Search

Begin New Search Topic Geopolitics Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 10 Years

1. A battle against time – and against Putin’s Russia

Author:
Erwan Fouéré
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With Putin’s war against Ukraine about to enter its third year, the EU’s enlargement policy remains at the top of its foreign policy priorities, with the focus being on both Ukraine and Moldova. This is following the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with both countries. But where does this leave the countries of the Western Balkans and their very long journey towards the EU which began over 20 years ago? Will these countries’ hopes for much needed political momentum in their accession prospects be fulfilled during 2024, despite the repeated delays and the EU’s failure to respect its commitments to the region over the past few years? With elections taking place across Europe offering fertile ground for Russia to deploy its arsenal of disinformation tactics, time is not on the EU’s side. To counter Russian attempts to influence developments in the region, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of backsliding in democratic and rule of law reforms, the EU will need to adopt a more robust, consistent and determined approach towards the Western Balkans. Without any further delay, it needs to set out a much needed geopolitical and security direction for its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Rule of Law, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Balkans

2. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: the liberal power and its limits

Author:
Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. There was talk of a "paradigm shift" in France, of a "Zeitenwende" ("change of era") in Germany, of an "end to naivety". Across Europe, a surge of sympathy and solidarity for Ukraine and its suffering has gripped public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colours of the EU and Ukrainian flags being ostensibly displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has given massive economic aid to Ukraine (€20 billion already paid out, €20 billion planned for 2023) and has taken in 4 million Ukrainian refugees. At the June European Council, it accepted Ukraine's membership application, as well as that of Moldova, and a prospect of accession for Georgia. By adopting sanctions against Russia that were unprecedented since those taken against Serbia at the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has also demonstrated its capacity for "hard power". In the wake of its common defence policy, it delivered arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3 billion "peace facility". By almost completely depriving itself of Russian fossil fuels, it is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the enormous change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is undergoing a new existential crisis after the repeated shocks of the last few years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy that Europe would be built through crises and would be the sum of the solutions brought to these challenges. By defending its values against Russia, the European Union is asserting itself as a "liberal power". But it remains no less fragile beyond its response.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Liberalism, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. What Should India Do Before the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis?

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In the next two decades, the Taiwan question is likely to assume increasing importance for the Indo-Pacific region. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming more assertive about unifying Taiwan with the mainland, and it is also making progress toward establishing the military capability toward this end. For a rising PRC seeking to establish itself as the dominant global power, it is untenable that a part of its territory remains outside its control. Possible endeavors toward establishing this control could lead to a response by the United States, which would have broader ramifications for the region and the world. For the United States, any endeavors by the PRC to this end would undermine the very core of the idea that the United States is the defender of freedom and democracy across the world, thus undermining its credibility. It might also deal a devastating blow to the United States’ global power. In this context, and given the significance of Taiwan to both countries, it is an issue that can rapidly escalate, making it a matter of concern in the Indo-Pacific. Further, a conflict over Taiwan would dwarf the global economic fallout that began when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Short of conflict, Chinese coercion of Taiwan could disrupt the freedom of navigation and sea lanes of communication through the Taiwan Strait and will have severe consequences for Asian geopolitics and geoeconomics. Given India’s substantial geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region and its long history of exchanges with East and Southeast Asia, India should pay constant and careful attention to this issue. Further, a policy to respond to various contingencies must be thought through and put into place. This paper tries to look at the possible policy that India might adopt ahead of a major crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The paper proceeds in three parts. The first part analyzes the geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of another Taiwan Strait crisis for India. While it is difficult to estimate the actual damage that would be dealt to the Indian economy, it is clear that all segments of the economy would be affected, with the impact possibly substantial enough to set India back several years. A crisis would also impact India’s geopolitical interests and national security, given that China is increasing its assertiveness both along the Line of Actual Control as well as in the Indian Ocean. The second part argues against a commonplace view that India played no role in crisis management during earlier periods of high tension in the Taiwan Strait—the 1954–55 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crises, also known as the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, respectively. By using archival material in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, it seeks to dispel the above notion and that Taiwan ceased to be a matter of interest for India after it had recognized PRC’s claim over Taiwan in 1950. Further, it looks at the lessons for policymaking from India’s handling of the crises. The third part of the paper briefly traces the history of India-Taiwan relations following India’s transfer of its diplomatic recognition to the PRC till the present day. It provides an overview of India’s Taiwan policy. Given that a war in the Taiwan Strait is not beyond reasonable doubt, it then discusses the scenarios India might find itself in and the possible policies to respond to these scenarios. It recommends a close following of the U.S.-ChinaTaiwan strategic triangle, a whole-of-government assessment around impacts of a Taiwan Strait contingency, and an assessment of policy options. It also recommends mapping the expectations that China and the United States would have of India, along with undertaking consultations with key partners on the Taiwan question.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Crisis Management, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

4. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:
Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Global trends in countries‘ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Drawing on global media reports, we conduct a sentiment analysis of the image of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the evolution of its image over time. Our main finding is that perceptions of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many geographies from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is in sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past. This is notwithstanding increases in debt levels with China, much of which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant inter- and intra-regional differences in the average sentiment towards China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative in countries which, until today, are not part of the BRI. Finally, we focus on the European Union, Africa and China’s immediate neighbourhood to better understand the complexities behind the perceived benefits and challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

7. Taiwan Strait Crises: Island Seizure Contingencies

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Conflict across the Taiwan Strait could disrupt East Asia’s extensive trade links, sever global production chains, generate serious shocks to regional economies, upend Asia’s security architecture, and, potentially, escalate into a catastrophic superpower war. Many regional states — including U.S. allies — are beginning to seriously consider how they would respond to a potential use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But analytic attention has focused overwhelmingly on the worst-case scenario of a PRC invasion, largely ignoring more likely contingencies calculated to stay below the threshold of lethal force. It is in this “gray zone” that the PRC has made strategic advances in the East and South China Seas in recent years. This paper argues that, compared with an invasion or blockade of Taiwan’s main island, an operation to capture one or more offshore islands currently controlled by the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) would offer Beijing considerable advantages. In an immediate tactical sense, it would offer Beijing greater flexibility and escalation control, lower risk of civilian casualties, and less likelihood of sparking a strong Taiwanese response or U.S. intervention. Strategically, such an operation could open up an array of options for further probes, faits accomplis, information gathering, and coercive pressure on ROC forces—and, in the case of the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, substantial opportunities for enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistical support for a future invasion of the main island. Domestically, in contrast with a bloody and potentially catastrophic all-out invasion or a blockade that would risk conflict with the United States, outlying island seizure could offer Beijing a low-risk yet highly symbolic rallying point in a period of likely economic struggles and rising social dissatisfaction. Policymakers and strategists on all sides of politics in Taiwan, the United States and elsewhere need to carefully consider how they would respond to such contingencies, in order to enable an effective international response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

8. Understanding Alignment Decisions in Southeast Asia: A Review of U.S.-China Competition in the Philippines

Author:
William Piekos
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The United States and China are engaged in an ongoing struggle for the alignment commitments of Southeast Asian governments, employing a variety of measures to entice, cajole, and threaten states to alter their policy behavior. Caught between this competition, countries in Southeast Asia weigh their alignment options in search of the strategy viewed by the ruling regime as most likely to ameliorate risk and increase its prospects for survival. While nonalignment through hedging is a sought-after option, most often smaller states align with the major power that offers inducements (over coercion), as the material and diplomatic benefits bolster regimes’ claim to performance-based legitimacy and its domestic stability and security. A review of the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning during the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations reveals that inducements and coercion have played a significant role in the country’s alignment decisions. During the Aquino administration, coercive measures taken by China in the South China Sea and continued security and diplomatic inducements from the United States underscore the respective approaches of Beijing and Washington. The candidacy and election of Duterte, however, switched this dynamic, and the new president courted and received promises of Chinese economic assistance to support his domestic growth strategy and downplayed U.S. ties in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. In the end, continued Chinese provocations in the South China Sea and domestic security challenges led Duterte to call upon U.S. assistance once again, and Duterte was unable to initiate a full reconsideration of Manila’s position. Still, his strategic flirtation with China underscores the importance of performance-based legitimacy and the impact of inducements and coercion in shaping the foreign policy choices of smaller states. The findings of this study suggest that Washington’s focus on great power competition and sanctions handicaps U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The Philippines’ leaders focused on securing their domestic political prospects and legitimacy; criticism and coercive measures were largely ineffective for the United States or China in gaining influence over policy decisions. Washington should more often consider the promise and provision of inducements—while remaining sensitive to human rights concerns, governance issues, and liberal norms—to support the needs of Southeast Asian states, incentivize more transparent behavior, and increase the likelihood that these states will support U.S. interests in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

9. Hydrodiplomacy and the Food, Water and Energy Nexus: A holistic approach for transboundary cooperation and peace

Author:
Fadi Comair
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The rapid social and economic development in the world is leading to increased levels of water stress that point to potential water crises. As the most vital and strategic of natural resources, water can serve as an instrument of domination or of cooperation. Given the presence of key geopolitical concerns in the Near East, regional hydro-diplomatic cooperation is necessary to ensure fair sharing of the resource and to avoid additional tensions and conflict. Nine of the seventeen EMME countries are below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 m3/year per capita, including all six countries in the Gulf region, Jordan and Palestine. Those countries that share major transboundary basins in the EMME region such as the Nile, Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates basins are subject to multiple challenges which include unilateral water resources management, water scarcity, and environmental degradation leading to food insecurity. Hydrodiplomacy is a tool for applying integrated water resource management at a national and transboundary level in accordance with a cooperative model seeking peace among riparian countries. Multiple UN agencies contribute to bringing riparian countries together with a view to fostering dialogue and the sharing of information on water management and transboundary cooperation.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Water, Food, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Middle East

10. The Greek Defence Sector: Turning the Page?

Author:
Antonis Kamaras
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
From the 1980s to the 2000s, Greece’s defence industry was mismanaged and failed to utilize Greece’s high defence expenditures to become innovative. The impact of Greece’s fiscal crisis and the subsequent expansion of the Turkish threat mean that both economics and geopolitics now favour an invigorated Greek defence sector. The first major weapons procurement programme since the end of Greece’s fiscal crisis has not meaningfully involved the Greek defence sector. Yet the sector’s future prospects have improved, assured by the need for the sector to be financially viable and internationally competitive and by the broader awareness of the defence sector as a building block in national defence. The EU’s growing role in Europe’s collective defence, driven by continent-wide geopolitical developments and industrial imperatives, will also boost the prospects of the Greek defence sector. Mutually reinforcing obstacles still hamper the Greek defence sector’s progress: (a) a polity which privileges distribution over capital investments in its fiscal choices, and (b) an officer corps which lacks the degree of autonomy to co-create novel defence solutions together with the Greek defence sector. Despite these obstacles, the ongoing Turkish threat engenders national insecurity within Greece to such an extent that it can drive the sustainable growth of the Greek defence sector.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Innovation, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Greece

11. China’s smart cities and the future of geopolitics

Author:
Valentin Weber
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this latest Strategic Update, Valentin Weber explores Chinese scientific research and industry application of smart cities, with ‘city brains’. The geostrategic implications for these complex Chinese smart city construction projects outside of China – particularly surrounding surveillance and artificial intelligence – and a potential future ‘world digital brain’ must be considered by policymakers, even if we are far away from an eventual bifurcation of the global internet.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, and Smart Cities
Political Geography:
China and Asia

12. Coronavirus and the Widening Global North-South Gap

Author:
Rosa Balfour, Lizza Bomassi, and Marta Martinelli
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) has a growing interest in investing in the Global South as the bloc seeks to fill a niche amid the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, find new allies in support of multilateralism, and diversify its international relations in pursuit of its norms and interests. But the union’s policies and ambitions are underinformed by empirical research on how the Global South views the EU and Europe as a whole. This paper presents the initial results of an eighteen-month-long project conducted by Carnegie Europe and the Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI) that explored perspectives on Europe’s international role through the eyes of the Global South.1 The project was launched in 2020 and, by necessity, the coronavirus pandemic and the world’s responses to it became the backdrop for identifying and deconstructing the key issues and dilemmas in the relationship between the EU and the Global South. What followed were some sobering lessons that offer new ways of thinking about future engagement. After two years of battling the coronavirus, and as domestic restrictions ease in much of the Global North, what has emerged is a widening gap between North and South. Without the resources and policy innovations the West used to shield itself from the worst of the pandemic’s economic effects, developing countries, already economically vulnerable, were hit hard by the crisis. In some countries, this has reversed decades of progress on poverty, healthcare, and education. The pandemic could have been a watershed moment: an opportunity for the EU to reframe donor-recipient relations, build on ongoing efforts to eliminate global poverty, and demonstrate the value of multilateralism. Yet, rather than capitalizing on the chance to strengthen the Global South’s resilience, the EU was perceived as pursuing more insular strategies, from hoarding COVID-19 vaccinations to opposing vaccine waivers. While outwardly espousing the benefits of international solidarity, the EU was unable to enact extensive policies to address the structural economic and political imbalances in its relationship with the Global South. This shortsightedness led to several missed opportunities for the EU to play a leading role in helping the Global South navigate what will be a long and painful recovery from the pandemic. At the same time, geopolitical games among the United States, Europe, China, and Russia tarnished the West’s image, leading to further resentment and frustration. The EU’s efforts to deweaponize access to healthcare by exporting half the vaccines it produced and supporting the establishment of the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) initiative in the early days of the pandemic were admirable; but a series of missteps—by accident or design—seriously dented the EU’s credibility in the eyes of many of its partners. Much of this harm can be attributed to a strategy that tried to balance competing and contradictory aims with a values-based external policy that boasted the principles of solidarity at its core. China and Russia exploited this weakness to position themselves as more reliable partners than their Western counterparts. However, there are still opportunities for the EU to regain what it has lost. Both Africa and Asia have turned to multilateralism to effectively combat the coronavirus. The Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (ACDC) has played a leading role in coordinating African responses to the pandemic, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has announced the creation of the Center for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases. The EU can support these organizations in a bid to deepen partnerships with the Global South. Lizza Bomassi Lizza Bomassi is the deputy director of Carnegie Europe, where she is responsible for harmonizing Carnegie Europe’s strategic and operational priorities and managing relations with Carnegie’s global centers and programs as well as partner organizations in Europe. The coming year is rife with opportunities to enact course correction: patent waivers will be discussed in the World Trade Organization (WTO), while Indonesia’s 2022 presidency of the Group of Twenty (G20) and the EU’s Global Gateway initiative are chances for Europe to recharacterize its relationship with the Global South. The EU must embrace ambitious and creative forms of cooperation to build lasting alliances that will, in turn, address global inequality in a manner that aligns with the union’s declared intention to create more equal partnerships in the global community.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global South and Global North

13. U.S. Strategy and Economic Statecraft: Understanding the Tradeoffs

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Ethan Kapstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Few would dispute that U.S. economic policy has enormous consequences for America’s national security and role in the world. But economic policy is too often made without a clear picture of the strategic tradeoffs it entails. The purpose of this paper is to help clarify some of these tradeoffs by considering three alternative models of U.S. economic statecraft. The first model examined here, America First, has several national security and economic disadvantages. It would not only antagonize some of Washington’s key military allies but probably also undermine U.S. international competitiveness. It might even induce countries to turn their economic attention toward China, reducing the United States’ global influence accordingly. A better approach would be a blend of two other models, namely alliance economics and globalization 2.0. Together these approaches could help orient the United States for the geopolitical challenges of the next decade. By emphasizing commercial relations with U.S. military allies, such a blend would recall Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which calls for international economic cooperation among NATO member states. And by leading a reformed multilateral system, the United States would again put itself at the center of the rules-based global economic order that brought prosperity to millions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Cooperation, and Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. How New Export Control Will Affect Food Security in Azerbaijan?

Author:
Emin Mammadov
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:
The ongoing climate change and recent geopolitical tensions could spark a global food crisis with simultaneous disruptions to supply-chain systems that drive up the economic shock waves throughout the world. Following the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the upsurge in the price of agricultural commodities and broken supply chains are undeniably vivid. Both countries are exporters of vital commodities such as wheat, oil, corn, sunflower oil and corn, and disturbances to production affect the import-reliant countries.
Topic:
Climate Change, Food Security, Geopolitics, Exports, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Azerbaijan

15. Turkey in Afghanistan: more than one reason to stay

Author:
Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Despite a long history of bilateral contacts, Turkey’s most intensive commitment in Afghanistan only started in 2001 with the NATO mission. A first friendship treaty was signed back in 1921; the first official foreign visit to the Republic of Turkey was made in 1928 by King Amanullah of Afghanistan. Turkey’s engagement in South Asia started with Afghanistan but has recently been Pakistan-centred. As the only majority-Muslim NATO country, Turkey was viewed more positively by the Afghan population and the Taliban than other NATO member states. Ankara has been reaching out to the Taliban since summer 2021. However, the Taliban have not met Turkish demands for a more inclusive government, or in relation to girls’ education. Turkey has become a haven for non-Taliban (opposition) Afghans, who are told not to voice their criticism of the Taliban. There are four main motivations for Turkey’s engagement in Afghanistan: 1) improving relations with the US; 2) stabilizing Afghanistan to prevent migrant flows; 3) getting a foothold in the geopolitics of the region; 4) benefitting from the economic potential. Kabul international airport is important both for the Taliban and for Turkey. For the Taliban, it is their window to the world; for Turkey, it is an opportunity to profit economically and to boost its international status. In Afghanistan, Turkey’s soft power approach includes TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), the Maarif schools, and the Yunus Emre Institute. These institutions have remained operational. In 2020, Afghanistan received the third largest amount of Turkish developmental aid, amounting to 36.5 million USD. Even if the world, and Turkey, are currently focused on Ukraine, Afghanistan will continue to occupy an important place in Turkey’s regional foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Turkey, and Middle East

16. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Unity is good, but ambition is better

Author:
Sophie Pornschlegel and Ilke Toygür
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In view of the volatile geopolitical environment, EU leaders no longer have the luxury of waiting for all 27 member states to find a consensus. In order to lead the way to a Union that is apt for future challenges, the EU should become more ambitious and embrace alternatives, such as differentiated integration, in the coming months and years. Rather than returning to the status quo ante, the EU should use this momentum to progress in five policy fields: economic governance, with a new recovery package and a reform of the fiscal rules; security and defence, with improved EU–NATO cooperation and a stronger ‘European pillar’; energy policy, by quickly steering member states away from dependence on Russian fossil fuels while simultaneously ensuring admissible energy prices for consumers and respecting the climate targets; enlargement and neighbourhood policy, by rethinking its aims and creating options for countries that are unlikely to become EU members in the foreseeable future; and the rule of law, to safeguard the Union’s values ‘at home’. Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion revealed that the EU institutions and leaders are capable of managing crises swiftly and decisively. This reality certainly increases its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens as well as its allies. The European Union could use this moment of change to increase its ambition for reforms and for moving European integration forward. This should encourage leaders to think about all the options for designing the Union’s future. This is not a time for black and white thinking – Treaty change or nothing –, but rather a time to explore all the shades of grey for securing necessary reforms. If like-minded countries could lead the way, others may also follow. The changing and evolving positions in the EU could help secure more inclusive alliances for moving forward. The political momentum to do so is finally here.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Rule of Law, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. China and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Economic and Political Perspective

Author:
Zhang Yunling
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper studies China’s policies and participation in East Asian economic integration and cooperation. The progress of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is remarkable in the time when global as well as regional economies are facing so many challenges. China as the largest economy in East Asia plays a key role in sustaining regional dynamism. China is active and constructive in initiating the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN+1) free trade agreements (FTAs) and an integrated framework of FTAs in East Asia. As RCEP was initiated by ASEAN and supported strongly by China it is essential to keep East Asian economic dynamism: the conclusion of the RCEP negotiations and the implementation has great effects. China’s gains from RCEP are not just economic, but also political. Whilst this paper focuses on economic gains for China, it also analyses the political gains for China, for example, against ‘decoupling’ and political division, which is harmful to East Asian integration and cooperation. The novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic is still ongoing, so the timely enforcement of RCEP is important as it gives confidence to the region to keep the region open and to work together to make East Asia dynamic in facing the challenges. Some challenges for East Asia are (i) how to rebuild the supply chains that are either weakened or broken by the pandemic; (ii) how to overcome the new barriers created by government policies in the name of ‘national security’ both in trade and investment areas; and (iii) how to overcome the new divisions created by the United States’ policy under its comprehensive strategic competition with China that leads to the exclusive arrangements in East Asia. East Asian economic integration and cooperation are based on two basic principles: openness and inclusiveness. As a region with great diversity, it is crucial to provide opportunities for all parties with difference. China will continue its open policy and actively participate in multilateral and regional arrangements, and as the largest economy in East Asia it serves as a key pillar to be a centre of the global economy. China will take RCEP as an essential framework to enhance its interest and role in East Asia, as well as in the Asia-Pacific against a politically oriented Indo-Pacific initiative.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and ASEAN

18. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:
Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

19. Turkey’s Involvement in the Libyan Conflict, the Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and Drone Warfare

Author:
Buğra Süsler
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Dr Buğra Süsler’s Strategic Update explains Turkish foreign policy-making around a fragile Libya, highlighting its impact on power dynamics in the North Africa and the Middle East, as well as opening a gateway to sub-Saharan Africa. The paper addresses Turkey’s regional economic and political motives, the AKP’s increasingly hawkish use of hard power – especially the diplomatic and ethical implications of the Turkish military’s specialisation in drone warfare – and Ankara’s desire to maintain mutually beneficial relations with Libyan power-brokers key to post-civil war reconstruction.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Drones, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey, Libya, North Africa, and Mediterranean

20. The ‘Kosovo Precedent’: Russia’s justification of military interventions and territorial revisions in Georgia and Ukraine

Author:
Valur Ingimundarson
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this latest Strategic Update, Valur Ingimundarson explores Russia’s use of the ‘Kosovo precedent’, in order to instrumentalise its violation of international norms for geopolitical gain in the post-Soviet space. Ever since Kosovo’s 2008 unique and contested independence process, Russia has increasingly relied paradoxically on the Kosovo case to legally justify support for secession within, and now overt military expansionism into, post-Soviet territory: from its invasion of Georgia and support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, to the incorporation of Crimea into the Federation, its invasion of Ukraine, and current effort to absorb the Donbass region.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Military Intervention, Expansion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Georgia

21. The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin’s Rhetoric Towards Ukraine

Author:
Björn Alexander Düben
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
As tensions between Russia and Ukraine reach an almost-tipping point, Björn Alexander Düben analyses the historical and geopolitical rhetoric Putin and his government have deployed against the post-Maidan Ukraine since 2014. Asking, can this be seen as another Russian assertion of dominance in the post-Soviet region, could there be reasons closer to home, or why tensions across the border seem to once again be at a breaking point? From global oil prices to regime consolidation, an analysis into the words of Russia’s elites could unveil what future Europe is steering towards.
Topic:
Geopolitics, History, Conflict, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:
Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

23. Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam. The Law, History, Politics and Geopolitics behind Africa’s Largest Hydropower Project

Author:
Francesca Caruso
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Since 2011, the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has provoked a diplomatic crisis between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, adding fuel to the already combustible geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. Despite its technical aspects, the GERD dispute has over time become a multi-layered geopolitical crisis where a plethora of actors and dynamics have been influencing the ongoing negotiations. Protagonists are no longer only Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, and the resolution of the crisis is now dependent on factors beyond technical solutions. Moreover, the crisis seems to have become an instrument that the three countries are using to deal with issues of national legitimacy, territorial disputes and regional balance. However, while instrumentalisation can be politically expedient in the short term, all parties have an interest an equitable and regionally based, inclusive and cooperative agreement. In order to understand how multilateral organisations can contribute to the finding of an equitable and reasonable solution, a multi-layered analysis – on local, national and regional dynamics – needs to identify the main drivers for Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Water, Infrastructure, Law, Geopolitics, Dams, Conflict Management, and Hydropower
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt

24. Russia’s Climate Action and Geopolitics of Energy Transition: The Uncertain and Unsettling Outlook following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Kamila Godzinska and Maria Pastukhova
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has profoundly altered the outlook for Russia’s energy transition and created uncertainties on the global path towards net zero. In response to global economic shifts, Russia had begun taking steps towards decarbonisation, albeit without plans to depart from its hydrocarbon-based economic model in any substantial way. The new political, trade and financial environment induced by Russia’s act of aggression has damaged its potential to maintain the once-emerging momentum. Russia’s actions and the Western response are also reconfiguring global energy relations, with profound economic and geopolitical consequences that may, unless managed, undermine international cooperation on the energy transition and slow down progress on climate change mitigation.
Topic:
Climate Change, Sanctions, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Balkans

25. The Geopolitics of Clean Hydrogen – Opportunities and Challenges for Italy

Author:
Marco Giuli
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The emergence of clean hydrogen as an energy carrier promises to shape the future geography of the energy trade. Under growing contestation of interdependence, such a geography should be read through political lenses alongside commercial and technological ones. Generally, hydrogen is likely to reduce the geopolitical sensitivity of energy trade with respect to a fossil-fuel-based energy order by increasing the share of energy produced domestically, shifting geostrategic competition from a focus on grabbing resources to a focus on mastering technology and setting standards, and offering petrostates opportunities for economic diversification. Italy can exploit the opportunities offered by a hydrogen economy for enhancing its energy security and positioning in the regional energy trade. However, it should be careful with monitoring how geopolitical barriers such as regional instability may affect its hydrogen ambitions.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Trade, Hydrogen, Pipeline, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

26. A Scramble for Gas: Qatari LNG and EU Diversification Plans

Author:
Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Amidst a worsening geopolitical and energy crisis in Europe, the EU is scrambling to increase liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports as one component of its larger objective to reduce its overdependence on Russian gas. In 2021, the EU imported 155 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas from Russia (140 bcm via pipeline and 15 bcm of LNG). Under its REPowerEU initiative, the European Commission aims to increase LNG imports to replace 50 bcm of Russian gas by the end of 2022.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Gas, Diversification, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Qatar

27. Reckless Abandon: Why Tunisia Can No Longer Delay a Border Free Trade Zone

Author:
Hamza Meddeb
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In 2012, Tunisia announced the establishment of a free trade and logistics zone (FTZ) in Ben Guerdane, near the Libyan border. The aim is to develop marginalized southeastern border regions and formalize informal economic actors. However, the plan has stalled due to institutional resistance, political divisions, and an incapacity to exploit international geopolitical rivalries. If this persists, the project may become irrelevant because of emerging FTZs in Libya, denying Tunisia revenues its ailing economy needs.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Economy, Borders, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
Libya, North Africa, and Tunisia

28. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

29. Green energy depends on critical minerals. Who controls the supply chains?

Author:
Luc Leruth, Adnan Mazarei, Pierre Régibeau, and Luc Renneboog
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In light of the transition away from fossil fuel–based energy, this paper highlights the importance of understanding who controls vital parts of the global supply chains of critical minerals and rare earth elements (REEs). Analysis of direct ownership does not reveal the real sources of control over the decisions of the company. To identify those sources, the authors use an index that measures the degree to which important shareholders can affect voting decisions. This analysis is not straightforward, because companies along the supply chain are not necessarily incorporated in the countries in which mining and production activities take place, and shareholders can exert influence through multiple layers of subsidiaries. The analysis reveals that China’s control over the global value chains involving critical minerals and REEs extends beyond what is commonly assumed. It also sheds light on environmental, social, and governance issues in the countries in which mining and/or production take place. The paper advocates increasing transparency regarding the sources of control to better assess and manage economic and geopolitical risks; enhancing recycling, to reduce dependency on foreign supply; avoiding protectionist and trade-reducing reactions; and encouraging research and development in order to speed up the adoption of technologies of substitution.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, Supply Chains, Minerals, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

30. Will economic statecraft threaten western currency dominance? Sanctions, geopolitics, and the global monetary order

Author:
Carla Norrlof
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The return of great power rivalry is stoking renewed fears of weakening Western currency dominance. Financial sanctions are becoming the preferred economic tool for accomplishing geopolitical goals. These instruments are especially popular with the United States and Europe. In response, rival great powers, notably China and Russia, are diversifying away from Western currencies and developing counterstrategies to maintain economic and foreign policy autonomy. As other countries are hit by increasingly punishing Western sanctions, the incentive to join Russia and China’s alternative international monetary order increases. New analysis, published in this report, shows early signs that some countries may be trying to diversify away from the dollar. A growing circle of countries attempting to evade the Western-centric financial and currency order may over time erode the dollar and the euro’s sizeable lead, though will likely fall well short of ending their global dominance. This report analyzes these trends and quantifies the extent of reserve diversification following Russia’s 2022 war on Ukraine. It also assesses the polarity of the international currency order since the onset of the euro in 2002. Reserve diversification out of the dollar, and into the euro, has been modest, though Chinese renminbi reserves grew after Russia’s February offensive in Ukraine. Dollar unipolarity declined acutely in 2017 as the number of countries sanctioned by the United States increased and the US President Donald J. Trump threatened to revoke alliance commitments. Using economic statecraft while retaining global economic influence will require the United States to keep its economic house in order and allies close, if the current unipolar currency order is to survive.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

31. India Emerges as a Key Power and Important Partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
India’s commissioning of its second aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, in September this year reaffirms the country’s aim to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific. The country’s importance in the region will depend mainly on the course of the India-China rivalry, an increase in its economic potential, and the support provided to it by foreign partners. The convergence of goals in the Indo-Pacific strengthens India’s partnership with the U.S. and opens up opportunities for intensifying cooperation with the EU, especially in terms of connectivity, climate change, and the development of capacity in maritime domain awareness.
Topic:
International Cooperation, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, South Asia, India, and Indo-Pacific

32. China Tightens Policy towards Taiwan

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China treated the visit of Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan at the beginning of August as an expression of U.S. efforts to change the status quo in the region. The reaction of the Chinese authorities was calculated as a controlled escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, but without the risk of direct military confrontation. Harsh rhetoric, military exercises around the island, and the limitation of dialogue with the U.S. confirmed the intention of China to take over Taiwan in the coming years. For the EU, this means the need to intensify support for Taiwan, including the development of political and economic contacts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

33. Assessing the groundwork: Surveying the impacts of climate change in China

Author:
Stephan Robin
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The immediate and unprecedented impacts of climate change are becoming increasingly apparent across China, as they are for many parts of the world. Since June 2022, China has been battered by record-breaking heatwaves, torrential downpours, flooding disasters, severe drought and intense forest fires. In isolation, each of those climate hazards is a reminder of the vulnerability of human systems to environmental changes, but together they are a stark reminder that climate change presents a real and existential threat to prosperity and well-being of billions of people. Sea-level rise will undermine access to freshwater for China’s coastal cities and increase the likelihood of flooding in China’s highly urbanised delta regions. Droughts are projected to become more frequent, more extreme and longer lasting, juxtaposed with growingly intense downpours that will inundate non-coastal regions. Wildfires are also projected to increase in frequency and severity, especially in eastern China. China’s rivers, which have historically been critical to the county’s economic and political development, will experience multiple, overlapping climate (and non-climate) impacts. In addition to these direct climate hazards, there will also be major disruptions to the various human systems that underpin China, such as China’s food and energy systems as are discussed in this report. These impacts deserve greater attention from policy analysts, particularly given that they’ll increasingly shape China’s economic, foreign and security policy choices in coming decades. This report is an initial attempt to survey the literature on the impact that climate change will have on China. It concludes that relatively little attention has been paid to this important topic. This is a worrying conclusion, given China’s key role in international climate-change debates, immense importance in the global economy and major geostrategic relevance. As the severity of climate change impacts continue to amplify over the coming decades, the significance of this gap will only grow more concerning.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, National Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China and Asia-Pacific

34. Unequivocal benefits of, and necessity for, stronger Turkic Union

Author:
Emin Mammadov and Kamran Ismayilov
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:
In recent years, the cooperation and unity of the Turkic countries gain increasing momentum which are being demonstrated by its viability leading to the emergence of a united Turkic World as a new geopolitical reality in the Euroasian region. The cooperation deeply embedded in historical brotherhood ties, common language root, cultural and traditional commonalities has revealed significant political and economic results in the continent.
Topic:
Culture, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, and Turkic People
Political Geography:
Eurasia and Caucasus

35. Between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics: The Growing Role of Gulf States in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Adel Abdel Ghafar
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The role played by countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming increasingly important. This calls for an assessment of their evolving relationship with countries in the region, as well as their involvement in the Libyan conflict. Increased involvement by Gulf actors may inflame existing regional rivalries and geopolitical tensions. The interests of GCC countries in the Eastern Mediterranean are first analysed in the broader context of regional rivalries. Special attention is then devoted to Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Greece and Cyprus, while considering the role of other key regional actors such as Turkey and Israel. Recommendations on why and how the new US administration should intervene to decrease regional tensions are provided. Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI-Eni Strategic Partnership, January 2021.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Libya, Lebanon, Egypt, Cyprus, Mediterranean, and Gulf Nations

36. Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination

Author:
Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia has big Arctic plans, but how they will be realized is uncertain. For the United States this will likely mean the return to a Cold War–like environment rather than a new chapter in great-power competition in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic ambitions have attracted increasing attention in the West over the past decade as climate change opens up new opportunities in the region for navigation and exploration of its riches. For its part, Moscow casts a wary eye on what it sees as a challenge from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its position and ambitions there. The Kremlin’s rhetoric about Western encroachment has become more strident, in sync with its enhanced military posture and ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.
Topic:
NATO, Cold War, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

37. Adapting the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to an Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture: Challenges and Prospects

Author:
Andrew Yeo
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper addresses the U.S.-South Korea alliance in the context of Asia’s evolving security architecture. At the crux of the issue is the Biden administration’s desire to uphold the rules-based international order by reinforcing the network of inter-Asia alliances and multilateral institutions, on one hand, and the Moon government’s relative reluctance to deepen and expand security ties linked to an Indo-Pacific strategy that counter-balances China, on the other hand. Leveraging the existing alliance relationship, the Biden administration should encourage Seoul to coordinate with other like-minded countries committed to sustaining a rules-based regional order while assisting Seoul in mitigating potential strategic vulnerabilities. Conversely, as a middle power, South Korea must not shy away from the region’s security architecture, but instead actively coordinate with other actors in shaping the region’s strategic environment. By working in concert with other countries in the Indo-Pacific, Seoul can reduce its geopolitical vulnerability while advancing its national and regional interests.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

38. The “Four Plus One”: The Changing Power Politics of the Middle East

Author:
Joshua Krasna and George Meladze
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this inaugural MDC Occasional Paper, Josh Krasna and George Meladze analyze the structure of power in the Middle East during the past decade, mapping the main regional players and the interrelationships between them, and assessing the potential for future change in the politics of the region.
Topic:
Politics, Regional Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

39. Engagement of External Powers in Africa: Takeaways for India

Author:
Rajiv Bhatia
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
As multiple foreign powers compete in Africa, there is a need to understand the geopolitical landscape, and analyse the various policies, strategies and motivations of each country. Where lies India in this great strategic game? India has a unique relationship with the continent, with respect for equality, mutual benefit, and need-based assistance. By deepening India-Africa cooperation, bolstering economic relations and leveraging new digital, space and medical technologies, the relationship between India and the African nations can be better cemented, despite the global competition at play.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Engagement, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, and India

40. Inserting India into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation

Author:
Gateway House
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
Over the last decade and a half, Israel and the U.S. have become India’s top arms suppliers, and a robust defence partnership is underway. Beyond pure defence trade, Israeli and U.S. defence companies have participated in the ‘Make in India’ initiative, focusing on technology transfers and the co-development and co-production of technologies. This is the moment for India to capitalise on these two critical, bilateral defence partners, and particularly the start-up innovation hubs of Silicon Valley and Tel Aviv. How can India insert itself into the U.S.-Israel defence technology cooperation corridor, and participate in the development of emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence in defence? What benefit will the U.S. and Israel gain from a partnership with India? This paper studies the U.S.-Israel defence technology corridor, and suggests potential collaborations for India. It will necessitate the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru coming together to capitalise on their respective strengths and declared national technology priorities. Bringing a like-minded, tech-savvy democracy like India into the arc of the U.S.-Israel partnership will offer a trinity of benefits: a robust and tested edge in emerging technologies to the three militaries over their adversaries, develop interoperability, and reinforce their access to the Indian market. The greatest benefit will be for India, which has been set back by lengthy defence acquisition procedures, and will do better with a modern defence base at home. India will have to overcome the geopolitical hurdles of its defence relationship with Russia, and of Israel’s reported defence ties with China and Pakistan, to build a sturdy trilateral cooperation.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Arms Trade, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, Israel, and United States of America

41. Winds of change in the Eastern Mediterranean: Between hydrocarbons and renewable energy geopolitics

Author:
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Constantine Levoyannis
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Once a cradle of empires, civilizations and religions, the Mediterranean region that once dominated world trade today stands among the world regions with the lowest interconnectivity, trade and investment flows. Under these rather unpromising circumstances, the discovery of sizeable natural gas reserves under the seabed of the Eastern Mediterranean in the 2000s and early 2010s appeared as a golden opportunity for the emergence of the Mediterranean in the EU and global energy map, as well as for regional economic cooperation. Yet various missed opportunities and with gas consumption set to decline sharply post 2030 within the European Union, the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas reserves are no longer likely to emerge as gamechanger in EU energy geopolitics. There is another field where the Eastern Mediterranean can play a leading role in the transformation of European energy policy, giving a new dimension to Eastern Mediterranean energy geopolitics. A new, more dynamic and forward-looking energy and climate strategy is needed and with it, a need to evolve from the traditional definition of energy security. The European Green Deal has transformed the discussion on the monetization of natural resources with a negative climate footprint. While the European Union pledges to turn climate neutral by 2050, carbon dioxide emissions must be decisively cut, affecting the use of hydrocarbons including natural gas. This development brings forward a major opportunity for economic cooperation in the Mediterranean, focusing on the development of infrastructure for the production, storage and transport of renewable energy towards Europe. A robust political response is necessary to address climate change to keep our planet viable. The European Green Deal emerges as a new historic cooperation opportunity for a region with lots of regional conflicts as well as with a lot of unrealized potential.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Geopolitics, Renewable Energy, and Hydrocarbons
Political Geography:
Mediterranean

42. Greece’s Rise as a Trans-Mediterranean Power: Greece’s Eastern Mediterranean strategic shift to Europe-to-Africa and Europe-to-Middle East connectivity

Author:
Michaël Tanchum
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Greece stands at the threshold of a strategic shift that could see the Hellenic Republic become Europe’s geopolitical gatekeeper of the emerging East Africa-to-Europe and Middle East-to-Europe commercial corridors. Whether Greece becomes a European leader in trans-Mediterranean connectivity depends on Athens’ ability to develop its own position in East Africa-to-Europe and Middle East-to-Europe manufacturing value chains. Greece’s advancing green energy, innovation economy offers promising avenues to engage Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in joint ventures that will transform Greece into a cutting-edge trans-Mediterranean actor. Greece’s new trans-Mediterranean profile is a strategic shift that will require the EU system to adjust its perception of Greece and incentivize closer coordination between Greece and other member states to facilitate joint venture investments in the two corridors. In the absence of such coordination, Athens will continue to deepen its relations with Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia while engaging with select EU member states. The extent to which Greece succeeds at industrial value chain integration will determine its role in the emerging trans-regional commercial architecture, and with it, Greece’s strategic standing within the European Union and the MENA region.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Value Chains
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, Greece, and Mediterranean

43. Coordination Failure: Risks of US-China competition in space

Author:
Gidon Gautel
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The 2020s will see a flurry of space activity, with both national and commercial programs picking up pace. Both the United States and China hold strong ambitions in telecommunications, lunar exploration, and beyond. However, currently fraught relations between the superpowers are unlikely to improve and may yet deteriorate further. On the one hand, competition between both countries may drive space activities and foster technological innovation. On the other, as both superpowers expand their activities in space, geopolitical tensions may increase the risk of harmful dynamics that could endanger the sustainable rollout of future programs. In this Strategic Update, Gidon Gautel seeks to outline and call attention to two high-risk flash points arising from the development of the US and China’s national space programmes and industries.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Space, Innovation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. Strategic Report

Author:
Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

45. How China and Pakistan Negotiate

Author:
Katharine Adeney and Filippo Boni
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since being officially launched in April 2015, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been one of the most watched set of projects under the aegis of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Having already injected around $25 billion into Pakistan, the CPEC not only has been dubbed the “flagship project” of the BRI, but it also holds a central role in Beijing’s global ambitions.1 While much has been said about the geopolitical implications of the CPEC, including for both India and the United States, less attention has been devoted to providing in-depth insights into the mechanics of how the BRI is unfolding on the ground in Pakistan. How do China and Pakistan negotiate the terms of CPEC deals? To what extent has Islamabad managed to exert agency in its dealings with Beijing? How does China adapt to the contexts it operates in? By now, the CPEC has been subject to much media, academic, and policy scrutiny, but these questions have not been answered. The power asymmetry between the two partners—coupled with the impression that the BRI represents a unidirectional Chinese endeavor, not just in Pakistan but also globally—has contributed to the erroneous representation that Beijing is merely imposing the CPEC on its all-weather partners in Islamabad. On the contrary, this study highlights China’s adaptive strategies in dealing with a host of Pakistani actors (including political parties, local communities, and the military) against the backdrop of Pakistan’s evolving political landscape and change in leadership following the country’s 2018 elections. In filling this gap, this paper foregrounds the importance of adopting a relational approach to studying how the BRI unfolds on the ground. This entails looking at how Pakistan and China have negotiated the CPEC’s energy, infrastructure, and industrial cooperation projects. The analysis is based on semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the two authors during three rounds of fieldwork in 2015, 2018, and 2020–2021 triangulated with a host of official reports, statements, and newspaper articles. Examining the domestic contours of the CPEC shows that Pakistani actors have wielded agency in important ways throughout the process, while Chinese actors at times have accommodated key Pakistani demands.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

46. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

47. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

48. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

49. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:
Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

50. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

51. India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal–China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India’s postindependence ties with Nepal were predicated on the intimate cultural and historical links between the two countries. As India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted, “though Nepal was an independent country, it was very closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a foreign country.” New Delhi also regarded China as an “interloper” in Nepal in 1950 who threatened India’s security and interests in the region, ignoring at least a century of Sino-Nepali history centering around Tibet. This paper argues that New Delhi’s close relationship with Nepal, bound in history and culture, and the misperception about China’s relations with Nepal before 1950 have contributed to a skewed understanding of Sino-Nepali relations. The Working Paper looks at the impact that New Delhi’s misperceptions of Sino-Nepali relations, termed the “fog of misunderstanding,” has had in the context of the triangular relations between China, India, and Nepal. The paper is divided into four sections arranged chronologically. The first section looks at the historical Sino-Nepali relationship from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. It establishes that this early relationship was centered on Tibet. While the Gorkha kings of Nepal sought to preserve their trade privileges in the region, the Chinese were concerned about the security of their southwestern frontier. Notably though, Beijing’s concern with security does not appear to have extended into any desire to conquer Nepal. This section also touches upon British India’s policy toward Nepal in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent approach that the government of independent India took in the first few years, without an adequate appreciation of Kathmandu’s history with China. As a consequence, India developed a suspicious attitude toward Beijing’s desire to re-establish ties with Kathmandu after the Chinese Civil War, and shaped its policy toward Nepal with this factor in mind. The second section delves into Indian and Chinese policies toward Nepal in the period from 1955 until the end of the monarchy in 2008. It showcases how, during this long period, the three kings of Nepal sought to leverage their ties with China in order to maintain some semblance of balance and how China, in turn, followed a limited but strategic approach that was centered on the kings. The fog of misunderstanding continued to shroud India’s attitude to Nepal-China relations during this period and, consequently, India’s Nepal policy lacked a working template to manage relations with a smaller neighbor sandwiched between India and China in a way that would preserve New Delhi’s influence in a positive way. In contrast to China’s political approach, New Delhi fluctuated between the monarchy and an assortment of democratic political parties, suggestive of a provincial approach in New Delhi’s dealing with Kathmandu. As a result, China’s approach ensured that its main objective in Nepal, namely the security of its southwestern frontier, was secured with a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy. The third section deals with the aftermath of the fall of the Nepali monarchy, 2008 to 2016. During this important period, New Delhi had a fresh opportunity to reset ties by providing the support to democratic forces in Nepal, that could have resulted in a transformation of the Indo-Nepali ties. However, India appeared to hew to its traditional policy. China, on the other hand, quickly built new ties with the post-monarchical dispensation. India’s perceived actions as a result of the adoption of the new constitution of Nepal plunged Indo-Nepali ties to a nadir. It seems to have pushed Kathmandu to strengthen its relationship with China. This section of the paper also outlines the changing nature of China’s policy and objectives in Nepal, especially in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and its possible implications on the future course of the triangular relationship, as well as for India-Nepal relations. It postulates that under President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Nepal has shifted from protecting its periphery to a broader goal of bringing Nepal under its strategic control. This section highlights the political and economic levers that Beijing is using to build a preeminent position in Nepal. The paper concludes with an assessment of options available to all three countries going forward, and India’s options in Nepal in the face of China’s new policy in the region. It suggests that a decisive reset in policy toward Nepal is required to restore healthy relations that are based on mutual respect and mutual sensitivity. New Delhi may need to re-orient its thinking toward Nepal in the context of triangular relations, including on the boundary issue and the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that have been long-standing irritants in the India-Nepal relationship. Nepal, for its part, should also reflect carefully on whether its leveraging of China might become counterproductive in the light of changing strategic balance in its vicinity, and the implications of giving up the policy of balance for one that tilts decisively toward Beijing. The paper concludes that there is sufficient scope and opportunity for course correction by India, and that through sustained efforts India may be able to preserve its influence and security in Nepal and counter China’s expanding footprint.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Nepal

52. Taiwan’s Opportunities in Emerging Industry Supply Chains

Author:
Evan A. Feigenbaum and Michael R. Nelson
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To some, the acute supply chain crisis that has followed in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic is a sign of poor planning, lack of resilience and surge capacity, and industry rigidity. Inflation is also having a major impact and will inevitably lead to some supply chain reconfiguration. But structural shifts matter too, including rising costs in mainland China—the world’s manufacturing’s powerhouse—and the overconcentration of freight in just ten companies that control 85 percent of global container capacity. Globalization has bequeathed a system that seemed efficient until it was tested by the multidimensional crises of the last two years. In industry after industry, C-suites are planning for a world of disruption. At a minimum, companies aim to build resilience and redundancy into their supply chains. But there is another factor—political risk—that is complicating planning, especially in technology-intensive industries. Specifically, the emergence of multidimensional strategic competition between Beijing and Washington has interrupted the flow of goods, capital, people, technology, and data. And these geopolitical disruptions look set to become a long-term structural trend. This is a sea change that will invariably bleed into many industries and rejigger supply chains. But amid the disruption, some economies will have fresh opportunities to attract investment, build out new industries, and diversify their growth drivers. Taiwan is one such economy that may stand to benefit from the supply chain rethink. This paper explores some ways that it could do so. But to seize opportunities in this dynamic environment, Taiwan needs policy changes and technology investments to better position its ecosystem of government, business, academia, research institutions, and labor to attract new supply chain opportunities, especially for the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the emerging economy of the twenty-first century. Two prior Carnegie Endowment studies of Taiwan’s economic competitiveness included specific recommendations that could comprise the foundation of an ecosystem that serves the public interest by bolstering Taiwan’s profile and role in more and more global supply chains. Most notably, these were Carnegie’s recommendations to position Taiwan’s economy as a trusted hub, trusted vendor, trusted tester, and trusted conduit for technology-intensive R&D and production. Taiwan’s public interest would benefit if such opportunities became a counterpoint to mainland China’s scale advantages. But Taiwan faces intense competition from other economies in Asia and Europe that also seek to capitalize on supply chain shifts, reaping the harvest from their investments while carving out specialized niches amid rising suspicion of mainland China-origin technology products and services. This study aims to help to refine competitive choices for Taiwan while highlighting unique comparative advantages that would make it an especially attractive place for new global investments. The paper digs deeply into two opportunities for Taiwan. The first involves dynamic changes in one of the high-tech industries that Taipei has made into a strategic priority—the life sciences, including biotechnology and precision medicine. Despite twenty years of concerted effort and some signal successes, especially with drug development and diagnostics, Taiwan has not captured a role or market share analogous to its multidecade build-out in semiconductors. For Taiwan, trust will be the crucial variable and competitive advantage. Taiwan could, for example, leverage its advantages with high-quality medical data to become a locus for clinical trials, while also leveraging other advantages for global supply chains in the drug discovery, advanced diagnostics, and personalized medicine markets. But to do so, it will need to make policy and regulatory changes and make some new strategic investments. The second chapter turns to whether Taiwan’s economy could be positioned as a leader in testing, validating, and deploying software, which would give Taiwan-based firms a larger role in the information technology services business where mainland China, India, and others have a larger profile. Elements of Taiwan’s ecosystem could potentially be positioned to use software engineering to ensure that business software and services produced by local companies and their international partners are more tested and more trusted than competing products on the market.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Investment, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Taiwan and Asia

53. The Scramble for the Eastern Mediterranean: Energy and Geopolitics

Author:
Valeria Talbot
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become a major hotspot for both natural gas and geopolitical competition. Natural gas discoveries in the last decade have attracted growing interest from regional countries and beyond. However, recent escalations in tensions and outright confrontations suggest that competition goes beyond the scramble for energy. Indeed, natural gas is just one of the factors that contribute to shaping security and geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, which has emerged as a crucial strategic area in the broader Mediterranean and the Middle East. Moving from the analysis of these interconnected factors, this Report examines the strategy and the plethora of interests of regional and international players, as well as the interplay between cooperative and competitive dynamics in the region. What are the geopolitical, security, and energy interests of the countries involved? What are the implications on the regional security context of the moves and policies of regional and international powers?
Topic:
Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Gas, Strategic Competition, and Energy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Mediterranean

54. Australia’s future – still the lucky country or running out of luck?

Author:
Gorana Grgic
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
As the world rung in 2020, political analysts across the globe were busy making assessments of the past decade and offering predictions as to the dominant geopolitical, economic and social trends over the next ten years. Subjecting Australia to the same scrutiny leaves an impression the 2010s are going resilience is its greatest success as the country has continued to enjoy uninterrupted economic growth amidst the global financial crisis and in the aftermath of the direst recession to hit the world since the Great Depression. This makes it an absolute record-setter across the Western world. Yet, the optimism that such to be remembered as a decade of missed opportunities as ‘kicking the can down the road’ approach to economy, polity and security start to imperil Australia’s reputation as a lucky country. In brief, Australia’s economic positive trends will endure is fading. While Australia has been spared of the surge of populism that has plagued a significant portion of mature democracies across the West, it has suffered from an unprecedented leadership turnover that has impeded action on the most (figuratively and literally) burning issue it faces – that of climate change. On the foreign and security policy front, successive Australian governments have been walking the diplomatic tightrope as the United States remains to be an indispensable ally, while China takes the prime spot as the country’s largest trading partner. Given the intensification of the US-China rivalry, Australia finds itself needing to find a way out of this Gordian knot. Facing the grim prospects of the precipitously warming planet, the return of great power rivalry, the decline of liberal democracies, and the uncertainties of technological change, 2020s are inevitably going to force Australian decisionmakers to make hard choices.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Political stability, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
Australia

55. Russia at the United Nations: Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy

Author:
Philip Remler
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The central task for Russian foreign policy in the era of President Vladimir Putin has been to regain the undisputed recognition that Russia is a world power like the Soviet Union before it, a status to which Russia feels entitled.1 The United Nations (UN) is Russia’s most important venue for putting its global aspirations and achievements on display. Russia’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council boosts its claim to be part of a global oligarchy and grants it the power to veto or undermine initiatives that it deems contrary to its interests. The concepts underlying Russia’s use of the UN to promote its aspirations form the subject of this paper. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, devotes great resources to its missions at the UN, especially New York and Geneva. It traditionally cultivates extensive expertise among its mission members, appointing them to UN postings several times over their careers and leaving them in place for long periods. Russian diplomats are noted for their abilities in drafting highly technical UN documents in English—none more so than Sergey Lavrov, currently Russia’s foreign minister and formerly its permanent representative to the UN from 1994 to 2004.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Power Politics, Law, Geopolitics, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Russia and United Nations

56. Security Assistance in the Middle East: A Three-Dimensional Chessboard

Author:
Robert Springborg, F.C. "Pink" Williams, and John Zavage
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The United States, Russia, and Iran have chosen markedly different approaches to security assistance in the Middle East, with dramatic implications for statebuilding and stability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the world’s testing ground for the effectiveness of security assistance provided by global and regional powers. That security assistance has contributed to the intensity and frequency of proxy wars—such as those under way or recently wound down in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq—and to the militarization of state and substate actors in the MENA region. Security assistance is at the core of struggles for military, strategic, ideological, and even economic preeminence in the Middle East. Yet despite the broad and growing importance of security assistance for the region and for competition within it between global and regional actors, security assistance has been the subject of relatively little comparative analysis. Efforts to assess relationships between the strategic objectives and operational methods of security assistance providers and their relative impacts on recipients are similarly rare.
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

57. Cyberspace and Geopolitics: Assessing Global Cybersecurity Norm Processes at a Crossroads

Author:
Christian Ruhl, Duncan Hollis, Wyatt Hoffman, and Tim Maurer
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As cyber insecurity has become a growing problem worldwide, states and other stakeholders have sought to increase stability for cyberspace. As a result, a new ecosystem of “cyber norm” processes has emerged in diverse fora and formats. Today, United Nations (UN) groups (for example, the Group of Governmental Experts [GGE] and the Open-Ended Working Group [OEWG]), expert commissions (for example, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace), industry coalitions (for example, the Tech Accord, the Charter of Trust), and multistakeholder collectives (for example, the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace) all purport to identify or operationalize various normative standards of behavior for states and/or other stakeholders in cyberspace. As some of these processes wind down (for example, the Global Commission) and others wind up (for example, the OEWG), cyber norms are at a crossroads where each process’s potential (and problems) looms large.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Norms
Political Geography:
Global Focus

58. Great-power competition and the rising US-China rivalry: Towards a new normal?

Author:
Bart Gaens and Ville Sinkkonen
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The United States and China are posited to be at the epicenter of an emerging and – by most accounts – intensifying rivalry. This report delves into the theoretical underpinnings as well as the geostrategic and geo-economic dynamics driving this great-power competition. It explores future prospects for contestation and engagement in key issue areas, such as arms control, trade and sanctions. The chapters in this volume also examine the Indo-Pacific as the immediate regional frontline of the unfolding great-power contest and explore the role that Europe has to play in this game. As the world is crossing the threshold into a new age of great-power competition, the debate on the US-China rivalry reveals the complex and contested nature of the meanings, causes, policy implications and future prospects of what is set to become the “new normal” in global politics.
Topic:
Hegemony, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

59. The Geopolitics of Food Security: Barriers to the Sustainable Development Goal of Zero Hunger

Author:
Jiayi Zhou, Lisa Marie Dellmuth, Kevin M. Adams, Tina-Simone Neset, and Nina von Uexkull
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Assessing the prospects for Zero Hunger—Sustainable Development Goal 2—requires an understanding of food security that goes beyond developmental or humanitarian issues, to include linkages with geopolitics. Geopolitical challenges cut across areas such as natural resources, trade, armed conflict and climate change where unilateralism and zero-sum approaches to security directly hamper efforts to eradicate hunger and undermine the frameworks that govern those efforts. The report provides an overview of how geopolitics interacts with these areas. Competition for agricultural resources can be both a cause and a consequence of geopolitical rivalry. International trade, while essential for food security, also creates vulnerabilities through supply disruptions—sometimes politically motivated. Armed conflict is a driver of food insecurity, which can itself feed into social unrest and violence. Climate change interacts with all three phenomena, reshaping both the physical landscape and political calculus. These overlapping linkages require further integrated policy engagement and analysis.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, International Trade and Finance, Governance, Food Security, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

60. Civil War in the Horn of Africa?: Four Possible Trajectories for Ethiopia

Author:
James Barnett
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
A civil war is erupting in Ethiopia—Africa’s second most populous state, a geopolitical fulcrum in the volatile Red Sea arena, and the seat of the African Union (AU). The question now is whether a ceasefire can quickly be brokered that would, in the best case, serve as the basis for a broader national dialogue aimed at stabilizing the country’s political transition; or whether the situation will devolve into a multisided conflict that draws in neighboring states and further destabilizes what is already one of the world’s most fragile regions. As of this writing, the latter unfortunately seems more likely, but there is still hope for a ceasefire, particularly if Ethiopia’s regional and international partners make a concerted push for de-escalation. One should not use the term “civil war” lightly, but this appears to be the course that Ethiopia is on. While in recent years the country has suffered from intercommunal clashes, assassinations, a coup attempt, and a low-level insurgency, this is the first time that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government has faced a direct challenge from a well-armed state within the state. The stakes are high. With a population of over 100 million, the United States Institute of Peace’s senior study group on the Red Sea warns that Ethiopia’s disintegration would constitute “the largest state collapse in modern history.”
Topic:
International Relations, Civil War, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Horn of Africa

61. Fostering Europe’s Strategic Autonomy - A question of purpose and action

Author:
Giovanni Grevi
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Strategic autonomy is about empowering Europe, not disengaging from partnerships, globalisation or multilateralism. The core of strategic autonomy is not that Europeans should act alone, but that they should have a purpose of their own, and a stronger power base to fulfil that purpose through cooperation with others whenever possible, or on their own, if needed. As such, strategic autonomy is not a condition to be achieved once and for all, but a mindset and a process, guiding initiatives across multiple areas. By advancing its strategic autonomy, Europe should acquire a stronger position to manage interdependence amidst geopolitical competition – arguably the defining challenge of our times. The concept has become central to a number of statements by EU and national leaders, and to important EU policy documents. Although the level of ambition and requirements for progress differ across policy areas – from trade and investment to innovation, the single market or security and defence – and are the subject of ongoing debate, an EU strategic narrative is emerging alongside current or envisaged policy measures and initiatives. These policy developments point to three main tracks of action, or dimensions of Europe’s strategic autonomy, namely bracing against threats and challenges, empowering Europe by joining forces and engaging others to strengthen a rules-based international order. Bracing. Europe needs to strengthen its resilience and political cohesion in the face of multi-dimensional competition. It needs to counter trade-distorting practices and unfair competition, while better enforcing the rules and obligations of EU trade agreements. Europe should also reduce its current overdependence on foreign technologies and companies, such as for 5G and data infrastructure, and Europeans should do more to secure their critical infrastructure against malicious practices or cyberattacks. Empowering. Europe is much more than the sum of its parts, even though it often performs as less than that because of disagreements among EU member states, or their reluctance to pool their resources. Completing and strengthening the Single Market is crucial to sustaining both Europe’s growth and the EU’s regulatory power. Eliminating current barriers within the Digital Single Market will be critical to spur innovation and scale-up European technology companies while creating a regime for data sharing and access that benefits all market actors and citizens. To both deliver the capabilities that Europeans need and acquire a real operational capacity, EU member states should make full use of the arrangements for defence cooperation established in the last few years, on the basis of a better-defined set of shared goals. Engaging. The purpose of shaping and supporting a rules-based international order should continue to drive Europe’s foreign policy, even though Europeans will need to take a pragmatic approach in a context of geopolitical competition. The election of Joe Biden paves the way to dialogue and cooperation with the US, and to reinforcing the transatlantic partnership and multilateralism.
Topic:
Globalization, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe

62. The Transformation of the Iraqi-Syrian Border: From a National to a Regional Frontier

Author:
Harith Hasan and Kheder Khaddour
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past nearly two decades, the presence of a variety of state and nonstate military and security forces has transformed the Syrian border district of Bukamal and the neighboring Iraqi district of Qa’im. Following the end of the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s caliphate, Iranian-backed militias began to play a major role in the area, turning it into a flashpoint between Iran and its allies on the one side and the United States and Israel on the other. The strain of tensions and the threat of instability are liable to ensure that this heavily securitized part of the border will remain a magnet for conflict for years to come.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Islamic State, Conflict, and Borders
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

63. Turkey Is Building a Geopolitical Alliance Between Sunni and Shiite Islamists

Author:
Irina Tsukerman
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
The recent news about the involvement of Iranian diplomats in the murder of an Iranian dissident in Turkey sparked a flare of international interest from within the all-encompassing coronavirus pandemic coverage, largely thanks to unflattering comparisons with coverage of the Jamal Khashoggi murder in 2018 (which the Iranian press promoted with gusto). The relative lack of interest in the crime from within Turkey itself reflects Ankara’s willingness to consort with Shiite Islamists to its own advantage.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, and Islamism
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, and Middle East

64. Framing an Indo-Pacific Narrative in India-South Korea Ties

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Both India’s and South Korea’s strategic choices are deeply influenced by the rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific construct, particularly amid a mounting U.S.-China rivalry. With India’s “Look/Act East” policy and South Korea’s “New Southern Policy” offering a perfect stage for deepened mutual cooperation, both nations need to further their relations to build Asia’s future while advancing their respective national interests. With both countries following stringent foreign policies as a result of the actions of their immediate neighbors, they present a geopolitically strategic complementarity for their relationship to prosper and emerge as one of the most important relationships in the region. Seoul’s hesitation to overtly embrace the “Indo-Pacific” concept is not really a barrier; rather a geo-political overture to discard the balance of power politics and pursue an autonomous foreign policy. India’s preference for the “Indo-Pacific” is equally based on strategic autonomy, imbibing universal values and an inclusive regional order. Both countries emphasize a free and rules-based Indo-Pacific and have immense potential to establish security and connectivity partnerships as the keystone of their bilateral ties. With India and South Korea understanding the economic importance versus security ramifications of China, and with Japan’s reemergence as a key regional, if not global actor, both countries need to bring serious strategic intent to their relationship. Making use of the ASEAN platform and bilateral dialogues, South Korea and India have the potential to become one of the strongest Indo-Pacific partners of the 21st century
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, South Korea, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

65. Moscow Concerned About Turkish Influence on the Gagauz

Author:
Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Turkey’s success in the South Caucasus is echoing across the former Soviet space as well as inside the Russian Federation itself; and not surprisingly, Moscow is worried. Azerbaijan is now openly an ally of Turkey and has Turkish military forces on its territory, something Russia had previously said it would never allow. Three of the four Turkic-majority countries in Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan—have taken note of the change in the balance of forces in the region in Turkey’s favor and are increasingly looking toward Ankara for guidance. And some Turkic nations inside the Russian Federation, Volga Tatars in particular, have organized pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Turkic demonstrations, which, despite their small size, troubled the central authorities in Moscow (Vestnik Kavkaza, November 29). Except for Azerbaijan, of course, these all represent overwhelmingly long-term challenges. Central Asian countries are not about to make any dramatic geopolitical shifts unless and until additional robust transportation links through the Caucasus make that compelling; whereas the Turkic peoples within the Russian Federation, however strongly they may identify with such pan-Turkic impulses, have few possible outlets for acting on them.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Caucasus

66. There Goes the Neighborhood: The Limits of Russian Integration in Eurasia

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Eurasia is squeezed between a rising China and an aggressive and unpredictable Russia. The United States should remain engaged with the region to help it resist Russian advances. Since 2014, Russia has redoubled its efforts to build a sphere of influence, operating frequently under the flag of Eurasian integration. Its undeclared war in Ukraine and hardball tactics vis-à-vis other neighbors demonstrate the lengths to which it is willing to go to undermine their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Moscow has pushed hard to expand the membership and functions of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the formal vehicle for cross-regional integration of political and economic activity. However, Russia’s limited economic resources and lack of soft-power appeal; the engagement with the region by other outside powers, including the European Union, China, Turkey, and the United States; and societal change in neighboring states are creating significant long-term obstacles to the success of Russian neo-imperialist ambitions and exposing a large gap between its ends and means. Russia’s ambitions in Eurasia are buffeted by unfavorable trends that are frequently overlooked by analysts and policymakers. Russia’s own heavy-handed behavior contributes to both regional upheaval and instability as well as to the creation of diplomatic headwinds that constrain its own room for maneuver.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

67. India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity

Author:
Darshana M. Baruah
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India now plays a crucial role in the Indo-Pacific region. But how will the country define its approach as the region takes on new geopolitical importance? Throughout history, the maritime domain has been a crucial space in establishing new and emerging powers shaping regional dynamics and the larger security architecture. The great power competition today is no different. As India and Australia recently recognized, “many of the future challenges are likely to occur in, and emanate from, the maritime domain” underlining the reemergence of the maritime space as the theater for geopolitical competition.1 The rise of China across the Indian and Pacific Oceans challenges the security umbrella established at the end of Second World War and strengthened after the end of the Cold War. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a new geographic space—bringing together the Indian and the Pacific Oceans—represents the new strategic reality of the twenty-first century. India’s role in the Indo-Pacific is considered crucial by countries such as Australia, Japan, and the United States. However, despite New Delhi’s presence in the Indian Ocean, maritime security has actually remained outside of India’s strategic interests, concerns, and thinking, due to its continental threats. The Indo-Pacific therefore is a new domain in India’s foreign policy engagements, representing a shift in New Delhi’s strategic environment—expanding its threats solely from its continental borders to its maritime space. As Canberra, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, DC continue to support and promote a stronger Indian role in the Indo-Pacific, this paper highlights New Delhi’s perceptions, challenges, and opportunities in the region.
Topic:
Security, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Maritime
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Indo-Pacific

68. A critique of geopolitics travelling South: Preface to the Brazilian edition of 'A return of geopolitics in Europe?'

Author:
Stefano Guzzini
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The DIIS Working Paper ‘From the geography of politics to the politics of geography’ is the English version of the preface for the Brazilian edition of A return of geopolitics in Europe? The book originally published with Cambridge University Press was translated by Bárbara Motta and published at the University Press of the Universidade Estadual Paulista (Editora Unesp) in São Paulo. The preface introduces the critical thesis of the political effect that the return of geopolitical thought had in Europe in the 1990s, well before 9/11. The rise of geopolitical thought can be linked to the disorientation, the foreign policy identity crises in many European countries when the end of the Cold War took away the stable coordinates of the post-1945 European security order. Its rise has, however, two pernicious consequences. First, it reverses Clausewitz by making politics the prolongation of war by other means. In other words, it militarises politics, as Aron had already criticised during the Cold War. Second, it essentialises physical and human geography, which justifies the homogenising of identities. The book does not claim that this European experience is universal, but invites scholars in Brazil to contrast it with the specificities of their political discourse and practice, the different nature of foreign policy identity crises and processes of militarisation in Latin America.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Geography
Political Geography:
Europe and Brazil

69. Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Daniel R. Russel and Blake Berger
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, is a massive international infrastructure program involving nearly 140 countries with over an estimated $1 trillion in projects related to energy, transportation, digital networks, and trade. Chinese leaders frame the BRI as “win-win” cooperation focused solely on development and connectivity. Beijing has gone to great lengths to minimize BRI’s links to the People’s Liberation Army and to downplay the initiative’s geostrategic overtones. Nevertheless, many governments have become worried about ulterior motives behind BRI projects, many of which have dual-use commercial-military capabilities and are increasingly connected to Chinese digital technologies and networks and satellite systems. The Asia Society Policy Institute’s – Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative – examines key BRI projects in the Indo-Pacific and explores relevant Chinese doctrine, the involvement of the People’s Liberation Army with BRI, and assesses the potential military and geostrategic advantages to China from BRI ports and other projects. This project is led by ASPI Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy Daniel Russel, with support from ASPI Senior Program Officer Blake Berger. The project and the report benefitted from advisement from experts and officials in Singapore, Australia, Japan, Vietnam, China, and the United States as well as to the expert advisory group whose distinguished members generously shared their time and wisdom to support this effort.
Topic:
Development, Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

70. Cooperation Between the United States and Pakistan: What is the Future?

Author:
Riaz A. Khokhar
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Within the Indo-Pacific region, the United States and Pakistan have sharply divergent strategic objectives. While American objectives have changed over time, focusing in recent years on rivalry with China, Pakistan’s strategic objective has remained constant—to maintain a balance of power with India. Yet Pakistan retains close strategic and economic ties with China, and the United States considers India an important strategic partner. Nevertheless, the two countries have worked together for nearly two decades toward two tactical goals—achieving a political settlement in Afghanistan and eliminating terrorism in South Asia. There is potential for them to cooperate more broadly, for example, increasing direct foreign investment to Pakistan and helping Islamabad balance its relations with the United States and China. Washington’s willingness to expand such cooperation will depend on Pakistan’s cooperation in fighting terrorism in the region.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Terrorism, Power Politics, Foreign Direct Investment, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, South Asia, India, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

71. Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order: Regional Responses to the South China Sea Disputes

Author:
Rebecca Strating
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The seas are an increasingly important domain for understanding the balance-of-power dynamics between a rising People’s Republic of China and the United States. Specifically, disputes in the South China Sea have intensified over the past decade. Multifaceted disputes concern overlapping claims to territory and maritime jurisdiction, strategic control over maritime domain, and differences in legal interpretations of freedom of navigation. These disputes have become a highly visible microcosm of a broader contest between a maritime order underpinned by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and challenger conceptions of order that see a bigger role for rising powers in generating new rules and alternative interpretations of existing international law. This issue examines the responses of non-claimant regional states—India, Australia, South Korea, and Japan—to the South China Sea disputes.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Jurisdiction
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

72. Taking Stock of United States-Vietnam Relations 45 Years After the Fall of Saigon

Author:
Huong Le Thu
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Huong Le Thu, Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, explains that “To many, shared concerns about China are the driving force for Vietnam‐U.S. relations.”
Topic:
Bilateral Relations and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Vietnam, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

73. The United States and Fiji Reaffirm Security Assistance Cooperation

Author:
Steven McGann
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The United States and Fiji continue to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Ties between the regional partners endured throughout Fiji’s 2006 military takeover and resultant domestic political challenges. During this period Washington’s engagement with Suva included humanitarian assistance/disaster response, maritime security, law enforcement cooperation, counter-narcotics, and anti-trafficking of vulnerable populations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
United States of America and Fiji

74. Framing Russia’s Mediterranean Return: Stages, Roots and Logics

Author:
Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s return as a major geostrategic actor in the Mediterranean is one of the most significant trends characterising this area over the past few years. Part of a broader geopolitical pluralization of this space, Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria marked a new phase in Moscow’s Mediterranean engagement. Based on a stringent logic of intervening where other powers leave strategic vacuums, Russia has succeeded to carve out an increasingly central role in Mediterranean equilibria, despite its limited resources. Russian diplomatic and economic support for the Syrian regime in Damascus had steadily increased since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011. Yet, it was Moscow’s direct military intervention in September 2015 that signalled a decisive upgrade in engagement. Moscow’s military involvement shifted the tide of the conflict, proving decisive in avoiding the collapse of the Syrian regime, which is also backed by Iran and the Lebanese group Hezbollah.
Topic:
Civil War, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

75. Italy, Atlanticism and the Biden Administration: Greater Convergence to Defuse Ambiguity on China

Author:
Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In September 2019, the once anti-establishment Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S) agreed to enter a ruling alliance with the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico – PD).[1] By establishing this “yellow-red” coalition government with what was considered its political nemesis, the M5S managed to preserve its presence in power and avoid early elections. However, its influence gradually weakened, as attested to by poor performances in local elections. The M5S’s declining political fortunes and the changing composition of the government have a significant foreign policy dimension, especially if addressed through the lens of Italy–US relations. The PD is a solidly pro-Atlanticist party in Italy. The M5S, despite its evolution towards greater pragmatism over the years, remains a source of concern, being still perceived as the most pro-China actor within the Italian political landscape.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Italy, and United States of America

76. Russia's Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East: Entering the 2020s

Author:
Ekaterina Stepanova
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
As Russia has become a major external player in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region due to its military engagement in Syria since 2015, it has acted as a balancer and mediator in several regional controversies and has continued to serve as a security guarantor for the Syrian state. This course has brought Moscow some practical dividends, such as growing economic and military-technical cooperation with select MENA countries, and has spurred its broader international profile. However, entering the 2020s, the risks of more active engagement in the Middle East have also mounted, making Russia’s balancing act more difficult. In three cases where Russia’s involvement has been visible (Syria, Libya and the Israeli-Palestinian problem), evolving developments challenge Moscow’s acquired influence and multi-vector approach, but also create new opportunities for its engagement and mediation. Above all, the 2020 US–Iran crisis catalysed the urgent need for structured regional dialogue, especially across the Persian Gulf. While this requires direct interaction between the region’s main antagonists, the initial impulse to unlock the trans-Gulf impasse might need to come from the outside. A process-oriented blueprint for inclusive multilateral security in the Gulf proposed by Russia in 2019 is a step in the right direction, but to be activated it may need to come as part of some broader international initiative.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Libya, Palestine, North Africa, and Syria

77. Parameters for Developing Cross-border Sustainable Infrastructure

Author:
Jyotsna Bapat
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
India, till 2014, had bilateral trade and infrastructure agreement treaties with its Asian neighbours. India, through the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), has been investing in trilateral and multilateral infrastructure projects since 2014, with its littoral (coastal) and inland neighbours in Asia. While it demonstrates the growing potential of infrastructure diplomacy, it also puts India in direct competition with China, which through its own infrastructure initiative, has been involved in building physical infrastructure in India’s neighbours. This paper argues that taking into account environmental security as a parameter for developing cross border sustainable infrastructure, during signing of MoUs in these treaties, will provide a unique opportunity for India to develop norms for environmental and social security framework/policy, training assistance, and capacity building in its funded projects in other countries.
Topic:
Environment, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, and Social Security
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Asia

78. From Russia With Love? Serbia's Lukewarm Reception of Russian Aid and Its Geopolitical Implications

Author:
Vuk Vuksanovic
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
As the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic reached the Balkans, Serbia has energetically taken its partnership with China to the next level. This happened as Belgrade embraced China’s “mask diplomacy” campaign of supplying medical equipment to the countries affected by the pandemic. However, while Russia has supplied aid to Serbia to combat the pandemic, it has not received the same attention from the Serbian leadership and public the way China did. Therefore, the pandemic has proven to be a potent ‘revealer’ and reminder of the lack of substance and depth of differences in the Serbo-Russian partnership.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Serbia, and Balkans

79. Britain's Uncertain Brexit March

Author:
Marko Attila Hoare
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The popular vote of the UK on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU has been politically an earthquake for the first and a shock to the second. Retrospectively, the outcome was likely, given the structural factors both within Britain and between Britain and the EU. Yet these same factors have obstructed a clear British post- referendum strategy for secession: Britain Britain’s relationship to Europe is traditionally ambiguous. Britain’s identity - of a Protestant island-state formed in 1707 from the Anglo- Scottish union - was cemented during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in wars against the Catholic powers of continental Europe. It was successively reinforced by Napoleon’s anti-British Continental System; does not know what kind of Brexit it wants, or whether it wants one at all. This briefing will examine the causes of the Brexit revolution and the reasons for its uncertain execution, before considering the likely outcome.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Europe Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales

80. Volodymyr Zelensky’s Sweeping Victories: Is Ukraine’s Turn Toward the West Definite?

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
For more than half a decade Ukraine has been one of epicenters on the map of geopolitical crises in the world and consequently drawn a lot of international attention worldwide. Ever since it gained its independence form the crumbling Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine was a of the country also changed. Ukraine has been dominated by Russia as the Russian Empire penetrated deep toward the Black Sea in the 17th century, and the position of inferiority towards Moscow was also the case in the USSR. The first upheaval dubbed the Orange Revolution sort of buffer zone between the West and East, between the United States and European allies on the one hand, and the Russian Federation on the other. With the change of political elites and their political preferences, the orientation in 2004, brought to power Viktor Yushchenko, who tried to conduct reforms and bring Ukraine closer to the West, but the effect of his Presidency were ephemeral. President Viktor Yanukovych turned Ukraine’s sight towards Russia again, but also kept the process of EU association alive before suddenly deciding not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU just days before the planned signing ceremony on 29th November 2013. This Yanukovych’s abrupt turn from EU in favor of stronger ties with Russia triggered the wave of massive public demonstrations which later become known as the Euromaidan and subsequently the Ukrainian revolution in February 2014. The Euromaidan Revolution toppled Yanukovych and the new pro-Western government was formed. Russia soon reacted to the change of tide in Ukraine by annexing the Crimean peninsula in March and soon the armed conflict between the pro- Western government in Kiev and Russia backed rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts broke out. Ever since the spring of 2014, Ukraine has been engulfed in a brutal conflict in the east of the country that is hampering its efforts to reform and get closer to the EU. Nonetheless, Ukrainian leadership is under the new President Volodymir Zelensky is striving to forge stronger links with the West and the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Crimea

81. Norm and Dissidence: Egyptian Shiʿa between Security Approaches and Geopolitical Stakes

Author:
Stéphane Valter
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University in Qatar
Abstract:
This paper presents a study of Egyptian Shiʿism by providing historical context as well as a focus on actual or current issues. The study includes a historical overview of local Shiʿism (Fatimid period, late nineteenth century, 1940s–1960s, and contemporary period); Shiʿi institutions and personalities; the situation following Egypt’s 2011 revolution; the hectic one-year government of the Muslim Brotherhood (2012–2013); President al-Sisi’s authoritarian takeover; and, finally, an exploration of the current geopolitical stakes, focusing mainly on the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over religious hegemony.
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, and Shia
Political Geography:
Africa, Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt

82. Climate Security: Making it #Doable

Author:
Karolina Eklöw, Florian Krampe, Malin Mobjörk, and Dan Smith
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Climate-related events left no region unaffected in 2018. These events demonstrate how climate change impacts are worsening. Despite increased geopolitical tensions that seem to undermine the Agenda 2030 or the Paris Agreement, global and regional organisations have been able to achieve some progress in addressing and mitigating climate-related security risks. This report, prepared for the Planetary Security Conference taking place in The Hague on 19–20 February 2019, feeds into the conversation by sketching the past year’s trends in relation to climate and security.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Geopolitics, Risk, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

83. The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region

Author:
Neil J. Melvin
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Horn of Africa is undergoing far-reaching changes in its external security environment. A wide variety of international security actors—from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf and Asia—are currently operating in the region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has experienced a proliferation of foreign military bases and a build-up of naval forces. The external militarization of the Horn poses major questions for the future security and stability of the region. This SIPRI Background Paper is the first of three papers devoted to the new external security politics of the Horn of Africa. The paper maps the growth of foreign military forces in and around the Horn over the past two decades. The other two papers in this series are ‘The New External Security Politics of the Horn of Africa Region’ (SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, April 2019) and ‘Managing the New External Security Politics of the Horn of Africa Region’ (SIPRI Policy Brief, April 2019).
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa, Indian Ocean, and Horn of Africa

84. The Cartographic Constitution Of International Politics

Author:
Jeppe Strandsbjerg
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
Our current system of international politics is built on a cartographic real- ity of space. Te legal attachment of sovereignty to territory requires a particular cartographic representation of space. By this I mean that our system of states— being territorially defned—implicitly requires a geography that is mapped in a way that is compatible with our notion of sovereignty. Te cartographic image of state territory enables us to maintain the idea of territorial integrity even when the reality on the ground corresponds very little with the fundamental principles of the UN Charter: Sovereignty (Article 2:1) and Territorial Integrity (Article 2:4).1 When UN operations map the Democratic Republic of Congo it is represented as an integrated territory, and Iraq and Syria maintain their coherent cartographic-territorial representation even when both countries have been divided in all but formal name. Although these are obvious examples of the territorial ideal disagreeing with the power relations on the ground, they actually capture a general logic where the territorial order represented by the map precedes the order on the ground.
Topic:
International Relations, Geopolitics, International Relations Theory, and Cartography
Political Geography:
Global Focus

85. India, The United States, Australia and the Difficult Birth of Bangladesh

Author:
Ric Smith
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Ric Smith has masterfully woven archival material, memories of his own time as a foreign service officer, and conversations with other officers of the then Department of Foreign Affairs to recount the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971 and the difficult birth of Bangladesh. Smith highlights the Cold War incongruities of the crisis, including the Soviet Union’s support for democratic India’s position during the crisis, while the United States supported the military regime in Pakistan. The episode also stands as an example of Canberra diverging from Washington on an issue that was garnering political and media attention in Australia. Australia was able to pursue a policy toward the region that was independent from the United States, accepting early that East Pakistan was “finished” and that there was a need to address an unfolding humanitarian crisis. Smith’s book imparts important lessons about diplomacy for Australia: It is not only possible for Australia’s politicians and diplomats to take independent positions on major international problems, but they are sometimes respected by their allies when they do so.
Topic:
Cold War, Human Rights, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Europe, India, Asia, Soviet Union, and Australia

86. A debate with the Kurdistan Region’s President

Author:
Middle East Research Institute
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
This timely session was dedicated to a debate with the President of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to discuss central geo-political and domestic developments, including the protests and the crisis of governance in Baghdad; the Turkish invasion of Northern Syria (particularly Rojava); and finally, the effects of internal political fissures within the KRI.
Topic:
Development, Governance, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Baghdad, Syria, and Kurdistan

87. The Middle East in a Crystal Ball: Trajectories and Predictions

Author:
Middle East Research Institute
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
In her introduction, panel chairman Tanya Gilly highlighted that Middle East history has long been marked by turmoil and transition. While the region is no stranger to overlapping and intractable conflicts, she emphasized that recent dynamics have introduced new complexities. Buffeted by competing regional and global entities, and littered with fragile and failing states, the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has become fraught with militarization, mass population displacement, and communal fragmentation. Gilly explained that this panel would focus on recent geopolitical developments in Northern Syria, and that panelists would be pressed to consider how they might influence the next evolution of the Middle East to create an environment conducive to lasting peace.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

88. Toward a New EU Democracy Strategy

Author:
Ken Godfrey and Richard Youngs
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Ten years ago, the European Union’s (EU’s) member governments agreed on important council conclusions designed to raise the profile of the union’s support for democracy across the world. In late 2019, EU member states are likely to agree on new democracy conclusions and then, in 2020, on an updated and more operational action plan. They recognize that the strategic context has changed dramatically in the last decade, and the union needs to take on board many lessons about what has worked and not worked in its policies since 2009. Many policymakers hope that the change in leadership of the EU institutions in late 2019 might rejuvenate the bloc’s commitment to international democratic norms, after a period in which the priority has shifted to security issues. This working paper assesses the evolution of EU democracy support policies in recent years and proposes a number of improvements that a new policy framework might offer. The union has focused on improving microlevel tactics, but it most urgently needs a rethink at the macrolevel of its democracy strategies. Ironically, in the last ten years EU approaches to democracy have slowly become more sophisticated and sensitive at the implementation level yet have lost traction because they have failed to keep up with larger political and strategic changes within and beyond Europe. The paper proposes ten action points built around the need for the EU to be more proactive and flexible in supporting democracy and to link democracy support to the union’s changing approach to geopolitical challenges.
Topic:
Governance, Democracy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

89. Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After a decades-long absence, Russia is once again appearing on the African continent. The Kremlin’s return to Africa, which has generated considerable media, governmental, and civil society attention, draws on a variety of tools and capabilities. Worrying patterns of stepped-up Russian activity are stirring concerns that a new wave of great-power competition in Africa is now upon us. U.S. policymakers frequently stress the need to counter Russian malign influence on the continent. On a visit to Angola in early 2019, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan said that “Russia often utilizes coercive, corrupt, and covert means to attempt to influence sovereign states, including their security and economic partnerships.”1 Advocates for a more forceful Western policy response point to high-visibility Russian military and security cooperation in the Central African Republic and the wide-ranging travels of Russian political consultants and disinformation specialists as confirmation that Russia, like China, represents a major challenge in Africa. Yet is that really the case? Are Russian inroads and capabilities meaningful or somewhat negligible? Hard information is difficult to come by, but any honest accounting of Russian successes will invariably point to a mere handful of client states with limited strategic significance that are isolated from the West and garner little attention from the international community. It remains unclear whether Russia’s investments in Africa over the past decade are paying off in terms of creating a real power base in Africa, let alone putting it on a footing that will expand its influence in the years to come. Nevertheless, Russia increasingly looks to Africa as a region where it can project power and influence. President Vladimir Putin will welcome leaders from across the continent to Sochi in late October for the first Africa-Russia summit, a clear indication of the symbolic importance that Africa holds for the Kremlin right now.2 It is clear that Russian inroads there would be far more limited but for the power vacuums created by a lack of Western policy focus on Africa in recent years. That state of affairs gives Russia (and other outside powers) an opportunity to curry favor with the continent’s elites and populations. More than anything else, it is opportunism that propels Russia’s relatively low-cost and low-risk strategies to try to enhance its clout and unnerve the West in Africa, just as in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Topic:
International Affairs, Power Politics, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, North America, and United States of America

90. Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None

Author:
Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The 2015 Russian military intervention in Syria was a pivotal moment for Moscow’s Middle East policy. Largely absent from the Middle East for the better part of the previous two decades, Russia intervened to save Bashar al-Assad’s regime and reasserted itself as a major player in the region’s power politics. Moscow’s bold use of military power positioned it as an important actor in the Middle East. The intervention took place against the backdrop of a United States pulling back from the Middle East and growing uncertainty about its future role there. The geopolitical realignment and instability caused by the civil wars in Libya and Syria and the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia have opened opportunities for Russia to rebuild some of the old relationships and to build new ones. The most dramatic turnaround in relations in recent years has occurred between Russia and Israel. The new quality of the relationship owes a great deal to the personal diplomacy between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but Russia’s emergence as a major presence in Syria has meant that the Israelis now have no choice but to maintain good relations with their new “neighbor.” Some Israeli officials hope that Moscow will help them deal with the biggest threat they face from Syria—Iran and its client Hezbollah. So far, Russia has delivered some, but far from all that Israel wants from it, and there are precious few signs that Russia intends to break with Iran, its partner and key ally in Syria. Russian-Iranian relations have undergone an unusual transformation as a result of the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war. Their joint victory is likely to lead to a divergence of their interests. Russia is interested in returning Syria to the status quo ante and reaping the benefits of peace and reconstruction. Iran is interested in exploiting Syria as a platform in its campaign against Israel. Russia lacks the military muscle and the diplomatic leverage to influence Iran. That poses a big obstacle to Moscow’s ambitions in the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

91. Nuclear Enrichment: Russia’s Ill-Fated Influence Campaign in South Africa

Author:
Andrew Weiss and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Amid the widespread attention the Kremlin’s recent inroads in Africa have attracted, there has been surprisingly little discussion of South Africa, a country which, for nearly a decade, unquestionably represented Russia’s biggest foreign policy success story on the continent. As relations soared during the ill-starred presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009–2018), the Kremlin sought to wrest a geopolitically significant state out of the West’s orbit and to create a partnership that could serve as a springboard for expanded influence elsewhere in Africa. Moscow’s strategy was multifaceted, capitalizing on well-established close ties with Zuma, a former African National Congress senior intelligence official with extensive Soviet bloc connections. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials pursued a series of initiatives, such as the inclusion of South Africa in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) grouping and the launch of ambitious forms of cooperation between state-backed energy interests primarily in the nuclear sector. Yet relations were undermined by the Kremlin’s propensity to overreach, to lean too heavily on the legacy of Cold War–era relationships forged with leaders of national liberation movements, and to take advantage of cultures of corruption. The controversy arising from a massive $76 billion nuclear power plant construction deal triggered strong pushback and legal challenges from South Africa’s institutional checks and balances, civil society groups, and independent media. Key parts of the Russian national security establishment view civil nuclear power exports as an important tool for projecting influence overseas while creating revenue streams for sustaining intellectual and technical capabilities and vital programs inside Russia itself. Yet such cooperation is often a two-edged sword. On the one hand, costly projects such as the one pushed by Zuma typically make little economic sense for the purchasing country, spurring uncomfortable questions about who stands to benefit. On the other hand, heavily subsidized projects pursued mainly for geopolitical reasons risk saddling Russia’s nuclear power monopoly Rosatom with burdens it can ill afford. Ongoing investigations of high-level corruption during the period of so-called state capture under Zuma shed remarkable light on how the Kremlin operates in Africa and other parts of the world. In retrospect, the sustainability of Moscow’s embrace of South Africa was highly questionable due to its paltry tool kit. Russian involvement in the South African economy is miniscule compared to that of other trading partners such as the EU, China, the United States, India, and the UK, accounting for a mere 0.4 percent of South Africa’s foreign trade. While the Soviet Union was an important patron during the anti-apartheid struggle, modern-day Russia offers little in the way of practical assistance for helping South Africa deal with its deep-set economic and societal challenges.
Topic:
Energy Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, and Nuclear Waste
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and South Africa

92. The Baltic Sea Region after the Ukraine Crisis and Trump: A Russian perspective

Author:
Alexander Sergunin
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
This DIIS Report identifies Russian national interests in the BSR (Baltic Sea Region) and discusses whether there are continuities and changes in these interests in the post-Crimea era. The Russian discourse on the BSR is explored, including Russian foreign policy schools and official foreign policy and national security doctrines. Different aspects of Moscow’s BSR strategy - political, economic, sub-regional, environmental and military - are examined. The chances for Russia’s participation in the BSR multilateral cooperative framework are assessed. This DIIS Report authored by Alexander Sergunin, professor at St. Petersburg State University, is an outgrowth of a defence and security project on 'The Baltic Sea Region after Crimea and Trump' with Sergunin and Hans Mouritzen, senior researcher at DIIS, as participants (see also DIIS Working Paper 2019:1).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Crimea, and Baltic Sea

93. The Middle Eastern Scramble for the Horn of Africa: Humanitarian, Agricultural and Educational Aspects

Author:
Irit Back
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the new issue of Ifriqiya, Irit Back deals with how Middle Eastern powers are trying to increase their involvement in the Horn of Africa. A number of analysts and observers have noted that in the Horn of Africa, contemporary Middle Eastern states are now influencing events on the ground and long-term patterns of change. Moreover, the regional divisions within the Middle East, such as the divide between Iran, Turkey and Qatar on the one hand, and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other, impacts how they compete for shares in the economic and human potential of the Horn of Africa, which includes about 150 million people.[1] Indeed, it seems that the Horn is one of the more turbulent regions in the world, which at the same time is among the most geopolitically and economically important. Currently, the intersection of global, regional, national, and local interests is creating rapid change and political transition.
Topic:
Cold War, Humanitarian Aid, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Middle East and Horn of Africa

94. Leading Change in United Nations Organizations

Author:
Catherine Bertini
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
This paper provides food for thought for incoming senior officials of the United Nations on a range of issues related to leading their organizations and embarking on organizational change. The transition to UN leadership, especially by the many agency executive heads who come to the United Nations from outside the system, is extremely critical, and these incoming senior leaders need to quickly understand their agency, its mission, its staff, its place within the larger UN and NGO ecosystem, and whether change is needed to improve the functioning of the agency. However, the United Nations and individual agencies provide little, if any, transition assistance for incoming executive heads. There is also little guidance and information provided to agency heads in leading transformational organizational change. Given the immense issues facing incoming leaders— including the internal pressures of running a large, multinational, political organization and external pressures from geopolitical shifts, poverty, war, strife, natural disasters, climate change— strong, creative, and risk-taking leadership is necessary for success. This paper provides guidance for new leaders through various stages of the early days of UN leadership; from preparations made upon appointment to the position to the first 100 days in office and finally through the assessment, planning, and implementation of transformational organizational change. It was written with input from many former and current senior UN leaders in hopes of providing valuable advice, insight, and lessons learned that can be used by new leaders as they embark on their challenging and rewarding mission to change lives and change the world.
Topic:
Climate Change, United Nations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Global Focus

95. The parliamentary election in Moldova: The end of European illusions

Author:
Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Moldovan parliamentary election is not about geopolitical or societal choices; it is about a power grab by oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, and the erosion of pluralism, freedoms and European aspirations under the EU’s watch.
Topic:
Elections, European Union, Geopolitics, Election watch, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Moldavia

96. Bangladesh: Two Independence Movements

Author:
Howard Shaffer and Teresita Schaffer
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 shocked the world with its violence and the callousness of U.S. policy, inspired a unique Beatles concert, and became a feature in a major shift in relations among the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and India. But the Bangladesh movement did not arise in a vacuum. Instead, it grew out of the fragmented geographic, ethnic, and power structure left behind from its first independence movement, when the subcontinent was partitioned into India and Pakistan in 1947. After independence, Bangladesh was expected to be a “basket case.” Relatively successful economically, its political trajectory has been more volatile, albeit more promising than other countries studied for this project. However, many issues that shaped the Bangladesh movement—the second of the country’s two independence movements—still stalk Bangladeshi politics four decades after its bloody creation.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Independence
Political Geography:
Bangladesh and Asia

97. Eritrea: The Independence Struggle and the Struggles of Independence

Author:
Terrance Lyons
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Eritrea’s saga of achieving independence in 1993 entails a brutal 30-year war and the mobilization of a remarkable national liberation movement. In the late nineteenth century, this small state in the Horn of Africa suffered under the colonial domination of the Italians, followed by Ethiopia’s imperialism and military rule. Self-determination, not secession, was sought by Eritrean nationalists because they never accepted colonial rule or Ethiopia’s sovereignty. After a war that included near victory in the mid-1970s, internecine splits, and a strategic retreat to a mountain redoubt in the far northwest, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) defeated the Soviet-backed Ethiopian army and seized control of all of Eritrea in May 1991. The postwar independence era started with great hopes, a referendum in which 99 percent of the population voted in favor of independence, the conversion of the rebel movement into a ruling party, and the creation of a consultative process to write a new constitution. In 1998, however, a border war broke out with Ethiopia, resulting in the almost complete militarization of Eritrean society. In 2001, a group of leaders who played key roles in the liberation war demanded political reforms and were arrested by President Isaias Afwerki. Since then Eritrea has experienced the complete closure of political space, economic decline, international sanctions, and isolation. It ranks near the bottom of global assessments regarding democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and free media.
Topic:
Nationalism, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, and Independence
Political Geography:
Africa and Eritrea

98. Timor-Leste: A Nation of Resistance

Author:
Miks Muizarajs
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At the turn of the twenty-first century, a small half-island nation emerged from the chaos of conflict against monumental odds. Within just 15 years of independence, Timor-Leste managed to become the most democratic nation in Southeast Asia. Its success was possible due to the skill of its leaders, shifts in geopolitics, and unprecedented levels of international support. Leaders were able to unite East Timor’s ethnically and politically divided society and transform it into a powerful resistance network that coalesced military, clandestine, diplomatic, and activist efforts at a critical juncture in history. A successful campaign to win the hearts and minds of the global audience and the realignment of powerful interests after the Cold War culminated in considerable pressure on Indonesia to release its grip. Brief UN administration and considerable commitments from Australia, Portugal, the United States, and other nations to construct institutions and deploy troops helped prevent a return to violence. Timor-Leste’s savvy and dynamic leadership capitalized on this international support and managed to use its considerable oil reserves to overcome fragility. Despite centrifugal forces, the leadership continues to share aspirations of building a sovereign and prosperous nation.
Topic:
Nationalism, Geopolitics, Independence, and Resistance
Political Geography:
Asia, Timor-Leste, and Southeast Asia

99. Kosovo: An Unlikely Success Still in the Making

Author:
Daniel Serwer
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
he modern Kosovo state is a product of Albanian nonviolent and violent rebellion, Serbian repression, the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, state collapse in Albania, NATO intervention, U.S. and EU support, Russian weakness, and UN administration. Without one or another of these ingredients, it might never have occurred, and certainly not in the surprising way that it did.
Topic:
Nationalism, United Nations, Geopolitics, Independence, and Resistance
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

100. Belarus Could Be Russia’s Next Big Geopolitical Target

Author:
Emil Avdaliani
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Russia’s geopolitical projection has shifted over the past two decades. The country has tried to reverse its losses in Ukraine and the South Caucasus, but it is in Belarus that Moscow will most likely try to further extend its leverage to keep the EU and NATO at bay.
Topic:
International Affairs and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Israel