on its reform agenda, all while dealing with the impacts of the war, including looking after refugees and handling increased transit of goods across its territory. If the government can get through this winter, in 2023 it should be able to further diversify its energy options and make stronger progress on reform of the judiciary, defence, and security. The EU should support the Moldovan government in its endeavours. The country remains highly vulnerable to Russian pressure but financial assistance in the short term and support for reform in the long term will help it make progress, including towards eventual EU membership.
Topic:: Reform, European Union, Democracy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

356. Reconfiguring NATO: The Case for Burden Shifting

Author:: Rajan Menon
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: This explainer begins by recounting how an American-led NATO, a key element in U.S. global primacy, lived on despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat it was meant to deter—and, if necessary, defeat. The next section highlights the implicit bargain that has sustained NATO: U.S. preponderance in Europe, achieved by the American willingness to serve as the continent’s indispensable protector, in exchange for Europeans’ freedom to spend more on butter and less on guns. Next comes a set of proposals to move NATO from burden sharing, a perennial point of contention within the pact, to a more far-reaching change, burden shifting, an idea that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made even more feasible and prudent. The explainer concludes by assaying the prospects for burden shifting and challenging prominent counterarguments.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

357. “Russia’s war in Eastern Europe is a central threat to the international architecture”

Author:: Luca Niculescu
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: n the short, medium and long term, what dangers does Russia's attack on Ukraine pose to the European Union? Is there a different perception of these dangers/threats in Eastern Europe? The Russian aggression in Ukraine, which began more than three months ago, has come at a complex time at both European and global level. Dealing with the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic already required a great deal of effort, imagination and mobilisation on the part of states and citizens. Transformations and reforms have been launched to respond to the new reality and to allow for a sustainable, environmentally friendly recovery. It was in this context that we witnessed the return of war to the European continent after 77 years of peace, with unprecedented suddenness and violence. Russia's war in Eastern Europe is not a conflict relegated to the periphery of political reality, but in its present form is a central threat to the international architecture as we know it.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Threat Perception, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe

358. Strategic dependencies, a question of sovereignty

Author:: Eric Maurice
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine triggered a massive response from Europeans and their Western allies. Instead of direct military intervention, which would have carried the risk of an armed or even nuclear escalation with Russia, the EU's response has taken the shape of sanctions against the Russian regime in many sectors of the country's economy, with the stated aim of weakening the government's ability to finance the war. The five packages of European sanctions adopted since the end of February in coordination with the sanctions of the G7 countries, have "devastated the Russian economy", deems Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The sanctions, in particular the exclusion of most Russian banks from the Swift financial messaging system, the ban on market transactions with the Russian Central Bank and the embargo on the sale of certain equipment, are having an impact because they rely on the economic and financial strength of the West and, conversely, on Russia's dependence on Western financial markets and foreign technology. Yet, after two months of war, the Russian regime continues its offensive despite numerous casualties, several tactical defeats and the impact of sanctions. Sanctions have so far failed to stop the fighting, or even to change the behaviour of the Russian President. And for the Europeans there is the question of the final stage of possible sanctions, an embargo on Russian oil and gas, which would deprive the regime of about €100 billion a year (€99 billion in 2021). In early April, EU High Representative Josep Borrell lamented that Europeans had bought €35 billion worth of gas from Russia since the war began. The reluctance of some member states, most notably Germany, to take the decisive step of an embargo highlights the fact that the other side of the EU's economic strength is its dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, which is hampering its decision-making capacity and leaves it at the mercy of supplies being cut off in retaliation for sanctions. While the Commission claims to be geopolitical and the President of the Council considers the European Union's strategic autonomy to be "the aim of our generation", recent events have raised the question of its capacity to act through economic power and sanctions and its dependence on the outside world. They are forcing Europeans to rethink their relationship with the economy and trade.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Sanctions, Gas, Military Intervention, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dependency
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

359. Reception of Ukrainian refugees. Between emergency responses and long-term solutions

Author:: Ramona Bloj and Stefanie Buzmaniuk
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: By mid-April 2022, more than 7.1 million Ukrainians had been forced to move within their country. More than 4.6 million people have had to flee Ukraine since 24 February when the Russian invasion began (Figure 1). In total, more than a quarter of the population has been forced to leave their homes as a result of Russia's aggression. For Europe, this is the largest movement of a population since the Second World War, and the challenges for neighbouring countries - Moldova[1], Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia - hosting the largest numbers of refugees are significant, from securing temporary accommodation and immediate access to health care, to ensuring children's education and access to labour markets.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

360. From the Russian Pact to the Green Deal?

Author:: Gilles Lepesant
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, among other things, caused an energy crisis comparable to the oil crisis of the 1970s, one that goes beyond oil however since Russia is also a major supplier of gas and coal. By 2021, it was the EU's largest supplier of all three fossil fuels. The military hostilities started in a context dominated by price pressures induced by global economic recovery and by an abnormally low level of storage sites in Europe. In this context a policy of diversification as part of RepowerEU was launched in view - as put forward by the European Commission - to do away with the supply of fossil fuels from Russia by 2030. Beyond the quest for new short-term suppliers, the question of a radical acceleration of the energy transition in Europe in favour of low-carbon energy sources and sobriety is now being asked. This paper highlights the opportunity for Europeans to break not only with their dependence on Russia but also, and above all, with fossil fuels. It outlines the challenges to be met by underlining the extent to which the current stage of energy decoupling from Russia marks a turning point and closes several decades of close interdependence between Russian deposits and the European economies.
Topic:: European Union, Fossil Fuels, Green Deal, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

361. The Black Sea, the spectre of a new Iron Curtain?

Author:: Radu Magdin
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: For thousands of years, the Black Sea has been a place of meetings and exchange. It has often been the natural border between empires. Now, together with the Baltic Sea, it is the place where East and West, the United States (through NATO), the European Union, Turkey and Russia still meet on open terrain.
Topic:: NATO, History, European Union, Geopolitics, Borders, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, United States of America, and Black Sea

362. “In Russia today the whole media sphere has been destroyed."

Author:: Katerina Abramova
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: What role does media play in informing the Russian population about the war in Ukraine? I would like to emphasise that no problems can be solved until people realise that there is a problem. If independent media and independent journalists stop telling the truth about what is going on in Ukraine some people will just be left with state propaganda, others will just know nothing. Most governments thought the war would not last more than half a year. But it is far from being a short and victorious one as Moscow had planned, so people are starting to ask questions. Some analysts say that in the autumn ordinary citizens will start to feel some of the consequences, as they prepare, for example, their kids for school; they will have to pay more because of inflation and the effects of the sanctions. For the media it is simply very important to give people the opportunity to know what’s going on.
Topic:: Media, Journalism, Exile, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

363. The end of European dependence on Russian fossil fuels

Author:: Ramona Bloj
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The Russian war in Ukraine is entering its eighth month. As winter approaches, the question of energy and Europe's dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, which has dominated European debate since the invasion began on 24 February, is turning into a major challenge for the 27 Member States. The latter must strike a delicate balance between reducing consumption, relieving pressure on consumers and making a genuine transition to deal with climate change
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Fossil Fuels, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

364. Nationalism, Sovereignism, Virilism: the sources of Russia's war against Ukraine

Author:: François Hublet
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Because war is the ultimate negation of all autonomy, all freedom and, a fortiori, all democracy, maintaining peace is the first of political necessities. Post-war Europe[1] knew this only too well. In the industrial age, education for peace and tolerance has become the condition for the survival of humanity: according to Adorna, "all political education must have at its centre the demand that Auschwitz cannot be repeated[2]”, not only because horror is imprescriptible, but because, in the absence of consistent education, it is destined to reproduce itself and sweep away the entire civilisation in which it is rooted. With the return of war in Europe, the question of collective education cannot be eluded. The mental patterns that led - directly or indirectly - to the massacres in Ukraine will have to be questioned in depth, lest any future peace be obliterated in advance, since "no peace treaty can be considered as such, if it secretly reserves for itself some subject for starting war again[3]”
Topic:: Nationalism, Sovereignty, History, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

365. What is President Putin so afraid of?

Author:: Francisco Juan Gomez Martos
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Faced with the brutal and unjustified military aggression of Putin's Russia against Ukraine, the vast majority of European citizens have realised what seemed unlikely until now: the possibility of a war in Europe[1]. A cruel and devastating war, both materially and morally, a war of occupation of a sovereign country and a free people. Undoubtedly the aggressor will be held accountable for his crimes before the international community and nothing will be forgotten. The EU is watching, perplexed but united and in solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people who are valiantly defending their independence and their freedom, which is also ours. The borderline between Western civilisation based on values and respect for human rights and authoritarian regimes that trample on the dignity of their citizens has been crossed in the blood of the victims, many of whom are civilians. The European Union, as a global actor, is facing its limits as it tries to curb the hideous logic of war against which it was built 72 years ago.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

366. The defeat of Russia in Ukraine will herald the defeat of the Lukashenko regime.

Author:: Svetlana Tikhanovskaia
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: What is the domestic political situation in Belarus? Has the government been weakened by its brutal and incessant repression? How is the population responding? The government has been weakened by the protest movement of the Belarusian population. It has chosen the path of repression instead of meeting the demands of the people and holding fair elections. It has been weakened. The government now has a very small toolbox. Only repression remains. Any easing in its stance will be a signal for people to launch further protests, even bigger than before. Because life has not improved. When you are at war with your own people all the time, your position is a weak one. And the gains here for the so-called government are not visible.
Topic:: Democratization, Authoritarianism, European Union, Domestic Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Belarus

367. Rising Apprehensions

Author:: Simon Serfaty
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: To the end, Samuel Beckett insisted that he did not know who Godot was, nor what his two characters, Vladimir and Estragon, were waiting for. That was not the least absurdity of his play, which he wrote in French, the Irish author later explained, because he did not know the language well. That is where we all are now: confused over what to expect as we stagger into the second and possibly final half of the Biden presidency. In America, momentarily reset as the leader of the Free World, a democracy at risk; in Europe, an alliance recast by an unwanted war; and elsewhere, a global mutation told in languages we understand poorly even when they carry a slight American accent. This is unchartered territory: across the Atlantic, half the people waiting for Trump to return to the White House and the other half waiting for him to go to prison; around the world, half the people welcoming America’s restored leadership and the other half celebrating its demotion; and all over, rising apprehensions over a war which neither belligerent can realistically win but which both refuse to end.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Global Focus, and United States of America

368. Ukraine War and Food Security: How Should ASEAN Respond?

Author:: Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Mely Caballero-Anthony
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: ASEAN should come together and assess what regional mechanisms it can leverage in addressing the looming threat of food trade protectionism within the region, amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:: Regional Cooperation, Conflict, Violence, Regionalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and ASEAN

369. Mass Atrocities in Ukraine: Assessing Risks of Significant Escalation

Author:: Daniel Solomon
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:: On October 11, 2022, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum convened a private roundtable to discuss potential scenarios of mass atrocity escalation in Ukraine. The discussion featured preliminary remarks by three Ukraine experts, followed by a facilitated discussion. The discussion aimed to encourage more systematic thinking about how the current pattern of mass atrocities in Ukraine could escalate, in terms of severity, lethality, and/or systematicity to inform policy makers’ consideration of preventive options. The 2022 United States Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities states, “In cases of ongoing atrocities, the [Atrocity Prevention] Task Force supports regional policy processes in developing and monitoring targeted response options and adjusting course as needed.” Assessing potential pathways to escalation is one way to help identify targeted response options that could mitigate atrocity risks. Even in a case like Ukraine, where the core US strategy is to help Ukraine repel Russia’s invasion, additional options may be available to help protect vulnerable populations or head-off future escalation. At the time of the convening, little analysis of this type appeared to exist, despite the substantial attention to documenting atrocity crimes, monitoring day-to-day developments in the war, and anticipating potential future scenarios of the conflict in general. Therefore, the discussion focused on the following prompts: What are the major potential triggers or drivers of potential significant escalation of atrocities in Ukraine over the next year or so? What strategies might policy makers use to anticipate, prevent, or respond to the potential escalation of atrocities? What observable trends or events would indicate increasing likelihood of a significant escalation of atrocities in Ukraine? The discussion took place under the Chatham House rule. This rapporteur’s report summarizes key discussion points and questions without attribution.
Topic:: Atrocities, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

370. Development of the IT Industry and Structural Transformation: Focused on IT Cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

Author:: Minhyeon Jeong, Jiyoung Min, and Dongyeon Jeong
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This study was designed as a primary study to analyze the economic significance and potential of cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the IT sector, and to derive implications for new directions between Korea and the three countries with the advent of the fourth industrial revolution era. The goal of the study is to discuss what the development of the IT industry means for the three economies, examine the characteristics of each country, and gain policy implications on how cooperation with Korea should proceed in the future. To this end, this study is consisted of the following four components. First, the economic significance of IT technology cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan is viewed from the perspective of structural transformation. Second, the effect of IT cooperation between Korea and Russia on the Russian economy is quantitatively estimated through the analytical framework of structural transformation. Third, to supplement the limitations of theoretical discussions and derive customized cooperation directions for each country, the current status and policies of the IT industry in the three countries are examined in detail. Fourth, IT technology subsectors promising for cooperation between Korea and Russia are identified, from the patent citation analysis and network analysis.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Science and Technology, Industry, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan

371. Russia’s Energy Strategy in the Northeast Asian Region and New Korea-Russia Cooperation: Focusing on the Natural Gas and Hydrogen Sectors

Author:: Joungho Park, Boogyun Kang, Seok Hwan Kim, Won Soon Kwon, and Andrey Kovsh
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: This study attempts to identify new directions for energy cooperation between Korea and Russia, focusing on the areas of natural gas and hydrogen. In particular, we derive new directions and tasks for energy cooperation between the two countries, reflecting changes in the international energy environment, such as climate change and decarbonization, which are in full swing at the global level. To this end, this study is consisted of the following four parts. Part II examines the geopolitics of energy coming into the 21st century and Russia’s new energy strategy. Part III conducts an in-depth analysis of the energy cooperation strategies of China and Japan, major Northeast Asian countries, with Russia, and Part IV comprehensively evaluates Korea’s energy strategy and Korea-Russia energy cooperation. In conclusion, Part V presents new plans for Korea-Russia energy cooperation. As a side note, after carrying out this study, the policy environment for energy cooperation with Russia has significantly changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine is expected to change the landscape of global energy and its geopolitics in profound ways. In the midst of these significant changes, it is hoped that this study will serve as a meaningful reference for analyzing and forecasting the global energy dynamics surrounding Russia.
Topic:: International Relations, International Cooperation, Gas, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Asia, South Korea, and Northeast Asia

372. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare

Author:: Sarah J. Lohmann, Chuck Benson, Vytautas Butrimas, Georgios Giannoulis, and Gabriel Raicu
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the United States and its NATO partners to be confronted with the impact of hybrid warfare far beyond the battlefield. Targeting Europe’s energy security, Russia’s malign influence campaigns and malicious cyber intrusions are affecting global gas prices, driving up food costs, disrupting supply chains and grids, and testing US and Allied military mobility. This study examines how hybrid warfare is being used by NATO’s adversaries, what vulnerabilities in energy security exist across the Alliance, and what mitigation strategies are available to the member states. Cyberattacks targeting the renewable energy landscape during Europe’s green transition are increasing, making it urgent that new tools are developed to protect these emerging technologies. No less significant are the cyber and information operations targeting energy security in Eastern Europe as it seeks to become independent from Russia. Economic coercion is being used against Western and Central Europe to stop gas from flowing. China’s malign investments in Southern and Mediterranean Europe are enabling Beijing to control several NATO member states’ critical energy infrastructure at a critical moment in the global balance of power. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare will be an important reference for NATO officials and US installations operating in the European theater.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Economics, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Renewable Energy, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Western Europe, and Southeast Europe

373. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:: Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

374. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

375. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:: James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Ukraine

376. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

377. Of Ships and Cyber: Transposing the Incidents at Sea Agreement

Author:: Alexander Klimburg
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Amid the geopolitical crises caused by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it may seem wildly optimistic—or even bad diplomacy—to consider future arms-control scenarios for cyber operations. However, good policy needs to prepare for the day after tomorrow, and smart policy will look at what has gone wrong today and what can be learned from yesterday. Arguably, one element that may have contributed to rising geopolitical tensions over the past decade has been a lack of clear cyber signals among the main adversaries. This makes it even more urgent to consider what can be learned from past arms-control exercises such as the vaunted Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement—especially as this accord was conceived in the wake of several of its own perilous crises. In 1962, a lack of agreed signaling protocols nearly led to World War III. According to a riveting account in the 2020 book Nuclear Folly, 1 on October 27, 1962—at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the U.S. Navy cornered one of the few Soviet submarines unaccounted for off Cuba. In an effort to convince the Foxtrot-class B-59 submarine to surface, the destroyer USS Cony employed practice depth charges—which were not accurately identified as such by B-59’s beleaguered crew. When, in the middle of the night, the submarine did indeed surface, a low-flying anti-submarine aircraft dropped flares and pyrotechnics so it could take better photographs. This seemed like an attack to the submarine, and the exhausted captain of B-59 ordered a crash dive and speculated that perhaps the war had already broken out. He gave orders to prepare to launch a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo at the U.S. Navy task force. It took a near-mutiny by senior officers to stop him. This close call remained unknown until fairly recently. But several more prominent naval incidents throughout 1960s convinced the Soviet Union and the United States that a basic common agreement was necessary, and the Cold War “thaw” of the early 1970s made this possible.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

378. REVISITING THE EMBOLDENING POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Author:: Kyungwon Suh
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Do nuclear weapons make their possessors more aggressive? A series of high-profile aggressive actions by some nuclear-armed states appear to substantiate the argument that nuclear weapons enable aggressive behavior. Since its all-out invasion of Ukraine in February, Russia has continued to conduct brutal, coercive operations, including missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and population centers. North Korea has continued to test launch a wide array of missiles, one of which recently landed close to South Korea’s territorial waters. Policymakers also echo the view that nuclear weapons are more than simply defensive weapons. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review argues that Russian leaders have exploited their nuclear arsenal as a “shield” behind which they launched military aggression against Ukraine. When he was CIA Director, Formal Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued that Pyongyang could use nuclear weapons “beyond self-preservation.”
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Russia-Ukraine War, and Mike Pompeo
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

379. CAN DEBT RELIEF CONSTRAIN REPRESSIVE GOVERNMENTS?

Author:: Brett L. Carter
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: The African continent is confronting the prospect of a new debt crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on government finances. The Russian government’s war against Ukraine has increased the cost of food and energy, and compelled investors to sell off government bonds in emerging markets. Rising interest rates in the United States will increase the cost of borrowing. The Chinese economy is struggling under the weight of Xi Jinping’s “Zero COVID” policy and accumulated real estate debt. In 2015, the International Monetary Fund announced that eight countries were in debt distress. By March 2022, 23 were. In June, public debt ratios reached a 20-year high. Africa’s debt-distressed governments “are unlikely to default” in 2022,” The Economist observed, “but face trouble by 2024.” There is some evidence that the debt crisis is especially acute for Africa’s non-democracies. The impending debt crisis coincides with a general sense that Africa is experiencing a democratic recession. Voters are increasingly subject to intimidation and violence. Incumbent presidents are removing term limits. The longstanding norm against military coups is fading.
Topic:: Cold War, Debt, World Bank, GDP, Repression, and IMF
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and United States of America

380. WHO ATTACKED MONTENEGRO? THE MORAL AND STRATEGIC HAZARDS OF MISASSIGNING BLAME

Author:: Erica Lonergan and Maggie Smith
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: A few weeks ago, Montenegro—a NATO member—was hit with a cyber attack that targeted government servers. Montenegro’s outgoing Prime Minister, Dritan Abazovic, initially hedged about potential responsibility for the attack, stating on August 26: “We do not have clear information about the organizers… Security sector authorities couldn’t confirm that there is an individual, a group, a state behind [the attack].” Nevertheless, later that same day officials from Montenegro’s national intelligence agency attributed the attack to Russia. They also implied that the attack was related to Montenegro’s support for Ukraine and push for membership in the European Union. Yet, the extent of Russian involvement in the cyber attack remains ambiguous, which poses significant political and strategic challenges.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, Montenegro, and United States of America

381. DOES THE GLOBAL CONSENSUS ON APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA HOLD CLUES FOR THE UYGHURS?

Author:: Maria Lotito
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: A new report from the United Nations finds that China may have committed crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and that human rights violations are ongoing. The abuse flows from China’s “Strike Hard” campaign, executed to counter separatism and extremism, subjecting Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities to mass detentions, forced labor and sterilizations, cultural suppression, and surveillance. The report comes months after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, before which some governments sympathetic to the Uyghurs’ plight staged diplomatic boycotts, to little avail. The UN report, much like the Olympic boycotts, will change few minds. What does it take to generate intergovernmental consensus around broad-scale human rights violations? Such convergence, even upon opposition to egregious human rights abuse, is rare and difficult to achieve. This is because violating governments are skilled at subverting international human rights norms and onlooking states have many reasons to avoid acting. Abusive practices might be reframed as responsible policy, or covered up. Meanwhile, supposedly compliant governments contend with a panoply of bilateral interests, some incompatible with international norms.
Topic:: Apartheid, Human Rights, Arab Spring, Color Revolutions, Soviet Union, and Consensus
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Iceland

382. FOOD INSECURITY AND UNREST: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

Author:: Thomas S. Benson, Ore Koren, and Benjamin E. Bagozzi
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked fears that skyrocketing commodity prices—especially of wheat (Ukraine and Russia together account for about one-quarter of the world’s exports), oil, and gas—will cause a global wave of food protests. War, coupled with rapidly rising inflation—which has also been linked to bread riots—and more frequent climatic shocks suggest that concerns about food insecurity creating global unrest are timely and warrant further examination. At the same time, framing the complexities of sociopolitical environments as simple “kneejerk” reactions to rising food insecurity risks oversimplifying the situation and our ability to address it. Previous studies that identify a clear relationship between food prices and protests emphasize this risk.
Topic:: Food Security, Civil Unrest, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Kenya, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and Papua New Guinea

383. MANAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RIVALS

Author:: Elizabeth Radziszewski and Jeremy Berkowitz
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:: Sweden’s and Finland’s recent decisions to join NATO marked a historic moment for the two Nordic states known for their neutrality. The move not only reflects evolving security concerns about Russia’s aggression in Ukraine but marks a shift that is set to end decades of accommodation toward Russia. It also sheds light on a broader question about why some rival countries—or those that have a history of tensions—sustain policies of accommodation over the years, and what pushes them to abandon such policies. Why would Sweden and Finland refrain from alienating Russia for years only to break suddenly with this tradition with their unprecedented decision to apply for NATO membership?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Asia, Spain, North Africa, Sweden, Morocco, and United States of America

384. Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?

Author:: Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew "BINCS" Zublic
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone operations are underway, and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine. In this effort, Russia’s playbook will test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter further Russian aggression.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and Baltic States

385. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

386. Geopolitical Struggle between Russia and Turkey: The Intersection of Ukraine and Syrian Crises

Author:: Rahman Dag
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: As a new but uncertain international system has been operating for decades that can be regarded as a transition from unipolarity to something resembling multipolarity. Therefore, established and possible future great powers have been determining their foreign policies according to their future projections of the regional conflicts. This paper investigates Turkey and Russia’s stances in the Syrian and Ukrainian Crises. It might sound odd that Russia and Turkey are comparable in a struggle for the sphere of influence that intercepts each other. However, their good bilateral relations and different, even conflictual, approaches to regional and international issues provide a suitable ground to claim that a new international system is about to emerge. It will continue until the positions of established and newly emerged great powers are embedded. In practice, Russia's stance in the Ukrainian crisis and Turkey's stance in the Syrian crisis represent ontological threads to the vision of their own countries. However, they can still work together at a certain level because of third-party involvement in the issues
Topic:: Hegemony, Crisis Management, Humanitarian Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria

387. Military Stockpiles: A Life-Insurance Policy in a High-Intensity Conflict?

Author:: Léo Péria-Peigné
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: For the first time after thirty years of budgetary restriction, European armies must face a high-intensity conflict involving heavy human and material losses. Having run down their military stockpiles to the bare minimum, supporting Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on their operational inventory; as modern operational inventories are limited, much decommissioned and older equipment has also been donated. Russia too has mobilized its extensive military stockpiles, inherited from the USSR, to maintain its combat capability after the initial failure of its “special military operation”. Russian efforts to retrofit older systems have also intensified as production of modern equipment has stalled. As a result, we are seeing modern and ancient weapons pitted against each other in Ukraine. This situation raises questions about France’s military storage strategy and prompts comparisons with those of other nations. US forces have kept a significant proportion of their Cold War arsenal in working condition, using it as a valuable commercial, diplomatic, and military asset. This arsenal also allows the United States to dominate the second-hand weapons market as it can supply cheap and almost immediately available systems. In Russia, despite an apparent modernization process, military power still relies on Soviet-era stocks of vehicles and weapons. For the Russian navy, modernization of old hulls is a way to compensate for the slow production of modern ships. Chinese armed forces are being modernized and rationalized: substantial quantities of older equipment could therefore become available before 2030, a potential asset for Chinese diplomacy. In Europe, military stockpiling strategies diverge along a rough east–west line. Western powers such as the United Kingdom and France chose quality over quantity, while Eastern ones, closer to the Russian threat, try to maintain large volumes while also modernizing their equipment. While the war in Ukraine may prompt Western nations to begin a reinforcement program, Eastern European countries such as Poland had already begun their own before 2014 and the Crimea crisis. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France began to restore its military means and budgets, but the overall size of its armed forces is still inadequate to face a high-intensity conflict. The professionalization of the armed forces, the 2008 financial crisis, and budget cuts progressively led to the practice of stockpiling being replaced with a generalized “just-in-time” approach, to reduce infrastructure needs and costs more broadly. French armed forces had to make tough choices with their limited budgets, keeping what was immediately useful to their current missions and abandoning what was not. Operations in Africa and the Middle East and anti-terrorist operations in French cities absorbed considerable budgets, while specialized military units and infrastructure necessary to maintain stocks required for high-intensity conflicts were disbanded. Several initiatives and processes are at work to restore minimum storage capabilities, but a relevant stockpiling strategy, in line with France’s resources and strategic context, is still far off. The French army is building several military reserve units that could drive greater retention of older equipment and vehicles, although compatibility issues with more recent models may arise. As storing combat aircraft would be far too costly, the French Air and Space Force is trying to optimize the availability of its fleet, especially through a new approach to private industry partners in maintenance and training. The French navy has initiated a reform and rationalization process of its spare-parts-storage policy to optimize the availability of its ships as well as their capabilities. A coherent equipment reserve and stockpiling program is an essential component of a military driven by a clear strategic framework. However, in the French case, this strategy is currently being pulled in two directions: between the probable end of expeditionary operations in Africa and the Middle East, and the likelihood of a high-intensity conflict. The whole French stockpiling approach cannot be based entirely on the experience in Ukraine, and it is therefore necessary to evaluate multiple probable scenarios to develop relevant recommendations. A conflict in Eastern Europe fought by a coalition differs from one led by Europe without US support, or from a major crisis in the French territories of the Pacific or Indian Ocean. Moreover, recommendations must reflect military realities, as French resources are limited and would not allow for the creation of a reserve stock strategy similar to that of the United States. To support an allied nation under attack, the French army would need a much expanded ammunition stockpile. Similarly, the French air force lacks advanced munitions, while the French navy needs to rebuild a support fleet sufficient to enable combat operations far away from the French mainland and infrastructure.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Conflict, Industry, and Armament
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, France, and United States of America

388. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:: Pavel Baev
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

389. Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations

Author:: Gavin Wilde
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: A review of academic, doctrinal, and journalistic writing covering the last three decades of Russian military theorizing on cyber-related issues yields three hypotheses that may explain the mismatch between the expectations of many Western observers and the reported impact of Russian cyber operations in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.1 By exploring the unique and oft-overlooked facets of Moscow’s conceptualization of “cyber,” this paper provides a foundation for better assessing Russia’s performance in cyberspace in Ukraine in early 2022, along with a more nuanced understanding of its capabilities and possible expectations going forward. These hypotheses are as follows: Russia’s Information Operations Troops—a rough analog to Western military cyber commands—remains in its infancy and appears optimized more for counterpropaganda than for offensive cyber operations. The operational command structure over offensive cyber operations, meanwhile, remains murky and is possibly more political than military in nature. Russia’s premier offensive cyber capacities are housed within agencies focused on intelligence and subversion—the key tool kits used against Ukraine since 2014—rather than combined-arms warfare. Moscow’s secretive and poorly executed February 2022 invasion precluded optimal performance in the initial period of the war, which is particularly pivotal in Russian thinking about effectiveness in the information domain. These are each examined through Russia’s own information warfare prism, which differs in crucial ways from Western conceptions of “cyber”—foremost in that it is more expansive, encompassing and emphasizing the psychosocial impacts of information and communication technologies on both the polity and the public.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Russia-Ukraine War, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

390. Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications

Author:: Jon Bateman
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: This paper examines the military effectiveness of Russia’s wartime cyber operations in Ukraine,1 the reasons why these operations have not had greater strategic impact, and the lessons applicable to other countries’ military cyber efforts. It builds on previous analyses by taking a more systematic and detailed approach that incorporates a wider range of publicly available data. A major purpose of this paper is to help bridge the divide between cyber-specific and general military analysis of the Russia-Ukraine war. Most analysis of Russian cyber operations in Ukraine has been produced by cyber specialists writing for their own field, with limited integration of non-cyber military sources and concepts. Conversely, leading accounts of the war as a whole include virtually no mention of cyber operations.2 To begin filling the gap, this paper places Russian cyber operations in Ukraine within the larger frame of Moscow’s military objectives, campaigns, and kinetic activities.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

391. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:: Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

392. My Country, Right or Wrong: Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine

Author:: Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Western governments, including the United States, immediately condemned what they described as “Vladimir Putin’s war.”1 Surely, this formulation was no accident. It was aimed, first and foremost, at drawing a distinction between the actions of the Kremlin and the attitudes of ordinary Russians. There was optimism that ordinary Russians would not countenance a war against a neighboring country.2 But hopes of Russian grassroots opposition to the war were swiftly dashed. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently shown overwhelming support (70 percent or higher) for what Moscow calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, Putin’s popularity has also seen a boost, similar to what happened in the immediate wake of the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Partly in response to these indicators, figures like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have called for a visa ban for all Russian passport holders, with an exception for people whose safety is at risk or who are vulnerable to political persecution.3 According to Zelenskyy, “[T]he most important sanctions are to close the borders—because the Russians are taking away someone else’s land” and Russians should “live in their own world until they change their philosophy.” He added, “The population picked this government and they’re not fighting it, not arguing with it, not shouting at it.” Such sentiments are echoed in calls by some European politicians, such as Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin, for an EU ban on tourist visas. “It’s not right that at the same time as Russia is waging an aggressive, brutal war of aggression in Europe, Russians can live a normal life, travel in Europe, be tourists. It’s not right,” Marin said in mid-August.4 At the same time, a careful reading of popular Russian attitudes toward the war reveals important nuances that all too often are overlooked. First and foremost is the fact that rather than consolidating Russian society, the conflict has exacerbated existing divisions on a diverse array of issues, including support for the regime. Put another way, the impression that Putin now has the full support of the Russian public is simply incorrect. A more careful reading of sociological data, including conversations with focus group participants and quantitative research, presents a far more complex picture of Russian society.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Society, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

393. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:: Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

394. Networks and Competitive Advantage in a Contested World

Author:: Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: In an increasingly multipolar world and amid challenges from China, Russia, and elsewhere, the United States faces a complex set of foreign policy demands and the real risk of becoming overextended. Networks—of states, businesses, and individuals—offer policymakers a way to prioritize and reduce global commitments while advancing core U.S. interests. Leveraging the right networks in the right ways can extend U.S. influence, support the economic and physical security of Americans, and compete with adversaries at sustainable cost. Today’s policymakers understand the power of networks but need more guidance on how to build and employ them as tools of competition in a contested world rather than a world of open borders and markets. Influence networks—networks primed to spread and amplify U.S. power, enhance U.S. competitiveness, and protect national interests—have three characteristics. They are attraction networks, organized around places and issues where countries and corporations are already interacting, meeting common needs with customized resources. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, is organized around a shared need for infrastructure across the Global South and embeds Chinese influence by tailoring agreements to each partner’s local conditions. The United States has used attraction effectively in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but most U.S. foreign investment has been centralized and top-down. They are gated networks with clear criteria for entry, access, and exit. Gates capture network power and direct it toward specific goals. The European Union (EU) has used gated economic markets to build significant regulatory power and geopolitical relevance. The United States has tended toward universalism but employs gates in some security networks, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is turning toward gates in economic networks with friendshoring initiatives in some industries. Finally, they are distributed networks that have robust ties between members throughout the network, allowing influence to flow quickly along more pathways and facilitating collective action. The United States has often relied on less resilient hub-and-spoke networks to retain control. U.S. Indo-Pacific security alliances are hub-and-spoke, while NATO is more distributed, enabling more rapid, coordinated responses and wider spread of U.S. influence. Networks with these characteristics can help policymakers tackle their hardest problems. For example, better use of influence networks can support U.S. efforts to prioritize and fully resource the more significant challenge posed by China by pushing forward changes that advance European security autonomy and by building and mobilizing needed, distributed networks in the Indo-Pacific theater. Influence networks can inform U.S. strategies for building ties to hedging states that offer access to key resources or strategic locations—for example, by focusing on shared local needs of potential partners and U.S. comparative advantages and by creating distributed business or civil society partnerships. Finally, influence networks provide ways to approach the Russia-China relationship that support U.S. security and economic interests, including avoiding the isolation of either. These examples begin to illustrate how influence networks can improve U.S. strategies toward foreign policy challenges by offering policymakers a way to prioritize commitments, capitalize on U.S. strengths, and avoid overextension that harms U.S. interests. Additional exploration and application of these networks will investigate these and other foreign policy challenges in more depth.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Networks, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

395. Systemic Geopolitical Analysis in the research of power distribution in Eastern Europe

Author:: Erwin Metera
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The article presents Systemic Geopolitical Analysis, which as a scientific method can be an important tool for studying the distribution of power in Eastern Europe, supporting the assumptions of structural realism with an element of quantitative research. This region, as a place where spheres of influence and the ensuing economic and potentially military conflicts meet, is an area where the knowledge of the most precise distribution of power may be a crucial element in the analysis of the genesis of conflicts, the shifts in power distribution during their course, as well as in the prediction of future flashpoints. Being the first attempt to correlate Systemic Geopolitical Analysis with the issue of conflicts in Eastern Europe, the paper contains a hypothesis that Systemic Geopolitical Analysis is a research method that enables an effective analysis of the geopolitical reality in the region because of: 1) the conflicts occurring in the system due to differences in power distribution; 2) the nature of the components of power, measurable by the means of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis. Confirming the above hypothesis, the article points to the economic aspect, linked to the Russian natural gas exports, and the military aspect, by taking into account the characteristics of contemporary tensions in the region, which reduce the role of supra-systemic reserves.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Gas, Conflict, Exports, Regional Politics, and Structural Realism
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

396. The Influence of Political Processes and the War in Ukraine on the Formation of Generation Alpha and the iGeneration (Z): Defining Specific Features

Author:: Liudmyla Kryvachuk
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: The article attempts to analyse and define the specific features of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha in Ukraine in the context of the political processes and the war taking place in Ukrainian society. The article discusses the generation issues, taking into account the characteristics of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha. Assuming that a generation is an identifiable group of people who share a similar time of birth and significant events at critical stages of development, the article presents an original approach to determining the specific features of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha in Ukraine. The Orange Revolution (2004), the Revolution of Dignity (2014) and the hybrid war (2014-2022) and Russian-Ukrainian war (from 24.02.2022) had a significant impact on the formation of the iGeneration (Z) and Generation Alpha in Ukraine.
Topic:: Children, Geopolitics, Youth, Social Policy, Hybrid Warfare, Generation, Generation Z, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

397. Russian economic nationalism and the vectors of Russian foreign policy

Author:: Rafał Lisiakiewicz
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: In this article, the author wants to test the impact of economic nationalism on the change in Russia’s foreign policy. The author will refer to neoclassical realism, which shows how to combine the issues of power distribution in international relations with the influence of the domestic level of the state on the process of creation of the foreign policy. In terms of neoclassical realism, economic nationalism is a variable that shapes the perception of the economic challenges facing Russia. The author also points out that economic nationalism is also related to the protectionist policy of the Russian Federation. Thus, it influences the shaping of processes within and outside the country. The author recognizes that in the process of creating the Russian foreign policy decisions, economic nationalism should be linked to other factors, especially security issues and Russia’s general strategic culture, in order to obtain the final set of premises that will determine Russia’s shifts in foreign policy. The tensions related to the role of the EU and NATO in the countries of Eastern Europe clearly influenced the level of cooperation between Russia and the West. Nevertheless, economic issues in this regard were also extremely important. Russia’s power position was based on the economic potential.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, Nationalism, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

398. The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Economic Consequences on Europe and the World

Author:: Philip Fwaldin Kasuwa
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: A number of international sanctions have been placed on Russia since it launched an attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, in order to persuade the country to de-escalate the conflict. The sanctions imposed on Russia, while designed to harm the Russian economy, had unintended consequences on the world economy, primarily through the disruption of global supply chains. Energy supply shocks, commodities and trade supply shocks were all caused by the conflict. In many nations, this resulted in an increase in worldwide inflation. Despite the fact that Israel and Turkey were instrumental in mediating a peaceful end of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the economic fallout from the crisis continued to reverberate throughout Europe and beyond.
Topic:: Economics, Sanctions, Commodities, Trade, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

399. The American Multi-Domain Operation as a response to the Russian concept of New Generation Warfare

Author:: Tomasz Wójtowicz
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: America’s unipolar balance of power created after the end of the Cold War is inevitably coming to an end. The dynamic economic growth of the People’s Republic of China, lasting uninterruptedly since the 1980s, the reconstruction of spheres of influence by the Russian Federation, the world war on terrorism with the accompanying costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, economic crises systematically weakening the economies of Western countries in 2001, 2007 and 2020, and the COVID-19 pandemic – these are just some of the many causes of geopolitical changes. Parallel to the weakening position of the United States, countries such as the Russian Federation are increasingly boldly challenging the current balance of power, provoking armed conflicts and destabilizing countries located in Central and Eastern Europe. The purpose of this article is to present the American Multi-Domain Operation concept as a response to the Russian concept of new generation warfare by which the country successfully led to the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the political destabilization of Ukraine. The main research problem resulting from the assumed goal was to answer the following question: what is a Multi-Domain Operation and how do the United States intend to compete and win in the armed conflict taking place in Central and Eastern Europe with the Russian Federation? The following research methods were used to solve the research problems: the method of cause-effect and institutional-legal analysis, method of examining documents, and the method of analysis and criticism of literature. The monographic and comparative methods were also used. However, the main role was played by deductive reasoning which enables the identification of facts based on an in-depth analysis of source data. Taking into account the preliminary research, the author proposed the following research hypothesis: a Multi-Domain Operation is another American operational concept describing the security environment, and the Russian and American way of war. The USA will achieve victory in a possible armed conflict by locating and neutralizing the enemy’s anti-access – area denial capabilities, and then destroying its forces in the disputed area.
Topic:: Power Politics, Conflict, Multipolarity, Russia-Ukraine War, and New Generation Warfare
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

400. Role theory and Russia’s attempts to integrate the post-Soviet space: from internal to international duties

Author:: Damian Strycharz
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: With the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow’s foreign policy towards the post-Soviet space has become an even greater area of concern. In order to better understand Russia’s behaviour in the post-Soviet space, it is worth analysing what led to Moscow’s renewed interest in this area. There are numerous accounts explaining Russia’s policies towards its neighbourhood, but they often focus on material factors or Russian imperial complexes. To address the existing gap and examine changes in Moscow’s attitude towards the region, this paper will use role theory and analyse shifts in Russia’s national role conceptions. It argues that the combination of important external and internal factors led to changes in perception of Russia’s international duties and responsibilities between Putin’s rise to power and his return to the presidency in 2012. Consequently, these changes resulted in different understanding of Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space, which had implications for Russia’s increasingly aggressive actions in the region afterwards.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, Post-Soviet Space, Russia-Ukraine War, and Role Theory
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS