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2. Russia at War and the Islamic World
- Author:
- Marlène Laruelle
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- While Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a decoupling with the West on a scale not seen since the worst years of the Cold War, Russia has not been isolated from the non-Western world and has even reinvested its diplomatic energy toward the Global South. This paper focuses on Russia’s relationships with the Islamic world and how they have been transformed — or not — by the Ukraine war. It discusses both Russia’s “internal” Islamic realm and how the Middle East has reacted to the strategic tectonic shift unleashed by the war and Western sanctions. It explains that the role and place of Islam in Russia have been reinforced by the war context, as Islamic institutions and Muslims are seen by the Russian regime as among the most loyal constituencies. It concludes that the main Middle Eastern regional powers have been able to consolidate their transactional foreign policies and use the war to assert their autonomy toward Western actors so that Russia’s weakening does not result in the West’s increased influence but in a more multipolar order.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Islam, Multipolarity, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Middle East
3. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security
- Author:
- Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America
4. Four Contending U.S. Approaches to Multilateralism
- Author:
- Stewart Patrick
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The era of U.S. president Donald Trump exposed the shortcomings of a unilateralist and hypernationalist approach to the pursuit of U.S. global objectives. Although that orientation still commands support in some Republican quarters, a more compelling foreign policy debate for the United States has emerged: What form of multilateralism is currently best suited to advance U.S. national interests and international stability? This historical moment is defined by two countervailing trends, as described in the 2022 National Security Strategy issued by U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration. The first is a profusion of transnational challenges that can only be addressed, mitigated, or resolved through collective action, such as climate change and pandemic disease. The second is a resurgence of geopolitical competition that hinders that very cooperation.1 The imperative for collective action has never been greater, yet the world remains, as United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres bemoans, “gridlocked in colossal global dysfunction.”2 Biden has turned the page on Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, but the debate over alternative approaches to intergovernmental cooperation has just begun.3 Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, four distinct models vie for primacy—and the administration’s attention. The first is a charter conception of multilateralism, focused on the UN’s model of universal membership. The second is a club approach, which seeks to rally established democracies as the foundation for world order. The third is a concert model, which seeks comity and joint action among the world’s major powers. The fourth is a coalition approach, which would tailor ad hoc frameworks to each global contingency. Each of the so-called four Cs lays claim to a respective virtue: legitimacy, solidarity, capability, and flexibility.4 As the Biden administration begins its third year—and as internationalists continue to advocate for different modes of multilateralism to tackle a daunting global agenda—the time is ripe for the United States to take a more strategic and intentional approach to international cooperation. Each of the four Cs rests on specific assumptions, makes distinct causal and normative claims, and poses real-world trade-offs for the pursuit of U.S. preferences and prospects for effective collective action. To be able to weigh their relative merits in specific circumstances, policymakers first need to better understand their conceptual underpinnings and practical implications.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
5. What Should India Do Before the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis?
- Author:
- Vijay Gokhale
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- In the next two decades, the Taiwan question is likely to assume increasing importance for the Indo-Pacific region. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming more assertive about unifying Taiwan with the mainland, and it is also making progress toward establishing the military capability toward this end. For a rising PRC seeking to establish itself as the dominant global power, it is untenable that a part of its territory remains outside its control. Possible endeavors toward establishing this control could lead to a response by the United States, which would have broader ramifications for the region and the world. For the United States, any endeavors by the PRC to this end would undermine the very core of the idea that the United States is the defender of freedom and democracy across the world, thus undermining its credibility. It might also deal a devastating blow to the United States’ global power. In this context, and given the significance of Taiwan to both countries, it is an issue that can rapidly escalate, making it a matter of concern in the Indo-Pacific. Further, a conflict over Taiwan would dwarf the global economic fallout that began when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Short of conflict, Chinese coercion of Taiwan could disrupt the freedom of navigation and sea lanes of communication through the Taiwan Strait and will have severe consequences for Asian geopolitics and geoeconomics. Given India’s substantial geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region and its long history of exchanges with East and Southeast Asia, India should pay constant and careful attention to this issue. Further, a policy to respond to various contingencies must be thought through and put into place. This paper tries to look at the possible policy that India might adopt ahead of a major crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The paper proceeds in three parts. The first part analyzes the geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of another Taiwan Strait crisis for India. While it is difficult to estimate the actual damage that would be dealt to the Indian economy, it is clear that all segments of the economy would be affected, with the impact possibly substantial enough to set India back several years. A crisis would also impact India’s geopolitical interests and national security, given that China is increasing its assertiveness both along the Line of Actual Control as well as in the Indian Ocean. The second part argues against a commonplace view that India played no role in crisis management during earlier periods of high tension in the Taiwan Strait—the 1954–55 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crises, also known as the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, respectively. By using archival material in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, it seeks to dispel the above notion and that Taiwan ceased to be a matter of interest for India after it had recognized PRC’s claim over Taiwan in 1950. Further, it looks at the lessons for policymaking from India’s handling of the crises. The third part of the paper briefly traces the history of India-Taiwan relations following India’s transfer of its diplomatic recognition to the PRC till the present day. It provides an overview of India’s Taiwan policy. Given that a war in the Taiwan Strait is not beyond reasonable doubt, it then discusses the scenarios India might find itself in and the possible policies to respond to these scenarios. It recommends a close following of the U.S.-ChinaTaiwan strategic triangle, a whole-of-government assessment around impacts of a Taiwan Strait contingency, and an assessment of policy options. It also recommends mapping the expectations that China and the United States would have of India, along with undertaking consultations with key partners on the Taiwan question.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Crisis Management, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- South Asia, India, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific
6. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?
- Author:
- Ronak Gopaldas
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
7. China’s Response to Türkiye’s Volatile Authoritarianism
- Author:
- Ceren Ergenç and Kenan Göçer
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- This paper investigates Türkiye’s evolving relations with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a large-scale program of infrastructure investment and project financing proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The paper digs deeply into cases from two sectors—transportation and energy—focusing on how heightened and changing local expectations among Turks for these prospective BRI projects have shaped choices and outcomes, including China’s. In so doing, it explores how these shifting Turkish perceptions affect the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye. This paper has several goals: it seeks to understand the reasons behind these local changes, the role of the state and private sector in Türkiye in these changes, and the way China has responded so far. Of course, domestic factors are not the only ones that shape the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye or elsewhere; regional and global trends have had an impact too.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
- Political Geography:
- China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia
8. Fighting Against Internal and External Threats Simultaneously: China’s Police and Satellite Cooperation with Autocratic Countries
- Author:
- Chisako T. Masuo
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- What direction will the Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy take over the coming years, and how will that affect the existing international order? The Chinese Communist Party harbours a strong sense of crisis about the internal and external threats colliding to supposedly destabilise its regime, and thus aims to strengthen cooperation with developing countries in order to prevent such danger. The Xi administration is consequently strengthening police and law-enforcement cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes Russia. Besides, China has launched a new initiative of collaborating with Moscow on satellite systems to monitor the entire Earth, in order to accumulate big data on various issues. The current Chinese foreign policy, which pursues a cultivation of deeper relations with autocratic countries by providing them with surveillance technologies, is likely to deepen the global divide with liberal democracies.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, International Order, and Satellite
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia
9. Forced migration, aid effectiveness, and the humanitarian–development nexus: The case of Germany’s P4P programme
- Author:
- Stefan Leiderer and Helge Roxin
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United Nations University
- Abstract:
- Bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation has been a contentious issue in academia and development practice for decades. Drawing on an evaluation of Germany’s ‘Partnership for Prospects’ initiative, this paper argues that, whilst the supplement of ‘peacebuilding’ to the nexus (humanitarian–development–peacebuilding [HDP] nexus) brought an important context factor into the discussion in an environment of conflict, it is only of marginal help in a context of forced migration to neighbouring countries of a given conflict. For the context of host countries of refugees in a protracted crisis, it is more relevant that host countries show ownership and reliability in their policies to create long-term perspectives for refugees. These policies in turn need to be embedded in reliable rules (polity) and negotiation processes (politics) in host countries. Consequently, the paper suggests that a ‘HD–Triple-P’ nexus would take the necessary political dimension into account more adequately. However, it might also mark the boundary as to what development politics can achieve.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, Refugees, Conflict, and Forced Migration
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
10. Gender and poverty as a feminist foreign policy priority
- Author:
- Joanne Crawford
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
- Abstract:
- This issues paper is dedicated to the late Sylvia Chant, who named household-level measurement as a barrier to evidence related to the ‘feminization of poverty.’ Her work underpinned the commitment of the author and International Women‘s Development Agency (IWDA) to change the way that poverty is measured so that its gendered dimensions are visible. As IWDA worked with othersi to create an alternative quantitative measure of poverty, Chant’s focus on the “feminization of responsibility and obligation – women’s increasing liability for dealing with poverty (responsibility), and their progressively less choice other than to do so (obligation)” ii informed the inclusion of voice, unpaid work and time use as dimensions of gendersensitive measurement of multidimensional poverty.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Poverty, Feminism, and Gender
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
11. Peacebuilding and feminist foreign policy
- Author:
- Federico Casolari and Patricia Sango Pollard
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
- Abstract:
- In this paper, Dr Frederica Caso from La Trobe University and independent researcher Patricia Sango Pollard examine the added value of a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) approach to peacebuilding in the Pacific by looking at the case of Australia and Solomon Islands. In the strategic competition over allies, a FFP will promote a value-based approach that can attract and secure key partners and bolster the idea of the Pacific Family.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Feminism, Intersectionality, and Gender
- Political Geography:
- Australia
12. Erdoğan's Re-election as President Raises Concerns among Allies
- Author:
- Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s win in the presidential election and ministerial appointments promises to further weaken democracy, move Türkiye further away from EU standards, and continue so-called personal diplomacy and transactionalism in foreign policy. This could prolong the Turkish parliament’s ratification of Sweden’s accession to NATO.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Sweden
13. Examining Changes in Regional Cooperation in Central Europe from a Polish Perspective
- Author:
- Tomasz Żornaczuk
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The Visegrad Group (V4), until recently the most active and multidimensional cooperation platform in Central Europe, does not serve currently to strengthen the voice of the region on the most essential issues concerning its security. This is because Hungary’s stance on Russia’s attack on Ukraine is different than that of its partners. That is why Poland is tightening relations with the other Visegrad countries—Czechia and Slovakia. At the same time, Poland is also intensifying cooperation with the Baltic states, which has its source in joint actions on security and eastern affairs in the years preceding the war.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Visegrad Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Central Europe, Slovakia, and Czechia
14. South Africa-Russia Maintain Special Relations
- Author:
- Jędrzej Czerep
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Although South Africa declares it is neutral regarding the war in Ukraine and offers mediation, it remains a de facto ally of Russia. This is due to the strong sentiment among the ruling elites for the period of cooperation with the USSR, its successor Russia and its activity and influence in this country, and the perception that BRICS will help elevate South Africa’s international importance. If Vladimir Putin visits Johannesburg as scheduled in August, the authorities of the state, which is party to the Rome Statute, will not be willing to fulfil their obligation to arrest him or may even leave the International Criminal Court.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and South Africa
15. Lavrov Visits Latin America to Try to Lure It to Russia's Side
- Author:
- Bartłomiej Znojek
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- On 17-21 April, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. During his trip, he argued that the goals and interests of Russia and most Latin American countries coincide. He also repeated false Russian narratives, for example, about the reasons for the invasion of Ukraine, portraying Russia as a victim of the policy of the West. While he used his stay in Brazil to legitimise the Russian narratives, in other countries, it was mainly about consolidating Russia’s ties with their authoritarian regimes, including cooperation on evading sanctions.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Narrative, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Latin America
16. China Adapts Policy in Response to Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine
- Author:
- Marcin Przychodniak
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- China perceives the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expression of resistance to the U.S. and NATO hegemony and an important element of building a new international order that marginalises the West. Based on this, China is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, striving to weaken the international position of the U.S., the EU, and their partners, while testing reactions to a possible escalation of Chinese actions towards Taiwan, for example. President Xi Jinping expressed this policy course during his March visit to Russia. At the same time, China is trying to gain support from the countries of the Global South. This approach means a continuation of China’s assertive policy towards the European Union, among others.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia
17. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy
- Author:
- Oskar Pietrewicz
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea
18. Iceland Makes Changes to Foreign Policy after Russia's Aggression against Ukraine
- Author:
- Veronika Jóźwiak
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The Russian aggression against Ukraine forced Iceland to adjust its foreign policy. As a small country without armed forces but covered by security guarantees as a NATO member, it wants to strengthen ties with its allies while resigning from contacts with Russia. Its partnership with the U.S. and the Nordic countries, as well as activity in international organisations and relations with Central European EU Member States, including Poland, have become even more important to the country.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Iceland
19. Mateship Amongst Competition: Recommendations for the U.S.-Australia Alliance
- Author:
- Randall G. Schriver and Wallace "Chip" Gregson
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project 2049 Institute
- Abstract:
- The U.S.-Australia alliance is one of the deepest and most comprehensive alliances in existence. In this report, a bipartisan study group co-chaired by Project 2049 Chairman Hon. Randall Schriver and LtGen Wallace “Chip” Gregson identify three key priorities for the U.S.-AUS alliance. Then, they explore recommendations to address these priorities in four main spheres: political, defense, trade, and resource security. Their recommendations range from minor adjustments of current alliance institutions to expansive changes such as the broadening of ITAR. They conclude by reaffirming the current strength of the U.S.-AUS alliance, and that its current challenges present an opportunity to demonstrate how like-minded allies can “lift as one” and deliver a robust, agile, and sustainable response in the face of an increasingly unstable security environment.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Australia, North America, and United States of America
20. China's Political-Economy, Foreign and Security Policy: 2023
- Author:
- Center for China Analysis
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- It has now been three months since the 20th Party Congress convened in Beijing on October 15. While the Congress set Xi Jinping’s ideological, strategic, and economic direction for the next five years, much has happened since then that the Chinese leadership did not anticipate. Principal among these surprises was the spontaneous eruption in late November of public protests across multiple Chinese cities against the economic and social impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s “dynamic zero-COVID” policy. These protests resulted in an unprecedented U-turn on December 8 from China’s relentless pursuit of its three-year-long national pandemic containment strategy to the Party now seeking desperately to restore economic growth and social calm. This shift has in turn generated major public pressures on the Chinese health system as hospitals struggle to cope with surging caseloads and mortalities. All of these developments stand in stark contrast to the political, ideological, and nationalist self-confidence on display at the 20th Party Congress. In October, Xi Jinping swept the board by removing any would-be opponents from the Politburo and replacing them with long-standing personal loyalists. Xi also proclaimed China’s total victory over COVID-19, contrasting the Party’s success with the disarray its propaganda apparatus had depicted across the United States and the collective West. Despite faltering economic growth, Xi had doubled down in his embrace of a new, more Marxist approach to economic policy which prioritized planning over the market, national self-sufficiency over global economic integration, the centrality of the public sector over private enterprise, and a new approach to wealth distribution under the rubric of the Common Prosperity doctrine. At the same time, Xi’s 2022 Work Report, delivered at the Congress, abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s long-standing foreign policy framework that “peace and development are the principal themes of the time” and instead warned of growing strategic threats and the need for the military to be prepared for war. As part of a continuing series on China’s evolving political economy and foreign policy, this paper’s purpose is threefold: to examine the political and economic implications of this dramatic change in China’s COVID-19 strategy; to analyze what, if any, impact it may have on China’s current international posture; and to assess whether this represents a significant departure from the Party’s strategic direction set at the 20th Party Congress last October. The paper concludes that the Party changed course on COVID-19 for two reasons: (1) it feared that not doing so would threaten its unofficial social contract with the Chinese people based on long-term improvements in jobs and living standards; and (2) that a structural slowdown in growth could also undermine China’s long-term strategic competition against the United States. This paper also concludes that the stark nature of the December 8 policy backflip, together with the Chinese health system’s lack of preparedness for it, has dented Xi Jinping’s political armor for the medium term. This setback comes on top of internal criticism of Xi’s broader ideological assault on the Deng-Jiang-Hu historical economic growth formula that Xi has prosecuted since 2017, as well as Xi’s departure from Deng’s less confrontational foreign policy posture that characterized previous decades. Nonetheless, these policy errors remain manageable within Chinese elite politics, where Xi still controls the hard levers of power. Furthermore, many of these changes on both the economy and external policy are more likely to be short-to-medium term and therefore tactical in nature, rather than representing a strategic departure from the deep ideological direction laid out for the long-term in Xi’s October 2022 Work Report. While these changes to current economic and foreign policy settings are significant in their own right, there is no evidence to date that Xi Jinping’s ideological fundamentals have changed.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Political Economy, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
21. Taiwan Strait Crises: Island Seizure Contingencies
- Author:
- Andrew Chubb
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Conflict across the Taiwan Strait could disrupt East Asia’s extensive trade links, sever global production chains, generate serious shocks to regional economies, upend Asia’s security architecture, and, potentially, escalate into a catastrophic superpower war. Many regional states — including U.S. allies — are beginning to seriously consider how they would respond to a potential use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But analytic attention has focused overwhelmingly on the worst-case scenario of a PRC invasion, largely ignoring more likely contingencies calculated to stay below the threshold of lethal force. It is in this “gray zone” that the PRC has made strategic advances in the East and South China Seas in recent years. This paper argues that, compared with an invasion or blockade of Taiwan’s main island, an operation to capture one or more offshore islands currently controlled by the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) would offer Beijing considerable advantages. In an immediate tactical sense, it would offer Beijing greater flexibility and escalation control, lower risk of civilian casualties, and less likelihood of sparking a strong Taiwanese response or U.S. intervention. Strategically, such an operation could open up an array of options for further probes, faits accomplis, information gathering, and coercive pressure on ROC forces—and, in the case of the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, substantial opportunities for enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistical support for a future invasion of the main island. Domestically, in contrast with a bloody and potentially catastrophic all-out invasion or a blockade that would risk conflict with the United States, outlying island seizure could offer Beijing a low-risk yet highly symbolic rallying point in a period of likely economic struggles and rising social dissatisfaction. Policymakers and strategists on all sides of politics in Taiwan, the United States and elsewhere need to carefully consider how they would respond to such contingencies, in order to enable an effective international response.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
22. South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral
- Author:
- Jeffrey Ordaniel
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Multilateral Relations, Maritime, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, Philippines, East China, United States of America, and South China Sea
23. ROK-US Alliance: Linchpin for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Rob York, Chloe Clougher, Julian Gluck, Jaeeun Ha, and Lindsay Horikoshi
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- The US-ROK alliance in 2023 celebrates its 70th anniversary, and in both countries remains broadly popular. Previous doubts that both countries have had about the other’s commitment have largely given way to a sense of shared opportunities, and shared challenges. Not only is there an ever-more belligerent North Korea, with its growing nuclear and missile arsenals, but the People’s Republic of China uses both military and economic means to coerce other countries and Russia has demonstrated a willingness to upend norms, redraw borders, and dare former partners (including Seoul) to risk its ire. This is also an era of the minilateral, as the US seeks to move past its previous hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia and draw its partners into closer cooperation. South Korea, especially under its current administration, demonstrates increased interest in becoming a regional player, with its recent gestures toward old frenemy Japan representing a key test: historical differences between the US’ two closest partners have prevented a “normal” relationship from emerging despite many similarities in political systems, values, and interests, and Korean public opinion remains skeptical of the Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. Furthermore, there is always a chance that issues complicating US-ROK relations in the past—conduct by US military personnel in Korea, trade disputes, environmental concerns related to US bases—could resurface. All of these issues present challenges for the alliance that will require addressing. In that light, the Pacific Forum, with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, has launched the “ROK-US Next Generation Leaders Initiative” program, bringing together young burgeoning scholars and analysts from both countries to discuss pressing issues in the alliance the way forward. This edited volume contains edited papers on pressing topics—extended deterrence, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and much more—by rising scholars we expect to see addressing these issues in the years to come. Their active engagement, we believe, will help the alliance endure another 70 years, will providing for the security and prosperity of both countries.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- South Korea, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
24. Understanding Alignment Decisions in Southeast Asia: A Review of U.S.-China Competition in the Philippines
- Author:
- William Piekos
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- The United States and China are engaged in an ongoing struggle for the alignment commitments of Southeast Asian governments, employing a variety of measures to entice, cajole, and threaten states to alter their policy behavior. Caught between this competition, countries in Southeast Asia weigh their alignment options in search of the strategy viewed by the ruling regime as most likely to ameliorate risk and increase its prospects for survival. While nonalignment through hedging is a sought-after option, most often smaller states align with the major power that offers inducements (over coercion), as the material and diplomatic benefits bolster regimes’ claim to performance-based legitimacy and its domestic stability and security. A review of the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning during the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations reveals that inducements and coercion have played a significant role in the country’s alignment decisions. During the Aquino administration, coercive measures taken by China in the South China Sea and continued security and diplomatic inducements from the United States underscore the respective approaches of Beijing and Washington. The candidacy and election of Duterte, however, switched this dynamic, and the new president courted and received promises of Chinese economic assistance to support his domestic growth strategy and downplayed U.S. ties in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. In the end, continued Chinese provocations in the South China Sea and domestic security challenges led Duterte to call upon U.S. assistance once again, and Duterte was unable to initiate a full reconsideration of Manila’s position. Still, his strategic flirtation with China underscores the importance of performance-based legitimacy and the impact of inducements and coercion in shaping the foreign policy choices of smaller states. The findings of this study suggest that Washington’s focus on great power competition and sanctions handicaps U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The Philippines’ leaders focused on securing their domestic political prospects and legitimacy; criticism and coercive measures were largely ineffective for the United States or China in gaining influence over policy decisions. Washington should more often consider the promise and provision of inducements—while remaining sensitive to human rights concerns, governance issues, and liberal norms—to support the needs of Southeast Asian states, incentivize more transparent behavior, and increase the likelihood that these states will support U.S. interests in the future.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Philippines, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America
25. Deciphering Erdoğan's Regional Paradigm Shifts
- Author:
- Ofra Bengio
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Professor Ofra Bengio analyses the trajectory of Turkish foreign and domestic policies by examining three paradigms in Erdogan's strategy since the early 2000s. In addition, we offer our sincere condolences to the victims of the earthquake last week.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Arab Spring, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Turkey, and Middle East
26. Who is to suffer? Quantifying the impact of sanctions on German firms
- Author:
- Holger Görg, Anna Jacobs, and Saskia Meuchelbock
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- In this paper, we use a novel firm level dataset for Germany to investigate the effect of sanctions on export behaviour and performance of German firms. More specifically, we study the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in 2014 in response to the annexation of Crimea and Russia's countermeasures. We find a substantial negative effect on both the extensive and intensive margin of German exports. While the negative effects are strongest for firms exporting products subject to trade restrictions, we provide further evidence on the indirect effects of sanctions. Analysing the impact on broader measures of firm performance, we document that the cost of sanctions is heterogeneous across firms but overall modest. Our results reveal that the negative impact of the shock was concentrated primarily among a small number of firms that were highly dependent on Russia as an export market and those directly affected by the sanctions.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Russia-Ukraine War, and Firm Dynamics
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Germany
27. Mapping Pathways for Peace through the Composition of Official Development Assistance
- Author:
- Jannie Lilja and Gary Milante
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Abstract:
- Mapping the changing composition of official development assistance (ODA) against peace and conflict patterns in recipient countries over time can enhance the understanding of how pathways to peace look like in practice. This working paper presents empirical findings from more comprehensive research into the composition of ODA across aid recipient countries in the period 1990–2020. ODA is broken down into humanitarian, development and peacebuilding aid components. While development assistance is found to dominate across all types of country contexts, and the humanitarian share tends to be larger during conflict, peacebuilding assistance varies by conditions in countries. Post-conflict countries that avoid conflict relapse receive significantly higher shares of peacebuilding aid compared to post-conflict countries that relapse. A ternary graph is introduced to strategically track the composition of the total ODA envelope at the country level during different time periods. The findings suggest that a more effective future deployment of ODA for the advancement of peace and stability is possible.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
28. The Syrian Civil War Twelve Years On: Can There Be a Constructive Role for Greece?
- Author:
- Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Loukas I. Papavasileiou
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Continual and ever-growing foreign involvement led to the internationalization of the armed conflict and turned Syria into a battleground for the strategic competition of several powers. The Kremlin has long viewed Hafez and Bashar al-Assad as indispensable partners in the Middle East and has repeatedly offered its diplomatic and military support in an attempt to achieve its own strategic objectives. Given the destabilizing effects the unending Syrian crisis has had on Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean security, Greece maintains a profound interest in the resolution of the conflict. Greece appointed a Special Envoy for Syria in May 2020 with a view to reinvigorating its policy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. Greece’s successful re-engagement with key Arab countries and improved relations with other regional actors could pave the way for a more prominent Greek role in Syria. This could entail reinforcing its diplomatic cooperation with the EU Delegation to Syria, leading the EU humanitarian relief effort following the devastating earthquakes that hit Syria on 6 February 2023, and formulating a realistic and forward-looking strategy for the future of the Syrian people, including provisions for the voluntary repatriation of refugees and the protection of minority rights.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Political stability, Syrian War, and Armed Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Greece, and Syria
29. A New New Turkey? What an Opposition Victory Would Mean for Ankara’s Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Nicholas Danforth
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- The opposition foreign policy platform seeks to improve relations with the West while simultaneously continuing to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Securing the safe, voluntary and legal return of Syrian refugees through rapprochement with the Assad regime, as the opposition proposes, will prove a non-starter. Ultimately, a democratic Turkey that calibrates its foreign policy to the interests of its citizens rather than the interests of one man will be a stronger and more reliable actor on the global stage.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Elections, and Domestic Politics
- Political Geography:
- Turkey and Middle East
30. Diplomatic scramble: Greek foreign policy towards Libya
- Author:
- Constantine Capsaskis
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Libya became a country of immediate interest to Greece following its 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey. Greece engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity in the aftermath of the MoU, both within Libya and the wider region, to counter Turkey’s momentum with Tripoli. The complex political situation in Libya and its many facets (proxy conflicts between regional and international players, competition for energy resources, and other factors including religion) compound the difficulties confronting Greek efforts to shield Greece’s interests. European division over Libya has led Greece to seek other bilateral approaches, primarily through cooperation with France and Egypt. Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations with its regional interlocutors (primarily Egypt, Israel and Greece) following the devastating earthquake that struck the country in February 2023 may yet change conditions on the ground in Libya, though it is still too early to tell.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Greece, Libya, and North Africa
31. China-US Competition in the Balkans Impact, regional responses, and larger implications
- Author:
- Ivan Lidarev
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- This strategic update from Sotirov Visiting Fellow Dr Ivan Lidarev analyses the competition between China and the US in the Balkans, striving to answer three broad research questions about its impact on the region. The paper analyses how the China-US competition has shaped the strategic framework in which Balkan states operate; how Balkan nations have responded strategically to this competition; and what the long-term implications of the regional US-China competition are.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and United States of America
32. Is Feminist Foreign Policy driving progress for women’s representation in diplomacy?
- Author:
- Caroline Green, Marta Kozielska, and Karen E. Smith
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- Building on an October 2022 Women in Diplomacy online event, this Strategic Update assesses the implications of feminist foreign policy (FFP) adoption for driving progress on improving women’s representation in diplomacy. Tracking the spread of FFPs globally and the ministers responsible for implementation, this paper focuses on their potential for improving or strengthening the role of women in diplomacy – including in ambassadorial and cabinet foreign-policy roles.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Women, Feminism, and Representation
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
33. China’s Global Strategy as Science Fiction
- Author:
- William A. Callahan
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- Xi Jinping is leading China in a new direction, but how are we to understand his global strategy? For most countries, to understand domestic and international politics we would analyse authoritative sources – leaders’ speeches, official documents and statistics, elite interviews and essays, and public opinion surveys. In the 2000s these methods worked well to probe Chinese politics. But since civil society and independent thought have been severely restricted under Xi, it’s necessary to go beyond such “factual” sources. To understand China’s global strategy, it’s best to read fiction, especially Chinese science fiction. This essay critically analyses Liu Cixin’s novels, The Wandering Earth and the Three Body Problem trilogy, to probe how Chinese sci-fi pushes us to think creatively about key topics: the relation of humans and technology, the relation of science and politics, and the relations between political communities, i.e. are we doomed to existential struggle, or can we engage with difference in creative and productive ways?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Grand Strategy, Novels, and Science Fiction
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
34. China’s Provinces as Global Actors: Evidence from China-Africa Relations
- Author:
- Charlotte Lenz
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- With the launch in the early 2000s of China’s ‘Going Global’ Strategy, Chinese provinces became one group of actors participating in China’s South-South relations. In this Strategic Update, Charlotte Lenz investigates the role of Chinese provinces as foreign policy actors and explains their internationalisation strategies, challenging the prevalent perception of China as a unitary actor on the world stage. Drawing on evidence from Africa-China relations, the report identifies two strategies employed by Chinese provinces in pursuit of their foreign policy interests: (1) Formal and informal “twinning” as a collaborative model between central and local actors, wherein central actors design policies and provincial governments execute projects; (2) and “clustering” according to a sectoral logic of investment and diplomacy in which a certain Chinese province engages a certain foreign country. Despite ongoing bureaucratic centralisation under Xi Jinping, provinces continue to pursue their own internationalisation strategies to help meet local economic and employment targets. Understanding their agency, interests and limitations is thus key to deriving a better understanding of China’s evolving global presence.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Internationalization
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, and Asia
35. China’s Grand Vision and the Persian Gulf
- Author:
- Anoushiravan Ehteshami
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- China’s engagement with Asian regions beyond its geographical periphery has grown exponentially since the 1990s and this is nowhere more evident than in West Asia and the Persian Gulf subregion. While energy drove China’s early interactions with the Gulf states, within two decades after the Cold War the relationships had evolved into much tighter networks of partnerships. China’s relations with the Gulf states, however, has not been uniform and the case studies of the United Arab Emirates and Iran highlight the complexities of China’s strategy in this subregion and the ways in which it actively pursues its diverse set of interests.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations
36. Reinventing Soft Power: The Strong Impact of China’s Soft Power “Shortcomings” on the Global South
- Author:
- Tanina Zappone
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- After being introduced into the Chinese academic debate in the 1990s, the notion of soft power has undergone such a process of “Sinicisation” that some scholars now wonder if the original concept has been gradually “reinvented” in China. Given worsening opinions about the PRC in the US and Europe over the last years, many analysts have stressed the weakness of China’s soft power, pointing to its state-centred approach and lack of an attractive set of values to be emulated as the main shortcomings. However, China’s growing influence in the Global South shows that these analyses have misevaluated the real goals and motivations of China’s soft power. The Russia-Ukraine war provides telling examples of the successful dynamics of China’s “defensive” or “negative” version of soft power and suggests it has significant impact in the least industrialised countries.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, and Soft Power
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, and Global South
37. China and the Global South: Many Initiatives, One Narrative
- Author:
- Marina Rudyak
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Since its 2013 launch, the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has stirred heated debates. Despite Beijing framing it as win-win cooperation, concerns mounted over BRI’s risks for involved countries, especially in the Global South. China’s narrative merely signals a search for an effective communication strategy and international discourse power, while its understanding of development remains constant. Developing countries play a crucial role in China’s pursuit of global status. Firstly, it positions itself as the advocate for developing nations, promoting “diverse paths to modernisation” and “true multilateralism”. Secondly, China aims to redefine major power by prioritising development and security over liberal democracy.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, Multilateralism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Modernization
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Global South
38. US Aid to Egypt: The Challenge of Balancing National Interest and Human Rights
- Author:
- Murad Ali, Mairaj ul Hamid, and Sadia Sulaiman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Society of Social Science Academics (SSSA)
- Abstract:
- The United States provides generous aid to developing countries around the world. However, one of the conditions for aid giving is to first make sure that the receiving country is not involved in human rights violations. In this respect the US has also passed legislation in 1970s that clearly forbids aid, both economic and military, to a country involved in human rights violations. While such legislation is in place, the actual practice of aid giving often ignores the human rights violations. In this article, we focus on the US aid giving to Egypt and explore whether the US took into consideration the aspect of human rights violation by the latter. Examining US economic and military aid to Egypt over an extended period of several decades covering various regimes including that of President Sisi, we conclude that the US has consistently ignored the aspect of human rights violations as the country is vital for safeguarding US foreign policy goals in the region.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Development Aid, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- North Africa, North America, Egypt, and United States of America
39. Modernizing the People's Liberation Army: The Human Factor
- Author:
- Marc Julienne and Constantin Lagraulet
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The tremendous demographic challenges facing China will not significantly affect the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the immediate future, but will become more problematic in the medium and long term. The rapid aging of the population and the resulting socio-economic imbalances will put pressure on defense budgets, military wages and the general attractiveness of the army. For the time being, the PLA’s primary goal in terms of human resources is to build a less oversized, more professional army, prepared for high-intensity combat. This objective is in line with the institutional reform of 2016, which shortened the chain of command and strengthened the political and ideological control of the Communist Party of China (CPC) over the PLA through an overhaul of the Central Military Commission (CMC). This reform also involved a major restructuring of China’s armed forces. The PLA is pursuing a streamlining target that emphasizes quality over quantity. This qualitative improvement concerns equipment, forces and chains of command, and is driven by the need to elevate modernity, operational effectiveness and interoperability. An analysis of the evolution of the PLA Navy Marine Corps and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) demonstrates this qualitative upgrading trend and the prioritization of combat readiness. To integrate increasingly modern and complex equipment, the PLA is also focusing on recruiting and retaining young conscripts and volunteers with a high level of education, in order to increase the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The major reforms being carried out thus aim to enhance the status of the military so as to strengthen its economic and social attractiveness. On the other hand, the PLA, like other armies around the world, is confronted with societal phenomena such as internet addiction, near-sightedness and obesity, which hinder its ambitions and force it to make trade-offs in its selection standards.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Demographics, Modernization, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, East Asia, and Asia
40. How China’s Foreign Aid Fosters Social Bonds With Central Asian Ruling Elites
- Author:
- Nargis Kassenova
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular. Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, and Elites
- Political Geography:
- China, Central Asia, and Asia
41. A Historical Evaluation of China’s India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations
- Author:
- Vijay Gokhale
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The violent clash in the Galwan valley in eastern Ladakh in 2020 fundamentally altered the dynamics of the India-China relationship. China’s increasing transgressions and attempts at coercion in the border areas since 2008–2009 have put the boundary question to the center of the India-China relationship. The salience of this question has also increased because the geopolitical backlash to China’s actions in 2020 has been greater than in previous instances, and because India’s policymakers and strategic community are no longer willing to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt regarding its intentions and actions. This has prompted a comprehensive relook in India at the past, present, and future of the relationship. While much of this has focused on the relationship from the Indian perspective and on trying to understand India’s China policy, the current chill in ties has highlighted the necessity of understanding China’s India policy. Thus, using Chinese sources, this paper analyzes the drivers of that policy and the options available to Indian policymakers to engage with, adapt to, and mold it. This paper argues that from the time of Mao Zedong’s rise to the helm of the Chinese Communist Party and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s India policy has been shaped by its view of the larger great power strategic triangle of China, the Soviet Union (later Russia), and the United States. As this triangle has evolved, this has had a direct effect on the India-China relationship. For much of the past seventy years, China was the weakest corner of the triangle and therefore driven by goals of security and status. In that context, it saw India—another large, developing country in Asia—as a competitor for security and status alike. As a result, China always looked at India through the lens of its own relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. It did not view India on its own merits, or credit it with agency, but as unequal as well as untrustworthy. China’s objective during the Cold War was to keep India as neutral as possible. In the post–Cold War period, the goal evolved to limit through containment and coercion India’s capacity to harm China’s strategic goal of hegemony. This paper analyzes China’s India policy in three phases. In the first phase between 1949 and 1962, China viewed the United States as its primary adversary and its core objective was to keep India neutral and away from the U.S. camp on matters of concern to Beijing. Flowing from this was the secondary objective of utilizing India’s influence in the developing world to build “Asian solidarity” to stem U.S. inroads into Asia.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Military
- Political Geography:
- China, India, and Asia
42. Will France’s Africa Policy Hold Up?
- Author:
- Corentin Cohen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- During his first term, French President Emmanuel Macron sought to revitalize his country’s diplomatic outreach to countries throughout Africa. Some aspects of this pivot were designed to more directly address the legacy of French colonialism in Francophone countries. He also sensed that the growing stature of non-Western powers like China has given African counterparts greater latitude to pursue ties amid heightened diplomatic competition among a host of other countries both in Europe and elsewhere. In pursuing this strategy, Macron has sought to promote a vision of French diplomacy with Africa through greater foreign aid and more robust people-to-people ties grounded in a spirit of partnerships between equals. While Macron’s efforts have created an opening for renewed relationships, this pivot has not been as seamless as he had hoped. Bureaucratic inertia and stovepiping in French foreign policy circles have at times meant that implementation of these policies has lagged. In certain cases, Macron’s own nationalistic appeals during his recent reelection bid have appeared to undercut his attempts to make amends for France’s troubling colonial history. Meanwhile the French president’s attempts to deepen economic, people-to-people, and security ties in more equitable ways have fallen short of lofty expectations, with past practices proving harder than expected to jettison. For Macron’s ambitions for French relations with African countries to keep their momentum, the president and his team must take an earnest look at what has worked well and what can still be improved.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Diplomacy, Partnerships, Emmanuel Macron, and Degrowth
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, and France
43. Localization and China’s Tech Success in Indonesia
- Author:
- Gatra Priyandita, Dirk Van Der Kley, and Benjamin Herscovitch
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- On average, Indonesians distrust China and many Chinese firms. Yet Huawei and to a lesser extent ZTE have successfully positioned themselves as trusted cybersecurity providers to the Indonesian government and the Indonesian nation. This has been no easy feat given long-held Indonesian animosity toward China. Many Chinese companies have faced protests over concerns they were taking local jobs. Huawei and ZTE have suffered no such fate. Nor has there been a broad coalition of Indonesian voices against using Chinese technology in critical telecommunications infrastructure. In short, Indonesians care a lot more about Chinese cement plants than they do about Huawei involvement in 5G networks. Gatra Priyandita Gatra Priyandita is an analyst at the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, where he leads a project researching cyber-enabled intellectual property theft. He is a political scientist by training and specializes in the study of foreign policy and security in Southeast Asia. He holds a PhD in political science from the Australian National University. This is a vastly different conversation to those happening in rich liberal democracies. Huawei and ZTE have been able to achieve success in Indonesia, despite a sense of ambivalence among the Indonesian political and defense establishment about Chinese intentions and growing Western scrutiny over the use of Chinese technology in broadband networks. As other papers in this series have demonstrated, Huawei and ZTE needed to localize their strategies. Like elsewhere in the world, available evidence suggests that part of Huawei’s and ZTE’s value proposition is cheaper prices (compared to those of competitors) for high-quality technology. But that is only part of the story. Huawei has positioned itself as Indonesia’s cybersecurity provider of choice by offering enormous cybersecurity and other related training programs across the country for groups ranging from senior government officials to students in rural Indonesia. Much of this training is technically focused on practical vocational skills with a hope that students one day will become customers. In addition, the company offers an attractive maintenance and upkeep package. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese information and communications technology (ICT) firms have created training centers in partnership with local Indonesian telecoms companies and universities to train the next generation of Indonesian engineers and tech specialists. Government agencies are also increasingly targets of training and capacity-building programs, with Huawei claiming that 7,000 government officials have participated in its training programs. The Indonesian government, corporations, and ordinary citizens alike have welcomed Huawei and ZTE as essential partners in their efforts to build both the infrastructure and human capital necessary to prosper in the twenty-first century’s digital economy. What Huawei and ZTE offer is knowledge transfer, not technology transfer. The technology is still being built in China by Chinese firms. Huawei’s role in training relates instead to capacity building. Indonesians will install, maintain, and use the networks. China will build the hardware. There is also evidence that China has had some rhetorical success in pushing its version of cyberspace governance. Beijing’s preferred cyberspace governance language was inserted into a memorandum of understanding between Indonesia’s National Cyber and Crypto Agency and the Cybersecurity Administration of China. However, it is difficult to see how the memorandum has influenced Indonesia’s cybersecurity governance in practice. One of the concerns often leveled by rich liberal democracies is that reliance on Chinese tech will end up aligning the political interests of countries like Indonesia with those of China. Other key worries are China’s pervasive espionage and the enduring (though as yet unrealized) risk that Chinese companies with a dominant role in an ICT ecosystem could be used by Beijing to apply coercive political pressure. Despite Indonesia’s embrace of Huawei and ZTE, political leaders in Jakarta have not simply disregarded the hard security questions posed by upgrading ICT equipment, especially when foreign suppliers are involved. Indonesian officials simply rate the need for development and cybersecurity-related capacity building higher than the risk of using Chinese ICT hardware in their critical infrastructure systems. If rich liberal democracies are concerned about this trend, then they need to offer workable alternatives that place Indonesia’s enormous digital development needs at the heart of any value proposition. It is unlikely that Indonesia will stop using Chinese hardware in its infrastructure, but alternatives could prevent overreliance.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Telecommunications, and Localization
- Political Geography:
- China, Indonesia, and Asia
44. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front
- Author:
- Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine
45. Russia and India: A New Chapter
- Author:
- Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America
46. Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy
- Author:
- Alper Coşkun and Sinan Ülgen
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Turkey is heading toward a set of twin elections that could have momentous consequences for the country’s future. In June 2023 at the latest, Turkish voters will be asked to choose a new president and a new parliamentary majority. For the past two decades, the Turkish political landscape has been dominated by the Justice and Development (AK) Party and its uniquely successful leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. After having ruled the country single-handedly since 2002, Erdoğan became the first executive president of Turkey in 2018, following a tightly contested constitutional change. He has come out victorious in every round of elections since the start of his political career. And yet, after two decades, his popularity is faltering, raising the prospect of political change. The turning point for Turkey’s political system has been the transition to a presidential system with the constitutional amendment of 2017.1 Since the start of multiparty elections in 1946, Turkey had had a parliamentary system, and since 2002 it has had single-party governments. With Erdoğan at the helm, the AK Party has won nearly all elections over the past two decades. It only failed to win a parliamentary majority in the most recent elections,2 in June 2018, and since then has been forced to rely on the support of the hyper-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to secure control of the legislature.3 Alper Coşkun Alper Coşkun is a senior fellow in the Europe Program and leads the Türkiye and the World Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. @IACOSKUN The transition to the presidential system forced a realignment of the political constellation. The structural impact of this transition has led to the creation of two major political alliances. The Cumhur, or People’s, Alliance is led by the AK Party and includes the MHP and a small number of marginal parties. The Millet, or Nation, Alliance is led by the main opposition, the center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP); it also includes the center-right/nationalist İYİ Party as well as the Saadet and Demokrat parties, which appeal to a smaller electoral base. The first real test of this alliance-based politics was the municipal elections of March 2019, where the opposition alliance performed markedly better. Millet-backed opposition candidates won the electoral race in nine out of Turkey’s ten major metropolitan cities, including Ankara and Istanbul. These cities had been ruled by mayors linked to the AK Party and its predecessors since 1994. Now the alliances are gearing up to contest the critical 2023 elections. The ruling Cumhur Alliance’s candidate will be Erdoğan, who will try to win a third term as Turkey’s president. The candidate of the Millet Alliance is still unknown. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, as the leader of the main opposition party, is intent on becoming the Millet candidate, but there are doubts about his electability against Erdoğan. Meral Akşener, the chairwoman of İYİ—the second-largest opposition party—has so far sidelined herself from the presidential race. Ekrem Imamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul, and Mansur Yavaş, the mayor of Ankara, are also possible presidential candidates for the opposition. At present, all four potential candidates for the opposition are polling better than Erdoğan—fueling speculation about political change.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Elections, and Political Parties
- Political Geography:
- Turkey and Middle East
47. Networks and Competitive Advantage in a Contested World
- Author:
- Jennifer Kavanagh
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- In an increasingly multipolar world and amid challenges from China, Russia, and elsewhere, the United States faces a complex set of foreign policy demands and the real risk of becoming overextended. Networks—of states, businesses, and individuals—offer policymakers a way to prioritize and reduce global commitments while advancing core U.S. interests. Leveraging the right networks in the right ways can extend U.S. influence, support the economic and physical security of Americans, and compete with adversaries at sustainable cost. Today’s policymakers understand the power of networks but need more guidance on how to build and employ them as tools of competition in a contested world rather than a world of open borders and markets. Influence networks—networks primed to spread and amplify U.S. power, enhance U.S. competitiveness, and protect national interests—have three characteristics. They are attraction networks, organized around places and issues where countries and corporations are already interacting, meeting common needs with customized resources. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, is organized around a shared need for infrastructure across the Global South and embeds Chinese influence by tailoring agreements to each partner’s local conditions. The United States has used attraction effectively in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but most U.S. foreign investment has been centralized and top-down. They are gated networks with clear criteria for entry, access, and exit. Gates capture network power and direct it toward specific goals. The European Union (EU) has used gated economic markets to build significant regulatory power and geopolitical relevance. The United States has tended toward universalism but employs gates in some security networks, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is turning toward gates in economic networks with friendshoring initiatives in some industries. Finally, they are distributed networks that have robust ties between members throughout the network, allowing influence to flow quickly along more pathways and facilitating collective action. The United States has often relied on less resilient hub-and-spoke networks to retain control. U.S. Indo-Pacific security alliances are hub-and-spoke, while NATO is more distributed, enabling more rapid, coordinated responses and wider spread of U.S. influence. Networks with these characteristics can help policymakers tackle their hardest problems. For example, better use of influence networks can support U.S. efforts to prioritize and fully resource the more significant challenge posed by China by pushing forward changes that advance European security autonomy and by building and mobilizing needed, distributed networks in the Indo-Pacific theater. Influence networks can inform U.S. strategies for building ties to hedging states that offer access to key resources or strategic locations—for example, by focusing on shared local needs of potential partners and U.S. comparative advantages and by creating distributed business or civil society partnerships. Finally, influence networks provide ways to approach the Russia-China relationship that support U.S. security and economic interests, including avoiding the isolation of either. These examples begin to illustrate how influence networks can improve U.S. strategies toward foreign policy challenges by offering policymakers a way to prioritize commitments, capitalize on U.S. strengths, and avoid overextension that harms U.S. interests. Additional exploration and application of these networks will investigate these and other foreign policy challenges in more depth.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Networks, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and United States of America
48. A Roundtable on Tizoc Chavez, The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H.W. Bush
- Author:
- Kelly M. McFarland, Jeffrey A. Engel, Silke Zoller, Seth Offenbach, M. Elizabeth Sanders, and Tizoc Chavez
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
- Abstract:
- Presidential diplomacy has arguably been more front and center in the American public consciousness than usual over the last half decade. President Trump made his personal relationship with a multitude of world leaders a key media talking point. Whether it was his use of Twitter to praise, degrade, or threaten another leader, his bombastic actions at NATO and G-7 summits, his secretive discussions with Vladimir Putin, or his eventual BFF relationship with Kim Jong Un, Trump was always quick to place himself at the helm of his administration’s diplomatic endeavors. Likewise, albeit with a different tone, strategy, and oftentimes different desired outcomes, President Biden has made much of his personal diplomatic skills, and his belief in the need to use them. Candidate Biden touted his foreign policy experience on the campaign trail, noting that he personally knew many world leaders. Biden has used his experience and full Rolodex to try and repair relationships with allies. This approach has been on full display since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This recent atmosphere of personal presidential diplomacy makes the arrival of Tizoc Chavez’s work, The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush, all the more important. Chavez makes it clear that presidential diplomacy as we know it today become part of the office, for better or worse, with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Most importantly, Chavez demonstrates that regardless of a president’s personal inclinations, personal diplomacy will come into play at points throughout their presidencies due to any one, or a combination, of four consistent structures. In doing so, he adroitly demonstrates how personal diplomacy became an ingrained part of the modern presidency.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Hegemony, Leadership, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
49. Adapting to New Realities: Israel’s foreign policy in post-Netanyahu times
- Author:
- Gabriel Haritos
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Israel had to adapt to the revised objectives of the Biden administration in the Middle East and to update its coordination with Russia on the Syria front. The war in Ukraine has reconfigured Israel’s relations with the US and Russia. Israel’s reluctance to provide arms to Ukraine has allowed Russian-Israeli coordination to continue in Syria. The energy crisis triggered by the Russo-Ukrainian war led the US to revise its stance towards Saudi Arabia. The US-Iran talks ground to a halt in Vienna in the light of the growing ties between Iran and Russia. Israel took advantage of the new state of affairs, encouraging the rapprochement between Washington and Riyadh and countering the possibility of the US reopening its consulate in East Jerusalem. In coordination with the US, Israel has promoted the deepening of the Abraham Accords and drawn India into the new Middle East reality through the new I2U2 mechanism. Thanks to carefully managed communication, the Bennett-Lapid government was able to restore diplomatic relations with Turkey while maintaining close cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. It would seem advisable to put in place additional safeguards to maintain the quality of Athens-Nicosia -Jerusalem relations, similar to those which are expected to accompany the revamped relations between Israel and Turkey.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and United States of America
50. What is new about the reset between Israel and Turkey?
- Author:
- Selin Nasi
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Entering 2021, revising its foreign policy became an ever more pressing necessity for Ankara, in the light of both international and domestic developments. The Turkish government only took steps towards mending its broken ties with countries in the region, including Israel, when the economic cost of its assertive policies began to threaten Erdoğan’s rule. Israeli PM Netanyahu’s defeat in the 2021 elections provided an opportunity for Ankara to step up its diplomatic overtures toward Israel. Bilateral relations may follow a different course than they did in the 2000s, primarily because the basic parameters of the relationship between Israel and Turkey have changed since Israel made new friends in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The erosion of institutions and the subsequent personalization of Turkish foreign policy render bilateral relations prone to crisis. For Israelis, this is a manageable risk, at least for now, given the benefits Ankara can expect from normalizing relations with Israel. Against the backdrop of an intensifying power competition between the US and China, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, and the current security landscape in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, opportunities for cooperation between Israel and Turkey remain dependent on the resolution of long-standing issues.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Middle East, and Israel