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21. How Huawei’s Localization in North Africa Delivered Mixed Returns

Author:
Tin Hinane El Kadi
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Trade between China and North Africa has increased significantly since the early 2000s, but it has largely reproduced patterns of unequal exchange. Since they were unveiled, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Chinese government’s 2016 Arab Policy Paper have signaled the promise of a qualitative shift in China’s engagement with the region. China has committed to increase investments in high-value-added sectors and to boost cooperation in science and technology with countries across North Africa. The digital space is a notable aspect of recent China–North African partnerships. Chinese tech firms are becoming ever more important actors in North Africa through the Digital Silk Road, the digital component of the BRI. North African governments see the Digital Silk Road as an opportunity to help bridge the digital divide and bolster their own national efforts to build digital economies and create high-quality jobs for the millions of unemployed university graduates across the region. In recent years, the region has become home to notable Digital Silk Road projects such as smart cities, satellite navigation centers, data centers, and network infrastructure. Huawei’s localization strategies in Algeria and Egypt show that, far from imposing a one-size-fits-all blueprint on other countries, as Beijing is often depicted as doing in U.S. and European media and policy discussions, Chinese tech players adapt their engagement depending on local development agendas. Flexibility, customization, and services tailored to local demand have been cornerstones of Huawei’s localization strategies in North Africa. Accommodating local development priorities is central to Huawei’s success in globalizing its business ventures. The Chinese firm has responded favorably to Algeria’s and Egypt’s attempts to leverage foreign companies for conducting more value-added activities within their respective economies. Among other things, Huawei opened its first African factory in Algeria, employing Algerians to assemble products for and beyond the Algerian market. It also launched an OpenLab for conducting research and development (R&D) activities in Egypt and established partnerships with several universities in the region to train local students. However, closer scrutiny of Huawei’s localization in both Algeria and Egypt indicates that the company improved its brand image without engaging in meaningful capacity building. For all its success at winning the hearts of government officials across the region, Huawei has engaged in training, manufacturing, and R&D in a way designed to maintain the firm’s technological edge. The Chinese tech giant has managed to localize seemingly developmental activities in North Africa without contributing much to technological upgrading. North African governments should take lessons from China’s playbook of how it became a technological superpower. This means adopting policies that could maximize the benefits of Chinese and non-Chinese investments by ensuring positives spillovers and protecting potential local tech champions. Increasing economic integration across North African countries and moving beyond fragmented bilateral commercial negotiations with China are two steps that may help level the playing field with the Asian giant.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Telecommunications, Huawei, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Algeria, North Africa, and Egypt

22. China’s Infrastructure Projects in the Middle East: Lessons from China’s Engagement Elsewhere

Author:
Dominika Urhová
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Iqtisadi, Ms. Dominika Urhova discusses the economic strategy and role of China in the Middle East, and analyzes the implications of China's growing influence in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

23. Tracking Chinese Aid through China Customs: Darlings and Orphans after the COVID-19 Outbreak

Author:
Andreas Fuchs, Lennart Kaplan, Krisztina Kis-Katos, Sebastian Schmidt, Felix Turbanisch, and Feicheng Wang
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, China's mask and vaccine diplomacy have been widely discussed, but the debate relies on a few stylized data points. This article introduces a systematic way to measure China's foreign aid in almost real-time through official customs records of exported aid goods. Our results show significant shifts in China's aid after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, medical aid skyrocketed after the outbreak. It was initially dominated by face masks and other protective equipment and later by vaccines. This came at the expense of non-medical aid, which was 16.3 percent below its pre-pandemic level. Second, China's aid became global, clearly extending beyond the Global South. Third, in the aftermath of the initial outbreak in March 2020, China's aid became less responsive to both recipient need and political friendship, which can be mainly attributed to the rise of aid through non-government sources. However, in the vaccine diplomacy period of 2021, economic needs and political factors have regained their original importance.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Public Health, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

24. Mapping China’s Multilateralism: A Data Survey of China’s Participation in Multilateral Development Institutions and Funds

Author:
Scott Morris, Rowan Rockafellow, and Sarah Rose
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
A considerable body of recent research attempts to shed light on China’s bilateral aid and finance flows, but there have been fewer efforts focused on China’s participation in multilateral development channels. As a result, China’s role across the landscape of multilateral institutions and funds is poorly understood, even as China has emerged as a leading donor within many of these entities. Part of China’s increased multilateral engagement reflects its economic growth, with shareholding and assessed contributions based largely on economic size. But the government of China’s policy choices are also revealed, in part, through its patterns of voluntary funding, cooperation agreements, and influence through personnel instated in leadership positions. By collating data on China’s financial and non-financial engagement with multilateral development banks and other financial institutions, sector-based vertical funds, and the development entities of the United Nations, among others, this paper seeks to provide a clear picture of China’s role in the multilateral development system and the evolution of that role over the past decade. This assessment brings to light the weight of China’s voting power across the multilateral development banks, the extent to which Chinese firms benefit from procurement opportunities in multilateral institutions, and the degree to which China has achieved a singular position of being a large-scale donor and recipient in the multilateral system.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

25. How Effectively Is the Asian Development Bank Responding to COVID-19? An Early Assessment

Author:
Azusa Sato, Rakan Aboneaaj, and Scott Morris
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
In 2020, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) joined efforts by other multilateral development banks (MDBs) to rapidly scale up support to developing countries to address COVID-19. Beyond headline numbers, there has been less focus on how ADB’s support was distributed by country income group, sector, modality, and product. Using an updated dataset on commitments and disbursements between 2018 and end of December 2020, we compare “pre-crisis” and “crisis period” trends. We overlay ADB data on other publicly available datasets reflecting population size, mobility levels, and government fiscal stimulus to evaluate the responsiveness and size of ADB support vis-à-vis other MDBs. Our findings show ADB’s response was most significant in the countries that most needed support—low income economies with sharp GDP declines and limited fiscal response capacity. The health and public sector management sectors had significant surges in commitments, and impacted the modality used. While there was a rise in grant and concessional financing in 2020, non- concessional loans and sovereign operations still dominated during the crisis period. We suggest further work on how these changes impact development outcomes, with a view to recalibrating the bank’s strategies in some sectors and products in the medium term.
Topic:
Development, Finance, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Banking
Political Geography:
Asia

26. An Analysis of the Binding Constraints on Digital Financial Inclusion in India Using a Decision Tree Methodology

Author:
Nandini Harihareswara and Howard Miller
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The past decade has seen significant innovation and growth in the volume and value of digital payments in India. However, we find that the associated gains have been heavily concentrated in favor of wealthier and urban customers and have had less impact on lower income and rural populations. While some customers now have a far greater selection of quick, cheap, and convenient digital payments methods, as much as 65 percent of the population remains effectively excluded. Using a decision tree framework, we test a range of factors on the supply and demand sides that could be binding constraints on further digital finance penetration. We find that an unlevel playing field in favor of the (primarily state-owned) banking sector results in a lack of effective competition that could be inhibiting greater innovation and outreach in favor of lower-income and marginalized people. This unlevel playing field is potentially a function of institutional weakness combined with the nexus of control of the government and the banking sector, which is reinforced by the position of the National Payments Corporation of India. This control may also be viewed by the government as necessary to protect economic stability in a very dynamic market. To the extent that institutional deficiencies are the root cause of regulatory barriers to the entry of new providers and the scope of digital financial services offered, they are a binding constraint on advancing digital financial inclusion. Under this market structure, the outreach and inherent business models of digital payments and transfers do not provide sufficient perceived benefits to attract large segments of the population. Further, a lack of trust in providers combines with the perception of low benefits to generate an additional binding constraint, preventing the market from reaching a critical mass at which the bulk of the population would have the means and the incentives to use the system. Therefore, the market remains at an equilibrium below its potential.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Finance, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
India and Asia

27. The Political Economy of India’s Transition to Goods and Services Tax

Author:
Chanchal Kumar Sharma
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
What kept the Goods and Services Tax (GST) from becoming a reality in India for a quarter of a century after the adoption of the structural adjustment programme in 1991? What made it possible in 2016? To what extent the Indian model of GST reflects a compromise between the need to keep fiscal federalism intact and to respond to a more global economic imperative? To what extent India’s transition to a concurrent dual GST has brought about a change in the principles, rules, frameworks, and institutions guiding intergovernmental fiscal interactions? This paper investigates these issues and shows that the shifts in the indirect tax regime in India since independence have taken place within the structural context of constitutional rules, the economic policy paradigm and political dynamics. Party congruence after 2014 helped to facilitate the introduction of the GST, but the shape thereof was strongly marked by path-dependent logics and the role of state governments as institutional veto players. In addition, the paper examines the ways in which India’s transition to a concurrent dual GST has brought about a fundamental change in the principles, rules, frameworks, and institutions guiding intergovernmental fiscal interactions.
Topic:
Development, Political Economy, Governance, Tax Systems, Institutions, and Services
Political Geography:
India and Asia

28. China and Geoeconomic Dynamics in Central Asia: Balancing Global Strategies, Local Interests and Multiple Partners

Author:
Aliya Tskhay
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Central Asia is at the core of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which promises to bring connectivity, trade, and improved infrastructure, as well as overall economic development to the states of the region. Yet beyond the official rhetoric, China is promoting its power through geoeconomic means. This paper looks at areas of cooperation (energy, infrastructure, trade, and finance) and identifies the ways in which China is involved with the region. Through a combination of loans, investments, and infrastructure projects, the research shows how China ‘binds’ the region closer to itself and ‘wedges’ out alternative partners. It also shows how Central Asian states utilise the funding within the BRI framework for national development programmes, whilst navigating avenues for mitigating the establishment of a dependent relationship with China. The paper concludes with some policy implications for China, Central Asia, and the wider region.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China and Asia

29. China’s Techno-Industrial Development: A Case Study of the Semiconductor Industry

Author:
Alex He
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
This paper reviews the strategies and plans, policy-making institutions, process and problems in China’s techno-industrial development. Although it has made noticeable progress in some areas in the past two decades, China still lags behind in most core technology and advanced manufacturing fields, such as high-end chips. There have been several real breakthroughs in the semiconductor sector by private companies such as HiSilicon and rapid advancement in frontier technologies — artificial intelligence, fifth-generation wireless communication network technology, big data, blockchain and the Internet of Things — by private companies such as Huawei, Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu; however, state-sponsored technological innovation and breakthroughs have been crippled by the existing problems in China’s science and technology research system and a campaign-style catch-up strategy that rewards bureaucrats on short-term goals, as well as by weak links between academic research and industry and a swing between the market-oriented approach for technology acquisitions and indigenous innovation for technology breakthroughs. A case study of China’s semiconductor industry demonstrates both the problems and progress in China’s techno-industrial development, as well as the implications for the country's prospects of evolving into a technological powerhouse.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Industry, and 5G
Political Geography:
China and Asia

30. Approaches for Supporting Smallholders in the Global South: Contentious Issues, Experiences, Syntheses

Author:
Theo Rauch and Michael Brüntrup
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
There is a widely held consensus that it will not be possible to feed the world without the help of the smallholders of Africa, Latin America and Asia, who number up to 570 million farms or 2 billion people. Given the sheer size of this figure alone, the sustainable development of smallholder farming will be key to achieving a range of other sustainability goals.
Topic:
Agriculture, Development, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Global South

31. Chinese Mining and Indigenous Resistance in Ecuador

Author:
Cintia Quiliconi and Pablo Rodriguez Vasco
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources of copper in Latin America. But Chinese mining operations in Ecuador, which could have contributed to Ecuadorian development, soon gained a negative reputation after these activities prompted a great deal of local pushback, especially from affected Indigenous communities. As a result, the major Chinese mining consortium that now controls Ecuador’s two main copper mines has taken adaptive steps to stabilize its mining investment and increase the security of its supply networks, steps that often have not produced the intended results. Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels. This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon. In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities. To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land. In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016. This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced. This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
Topic:
Development, Government, Mining, Indigenous, and Resistance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South America, and Ecuador

32. Enhancing Inter-Firm Linkages through Clusters and Digitalisation for Productivity Growth

Author:
Vo Tri Tranh
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper examines the policies for industrial cluster development in Viet Nam. The first export processing zone was established in 1991. Since 1994, Viet Nam has focused more on developing domestic productive capacity and thus various types of industrial estates were established. The key actors in industrial cluster policy are the government, Prime Minister, ministries, provincial people’s committees, and management boards of industrial and economic zones. The choice of industrial estate is often determined by factors such as geographic location, land, labour, infrastructure, industry, business environment, and incentives. Viet Nam has provided various incentives to industrial estates of various types, but the scope and extent of preferential policy support for firms in general and those operating in industrial and economic zones are rather modest. The industrial estates have contributed significantly to attracting foreign direct investment, to exports, to productivity improvement, etc. Looking forward, Viet Nam needs further efforts on industrial cluster development, including development of statistics, analysis of cluster policy impacts, and provision of FTA-consistent incentives.
Topic:
Development, Industrial Policy, Governance, Leadership, and Management
Political Geography:
Asia and Vietnam

33. Foreign Direct Investment and Labour Market Dynamics in a Developing Country: Evidence from Indonesian Plant-Level Data

Author:
Toshiyuki Matsuura and Hisamitsu Saito
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study examines the impact of inward foreign direct investment on the wages and employment of skilled and unskilled workers in Indonesian manufacturing plants. Entry of multinational enterprises affects local labour markets through spillovers as well as labour and product market competition. Our results show that spillovers increase the labour demand of local plants for unskilled workers, but increased wages due to severe labour market competition reduce the demand for skilled workers. We also find that product market competition causes resource reallocation from low- to high-productivity plants. Thus, attracting inward foreign direct investment effectively enhances aggregate productivity growth, but may retard the transition to skill-intensive production in Indonesian manufacturing.
Topic:
Development, Foreign Direct Investment, Manufacturing, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Asia

34. Technology Imports and Employment in Developing Countries: Evidence from Viet Nam

Author:
Thu Thu Vu and Duc Anh Dang
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Advanced machines and technology replace workers through automation. However, capital–labour substitution need not reduce aggregate labour demand, as it induces simultaneous contrasting effects within industries. To explore these effects, we examine the relationship between employment in Vietnamese manufacturing firms and imported capital goods in 2011–2017. To solve the problem of potential endogeneity and measurement errors, we used Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) imported capital goods as an instrument variable for imported capital goods in Viet Nam. We found that imported capital goods do not displace employment and even increase employment and labour productivity. The impacts of imported advanced technology are more pronounced in large firms. More imported technology increases labour productivity in state-owned enterprises and the number of workers in large firms and firms in industrial zones. However, the increase in the level of employment is lower in industries and firms intensively using machines.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Employment, and Imports
Political Geography:
Asia and Vietnam

35. The Effects of Financial Inclusion on Development Outcomes: New Insights from ASEAN and East Asian Countries

Author:
Rajabrata Banerjee, Ronald Donato, and Admasu Afsaw Maruta
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study empirically examines the effects of financial inclusion on economic development, – economic growth, education, health, and income inequality – in 20 Asian countries in the period 2004-2015. The financial inclusion index at an aggregate level is constructed using a hybrid methodology (reported in the previous paper) and we empirically examine its relationship with particular development outcomes. We then disaggregate the index into the three dimensions of financial inclusions – access, usage, and quality – and further into the top two indicators from each dimension based on principal component analysis scores (reported in the previous paper), to examine whether specific dimensions or indicators are more strongly associated with particular development outcomes than with others. Our results show that aggregate financial inclusion has a strong positive effect on all development outcomes and this effect improves for countries with lower political risk. At the dimension level, while usage is the only dimension impacting on economic growth, and access is the only dimension impacting on health outcomes, both usage and access influence education and income inequality. Moreover, the top ranked indicators in each dimension exert a far greater positive influence on development outcomes than the second highest ranked indicators. Our findings show that adopting a single blanket policy may not be appropriate to realise the full potential of financial inclusion in a less developed country. Policy prescriptions should therefore target specific dimension and indicators of financial inclusion to maximise the positive effect on development outcomes.
Topic:
Development, Health, Finance, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Asia

36. The Role of Innovation in Skill Development: Evidence from Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Viet Nam

Author:
Duc Anh Dang and Vuong Ahn Dang
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Using the Small and Medium Enterprise Survey in Vietnam and three proxies of innovation, we study the impact of firm innovation on on-the-job training in the manufacturing sector from 2007 through 2015. To address potential measurement errors and omitted variable problems, we use the average level of innovation in the same sector in other districts as an instrument for firms’ innovations. We find that firms provide additional training for existing workers when introducing new technology, and high-value-added firms provide additional training for existing workers. Moreover, government assistance may not be the main reason that encourages firms to provide training. The results also show that firms hire more skilled workers when implementing innovations.
Topic:
Development, Training, Innovation, and Skilled Labor
Political Geography:
Asia and Vietnam

37. China and COVID-19: a shock to its economy, a metaphor for its development

Author:
George Magnus
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The Chinese government’s draconian actions to control the coronavirus seem to be producing a remarkable economic contraction. As so many are unable to attend or resume work at the moment, the government’s palliative economic measures may gain little traction. Although the demand shock will eventually fade, other longer-term issues will surely endure. The supply shock will be less obvious but more corrosive. The government’s questionable conduct in managing the public health crisis has unveiled significant features about governance in Xi’s China that can be mapped on to China’s development. While this crisis is the biggest challenge Xi has faced, there is little doubt that he will survive it, champion the party’s role in the nation’s rescue, and feel emboldened to continue with his authoritarian governance. Yet it is this that, in the long run, will prove incompatible with China’s economic development ambitions.
Topic:
Development, Economy, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
China and Asia

38. China’s BRI: The Development-Finance Dimension

Author:
David Gordon and Haoyu Tong
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This report is the first of two synthesising the findings of a major research workshop convened in Washington DC on 26 June 2019, by The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as part of its multi-year project on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The IISS commissioned ten papers that addressed development-finance and security issues in the BRI, prepared by leading scholars and policy practitioners. They were joined at the workshop by more than two dozen other experts on China’s international behaviour. This first report focuses on development-finance issues in the BRI; the second will address security issues broadly cast. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is now six years old. Announced by (then) newly ensconced President Xi Jinping, it has since become the centrepiece of Xi’s ambitious drive to make China a more active global leader, and to break free from the cautious approach set out more than 30 years earlier by then-paramount-leader Deng Xiaoping – that China’s strategic approach should be to ‘hide its capacities and bide its time’. At the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th Congress in 2017, the BRI was integrated into the party’s charter. Much of the early analytical work on the BRI has focused on questions surrounding China’s motivations – economic or geopolitical. Is Xi’s initiative a response to changing domestic economic circumstances? Or does it signal evidence of China’s intent to build a twentyfirst- century imperium modelled on the post-war United States-led experience, more than on European colonial or earlier Asian empires? The emerging consensus on this question is that it has been a bit of both. At the same time, an often overlooked factor is Xi’s constant need to further consolidate his power inside China, as the economics versus geopolitics debate about the motivations for the BRI gives too little attention to the more purely political dimension. The BRI cannot be separated from Xi’s efforts to cast himself domestically as an exceptional leader for an exceptional moment in China’s history.
Topic:
Development, Globalization, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

39. Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Daniel R. Russel and Blake Berger
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, is a massive international infrastructure program involving nearly 140 countries with over an estimated $1 trillion in projects related to energy, transportation, digital networks, and trade. Chinese leaders frame the BRI as “win-win” cooperation focused solely on development and connectivity. Beijing has gone to great lengths to minimize BRI’s links to the People’s Liberation Army and to downplay the initiative’s geostrategic overtones. Nevertheless, many governments have become worried about ulterior motives behind BRI projects, many of which have dual-use commercial-military capabilities and are increasingly connected to Chinese digital technologies and networks and satellite systems. The Asia Society Policy Institute’s – Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative – examines key BRI projects in the Indo-Pacific and explores relevant Chinese doctrine, the involvement of the People’s Liberation Army with BRI, and assesses the potential military and geostrategic advantages to China from BRI ports and other projects. This project is led by ASPI Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy Daniel Russel, with support from ASPI Senior Program Officer Blake Berger. The project and the report benefitted from advisement from experts and officials in Singapore, Australia, Japan, Vietnam, China, and the United States as well as to the expert advisory group whose distinguished members generously shared their time and wisdom to support this effort.
Topic:
Development, Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

40. Assessing Asia: Sub-Saharan Africa Global Value Chain Linkages

Author:
Heiwai Tang, Douglas Zhihua Zeng, and Albert Zeufack
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper studies the relationship between Asia’s economic engagements in Africa and individual African nations’ participation in global value chains (GVC) over the past two decades. We find that while overall exports from Africa to Asia are still highly concentrated in resource-intensive sectors, a few African countries have exploited the emerging opportunities to diversify export portfolios through exporting to Asia. Each African nation has a distinct main trade partner in Asia, in contrast to the common view that China has become the dominant trade partner of most African nations. Using a panel data set for 46 African countries over 16 years from 2000 and 2015, we find that exports to Asia are positively correlated with exports to the rest of the world, suggesting that in contrast to trade diversion, trade with Asia complements exports to other countries. Asian economic engagement in the continent is associated with countries’ exports “moving up the value chain”, as measured by the upstreamness index proposed by Antras et al. (2012). However, such process was accompanied by a reduction in the length of their production chains, implying that fewer stages and countries are now involved in the production of exported goods.
Topic:
Development, International Political Economy, Natural Resources, Partnerships, Exports, Trade, Global Value Chains, and Data
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, and Global Focus