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81. India’s personal data protection act and the politics of digital governance

Author:
Stephen Weymouth
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
India recognizes the importance of establishing policy foundations for digital commerce, as cross-border data flows are essential to firms in all sectors, not just in technology. In manufacturing, three dimensional printing and robotics are revolutionizing production processes. Agriculture is benefiting from sensors and analytics, which optimize crop yields and resource usage. Healthcare is being transformed by electronic medical records, health information exchanges, and algorithms that analyze patient data and detect illness. Financial services are using blockchain technologies and AI to enable faster and more secure transactions. All industries rely on electronic payments, data analytics, and cloud storage to streamline various processes. With customers located worldwide, cross-border data flows are the byproduct of digital transactions. Data privacy frameworks can facilitate these flows by building consumer trust, thereby unlocking innovation and efficiency in all sectors. Given the significance of cross-border data flows to its economy, India has actively engaged in multilateral and bilateral discussions on digital trade governance. It is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a strategic forum comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, a possible venue for coordination on digital governance. India has also joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a US-led framework for economic cooperation which will facilitate conversations seeking “high-standard rules of the road in the digital economy, including standards on cross-border data flows and data localization.” The US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), launched by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Joe Biden during the Quad summit in May 2022, presents an opportunity to build India-US trade ties through an industry-focused agenda. Finally, India and the United States have launched a new bilateral Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap to accelerate technological cooperation. This issue brief delves into the politics of India’s evolving digital governance, focusing on the draft Digital Personal Data Protection Bill of 2022 (DPDPB). The DPDPB aims to balance the interests of Indian consumers seeking enhanced privacy and data security against the business need for unconstrained data flows. The government’s responsive approach to stakeholder feedback on previous versions of the bill indicates that achieving these goals is feasible. However, concerns persist about ambiguities surrounding data transfers and institutional arrangements that exempt the government from complying with the law in ways that may encourage surveillance and censorship of opposing viewpoints.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Rule of Law, Data, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

82. Bangladesh draft data protection act 2023: Potential and pitfalls

Author:
Christabel Randolph
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Bangladesh government’s updated draft data protection bill is a welcome revision of its 2022 attempt to address the country’s lack of a comprehensive data protection law, but there is still room for constructive change to heighten regulatory certainty. The Information and Communications Technology Division of the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunication, and Information Technology released the proposed Data Pro­tection Act 2023 (DPA 2023 or the bill) 1 on March 14—just days after the publication of the South Asia Center’s March issue brief—and the revised version responds to some of the criticism of the digital protectionism and restrictive provisions on digital business activity in the 2022 draft. Specifically, the proposed legislation reflects an operational sensibility based on stakeholder feedback on significant issues. It has incorporated more flexibility to frame rules to address changing situations, provided for a transition period, relaxed data localization requirements, and expressly recognized the importance of interna­tional cooperation and safeguard measures for facilitating data flows.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Legislation, Innovation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Bangladesh and South Asia

83. The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Author:
Robert Murray
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”1 The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment. As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment. Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models. To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

84. Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Author:
Roman Osadchuk and Andy Carvin
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In the lead-up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin and its proxies perpetrated information operations to justify military action against Ukraine, mask its operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the war. DOWNLOAD PDF Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America. Building upon daily monitoring by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), this report synthesizes Kremlin attempts to undermine Ukraine by targeting local, regional, and global audiences over the course of 2022 since the start of the war on February 24 of that year.
Topic:
Media, News Analysis, Conflict, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

85. United States–China semiconductor standoff: A supply chain under stress

Author:
Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In August 2022, the US Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, a law that approves subsidies and tax breaks to help jump-start the renewed production on American soil of advanced semiconductors.1 Just two months later, the Joe Biden administration issued wide-ranging restrictions on the export to China of chips and chip-making technology to undercut that country’s ability to manufacture the same class of integrated circuits.2 Taken together with a steady stream of Biden administration prohibitions on technology sales to key Chinese companies, the US initiatives represent a profound turn toward competition with China in the high-tech realm.3 They also highlight an effort to restructure the complex, multinational supply chains centered on East Asia that manufacture hundreds of billions of dollars of semiconductors a year. As such, the Biden administration has set in motion a process that could alter the business strategies—and fortunes—of homegrown and foreign-invested semiconductor companies based in China, world-leading chipmakers in Taiwan and South Korea, and suppliers around the world that provide the industry with the machinery and myriad inputs that fuel chip production. The Biden administration insists that its restrictions on sales to China are intended only to limit China’s ability to produce the cutting-edge chips that can feed into the development of weapons and other strategically important technologies—and not to cripple its semiconductor industry. But the current state of play of sanctions and support for US-based semiconductor production, including by Taiwanese and Korean chipmakers, is not the endpoint in this process. Rather, the momentum to constrain Beijing’s semiconductor program is likely to continue in the coming months, at the very least with additional restrictions on Chinese companies and government-linked entities, and unprecedented bureaucratic scrutiny of American venture-capital and equity-financing flows to China. That amounts to more bad news for corporate leaders in Asia, North America, and Europe who have spent the past generation building a globe-spanning semiconductor industry that has faced few barriers to expansion. As US restrictions mount, and sales of certain technologies to China flag, the once-unimaginable process of reorienting semiconductor supply chains will become an ever-present reality. The CHIPS and Science Act already is becoming an important factor in corporate strategy, providing incentives for Taiwanese, Korean, and American companies to make big bets on new factories in places like New York, Ohio, Texas, and Arizona—witness Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC’s) recent decision to build a second factory in Phoenix.4 This paper explores the potential implications of US semiconductor policy for the global semiconductor supply chains and the competition for primacy in an industry that is constantly changing the face of the global economy and one that has implications for global security in all its dimensions. It begins by examining the policies put in place by the Biden administration, and then discusses the changes taking place across the industry, with a focus on Asia.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

86. In Support of Market-Driven Standards

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU published its new Standardisation Strategy in 2022. The strategy contains some good ideas to improve the way European standards are set. However, in its attempt to gain more control over technical standards, the EU risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The primary motivation behind the strategy is the belief that the process governing the way CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI – the three European Standardisation Organisations – take decisions over EU standards favours non-EU multinationals. To address this perceived imbalance, EU National Standardisation Bodies will have the exclusive power to accept standardisation requests, and adopt, revise and withdraw European technical standards. These changes are particularly significant for ETSI, Europe’s Standardisation Body in charge of telecommunication standards and one of Europe’s most successful organisations. ETSI is a prime example of EU normative power since it hosts companies from more than 60 countries, while retaining a large membership of EU firms. The regulatory changes included in the strategy are not risk-free. There could be unintended consequences that may undermine a standardisation system that has delivered significant economic benefits for the EU and the world. First, giving more responsibility to EU’s National Standardisation Organisations will turn a European discussion into 30 (EU and EEA) national debates. As a consequence, small companies will not be able to contribute to each and every one of the National Standardisation Organisations, diluting their contribution, while multinational companies, with the resources needed to cooperate with a larger number of bodies, will benefit from an expanding role in the EU standard setting process. Second, if standards are fragmented along national borders and companies must multiply their efforts to take part in several Standardisation Development Organisations, there will be less resources for Research and Development spending. Finally, if each and every National Standardisation Organisation needs to have a position with regards to the acceptance of a standardisation request, or adoption, revision and withdrawal of European technical standards, the time period required to adopt a technical standard may be extended rather than shortened, which is the exact opposite of what the European Commission wants to achieve. The regulatory changes included in the EU Standardisation Strategy are akin to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. If the European Commission is concerned about the influence of non-EU companies in European Standardisation Bodies, it does not need to overhaul their governance systems. Supporting greater participation of European firms in the European standard system will ease EU’s concerns without the downside risks associated with changing the rules of the game that govern Europe’s Standardisation Bodies. The success of the European standardisation system, which is market-driven and based on consensus, has had significant economic benefits in the development of specific industries, like the European Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Technical standards in ICT have shaped a European industry that is not only dynamic and international but also enjoys some of the highest levels of wages and Research and Development spending. Moreover, if technical standards are not developed through an open, consensus-based, and industry-led voluntary process, they will be developed in different ways. For instance, governments and private companies can develop standards by themselves. Both solutions are inferior to the current market-driven approach that governs European standards. However, the European market-driven approach to set standards is voluntary, and its success and continuation must not be assumed. European policymakers should be worried about tinkering with a European standardisation system which has produced economic specialisation and innovation to the benefits of EU firms and consumers.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, and Standardization
Political Geography:
Europe

87. What is Wrong with Europe’s Shattered Single Market? – Lessons from Policy Fragmentation and Misdirected Approaches to EU Competition Policy

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
What is wrong with Europe’s Single Market? The brief answer to that question is that it does not really exist – it is unsingle. The Single Market is in many ways a political illusion. It exists only nominally. Any company doing business in Europe faces significant barriers to cross-border exchanges within the EU, and it is these barriers that hamper companies’ ability to scale and compete internationally on the back of innovation and economic integration. We outline that Brussels and national governments need to beat the drum for eliminating policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market and at the same time change course in competition policy to sufficiently support investments in innovation, business growth, and the adoption of advanced technologies across industries. Major economic indicators show that Europe is caught in a protracted corporate and technology crisis. The EU has for a very long time now been tailing US corporate and innovation leadership. At the same time, competition with technology-intensive imports from China is getting increasingly intense. Europe’s underperformance is rooted in a legally fragmented internal market which is disincentivising business growth and innovation. On top of that, an outdated approach to competition policy is discouraging businesses from adopting innovation and scaling across national borders, risking that EU companies continue to lose clout and international competitiveness. 30 years have passed since the formal establishment of Europe’s Single Market. Data reveals that regulatory convergence has reversed or come to a halt in most policy areas. Recent policies for technologies and digital business models, which are key sources of cross-industry competitiveness, created new layers of regulation and legal uncertainty in EU and Member State law. Overall, EU policies have not significantly helped European companies, large and small, to do business in another Member State or use advanced technology-enabled services. EU competition policy does not live up to its promise to “enable the proper functioning of the EU’s internal market”. Europe’s competition policy is still fragmented along national borders and largely ignorant to dynamic effects of competition, especially investments in innovation. Due to mixed legal competences, competition rules are often enforced differently by Member States’ national authorities and can be appropriated to support protectionist industrial policy ambitions. The recently enacted Digital Market Act (DMA) demonstrates that the European Commission and Member State authorities favour protection and discretionary enforcement over innovation and economic disruption, without providing solid evidence of abusive business behaviour and consumer harm. With the DMA, the EU introduced legislation with serious ambiguities in objectives, concepts, and rules, and explicitly allows national Member States to regulate competition at their own discretion. A recent attempt by Germany’s competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, to enforce its own rulebook for large digital companies (Section 19a of the German Competition Act) risks creating a patchwork of competition rules for large providers of advanced digital services across the EU. Local adopters of advanced digital services, particularly small businesses, that use advanced technology services to compete in their markets would be confronted with less choice and quality. Recently imposed policies under the umbrella of European Strategic Autonomy will hardly help policymakers in their ambition to achieve “innovation and technology leadership”. The paramount task for the EU and national governments is to eliminate policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market, accompanied by an approach to competition policy that embraces investments in innovation and business growth while accounting for the substantial value created through the adoption of innovative technologies and disruptive business models across industries in the EU.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

88. Strategic Autonomy and the Competitiveness of Europe’s Innovative Pharmaceutical Sector: A Wake-up Call

Author:
Fredrik Erixon and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
It is high time for Europe to break its relative decline in the pharmaceutical sector. Europe used to be the preeminent region in the world for Research and Development and innovation in the sector – being the location for a majority of R&D and the development of new medicines. However, its competitiveness has been going down for several decades – and, in more recent time, the pace of the decline is now accelerating. Europe is not just outpaced by the United States. Unless there is a new direction, China will soon be ahead of Europe too. Europe is behind the global frontier in innovation and new product development in medicines. It is not just Europe’s share of global R&D that is going down. Of all the new chemical and biological entities that are developed, Europe is contributing a falling share. There is a similar development in the drug pipeline – medicines that are in the regulatory approval process. The location of clinical trials for Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products – an area of new frontline drug development – is moving out of Europe. If Europe is to improve its strategic autonomy and restore competitiveness in the pharmaceutical sector, better policies are needed to incentivise innovation and attract R&D investment. A new strategy for the pharmaceutical industry should include – among other things – better protection of intellectual property, more and focused R&D expenditures, and streamlined regulatory and reimbursement processes.
Topic:
European Union, Pharmaceuticals, Strategic Autonomy, Research and Development, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

89. Increasing Systemic Legal Risks in the EU: The Economic Impacts of Changes to the EU’s Product Liability Legislation

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU’s Product Liability Directive (PLD) determines the rules for strict product liability in the EU. It establishes a framework in which manufacturers’ liability is determined solely based on the presence of defects in the product, regardless of the manufacturer’s fault. The PLD is intended to serve as a “safety net” when fault-based or contractual liability rules do not offer sufficient compensation to consumers. It operates independently from contractual arrangements between businesses and consumers, and it cannot be weakened by contractual agreements between businesses and consumers. The PLD is a horizontal regulation that applies to a wide range of industries in the EU because it applies to all products available on the EU market. The recently proposed changes by the European Commission would increase systemic legal uncertainty for producers and sellers of technology-intensive goods and services in the EU. The impact assessment of the European Commission does not sufficiently account for changes to the PLD proposed in 2022. Nor does it sufficiently account for the major impacts of increased legal uncertainty for European businesses. Legislators in the Council and the European Parliament should slow negotiations to allow time for policymakers to collect more evidence on the impacts on businesses, insurers, and courts we detail in this paper. This would be an opportunity to improve regulatory quality in light of the high levels of legal uncertainty associated with the changes proposed by the Commission.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Legislation, and Risk
Political Geography:
Europe

90. The Insurance Implications of Government Student Loan Repayment Schemes

Author:
Martin Gervais, Qian Liu, and Lance Lochner
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP), Western University
Abstract:
A large literature examines the extent to which consumption responds to idiosyncratic earnings shocks.1 This paper studies whether student loan repayments serve as a source of insurance, much like government tax and transfer programs.2 Indeed, this insurance mechanism is an explicit aim of formal income-contingent repayment schemes in many countries, where the efficient structure of contingencies depends on such market frictions as moral hazard, adverse selection, and costly income verification (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2016). We use new administrative data that links detailed information on Canadian student loan recipients with their repayment and income histories from the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP), income tax filings, and post-secondary schooling records to measure the extent to which student borrowers adjust loan repayments to insure against income variation.3 Several mechanisms are available for students to adjust loan repayments in response to income fluctuations: formal, like CSLP’s Repayment Assistance Plan (RAP); and informal, such as delinquency or default. Close to 30% of students are enrolled in RAP soon after graduation, although that fraction falls as incomes rise thereafter. ∗ Gervais: University of Georgia, Athens, mgervaisca@gmail.com. Liu: Brock University, St. Catharines, Canada, qliu@brocku.ca. Lochner: Western University, London, Canada, llochner@uwo.ca. We thank the Statistics Canada Research Data Centres at Western University and McMaster University. Lochner gratefully acknowledge support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 1See, e.g., the survey by Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) and references therein. 2Brzozowski et al. (2010) show that the tax and transfer system in Canada is very effective at absorbing income movements. 3Lochner, Liu and Gervais (2021) document sizable transfers implicit in the CSLP through differences in repayment by expected post-school income. Within 5 years of graduation, nearly 10% of borrowers have defaulted on their debt. In addition, borrowers can make larger payments than required should they experience unexpectedly high income: 40% of borrowers have fully repaid their student debt within 5 years of graduation. Indeed, loan payments are shown to increase in income, more so in early years and for individuals with higher initial debt. More formally, we estimate that on average, an unexpected $1,000 change in yearover-year income is associated with a $30 change in loan payment: from a $50 change the year after graduation, declining to a $20 change 5 years after graduation. Loan repayments are also used to absorb income variation that is more permanent in nature: for borrowers whose income is consistently below or above expected income at graduation, the magnitude of average repayment adjustment is similar to the average yearly response.
Topic:
Debt, Education, Economy, Insurance, and Student Loans
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

91. State Upgrading in Global Value Chains and Production Networks: A Conceptual Note

Author:
Andries Bezuidenhout and Søren Jeppesen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
Despite the contribution and influence of the Global Value Chains (GVCs) and Global Production Networks (GPNs) perspectives on our understanding of processes of economic and social development, the understanding of the role of the state within in this framework has some limitations. Based on an assessment of perspectives on the role of the state within GVCs/GPNs, we propose that there is a need to supplement these existing understandings of the state with an analysis of ‘state upgrading’. Recognizing state upgrading as a distinct process, but related to economic and social upgrading, provides an opportunity to analyze in more detail the dynamic exchange between state institutions and GVCs/GPNs. This allows for the development of an enhanced understanding of what the substantive dimensions of the role of the state within GVCs/GPNs consists of. We suggest that such dimensions should include ‘state representational upgrading’ and ‘state institutional upgrading’. We further propose to extent the analysis to what we term the ‘upgrading nexus’ – describing the dynamic interaction between the three types of upgrading in relation to the main actors in GVCs/GPNs (the private sector/industry, the civil society/labor, and the state). With such an approach, we imply an analytical understanding of how economic, social, and state upgrading in GVCs/GPNs are either mutually reinforcing, or potentially mutually undermining. Our aim is to suggest a way of analytically addressing the role of the state within GVCs/GPNs to supplement and refine existing approaches, not to propose to develop an original theory of the state.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Networks, Institutions, Global Value Chains, Production, and State Upgrading
Political Geography:
Global Focus

92. Centralization in National High-Performance Sports Systems: Reasons, Processes, Dimensions, Characteristics, and Open Questions

Author:
Wolfgang Maennig
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg
Abstract:
Centralization provides for the bundling of tasks that are relevant to the achievement of an institution's goals. Centralization is discussed in almost all areas of life: For example, in politics (more centralized structures in France vs. more decentralized structures in Germany), in economics (centrally planned organization as in the former COMECON-Countries), decentralized decision-making at the individual level in market economies), and at the corporate level. Objects of centralization can be, for example, decision-making processes, products, personnel and customer groups. In some cases, the aim is to centralize (only) certain objects, while other activities are to remain decentralized, for example. In some cases, centralization in some areas virtually necessitates decentralization in others: For example, centralization by product usually leads to decentralization by sales area. Synergy effects, specialization advantages and, ultimately, cost degression effects are cited as benefits or advantages of more centralization; duplication of work and infrastructure can be avoided. Decision-making processes can be accelerated and simplified – subordinate or geographically distant units do not participate in the decision-making process. Unified concepts and strategies can be better enforced. “Density effects" must also be taken into account: There often are positive spill-over effects between people with related activities, for example, due to imitation and learning effects, but also due to the exchange of experience, which leads to an increase in the productivity of those involved. However, the decentralization tendencies that have emerged as a result of the Corona pandemic, for example through homeworking, partly question this finding. One of the disadvantages of centralization is that large centralized companies have high demands on information and decision-making systems because the experience, problems and ideas for solutions that arise decentrally have to reach the decisionmakers and therefore often (but not always) react more slowly to external changes. Less consideration may be given to regional peculiarities. Due to the standardization usually associated with centralization the scope for adaptation to specific circumstances may be lost. Centralization can increase the distance of decision-makers from "grassroots" concerns. The non-central units can suffer from devaluation, delegitimization, and demotivation, possibly associated with a long-term decrease of activities. The restricted competition of ideas can lead to a long-term decline in competitiveness, since the reduced competencies of the decentralized employees can inhibit their individual performance development. Centralization leads to a greater burden on central decisionmakers because the quantity and complexity of decisions increase. Individuals affected by centralization (in a different location) may experience family relocation problems and additional financial problems. The Corona pandemic and the current China discussion have brought additional arguments into the discussion with contagion risks for (too) many and (too) strong dependencies/blackmail possibilities on centralized procurement. And Ukraine's energy supply, which is based on relatively few large nuclear power plants, illustrates the possible increased susceptibility of certain centralized structures to crises.
Topic:
Sports, Economic Policy, Olympics, and Centralization
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Global Focus

93. Erdoğan's Re-election as President Raises Concerns among Allies

Author:
Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s win in the presidential election and ministerial appointments promises to further weaken democracy, move Türkiye further away from EU standards, and continue so-called personal diplomacy and transactionalism in foreign policy. This could prolong the Turkish parliament’s ratification of Sweden’s accession to NATO.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Sweden

94. EU-South Korea Extend Cooperation Beyond the Economy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The 10th EU-Republic of Korea Summit, held on 22 May in Seoul, reaffirmed the importance of South Korea as a critical Asian partner of the Union. The meeting also signalled the growing importance of security issues in bilateral relations. South Korea shares the EU’s assessment of Russian aggression against Ukraine and intends to continue to support the invaded country, but not with supplies of military equipment for now. The announcement of a “green” partnership indicates both sides’ willingness to engage in other areas of cooperation, which also will benefit the development of Polish-South Korean relations.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, South Korea, and Poland

95. Examining Changes in Regional Cooperation in Central Europe from a Polish Perspective

Author:
Tomasz Żornaczuk
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Visegrad Group (V4), until recently the most active and multidimensional cooperation platform in Central Europe, does not serve currently to strengthen the voice of the region on the most essential issues concerning its security. This is because Hungary’s stance on Russia’s attack on Ukraine is different than that of its partners. That is why Poland is tightening relations with the other Visegrad countries—Czechia and Slovakia. At the same time, Poland is also intensifying cooperation with the Baltic states, which has its source in joint actions on security and eastern affairs in the years preceding the war.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Visegrad Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Central Europe, Slovakia, and Czechia

96. What is the Significance of Prigozhin's Revolt for Russian Security Policy?

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
On the night of 23-24 June, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group private military company, which has been fighting in Ukraine and operating elsewhere, stood up to the Russian Ministry of Defence and began an armed march on Moscow. However, in the end he and his forces did not storm the capital, officially as a result of negotiations led by Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenka. Prigozhin’s actions will worsen the morale of Russian soldiers and mercenaries fighting in Ukraine but will not change Russia’s hostile actions towards NATO countries.
Topic:
NATO, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

97. EU Development Cooperation Policy Shifts from Charity to Self-interest

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In recent years, the EU’s development cooperation policy has evolved, moving away from an approach based on poverty eradication and the needs of partner countries to focusing more on its own interests. This change is supported by the majority of EU members. This gives the EU the opportunity to exert strategic influence in the world but risks the loss of its unique identity as an altruistic donor and attractive partner in development cooperation. The change in the Union’s approach is consistent with the position of Poland, which can use it to reform and strengthen its development aid system.
Topic:
Development, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Development Aid
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

98. Syria returns to the Arab League

Author:
Sara Nowacka
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The decision to restore Syria’s membership in the Arab League (AL) is aimed at Arab states gaining greater control over the situation in the region and reducing external influence, including that of the West. Although the AL imposed a number of obligations on Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, such as holding elections, it is doubtful whether the League can enforce them. The organisation’s decision to normalise relations with Syria will be used to undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions in counteracting violations of international law, also in the context of the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, Syrian War, Normalization, Bashar al-Assad, Arab League, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Arab Countries and Syria

99. Using Frozen Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine: Possibilities for the EU

Author:
Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The EU wants to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine, using for this purpose frozen Russian assets, among others. The European Commission proposes to improve the system of confiscation of private assets of sanctioned persons in case of criminal activity and to obtain income from the active management of immobilised Russian public assets. These solutions may yield limited results. To be more effective, the EU would have to reach an international agreement to confiscate the reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Sanctions, Reconstruction, European Union, Assets, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

100. Ending the War in Sudan will be Difficult

Author:
Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Fighting in Sudan between the regular army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been ongoing since 15 April. The clashes are mainly taking place in the capital, Khartoum, and in the Darfur region, causing the destruction of infrastructure, a humanitarian disaster, and the displacement of the population. Although neither side has achieved military superiority or the support of the population, they are determined to continue fighting until the opponent is eliminated, which makes efforts to achieve a permanent ceasefire difficult. In the longer term, international support for a political solution to the crisis should aim to restore civilian control of the state.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, War, Armed Forces, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan