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61. Present at the re-creation: A global strategy for revitalizing, adapting, and defending a rules-based international system

Author:
Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the United States and other leading democracies built an international system that ushered in an almost 70-year period of remarkable peace and prosperity. After three decades of largely uncontested primacy, however, this rules-based system is now under unprecedented challenge, both from within and without. We need a new strategy— one ambitious enough to meet the moment, and one innovative enough to fit the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, North America, and United States of America

62. The concept of hedging and its application to Southeast Asia: a critique and a proposal for a modified conceptual and methodological framework

Author:
Jürgen Haacke
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Japan Association of International Relations
Abstract:
In the context of the complex unipolar post-Cold War period that has witnessed China’s reemergence as an economic and military power, small and middle powers are increasingly considered to be hedging. This analysis is especially prevalent in relation to Southeast Asian countries, many of which face security challenges posed by China. However, as the literature on hedging has expanded, the concept’s analytical value is no longer obvious. Different understandings of hedging compete within the literature, and there are many criteria by which hedging is empirically ascertained, leading to confusion even over the basic question of which countries are hedging. In response, this article presents a modified conceptual and methodological framework that clearly delineates hedging from other security strategies and identifies key criteria to evaluate whether smaller powers are hedging when confronting a serious security challenge by one of the major powers. This framework is then applied to Malaysia and Singapore.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Post Cold War
Political Geography:
China, Malaysia, Asia, Singapore, and Southeast Asia

63. Research Collaboration in an Era of Strategic Competition

Author:
Stephanie Segal and Dylan Gerstel
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is a growing concern in Washington that certain aspects of international scientific collaboration pose a risk to U.S. economic and national security, making it the latest front in rising U.S.-China competition. At the same time, the U.S. innovation ecosystem depends greatly on foreign scientists and partnerships with foreign research institutions. A well-calibrated strategy to manage these risks will maximize openness while protecting intellectual property, research integrity, and national security. These efforts should preserve the ability of the United States to attract top talent, including by maintaining a welcoming environment for foreign researchers, while improving domestic investment in science, technology, engineering, and math outcomes. This report outlines the vulnerabilities arising from foreign research collaboration, the risks of policy overreach, and recommendations to manage risks while maintaining scientific openness.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

64. Water Security in the Himalayan Region: Navigating Opportunities for Joint Prosperity and Conflict Prevention

Author:
Farwa Aamer and Jace White
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
On October 21, 2019, the EastWest Institute (EWI), together with the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), convened a high-level roundtable dialogue in Brussels, concerning international water security. The dialogue, the first in the project series, brought together distinguished experts representing both the public and private sectors in China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and the European Union to assess the risks and threats to water security and gauge opportunities for future cooperation between co-riparian states in the Himalayan region. The roundtable dialogue consisted of two panels: “Rethinking Hydrodiplomacy in an Uncertain Geopolitical Future,” moderated by Ms. Kitty Pilgrim, international journalist and former CNN correspondent, and “Effective Water Resource Governance through Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships,” moderated by Dr. Peter Hefele, head of the Asia and Pacific team of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS).
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, International Cooperation, and Water
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Himalayas

65. Petro Dollar. Petro Yuan. Petro Rupee?

Author:
Amit Bhandari
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, every component of the global energy scenario has changed: demand, supply and energy-type. The only constant has been the U.S. Dollar as the currency of energy trade. Lately, the Chinese Yuan has emerged to challenge the Dollar. Can the Indian Rupee be a third player? India is now the world’s third-largest consumer and second-largest importer of energy. Its open market, transparent regulation and growing demand give it an opportunity to become the hub of a vibrant new oil market, simultaneously ensuring its energy security and raising the international profile of the Rupee. This paper explores the possibility the Rupee could be the third currency in which energy is traded, and the challenges and opportunities it presents.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Markets, Oil, Currency, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

66. US foreign policy tools in the era of disinformation: Deficiencies prevent effective response to malign information operations

Author:
Deborah A. McCarthy
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia, China, Iran and ISIS use information operations to undermine the national security objectives of the United States and its allies. However, the US’s international response has been weak. Internal constraints have limited more effective counter-measures. In particular, the lack of a coordinated White House-level strategy, dispersed authorities and little cooperation with private social media companies can be identified as causal factors. Additional steps by the Trump Administration to counter foreign disinformation will aim to protect the 2020 presidential elections rather than to push back on efforts to undermine US leadership abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, ISIS, Social Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North America

67. U.S. Trade Policy in North America, China, and Beyond

Author:
Andy Green and Daniella Zessoules
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
In recent decades, economic, political, and technological barriers to international trade and investment have collapsed around the world. This rapid globalization of commerce has lifted many out of poverty in developing countries, but due in part to a lack of meaningful labor and environmental standards and enforcement, it has also resulted in an outsourcing of production and jobs as well as downward pressure on workers’ real wages in developed countries such as the United States.1 The key trade agreements and international institutions put in place to manage globalization, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), have failed to rebalance the rules to enable globalization to work on behalf of all workers—not just in the United States, but in Mexico, China, and more broadly. And in many cases, the trade rules have exacerbated economic pressures on many U.S. workers.2 For years, progressive voices in the United States have called for efforts to make globalization work better for working families, communities, and the environment.3 Now, the Trump administration has sought claim to the trade reform mantle. Those claims, however, should be met with skepticism. The 2017 congressional Republican tax law slashed taxes for corporations and the wealthy on the false promise of raising wages for workers.4 Corporate profits, share buybacks, and mergers and acquisitions have all boomed, but working-class wages have barely budged.5 The international provisions of the 2017 tax law further incentivize offshoring operations at the expense of domestic investments and sourcing.6 The Trump administration’s domestic economic agenda of financial deregulation, budget cuts, and attacks on workplace safety and labor rights protections will simply make matters worse for working families. The administration’s record on trade policy has been mixed and largely incoherent. The president railed against NAFTA and other trade agreements for harming workers and U.S. jobs yet renegotiated a new NAFTA deal that fails to make labor and environmental standards meaningfully enforceable.7 His administration has slapped tariffs on adversaries and allies alike with little strategy—often in the name of national security and without addressing the root causes of the problem. Threatening further tariffs, the administration now is engaged in negotiations with China over intellectual property theft, market access for foreign multinationals, and a state-led industrial strategy.8 The president announced a delay in the additional tariffs, suggesting a deal with China is coming together, but concerns have long existed that the administration may settle for high-profile spot sales of U.S. commodities while effectively letting structural impediments and China’s industrial policies continue.9 The cost of what may be President Donald Trump’s high-profile deal with China could be real concessions for the United States, including in the technology and national security space, without providing lasting, solidly enforceable benefits more broadly.10 As U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer makes his first appearance this week before the new U.S. House of Representatives, the Trump administration will finally have to answer for its approach. Here are several questions that Congress should ask in order to hold the administration accountable to the American people.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

68. Promoting the Well-Being of North Korea’s Residents and Refugees through US-ROK Cooperation

Author:
Sungwoo Chun
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Under extreme poverty and political repression, many North Koreans endure systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations, along with a protracted, entrenched humanitarian crisis. Many are malnourished and lack clean water, proper sanitation and basic health care. Young children, pregnant women, people with disabilities and the elderly have become the most vulnerable to such privations. These deplorable conditions are exacerbated by continued denial of human rights, including torture and other inhumane treatment, political imprisonment, public executions and suppression of speech, information, religion and movement. A former United Nations high commissioner for human rights described North Korea’s human rights situation as “incomparable . . . anywhere in the world, past or present.” And Thomas Buergenthal, a former International Criminal Court judge and survivor of Auschwitz, described the conditions in North Korean prison camps as “terrible, or even worse, than Nazi camps.” The few North Koreans who manage to escape face additional horrors. Initially, escapees risk being shot and killed by North Korean soldiers as they approach the border. If they manage to cross the border safely, their status as illegal economic migrants, rather than political refugees, presents enormous danger. Women and children are subjected to work in invisible and highly dangerous industries, leaving them particularly vulnerable to sexual and labor exploitation. Approximately 80% of female defectors, studies have shown, have been sold through human trafficking into commercial sex exploitation, enslaved marriage and exploitative labor. All live under the constant fear of being repatriated to North Korea, where they face severe punishment and/or execution. Both the United States and South Korea possess the legislative foundations to address such atrocities. Yet the administrations of Presidents Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in have chosen to ignore them, apparently out of concern that any such discussion would ruffle North Korean feathers at a time of attempted rapprochement. The rationale is that North Korea has become a threat to international peace and security by developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This paper argues that those security concerns should not be considered in isolation. It proposes that the United States and South Korea adopt cooperative and coherent measures to pressure North Korea to improve its human rights record. The Helsinki Accords of 1975 provide the formula for this process. While bringing human rights to the negotiating table may anger the Pyongyang regime in the short term, in the long term it would be beneficial to all involved, particularly in the event of reunification. At the same time, the allies should offer humanitarian assistance to North Korea through internationally monitored and transparent channels. Specifically, South Korea should proceed with the delivery of $8 million in humanitarian aid to the World Food Programme and UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) that Moon pledged in May 2019. The United States should also free up its promised international aid and do more to help North Korean refugees.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Human Rights, and Refugees
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

69. Securing Energy Supply and Maritime Interests: Seeking Convergence

Author:
Frank Umbach
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
As ASEAN’s energy demand is likely to increase by almost two-thirds in the period up to 2040, the regional oil and gas resources in the offshore zones of the ASEAN member states will become even more important for enhancing the energy supply security of both the individual member states as well as for ASEAN as a whole. Accordingly, access to and political as well as physical control and security of these offshore energy resources will receive even more governmental attention. In context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as well as South China Sea policies and its energy dimensions, they can fuel already existing maritime competition and conflicts in the South China Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the interconnecting sea lanes and regional choke points. This paper analyses the question to what extent are energy security concepts and challenges are interlinked with maritime policies, particularly in regard to the unresolved overlapping claims in the South China Sea and the perceived intensifying naval competition in the Indian Ocean. It also highlights the strategic implications of ASEAN's rising energy demand and growing exploitation of its offshore maritime energy resources for future regional cooperation, enhanced competition and potential strategic rivalries as well as conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Oil, Gas, Maritime, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea

70. The Return of Political Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

71. Trump’s 2019 Missile Defense Budget: Choosing Capacity over Capability

Author:
Tom Karako and Wes Rumbaugh
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
President Trump’s 2019 budget request includes $12.9 billion for missile defense programs, including $9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and about $3 billion in modernization in the military services, building upon the acceleration initiated in the $323 million FY 2017 Above Threshold Reprogramming and the FY 2018 Budget Amendment of $2.0 billion. The proposed budget continues the recent trend of procurement consuming a greater portion of overall missile defense spending, reflecting a choice for prioritizing near-term capacity over longer-term capability. With the exception of two new Pacific radars and a modest effort for tracking hypersonic threats, the request includes strikingly few changes to the program of record. The submission fails to address past shortfalls for more research and development of new missile defense technologies and capabilities, most significantly with its lack of real movement toward a space-based sensor layer for tracking and discrimination, as opposed to merely missile warning. Pursuit of more advanced capabilities will require substantial programmatic changes in the 2020 budget, or with a budget amendment later this year, if such capabilities are recommended by the forthcoming Missile Defense Review. On February 12, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its budget request for FY 2019, which included a total of $12.9 billion for missile defense-related activities. The proposed topline for the Missile Defense Agency comes in at $9.9 billion, comprising $2.4 billion for procurement, $6.8 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), $500 million for operations and maintenance (O&M), and $206 million for military construction (MILCON). The $9.9 billion request is a 26 percent increase from the FY 2018 budget request of $7.9 billion. Funding for ballistic missile defense within the services includes about $3 billion, largely for the procurement of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors. Overall, the budget reflects a near-term focus on capacity of existing programs, even at the expense of capability improvements. In its current form, the request boosts funding for all four families of interceptors. For homeland missile defense, this includes the continued improvements to the capacity and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system by continuing to deploy an additional 20 interceptors, several testing spares, and a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. The request also deepens the magazines for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot interceptors, continuing a procurement-heavy trend from last year.1 The focus on capacity does not answer the question, however, how missile defense efforts will be adapted to the new reality of great power competition described by the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.2 One of the few new muscle movements in the entire budget is the addition of two radars in the Pacific for discriminating long-range missile threats to the homeland. The idea of a discrimination radar for Hawaii had been publicly floated over the past two years, and had previously been part of the yet-unpassed appropriations marks from the House and Senate appropriations committees. The Hawaii radar is scheduled for a 2023 deployment, with an additional radar deployed by 2024 at a yet-undisclosed location. The two radars will cost approximately $2.5 billion over the course of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. Although these radars would be useful to close the near-term Pacific midcourse gap against limited ballistic missile threats to the homeland, such funds must be weighed against the opportunity cost for larger improvements in capability provided by a space-based sensor layer that could provide substantially more capable birth-to-death tracking and discrimination on a more global scale and against a wider diversity of threats. The choice for capacity over capability reflects a near-term time horizon, but further delay in more advanced technologies will carry costs at a later time. In sum, the administration’s budget request for FY 2019 prioritizes near-term readiness against limited but growing ballistic missile threats from sources such as North Korea. This choice, however, falls short of connecting missile defense efforts to the reality of renewed great power competition as articulated in the National Defense Strategy. The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. The 2019 request’s modesty of ambition is manifested by low funding for more advanced programs, such as boost-phase intercept, space-based sensors, and volume kill. Should the forthcoming Missile Defense Review address some of these issues and recommend programmatic changes, their implementation may have to wait until the 2020 budget, unless a budget amendment of some kind prioritizes them for the coming fiscal year.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Budget, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Asia, and North America

72. The Other Side of the North Korean Threat: Looking Beyond Its Nuclear Weapons and ICBMs

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States, South Korea, Japan—and every other state affected by the stability and security of Northeast Asia—has a strong incentive to find a way to end North Korea's nuclear threat and its development and deployment of ICBMs. At the same time, no one can afford to forget that North Korea poses a much wider range of threats from its conventional forces and shorter-range missiles—particularly as it develops ballistic and cruise missiles with precision strike capabilities. U.S. diplomacy and strategy cannot afford to focus solely on nuclear weapons, particularly when North Korea has the option of developing biological weapons with the same lethality as nuclear weapons. The U.S. cannot afford to ignore the conventional threat that North Korea poses to South Korea—a threat that could inflict massive casualties on South Korean civilians as well as create a level of conventional war that could devastate the South Korean economy.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Political stability, and Biological Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

73. Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Gurmeet Kanwai
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Issue The development of Gwadar Port is a key element of the greater China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It speaks to both the strength of the China-Pakistan relationship and the reach of China’s grand strategy. With Pakistan’s two other major ports operating near capacity with no room for expansion, projects in Gwadar promise to eventually handle one million tons of cargo annually, while also providing significant industrial, oil, and transportation infrastructure. Though a “monument of Pakistan-China friendship,” there are misgivings on both sides about CPEC, including the safety of Chinese workers, the resentment of Baloch nationalists, and the growing debt trap created by the project. The prospect of the PLA Navy in Gwadar poses greater security questions, as it forms another link in China’s efforts to expand its maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad,” comprised of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States, should counter China’s strategic outreach by networking with other like-minded countries on cooperative security frameworks to ensure a free, open, prosperous, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, Oil, Regional Cooperation, Global Political Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Japan, China, Middle East, India, Asia, and Australia

74. Rebooting U.S.-China Trade Ties: “Enter Ye Through the Narrow Gate”

Author:
Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Nearly two weeks after the U.S. “Trade Avengers” unleashed during their visit to Beijing what one reasonably could call “trade shock and awe” with a very aggressive—if thoroughly researched and well-crafted—set of demands targeting the yawning U.S. trade deficit with China and the core of that country’s throaty industrial policy, China this week is taking its turn with the visit of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member and Vice Premier Liu He, President Xi Jinping’s economic point man who is almost universally described as a thoughtful, pragmatic, and mild-mannered policy academic. In the interim, voices from a wide swath of official Washington have sounded the alarm about the dangers of Chinese influence operations and the presence of alleged subversives, while President Trump himself seemed to cast aside these growing concerns by suggesting via Twitter that he would ask the Commerce Department to overturn its action against the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE—long a focus of the U.S. security community for suspected cyber espionage activity and irrefutable violations of U.S. law—in response to protests that reportedly emanated directly from President Xi. With such frenetically sustained action in such a short period of time, the fog of war seems particularly thick at the moment. As such, it seems like a good time to slow down and have a think about how we got here, what actually is going on, and, with a little bit of luck, perhaps think about some ways to craft a viable way forward. Just like milestone birthdays in one’s personal life, important political anniversaries also can incline the mind toward reflection. Next year, of course, marks the fortieth anniversary of the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and China. As such, much breath and a lot of ink have been devoted to analyzing the course of the bilateral relationship over that nearly half-century. Although certainly not a universal opinion, it seems fair, if perhaps overly reductionist, to suggest that the general conclusion among a substantial number of U.S. officials, policy analysts, and journalists has been that the consistent U.S. policy emphasis on engagement with China during those forty years was, at the end of the day, a sham. In this rendering, naïve groups of senior policymakers in succeeding U.S. administrations and in most of the U.S. China-watching community were hoodwinked by wily CCP leaders who talked the talk of integrating into the so-called U.S.-led rules-based international order, but all the while they had a secret master plan to instead subvert that order and challenge U.S. primacy throughout the globe. In a slightly less menacing (if no less absurd) version of this narrative, China was, indeed, headed generally toward this hoped for integration under the stewardship of deceased paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and his handpicked successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao until Xi Jinping arrived and, through a ruthless consolidation of power, decided instead to change course in what now regularly is referred to in shorthand as Xi’s “authoritarian turn.” But this conclusion seems utterly wrongheaded when examined in the light of hard facts. On the Chinese side of the equation, for example, Deng Xiaoping may have appeared warm and cuddly when donning his cowboy hat during his famous 1979 visit to the United States, but he could be just as ruthless and grasping as any other authoritarian leader. Deng’s exceptionally courageous and dogged pursuit of the policies of reform and opening certainly are worthy of praise, but they cannot, and therefore should not, be separated from the fact that he was content to sit idly by as Chairman Mao’s loyal lieutenant as Mao decimated his political rivals during the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-59) and the Great Leap Forward (1958-62). Nor should we forget that Deng used every ounce of his massive personal prestige with the People’s Liberation Army to, with steely determination, rally his many reluctant commanders to execute the brutal Tiananmen crackdown of June 4, 1989. Similarly, Xi Jinping is no Jack-in-the-Box-like figure who has pulled a fast one with a sharp directional turn in the last couple of years made all the more stark after his sweeping consolidation of power at last fall’s 19th Party Congress. In fact, it is this author’s contention, as supported by a large body of written work and public commentary, that everything Xi has done over the last five years was abundantly clear, whether explicitly or in embryonic form—from the moment he was introduced to the world as China’s new top leader in the fall of 2012, as encapsulated in his call for his country to pursue the “China Dream” set on a foundation of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This by no means suggests the United States should express support for, or even acquiescence in, Xi’s policies, but only that it should not be reacting with the borderline hysteria that now seems to be gripping Washington.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Global Political Economy, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

75. Fuel Competition in the Expanding Power Market Renewable Energy in Southeast Asia

Author:
Stephen Naimoli and Jane Nakano
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This report provides a summary of the discussion from a CSIS roundtable held on April 13, 2018, as part of the CSIS-Pertamina Energy Initiative. The discussion brought together government, industry, and policy experts to explore the outlook for the region’s energy mix out to 2040, the state of renewable energy in Southeast Asia, and its role in the region’s energy priorities. This was the first in a series of events that will be convened this year to examine the role of renewable energy in Southeast Asia and its security, economic, and political importance in the Indo-Pacific. Southeast Asia is one of the fastest-growing regions in the world. The region’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew 66 percent from 2006 to 2015, and if all 10 countries were one economy, it would be the seventh-largest in the world. This growth is projected to increase, averaging just over 5 percent annually from 2018 to 2022. With economic growth comes demand for energy. From 2000 to 2016, economic growth in Southeast Asia drove a 70 percent increase in primary energy demand. Governments in Southeast Asia have implemented a range of policies and incentives to ensure they meet their energy demand. Renewable energy (wind, solar, geothermal, and sometimes hydro and biomass) is capturing an increasing, although not dominant, amount of attention from policymakers, investors, and the private sector as an important part of meeting this demand. Renewable energy’s share of the electric power mix is driven by a range of factors—the economics of power generation, efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, energy security concerns, and concerns over local air pollution. While renewable energy is set to grow as a share of the region’s energy mix, there are indications that its potential contribution is much higher than is currently on track to be realized. Renewable energy increasingly competes on an economic basis in many countries against all fuels except coal, but sometimes political and socioeconomic factors stand in the way of improving their competitiveness in specific markets. The region is also attracting a great deal of outside investor interest. Countries from around the region and ever farther afield are investing in Southeast Asia’s energy sector because of the rapid growth experienced over the last decade and half, and their investment priorities, along with economics, shape their investment decisions in Southeast Asia. Energy policy and investment decisions are also being driven by the shifting nature of supply-and-demand balances in each country and the shifting domestic realities that come from becoming a net importer of specific fuels, such as in Indonesia. Many Southeast Asian countries have integrated low- or zero-carbon renewable energy into their energy planning efforts, and this report examines the dynamics of the power sector in Southeast Asia and how renewable energy competes with fossil fuel sources of electricity.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Oil, Governance, Gas, Electricity, Renewable Energy, and Industry
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Asia, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

76. Responses to Climate-related Security Risks: Regional Organizations in Asia and Africa

Author:
Florian Krampe, Roberta Scassa, and Giovanni Mitrotta
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The transnational character of climate-related security risks often goes beyond the capacity of national governments to respond adequately. As such, it creates challenges for and increases the relevance of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). It is, therefore, not only important to understand the climate-related security risks that regions are experiencing but also to analyse how regional IGOs are developing their capacities to deal with these risks. This SIPRI Insights presents a concise analysis of four regional IGOs—two in Asia and two in Africa. The main findings show that, in various ways, climate-related security risks have found their way into the IGOs’ policy frameworks and institutional discourse. Furthermore, it was found that both the regional security context and the regions’ vulnerability to climate change affect the framing of climate-related security risks.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, and Risk
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, Asia, West Africa, and Southeast Asia

77. Climate Change and Violent Conflict: Sparse Evidence from South Asia and South East Asia

Author:
Florian Krampe and Pernilla Nordqvist
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The impacts of climate change are increasingly viewed as global security risks, which will have far-reaching implications for both human and renewable natural systems. Most climate–conflict research has focused on East Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. This SIPRI Insights explores and summarizes the findings from a systematic literature review of climate–conflict research on South Asia and South East Asia. Although these regions have been greatly affected by both climate change and conflict, there have only been a small number of rigorous academic studies that focus on the climate–conflict relationship. While this constrains the ability to draw general conclusions, there is context-specific evidence that climate change can have an effect on the causes and dynamics of violent conflict in the region when: (a) it leads to a deterioration in people’s livelihoods; (b) it influences the tactical considerations of armed groups; (c) elites use it to exploit social vulnerabilities and resources; and (d) it displaces people and increases levels of migration. In acknowledging that these mechanisms are often interlinked and more noticeable in some climatic, conflict and socio-economic contexts than in others, the need for more research in both regions is clear.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Conflict, and Risk
Political Geography:
Africa and Asia

78. Taiwan's Place in the Evolving Security Environment of East Asia

Author:
Kharis Templeman
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
In March 2018 the Taiwan Democracy and Security Project, a part of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia- Pacific Research Center, convened a workshop that examined Taiwan’s place in the evolving security environment of East Asia. Participants from the United States, Taiwan, and elsewhere in Asia were experts on a wide array of economic, diplomatic, and security topics. The discussions at the workshop were intended to place Taiwan’s security challenges in a broader regional context, to consider possible obstacles to and opportunities for greater multilateral cooperation on security issues, and to devise a set of recommendations for steps that Taiwan and its friends and partners could take to enhance regional security relationships.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Military Strategy, and Democracy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

79. Comments on the Proposed Amendments to the Electricity Act 2003

Author:
Ashwini K. Swain, Parth Bhatia, and Navroz K. Dubash
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
The proposed amendments to the Electricity Act 2003, released on 7th September 2018, are most critical among the set of planned reforms in the power sector. With significant changes, it seeks to provide an enabling framework for transformations in electricity market, pricing reforms, regulatory oversight, quality of supply and energy security. While we appreciate the endeavours and intent, in our comments we focus on some serious concerns the draft raises, vital gaps and issues that need serious consideration. These comments have been drafted based on an internal discussion at the Centre for Policy Research, and should not be considered an institutional position, as CPR does not take institutional positions on issues. Rather, these comments reflect the result of internal deliberations, aimed at understanding and reflecting on the draft amendments, with the aim of constructive feedback to the Ministry of Power.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Government, Social Policy, and Legislation
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Asia

80. Guardians of the Belt and Road: The Internationalization of China's private security companies

Author:
Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Chinese private security companies are going global to protect the country's assets and citizens, in the sometimes unstable countries linked to Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. Following the build-up of infrastructure and investment projects along China’s extensive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), private security companies from China are also increasingly going global – to protect Chinese assets and the growing number of Chinese nationals living and working in countries along the BRI, in sometimes unstable regions. Out of the 5,000 registered Chinese private security companies, 20 provide international services, employing 3,200 security personnel in countries like Iraq, Sudan and Pakistan. The impact of this newly developing Chinese activity abroad is analyzed in this MERICS China Monitor. Chinese private security companies’ international activities pose a challenge to European interests as they are often largely unregulated and their security staff are often inexperienced in dealing with serious conflict situations and combat. EU policymakers, thus, are called upon to encourage and assist Beijing to pass laws regulating Chinese private security companies’ activities overseas.
Topic:
Security, Globalization, European Union, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Beijing, and Asia