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1. Australia as a Rising Middle Power

Author:
Malcolm Davis
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper examines the key drivers shaping Australia’s role as a middle power in an era of intensifying US-China strategic competition. These drivers include the influence of strategic geography; its historical legacy in international affairs; the impact of its economic relationships with states in the Indo-Pacific region; the changing demands of defence policy, including the potential offered by rapid technological change; and, the impact of climate change, resource constraints and demographic factors. The paper considers three possible scenarios that will shape Australia’s middle power policy choices – a US-China strategic equilibrium; a “China crash” scenario that promotes a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy; and a third “major power conflict” scenario where competition extends into military conflict. The paper concludes that Australia cannot maintain a delicate balance between its strategic alliance with the US and trading relationship with China. It argues there is a need for Australia to adopt a deeper strategic alliance with the US while promoting closer ties with its partners in the Indo-Pacific and supporting the growth of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region to counterbalance growing Chinese power. Australia needs to embrace an Indo-Pacific step up, and as a middle power, reduce the prospect of a Sino-centric regional order emerging.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nationalism, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

2. Trump, the Middle East, and North Africa: Just Leave Things to the Proxies?

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
When Trump says that he wants NATO to take more responsibility in the Middle East, what he means is that he wants the European allies to do more. He is campaigning for re- election and has promised to bring the boys (and girls) home for Christmas. And of course, in Iraq American troops are less than welcome these days, after the targeted assassination of Iranian General Soleimani near Baghdad airport (3 January 2020). In late 2019, Trump had already withdrawn most troops from Syria, and now the peace agreement with the Taliban (29 February 2020) will allow him to draw down the US military presence in Afghanistan too. And the US is considering pulling its troops out of the Sahel as well. What does this mean for Europe?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Assassination
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and North America

3. China Global Security Tracker, No.6

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
China hits back after NATO calls it a security challenge, dormant Chinese hacking group resumes attacks, and more.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Beijing, Asia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka

4. Talking Points for the Top National Security Issues of 2020

Author:
Mieke Eoyang
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
In 2020, candidates and elected officials will face questions on national security and foreign policy issues. In this memo, we provide short talking points on these issues that acknowledge the concerns of Americans, critique current approaches and policies, and present a vision for the future: 1. Global Health Security, 2. China & COVID-19, 3. China Trade War, 4. Russia, 5. Terrorism, 6. Domestic Extremism, 7. Iran, 8. Election Security, 9. Saudi Arabia & Yemen, 10. Syria, 11. Alliances, 12. North Korea, 13. Cyberthreats, 14. Venezuela, 15. Afghanistan, 16. Forever War, 17. Border Security, 18. Defense Spending, 19. Impeachment, 20. Climate Change, 21. Corruption
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Elections
Political Geography:
United States, North America, and Global Focus

5. American Sanctions and European Sovereignty

Author:
Jean De Ruyt
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The decision by the United States to withdraw from the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and re-impose sanctions on Iran broke an international understanding, sanctioned by a UN Security Council Resolution. However, European and other non-US companies dealing with Iran must abide by US law in order to avoid its extra- territorial effects on their US operations. Efforts are being made to help the EU keep its “sovereignty” on sanction issues when there is disagreement with the US, but until now these have not accomplished much. Therefore a new Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was launched at the end of January to ensure the continuation of some trade with Iran. But the only convincing way to allow the EU to increase its autonomy is to boost the role of the Euro in international transactions. Certainly, in today’s unpredictable world, we need more than ever to address the issue of the extraterritorial application of American sanctions – today it is Iran, what if tomorrow it is China?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sovereignty, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and North America

6. Downsizing Defense in Development: Unpacking DOD’s Development Assistance

Author:
Sarah Rose
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The US Department of Defense (DOD) is not a development agency, but it does manage millions of dollars of development assistance. In the early 2000s, DOD took on a significantly expanded development role, prompting a number of concerns and creating a lingering perception of intensive US military involvement in development activities. In fact, lessons learned from this era drove a reconceptualization of the Pentagon’s role in development. Today, the military controls only a tiny portion of US development funds, most of which go toward health (mainly PEPFAR) and disaster relief activities. This paper provides a brief landscape analysis of DOD’s recent development aid-funded efforts, breaking down its engagement into six key thematic areas. It concludes with five considerations related to DOD’s role in development assistance: (1) DOD has comparative advantages that make it an important actor in US development policy; (2) civilian-military coordination is hard but critical for development policy coherence; (3) adequate resourcing of civilian agencies is critical for effective civilian-military division of labor; (4) increasing the flexibility of civilian agencies’ staffing, programming, and funding could complement the military’s rapid response capabilities; and (5) incomplete transparency and limited focus on results reduces accountability around DOD’s aid investments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, Military Strategy, Bureaucracy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
United States and North America

7. China Global Security Tracker, No.5

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Presenting China as a 'responsible power' – Beijing releases first major defense white paper in four years
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Europe, Canada, Taiwan, France, and North America

8. Advancing UK maritime aviation in the Queen Elizabeth-class era

Author:
Nick Childs
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom is on the cusp of regenerating what is a transformational capability. The first of the UK’s new-generation aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth, has been at sea on trials for two years, and is working up towards its first operational deployment in 2021. The second ship, HMS Prince of Wales, is scheduled to be accepted into service before the end of the year. The F-35B Lightning II has achieved initial land-based operating capability and the Lightning Force has carried out its first overseas deployment, Lightning Dawn. Maritime aviation in the round has undergone a significant transformation, and there has been a substantial increased focus on collaboration and partnering with industry as well as developing stronger links with critical allies. To underscore the significance of the undertaking, then secretary of state for defence Penny Mordaunt announced on 15 May 2019 that the UK planned to produce a National Aircraft Carrier Policy to lay down a blueprint for how the new carrier era would help deliver the UK’s global objectives. In addition, on 4 June, then prime minister Theresa May announced that the UK would earmark the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to form part of NATO’s significant new Readiness Initiative. These developments have prompted thought and discussion on the extent to which the carrier programme will enable and actually drive the transformation of UK joint-force capabilities, and are posing questions about the demands such a programme will place on UK defence and industry. This paper considers both the opportunities and challenges that the carrier era presents in a number of key areas
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and London

9. You Can't Surge Trust: Lessons on Working with Allies and Partners

Author:
George Fust
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
Today’s increasingly complex global operating environment can change at the speed of a tweet or viral video. It is therefore imperative for US forces to have the relationships that offer flexibility and options for any contingency—relationships established in advance of unforeseeable events. The world’s interconnectedness and US defense requirements demand partners and allies with whom we work effectively to bridge cultural gaps. Those relationships increase interoperability by creating realistic expectations and combating what can at times emerge as negative stereotypes. Further, shared experiences can help overcome misunderstandings and foster friendships that will be critical in times of crisis. Simply put, you cannot surge trust. It must be cultivated and given constant attention.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States and North America

10. Current Military Academy Service Obligation: Good for Civil-Military Relations

Author:
George Fust
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
Imagine receiving a free undergraduate education at one of the best colleges in the United States. The military academies provide this. Any economist, however, will tell you that there is no such thing as a free lunch. The American tax payer foots the bill for all those who are admitted to attend one of the military’s academies. In exchange, these citizens will commission as officers and serve an obligation of five years on active duty. The most recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes a section directing the Secretary of Defense to assess if this five-year service obligation should be extended. Congress is now questioning if the increase in the cost of educating and training should equate to an increase in time served for graduates. In short, is the nation getting “an adequate return on investment for a service academy graduate?”
Topic:
Defense Policy, Education, Training, and Military Service
Political Geography:
United States and North America

11. The basis for strong US-European relations endures: Continuity in institutions and interests

Author:
Christopher Kojm
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
President Donald Trump’s words and actions are disrupting US-European relations. Yet the structural basis for strong transatlantic ties endures. Key institutions and forces involved in the making of US foreign policy exhibit more continuity than change with respect to transatlantic relations. Congress strongly supports NATO. It agrees with the President on the need for greater burden-sharing, yet opposes the President’s harsh and gratuitous attacks on the Alliance. Executive Branch Departments, especially the Department of Defence, have longstanding institutional ties with European counterparts. High-level meetings, defence cooperation agreements, military exercises, and relationship-building continue without interruption. The US business community strongly opposes tariffs, and has been able to blunt the Administration’s further imposition of tariffs on European partners. Public opinion still strongly supports transatlantic defence and trade relations, even as partisan differences grow.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Tariffs, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

12. The militarization of US foreign policy: Engagement with Europe increasingly about defense

Author:
Deborah A. McCarthy
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The US Department of Defense is playing a predominant role in US foreign policy due to expanded mandates, large budgets and the disparagement of diplomacy by the Trump Administration. Defense relations may be the steadier foundation for transatlantic cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Budget, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and North America

13. Distributed Defense New Operational Concepts for Integrated Air and Missile Defense

Author:
Tom Karako and Wes Rumbaugh
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the rising salience of missile threats, current air and missile defense forces are far too susceptible to suppression. Today’s U.S. air and missile defense (AMD) force lacks the depth, capacity, and operational flexibility to simultaneously perform both missions. Discussions about improving AMD usually revolve around improvements to the capability and capacity of interceptors or sensors. Rather than simply doing more of the same, the joint integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) efforts might be well served by new or reinvigorated operational concepts, here discussed collectively as “Distributed Defense.” By leveraging networked integration, Distributed Defense envisions a more flexible and more dispersible air and missile defense force capable of imposing costs and dilemmas on an adversary, complicating the suppression of U.S. air and missile defenses. Although capability and capacity improvements remain essential to the high-end threats, the Distributed Defense concept focuses on creating a new architecture for today’s fielded or soon-to-be fielded IAMD force to boost flexibility and resilience.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States

14. The Return of Political Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

15. Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance

Author:
Melissa Dalton and Hijab Shah
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
With the range of security challenges confronting the United States in the 21st century, characterized by competition by both state and nonstate actors, the importance of working with allies and partners to address common challenges is paramount. Deeper examination of the relative effectiveness of U.S. security sector assistance and how it must nest in a broader foreign policy strategy, including good governance, human rights, and rule of law principles, is required. Improving oversight and accountability in U.S. security sector assistance with partners are at the core of ongoing security assistance reform efforts to ensure that U.S. foreign policy objectives are met and in accordance with U.S. interests and values. This report examines key areas in security sector programming and oversight where the U.S. Departments of Defense and State employ accountability mechanisms, with the goal of identifying ways to sharpen and knit together mechanisms for improving accountability and professionalism into a coherent approach for partner countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Human Rights
Political Geography:
United States and North America

16. Trump’s 2019 Missile Defense Budget: Choosing Capacity over Capability

Author:
Tom Karako and Wes Rumbaugh
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
President Trump’s 2019 budget request includes $12.9 billion for missile defense programs, including $9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and about $3 billion in modernization in the military services, building upon the acceleration initiated in the $323 million FY 2017 Above Threshold Reprogramming and the FY 2018 Budget Amendment of $2.0 billion. The proposed budget continues the recent trend of procurement consuming a greater portion of overall missile defense spending, reflecting a choice for prioritizing near-term capacity over longer-term capability. With the exception of two new Pacific radars and a modest effort for tracking hypersonic threats, the request includes strikingly few changes to the program of record. The submission fails to address past shortfalls for more research and development of new missile defense technologies and capabilities, most significantly with its lack of real movement toward a space-based sensor layer for tracking and discrimination, as opposed to merely missile warning. Pursuit of more advanced capabilities will require substantial programmatic changes in the 2020 budget, or with a budget amendment later this year, if such capabilities are recommended by the forthcoming Missile Defense Review. On February 12, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its budget request for FY 2019, which included a total of $12.9 billion for missile defense-related activities. The proposed topline for the Missile Defense Agency comes in at $9.9 billion, comprising $2.4 billion for procurement, $6.8 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), $500 million for operations and maintenance (O&M), and $206 million for military construction (MILCON). The $9.9 billion request is a 26 percent increase from the FY 2018 budget request of $7.9 billion. Funding for ballistic missile defense within the services includes about $3 billion, largely for the procurement of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors. Overall, the budget reflects a near-term focus on capacity of existing programs, even at the expense of capability improvements. In its current form, the request boosts funding for all four families of interceptors. For homeland missile defense, this includes the continued improvements to the capacity and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system by continuing to deploy an additional 20 interceptors, several testing spares, and a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. The request also deepens the magazines for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot interceptors, continuing a procurement-heavy trend from last year.1 The focus on capacity does not answer the question, however, how missile defense efforts will be adapted to the new reality of great power competition described by the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.2 One of the few new muscle movements in the entire budget is the addition of two radars in the Pacific for discriminating long-range missile threats to the homeland. The idea of a discrimination radar for Hawaii had been publicly floated over the past two years, and had previously been part of the yet-unpassed appropriations marks from the House and Senate appropriations committees. The Hawaii radar is scheduled for a 2023 deployment, with an additional radar deployed by 2024 at a yet-undisclosed location. The two radars will cost approximately $2.5 billion over the course of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. Although these radars would be useful to close the near-term Pacific midcourse gap against limited ballistic missile threats to the homeland, such funds must be weighed against the opportunity cost for larger improvements in capability provided by a space-based sensor layer that could provide substantially more capable birth-to-death tracking and discrimination on a more global scale and against a wider diversity of threats. The choice for capacity over capability reflects a near-term time horizon, but further delay in more advanced technologies will carry costs at a later time. In sum, the administration’s budget request for FY 2019 prioritizes near-term readiness against limited but growing ballistic missile threats from sources such as North Korea. This choice, however, falls short of connecting missile defense efforts to the reality of renewed great power competition as articulated in the National Defense Strategy. The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. The 2019 request’s modesty of ambition is manifested by low funding for more advanced programs, such as boost-phase intercept, space-based sensors, and volume kill. Should the forthcoming Missile Defense Review address some of these issues and recommend programmatic changes, their implementation may have to wait until the 2020 budget, unless a budget amendment of some kind prioritizes them for the coming fiscal year.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Budget, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Asia, and North America

17. Russia's New Nuclear Weapons: Whoever Dies with the Most Toys Wins?

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Whatever his other limitations, Vladimir Putin has shown he is a master in exploiting Russian nationalism and American and European sensitivities. His latest gambit—publicizing new Russian nuclear systems—several of which are still developmental, may have key components that are untested, or do not yet exist—give him political credibility in asserting Russian national strength in a Russian election year, and emphasize the one key area where Russia remains a leading global super power: its possession of nuclear weapons. The key question is whether they represent any real change in the nuclear balance, Russian and U.S. ability to pose an existential threat to the other state, and mutual assured destruction. If they do not, they are more technological status symbols or “toys” than real threats, although the proliferation of such weapons might allow smaller nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea to defeat today’s missile and air defense systems and technologies. An analysis of the actual content of his speech, the changing nuclear and conventional balance between the superpowers—the U.S., Russia, and China, the global balance of deployed nuclear weapons, the shifts taking in US and Russian balance since the Cold War, and as a result of START, the full range of new U.S. and Russian nuclear programs, and of what Putin did and did not say about Russia's new programs, provides a very different picture from the one Putin portrayed in his speech. It shows that Putin focused on the "toy factor" in emphasize technology over any real world aspects of the balance, arms control, and war fighting.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nationalism, Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

18. Contested Seas Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe

Author:
Kathleen H. Hicks
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Northern Europe, and specifically the Baltic and Norwegian Seas, has been the site of increasingly provocative and destabilizing Russian actions. The country’s use of a range of military, diplomatic, and economic tools to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies highlights the need to monitor and understand Russian activity. The region is characterized by complex factors like unique geographic features, considerable civilian maritime traffic, the presence of advanced Russian and Western military capabilities, and strategic proximity to Russia and the Kola peninsula, home to the Russian Northern Fleet. While the Norwegian and Baltic Seas do differ in key ways, they are linked by the emerging risk posed by Russia’s long-range strike capabilities. Responding to Russian challenges across the competitive space requires a deep understanding of the Northern European maritime environment. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), defined by the United States as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation or region, is an exceptionally broad concept. At its core, MDA has three functions: the collection of raw data, the analysis of that data, and the action of disseminating information to and coordinating among the different components of the framework. In order to provide security in Northern Europe, NATO and its allies must use MDA frameworks to understand and respond to the challenges above, on, and underneath the sea, as well as the surrounding land environment. While some constructive work has been done to address the evolving Russian threat, NATO and its partners must make changes to their current MDA capabilities to evolve alongside with it. Russia presents three challenges of particular concern to the MDA efforts in Northern Europe: maritime hybrid warfare, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, and long-range strike systems. Maritime Hybrid Warfare—The Russian military is experienced and effective in its use of hybrid warfare, seen in Syria, Crimea, and Northern Europe. The ambiguity possible in the maritime domain lends itself well to this strategy. Russia uses three specific approaches in this realm: deception through different types of vessels including civilian ships, deniable forces like the amphibious and light infantry that easily navigate the complex Baltic and Norwegian Seas, and the country’s well-developed and diverse force for seabed warfare. Cyber and Electronic Warfare—Russia’s advanced EW capabilities have the potential to hinder information gathering and dissemination methods, which are both vital functions of MDA. These capabilities are challenging for military personnel but potentially devastating in civilian contexts, especially as civilian networks and technology (like GPS) are far less secure. Long-Range Strike Capabilities—New challenges for NATO and Northern European partners have emerged with Russia’s development of a long-range precision strike complex. The weapons, now being mounted on new and existing Russian naval vessels, give these vessels the option to stay in the Barents or White Seas and strike targets across Northern Europe. This, combined with air force capabilities based on the Kola Peninsula and in Kaliningrad, presents threats unlike any seen by NATO before. These capabilities require NATO and its partners to use MDA frameworks to monitor launch platforms across the domain. The modern history of MDA begins in the United States, with Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 13 (HSPD-13) / National Security Presidential Directive – 41 (NSPD-41) issued in 2004 by President George W. Bush. The document lays out core interests for the United States to enhance security in the maritime domain and creates a cooperative framework to support MDA operations across different spheres. At the same time, the European concept of maritime security awareness was built upon the U.S. definition of the challenge, placed within the context of rising illicit traffic in the Mediterranean. A weakness of the original MDA and Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) concepts is that many of the associated capabilities and frameworks are focused on civil maritime issues. Given the global proliferation of advanced military capabilities, like antiship cruise missiles, NATO and its partners require a holistic understanding of the maritime environment that focuses on everything from civil maritime actions to high-end military operations and even issues associated with the maritime environment. A key implication of the heightened maritime threat environment is the need to improve the integration of and attention to undersea aspects of MDA. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), a traditional strength of Western naval intelligence and operations, has atrophied since the end of the Cold War. Today, Russian submarines with conventional long-range missiles pose a threat to NATO. ASW must be integrated with MDA to address these concerns. Comprehensive understanding of the undersea realm should extend beyond ASW. Russia’s amphibious special forces and combat swimmers threaten more than just military targets, including civilian vessels and undersea cables, which are an integral part of MDA. ASW technology can be useful in countering these and other threats. In the Norwegian Sea, the biggest challenge for NATO is detecting advanced ultra-quiet submarines. This issue is sharpened by dramatically depleted stockpiles of sonobuoys, a constant need for increasingly advanced sonobuoy technology, and an American unwillingness to share highly classified information about the undersea domain. NATO would benefit from an apparatus like the ASW Operations Centers (ASWOC), used most prominently during the Cold War to streamline ASW operations. Integration of platforms is a challenge in the Baltic Sea as well, largely because Sweden and Finland are not NATO states, making data sharing challenging. Frameworks like Sea Surveillance Co-Operation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) and the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) project facilitate the work of regional states to address these issues but more must be done. Additionally, NATO monitoring of the Baltic region is largely domain specific and suffers from not examining the maritime domain holistically. The alliance and its partners should also act to focus on resiliency to continue to operate in the face of jamming and nonkinetic attacks from Russia. The key to enhancing MDA capabilities in Northern Europe is the integration of frameworks across the maritime domain. Cooperation between NATO states and allies is vital to understanding the complex environment. The CSIS study team has identified seven recommendations of particular importance: Create a Baltic Sea MDA analytic center at the Baltic Maritime Component Command (BMCC) at Rostock, Germany; Empower a small analytic team at the BMCC to focus on maritime hybrid issues; Develop a training course for military intelligence officers on best practices for Baltic Sea MDA analysis; Create a classified Baltic Sea data environment that can incorporate both NATO and partner states; Develop a multinational operational framework for the Baltic Sea; Integrate subsurface sensors and antisubmarine warfare into a comprehensive MDA framework; and Acquire significant stockpiles of advanced sonobuoys and associated acoustic processing systems. These priority recommendations are presented in detail in Chapter 4 of the report, along with others. Collectively, their implication would markedly enhance security in Northern Europe by closing identified gaps and ensuring capabilities for collection, analysis, and action in MDA.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, Western Europe, Baltic Sea, and Norwegian Seas

19. Shield of the Pacific: Japan as a Giant Aegis Destroyer

Author:
Tom Karako
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Several decades ago, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone once described his country as a “big aircraft carrier” from which to defend against Soviet aircraft.1 Although such an analogy fails to capture the richness and depth of the U.S-Japan alliance, it did say something important about Japan’s unique geographic and strategic position. Today’s air and missile threats in the Asia-Pacific region are different, as is the joint U.S.-Japanese defense posture to meet them. Given a handful of changes underway, however, one might instead say that Japan is shaping up to be a giant Aegis destroyer group of sorts. A vision of much more robust air and missile defense capability in the Asia-Pacific region hinges upon the forthcoming acquisition of Aegis Ashore sites in Japan. Japan’s intent to acquire two such sites was announced in December 2017, a decision supported by 66 percent of the Japanese population, according to one recent poll.2 But the potential significance of Japanese Aegis Ashore deployments has not yet been widely understood. Combined with military forces in other domains, these sites will be the foundation of more robust air and missile defenses against North Korea and form a base upon which to adapt to more sophisticated future threats, including China. Assuming the approval process for the foreign military sales comes along well, this development has broad implications for the United States and America’s allies.3 The road to more layered missile defense goes in part through Aegis Ashore, and the road to innovative Aegis Ashore deployments probably goes through Tokyo. The U.S. Navy’s Aegis Combat System has evolved considerably since the first Aegis ship deployed in 1984. Some 90 Aegis ships are currently operated by the United States, and five other countries have Aegis ships as well: Australia, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and Japan. The word “Aegis” refers to the shield of the ancient god Zeus, and Aegis ships have long provided fleet air defense, strike, and antisubmarine warfare. Over the past decade, 35 American and 4 Japanese Aegis ships have also acquired a ballistic missile defense mission. The most recent configurations are capable of executing the integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) mission, with simultaneous air defense and ballistic missile defense operations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

20. The U.S., NATO, and the Defense of Europe: Underlying Trends

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Trump Administration has adopted an "America First" strategy, and taken aggressive stands on NATO burden sharing, trade, the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran, and the treatment of refugees that have led many in Europe to question its support for NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance. At least some European security experts talk about the U.S. as it was backing away from the NATO alliance, and a split between the United States and Europe that will force Europe to create its own approach to creating military and other security forces. Many aspects of the Trump Administration's approach to foreign policy are as controversial in the U.S. as in Europe, and President Trump has proved to be an exceptionally volatile and combative leader who can express himself in extreme terms and suddenly change his positions. However, it but it is important to note the underlying realities that shape the new U.S. strategy, the U.S. military role in the NATO alliance, and Europe's own divisions and failures to create effective forces. The current tensions between the U.S. and given European powers should not lead Europeans - or Americans and Russians for that matter – to ignore the fact that the U.S. remains fully committed to a strong Transatlantic alliance, that its forces and capabilities are critical to European security, and the Trump Administration's FY2019 budget to Congress will greatly increase the contribution that U.S. forces make to NATO and Transatlantic Security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Western Europe

21. The Evolution of U.S. Defense Posture in North and West Africa

Author:
Alice Hunt Friend
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
What is the U.S. military presence in North and West Africa, and how did it evolve? The Defense Department is considering adjustments to its North and West Africa posture in response to a fatal ambush on a U.S. special operations forces team in Niger last fall.1 Without some historical context, it is difficult to assess if these adjustments reflect substantial changes in U.S. presence, and how they might affect U.S. Africa policy in the future. This brief provides such context.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, North Africa, and West Africa

22. The U.S. Defense Budget in FY2019: Underlying Trends

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The report draws on a wide range of official sources and is designed to provide an overview of official reporting on major trends rather than make an independent analysis. The U.S. provides a vast amount of detail on its annual budget request for military and international affairs spending – much of it in graphic, tabular, and summary form. The material presented here is an attempt to pick the key materials to show where the U.S. is focusing its military spending, how it relates to its strategy, how major force improvements will affect U.S. capabilities, and how the U.S. is dealing with its strategic partners and potential threats. However, the user should be aware that much of the material presented is often uncertain and is not comparable from source to source. There also is no easy or single way to summarize the trends in the U.S. defense budget. The materials that go into just the unclassified portions of the Department of Defense’s annual submission of President’s budget request to Congress, and the subsequent Congressional review of that request, run well over several thousand pages. It is also critical for the reader to understand that only the portion of the report dealing with the National Defense Authorization Act (pages 24-43) represents the final result of Congressional action and the FY2019 budget signed by the President, and not all of the portions of reference action by the key Committees involved were approved in exactly the form shown in the final bill signed by the President. Much of the material is drawn from sources that precede the final Congressional markup because the Department never updates most of the tables and charts in the Department of Defense request until the following year and new budget submission. The material presented also shows that different sources define total defense spending in different ways, and include different expenditures and convert current to constant dollars in different ways. More importantly, most sources report in terms of “Budget Authority” (BA) – the total money the Congress authorizes in a given Fiscal Year that can be spent over a period of years. This is the best estimate of what the Congress is actually approving. However, some sources in terms of “Budget Outlays” (BO) – only the money that can be spent in 12-month period of that U.S. Fiscal Year. (Which begins on 1 October of the year the Congress acts upon, and ends on 30 September of the following year). This is the best way of assessing the impact of spending on how well the budget is balanced, the size of the deficit, and impact on the federal debt. Budget projections for future years present other problems. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides detailed estimates of how the President’s budget request – and the final budgets the Congress authorizes – will impact over time. Many such estimates precede Congressional action on the budget, and it then takes several months for the CBO to estimate the probable future trends in the total federal budget and impact of the final Congressionally approved levels of U.S. defense spending on that total federal budget and the U.S. GDP. This often creates major lags in official estimates of the trends in every aspect of federal spending, the budget deficit, and the national debt. More broadly, the Department of Defense has effectively abandoned any serious effort to create a program budget, and to provide a realistic estimate of the cost of the Future Year Defense Program beyond the fiscal year directly under review. It essentially rolls forward current activities and plans to make estimates of the next four years that are based on the spending levels in the budget year under review. It bases such estimates largely on input categories such as personnel, O&M, RDT&E, and procurement. The Department of Defense does not report expenditures by major mission or command. The Department defines “strategy” largely in terms of broad concepts and goals. It does not tie its “strategy” to net assessments of the balance in terms of threats and strategic partners, to specific force plans, to specific actions and schedules, to specific costs, or to measures of success and effectiveness. Unclassified reporting in “PPB” – or planning, programming, and budgeting– form has become a functional oxymoron. The Congress does hold strategy hearings and directs studies of key strategic issues, but these efforts rarely address any of the practical details of any aspect of the nature and cost of U.S. strategy. Similarly, the outyear estimates of military spending by the Department of Defense, OMB, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) focus on a “baseline” that assumes the United States does not actually use its military forces in any operational form. The limited estimates provided for future Overseas Contingency Operations are “placeholders” and not actual estimates. This is partly inevitable given the inability to predict the future, but it creates a practical problem in a country whose civil plans call for major future increases in mandatory spending on retirement, medical case, and welfare. This means the official U.S. projections of civil spending rise relative to military spending in ways history indicates will be highly unrealistic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, and North America

23. China’s pursuit of advanced dual-use technologies

Author:
Helena Legarda and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In its quest to become a global ‘science and tech superpower’ and to build a strong military that can fight and win wars, China has embarked on a major process to achieve civil–military integration (CMI) and develop advanced dual-use technologies. Using various methods both to promote indigenous innovation and to access foreign technology and know-how, China’s goal is to leapfrog the United States and Europe and achieve dominance in these technologies, which will have major civilian and military implications in the future. The EU does not have strong, coordinated strategies to promote the development of indigenous dual-use technologies or to protect Europe’s indigenous innovation. As a result of this patchwork regime, China is either catching up to, or surpassing, European capabilities regarding most of these technologies through a ‘whole-of-government’ regulatory framework and financial investment, as well as by accessing European innovation and technology through a variety of means. For Europe, the incentive to keep up with China’s progress in these technologies, and to protect its own innovation in this field, is one with military, but also commercial and economic, imperatives. At a time when China is increasing its commitment to this process of developing advanced, dual-use technologies, it is high time for Europe to think strategically and take action to leverage its own competitive advantages.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, and Asia

24. Strategic deterrence redux: Nuclear weapons and European security

Author:
Leo Michel and Matti Pesu
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
One of the most notable consequences of the end of the Cold War was the diminished role of nuclear weapons in international relations. The world’s primary nuclear weapon powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, made considerable reductions in their nuclear forces. The climax of the process was the New START Treaty signed in 2010. Now, the optimism that characterized the first decades of the post-Cold War era is rapidly evaporating. Geopolitical competition again dominates global and regional security dynamics. Nuclear powers are modernizing their forces and introducing novel systems that may affect strategic stability. At the same time, existing arms control regimes are crumbling. This report takes stock of recent developments in deterrence in general, and nuclear deterrence in particular. Its main ambition is to understand how deterrence has changed in light of certain post-Cold War trends. To this end, the report introduces the basic principles of deterrence. It also explores the nuclear-related policies and capabilities of the four nuclear weapon states most directly involved in European security affairs – Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Importantly, the report also analyses the implications of the recent trends in strategic deterrence for Northern Europe. This report is part of a research project conducted by the FIIA entitled ‘New Challenges for Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century’. The project is part of the implementation of the Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research 2018.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Europe, France, and North America

25. Turkey’s Turbulent Journey with the EPAA and Quest for a National System

Author:
Nilsu Gören
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper provides an overview of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense debate from a Turkish perspective. While Turkey participates in the EPAA by hosting a U.S. early-warning radar in Kurecik, Malatya, its political and military concerns with NATO guarantees have led to the AKP government's quest for a national long-range air and missile defense system. However, Turkish decision makers' insistence on technology transfer shows that the Turkish debate is not adequately informed by the lessons learned from the EPAA, particularly the technical and financial challenges of missile defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Turkey, and Asia

26. Theories on Why North Korea Rejects the World

Author:
Victor Cha
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
North Korea last week rejected South Korea’s invitation to attend the Seoul Defense Dialogue in September, denigrating the talks as “puerile.” In the same breath, it also rejected a proposal by National Assembly speaker Chung Ui-hwa for a meeting with his northern counterpart to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the Korean Peninsula on Aug. 15. If you ask an Obama administration official about America’s “strategic patience” policy of non-dialogue with North Korea, he or she will tell you that the problem is not an unwillingness on the part of the United States to have dialogue. On the contrary, the Obama administration has tried every channel possible, from six-party talks to personal communications to secret trips, to jump-start a dialogue. But the regime in Pyongyang has rejected all of these.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
United States, South Korea, and North Korea

27. Nuclear Notes

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence has been a central element of U.S. national security policy. The United States' nuclear guarantee became the foundation of its security strategy and that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was created to deter the Soviet Union and served as a core part of the alliance's victorious emergence from the Cold War. Just as many questioned the purpose of the alliance after the Cold War, many allies along with the United States currently debate the continued role of U.S. nuclear deterrence in Europe.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

28. Improving the US-GCC Security Partnership: Planning for the Future

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the years since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Southern Gulf states and the US have developed a de facto strategic partnership based on a common need to deter and defend against any threat from Iran, deal with regional instability in countries like Iraq and Yemen, counter the threat of terrorism and extremism, and deal with the other threats to the flow of Gulf petroleum exports.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Arabia, and North America

29. Exploring New Ways to Provide Enduring Strategic Effects for the Department of Defense

Author:
Clark A. Murdock and Samuel J. Brannen
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A CSIS study team led by senior adviser Clark Murdock and senior fellow Sam Brannen undertook an eight-month study to explore new "ways" of using U.S. military power to achieve enduring strategic effects. As the defense budget decreases over the coming decade, and with defense strategic priorities of the United States taken as a constant, the CSIS study team sought to identify new approaches, reflect on U.S. lessons l earned from historical cases, consider international defense best practices, and examine potentially transferrable approaches from the private sector to achieve defense strategic ends. Insights from the study were shared throughout the process with the sponsoring OSD Strategy Office in support of its role in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Border Control
Political Geography:
United States and North America

30. Civil Defense Groups

Author:
Bruce "Ossie" Oswald
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Between 1981 and 2007, governments in eighty-eight countries established or supported more than three hundred armed militias to provide security to local communities. Such militias often directly engage in armed conflict and law-and-order activities. A number of state-supported civil defense groups make local communities less secure by refusing to respond to state direction, setting up security apparatuses in competition with state authorities, committing human rights violations, and engaging in criminal behavior. The doctrine of state responsibility and the application of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international criminal law obligate the state or states that establish or support civil defense groups to investigate, prosecute, punish, and provide reparations or compensate victims. In many cases, the domestic laws of states are ineffective at holding members of govern¬ments or civil defense groups accountable. Local law enforcement authorities also often fail to investigate or prosecute members of civil defense groups. At present there is no specific international legal instrument to guide the responsible management of relationships between states and civil defense groups. Thus, the international community should develop a legal instrument that specifies the rules and principles that apply to states and civil defense groups and that includes a due diligence framework that focuses on accountability and governance of both states and civil defense groups. Such a framework would enhance the protection and security of communities by setting accountability and governance standards, assisting in security sector reform by establishing benchmarks and evaluation processes, and contributing to the reinforcement of legal rules and principles that apply in armed conflicts. For fragile states or those in a post conflict phase of development, the better management of such forces is likely to build state legitimacy as a provider of security to vulnerable communities.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Defense Policy, and Reform
Political Geography:
United States

31. Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) face a critical need to improve their understanding of how each is developing its military power and how to avoid forms of military competition that could lead to rising tension or conflict between the two states. This report focuses on China's military developments and modernization and how they are perceived in the US, the West, and Asia.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

32. Security Transition in Afghanistan

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Creating an effective transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan's other allies face during 2014-2015 and beyond.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Middle East

33. A strategy to defeat the islamic state

Author:
Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, and Jessica D. Lewis
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The Islamic State poses a grave danger to the United States and its allies in the Middle East and around the world due to its location, resources, the skill and determination of its leaders and fighters, and its demonstrated lethality compared to other al Qaeda-like groups. In Syria, the Assad regime has lost control of the majority of the state, and the regime's atrocities and sectarianism have fueled violent Islamists, particularly ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). In Iraq, the government has lost control over large portions of territory that the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish Peshmerga are incapable of retaking without significant foreign support. The Sunni Arabs of Iraq and Syria are the decisive human terrain. Al-Qaeda and similar groups can only flourish in distressed Sunni communities. Any strategy to counter al-Qaeda requires working with these communities, as the U.S. and the Iraqi government did during the Awakening in 2007. Having neglected Iraq and Syria, the U.S. currently lacks the basic intelligence and contextual understanding to build a strategy. The U.S. must adopt an iterative approach that tests assumptions, enriches understanding, builds partnerships with willing Sunni Arabs, and sets conditions for more decisive operations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Islam
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Syria

34. Foreign Fighters in Syria

Author:
Richard Barrett
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
Over 12,000 fighters from at least 81 countries have joined the civil war in Syria, and the numbers continue to grow. Around 2,500 are from Western countries, including most members of the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. There are also several hundred from Russia. But the great majority are from the Arab World. Most are fighting with rebel groups, and increasingly with the most extreme among them; but many are also fighting with the Government, or with ethnic or faith communities that are trying to protect themselves from both sides. A lot are young, often teenagers, and a fair percentage of those arriving from non-Muslim majority countries are converts to Islam. These and others who share their faith commonly express their motivation as a religious obligation to protect fellow Muslims from attack. This sense of duty is captured by their loose use of the word 'jihad'.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, Canada, Arabia, Australia, Syria, and New Zealand

35. Distinguishing Acts of War in Cyberspace: Assessment Criteria, Policy Considerations, and Response Implications

Author:
Jeffery L. Caton
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The monograph is comprised of four main sections: Characterization. This section provides the notional foundation necessary to avoid any devolution of the analysis to mere semantic arguments. It presents how cyberspace is defined and characterized for this discussion, as well as how this compares to existing concepts of the traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space. Also, it identifies some of the unique technical challenges that the cyberspace domain may introduce into the process of distinguishing acts of war. Assessment Criteria. This section explores the de jure and the de facto issues involved with assaying cyber incidents to determine if they represent aggression and possible use of force; and, if so, to what degree? It reviews the traditional legal frameworks surrounding military action to include the United Nations (UN) Charter and the Law of Armed Conflict. It also examines how these compare to the recently published Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. From these sources, it proposes a cyberspace incident assessment methodology. Policy Considerations. Having identified viable criteria to aid with the assessment of cyber-space incidents, this section looks at the policy considerations associated with applying such principles. First, it examines the relevant U.S. strategies; next, it investigates the strategies of other key countries and international organizations and how they compare to U.S. tenets; and finally, it evaluates how nonstate actors may affect U.S. deliberations. Courses of Action. This section examines the influences that course of action development and implementation may have on the assessment of cyberspace incidents. It first looks at the President's role as the primary decisionmaker in U.S. national matters regarding cyber-space. It then surveys key influences affecting subordinate decisionmakers and their staffs that may be advising the Commander-in-Chief: reliable situational awareness, global and domestic environment considerations, and options and their related risks and potential consequences.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and War
Political Geography:
United States and United Nations

36. Turkey's New Regional Security Role: Implications for the United States

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Until a few years ago, the relationship between Washington, DC, and Ankara, Turkey, was perennially troubled and occasionally terrible. Turks strongly opposed the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq and have subsequently complained that the Pentagon was allowing Iraqi Kurds too much autonomy, leading to deteriorating security along the Iraq-Turkey border. Disagreements over how to respond to Iran's nuclear program, U.S. suspicions regarding Turkey's outreach efforts to Iran and Syria, and differences over Armenia, Palestinians, and the Black Sea further strained ties and contributed to further anti Americanism in Turkey. Now Turkey is seen as responding to its local challenges by moving closer to the West, leading to the advent of a “Golden Era” in Turkish U.S. relations. Barack Obama has called the U.S.-Turkish relationship a “model partnership” and Turkey “a critical ally.” Explanations abound as to why U.S.-Turkey ties have improved during the last few years. The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq removed a source of tension and gave Turkey a greater incentive to cooperate with Washington to influence developments in Iraq. Furthermore, the Arab Awakening led both countries to partner in support of the positive agenda of promoting democracy and security in the Middle East. Americans and Turks both want to see democratic secular governments in the region rather than religiously sanctioned authoritarian ones. Setbacks in Turkey's reconciliation efforts with Syria, Iran, and other countries led Ankara to realize that having good relations with the United States helps it achieve core goals in the Middle East and beyond. Even though Turkey's role as a provider of security and stability in the region is weakened as a result of the recent developments in Syria and the ensuing negative consequences in its relations to other countries, Turkey has the capacity to recover and resume its position. Partnering with the United States is not always ideal, but recent setbacks have persuaded Turkey's leaders that they need to backstop their new economic strength and cultural attractiveness with the kind of hard power that is most readily available to the United States. For a partnership between Turkey and the United States to endure, however, Turkey must adopt more of a collective transatlantic perspective, crack down harder on terrorist activities, and resolve a domestic democratic deficit. At the same time, Europeans should show more flexibility meeting Turkey's security concerns regarding the European Union, while the United States should adopt a more proactive policy toward resolving potential sources of tensions between Ankara and Washington that could significantly worsen at any time.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Ethnic Conflict, Islam, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Turkey, and Middle East

37. Strategic Implications of the Evolving Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Author:
Andrew Monaghan and Henry Plater-Zyberk
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, China, and East Asia

38. European Missile Defense and Russia

Author:
Andrew Monaghan and Keir Giles
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” was cited as the primary justification. Despite widespread and well founded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile defense capability, stemming from a continued failure to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and Russian fears.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

39. Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al-Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds

Author:
Paul Kamolnick
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qaeda-based, affiliated, and inspired terrorism is the declared policy of the U.S. Government (USG). Despite noteworthy success in attacking the al-Qaeda (AQ) terrorist network and securing the homeland from terrorist attack, the United States has yet to execute an effective methodology for countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ. This monograph proposes a distinct War of Deeds methodology for accomplishing this.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

40. The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in the Pacific

Author:
John R. Deni
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S. Army's forward presence in East Asia, given the significantly changed strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. For economic, political, diplomatic, and military reasons, the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater continues to grow in importance to the United States. As part of a broad, interagency, multifaceted approach, the U.S. military plays a critical role in the rebalancing effort now underway. The U.S. Army in particular has a special role to play in bolstering the defense of allies and the deterrence of aggression, promoting regional security and stability, and ameliorating the growing U.S.-China security dilemma.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, East Asia, Asia, and Australia

41. Strategy and Force Planning in a Time of Austerity

Author:
Michael J. Meese
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
On February 13, 1989, General Colin Powell, who was in a transition between National Security Advisor and Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command, addressed the reality of strategy: “All of the sophisticated talk about grand strategy is helpful, but show me your budgets and I will tell you what your strategy is.”1 What General Powell meant is that the definition of the U.S. role in the world and its strategic goals flow from budgets, not the other way around. This paper fleshes out General Powell's observation by focusing on the means part of the ends, ways, and means of strategy in order to explain how austerity affects force planning and strategy. By first examining budget reductions as a general matter, the paper describes today's austere U.S. budgetary environment. It concludes with the current strategic options that will likely characterize the contemporary discussion of strategy and force planning.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Financial Crisis, and Budget
Political Geography:
United States

42. U.S. Department of Defense Contributions to Malaria Elimination in the Era of Artemisinin Resistance

Author:
Mark Fukuda and Tom Cullison
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), militaries remain essential to any effort to control and eliminate artemisinin-resistant malaria. Stretching back to World War II and the Vietnam War, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has a long and distinguished history researching and developing new tools for malaria control, in partnership with both military and civilian host government experts. Since the mid-1990s, DoD has significantly expanded its global surveillance, training, and capacity - building investments. As Southeast Asian countries have mobilized in recent years against artemisinin-resistance with the ultimate aim of malaria elimination, DoD and regional militaries have actively joined the effort, initiating promising pilot approaches in Southeast Asia. To strengthen DoD's contribution, it is proposed that the United States launch a Defense Malaria Elimination Program that will significantly enhance partner militaries' capacities, advance the goal of elimination, including the threat of resistance, and accelerate the development of drugs and vaccines.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Health, and Humanitarian Aid
Political Geography:
United States, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia

43. The Emirates Center and Gulf Think Tanks: The Next Twenty years

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Let me begin by congratulating the Emirates Center and Dr. Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi for so many accomplishments over the last 2 0 years. It has been a privilege to watch its growth, its sustained quality, and its steadily increasing influence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

44. Federated Defense in Asia

Author:
Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Zack Cooper
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States has long emphasized the desirability of working with allies and partners to meet pressing security challenges. Indeed, many of our most vexing security concerns—from terrorism to cyber attacks—are best met with concerted multilateral responses. At a time when the United States and many of its allies and partners are reluctant to increase defense and security spending, working together is paramount. This is perhaps most evident in Asia, where present and potential future threats to security and prosperity are high and shared interests are substantial.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Disaster Relief, Humanitarian Aid, and Intelligence
Political Geography:
United States and Asia

45. Talking Technology Best Practices in Communicating

Author:
Maren Leed, Kathryn Easop, Alvaro Genie, and Jaimie Hoskins
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In recent months, Department of Defense leaders have raised increasing concerns about the potential for the United States to lose its comparative advantage in multiple technology areas. To help address this trend, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently directed a “Defense Innovation Initiative” aimed at fostering the development of breakthrough technologies. Success in this effort will require a series of actions, but all rest on one critical factor: a shared understanding across the research and policy communities of the scientific potential and its importance to our national security going forward. Without that common view, scientists in both the public and private sector will be unable to sustain sufficient support to deliver meaningful advances.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
United States

46. Leveraging Global Value Chains for a Federated Approach to Defense

Author:
David J. Berteau, Scott Miller, Ryan Crotty, and Paul Nadeau
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
CSIS launched the Federated Defense Project to assess and recommend concrete ways for the United States and its partners to integrate their defense capabilities in support of shared interests. Rather than creating interdependencies that would hinder autonomous action or bind partners to commitments to which they only share a tangential interest, the federated defense strategy builds on the natural interests of allies and partners to develop closer working ties to the United States and one another in order to manage the challenges posed by constrained resources and a daunting geostrategic environment. Buttressing any form of federated defense must be a set of bottom-up, organic interactions within the private sector to develop the capabilities that will underpin these security architectures. The expansion of business-to-business relationships among providers of platforms, supplies, and services to the network of trusted partners and allies is a key building block in ensuring adequate capabilities development, integration, and interoperability. To date, this interaction has occurred despite the many barriers that exist to their success. A federated approach will seek to enable this cooperation and lower these barriers, leading to greater cooperation, collaboration, and integration through global value chains (GVCs). Addressing the findings below is essential to the successful execution of a federated approach to defense.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Privatization, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States

47. Global Cybercrime: The Interplay of Politics and Law

Author:
Aaron Shull
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Examining global cybercrime as solely a legal issue misses an important facet of the problem. Understanding the applicable legal rules, both domestically and internationally, is important. However, major state actors are using concerted efforts to engage in nefarious cyber activities with the intention of advancing their economic and geostrategic interests. This attempt to advance a narrow set of economic interests through cybercrime and economic cyber espionage holds to the potential to erode the trust in the digital economy that has been a necessary condition for the success of the Internet as an economic engine for innovation and growth. By pursuing these efforts, states are prioritizing short-term interests over long-term stability and a responsibly governed, safe and secure Internet platform. This paper explores the recent unsealing of a 31-count indictment against five Chinese government officials and a significant cyber breach, perpetrated by Chinese actors against Western oil, energy and petrochemical companies. The paper concludes by noting that increased cooperation among governments is necessary, but unlikely to occur as long as the discourse surrounding cybercrime remains so heavily politicized and securitized. If governments coalesced around the notion of trying to prevent the long-term degradation of trust in the online economy, they may profitably advance the dialogue away from mutual suspicion and toward mutual cooperation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Crime, International Trade and Finance, Terrorism, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

48. U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base, 2000-2012

Author:
David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, Jesse Ellman, and Rhys McCormick
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the past decade, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been analyzing and reporting on contract spending for national security and across the federal government. This report analyzes contracting for products, services, and research and development (R) by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and its key components. It provides an in-depth look at the trends currently driving nearly 70 percent of all federal contract dollars throughout the growth and subsequent inflection of defense spending of the 2000–2012 study period. This third edition of the DoD report updates reports from previous years and provides greater depth of analysis. Rather than primarily reporting the changes across dozens of graphs, the analysis lists key factors behind growth or decline. However, the ability to dive deeply into raw data is as important to many CSIS readers. To meet that need, CSIS has significantly upgraded the project website (http://www.csis.org/NSPIR/DoD ) to include the graphs and table contained within this report as well as variants by defense component and by product/service area. This web site will be a living repository. Throughout the year, the study team will publish and update the data underlying shorter publications on key issues relevant to the defense- industrial base.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States

49. The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
No single aspect of US and Iranian military competition is potentially more dangerous than the missile and nuclear dimensions, and the possibility Iran will deploy long-range, nuclear-armed missiles.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

50. The New NATO Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism: Analysis, Assessments, and Actions

Author:
Stefano Santamato and Marie-Theres Beumler
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will say that the first, and so far only, time NATO has called upon its Article 5 collective defense clause was on September 12, 2001, following a terrorist attack on one of its members. Yet, until the agreement by NATO Heads of State and Government on the new policy guidelines on counterterrorism on May 20, 2012, NATO did not have an agreed policy to define its role and mandate in countering terrorism.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Cold War, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

51. Afghanistan – Order of Battle

Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
This document describes the composition and placement of U.S. and other Western combat and advisory forces in Afghanistan down to battalion level. It includes the following categories of units: maneuver (i.e. infantry, armor, and cavalry) units, which in most cases are responsible for advising or partnering with Afghan troops in particular districts or provinces; artillery units; aviation units, both rotary and fixed-wing; military police units; most types of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units; and "white" special operations forces. It does not include "black" special operations units or other units such as logistical, transportation, medical, and intelligence units or Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

52. Defense Cuts, Sequestration, and the US Defense Budget

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert M. Shelala II
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Concepts are not a strategy. Broad outlines do not set real priorities. A strategy requires a plan with concrete goals numbers schedules and costs for procurement, allocation, manpower, force structure, and detailed operational capabilities. For all the talk of 10 years of planned spending levels and cuts, the President and Congress can only shape the actual budget and defense program one year at a time. Unpredicted events and realities will intervene. There is a near zero real world probability that the coming plan and budget will shape the future in spite of changes in the economy, politics, entitlements, and threats to the US.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

53. Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in U.S.-Indian Relations

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The evolving U.S.-Indian strategic partnership holds great potential for both countries. India's economic growth and its ties to the United States can assist its global rise, which contributes to keeping the peace in Asia, provided New Delhi and Washington sustain concerted cooperation. And India's emerging markets promise to be the key instrument for enlarging India's power while remaining a rich opportunity for U.S. businesses.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, India, Asia, and New Delhi

54. The Strategic National Stockpile: Vital to Maintain, Critical to Improve

Author:
Tevi Troy
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since 2000, the United States has been faced with an unprecedented series of natural and man-made disasters and threats that have generated concerns about the government's ability to respond to future emergencies. As Nate Silver, one of America's most prominent prognosticators, observed in his book The Signal and the Noise, “the first twelve years of the new millennium have been rough, with one unpredicted disaster after another.”As bad as the first decade of the twenty-first century was, with the terror attacks of 9/11, the anthrax scare, and deadly hurricanes, there are troubling indications that things are on track to be even worse in the 2010s. Wall Street Journal “Numbers Guy” Carl Bialik recently wrote, referring to events such as Hurricane Sandy and the 2012 derecho, among others, that “the current decade is on pace to outrank the prior three in cost from inflation-adjusted climate catastrophes costing at least $1 billion in 2013 dollars.”And emergencies related to severe weather events are just one of the many types of crisis we could face. To deal with the potential problems of the future, including bioterror attacks as well as natural disasters, the U.S. government needs to maintain a robust toolkit.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Disaster Relief, and Natural Disasters
Political Geography:
United States and America

55. Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike

Author:
James M. Acton
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The development of non-nuclear weapons that can strike distant targets in a short period of time has been a U.S. goal for more than a decade. Advocates argue that such Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) weapons could be used to counter antisatellite weapons or sophisticated defensive capabilities; deny a new proliferator the ability to employ its nuclear arsenal; and kill high-value terrorists. Critics worry that CPGS weapons could create serious strategic risks, most notably of escalation—including to the nuclear level—in a conflict.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States

56. The Civil-Military Challenge to National Security Spending

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Perhaps the worst part of the debate that has led to the shut down of the federal government is its almost total irrelevance. It threaten both the US economy and US national security, but it does even begin to touch upon the forces that shape the rise in entitlements spending or their underlying causes.The Congressional debate does not address the forces that have led to a form of sequestration that focuses on defense as if it were the key cause of the deficit and pressures on the debt ceiling. It does not address the irony that much of defense spending has direct benefits to the US economy and that the spending on foreign wars–the so-called OCO account–dropped from $158.8 billion in FY2011 to some $88.5 billion in FY2013, and is projected to drop to around $37 billion in FY2015. Much of the debate focuses on the Affordable Care Act or "Obama Care"–a program whose balance between federal expenditures and revenues is sufficiently uncertain so the Congressional Budget office can only make limited forecasts, but whose net impact cannot come close to the cost pressures that an aging America and rising national medical costs have put on Federal entitlements in the worst case NDS May actually have a positive impact in the best case.The following briefing provides a range of estimates that addresses the real issues that are shaping the overall pressures that poverty, an aging America, and rising medical costs are putting on the US economy and federal spending. It draws on a range of sources to show how different estimates affect key trends, but focuses on data provide by a neutral arm of the same Congress that has paralyzed the US government and whose action threaten the funding on a viable national security strategy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States and America

57. Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman, Nicholas S. Yarosh, and Ashley Hess
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) face a critical need to improve their understanding of how each is developing its military power and how to avoid forms of military competition that could lead to rising tension or conflict between the two states. This report utilizes the unclassified data available in the West on the trends in Chinese military forces. It relies heavily on the data in the US Department of Defense (DoD) Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, particularly the 2013 edition.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States and China

58. Iran's Present Day Military Capabilities and Military Aspirations in the Middle East

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Far too much of the analysis of Iran's search for nuclear weapons treats it in terms of arms control or focuses on the potential threat to Israel. In reality, Iran's mix of asymmetric warfare, conventional warfare, and conventionally armed missile forces have critical weaknesses that make Iran anything but the hegemon of the Gulf. Iran's public focus on Israel also disguises the reality that its primary strategic focus is to deter and intimidate its Gulf neighbors and the United States – not Israel. It has made major progress in creating naval forces for asymmetric warfare and developing naval missiles, but it has very limited air-sea and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (IS) capabilities. It lacks modern conventional land, air, air defense and sea power, has fallen far behind the Arab Gulf states in modern aircraft and ships, and its land forces are filled with obsolete and mediocre weapons that lack maneuver capability and sustainability outside Iran. Iran needs nuclear weapons to offset these facts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

59. Changing US Security Strategy: The Search for Stability and the "Non-War" against "Non-Terrorism"

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
More than a decade into the “war on terrorism,” much of the political debate in the US is still fixated on the legacy of 9/11. US politics has a partisan fixation on Benghazi, the Boston Marathon bombing, intelligence intercepts, and Guantanamo. Far too much US attention still focuses on “terrorism” at a time the US faces a much broader range of threats from the instability in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) and Islamic world. Moreover, much of the US debate ignores the fact that the US has not actually fought a “war on terrorism” over the last decade, and the US failures in using military force and civil aid in Afghanistan and Iraq. The US has not fought wars as such, but rather became involved in exercises in armed nation building where stability operations escalated into national building as a result of US occupation and where the failures in stability operations and nation building led to insurgencies that forced the US into major counterinsurgency campaigns that had little to do with counterterrorism. An analysis of the trends in the Iraq and Afghan conflicts shows that the US has not been fighting a war on terrorism since Bin Laden and Al Qaida Central were driven into Pakistan in December 2001. The US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and then made stability operations and armed nation building its key goals. It was US mishandling of these exercises in armed nation building that led to major counterinsurgency campaigns although – at least in the case of Afghanistan --the US continued to label its military operations as a struggle against “terrorism.” By 2013, the US had committed well over $1.4 trillion to these exercises in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, the US made massive increases in its domestic spending on homeland defense that it rationalized as part of the fight against terrorism but often had little or nothing to do with any aspect of counterterrorism. At the same time, the US failed to develop consistent or useful unclassified statistics on the patterns in terrorism and its counterterrorism activities. The US government has never provided a meaningful break out of federal activities and spending at home or abroad which actually focus on terrorism, or any unclassified measures of effectiveness. The OMB has lumped a wide range of activities that have no relation to terrorism it its reporting on the President's budget request – activities whose total cost now approach $60 billion a year. The Department of Defense has never provided a meaningful estimate of the total cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or a break out of the small portion of total overseas contingency operations (OCO) spending actually spent on counterterrorism versus counter insurgency. The State Department and US intelligence community provide no meaningful unclassified data on the cost of their counterterrorism effort and it is unclear that they have developed any metrics at any level that show the cost-benefits of their activities. The annual US State Department country reports on terrorism come as close to an unclassified report on the status of terrorism as the US government provides. While many portions are useful, the designation of terrorist movements is often political and shows the US designation of terrorist movements conflates terrorism and insurgency. The closest the US has come to developing any metrics on terrorism has been to develop an unclassified database in the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) that never distinguished terrorism from insurgency. This database formed the core of the statistical annex to State Department reporting, but has since been withdrawn without explanation. As this analysis shows in detail, it now has been replaced by a contractor effort that makes all of the previous mistakes made by the NCTC. The end result is a set of official reporting and statistics in the annex to the State Department report where “terrorism” remains remained poorly defined, badly structured, ignored in parts of the world, and conflates terrorism with counterinsurgency, instability, and civil war. A review of the Afghan, Iraq conflicts, and other recent conflicts in the MENA region shows just how serious these problems are in distorting the true nature of the wars the US is fighting and the threats it faces. The same is true of the unclassified reporting the US government provides on terrorism. A detailed review of the most recent State Department report on terrorism provides important insights into key terrorist movements, but the narratives generally ignore their ties to insurgent movements, their statistical data include some major insurgent movements and exclude others, and many of the data seem to include violence that is not truly terroristic in character.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, and North Africa

60. Offensive Cyber Capabilities at the Operational Level

Author:
Maren Leed
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At present, the defense policy landscape is replete with arguments, many of which are ultimately based in the lack of a common vision among both elites and within the broader population about the role of the U.S. military in the future. Cyber operations are one element of these debates, although much of the discussion has centered around how best to defend against a growing cyber threat, the role of the Defense Department in that defense, and tensions between civil liberties and security interests. Occasionally, greater attention is paid to questions about the U.S. use of cyber offensively, which brings with it questions of precedent, deterrence, international norms, and a host of other challenges. But it is also apparent that U.S. leaders have already approved the use of offensive cyber capabilities, though under tight restrictions. While not ignoring this larger context, the specific question this report examines is whether the Defense Department should make a more deliberate effort to explore the potential of offensive cyber tools at levels below that of a combatant command.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States

61. U.S.-India Homeland Security Cooperation: Building a Lasting Partnership via Transportation Sector Security

Author:
Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, Ally Pregulman, Rob Wise, Briana Fitch, and Melissa Hersh
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Given India's rapid development, the nation has become an increasingly vital world actor. India has the 11th largest economy in the world, and with its annual economic growth rate averaging 7 percent per year since 1997, it could surpass the United States and China to become the world's largest economy by 2050. This economic capacity facilitated billions of dollars in investments since 2006 to expand and upgrade India's defense and security capabilities, including the launch of its first nuclear- powered submarine and the ongoing acquisition of a fleet of aircraft carriers. The growth of India's economic and military sectors increases its strategic importance to the United States and other partners interested in ensuring stability and security in Asia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Terrorism, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, South Asia, and India

62. Task Force Report on Streamlining and Consolidating Congressional Oversight of the US Department of Homeland Security

Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe that Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Biosecurity, Governance, Law, and Reform
Political Geography:
United States

63. The Tenth Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum

Author:
Walter H. Shorenstein
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Meeting after North Korea had raised tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the spring, participants in the Tenth Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum focused on the implications for the Korean Peninsula of leadership changes in North and South Korea and especially China. Participants also focused on regional dynamics, including increased confrontation between China and Japan and various, sometimes conflicting, efforts to increase regional economic integration in Northeast Asia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bilateral Relations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Israel, and Asia

64. Before the Cut: The Global Politics of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Author:
Srdjan Vucetic
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is a high-calibre international collaboration project that figures in many debates on the emerging structure of international politics. How and why did the U.S. government and the U.S. defence industry enter into a set of international partnerships to develop this weapon system? Conversely, how and why did the partner nations become partners, and what influence, if any, have they had on the program so far? And how have participating governments dealt with the mounting controversies surrounding the new fighter jet? In principle, collaboration projects not only cement alliance ties, but also help offset development costs and increase exports, thus lowering unit costs overall. In reality, the F-35 has so far been a boondoggle. Highly asymmetric by design, the JSF project has proven particularly challenging to partners, especially now that the program's cost overruns, delays, and performance shortfalls have become a regular news item in the mainstream media. A review of ongoing F-35 debates across partner countries suggest that evaluations based on “high politics” considerations implicating the costs and benefits of the U.S. alliance trail well behind those concerning technical issues such as cost overruns, work shares, and transfers of technology. The F-35 is a political hot potato for all participating governments, but in the absence of a fatal cut to the program made in Washington D.C., outright defections are unlikely at this stage.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
United States and Washington

65. Sailing Against the Current – China-U.S. Relations in the Next Stage

Author:
Yu Bianjiang
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
In recent years, “rebalancing” has been a buzzword in the U.S.'s Asia-Pacific policy and naturally also in U.S.-China relations. Some believe this rebalancing has been quite successful and refer to this as the hallmark of President Barack Obama's first-term foreign policy.  At the same time, others, both within and outside of America, have expressed different opinions. The most critical point is that while the U.S. administration has argued that rebalancing is an integrated strategy with military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives intended to strengthen U.S. involvement in the Asia-Pacific area, in practice, rebalancing has been depicted and implemented in more military terms, with the United States shifting its troops and resources from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Asia- Pacific region. “The military soundtrack has the volume turned up too loud.”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Emerging Markets, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
United States, China, Israel, Asia, and Australia/Pacific

66. Afghanistan After the Drawdown

Author:
Seth G. Jones and Keith Crane
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Afghanistan will undergo three major transitions in 2014: from a Hamid Karzai–led government to one presumably headed by another president following the 2014 election; from a U.S.-led to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency; and from an economy driven by foreign expenditures on military support and assistance to one more reliant on domestic sources of growth, as the United States and other countries reduce their presence. The United States and its allies will need to shape each of these transitions in ways that safeguard their interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

67. Collective Self-Defense and US-Japan Security Cooperation

Author:
Ian E. Rinehart
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
If Japan decides to exercise its right of collective self-defense (CSD), it would have complex effects on US-Japan security cooperation. The tangible short-term outcomes would likely be rather modest, and mid-term outcomes are dependent on changes in complementary policies, laws, and attitudes. American observers who expect that a revised interpretation of Japan's Constitution will provide an immediate boost to the alliance are likely to be disappointed. There are institutional and legal limitations on the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) that will constrain its activities in the near-term, no matter what policy course leaders choose. Japanese public opinion is also highly circumspect about the use of force to resolve international problems and will likely not support missions that do not directly address the security of Japan. However, due to the powerful symbolism of CSD, the long-term effects could be quite significant.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, America, and Israel

68. To judge NSA reforms, look to the tech industry

Author:
Mieke Eoyang
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
In 1976, Senator Edward Kennedy first introduced the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to rein in government scrutiny of Americans. That law made America’s telecommunications companies the gatekeepers of the public’s information. But back then, “Ma Bell” was still around — AT&T wasn’t broken up until 1982 — and mobile phones were a distant dream. Now, nearly 40 years and a tech revolution later, President Obama faced similar questions on how to protect the American people’s privacy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Surveillance, and Civil Liberties
Political Geography:
United States and North America

69. Radicalization in the U.S. Beyond al Qaeda: Treating the disease of the disconnection

Author:
Clint Watts
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The attacks of September 11, 2001 spawned a decade of al Qaeda inspired radicalization of disaffected Middle Eastern and North African youth and a handful of young Western men. Ten years later, foreign fighters to Afghanistan, Iraq and other jihadi battlefields appear to be declining while in contrast analysts have pointed to an uptick in United States (U.S.) based “homegrown extremism” - terrorism advocated or committed by U.S. residents or citizens.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Middle East, and North Africa

70. Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict

Author:
T.X. Hammes
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
As America ends its military commitment to Iraq and continues its drawdown in Afghanistan, a lively discussion has emerged on what future challenges the Nation faces. High on every list is the requirement to deal with a rising China. In his remarks to the Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011, President Barack Obama stated, “As we end today's wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.” As part of this re-balancing to Asia, the administration has stated that it seeks “to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China's active efforts in global problem-solving.” Clearly, the United States seeks prudent and coordinated political, economic, and military actions to further integrate China into the international system.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

71. Grand Strategy and International Law

Author:
Nicholas Rostow
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
U.S. grand strategy, the calculated relationship between means and large ends, needs to be developed and implemented in an international legal context because of the nature of U.S. society and values, and the overriding requirement to prevent nuclear war. Since World War II, successive administrations have conceived of U.S. alliances, partnerships, arms control agreements, and international actions more generally as grand strategy. A central component of U.S. success has been creating, leading, and sustaining a minimum world order that all states have come to see as representing their core interests. International law cannot be and has never been far from U.S. policymaking because Americans have believed that it is essential to the maintenance of the minimum world order necessary for peace and the prevention of nuclear war insofar as it is possible to achieve these goals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Law, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

72. A Policy Mismatch: Canada and the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region

Author:
James Manicom
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The United States and Canada have simultaneously re- invigorated their diplomatic and military postures toward the Asia-Pacific region. As two of the world's closest allies, it is worth exploring the possible synergies and tensions between their efforts to identify areas of possible policy coordination. Canada has considerable assets that could support US diplomacy in the region, including the legacy of its good offices and its close ties with the US military; however, these assets are outweighed by three liabilities. First, Canada's diplomacy to the Asia-Pacific is driven by its desire to diversify away from the US market. Although relatively innocuous in isolation, the politics of this shift, driven by growing concern in Canada about whether the United States remains a reliable market for energy exports, adds a layer of complexity. Second, Canada's closer economic ties with China could undermine its willingness to support the United States on tough regional security issues in the Asia-Pacific. Third, and related, Canadian silence about navigational freedoms, the primary security issue between the United States and China in East Asia, has not gone unnoticed. This paper argues that, on balance, Canada may not be an ideal Pacific partner for the United States.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, Canada, East Asia, Asia, Australia/Pacific, and Asia-Pacific

73. Obama, Romney, and the Future of Turkey-United States Relations

Author:
Frank Lin
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
The 2012 American presidential election features two candidates, incumbent President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney, with contrasting foreign policy visions for the United States, particularly with regards to the Middle East. How could these differences between the two candidates affect bilateral relations between the United States and Turkey, which—aside from Israel—is generally seen by the United States as its most stalwart ally in the Middle East? This paper will examine the recent history of bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States, from the George W. Bush administration to the Obama administration, as well as current issues surrounding relations between the two countries. It will also explore how the predicted policies of each candidate could impact the future course of bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

74. Turkey and the Bomb

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Though most states that want a nuclear weapon can get one through determined effort, the fact remains that most choose not to proliferate. Turkey is no exception. Not even the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is likely to push Ankara to develop its own nuclear weapons. The only circumstance where such a scenario would acquire a degree of likelihood is a breakdown in Turkey's security relationship with the United States.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Turkey, and Middle East

75. The United States, Russia, Europe, and Security: How to Address the "Unfinished Business" of the Post–Cold War Era

Author:
Isabelle François
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
In 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense published Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. In this strategy document, the Defense Department outlines the new focus of U.S. efforts on threats emanating primarily from South Asia and the Middle East, spelling out the U.S. commitment to address them by working with allies and partners, acknowledging Europe as the “home to some of America's most stalwart allies and partners.” It clearly states that the United States “has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], which is critical to the security of Europe and beyond.” Moreover, the document characterizes engagement with Russia as important and reiterates U.S. commitment to continue efforts toward building a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest, encouraging Russia to be a contributor across a broad range of issues. The strategic environment will therefore remain one of partnership with Europe and Russia as nations work out the consequences of a rebalancing of forces in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

76. The beginning of the end? The future of international engagement in Afghanistan

Author:
Timo Behr and Charly Salonius-Pasternak
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
States which contribute to various international efforts in Afghanistan will find it increasingly difficult to balance a need to show long-term commitment with an unpredictable political and quickly changing operating environment. Recent events in Afghanistan are threatening to undermine the plans for an orderly transition of security responsibilities to Afghan authorities by the end of 2014. Countries must be ready to adjust contributions in both size and task during both 2012 and 2013. Germany has pledged to only gradually withdraw its forces and maintain its focus on partnering and training, despite an increasingly unstable environment. Current planning also foresees a German commitment in the post-2014 period. Finland will increasingly focus on civilian crisis management efforts and development assistance, and will stay engaged and committed as long as its closest partners also do so. Sweden is set to continue leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), but post-2014 commitments are unclear. The United States is set to return to 'pre-surge' force levels (though with a different force structure) of around 68,000 soldiers by autumn 2012. Further withdrawals of up to 30,000 soldiers are being discussed.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Peace Studies, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Finland, Germany, and Sweden

77. The War on Terror from Bush to Obama: On Power and Path Dependency

Author:
Hilde Eliassen Restad
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
James Madison famously stated in 1793: “War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.” By this, Madison meant that, when confronted with a grave threat to national security, the instinct of a state is to concentrate power at the very top. This can lead – and has led – to abuse of power. For instance, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's signing of Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942 resulted in the forcible internment of Japanese Americans (two thirds of whom were U.S. citizens), an episode widely seen as regrettable later, after history had removed Americans from the anxiety of war. But by no means do we have to look as far back as to World War II. We can note Cold War incidents such as the Iran-Contra scandal (1985–87), when the Reagan administration took it upon itself to bypass Congress – and specific laws – in order to support the controversial Nicaraguan Contras with money acquired by selling arms to Iran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

78. U.S.-India Defense Trade

Author:
S. Amer Latif
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the past decade, the United States and India have built the foundations of a partnership that has the potential to be one of the more consequential relationships of the twenty-first century. Since President Bill Clinton's visit to India in 2000, the two countries have forged a relationship that is now defined by five pillars of cooperation that include strategic issues, energy and climate change, education and development, economics and trade, and science and technology. It is a wide-ranging partnership that holds the promise of collaboration on issues that are not only important to these two countries, but to many other countries as well.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States, South Asia, and India

79. Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The most threatening form of US and Iranian competition takes place in the military and security arena. The areas where this competition now gets primary attention are the nuclear and missile arena, and Iranian threats to “close the Gulf.” US and Iranian tensions over Iran's nuclear program have grown steadily over the years. They now threaten to reach the crisis point as Iran produces highly enriched uranium and develops all of the technology necessary to produce nuclear weapons, and as US, European, and UN sanctions become steadily stronger.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Oil, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United Nations

80. Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: A Western Perspective

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US and China face a critical need to improve their understanding of how each nation is developing its military power and how to avoid forms of military competition that could lead to rising tension or conflict between the two states.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Israel

81. The FY2013 Defense Budget, the Threat of Defense Cuts and Sequestration and the Strategy-Reality Gap

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert M. Shelala II
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest. The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely. The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances. At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of "independence," including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts. US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP -- in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- versus 6-7% during the Cold War.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, Government, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

82. Nuclear Notes

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia is experiencing the most significant level of public dissatisfaction with Vladimir Putin since he assumed power a decade ago. While the sizeable street protests in Russia may well signal a political and social watershed moment for the country, a more minor political event a few months ago provided a telling sign regarding one of the regime's most important projects—a massive program for military modernization.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

83. Interim Report-Planning for a Deep Defense Drawdown—Part I

Author:
Clark A. Murdock
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As the defense budget is reduced in the coming years, the Department of Defense (DoD) will be confronted with not one but two budgetary threats: it will face not only fewer defense dollars but also a weakening defense dollar in terms of purchasing power. This weaker defense dollar, driven by the internal cost inflation of personnel, operations and maintenance (O), and acquisition accounts in particular, threatens to hollow out the defense budget from within. -
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
United States

84. U.S. Department of Defense Services Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base, 2000-2011

Author:
David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Gregory Sanders, Jesse Ellman, and David Morrow
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Spending by the Department of Defense (DoD) on services contracts, which range from clerical and administrative work to vehicle maintenance to research and development (R), has been largely neglected by past studies of DoD spending trends. Yet DoD spending on services contract actions amounted to just under $200 billion in 2011, more than 50 percent of total DoD contract spending and nearly a third of the entire DoD budget. Both the executive branch and Congress have implemented policies to improve acquisitions of services, but the impacts of their efforts remain uncertain without a clear, concise analysis of past spending. And the then Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Dr. Ashton Carter, has stated that: “Most of our services acquires, unlike weapons-system acquires, are amateurs… I intend to help them get better at it” (Speech at the Heritage Foundation, April 20, 2011).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, Government, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
United States

85. Military capabilities in the Arctic

Author:
Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
In recent years the forecast of far-reaching climate change in the Arctic has led to fears of future conflict in the region. Such fears have been expressed in official documents, including defence policy documents, of the five Arctic littoral states—Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States. Three of them—Canada, Denmark and Russia—have recently adopted foreign and defence policies that have put a special emphasis on the Arctic. They have strengthened their military presence in the Arctic or increased military capabilities for Arctic use and have presented plans for additional military strengthening. Meanwhile, Norway has moved a substantial part of its operational forces to the north of the country. Of the five littoral states, only the USA has placed less focus on Arctic security.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Climate Change, Natural Resources, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark

86. The FY2013 Defense Budget, Deficits, Cost-Escalation, and Sequestration

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert Shelala II
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest. The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely. The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances. At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of “independence,” including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts. US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP – in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – versus 6-7% during the Cold War.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Asia

87. Economic Effects of Reductions in Defense Outlays

Author:
Benjamin Zycher
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
This study examines the prospective economic effects of a reduction below the current baseline in defense outlays of $100 billion per year over 10 years.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, and Labor Issues
Political Geography:
United States

88. Developments in and Obstacles to the US Pivot to Asia: What Alternatives for Europe?

Author:
Alessandro Riccardo Ungaro
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The new US strategic guidance released in January 2012 represents a hallmark of US President Barack Obama's foreign policy and forms integral part of the so-called “Pivot to Asia”. However, rather than a radical departure from the past, the strategic guidance represents an evolution and extension of US foreign policy towards the region, envisaging the reallocation of American military assets from Europe to the Asia-Pacific. The implementation of the guidance strategy is a long-term and complex process: several challenges, tensions and frictions between the US and regional actors may hamper the implementation of the policy and will require a delicate balancing act in which China will play a key role. On the European side, the US shift should be seen as an opportunity to review the European Security Strategy and elaborate its own strategy towards Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
United States, China, America, Europe, Israel, and Asia

89. Trust, Engagement, and Technology Transfer: Underpinnings for U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation

Author:
E. Richard Downes
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
On the eve of the January 1, 2011, inauguration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, the State Department noted that the United States “is committed to deepening our relationship on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues with Brazil's government and people.” President Rousseff herself declared shortly thereafter, “We will preserve and deepen the relationship with the United States.” During President Barack Obama's March 2011 visit to Brazil, both leaders cited “the progress achieved on defense issues in 2010” and stated their commitment to “follow up on the established dialogue in this area, primarily on new opportunities for cooperation.” While these rhetorical commitments are important, will they lead to greater cooperation on defense issues and improve U.S.-Brazil ties?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Emerging Markets, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Brazil, and Latin America

90. Explaining the Pentagon’s Defense Strategy

Author:
Julie Zelnick and Mieke Eoyang
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to translate the long and technical national security strategic directive the Obama Administration laid out on January 5, 2012 into plain language and provide policymakers with guidance on how to make the case for the President’s plan. The directive has four over-arching goals, which are reflected in the budget
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Imperialism, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, North America, and Global Focus

91. Leashing the Surveillance State: How to Reform Patriot Act Surveillance Authorities

Author:
Julian Sanchez
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Congress recently approved a temporary extension of three controversial surveillance provisions of the USA Patriot Act and successor legislation, which had previously been set to expire at the end of February. In the coming weeks, lawmakers have an opportunity to review the sweeping expansion of domestic counter-terror powers since 9/11 and, with the benefit of a decade's perspective, strengthen crucial civil-liberties safeguards without unduly burdening legitimate intelligence gathering. Two of the provisions slated for sunsetroving wiretap authority and the so-called “Section 215” orders for the production of records—should be narrowed to mitigate the risk of overcollection of sensitive information about innocent Americans. A third—authority to employ the broad investigative powers of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act against “lone wolf” suspects who lack ties to any foreign terror group—does not appear to be necessary at all.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Intelligence, National Security, Counterinsurgency, Governance, and Law
Political Geography:
United States

92. Iraq and US Strategy in the Gulf: Shaping and Communicating US plans for the Future in a Time of Region-Wide Change and Instability

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
During the coming months, the US must reshape its strategy and force posture relative to Iraq and the Gulf States. It must take account of its withdrawal of most of its forces from Iraq, and whether or not it can give real meaning to the US­Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement. It must deal with steadily increasing strategic competition with Iran, it must restructure its post-­Iraq War posture in the Southern Gulf and Turkey, and define new goals for strategic partnerships with the Gulf states and its advisory and arms sales activity. It must decide how to best contain Iran, and to work with regional friends and allies in doing so. In the process, it must also reshape its strategy for dealing with key states like Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Turkey, Yemen, Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan

93. u.s. and iranian strategic competition: Competition in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan

Author:
Erin Fitzgerald and Varun Vira
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US has many hard decisions to make in shaping its policies toward Central and South Asia – driven primarily by the war in Afghanistan, the growing instability in Pakistan, and whether the US should actively pursue strategic interest in Central Asia in the face of Russian and Chinese pressures and advantages, than by strategic competition with Iran.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, and Central Asia

94. Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph was presented at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)-Carnegie Council conference connected with the Council's U.S. Global Engagement Program. In this case, the engagement in question is with Russia, and this monograph specifically addressed the issues of how those aspects of the reset policy with Moscow that concern arms control and proliferation are proceeding. It duly addresses the question of whether further reductions in strategic offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, i.e., is it possible to go beyond the parameters in the recently signed and so-called New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty with respect to reductions. Other critical issues involve the issues of missile defenses that Moscow vehemently opposes and the question of tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wishes to have Russia reduce.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, North Atlantic, and Moscow

95. Forecasting Zero: U.S. Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament

Author:
Jonathan Pearl
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
When four luminaries of U.S. policymaking—Cold Warriors, all—penned a 2007 op-ed calling for global nuclear disarmament, a shock wave emanated through the policy community in Washington and abroad. Had age or the stress of public life finally taken its toll on these elder statesmen? How could the goal of disarmament be practically achieved? Was their plea, in fact, a cynical ploy to strengthen a conventionally dominant United States? Were not communist sympathizers, naïve world government types, or a periodically randy anti-nuclear movement the only ones who took disarmament seriously? Perhaps most important, did their statement reflect a convergence of sentiment in the United States in favor of abolition? Might the United States abolish nuclear weapons in our lifetime?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

96. Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Author:
Stephen J. Blank (ed.)
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As of November 2010, the so-called “New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)” treaty between the United States and Russia that was signed in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, awaits a ratification vote in the Senate. Regardless of the arguments pro and con that have emerged since it was signed, it is clear that the outcome of the ratification vote will not only materially affect the Obama administration's reset policy towards Russia, but also the strategic nuclear forces of both signatories. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, both sides built up their forces based on what each was thought to have or be building. Although the Bush administration (2001-09) rhetorically announced its intention to sever this mutual hostage relationship, it failed in that regard. As a result, critical aspects of that relationship still survive in Russia's orientation to the United States and in the language of the treaty, especially in its preamble, which explicitly affirms a link between nuclear offense and defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Czech Republic

97. Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations: Where Do Space and Cyberspace fit?

Author:
Vincent Manzo
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Warfare has become even more complicated since Richard Smoke wrote this description of escalation in 1977. The National Security Space Strategy describes space as “congested, contested, and competitive,” yet satellites underpin U.S. military and economic power. Activity in cyberspace has permeated every facet of human activity, including U.S. military operations, yet the prospects for effective cyber defenses are bleak. Many other actors depend on continued access to these domains, but not nearly as much as the United States.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

98. DoD Workforce Cost Realism Assessment

Author:
David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Joachim Hofbauer, Gregory Kiley, and Jesse Ellman
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the past decade, federal spending on service contracts more than doubled in constant terms, from $164 billion in 2000 to $343 billion in 2010. Policymakers have recently attempted to reduce or even reverse this increase, emphasizing instead what is now called the “insourcing” of services contracts. Conversions from contractors to government civilians, as well as other actions to expand the federal workforce, are being undertaken for political and cost savings reasons. In this study, CSIS looks into recent developments of these insourcing efforts within one executive department: the Department of Defense (DoD). DoD is the largest government department in terms of demand for services. In 2010, it awarded $161 billion worth of service contracts, up from $67 billion in 2000. This report reviews the analytical validity of the current policy and practices and proposes an alternative methodology for conducting better sourcing decisions between private and public providers.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, and Labor Issues
Political Geography:
United States

99. U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Iran's Perceptions of its Internal Developments and their Implications for Strategic Competition with the U.S. in the Gulf, Sept. 2010 – March 2011 By

Author:
Alexander Wilner
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
With the assistance of Adam Seitz of the Marine Corps University, the Burke Chair has compiled a series of chronological reports that focus on Iranian perceptions of national security and assess Iran‟s intentions concerning competition with the US.
Topic:
International Relations and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

100. Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success

Author:
Evan Munsing and Christopher Lamb
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) is well known within the U.S. Government as the "gold standard" for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion, despite its preference for keeping a low profile and giving other agencies the credit for its successes. It is often cited as a model for whole-of-government problem-solving in the literature on interagency collaboration, and other national security organizations have tried to copy its approach and successes. Despite the plaudits and attention, the way that JIATF-South actually operates has only received superficial analysis. In fact, few people actually understand why JIATF-South works as well as it does or how its success might be replicated.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War on Drugs, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States