Content Type: Working Paper / Political Geography: / Publication Year: within 5 Years

2001. Erdogan using deniable private militias to destabilize the Middle East

Author:: Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak and Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Erdoğan has created a private military and paramilitary system. He deploys this apparatus for domestic and foreign operations without official oversight.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, Private Sector, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:: Europe and Turkey

2002. Israel should stay wary of Turkey’s gifts

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Only the very optimistic could believe in real strategic cooperation between Erdogan’s regime and Jerusalem.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Israel

2003. Iran Raises the Stakes for Biden

Author:: Alexander Grinberg
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Giving Iran unearned incentives in advance of negotiations only will bring about more Iranian provocation.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2004. Restoring American Bipartisan Commitment Towards Israel: A Moral Duty and Strategic Necessity

Author:: Eran Lerman
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: It is possible to restore American bipartisan backing for Israel. Therefore, it is important to avoid being too identified with President Trump, despite Israeli gratitude due to him for many of his policies. Bonds between Israel and American Jewry should be bolstered; bridges should be built to both sides of the aisle in Congress; and US defense establishment support should be solicited. All this, in view of Israel’s need to influence decisions in Washington on matters vital to its future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Religion, Alliance, Domestic Policy, and Partisanship
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

2005. Why Pakistan won’t be next to normalize with Israel

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Domestic constraints, support for Palestine and growing ties with Iran will likely continue to keep Pakistan and Israel apart.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Normalization, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

2006. What is Social Finance? Definitions by Market Participants, the EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities, and Implications for Development Policy

Author:: Sören Hilbrich
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The market for social financial instruments is rapidly growing. The issuance of social bonds, for instance, reached $149.4 billion in 2020, showing an extraordinary growth of 720% compared to 2019 (ADB, 2021, p. 14). By providing capital for certain types of investments associated with positive social impacts, these instruments are intended to close funding gaps that hamper the realisation of social goals, as laid down, for instance, in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In addition, social finance might set incentives for enterprises to engage in more sustainable business models that would give them access to social financial instruments potentially associated with a lower cost of capital. However, the magnitude of the potential contribution to society of social finance is a matter of debate. This paper focuses on an important challenge for social finance that concerns the plurality of existing definitions of social investments. The paper provides an overview of the definitions followed by market participants, describes the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities as a potential standard in this context, and discusses implications for development policy.
Topic:: Development, Markets, European Union, Sustainability, Bonds, and Social Finance
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2007. SDG-Aligned Futures and the Governance of the Transformation to Sustainability: Reconsidering Governance Perspectives on the Futures We Aspire to

Author:: Ariel Macaspac Hernandez
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The (im)possibility of governance of the transformation to sustainability (T2S) is driven by how the related multiple transition processes as well as the various functional, institutional and bargaining interactions among relevant agents or stakeholders can be steered. Like other transformation processes, T2S is an immediate response to threats and risks behind structural changes. In addition, T2S is a “purposive new normal” because it seeks ways to achieve a new equilibrium whereby the system is able to effectively confront or prevent imminent threats and risks. At the same time, this paper claims that there can be more than one version of the new equilibrium for each state or society. This paper argues against the “ahistoricity” (Geschichtslosigkeit) approach of much of the literature on T2S and contends that each country has a distinct set of socio-political (e.g. quality of institutions) and economic resources (e.g. gross national income) available, depending on its current standing. The academic debate on transformation has re-emerged with intensity due to it increasingly being linked to the discourse on sustainability. One important thread of this transformation–sustainability nexus is the role of governance. While the academic literature on governing T2S can already build on decades of work, the debate on the three-fold interfacing of governance, transformation and sustainability still has major gaps to fill. This paper articulates an integrated approach in understanding the governance of T2S by bringing together perspectives from sociology, political science and economics (and their sub-disciplines) as puzzle parts. Connecting the different puzzle parts contributed by the different disciplines, this paper conceptualises the four types of resources needed to make governance conducive to T2S: vision, performance, social cohesion and resilience. The next step for this paper is to use these puzzle parts to form a framework to introduce three sets of scenarios of pathways for sustainable futures, the “SDG-aligned futures”. The three pathways leading to these SDG-aligned futures are political-transition-driven (or strong), societal-transition-driven (or cohesive) and economic-transition-driven (or efficient). The three scenarios for SDG-aligned futures serve on one hand as the basis for the contextualisation of transformation for a more strategic application of appropriate solutions by focussing on what governance structures, levels, processes and scales are conducive to T2S. At the same time, this approach resolves the “ahistoricity” dilemma in many concepts of T2S by highlighting that countries have different entry points when initiating T2S. The perspectives on the scenarios towards a sustainable future provide multiple entry points for each country by specifying the departing stage for a specific country that consists of a set of path dependencies resulting from the country’s (1) historical experience (e.g. colonialism) and (2) national discourse (e.g. debate on the sustainable energy transition). As countries utilise the potentials of their already existing governance structures and implement policy reforms that occur within existing institutional and politico–legal structures as well as through social upheavals and fundamental changes (hence, resilience is fundamental to T2S), these pathways are aligned by the Sustainable Development Goals, leading to coherent societal priorities and policy mixes.
Topic:: Governance, Sustainable Development Goals, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2008. Social Cohesion: A New Definition and a Proposal for its Measurement in Africa

Author:: Julia Leininger, Francesco Burchi, Charlotte Fiedler, Karina Mross, Daniel Nowack, Armin von Schiller, Christoph Sommer, Christoph Strupat, and Sebastian Ziaja
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Social cohesion is key for sustainable development. While social cohesion has suffered in many societies from the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, high levels of social cohesion have helped to overcome critical situations during the pandemic in other societies. As a consequence, protecting and strengthening social cohesion has become an increasingly central goal for most countries and the international community. Despite the strong interest in the topic, the questions of how to define social cohesion and make it an observable phenomenon through proper measurement are still contested, in both academia and policy circles. To date, no consistent, temporally and geographically spread-out data on the different elements of social cohesion exists that would allow for a global analysis of social cohesion. This rather fragmented picture of analytical approaches calls for a more universal definition and measurement of social cohesion. This paper aims to provide a narrow and measurable definition of social cohesion that travels across regions and countries. Conceptually, it proposes a definition of social cohesion that incorporates the core elements of existing and widely used definitions of social cohesion across disciplines (trust, identity, cooperation for the common good). Our contribution is to offer a definition of social cohesion that is broad enough to cover the essentials holding societies together while at the same time keeping it lean enough to analyse the causes and consequences of social cohesion, for instance the relationship between social cohesion and inequalities or political institutions. Methodologically, we propose an application of our concept to the African context. It is not only a first step towards a more global and inter-regional measurement of social cohesion, but also the basis for further knowledge-creation, the identification of patterns of social cohesion and the analysis of its causes and consequences. From a policy-oriented perspective, a more unified definition of the core elements of social cohesion and its measurement can inform policies that aim at protecting and fostering social cohesion. In development cooperation, it will help not only to build indicators for designing programme objectives and for evaluation and monitoring, but also to advance evidence-based theories of change.
Topic:: Development, Sustainability, Social Cohesion, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Africa

2009. Does COVID-19 Change the Long-Term Prospects of Latecomer Industrialisation?

Author:: Tilman Altenburg, Clara Brandi, Anna Pegels, Andreas Stamm, Christiaan Vrolijk, and Tina Zintl
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: This study explores to what extent the COVID-19 crisis affects the long-term prospects for industrial development. The focus of the study is on latecomer economies – those facing an uphill battle because they joined global markets at a point in time when other economies had already established global production networks. In a first step, we analyse how the prospects for industrialisation are changing, mainly as a consequence of three global megatrends: digitalisation and automation of production; global economic power shifts; and the greening of economies. These trends create new opportunities for latecomer industrialisation, but they also raise entry barriers to markets, especially for country with weak innovation systems. We then explore COVID-19 effects through the analytical lens of the pre-COVID megatrends. While the pandemic has had a severe impact on the world economy, such impacts will not change the ongoing trends fundamentally. The ongoing recovery from COVID-19 is not showing much structural transformation – despite many voices demanding to “build back better”. Yet, the pandemic is accelerating or decelerating some of the previous trends. One is the trend towards online trading. The dominance of international trading platforms may lead to concentration in “upstream” activities such as manufacturing, crowding out weaker market actors. At the same time, platform economies are boosting delivery activities, such as courier services. Another trend that may be accelerated by the pandemic is towards the reshoring of previously offshored productive tasks, yet, evidence here is mixed, and we may see other risk-hedging strategies rather than large-scale reshoring. We may also see the gap between dynamic economies in East/Southeast Asia and other developing regions widening, because the former recovered faster due to vaccination programmes and fiscal stimulus packages. Regarding the greening of economies, some major economies initiated green fiscal stimulus packages, accelerating for example the development of global green hydrogen economy. Also, the trend towards tele-work is reducing emissions from the transport sector. Overall, however, the pandemic does not seem to alter the ongoing, but slow, progress towards greener economies. We conclude with police recommendations in five domains: i) Fostering economic resilience through economic diversification; ii) the need to develop pharmaceutical and medical supply industries in all countries; iii) increased investments in digital capabilities, including the ability to regulate platform economies; iv) strengthening domestic revenue generation to increase policy space and resilience, including pro-environmental fiscal reforms; and v) improving international governance e.g. in the domains of intellectual property rights and technology-sharing.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Governance, Industrialization, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2010. How the Political Participation of Refugees is Shaped on the Local Level: Self-Organisation and Political Opportunities in Cologne

Author:: Milan Jacobi
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Six years have passed since the so-called “long summer of migration” of 2015, and the numbers of newly arriving asylum-seekers in Germany have flattened. However, as one of the main receiving countries of refugees, other challenges are coming into focus. Besides labour market participation and cultural participation, political participation is crucial to social life. But how to enable the political participation of refugees in host countries remains a challenge. This study examines how refugees without the condition of citizenship, who, thus, lack formal, electoral means of participation, can engage in political activities. To this end, it first uses a qualitative approach to examine how various self-organisations in the city of Cologne, Germany, use their resources to bring their interests into the political decision-making process. Second, it examines the political opportunity structures that exist at the local level to enable refugee self-organisations (RSOs) to engage in political activities. For this purpose, interviews were conducted with representatives of the organisations as well as the municipality and other civil society actors in Cologne. The results show that RSOs can be important partners for municipal decision-makers when it comes to refugee-specific issues. However, the results also suggest that opportunity structures are unevenly distributed among organisations and affect the organisations’ resource endowments, thus limiting access.
Topic:: Migration, Refugees, and Political Participation
Political Geography:: Europe and Germany

2011. Global Access to COVID-19 Vaccines: Challenges in Production, Affordability, Distribution and Utilisation

Author:: Andreas Stamm, Christoph Strupat, and Anna-Katharina Hornidge
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing vaccination process calls for decisive, internationally coordinated and forward-looking action. We propose short-, medium- and long-term actions and emphasise that the political pressure for action should not only focus on short-term management, but on building long-term structures that are crucial to prepare for future epidemics or pandemics. Four key challenges need to be addressed in order to achieve global control of COVID-19 by using vaccines. First, vaccines need to be produced at scale; second, they should be priced affordably; third, they have to be allocated globally so that they are available where needed; and fourth, they have to be deployed and utilised in local communities. Challenges in production are producing some of the main bottlenecks, but the others – in particular vaccine scepticism and utilisation – need to be considered early enough to enable smooth global vaccination campaigns. Addressing the four key challenges, we recommend the following short, medium- and long-term actions. In the short term, we advise accelerating global vaccination efforts by scaling up financial support for the COVAX initiative. In the medium term, we suggest establishing regional production centres in priority countries, providing the necessary intellectual property through voluntary patent pools and fostering information campaigns and civil society participation to increase vaccination willingness and utilisation. In the long term, we recommend establishing Global Pandemic Centres of Excellence in all world regions – analogous to the CGIAR system in the agricultural sector – that are responsible for medical research, vaccine production, distribution and delivery.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Vaccine, COVID-19, and Coordination
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2012. The EU-UNDP Partnership and Added Value in EU Development Cooperation

Author:: Erik Lundsgaarde
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: European Union (EU) funding for United Nations (UN) organisations has expanded significantly over the last two decades. The EU’s partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is an important example of EU-UN cooperation, and UNDP was the fourth-largest UN recipient of European Commission funds in 2018. Against the backdrop of UN and EU reforms that aim to strengthen multilateralism and promote more integrated development cooperation approaches, this paper outlines priority areas in EU-UNDP cooperation and modes of cooperation. The term “added value” provides an entry point for identifying the rationales for EU funding to UNDP. In EU budgetary discussions, added value is a concept used to inform decisions such as whether to take action at the EU or member state levels or which means of implementation to select. These choices extend to the development cooperation arena, where the term relates to the division of labour agenda and features in assessments of effectiveness. The paper explores three perspectives to consider the added value of funding choices within the EU-UNDP partnership relating to the division of labour between EU institutions and member states, the characteristics of UNDP as an implementation channel and the qualities of the EU as a funder. On the first dimension, the large scale of EU funding for UNDP sets it apart from most member states, though EU funding priorities display elements of specialisation as well as similar emphases to member states. On the second dimension, UNDP’s large scope of work, its implementation capacities and accountability standards are attractive to the EU, but additional criteria – including organisational cost effectiveness – can alter the perception of added value. Finally, the scale of EU funding and the possibility to engage in difficult country contexts are key elements of the added value of the EU as a funder. However, the EU’s non-core funding emphasis presents a challenge for the UN resource mobilisation agenda calling for greater flexibility in organisational funding. Attention to these multiple dimensions of added value can inform future EU choices on how to orient engagement with UNDP to reinforce strengths of the organisation and enable adaptations envisaged in UN reform processes.
Topic:: Development, United Nations, Reform, European Union, Partnerships, and Funding
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2013. The Rise of the Team Europe Approach in EU Development Cooperation: Assessing a Moving Target

Author:: Niels Keijzer, Aline Burni, Benedikt Erforth, and Ina Friesen
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: This paper analyses the European Union’s (EU) evolving motivations, priorities and current approaches to development cooperation under the label of “Team Europe”, following its introduction in April 2020 as the European Union’s global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. It assesses what Team Europe is, to what extent and how the Team Europe approach has changed the EU’s development cooperation, which effects it has on EU initiatives to support partner countries, and discusses the implications of Team Europe on the EU’s development policy in the medium and long term. The paper analyses the Team Europe approach along four dimensions, which are traditionally emphasised in the EU’s development policy: (i) visibility, (ii) effectiveness, (iii) ownership and (iv) integration. It concludes that Team Europe primarily seeks to increase the visibility of EU’s actions in support of partner countries and prioritises European ownership of cooperation priorities over developing country ownership. Although ‘effectiveness’ efforts focus on improving efficacy of the intra-EU-MS coordinated processes, it remains unclear whether Team Europe promotes more programmatic collective action among member states.
Topic:: Development, European Union, COVID-19, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe

2014. Quantifying Investment Facilitation at Country Level: Introducing a New Index

Author:: Axel Berger, Ali Dadkhah, and Zoryana Olekseyuk
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: This article introduces a new and unique dataset for measuring the adoption of investment facilitation measures at country level. The Investment Facilitation Index (IFI) covers 117 individual investment facilitation measures, clustered in six policy areas, and maps their adoption for 86 countries. This article presents the conceptual and methodological background of the IFI and provides a first analysis of the level of adoption of investment facilitation measures across countries participating in the investment facilitation for development negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Our dataset reveals novel insights. Countries which have lower levels of adoption belong to the low-income and lower-middle-income country group and are often located in Africa, the Middle East and to some extent Latin America and the Caribbean. The strong correlation between FDI and the IFI score shows that countries with the lowest levels of FDI, and thus in need of policy tools to attract FDI, have the lowest levels of adoption when it comes to investment facilitation measures. Our dataset has direct relevance for current policy discussions on investment facilitation for development in the WTO but also for domestic-level policy-making. Furthermore, the IFI provides the basis for a future research agenda to assess the design and impact of a future WTO agreement.
Topic:: Development, Investment, and WTO
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and Caribbean

2015. The Transformative Capacity of Transnational and Transdisciplinary Networks and the Potential of Alumni Work

Author:: Johanna Vogel
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The Corona pandemic has shown us more than any other recent event that when it comes to a global crisis, we are all in the same boat. In a complex world, we need cooperation to meet global challenges. Networks can provide a structure that enables cooperation and offers promises of being flexible and adaptable. This paper will focus on transnational and transdisciplinary knowledge networks formed by alumni – people who have experienced collective training at the start of their network journeys. Through this shared experience, I see a special potential for these types of networks to engage in collaborative work and create a wider impact in society. The overall question of this paper is: How can knowledge networks fully develop their transformative potential through strategic alumni management? This question is of interest to network facilitators, especially of alumni networks. In order to address the challenge, the paper first presents findings from the alumni management literature focusing on the definition of alumni management, its relevance and the life stages of ideal alumni. This is complemented by insights from the social movement area that highlight the development paths of networks as well as the success factors for social impact networks. Empirical examples from existing alumni networks elaborate the success factors within their work. From these three areas, five recommendations are deduced. In order to foster transformation and create social impact beyond their networks, alumni networks should: (1) align their activities to the life stages of their alumni, (2) establish and nurture trustful relations among their network members – encompassing all elements of trust (benevolence and confidence, reliability and predictability, competence, honesty, openness as well as familiarity and intimacy), (3) initiate and continually work on a collaborative we-identity process, (4) provide supporting structures that allow for making easy connections as well as (5) enable self-organisation. When these five recommendations are taken into consideration, knowledge networks have a great potential to support societal change.
Topic:: Development, transnationalism, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2016. Refugees and Local Power Dynamics The Case of the Gambella Region of Ethiopia

Author:: Samuel Zewdie Hagos
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The Gambella Region is one of the marginalised and most conflict-ridden regions in Ethiopia. Recently, violent clashes between the two largest ethnic groups in the region - the host communities, the Anywaa, and the South Sudanese Nuer refugees - have reignited the debate on refugee integration in the region. In fact, the roots of the Anywaa-Nuer conflict can be traced back to the imperial regime of Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century. In the early 1960s however, the arrival and spontaneous integration of Nuer refugees was peaceful and relations between both ethnic groups were harmonious. During this time, refugee management was organised locally. Against this background, the focus of the present paper is to understand the nature, context and evolution of the long-standing conflict between the Anywaa and refugees from the Nuer ethnic group in the Gambella Region. Beyond that, the paper explores the Anywaa-Nuer conflict within the context of the political power dynamics of the last two decades. Thereby, the paper reveals that the disputes between the Anywaa and the Nuer have taken on a new dimension since the early 1990s.
Topic:: Refugees, Conflict, Integration, and Marginalization
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

2017. Mechanisms for Governing the Water-Land-Food Nexus in the Lower Awash River Basin, Ethiopia: Ensuring Policy Coherence in the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda

Author:: Srinivasa Reddy Srigiri, Anita Breuer, and Waltina Scheumann
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Interdependencies among the goals and targets make the 2030 Agenda indivisible and their integrated implementation requires coherent policies. Coordination across different sectors and levels is deemed as crucial for avoiding trade-offs and achieving synergies among multiple, interlinked policy goals, which depend on natural resources. However, there is insufficient evidence regarding the conditions under which coordination for integrated achievement of different water- and land-based Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) functions effectively. The paper investigates the land and water governance in the Ethiopian lower Awash River basin and identifies key interdependencies among related SDGs. It assesses in how far the interactions and coordination among various decision-making centres are effective in managing the interdependencies among different goals. Systems for using and managing water and land exhibit features of polycentric governance as this process involves decision-making centres across different sectors and at various levels. Key action situations for land and water governance in operational, collective and constitutional choice levels are interlinked/networked. Each action situation constitutes actions that deliver one of the functions of polycentric governance, such as production, provision, monitoring etc. as an outcome, which affects the choices of actors in an adjacent action situation. The study shows that the existing institutions and governance mechanisms for water and land in Ethiopia are not effective in managing the interdependencies. Non-recognition of traditional communal rights of pastoralists over land and water and ineffective policy instruments for ensuring environmental and social safeguards are leading to major trade-offs among goals of local food security and economic growth. The autocratic regime of Ethiopia has coordination mechanisms in place, which fulfil the role of dissemination of policies and raising awareness. However, they are not designed to build consensus and political will for designing and implementing national plans, by including the interests and aspirations of the local communities and local governments. The study recommends efforts to achieve SDGs in the Ethiopian Awash River basin to focus on strengthening the capacities of relevant actors, especially the district and river basin authorities in delivering the key governance functions such as water infrastructure maintenance, efficient use of water, and effective implementation of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Further, urgent efforts for scaling up of recognition, certification and protection of communal land rights of pastoralists and clear definition of rules for awarding compensation upon expropriation, are required.
Topic:: Water, Food, Governance, Sustainable Development Goals, and Land
Political Geography:: Africa and Ethiopia

2018. EU Development Policy as a Crisis-Response Tool? Prospects and Challenges for Linking the EU’s COVID-19 Response to the Green Transition

Author:: Svea Koch, Ina Friesen, and Niels Keijzer
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: This paper assesses the preferences of EU institutions and member states for the Union’s development policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Addressing both the effects of climate change and biodiversity loss and the exacerbating socio-economic inequalities requires a response that links the short-term recovery of the pandemic with longer-term socio-ecological transformations. Our findings show that the EU and its member states have mainly responded to that challenge through Team Europe and Team Europe Initiatives. While these have contributed to defining a joint European response to the pandemic, the strong focus on climate and green transitions and the lack of connections to the broader SDG agenda as well as social and human development have created tensions between some member states and the EU. A key challenge ahead in further defining the European response to the pandemic is finding new strategic directions and operational means for bridging these differing priorities.
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Sustainable Development Goals, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe

2019. Institutional Change through Development Assistance The Comparative Advantages of Political and Adaptive Approaches

Author:: Michael Roll
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Development assistance often fails to achieve institutional change because of a limited consideration of the political nature of these reforms and the local context. In response, political and adaptive development assistance (PADA) approaches, such as “Thinking and Working Politically” (TWP) and “Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation” (PDIA), have been developed in recent years. Politicians, practitioners and researchers increasingly want to know if these approaches are more effective than mainstream approaches to development assistance. To answer this question, this paper develops a framework by asking three more specific questions about the “which”, the “where” and the “what”. First, for which types of development problems is political and adaptive development assistance likely to work better than mainstream approaches? Second, where or in which contexts might this be the case? And third, what contributions can be expected from these approaches including, but going beyond, effectiveness? Available evidence is used to answer these questions. This paper finds that political and adaptive approaches have comparative advantages over mainstream approaches when either the problem is complex, the context is hard to predict, or the solution is contentious. The overall conclusion is that development policy needs a broader variety of approaches from which to choose based on which fits the problem and the context best.
Topic:: Development, Politics, Institutions, and Development Assistance
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2020. Employing Capital: Patient Capital and Labour Relations in Kenya’s Manufacturing Sector

Author:: Florence Dafe, Radha Upadhyaya, and Christoph Sommer
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Generating decent employment is key to the creation of a new social contract and social cohesion in Sub-Saharan Africa. The crucial question is, thus, how can more decent jobs be created? Much of the extant research has focused on the role of states and businesses in shaping employment relations. In this paper, we draw attention to a third type of actor that has been largely absent in the literature on the determinants of employment relations in developing countries: financial institutions. Based on data from 38 interviews of Kenyan manufacturing firms, financiers and labour representatives before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, we examine the relationship between the patience of capital and labour relations. In particular, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that access to more patient sources of capital may help to enhance the quantity and quality of jobs in African countries. We discuss three mechanisms through which this occurs. Our paper contributes to the growing body of research on patient capital (which largely focuses on developed countries) by extending it to the context of lower income African countries; it also speaks to the broader debates about how to enhance the contribution of finance capital to social cohesion.
Topic:: Development, Labor Issues, Manufacturing, Social Cohesion, COVID-19, and Capital
Political Geography:: Kenya and Africa

2021. Dissecting Aid Fragmentation: Development Goals and Levels of Analysis

Author:: Ruth Carlitz and Sebastian Ziaja
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Aid fragmentation is widely denounced, though recent studies suggest potential benefits. To reconcile these mixed findings, we make a case for studying differences across aid sectors and levels of analysis. Our cross-national time-series analysis of data from 141 countries suggests aid fragmentation promotes child survival and improves governance. However, just looking across countries has the potential to blur important within-country differences. We analyse subnational variation in Sierra Leone and Nigeria and find that the presence of more donors is associated with worse health outcomes, but better governance outcomes. This suggests that having more donors within a locality can be beneficial when they are working to improve the systems through which policies are implemented, but harmful when they target policy outcomes directly. A survey of Nigerian civil servants highlights potential mechanisms. Fragmentation in health aid may undermine civil servants’ morale, whereas diversity in governance aid can promote meritocratic behaviour.
Topic:: Governance, Development Aid, and Donors
Political Geography:: Africa, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria

2022. E-Government and Democracy in Botswana: Jana Bante Felix Helmig Lara Prasad Lea Deborah Scheu Jean Christoph Seipel Helge Senkpiel Markus Geray Armin von Schiller David Sebudubudu Sebastian Ziaja Observational and Experimental Evidence on the Effects of E-Government Usage on Political Attitudes

Author:: Jana Bante, Felix Helmig, Lara Prasad, Lea Deborah Scheu, Jean Christoph Seipel, Helge Senkpiel, Markus Geray, Armin von Schiller, David Sebudubudu, and Sebastian Ziaja
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: This study assesses whether the use of electronic government (e-government) services affects political attitudes. The results, based on evidence generated in Botswana, indicate that e-government services can, in fact, have an impact on political attitudes. E-government services are rapidly being rolled out around the globe. Governments primarily expect efficiency gains from these reforms. Whether e-government in particular, and information and communication technology (ICT) in general, affect societies is hotly debated. There are fears that democracy may be compromised by surveillance, censorship, fake news, interference in elections and other strategies facilitated by digital tools. This discussion paper adds to the nascent literature by investigating if the expanding e-government usage in Botswana affects individual support for democracy, regime satisfaction and interpersonal trust. Methodologically, the study relies on observational and experimental evidence. The observational approach assesses the impact of the usage of different e-services such as e-payments and electronic tax return filings on political attitudes. The experimental approach incentivises taxpayers to file their tax returns electronically. Both approaches build on an original in-person survey gauging the political attitudes of 2,109 citizens in Greater Gaborone. The survey was conducted in February and March 2020. In terms of results, we do not identify a general substantive effect for the impact of all e-services on political attitudes. For some of the e-services and attitudes tested, however, we find significant evidence. Furthermore, our study yields significant results for several of the linkages between the causal steps within our causal mechanisms. For instance, we find that e-government can empower citizens to engage in political activities and that, although e-government users on average report that the government is not addressing their needs, a simple incentivising message can significantly improve people’s feelings in this regard.
Topic:: Politics, Communications, Democracy, and E-Government
Political Geography:: Africa and Botswana

2023. Mainstreaming South-South and Triangular Cooperation: Work in Progress at the United Nations

Author:: Sebastian Haug
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: South-South cooperation has become an increasingly visible part of international development processes. Together with the expansion of triangular cooperation – that is, cooperation among developing countries supported by a traditional donor or multilateral organisation – the growing clout of South-South schemes reflects shifts in power and wealth towards the former developing world. Against this backdrop, United Nations (UN) entities have repeatedly been asked to mainstream their support for South-South and triangular cooperation (SSTC), but there is hardly any systematic comparative evidence on whether and how they have done so. This paper addresses this gap in three steps. First, it traces the rise and evolution of South-South terminology at the UN, showing that the use of North-South frames had its origins in debates about international inequalities in the 1960s and has expanded in the context of globalisation processes since the 1970s, and also that it is developing countries themselves that have taken up and rallied behind notions of South-South. The paper provides an overview of three partly complementary and partly contradictory approaches that understand South-South cooperation to be a set of technical cooperation modalities; a general political narrative; or a shorthand for inter-state cooperation beyond North-South assistance, with the latter being the dominant de facto understanding among UN entities. Second, the analysis focuses on UN efforts over the last two decades aimed at mainstreaming support for SSTC. It centres around a scorecard of 15 UN entities that maps their level of institutional focus on SSTC, based on insights from strategies, annual reports, publications, monitoring frameworks, budgets and organisational structures. Based on the scorecard, UN entities are grouped under the tentative labels of “champions”, “waverers” and “stragglers” for mapping patterns of SSTC mainstreaming. Third, the paper identifies three key factors that, in addition to beliefs in the functional relevance and potential effectiveness of SSTC, have accompanied and conditioned UN mainstreaming efforts. SSTC support has been part of (a) strategic considerations for positioning UN entities in an evolving funding environment; (b) internal bureaucratic dynamics that centre around individuals and shape day-to-day engagement; and (c) geopolitical tensions connected to the increasingly visible fracture between the United States and China. Traditional donors, in particular, tend to approach South-South cooperation as an umbrella for the expansion of China’s clout across the UN development system, leading to an intensification of SSTC-related contestations. Overall, support for South-South and triangular cooperation has had a long, multi-faceted, expanding and increasingly controversial trajectory at the UN. With reference to areas of future research and policy recommendations, the paper suggests that UN entities – in coordination with member states – are well advised to expand their efforts for exploring how to best support cooperation that unfolds outside traditional North-South assistance schemes.
Topic:: International Cooperation, United Nations, and International Development
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2024. Identity and Discourse Within Diverse International Networks: The Managing Global Governance Network Seen Through the Lens of Thematic Oral History

Author:: J. Carlos Domínguez
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The MGG Programme is an innovative and ambitious initiative implemented by the German Development Institute (DIE) with the support of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Although the scope and objectives have changed since it was launched in 2007, there is a clear vision that summarises its overarching goals: to construct a network that functions as an effective, high-quality, knowledge-based cooperation system for promoting global governance and sustainable development in the long run. In this respect, managing and crafting symbols, perceptions and collective identities within the MGG will remain crucial as a glue that enables collective efforts and maximises the network’s overall impact. Under what conditions does cooperation among diverse groups become sustainable? How does the MGG look when analysed as part of the longer-term life trajectory of its participants? How do individual identities intersect with a collective sense of belonging to the programme and to the network? What is the role of the collective identity and the collective narrative that underpins MGG efforts? The main goal of this discussion paper is to apply oral history methodologies to answer some of these questions. The assumption is that the long-term impact of the MGG Programme depends on how well individual motivations, which are shaped by complex life trajectories, intersect with national interests and broader global cooperation narratives. By confronting theory with empirical evidence, this paper also draws some lessons and raises some interesting questions that may be useful for MGG staff to consider when planning future activities.
Topic:: Development, History, Governance, Networks, and Identity
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2025. Assessing the US strategy in Iraq

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Only an integrated political, military and economic strategy targeting the Iranian system in all its aspects, with a long-term commitment to local allies and the mission, can succeed.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2026. After Soleimani: Maintain the Pressure on Iran’s Nuclear Project

Author:: Eran Lerman
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: A firm stand at this critical juncture may prove to be of use as part of the effort to bring Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table on terms more acceptable to the US and to Trump’s regional allies, including Israel.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Denuclearization, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

2027. A large amount of noise and smoke

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Iran’s attacks against the US in Iraq accomplished what was intended
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2028. How does exposure to conflict events shape social trust? A spatiotemporal approach

Author:: Jacob S. Lewis and Sedef A. Topal
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: This article examines how proximate exposure to violent conflict events affects levels of social trust. We argue that since exposure to conflict heightens perceptions of threat, individuals who were proximately exposed to conflict events should exhibit lower levels of generalized and out-group social trust than individuals not subject to such exposure. We also argue that individuals subject to exposure to conflict should show higher levels of in-group social trust due to existential concerns that increase their desire to find security within their group. Using geocoded survey data from more than 25,000 respondents in 16 African countries surveyed in 2005 and from the Armed Conflict Location Event Database, we draw spatiotemporal buffers around each respondent. We find that exposure to violent conflict events reduces all forms of social trust across all models. Such findings run counter to arguments suggesting that proximate exposure to violent conflict increases in-group social trust.
Topic:: Civil Society, Conflict, Social Order, and Trust
Political Geography:: Africa

2029. Green Hydrogen in a Circular Carbon Economy: Opportunities and Limits

Author:: Zhiyuan Fan, Emeka Richard Ochu, Sarah Braverman, Yushan Lou, Griffin Smith, Amar Bhardwaj, Jack Brouwder, Colin McCormick, and Julio Friedmann
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: As global warming mitigation and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reduction become increasingly urgent to counter climate change, many nations have announced net-zero emission targets as a commitment to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Low-carbon hydrogen has received renewed attention under these decarbonization frameworks as a potential low-carbon fuel and feedstock, especially for hard-to-abate sectors such as heavy-duty transportation (trucks, shipping) and heavy industries (e.g., steel, chemicals). Green hydrogen in particular, defined as hydrogen produced from water electrolysis with zero-carbon electricity, could have significant potential in helping countries transition their economies to meet climate goals. Today, green hydrogen production faces enormous challenges, including its cost and economics, infrastructure limitations, and potential increases in CO2 emissions (e.g., if produced with uncontrolled fossil power generation, which would be hydrogen but would not be green). This report, part of the Carbon Management Research Initiative at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, examines green hydrogen production and applications to understand the core challenges to its expansion at scale and the near-term opportunity to enable deployment. An analysis using Monte Carlo simulations with a varying range of assumptions, including both temporal (i.e., today versus the future) and geographical (e.g., the US, the EU, China, India, Japan) factors, anticipates emissions intensity and costs of producing green hydrogen. The authors evaluate these production costs for different scenarios as well as associated infrastructure requirements and highlight near-term market opportunities and policies to motivate development of the green hydrogen industry.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, Green Technology, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2030. Can Russia live with an ongoing conflict in Syria? Mapping out Trends Among Russian Foreign Policy Elites

Author:: Andrey Baklanov and Leonid Isaev
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: September 30, 2020 marked five years since the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria. This was the first military operation Moscow launched far from its own borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Russia is not only militarily involved but is deeply invested in the conflict as it seeks to shape the course of the negotiation process and the post-conflict socio-political development of Syria. Russia’s grand strategy in Syria continues to evolve as it assesses its actions and goals in the light of current realities. In this paper we look at how the Russian academic community and diplomatic circles see the outlook of the Syrian negotiation process. We conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of these groups in order to understand their perspective on the Geneva process, the prospects of the Astana format, and the impacts on Russia of an ongoing conflict scenario in Syria.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

2031. Reconciliation Initiatives in Daraa: A Testimony for Histor

Author:: Haytham Manna
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The southern city of Daraa was the birthplace of the peaceful Syrian uprising that started in March 2012. This genuine Syrian movement was met with accusations of conspiracy and vandalism by the Government of Syria (GoS), whose aggressive responses provoked similar reactions from local population. The Houranian people (Daraa city residents), who are known for their peacefulness and sensitivity towards strangers, detested the militarization of the uprising, and they resisted the increasing presence of foreign armed elements (Hezbollah, Nusra Front, ISIS). The feeling of loss of their identity and space to outsiders was acute. The reconciliation with the GoS came about through negotiations with the Russians in mid-2018. Houran people took it as an opportunity to avoid a costly military confrontation with the GoS, restore peacefulness, and expel the foreign militias. This author was part of the negotiations and involved in deliberations at many junctures, and this testimony was prepared in consultation with the principal members of the reconciliation negotiations with the Russians and the GoS.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

2032. The Concept of “Forward Defence”: How Has the Syrian Crisis Shaped the Evolution of Iran’s Military Strategy?

Author:: Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Over the past decade, Iranian officials have repeatedly referred to “forward defence” or “offensive defence” as the foundation of Iran’s military strategy. While the concept implies the inclusion of offensive aspects into Iran’s military strategy, which used to have an overwhelmingly defensive nature, it is also increasingly used to justify Iran’s military presence beyond its borders. This paper begins with a historical overview of the evolution of Iran’s military strategy, especially since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, showing how the concept of “deterrence” has become the cornerstone of its strategic military planning. It also discusses the crucial concept of “strategic depth”. Understanding these basic concepts is essential to be able to analyse the forward defence strategy, its main elements, and the domestic, regional, and international factors contributing to its formation. The paper also explores how the Syrian crisis has affected Iran’s military strategy in both conceptual and instrumental terms, leading to the formation and consolidation of the forward defence. Conceptually, Iran has justified its direct military presence far from its borders as necessary for confronting threats at their source before they reach Iranian territory. From an instrumental point of view, Iran’s involvement in the Syrian crisis has led to the development of Iran’s regional network of non-state allies and proxies, while adding a new layer to Iran’s deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. The main argument is that forward defence is not a new military doctrine but an evolved and updated form of “deterrence”. The paper also identifies Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programmes, its support for non-state actors across the region, and its focus on developing cyberwar capabilities as the main elements of its forward defence strategy, rooted in its perception that it is located in an increasingly insecure regional environment. Finally, the paper suggests that, for the United States to reach an agreement with Iran on these missile and regional issues, Washington and its regional allies must make reciprocal concessions to alleviate Iran’s sense of threat to its security and survival. In this case, Iran might be ready to make concessions on its allied and proxy militias in Yemen and Syria, although the more complex security and political situations in Iraq and Lebanon leave Tehran with comparably less leverage. While Iran is not expected to agree on considerably limiting its missile programme, an agreement on the range of its ballistic missiles could be achievable.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

2033. Understanding Russia’s Endgame in Syria: A View from the United States

Author:: Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Inherently unstable, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy will result in a fractured and volatile Syria. Neither Russia nor Turkey appears likely to withdraw from Syria in the near term. Iran will remain an important player, albeit without holding a territorial sphere of influence. Balancing against Moscow, Tehran will exploit opportunities where possible, deepening its influence through informal and covert efforts. In this endgame, Russia’s prickly partnership with Turkey in Syria likely will endure. As a Russian analyst noted, “Turkey and Russia need each other strategically.” While Moscow may acknowledge that Turkey’s presence in Syria is a long-term problem, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy nonetheless accommodates the reality of a lasting Turkish presence.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

2034. US-Russia interactions in Syria and the future of the conflict in 2021

Author:: Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: The future for Syria in 2021 looks bleak from the Russian perspective. Though the conflict entered a low-intensity phase of armed confrontations that characterised 2020 will likely continue in 2021. The temporary negotiated solution for north-western Syria reached in March 2020 is likely to hold but there exists a high probability of renewed fighting between the SAA and various Islamist groups. There will also be bickering between Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran due to their different visions for Idlib’s future. Tensions will likely also continue to grow in northern and north-eastern Syria, where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces sporadically clash with pro-Turkish groups. Occasional US-Russian encounters on the ground are also highly likely in the region. Additionally, confrontations between Israel and Iran/Hezbollah forces stationed in Syria will likely continue and might escalate.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

2035. Supporting Syrian Refugees amidst Lebanon’s Crises

Author:: Will Todman
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Lebanon is in freefall amid numerous crises. The currency has collapsed, food prices have quadrupled in a year, and Covid-19 cases continue to rise after one of the strictest lockdowns in the world. More than half of Lebanese households now live below the poverty line and the government will soon be forced to end subsidies on basic goods. The country is approaching a national humanitarian emergency and widespread food insecurity. Syrian refugees are especially vulnerable because the Lebanese government has curtailed their rights and restricted international support for them. More than 90 percent of Syrians in Lebanon now live in extreme poverty. However, the prospect of any imminent, voluntary return of large numbers of refugees to Syria remains distant. Numerous surveys with refugees confirm that they do not feel able to return to Syria, despite worsening conditions in Lebanon. Lebanese are increasingly in need of economic support and feel ignored by the government and aid organisations. In this context, Lebanese leaders’ attempts to scapegoat refugees are gaining traction. Scapegoating refugees not only allows the political class to delay critical reforms but has also resulted in increasing inter-communal violence. As Lebanon’s freefall continues, the risk of more widespread violence increases. Donors face a dilemma in how best to respond to the crises. The Lebanese political elite have steadfastly refused to implement necessary economic reforms to avoid collapse and have proved to be unsuitable partners for aid operations. To circumvent the government, donors have increased their support to local leaders in the hope that it can help create a more permissive environment for refugees with channelled support through local NGOs. Humanitarians are now trying to meet the needs of vulnerable Lebanese, Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees, and migrant workers in different humanitarian responses. Aid coordination is becoming a gargantuan task. Shifting to a country-wide or “Whole of Lebanon” response would better streamline the humanitarian response and ensure refugees and vulnerable Lebanese are treated equitably. Donors have little appetite for such an approach, but it could soon be the only viable option. Interviews with international donors revealed a viewpoint that the United States is not capitalising on its potential influence on the refugee file in Lebanon. To maximise the United States’ potential to improve conditions for vulnerable Lebanese and Syrians, it must increase its participation in donor discussions in Beirut and devote more political capital to the issue. The United States and other donors should use this political capital to take advantage of new openings to build the foundations of sustainable development for all. The changing context has created a few, though limited, opportunities to push for programs that are primarily framed as aiding Lebanese yet include refugees.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Refugees, NGOs, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

2036. Post-Election Iran and Syria: Continuity or Change?

Author:: Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: On June 18, conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s presidential election to succeed moderate President Hassan Rouhani. For many, his victory came amid public dissatisfaction with the dire economic and political situation, along with widespread disqualification of reformist and moderate candidates, which significantly reduced voter turnout. Traditionally, lower turnout in Iranian elections means the victory of conservative or so-called ‘hardline’ figures and so Raisi’s victory was in many ways following a theme. However, even though the election and its outcome indicate a significant shift in Iran’s domestic politics toward more authoritarianism, its impacts on foreign policy, including Iran’s strategy in Syria, will be less tangible. Over the past several years, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has almost completely dominated Iran’s regional policy. At the same time, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei openly seeks to limit the role of the president in foreign policy. Consequently, this means that Iran’s policy in Syria in the post-election period will be more about continuity than about change.
Topic:: Governance, Elections, Leadership, and Transition
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Syria

2037. Security Scenarios for Syria in 2021-2022

Author:: Serhat Erkmen, Nicholas Heras, and Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Syria is a geographic entity divided into three main zones of control, each ruled by local actors with the strong and seemingly indefinite support of powerful foreign actors. These three zones are one zone in western, central, and eastern Syria controlled by the Syrian government, a second zone in northwest and northern Syria along the Syrian-Turkish border controlled by the Syrian opposition and supported by Turkey and a third zone in northeast Syria controlled by the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) and its military the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - which is supported by the United States and several of its allies that are part of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The common perception by observers of the Syrian conflict is that it is frozen; that Syria will be indefinitely divided into these different territorial zones of control. This assumption obscures the fact though that a significant amount of fluidity on the ground within Syria's three main zones of control is possible. Each of these zones has its own unique characteristics and local customs that must be understood to draw broader assessments on how the wider Syrian conflict might be resolved one day.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Local
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

2038. Military Operations and Artificial Intelligence

Author:: Tobias Vestner
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will most likely transform military operations. This paper explores how AI systems may affect and be affected by principal instruments for preparing and conducting military operations. Therefore, the paper analyses and discusses AI in the context of strategy, doctrine, plans, rules of engagement, and orders to situate opportunities, challenges, and open questions as well as offer overarching observations. The paper takes a broad angle of analysis that enables a general examination of the issue based on new policies and technological developments as well as the consideration of political, military, legal, and ethical perspectives. Thereby, the paper provides insights and avenues to advance further reflection, research, and policy-making on the appropriate integration, management, and use of AI for military operations.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2039. The Political Economy of Syria’s Physical Fragmentation and Dependence

Author:: Samir Aita
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: It is difficult to imagine how the Syrian conflict could be resolved through a political process alone that does not directly involve the combating forces in Syria – namely the Syrian army and its associated militias linked to the power system in Damascus, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their Democratic Union Party (PYD) power system, as well as the “opposition” factions and their respective backers, i.e. Iran and Russia, the USA and Turkey. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine such a solution without addressing the political economy that has emerged and that now underpins these forces’ power, the warlords’ chaos-inducing advantages gained from the country’s physical fragmentation, the hidden or open bargains between these warlords and other powers, and the deterioration of Syrians’ living conditions to unbearable levels. The current situation, where the country’s physical fragmentation has reached relative stability, could persist for a long time at the people’s expense. However, several factors could reignite the conflict: growing competition over resources and rent-seeking activities, even within each area of influence; the ongoing decline in much-needed international aid; and the further deterioration of the situation expected in Lebanon and its consequences for Syria.
Topic:: Economics, Political Economy, Politics, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

2040. How China and Pakistan Negotiate

Author:: Katharine Adeney and Filippo Boni
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Since being officially launched in April 2015, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been one of the most watched set of projects under the aegis of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Having already injected around $25 billion into Pakistan, the CPEC not only has been dubbed the “flagship project” of the BRI, but it also holds a central role in Beijing’s global ambitions.1 While much has been said about the geopolitical implications of the CPEC, including for both India and the United States, less attention has been devoted to providing in-depth insights into the mechanics of how the BRI is unfolding on the ground in Pakistan. How do China and Pakistan negotiate the terms of CPEC deals? To what extent has Islamabad managed to exert agency in its dealings with Beijing? How does China adapt to the contexts it operates in? By now, the CPEC has been subject to much media, academic, and policy scrutiny, but these questions have not been answered. The power asymmetry between the two partners—coupled with the impression that the BRI represents a unidirectional Chinese endeavor, not just in Pakistan but also globally—has contributed to the erroneous representation that Beijing is merely imposing the CPEC on its all-weather partners in Islamabad. On the contrary, this study highlights China’s adaptive strategies in dealing with a host of Pakistani actors (including political parties, local communities, and the military) against the backdrop of Pakistan’s evolving political landscape and change in leadership following the country’s 2018 elections. In filling this gap, this paper foregrounds the importance of adopting a relational approach to studying how the BRI unfolds on the ground. This entails looking at how Pakistan and China have negotiated the CPEC’s energy, infrastructure, and industrial cooperation projects. The analysis is based on semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the two authors during three rounds of fieldwork in 2015, 2018, and 2020–2021 triangulated with a host of official reports, statements, and newspaper articles. Examining the domestic contours of the CPEC shows that Pakistani actors have wielded agency in important ways throughout the process, while Chinese actors at times have accommodated key Pakistani demands.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

2041. The Hidden Face of Informal Cross-Border Trade in Tunisia After 2011

Author:: Hamza Meddeb
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Despite the heavy-handed approach to security that has been adopted at Tunisia’s land borders, informal cross-border trade continues to thrive. Land corridors have been shut down, but the continued dynamic activity in maritime corridors has compensated for this loss, allowing Turkish and Asian consumer goods adapted to the declining purchasing power of the Tunisian population to penetrate local markets. The dynamism of Tunisia’s maritime corridors owes much to the emergence of small entrepreneurs and underprivileged outsiders who operate informally through trade networks connecting Tunisian and Asian ports. Some well-established firms also have adopted informalization strategies to circumvent trade barriers and restrictions against bilateral trade between Turkey and Tunisia. The rise of these informal networks and approaches reflects a growing trend: the progressive shift of Tunisia’s trade away from Europe and the rise of Turkey and China as major trade partners.
Topic:: Borders, Trade, and Informal Economy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Turkey, North Africa, and Tunisia

2042. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:: Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

2043. The Local Roots of Chinese Engagement in Pakistan

Author:: Muhammad Tayyab Safdar
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: China has deepened its economic engagement with Pakistan through elite-centered negotiations over the routes and projects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). But elites are not the whole story: China has made inroads beyond Pakistan’s political elites with a broader array of local stakeholders in the country’s education, media, and energy sectors. Pull factors in each of these areas are giving local Pakistani actors incentives to develop closer relationships with Chinese actors. In education, China’s status as a rising global power and the promise of future economic returns have driven ever more Pakistanis to learn Mandarin and opt to study abroad in China. In the media sector, the financial pressures facing Pakistan’s private media houses have contributed to increasing domestic buy-in for news sharing agreements with Chinese media organizations. In the power sector, the lack of alternative sources of external funding for local Pakistani conglomerates has resulted in the emergence of joint ventures on electricity generation projects with large Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). At the same time, Chinese government policies are serving as push factors to incentivize Chinese actors to expand their interactions in different segments of Pakistani society. For example, China has opened and sponsors Confucius Institutes and classrooms across Pakistan, while also offering scholarships to Pakistani students interested in studying in China. As Chinese firms have expanded their presence in Pakistan, they have worked with local universities to adapt to local customs and cultural and religious values. In media circles, stakeholders like China’s Xinhua News Agency have worked with local Pakistani media outlets to localize information dissemination and shape Pakistani public opinion on important international issues in ways that are in sync with Beijing’s worldview. And Chinese investment in Pakistan’s power sector is aligned with Chinese SOEs’ Go Global strategy and the expansion of these firms’ operations in overseas markets as part of the BRI. China’s engagement with Pakistani political, social, and economic institutions comes in response to local conditions. By adapting to these conditions and working through local institutions and actors, a host of Chinese actors are poised to continue deepening their interactions with different parts of Pakistani society.
Topic:: Education, Partnerships, Media, Economy, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

2044. Yemeni Border Markets: From Economic Incubator to Military Frontline

Author:: Ahmed Nagi
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: A string of border markets on Yemen’s northwestern border with Saudi Arabia turned the confluence of two countries’ peripheries into a center, gave rise to a distinct economic system, and bridged cross-border communities. The ongoing war in Yemen has either destroyed these markets or forced their closure. An end to the hostilities is unlikely to restore the status quo ante, owing to Saudi Arabia’s desire to establish a buffer zone. This would militarize the borderlands in perpetuity.
Topic:: Markets, Economy, Borders, and Military
Political Geography:: Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

2045. How Duterte Strong-Armed Chinese Dam-Builders But Weakened Philippine Institutions

Author:: Alvin Almendrala Camba
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Chinese construction contracts and development finance have increased massively in recent years. According to many experts, these projects are largely transplants designed to offshore and export Chinese technology, labor, and policy designs to host countries. However, these views have little regard for important nuances of place, time, and politics, ignoring the degree to which host countries—such as local elites, members of civil society, and norms—shape project design, implementation, and results on the ground. Under the regime of President Rodrigo Duterte, political elites in the Philippines have pressed Chinese firms to adapt to some of their demands for political expediency on key infrastructure projects. This pattern is evident from the Kaliwa Dam and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project—both of which have made substantial progress during Duterte’s rule. In particular, Manila has bypassed local social and environmental regulations and has paved the way for Chinese dam builders to break ground on projects quickly so as to strengthen the Duterte government’s political standing. Around the world, Chinese firms have been highly attentive to the will of local political elites, limiting or sometimes completely avoiding relationships with opposition elites and ties to civil society members. Philippine politics is turbulent. Projects supported by the Duterte regime today might not have the same traction under his successor. So while these Chinese concessions have earned favor with Duterte and his allies, such tactics may prove unsustainable over the long term and could easily spur future resentment against China among local communities marginalized by this decisionmaking. In sum, it is Filipinos, not Chinese actors, who mostly have set the agenda on these major infrastructure projects, except on a few specific contractual terms.
Topic:: Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Rodrigo Duterte, and Construction
Political Geography:: China, Philippines, and Asia-Pacific

2046. Reimagining Regional Governance in Latin America

Author:: Federico Merke, Oliver Stuenkel, and Andreas Feldmann
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Latin America’s existing predicament stems from a complex set of interlinked social, economic, and political crises, which have been magnified by the advent of the coronavirus pandemic and a rising tide of isolationism and “antiglobalism.” These crises range from domestic polarization and economic travails, to ideological divergence, personal rivalries among the region’s leaders and U.S.-Chinese geopolitical competition, and all are hampering regional governance and negatively impacting the prospects of cooperation. Latin American governments urgently need to work together to address the manifold challenges they face as events in recent decades have shown that unless better regional mechanisms can be found, domestic and transnational challenges—from organized crime and environmental degradation to migration and anemic economic growth—will become even more difficult to address, with potentially devastating long-term consequences. Yet, despite the high stakes, traditional regional governance mechanisms seem paralyzed, lacking even the capacity to discuss the current untenable situation, let alone address it. The conventional wisdom is that regional cooperation across Latin America is practically nonexistent because its heads of states have insurmountable ideological differences and because the region’s dominant diplomatic institutions have failed to fulfill their purpose. All is not lost in the realm of regional governance, however. While cooperation is either dysfunctional or nonexistent in many dimensions, in others it persists with surprising resilience and vigor, although it is often overlooked or underappreciated. Existing cooperation is for the most part technical and based on the committed work by government officials who, even during the bleakest moments of the pandemic, have shown adherence to principled norms and driven by a refreshing degree of pragmatism. Effective regional governance and cooperation in Latin America is necessary for a broader conversation on the region’s role in a rapidly changing global order, shaped by technological transformation and genuinely global problems such as climate change, migratory pressures, and increasing security threats. As great power competition continues to shape the global order, Latin America often is regarded as a peripheral player. Yet far from being somehow apart or exempt from today’s rising geopolitical currents, Latin America, for better or for worse, is very much affected by them. Regional governance is a fundamental instrument to help Latin America overcome its numerous daunting challenges. Even when ideological differences make cooperation difficult at the high politics level, it is crucial to find avenues of progress at other levels and in informal or less visible ways.
Topic:: Politics, Regional Cooperation, Governance, Economy, and Ideology
Political Geography:: Latin America

2047. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:: Paul Stronski
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

2048. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:: Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

2049. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:: Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

2050. Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship

Author:: Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: At present, the relationship between Turkey and the United States is in a deep crisis. The meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the margin of the June 2021 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Brussels raised expectations that the U.S.-Turkey relationship can be put back on track. And yet recovery from the present crisis is uncertain, as the underlying factors that previously shaped the relationship have changed. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more multipolar system have altered the nature of U.S.-Turkey engagement. In Washington, competition between global powers is now the overriding frame for U.S. foreign policy. Ankara, however, views the world very differently. The rise of Asia and the ascendancy of China are seen more as opportunities than threats. Ankara interprets these trends, as well as Russia’s growing regional activism, as signs of the lasting emergence of a multipolar world order. This understanding now shapes the strategic calculus of Turkish policymakers. Turkish political elites firmly believe that a successful repositioning of their country in this multipolar environment will benefit the nation in the long run. This growing divergence in terms of how Ankara and Washington see the world creates a challenging environment for constructively addressing the range of prevailing bilateral disputes. This paper examines five main areas of disagreement between the two countries and explores how the two sides might overcome these differences. At the top of the list of current disagreements are Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air and missile defense system from Russia and ongoing U.S. support for Syria’s Kurdish military and political factions. Also important are the consequences of the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey; the U.S. position on the self-exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who many in the Turkish government believe was the architect of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016; the possible impact of the Halkbank court case on grounds of past violations of Iran sanctions; and the Biden administration’s decision to use the word “genocide” to refer to the killings and deportations of Ottoman Armenians during World War I. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Turkey-U.S. relationship is in need of redefinition. The Turkey-U.S. relationship has long been defined as a strategic alliance underwritten by NATO. Today, this definition has become obsolete and does not capture the new reality of this relationship. Turkey undoubtedly will remain a strong NATO ally, but its relationship with the United States will no longer be shaped by the power asymmetry of this military alliance. In other words, the reality of the United States being the main security provider will not be sufficient to override and contain the centrifugal trends that have shaped the relationship since the end of the Cold War and that have gained momentum in the past decade as a result of the growing divergences between Ankara and Washington. Yet differences with Turkey cannot be managed with the same clinical approach reserved for adversaries of the United States. Turkey is not an adversary, and therefore, a categorical separation of areas of agreement and cooperation from areas of disagreement is unrealistic. Unlike in the case of the United States and its true adversaries, the perpetuation of areas of dispute will always hinder the scope of U.S. collaboration with Turkey. The underlying alliance relationship has a built-in expectation of solidarity and mutual trust. Without these values, the bilateral relationship cannot function effectively. Neither will the “grand bargain” approach favored by Ankara be successful. Turkey wants a diplomatic process with the United States that would involve deliberations on all the disputed areas in a flexible manner. These deliberations could then lead to trade-offs that would create the conditions for a mutually beneficial reset. Ankara could also showcase its flexibility provided that Washington demonstrates its willingness for compromise. And yet there is little interest in Washington in undertaking such an enterprise with the Erdoğan government. A scenario of gradual rapprochement as an alternative to the grand bargain championed by Turkey or the principled engagement currently favored by Washington can be promoted. The gradual rapprochement would entail a series of confidence-building actions. Positive areas of engagement could include future negotiations with Iran, the reconstruction of Syria, the normalization of Libya, the stabilization of governance reform in Afghanistan given Turkey’s interest to operate the Kabul airport even after the U.S. and NATO withdrawals, the countering of Russian aggressiveness (especially toward Ukraine), and collaboration in Africa to dampen the influence of China. The Turkey-U.S. relationship may in that sense be in acute need of gradual but concrete steps that over time will set a new tone for a more positive and constructive strategic partnership and reestablish mutual trust.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Multipolarity, and Military
Political Geography:: Turkey, North America, United States of America, and Mediterranean

2051. Fake Civil Society: The Rise of Pro-Government NGOs in Nigeria

Author:: Matthew T. Page
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Nigeria’s dynamic and expansive civil society is one of its greatest strengths and is crucial to maintaining what democratic space still exists in the country. Yet its independence, outspokenness, and unwavering commitment to democracy, transparency, and human rights have long antagonized the kleptocratic, power-hungry—but also image-conscious—ruling elites. To help protect themselves from domestic pressure and outside scrutiny, Nigeria’s top powerbrokers have cultivated a new generation of pro-government non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Like the fake grassroots groups bankrolled by past military juntas, these surrogate organizations masquerade as authentic civil society groups, singing the praises of top officials and attacking their critics. A symptom of the country’s more fundamental political ills, Nigerian elites’ growing use of civil society surrogates should set off alarm bells both domestically and internationally. It is both corrupting and corruptive, compounding the country’s downward democratic trajectory. Like many countries in Africa—and, for that matter, elsewhere in the world—Nigeria has recently experienced democratic backsliding that threatens its long-term stability and prosperity. The rise of pro-government NGOs is both a cause and a consequence of this backsliding and must be addressed as part of any effort to arrest and reverse it.
Topic:: Civil Society, Government, Democracy, and NGOs
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

2052. A High-Tech Alliance: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Science and Technology Collaboration

Author:: James L. Schoff, Douglas E. Rake, and Joshua Levy
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: In both Japan and the United States, there is a growing recognition that national security and alliance security involve more than just military concerns and extend to new technology areas and their economic effects. Looming over the two allies is a wide-ranging question of how to enable greater science and technology (S&T) research collaboration for commercial and defense purposes, involving such fields as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information science (QIS), cybersecurity, and space utilization. Competing domestic political and economic considerations in each country make this a particularly complex challenge for policymakers, who can be expected to treat the international sharing or sale of assorted technologies differently. Still, there is little doubt that it is in the mutual interest of Japan and the United States to harmonize their approaches and find acceptable ways to enable deeper and broader S&T collaboration—and to do so expeditiously.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Collaboration
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2053. Tangled Wires: Preparing India’s Power Sector for the Clean Energy Transition

Author:: Jonathan Kay
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Almost none of the world’s largest polluters have enacted policies compatible with the Paris Agreement’s target of limiting global warming to within 2 degrees Celsius, a threshold past which climate disruption is projected to become even more frequent, severe, and unpredictable. Fortunately, despite the absence of adequate government support, renewable energy has grown at an astonishing pace in recent years thanks to its plummeting cost. India, for example, has more than doubled its stock of wind and solar power in the last five years, driven less by sustainability concerns than by clean energy’s potential for cost-effectively meeting citizens’ pressing development needs. However, the low prices of wind and solar projects disguise the structural costs renewable energy poses for grids when deployed at larger scales. The intermittent, unpredictable nature of the electricity generated by such technologies—in contrast to the stable, on-demand flow of power from traditional fossil fuel generation—requires fundamental changes to how countries invest in and operate their grids. For India, one of the most important steps for coping with the variability of these new sources of energy will be better coordination of the flow of power between the country’s disparate state-run grids. By increasing the volume of energy traded between state utilities, periods of surplus power in one region can compensate for deficits in others, making for a more stable and reliable supply of renewable energy—one that can better displace expensive and polluting fossil fuels. Yet, while such reforms would be difficult under the best of circumstances, they will be particularly challenging given the unique dysfunctions of India’s power sector. With its politically compromised, perennially loss-making electricity distribution companies already struggling to keep the lights on, bolder change appears unlikely. Deeper reforms to India’s power sector are therefore prerequisites to adopting solutions like regional coordination that can ensure the continued growth of renewable energy. The good news is that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s national popularity and the dominance of his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at the state level offer the country’s leaders an opportunity to reform the power sector where others have failed. But to take advantage of this opening, Modi must go beyond his modus operandi by investing in incremental institutional solutions rather than one-and-done technical fixes and by serving as a coordinator for India’s states rather than legislating by central fiat. Deeper reforms enabling India to maintain its rapid expansion of renewable energy not only would provide clean, low-cost power to its people but also would help the world offset the failings of more laggard countries, perhaps even putting back within reach the Paris Agreement’s more aggressive target of keeping global warming to within 1.5 degrees Celsius. But the hardest part of this ambitious task lies ahead—in ending the vicious cycles that have plagued India’s power sector for decades.
Topic:: Climate Change, Pollution, Fossil Fuels, and Energy
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

2054. What Railway Deals Taught Chinese and Brazilians in the Amazon

Author:: Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Maiara Folly, and Maurício Santoro
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Over the past decade, Chinese investments in Brazil have expanded and diversified considerably, especially ones involving infrastructure. Chinese investors have also diversified geographically. Increasingly, major Brazilian infrastructure projects are being planned or implemented with Chinese backing in environmentally sensitive regions such as the Amazon rain forest and the Cerrado, a large savanna region in Central-West Brazil. Chinese actors have become directly involved in such projects against a backdrop of sharpening debates about sustainability and other consequences of large-scale infrastructure projects. This is especially true in protected areas such as land populated by Indigenous groups and conservation units. A notable example is the Ferrogrão project, a major railway line designed to cross sections of the Amazon and Cerrado to deliver goods to Brazilian ports. This paper examines the diverse ways that Brazilian and Chinese actors have learned from each other as they negotiate the terms of these deals. It also explores how these learning processes have been conditioned by intense domestic political debates over these projects in Brazil. Official documents and secondary sources reveal that, rather than a set Chinese way of doing business or a stock Brazilian response, such projects entail dynamic institutional learning. Such learning is shaped not only by the particulars of the Ferrogrão project but also by Chinese actors’ broader engagement with Brazilian infrastructure projects over the past ten years.
Topic:: Environment, Infrastructure, Investment, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, South America, and Amazon Basin

2055. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:: Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

2056. China’s Digital Yuan: An Alternative to the Dollar-Dominated Financial System

Author:: Rajesh Bansal and Somya Singh
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Central bank digital currencies (CBDC) are digital tokens issued by central banks. In a way, they are the digital version of cash; their value is guaranteed by a central bank. Unlike money held in credit cards and mobile wallets, CBDCs are not a mere representation of physical money stored elsewhere. Instead, they are a complete replacement for currency notes. While several countries are developing their digital currencies, China is well positioned to take the lead with the digital yuan. This paper highlights ways in which China can use its digital yuan to internationalize the renminbi (RMB) and gradually chip away at the hegemony of the dollar. The first part of the paper focuses on the dollar’s dominance in the global financial system and the privileges the United States accrues as a result of the dollar being the world reserve currency. The United States has a tight grip on the world’s payment rails, especially in the case of cross-border transactions. For example, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)—the largest cross-border payment clearinghouse in the world—has to comply with and implement unilateral U.S. sanctions. These sanctions seriously hinder trade and damage the economies of the countries affected by them, as was the case with Iran, which lost $150 billion worth of revenue as a result of U.S. sanctions.1 Once a country is cut off from SWIFT’s network, it becomes extremely difficult for it to trade with the rest of the world. Thus, via the dollar’s dominance and its geopolitical muscle, the United States is positioned to maintain a tight grip on the world’s financial system. In an increasingly multipolar world, this outdated, decades-old system of the dollar as the apex currency and the United States’ position of power that allows it to pursue its own geopolitical interests has become outdated. The U.S. dollar’s hegemony has been challenged by economies like those of the European Union (EU), Russia, and China. Of all the countries, China finds itself in a dominant position to gain from this transition. In order to challenge the dollar’s hegemony and internationalize its currency, China will have to move away not just from the dollar but also from the payment rails dominated by the dollar. The best way to simultaneously do both would be to introduce a new payment rail like CBDCs. This paper analyses the way the launch of China’s CBDCs could greatly enhance its currency internationalization prospects. Considering China’s growing economy and influence over the world, the paper argues that China’s CBDC launch could bring a period of momentous change in the global financial system. In order to challenge the dollar, China will have to build the payments infrastructure required to facilitate the use of its digital yuan. It will also have to incentivize other countries to adopt its digital currency. China’s ability to successfully promote its currency using CBDCs will depend heavily on the country’s ability to relax capital controls and maintain the world’s trust in its institutions. China’s geopolitics will play a key role here. In the last decade, some of China’s major geopolitical efforts have set the stage for its CBDC launch. As China continues to use its foreign policy and technological capabilities to grow its influence in the global financial system, the launch of the digital yuan could be a significant step forward in this direction. This paper examines the reasons for China’s past efforts at currency dominance and explores ways in which the country can use its CBDC to further internationalize its digital yuan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Finance, Economy, Central Bank, and Currency
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2057. Understanding the Encryption Debate in India

Author:: Anirudh Burman and Prateek Jha
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Encryption has become a contentious instrument for protecting the security and confidentiality of online communication. Rapid digitalization in the past decade has led to the proliferation of domestic and foreign online communication services that use encryption and, consequently, pose challenges to national security bodies and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). To address these challenges, the Indian government introduced new regulations in February 2021. These regulations require large social media platforms to enable traceability, or the ability to provide information concerning the originator of online communications. Technology companies and privacy activists have opposed such a move on the grounds that traceability would require the breaking of the end-to-end encryption used by many online communication platforms like WhatsApp and therefore would compromise the security of online communications on such platforms. This traceability requirement, however, is only the latest development in a drawn-out, contentious debate over the use of encryption. The contestation between maintaining higher degrees of online security and issuing new rules to grant technological exceptions for security agencies and LEAs is not specific to India. One of the first serious discussions on the issue took place in the United States in the 1990s, when public opposition warded off an early government attempt to sidestep encryption protections with a court order. In the past decade, the use of encryption has only grown more pronounced. The revelations that the United States’ National Security Agency was collecting vast amounts of communications data led to the introduction and increased adoption of end-to-end encryption for online communications. End-to-end encryption is now used widely by online communication platforms like WhatsApp, Signal, and Threema. Its use presents law enforcement and national security agencies with new challenges. Even though these agencies today have greater and easier access to more information than ever before, the absolute confidentiality provided by encrypted online communication platforms makes it harder for these agencies to engage in real-time surveillance to investigate crimes and identity wrongdoers. While some policymakers from India and other countries argue that encryption must only be weakened to solve specific problems, most experts agree that, as of today, there is no technological solution that would weaken encryption for specific law enforcement and national security purposes, while managing to maintain preexisting levels of security and confidentiality for general use. The introduction of any mechanism for specific access would, it is claimed, introduce both known and unknown vulnerabilities into these communications platforms. Such a mechanism would have a systemic effect on all online communication dependent on encryption for ensuring security and confidentiality. In India, these developments create challenges in specific ways. For example, India reports the highest number of child pornography cases worldwide, and encrypted communications makes it difficult to identify culpable parties. Similarly, as India has digitized rapidly, there has been a surfeit of fake and offensive online news that has, in some cases, led to mob lynchings. In addition, terrorist networks have been found to be using encrypted communication channels while planning and carrying out terrorist attacks in India. Over the years, the Indian government’s approach to encryption has responded to these concerns in a variety of ways. Indian financial regulators mandated the use of encryption for banking and financial services as they realized the security of such transactions was best protected through encryption. At the same time, the Indian government prohibited telecom operators from implementing bulk or mass encryption in telecommunication services. Starting in 2015, the government introduced different regulatory proposals requiring that messaging platforms and other communication service providers provide plaintext copies of communications to Indian government agencies on request. These proposals, however, faced significant opposition and were withdrawn. Earlier in 2021, the Indian government’s new rules requiring traceability have been officially notified. The mechanisms through which they will be implemented are not yet clear. It is also unclear if these rules are the last demands the Indian government will make to weaken encryption, or whether further demands will arise in the future. To weigh the relative benefits and drawbacks of the Indian government’s proposal, analysts should consider relevant factors such as (but not limited to) whether such changes will offer law enforcement officials the access they desire, how the security of encrypted communications will be affected, and how citizens’ civil liberties will be impacted, among others.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, Digitalization, and Encryption
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

2058. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Between August 2016 and the present, Turkey has launched four military operations in northern Syria. Each operation has served specific objectives and was designed to respond to rapidly changing scenarios on the ground. It is possible to identify the key priorities that have informed Turkey’s Syria policy over the years. Boiled down to its core, the Turkish government’s activism in Syria has been driven by domestic politics and has helped Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) preserve power. Domestically, Ankara has used the Syrian conflict as a pretext to suppress the rights of the Kurds living in Turkey and limit their parliamentary representation to secure a landmark constitutional reform in 2017. In the following years, successive military operations in Syria have helped Erdoğan connect with increasingly nationalistic constituencies and drum up support around key electoral dates. Finally, after the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish government’s Syria policy played a major role in rebuilding the credibility of the Turkish Armed Forces while redrawing the balance between civilian and military power. In foreign policy terms, Turkey’s military operations in Syria have resulted in increasingly tense relations with the United States. Washington’s support for the Syrian Kurds has alienated Ankara to an extent that U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate. The thorniest topic of the day in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relation—Ankara’s decision to deploy the Russian S-400 missile system—is also deeply related to the Syrian crisis. This decision was made in the context of a strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Ankara. Finally, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has also given Turkey new leverage over the EU when it comes to the management of refugee flows. Solving the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a priority of the Turkish government since the early stages of the Syrian civil war—and a main driver of Ankara’s policies toward both Syria and the EU. Overall, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has not only been a source of conflict—or rapprochement—with its traditional partners and neighbors across the region. It has also equipped Turkey with new tools for conducting a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. The strategies Turkey has employed in Syria have boosted the country’s image and international role. These operations have secured a seat for Turkey at the negotiating table with Russia and the United States. Ankara has used these tools, these lessons learned, and its new capabilities to inform its revisionist foreign policy posture. Going forward, and with an eye on the country’s 2023 presidential election, Turkey will continue to use these tools to reinforce its position in the international arena.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Syrian War, and Military
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

2059. Chinese Mining and Indigenous Resistance in Ecuador

Author:: Cintia Quiliconi and Pablo Rodriguez Vasco
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources of copper in Latin America. But Chinese mining operations in Ecuador, which could have contributed to Ecuadorian development, soon gained a negative reputation after these activities prompted a great deal of local pushback, especially from affected Indigenous communities. As a result, the major Chinese mining consortium that now controls Ecuador’s two main copper mines has taken adaptive steps to stabilize its mining investment and increase the security of its supply networks, steps that often have not produced the intended results. Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels. This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon. In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities. To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land. In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016. This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced. This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
Topic:: Development, Government, Mining, Indigenous, and Resistance
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South America, and Ecuador

2060. Civil Society and the Global Pandemic: Building Back Different?

Author:: Carnegie Civic Research Network
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Since the coronavirus pandemic began, civic activists around the world have shifted into a higher gear. As Carnegie’s Civic Research Network analyzed last year, the gravity of the health emergency has pushed many civil society organizations (CSOs) to engage in new ways to help alleviate the pandemic’s impact.1 Sometimes they have done this in cooperation with governments, but other times they have acted on their own out of frustration at governments’ sluggish and inadequate responses to the emergency. At the same time, many activists have had to defend themselves as governments have used the pandemic as a pretext for further clamping down on independent civil society voices, under the cover of emergency laws passed to help manage the crisis. As civic activists grapple with the challenges of the pandemic, they are also turning their attention to the long term. It is clear that the pandemic will reshape economics, politics, and international relations, but it is not yet clear how. Many countries are undergoing major economic upheaval and are searching for new economic templates to overcome the damage they have experienced. On the political side, the pandemic has fueled authoritarian actions and damaged the credibility of many democratic governments. Post-pandemic political life will likely entail heightened struggles for democracy and a search for new democratic practices that more effectively meet citizens’ needs. With regard to geopolitics, the pandemic is contributing to still greater tensions between the world’s major powers. Because of these factors, the pandemic is likely to have a long-term impact on the nature of civil society worldwide. Civil society has already adapted to the coronavirus pandemic through the growth of self-help activism. Looking further ahead, civic actors are helping to spark a rethink of economic models. In the political sphere, at least some civic actors are engaging in efforts to revitalize democratic politics, including through new ideas on technology’s role in post-pandemic politics. Finally, civil society is being reshaped by geopolitical competition: some civil society actors are being pulled into the Chinese and Russian orbits, while others are more firmly resisting political encroachment by these powers. In an overarching sense, civic activists are juggling uneasily at present as they focus on the immediate challenges of the pandemic while also trying to fashion new economic, political, and geostrategic agendas for the period after the pandemic.2
Topic:: Civil Society, Politics, Economy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Activism
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2061. India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal–China Relations

Author:: Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: India’s postindependence ties with Nepal were predicated on the intimate cultural and historical links between the two countries. As India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted, “though Nepal was an independent country, it was very closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a foreign country.” New Delhi also regarded China as an “interloper” in Nepal in 1950 who threatened India’s security and interests in the region, ignoring at least a century of Sino-Nepali history centering around Tibet. This paper argues that New Delhi’s close relationship with Nepal, bound in history and culture, and the misperception about China’s relations with Nepal before 1950 have contributed to a skewed understanding of Sino-Nepali relations. The Working Paper looks at the impact that New Delhi’s misperceptions of Sino-Nepali relations, termed the “fog of misunderstanding,” has had in the context of the triangular relations between China, India, and Nepal. The paper is divided into four sections arranged chronologically. The first section looks at the historical Sino-Nepali relationship from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. It establishes that this early relationship was centered on Tibet. While the Gorkha kings of Nepal sought to preserve their trade privileges in the region, the Chinese were concerned about the security of their southwestern frontier. Notably though, Beijing’s concern with security does not appear to have extended into any desire to conquer Nepal. This section also touches upon British India’s policy toward Nepal in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent approach that the government of independent India took in the first few years, without an adequate appreciation of Kathmandu’s history with China. As a consequence, India developed a suspicious attitude toward Beijing’s desire to re-establish ties with Kathmandu after the Chinese Civil War, and shaped its policy toward Nepal with this factor in mind. The second section delves into Indian and Chinese policies toward Nepal in the period from 1955 until the end of the monarchy in 2008. It showcases how, during this long period, the three kings of Nepal sought to leverage their ties with China in order to maintain some semblance of balance and how China, in turn, followed a limited but strategic approach that was centered on the kings. The fog of misunderstanding continued to shroud India’s attitude to Nepal-China relations during this period and, consequently, India’s Nepal policy lacked a working template to manage relations with a smaller neighbor sandwiched between India and China in a way that would preserve New Delhi’s influence in a positive way. In contrast to China’s political approach, New Delhi fluctuated between the monarchy and an assortment of democratic political parties, suggestive of a provincial approach in New Delhi’s dealing with Kathmandu. As a result, China’s approach ensured that its main objective in Nepal, namely the security of its southwestern frontier, was secured with a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy. The third section deals with the aftermath of the fall of the Nepali monarchy, 2008 to 2016. During this important period, New Delhi had a fresh opportunity to reset ties by providing the support to democratic forces in Nepal, that could have resulted in a transformation of the Indo-Nepali ties. However, India appeared to hew to its traditional policy. China, on the other hand, quickly built new ties with the post-monarchical dispensation. India’s perceived actions as a result of the adoption of the new constitution of Nepal plunged Indo-Nepali ties to a nadir. It seems to have pushed Kathmandu to strengthen its relationship with China. This section of the paper also outlines the changing nature of China’s policy and objectives in Nepal, especially in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and its possible implications on the future course of the triangular relationship, as well as for India-Nepal relations. It postulates that under President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Nepal has shifted from protecting its periphery to a broader goal of bringing Nepal under its strategic control. This section highlights the political and economic levers that Beijing is using to build a preeminent position in Nepal. The paper concludes with an assessment of options available to all three countries going forward, and India’s options in Nepal in the face of China’s new policy in the region. It suggests that a decisive reset in policy toward Nepal is required to restore healthy relations that are based on mutual respect and mutual sensitivity. New Delhi may need to re-orient its thinking toward Nepal in the context of triangular relations, including on the boundary issue and the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that have been long-standing irritants in the India-Nepal relationship. Nepal, for its part, should also reflect carefully on whether its leveraging of China might become counterproductive in the light of changing strategic balance in its vicinity, and the implications of giving up the policy of balance for one that tilts decisively toward Beijing. The paper concludes that there is sufficient scope and opportunity for course correction by India, and that through sustained efforts India may be able to preserve its influence and security in Nepal and counter China’s expanding footprint.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Nepal

2062. China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:: Deep Pal
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: China’s economic and political footprint has expanded so quickly that many countries, even those with relatively strong state and civil society institutions, have struggled to grapple with the implications. There has been growing attention to this issue in the United States and the advanced industrial democracies of Japan and Western Europe. But “vulnerable” countries—those where the gap is greatest between the scope and intensity of Chinese activism, on the one hand, and, on the other, local capacity to manage and mitigate political and economic risks—face special challenges. In these countries, the tools and tactics of China’s activism and influence activities remain poorly understood among local experts and elites. Both within and beyond these countries, meanwhile, policy too often transposes Western solutions and is not well adapted to local realities. This is especially notable in two strategic regions: Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe; and South Asia. China’s economic and political profile has expanded unusually quickly in these two regions, but many countries lack a deep bench of local experts who can match analysis of the domestic implications of Chinese activism to policy recommendations that reflect domestic political and economic ground truth. To address this gap, the Carnegie Endowment initiated a global project to better understand Chinese activities in eight “pivot” countries in these two strategic regions. The project’s first objective was to enhance local awareness of the scope and nature of Chinese activism in states with (1) weak state institutions, (2) fragile civil societies, or (3) countries where “elite capture” is a feature of the political landscape. Second, the project aimed to strengthen capacity by facilitating a sharing of experiences and best practices across national boundaries. Third, the project sought to develop policy prescriptions for the governments of these countries, as well as the United States and its strategic partners, to mitigate and respond to activities inimical to political independence or well-balanced economic growth and development. To establish a comprehensive picture of China’s activities and their impact, this project dug deeply into Chinese activism in four case countries in each region—eight countries in total. We began by holding workshops, so that influencers across countries could share experiences and compare notes. Invited participants included policymakers, experts, journalists, and others—all with deep local knowledge, steeped in their countries’ politics, economies, and civil societies. In Europe, the four countries were Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania, and in South Asia, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Cross-national discussions among these regional participants aimed to raise awareness, discuss the implications of China’s growing activism in their countries, and compare notes on the diverse ways in which these various countries had managed the rapid influx of Chinese capital, programs, people, technology, and other sources of influence.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Engagement, Regionalism, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Bangladesh, China, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldives

2063. China’s Influence in Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:: Erik Brattberg, Philippe Le Corre, Paul Stronski, and Thomas de Waal
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: China’s presence has brought socioeconomic opportunities to Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania. Yet it has exacerbated governance shortfalls, undermined elements of political and economic stability, and complicated the European Union’s ability to reach consensus on key issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, Political stability, Resilience, and Economic Stability
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Greece, Romania, Hungary, Georgia, and United States of America

2064. How Central Asians Pushed Chinese Firms to Localize

Author:: Dirk Van Der Kley and Niva Yau
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: There has been a sea change in China’s economic involvement in Central Asia. Large-scale transport and electricity projects funded by Chinese government loans have dried up. Hydrocarbon exports to China continue, but they are not the focus of most new projects. Instead, there are a growing number of industrial projects that seek to make value-added products that can be exported. These projects are increasingly staffed by Central Asians who receive technical training from Chinese firms. This change has been primarily driven by Central Asian states. The region’s governments have long pushed for industrial capacity building, including the upskilling of local workers. In addition, debt concerns in Kyrgyzstan in particular have made Chinese loans less attractive and less prevalent. This trend has coincided with Chinese policy banks’ embrace of more conservative lending policies globally for infrastructure projects. Chinese firms have begun adapting to these demands. They have steadily increased their proportions of local hires by training Central Asian workers both onsite and in China to address skills shortages. They have tried to engage local communities to earn a social license for their overseas operations. The Chinese government is now following suit. It is developing more formal cooperation agreements on industrialization and upskilling in addition to pre-existing, ad-hoc arrangements by individual companies. So far, the outcomes have been mixed. Many Chinese firms in Central Asia are employing more locals. Yet the more closely integrated these Chinese firms become with the region’s economies, the more they must deal with, or be co-opted by, localized corruption and political fights. Newly available polling data shows that public sentiments toward China are becoming more negative. Chinese companies are flexibly adapting to this environment of heightened expectations in a variety of ways. The views that outside observers in Washington and elsewhere harbor of China’s infrastructure investments through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia are outdated and do not reflect how much Chinese firms and eventually the Chinese government have adapted to meet local needs. Any Western-proposed alternative to the BRI needs to take these considerations into account.
Topic:: Economics, Business, Industry, and Job Creation
Political Geography:: China, Central Asia, and Asia

2065. South Korea Beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties With India and ASEAN

Author:: Kathryn Botto
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Under South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his administration, Seoul has undertaken its first unified diplomatic initiative aimed at advancing ties with India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This initiative is known as the New Southern Policy (NSP). Though Moon’s efforts toward securing inter-Korean peace have received the most publicity, the NSP has arguably sustained more momentum than any of the administration’s other flagship foreign policy initiatives. Looking beyond South Korea’s relationships in Northeast Asia, it is also important to assess the NSP’s progress toward its goal to “elevate [South] Korea’s relations with ASEAN member states and India in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, among others, to the same level [South] Korea maintains with the four major powers (the United States, China, Japan and Russia).”1 The NSP is an extension of South Korea’s need to diversify its economic and strategic relationships amid the uncertainty posed by competition between its closest ally, the United States, and largest trading partner, China. By elevating ties with India and Southeast Asia, particularly in the economic realm, Seoul hopes to insulate itself from the risks posed by trade and strategic friction between the two great powers. Moreover, it hopes to advance its middle power diplomacy and improve ties with India and Southeast Asia commensurate with their growing economic and strategic importance. Though India and ASEAN countries have strong ties to South Korea and share many of the same values and interests, they have not featured as prominently in Seoul’s diplomacy as major powers around the peninsula in the past. While it has clear logic behind it, the NSP’s implementation and outcomes so far are mixed. Of the policy’s three pillars—prosperity (economic cooperation), people (sociocultural cooperation), and peace (political and strategic cooperation)—the prosperity pillar has received the most emphasis. Under this pillar, South Korea has initiated new negotiations for free trade agreements and launched an official development assistance (ODA) strategy aimed at six NSP partner countries. However, cooperation with India has often lagged while cooperation with Vietnam has outpaced attention to most other ASEAN member states. The peace pillar, by contrast, has been relatively underdeveloped and focused mainly on nontraditional security issues while avoiding sensitive strategic issues confronting the region. This pillar showcases how South Korea’s concerns about Chinese influence both motivate and constrain the policy—though Seoul wants to diversify its economic portfolio and strategic partnerships to mitigate its reliance on China, it also must tread carefully to avoid retaliation from Beijing. Even so, while ASEAN, India, and South Korea share common interests on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, stability in the Taiwan Strait, and denuclearization by North Korea, South Korea’s main security concerns revolve around Northeast Asia, while those of India and ASEAN do not. Seoul’s hierarchy of priorities in the security realm will continue to differ from that of its NSP partners, posing another obstacle to security cooperation. That said, the policy has made progress in strengthening South Korea’s diplomatic infrastructure and institutional apparatus to devote more attention to NSP partner countries, even in just four short years and after being disrupted by a global pandemic. Considering this short period, many of NSP’s projects will take time to show results. Even so, the broad and far-reaching policy has sometimes struggled to define its goals or unify its wide range of elements under a clear strategy. It would benefit from a more well-branded approach to India and Southeast Asia that highlights core projects under each pillar.2 To that end, the Moon administration should strive to evaluate the outcomes of the NSP in its final year in office. Although it is typically difficult to maintain continuity in foreign policy due to South Korean presidents’ limit to one five-year term, the geopolitical and economic imperatives driving the NSP will remain under a new administration in 2022. Given the staying power of these drivers and the continuously growing importance of India and Southeast Asia, South Korea’s next president will have every reason to keep emphasizing these regional partnerships as well.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Integration, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: India, Asia, and South Korea

2066. Racial Reckoning in the United States: Expanding and Innovating on the Global Transitional Justice Experience

Author:: Ashley Quarcoo and Medina Husaković
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The United States is in a profound moment of public reckoning with its history of racial injustice. In the time since George Floyd’s murder, national and local initiatives seeking truth, redress, and reform (TRR) for historical racial injustices have multiplied across the country. These efforts include national proposals for a truth, racial healing, and transformation commission and a reparations commission, as well as dozens of subnational initiatives on reparations, truth, and reform. Diverse in form, these efforts are united in their goal of seeking remedies for state-sanctioned racial violence and discrimination. This emergent TRR movement is drawing deeply from the field of transitional justice. Transitional justice is a global practice designed to help countries reconcile with a history of past human rights abuses. While it is traditionally used in countries transitioning from conflict and authoritarianism, U.S. stakeholders are adapting its tools—like truth commissions, reparations, and institutional reforms—as well as its lessons for local purposes. This working paper investigates the transitional justice approaches and lessons most relevant for the United States’ TRR community in the present moment through three case studies: Brazil, South Africa, and Northern Ireland. Together, these case studies surface a number of lessons, relevant for both practitioners and donors, on initiating and sustaining TRR initiatives appropriate for the U.S. context. The case study of Brazil reveals the importance of confronting the legacies of amnesty and the ways in which amnesty can license collective forgetting about the brutality and impacts of past harms. The study also demonstrates the tremendous contributions that subnational truth commissions make in generating rich, new findings that complicate a larger narrative, as well as in developing locally relevant recommendations. In failing to fully capitalize on subnational contributions, the case of Brazil also demonstrates the importance of coordinating subnational and national TRR efforts and in leveraging a national commission to integrate and amplify local findings. South Africa provides a powerful example of how a truth commission can be a vessel for reshaping public memory and national identity, using nationally televised public hearings, emotional victim testimony, and respected national leaders to engage the population. However, South Africa’s case also shows the limits of a process that focused predominantly on individual human rights violations and invested less in investigating both the structural factors that enabled those abuses and the socioeconomic dimensions of harm. With the proper mandate, resources, and protocols, institutional hearings can be a critical tool for truth commissions to engage in analysis of structural harms. Finally, the case study of Northern Ireland demonstrates the potential limits of truth telling and the importance of focusing on reforms that remedy the relationship between the state and the citizens that have been harmed by its actions and policies. Northern Ireland’s Independent Commission on Policing pioneered a new approach to policing based on community partnership, human rights, and accountability that has led to measurable change in public opinion toward the police. Further, Northern Ireland’s success in addressing socioeconomic drivers of conflict can be traced to its affirmative approach to mainstreaming the goal of economic equality into its governance systems. Together, these cases reveal important ways that the United States can learn from and innovate on the global practice of transitional justice as it seeks to capture the opportunity of this moment.
Topic:: Race, Social Movement, Transitional Justice, and Protests
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2067. How China Learned to Harness Israel’s Media and Booming Tech Scene

Author:: Roie Yellinek
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Israel and China established full diplomatic relations only in 1992, making Israel almost the last Middle Eastern country to do so. Starting in the early 2000s, ties between the two countries began to blossom, mostly because the Chinese government started to view Israel as a global technology hub and began seeking to capitalize on Israel’s innovation capabilities to help meet its own developmental needs and strategic challenges. In addition, as China’s rivalry with Israel’s leading ally, the United States, has heated up, Beijing’s interest in Israel also has gotten stronger. In light of Israel’s status as a major technology hub and a leading U.S. ally, China has sought to deepen its influence in Israel through media engagement and other forms of outreach. As Chinese actors have pursued technological innovation and greater political influence in Israel, they have employed three basic approaches to court favor in and through Israeli media circles: direct messaging to the Israeli public in local Hebrew-language newspapers, the use of Chinese outlets (especially the Hebrew department of China Radio International) targeted at Israeli audiences, and efforts to leverage prominent public figures friendly toward China to amplify favorable messages delivered on these local Israeli and Chinese platforms. China’s messaging strategy in Israel has evolved in three stages. Early on, this strategy mainly included recycled talking points from the Chinese Communist Party that do not always translate well overseas. Between 2015 and 2018, this messaging from Chinese actors started to become more direct and tailored for the Israeli people. Since 2018, Chinese engagement has expanded to include a much wider variety of Israeli media outlets, which has meant even more direct access to ordinary Israelis. This strategy and other elements of China’s diplomatic outreach to Israel seem to be having an impact. According to 2019 polling from the Pew Research Center, Israeli respondents view China more positively than those in any other Western-oriented countries that took part in this survey did. These results are an outgrowth of China’s desire to build influence vis-à-vis Israeli society, especially in terms of Israelis’ views on China. Chinese government officials and other actors see this campaign toward the Israeli people as part of a broader and more important strategic campaign, as Beijing competes with Washington for worldwide influence. Israel has a clear national interest in carefully examining how and why Beijing deploys such strategic messaging and how Chinese actors have leveraged local conditions, language habits, and consumer preferences to advance their objectives. The new Israeli government under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett must act prudently and keep these Chinese messaging activities in mind as it balances and advances Israel’s foreign policy interests, seeking to underscore that it does not see China as an enemy but that cooperation with Beijing needs to be pursued in the right way.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Media
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

2068. Financial Markets and Social Media: Lessons From Information Security

Author:: Claudia Biancotti and Paolo Ciocca
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: On January 28, 2021, stocks in U.S.-based video game retailer GameStop Corp. reached an all-time high of $483. Two weeks earlier, they had been trading at $20. Two weeks later, they were down again, and a congressional hearing on the matter was underway in Washington. Wild swings are hardly uncommon in financial markets. This episode, however, had novel characteristics. In a recent report, the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission states that “GameStop Corp and multiple other stocks experienced a dramatic increase in their share price in January 2021 as bullish sentiments of individual investors filled social media.” 1 Retail traders congregating on the Reddit platform were key in both price formation and the emergence of a “Main Street versus Wall Street” narrative around the stock.2 The influence of social media on financial markets is here to stay, as younger generations start saving and investing. This carries both opportunities and risks. Information sharing and discussion on internet platforms can improve market transparency and efficiency. On the other hand, social media platforms are known vehicles of disinformation and manipulation of human behavior. They could be weaponized by malicious actors, ranging from state-sponsored groups to crime syndicates, looking to compromise market integrity and financial stability. For liberal democracies with independent financial watchdogs, a complex policy challenge follows. In order to fight information operations, financial authorities will need to cooperate with intelligence communities and other relevant parts of executive branches. This requires rules that clearly define each party’s role and encourage reciprocal trust. In many jurisdictions, cybersecurity statutes provide a starting point. They are, however, limited in scope, only covering cooperation vis-& agrave;-vis traditional cyber attacks. In this paper, we argue that the model must evolve to help prevent or defend against malicious information operations.3 We highlight, as a first step, the importance of organizational modules that allow entities with different levels of access to classified information to work together to assess and inform responses to hostile operations.
Topic:: Security, Markets, Finance, and Social Media
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

2069. Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey

Author:: Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: As President Joe Biden and his team seek to put the defense of democracy and protection of human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy, they confront the stubborn fact that the United States maintains cooperative security relations with a wide range of undemocratic or democratically backsliding governments. Powerful security interests, especially countering terrorist threats, maintaining stability in the Middle East, and managing competition with a rising China, underlie many of these partnerships. Such situations frequently give rise to a policy dilemma: confronting partner governments over their political shortcomings risks triggering hostility that would jeopardize the security benefits that such governments provide to Washington. Yet giving them a free pass on democracy and rights issues undercuts the credibility of U.S. appeals to values, bolstering the damaging perception that America only pushes for democracy against its adversaries or in strategically irrelevant countries. Already in the first year of Biden’s presidency, such tensions have emerged in relations with countries as diverse as Egypt, Hungary, India, the Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. While the Biden administration has publicly and privately raised democracy and rights issues with various security partners, its cautious approach toward some of them has started to attract criticism from those who feel that near-term security interests have been too strongly prioritized compared to democracy and human rights concerns. This paper looks in depth at the democracy-security dilemma with a view to helping U.S. policymakers deal with it more systematically and effectively. Case studies of U.S. policy toward Egypt, India, and Turkey over the past twenty years highlight the complexity of the democracy-security dilemma. In Egypt, U.S. concerns with the country’s authoritarian politics have surfaced periodically over the years yet struggled to find a meaningful place in a relationship dominated by deeply rooted security cooperation, including extensive U.S. security assistance. In India, a strong U.S. push, warmly welcomed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, to further strengthen the U.S. -Indian security partnership has unfolded alongside a distinctly illiberal turn in Indian politics. By contrast, democratic decline in Turkey has coincided with—and contributed to—a major deterioration in Ankara’s relations with Washington, including significant divergence on a range of foreign policy issues.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Democracy
Political Geography:: Turkey, India, Egypt, and United States of America

2070. The Humility of Restraint: Niebuhr’s Insights for a More Grounded Twenty-First-Century American Foreign Policy

Author:: Christopher S. Chivvis
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The habits of primacy and exceptionalism that history has bestowed on today’s U.S. foreign policy elites are unlikely to serve the nation well in a more competitive twenty-first-century international environment. Fresh perspectives on America’s role in the world are needed. One such perspective can be found in the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, whose searching books and articles from the 1920s to the 1960s drew attention to the unintended consequences of U.S. power in the world, pointed out Americans’ naïveté, and called for greater restraint and humility in U.S. foreign policy. His intellectual corpus deals widely with the perennial issues of U.S. foreign policy, such as nationalism, the self-interest of states, empires, violence, technology, and the problem of peaceful change. He was a realist who diverged from other, especially later realists, in his skepticism about rationalism and his rejection of the nationalist realpolitik of the right and the left alike. He was an anti-Communist who nonetheless urged U.S. policymakers to proceed cautiously in its Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Most of all, his critique of American exceptionalism stands as the classic argument for greater humility in U.S. foreign policy. It is a reminder that, however important the country’s role in the world may be, it is too often undergirded by an idealistic naïveté that looks duplicitous to other societies and can undermine durable U.S. leadership. Niebuhr’s insights seem well-suited for the challenges facing U.S. statecraft today. His mix of realism, humility, and sensitivity to the broader moral framework in which the United States operates offer essential ingredients for a clear-eyed, healthy U.S. foreign policy. His warnings against the excesses of anti-Communist ideological competition during the Cold War seem increasingly relevant given growing tensions between the United States and China. The exceptionalism and national chauvinism that Niebuhr diagnosed in the 1950s is no less pervasive in the U.S. foreign policy establishment today, and this diagnosis seems especially important in light of Washington’s recent struggle to reckon with its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and to manage its global alliances. Niebuhr’s insights speak volumes to the present historical moment the United States finds itself in—characterized by resumed domestic fractures, seemingly intractable international problems, and a role in the world that is again in flux.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, Exceptionalism, and Reinhold Niebuhr
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2071. Taiwan’s Opportunities in Emerging Industry Supply Chains

Author:: Evan A. Feigenbaum and Michael R. Nelson
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: To some, the acute supply chain crisis that has followed in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic is a sign of poor planning, lack of resilience and surge capacity, and industry rigidity. Inflation is also having a major impact and will inevitably lead to some supply chain reconfiguration. But structural shifts matter too, including rising costs in mainland China—the world’s manufacturing’s powerhouse—and the overconcentration of freight in just ten companies that control 85 percent of global container capacity. Globalization has bequeathed a system that seemed efficient until it was tested by the multidimensional crises of the last two years. In industry after industry, C-suites are planning for a world of disruption. At a minimum, companies aim to build resilience and redundancy into their supply chains. But there is another factor—political risk—that is complicating planning, especially in technology-intensive industries. Specifically, the emergence of multidimensional strategic competition between Beijing and Washington has interrupted the flow of goods, capital, people, technology, and data. And these geopolitical disruptions look set to become a long-term structural trend. This is a sea change that will invariably bleed into many industries and rejigger supply chains. But amid the disruption, some economies will have fresh opportunities to attract investment, build out new industries, and diversify their growth drivers. Taiwan is one such economy that may stand to benefit from the supply chain rethink. This paper explores some ways that it could do so. But to seize opportunities in this dynamic environment, Taiwan needs policy changes and technology investments to better position its ecosystem of government, business, academia, research institutions, and labor to attract new supply chain opportunities, especially for the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the emerging economy of the twenty-first century. Two prior Carnegie Endowment studies of Taiwan’s economic competitiveness included specific recommendations that could comprise the foundation of an ecosystem that serves the public interest by bolstering Taiwan’s profile and role in more and more global supply chains. Most notably, these were Carnegie’s recommendations to position Taiwan’s economy as a trusted hub, trusted vendor, trusted tester, and trusted conduit for technology-intensive R&D and production. Taiwan’s public interest would benefit if such opportunities became a counterpoint to mainland China’s scale advantages. But Taiwan faces intense competition from other economies in Asia and Europe that also seek to capitalize on supply chain shifts, reaping the harvest from their investments while carving out specialized niches amid rising suspicion of mainland China-origin technology products and services. This study aims to help to refine competitive choices for Taiwan while highlighting unique comparative advantages that would make it an especially attractive place for new global investments. The paper digs deeply into two opportunities for Taiwan. The first involves dynamic changes in one of the high-tech industries that Taipei has made into a strategic priority—the life sciences, including biotechnology and precision medicine. Despite twenty years of concerted effort and some signal successes, especially with drug development and diagnostics, Taiwan has not captured a role or market share analogous to its multidecade build-out in semiconductors. For Taiwan, trust will be the crucial variable and competitive advantage. Taiwan could, for example, leverage its advantages with high-quality medical data to become a locus for clinical trials, while also leveraging other advantages for global supply chains in the drug discovery, advanced diagnostics, and personalized medicine markets. But to do so, it will need to make policy and regulatory changes and make some new strategic investments. The second chapter turns to whether Taiwan’s economy could be positioned as a leader in testing, validating, and deploying software, which would give Taiwan-based firms a larger role in the information technology services business where mainland China, India, and others have a larger profile. Elements of Taiwan’s ecosystem could potentially be positioned to use software engineering to ensure that business software and services produced by local companies and their international partners are more tested and more trusted than competing products on the market.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Investment, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Taiwan and Asia

2072. The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex

Author:: Raluca Csernatoni
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Is the European Union (EU) about to rise as a defense technological actor on the world stage? According to conventional wisdom, attempts at greater European integration in security and defense were not likely to amount to much, given that such policy fields have long been considered the reserved domain of the EU member states or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This working paper goes beyond this traditional state-centered approach by looking at past and recent institutional efforts to consolidate European security and cooperation on defense industry and technology. Such efforts have continued despite the disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic, owing to the bloc’s willingness to become a stronger security and defense actor on the global stage. The timing of this shift was facilitated by a set of circumstances that triggered a new European defense momentum. Contributing factors include the geopolitical pressures of Brexit, an unreliable transatlantic partner in the United States, concerns within European defense industries regarding dwindling national defense budgets and fierce global technological competition in high technology areas, and the European Commission’s growing supranational role in security and defense. This impetus was also facilitated by the privileged relationship between various EU institutions, European defense industrial actors, transnational interest and lobby groups, and organized expert bodies. In this respect, the defense industry and high-level expert and interest groups have occupied a central position in shaping EU policy processes, funding priorities, and security and defense research programs. Such a rapprochement between EU institutional structures and the European defense industry has allowed for the emergence of a so-called European defense technological and industrial complex (EDTIC). This European defense industrial ecosystem encompasses a wider variety of transnational actors beyond the political, military, and industrial groups typically present in national military-industrial complexes. It presents a dense, multilevel network of EU institutions and agencies; security and industrial stakeholders; national public authorities; and interest and expert groups, all of which both compete and cooperate to shape and set policy agendas. However, this rapprochement is also characterized by the absence of strong democratic control mechanisms and little political and public accountability concerning the surge in and direction of the European defense technological and industrial integration process. These transformations have the potential to make the union a more capable and strategically autonomous global defense technological actor. At the same time, they challenge existing EU democratic governance structures and processes. The EU’s security and defense policies remain tough areas for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight. The EU’s policymaking institutional machinery has been finely tuned to mediate power, keep things as technical and bureaucratic as possible, and to create package deals for certain defense industrial interests and member states’ political agendas. Yet, for real European integration in the field of security and defense, more political and democratic trust is needed across the continent.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe

2073. How Argentina Pushed Chinese Investors to Help Revitalize Its Energy Grid

Author:: Juliana González Jáuregui
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: China’s modernization strategy integrates both domestic and foreign policy, especially through two complementary prongs—the so-called Going Global strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This push to internationalize China’s development strategy has ushered in a new era in Beijing’s relationships with countries and regions around the world. In Latin America, these policies have triggered a dynamic pattern of interactions between China and the region’s political economy. Being rich in fuels, energy, foodstuffs, and basic products, countries in Latin America have emerged as significant suppliers for China, but they also have become important destinations for Chinese-made industrial products, and, subsequently, Chinese investment and lending. For Latin American countries, China’s rise as an influential investor, lender, trader, and builder has created an array of new challenges and opportunities. While Beijing has harnessed its engagement in Latin America to support its own development, countries in the region have sought to direct some of China’s economic and financial resources to promote their own strategic sectors. Argentina illustrates this dynamic well, particularly in the energy sector. Argentinian government officials and business leaders have attracted Chinese investment and finance into renewables and other types of energy to promote Buenos Aires’s goals of taking a hybrid path to an energy transition. For its part, China has seized this opportunity to advance its own development goals and to participate in Argentina’s energy transition strategy. Though Argentina has not yet formally joined the BRI, Argentinian officials have reported publicly that Buenos Aires has already decided to endorse the initiative and is waiting for the right moment to do so.1 Argentina has been weighing the pros and cons of signing on to the BRI. On the one hand, signing on could enhance the presence of Chinese actors in the Argentinian renewables sector, as China seeks to intertwine its engagement in Latin America with the deployment of the Green BRI, the dimensions of the initiative that are framed in terms of environmental sustainability. More broadly, joining the BRI could attract new Chinese investment and finance in alternative energy and electricity transmission infrastructure, further contributing to Argentina’s goals for an energy transition. On the other hand, Argentina faces the challenge of designing and implementing a long-term national energy plan that complements its role in the BRI. This means devising an energy plan that, among broader objectives, seeks to help Argentina harness Chinese know-how on renewables and develop innovation and technological capacities of its own. In the meantime, Argentina’s lack of committed engagement with the BRI to date has not impeded the expansion of Chinese overseas investment and financing for renewables and other types of energy projects in the country. In a clear sign of political agency, the diplomatic outreach of key Argentinian national and provincial government officials, as well as corporate players’ push for local associations, has been central in the quest to increase Chinese engagement in Argentina’s solar and wind power sectors and in other alternative energy projects. These interactions have allowed Argentinian policymakers to help shape an adaptive partnership to strengthen the alignment between Chinese investments and Argentinian development objectives. Admittedly, this engagement has at times encountered resistance due to environmental and social risks in certain localities. Even so, these concerns are part of the learning process and set a tone for future cooperation on energy projects. Renewables and alternative energy will continue to be a magnet for global investment as countries around the world strive to address climate change. Thus, local tensions are pushing both Argentinian and Chinese actors to learn from the problematic impacts of some projects and do more to address local communities’ concerns jointly. Successful responses to such concerns would further enhance the basis of Argentina and China’s energy-focused adaptative partnership.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Economy, Business, Investment, and Energy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Argentina, and South America

2074. #EndSARS Protest: Re-thinking Nigerian Youth and Government Policies

Author:: Chinyere Stella Okunna
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: African Heritage Institution (AfriHeritage)
Abstract:: If any countries in the world should take youths and youth development seriously, Nigeria should be high on the list of such countries – Nigeria has one of the largest youth populations in the world, with the youth making up almost 34% (33.65%) of the country’s huge population of more than 200 million people. One fundamental way of demonstrating this seriousness is through the enactment and serious implementation of meaningful and effective youth policies, as well as the creation of an enabling environment for youth development. From virtually every indication, government has failed abysmally over the years in recent times to enthrone a liveable society as a conducive environment for effectively implementing its well-crafted youth policies and programmes, thus wreaking havoc on youth development. For how long should this terrible scenario continue? Something definitely needs to be done by the government, by the youth themselves, by non-governmental bodies made up of well-meaning Nigerians, and by the international community (if need be) – and the time to do this ‘something’ about this situation is NOW
Topic:: Education, Youth, Protests, Police, and Participation
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

2075. SVRI Knowledge Exchange: The Power of Language and its use in the BGV field

Author:: Elizabeth Louis
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Sexual Violence Research Initiative
Abstract:: This Knowledge Exchange focuses on language with the understanding that it’s a tool of communication, an exchange of perspectives, and can be a sacred form of expression. Language and terms have been reclaimed by individuals and groups to ensure that their narratives are authentically voiced and portrayed appropriately. The writers recognize that this piece is written in English and it brings in a bias in the ways we communicate information. Language bias can be defined as words or phrases that may make certain individuals or groups feel excluded or underrepresented. In our own awareness of the importance of meaning through language, we must not forget that continuous efforts must be made to decolonize language. To rid language of colonial influence that has shaped the lens we use in our gender- based violence work. The writers intend for this piece to be disseminated to a wide audience of practitioners, researchers, advocates, survivors, and those with lived experiences of violence driven by gender inequality to reflect and discuss the ways language is used and its implications. We strive to attain language justice that focuses on equity, shared power, and inclusion of voices that have been misrepresented or undervalued in the field of GBV. It is our hope that dialogues, critical analysis, and renewed commitment to intentionally unpack, revise, and retrieve all forms, dialects or translations gives rise to language that is wholesome, validates and honours within diverse beloved communities.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Communications, Inequality, and Language
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2076. Non-Consensual Intimate Image Distribution: The Legal Landscape in Kenya, Chile and South Africa

Author:: Michelle Bordachar, Nonhlanhla Chanza, Kailee Hilt, Carlos Lara, Emma Monteiro, and Grace Mutung'u
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: The non-consensual distribution of intimate images, colloquially referred to as “revenge pornography” or “image-based sexual abuse,” is an unforgiving reality that continues to plague the lives of many within the current digital landscape. It alludes to the non-consensual distribution of photos or videos depicting nudity, partial nudity or sexually explicit acts. This paper provides an overview of the state of the law, both existing and proposed, in three countries in the Global South — Kenya, Chile and South Africa — as it relates to the non-consensual distribution of intimate images. It was prepared under the overall coordination of CIGI’s Kailee Hilt and Emma Monteiro, who also wrote the introduction and conclusion. The three case studies were written by leading experts from Kenya, Chile and South Africa. The authors discuss current and proposed legislation in response to non-consensual intimate image distribution, while also sharing recommendations for further action to address this growing form of gender-based violence within the digital sphere. On June 24, 2021, CIGI held a panel discussion on this topic moderated by Ruhiya Seward, senior program officer at the International Development Research Centre. Grace Mutung’u, Michelle Bordachar and Nonhlanhla Chanza, experts who contributed the case studies in the paper, spoke about this issue as it pertains to Kenya, Chile and South Africa, respectively, and offered recommendations and road maps for further action within the existing landscape.
Topic:: Rule of Law, Sexual Violence, Judiciary, Digital Culture, and Digitization
Political Geography:: Kenya, Africa, South Africa, South America, and Chile

2077. TRIPS-Past to TRIPS-Plus: Upholding the Balance between Exclusivity and Access

Author:: James Bacchus
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: A deadly global pandemic and other unique circumstances have combined to present the World Trade Organization (WTO) with an opportunity to modernize its rules for the trade-related aspects of intellectual property (IP) rights. The best place to begin is with a full realization of the negotiated balance between exclusivity and access in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). There is the need to turn the “TRIPS-past” of WTO IP rules agreed in 1995 into the “TRIPS-plus” of improved rules more fit to purpose for the twenty-first century. New rules are needed to help spark new innovations of all kinds and the rapid spread of those innovations worldwide, including rules relating to intangible assets and especially to digital expressions of IP. Continuing questions over the extent to which the TRIPS Agreement protects the exclusivity of IP rights in COVID-19 vaccines underscore how much uncertainty remains about where the line of this balance is in this multilateral trade agreement, and also how much doubt still exists about whether that line is in the right place.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Multilateralism, Pandemic, COVID-19, and WTO
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2078. Could Trade Agreements Help Address the Wicked Problem of Cross-Border Disinformation?

Author:: Susan Ariel Aaronson
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: Whether produced domestically or internationally, disinformation is a “wicked” problem that has global impacts. Although trade agreements contain measures that address cross-border disinformation, domestically created disinformation remains out of their reach. This paper looks at how policy makers can use trade agreements to mitigate disinformation and spam while implementing financial and trade sanctions against entities and countries that engage in disseminating cross-border disinformation. Developed and developing countries will need to work together to solve this global problem.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Borders, and Disinformation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2079. Supply Chain Regulation in the Service of Geopolitics: What’s Happening in Semiconductors?

Author:: Dieter Ernst
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: Supply chain regulation can be a formidable tool to protect a country’s resilience against unexpected disruptions of trade, investment and the supply of skilled labour. Its utility, however, may erode when geopolitics rather than economics becomes the primary objective. This paper examines the implementation problems and the unintended consequences of a new supply chain doctrine in the service of geopolitics, with a focus on US President Joe Biden’s Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains to protect US technological leadership and national security against China. With semiconductors as a primary target, America’s supply chain controls are designed to exploit China’s most glaring weaknesses as supply chain chokepoints that the US Commerce Department can block, thus impeding timely and cost-effective access to essential products, services and technologies. The paper also highlights a second defining characteristic of America’s supply chain doctrine — regulatory supply chain controls are combined with a big push in domestic semiconductor manufacturing. Three propositions are presented as guideposts for further research. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for future US supply chain control against China: Will the quest for improved supply chain resilience succeed in mobilizing enough forces to shift the focus of US policy away from supply chain regulation in the service of geopolitics?
Topic:: International Cooperation, Labor Issues, Regulation, Rivalry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2080. Fintech for Good: Governance Mechanisms for Sustainable Development

Author:: Olaf Weber and Sep Pashang
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: Financial technology (fintech) for good can help to achieve sustainable development through environmental, social and governance investing, and through financial inclusion initiatives to address the needs of underbanked and unbanked individuals. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated greater dependence on digital banking technologies, the lack of cohesive governance and regulatory mechanisms around fintech in Canada and abroad is an obstacle toward achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The authors of this paper argue that better governance and regulatory frameworks are needed to minimize the risks associated with fintech for good while maximizing its benefits.
Topic:: Development, Science and Technology, United Nations, Governance, Sustainable Development Goals, Innovation, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Canada and North America

2081. Listening to Users and Other Ideas for Building Trust in Digital Trade

Author:: Susan Ariel Aaronson
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: This paper argues that if trade policy makers truly want to achieve data free flow with trust, they must address user concerns beyond privacy. Survey data reveals that users are also anxious about online harassment, malware, censorship and disinformation. The paper focuses on three such problems, specifically, internet shutdowns, censorship and ransomware (a form of malware), each of which can distort trade and make users feel less secure online. Finally, the author concludes that trade policy makers will need to rethink how they involve the broad public in digital trade policy making if they want digital trade agreements to facilitate trust.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Digital Economy, Innovation, and Trade
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2082. Policing the Dark Web: Legal Challenges in the 2015 Playpen Case

Author:: Michael Chertoff and Eric Jardine
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: The dark web is now a common platform for criminal activity, especially in liberal democratic regimes. The anonymity of the system gives rise to emergent use as a host of terrorist sites, gun marketplaces, drug bazaars, malicious software fora and pernicious child abuse content boards. Law enforcement can effectively police the dark web through a number of techniques, but the most technologically intensive approaches — known more euphemistically as “network investigative techniques”— raise a number of legal quandaries as their use collides with long-standing legal principles in liberal democratic regimes. Finding ways to minimize the excesses of the dark web through active law enforcement engagement, while also preserving the legal bedrock of liberal democratic societies, is key. The authors explore these issues using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2015 closure of the darknet Playpen child pornography site as a case study.
Topic:: Law Enforcement, Internet, Digital Culture, and Dark Web
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2083. Non-binary TikTokers in Latin America: Sharing Debates and Circumventing Censorship

Author:: Florencia Goldsman
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: This paper presents the findings of a research project carried out focusing on the #nonbinary community on TikTok in Latin America. The project was interested in exploring how gender violence and censorship impact their content in this space. A semantic analysis of their posts seeks to establish some topics that appear to be the main issues for individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning and other sexualities on this platform. The findings suggest that they use the platform in different ways to avoid censorship and reinforce the search for freedom of expression online. On November 25, 2021, join CIGI for a virtual discussion, Gender-Based Censorship: The Silencing of Voices in Digital Spaces, moderated by Suzie Dunn and featuring the paper’s author, Florencia Goldsman.
Topic:: Social Media, LGBT+, Censorship, Identity, and TikTok
Political Geography:: South America, Latin America, and North America

2084. Scoping AI Governance: A Smarter Tool Kit for Beneficial Applications

Author:: Maroussia Levesque
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: Artificial intelligence (AI) systems can be used to promote equality and non-discrimination, but without the right AI governance strategies, they can have the opposite effect. This paper aims to provide policy makers with the tools they need to build beneficial AI systems. Harmful biases in AI systems often disproportionately affect racialized, low-income and minority groups. For example, algorithms that over- or underestimate scores create false-positive and false-negative results that can perpetuate systemic discrimination. Policy makers can address these concerns through interventions and regulations that promote AI fairness.
Topic:: Governance, Minorities, Discrimination, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2085. Accounting for the Digital Economy: Time for a Fresh Approach

Author:: Patricia Meredith
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:: Accounting standards that are used for tangible assets are not suitable for today’s digital economy, which is fuelled by intangible assets. These standards need to reflect the shift in focus from tangible to intangible assets in order for the digital economy to thrive. Intangible assets such as design branding and software are not recognized by current accounting standards unless they are purchased from a third party. Without a shift in mindset that recognizes intangible assets and reflects the new economic reality, challenges will arise in making loans and investments and in taxing value creation. The accounting profession cannot act alone in making the shift and will need support from policy makers and regulators, investors, creditors and directors to make the necessary changes.
Topic:: Finance, Digital Economy, Investment, and Digitization
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2086. Consumer Responses to Price Shocks of Wine Imports in Korea

Author:: Chul Chung, Min-chirl Chung, and Bonggeun Kim
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:: The main purpose of the study is to develop a methodology that divides consumers' responses to FTAs or commodity taxes into quantitative and qualitative margins, which cause exogenous price changes for some specific goods. The use of unit values as a dependent variable for consumers' qualitative choice, unlike the usual method of utilization of unit values as a proxy variable for market prices, showed that qualitative response to price changes exists and its size is significant. The methodology of separating and estimating qualitative responses to income changes as in economic crises is also presented, and the empirical analysis using this methodology showed that much of the existing income effects were qualitative responses. As a key result, the price elasticity of -1.178 estimated by the usual demand model based on a single commodity assumption is reduced to -0.712 for the quantitative margin only, and the qualitative margin is the remaining -0.466, accounting for more than a third of the overall response. The significant degree of qualitative response estimates suggests that policy makers and researchers should consider qualitative response as an important factor when analyzing the effectiveness of FTAs, especially on consumption.
Topic:: Imports, Consumer Behavior, and Price Shocks
Political Geography:: Asia and South Korea

2087. Cashing in: Turning challenges into opportunities when evaluating humanitarian cash assistance

Author:: Neil Dillon, Ruth McCormack, Amelie Sundberg, Samir Hafiz, Paul Harvey, and Gabrielle Smith
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:: The use of cash transfers in humanitarian action has implications for evaluative activity. On the one hand, the utility of some evaluations has been strengthened by the increased attention that has been paid to evaluating cash transfers, the agreement of common outcome indicators and the creation of value-for-money methodologies. On the other hand, the programming approaches that are increasingly common to cash assistance – such as multipurpose and unconditional transfers, linkages with social protection systems and the digitalisation of transfers in partnership with financial service providers – present particular challenges for understanding humanitarian outcomes, delineating response scope, analysing different operational models and analysing new data sources. This discussion paper explores the challenges faced when evaluating cash assistance based on research activities by ALNAP along with substantive inputs from CaLP drawing on their wider research, such as the State of the World's Cash 2020 Report.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Markets, Partnerships, Public-Private Partnership, and Cash Transfers
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2088. Adapting humanitarian action to the effects of climate change

Author:: ALNAP, Véronique de Geoffroy, Paul Knox Clarke, Mihir Bhatt, François Grunewald, and Jennifer Doherty
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:: Humanitarian agencies need to reflect on the past, learn from the present and actively imagine the near and increasingly threatening future. From excessive consumption to the over-exploitation of natural resources, polluting activities to large-scale deforestation, humans have already dramatically changed the Earth’s climate and environment. As a result, we are experiencing more frequent and more intense weather events, the humanitarian consequences of which are major. Droughts, flooding and tropical storms cause death, disease, destruction and large-scale population displacement. Public health emergencies are already increasing because of these changes. Conflicts and conflict situations may increase, as may the resulting human migration and displacement. Humanitarian actors working on the ground with climate-related disasters are well placed to observe the intensification of climate-related effects and the increasing complexity of extreme weather events in all regions of the world, including regions where such events were previously rare or unknown.
Topic:: Climate Change, Humanitarian Aid, Natural Disasters, Conflict, and Public Health
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2089. Hostile Harbors: Taiwan’s Ports and PLA Invasion Plans

Author:: Ian Easton
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: The scale of an all-out Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) invasion by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—defies human comprehension and would likely eclipse any historical comparison. In this important contribution to the field, Senior Director Ian Easton analyzes Chinese military studies frameworks and internal PLA documents to answer pressing questions that will help Taiwan and the United States both understand and better plan for potential crisis scenarios. He highlights the centrality of ROC port facilities—and Taiwan’s ability to defend them—in the PLA’s potential invasion plans for Taiwan, illustrating likely operational strategies explored by PLA leadership. In addition to postulating ports likely targeted in a PLA invasion, he provides recommendations that the Taiwanese government could undertake to ensure its port infrastructure security, as well as recommendations for the United States on how to be a supportive partner to Taiwan in that effort.
Topic:: Conflict, Port, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

2090. Righting a Wrong: Taiwan, the United Nations, and United States Policy

Author:: Michael Mazza and Gary J. Schmitt
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: Fifty years ago, on October 25, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” from the United Nations (UN) and gave the Republic of China’s seat to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For several years now, the UN has misread the resolution as meaning that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. Neither the resolution nor the UN Charter empowers the UN Secretary-General to make this determination. Quite to the contrary, as Michael Mazza and Gary Schmitt demonstrate in this report marking the 50th anniversary of Resolution 2758, Taiwan’s participation in the UN system would be in accord with international law and the interests of a globalized world. Absent greater flexibility from Beijing regarding Taiwan’s engagement with the UN, the authors argue, the United States should launch a full court press to achieve Taiwan’s formal membership.
Topic:: Diplomacy, United Nations, History, and International System
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

2091. The Limits of Democracy

Author:: D. Eric Schansberg
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: There’s an old saying that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all of the others. Or putting it another way: the best form of government is a benevolent and knowledgeable dictator, except for the problem of finding a good and wise leader. Whatever democracy’s strengths, they are relative not absolute, and they are contingent on context—namely, the people being governed, the people governing, and the underlying institutions.
Topic:: Politics, Governance, Democracy, and Populism
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2092. Coronavirus Relief Fund: Review of Federal Fiscal Assistance and of Innovative County Response Strategies

Author:: Richard Callahan, Lisa Gordon, and Christopher Morrill
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The National Academy of Public Administration
Abstract:: The United States began to experience impact from the global COVID-19 outbreak in late January 2020. States, counties, and localities were almost immediately affected, and faced unprecedented challenges in providing services to meet the urgent needs of their communities. Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020 in late March, providing over $2 trillion to help cover the needs of affected individuals, families, and businesses. The Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) – part of the CARES Act – provided direct assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, and designated $150 billion for counties with populations of more than 500,000. The National Association of Counties (NACo) asked the National Academy of Public Administration (the Academy) to evaluate how well the CRF funding supported counties in addressing the pandemic and to review the effectiveness of the CRF federal aid package and its implementation. Additionally, they asked the Academy to identify and document innovative strategies employed by six specific counties using CRF funds and to highlight their approaches to address social equity. With the guidance of an Expert Advisory Group (EAG) of Academy Fellows, the Academy’s report presents findings and recommendations that can improve both current and future federal-to-local programs such as the CRF. It also highlights how these innovative counties responded to the challenges their residents faced as a result of COVID-19—examples that could be used by other counties in similar circumstances. I deeply appreciate our EAG members who contributed valuable insights and expertise throughout the project and the Academy Study Team that delivered focused research and analysis. The constructive engagement of NACo employees, as well as current and former federal officials and our broader community of Academy Fellows who have special expertise in intergovernmental relations and operations, was equally vital. They provided important knowledge and context that informed this report. We also owe special thanks to the administrators and leaders of the six counties – Cook County, Illinois; Franklin County, Ohio; Hennepin County, Minnesota; Lee County, Florida; New Castle County, Delaware; and Pierce County, Washington – who took time out of their demanding schedules while addressing the ongoing effects of the pandemic to provide information to us about their challenges and initiatives. This report provides information to federal policy makers on how they can better address the lasting effects of the pandemic and enhance relationships between the multiple levels of government in the United States. I trust that this report also will be useful to NACo as it continues to represent and support its constituents and that the county examples herein will be especially helpful to others facing similar challenges.
Topic:: Governance, Local, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Funding
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2093. UK Green Growth Index

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: Our UK Green Growth Index, produced on behalf of Lloyds Banking Group, assesses the degree to which each UK nation and region may be impacted by the challenges of the net zero transition, and how well placed they are to capitalise on green growth. The transition to net zero will require substantial investment and adaptation across the UK economy. This will create unique opportunities for British businesses to innovate, produce, and supply the goods and services needed to enable the transition, not only in the UK but globally. At the same time, for many parts of the economy the transition will create challenges due to the need to adapt products, processes, and skills. Our UK Green Growth Index, produced on behalf of Lloyds Banking Group, assesses the degree to which each UK nation and region may be impacted by these challenges, and how well placed they are to capitalise on green growth. Our research suggests that green growth opportunities are especially strong in Scotland, given its existing base of green economy activity and its access to a workforce with relevant skills. Similarly, Wales appears well placed to capitalise on green growth opportunities, although it may face greater disruption in the nearer term due to its reliance on high emitting industries. Northern Ireland is also relatively exposed to disruption and may need to accelerate efforts to put in place the factors needed to fully exploit green economy opportunities. Amongst English regions, the South East and South West appear to be best placed to capitalise on the green economy and are less exposed to disruption from the transition than many other parts of the UK. In contrast, Yorkshire and the Humber may face greater disruption and has further to go to develop some of the factors needed to capitalise on green growth. London is somewhat of an outlier: its status as a city-region with a service-orientated economy means it is much less exposed to the challenges than areas which rely more on industrial activity, but it also has less scope to capitalise on green economy opportunities in fields such as manufacturing and energy (although it is well positioned to develop as a centre for green finance and other professional services).
Topic:: Environment, International Trade and Finance, Economic Growth, and Green Technology
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

2094. The Economic Importance of Motorcycles to Europe

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: Motorcycle-related activity supports €21.4 billion of output (GDP) across Europe a year, sustains 389,000 jobs, and generates €16.6 billion of tax revenues, according to research by Oxford Economics. This means that in 2019 economic activities associated with motorcycling generated more GDP, and employed more people, than the metropolitan area economies centred on Venice, Malaga, and Palma de Mallorca. The total tax impact would have been sufficient to cover the pay of 380,000 teachers, or some 6.5% of all European teachers. Four-fifths of the total was accounted for by six countries, namely Italy (23%), Germany (20%), France (13%), the UK (11%), Spain (7%), and Austria (7%). This report, commissioned by ACEM, the motorcycle industry in Europe, also investigates the international trade in motorcycles and parts. In 2019, manufacturers in the EU-27 and the UK sold €2.1 billion of these goods to non-European customers—so that exports accounted for 39% of their total sales by value. Even so, European countries had a trade deficit in these products, with imports totalling €4.5 billion. Large quantities are imported from Asian countries where European manufacturers face high import tariffs. These high custom duties protect their domestic markets by making European vehicles relatively more expensive. This report, commissioned by ACEM, the motorcycle industry in Europe, also investigates the international trade in motorcycles and parts. In 2019, manufacturers in the EU-27 and the UK sold €2.1 billion of these goods to non-European customers—so that exports accounted for 39% of their total sales by value. Even so, European countries had a trade deficit in these products, with imports totalling €4.5 billion. Large quantities are imported from Asian countries where European manufacturers face high import tariffs. These high custom duties protect their domestic markets by making European vehicles relatively more expensive.
Topic:: Economics, Fiscal Policy, Manufacturing, and Motor Vehicles
Political Geography:: Europe

2095. The economic contribution of UK rail

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: The UK railway sector supported £42.9 billion of economic production (GVA) in 2019, associated with 710,000 jobs. Productivity and wage levels, both on the railways and in the rail supply sector, were above-average in every region. The UK railway sector supported £42.9 billion of economic production and was associated with 710,000 jobs and £14.1 billion in tax revenues in 2019, new research by Oxford Economics finds. The rail transport system—Network Rail and the train and metro system operators—accounted for £12.2 billion of that total Gross Value Added (GVA) measure of output. For every £1 of activity on the railway system itself, a further £2.50 of income was generated elsewhere in the UK economy, as a result of supply chain links and other knock-on effects. This extra GVA comprised £17.8 billion in the rail supply sector, £0.9 billion in on-station retail and its suppliers, and £12.0 billion across the wider consumer-facing economy due to wage-funded employee spending (the so-called ‘induced impact’). The study, commissioned by the Railway Industry Association (RIA), also finds that both productivity and wages are higher than the economy-wide average, in both the rail transport system and rail supply sector. This is true not just for the UK as a whole, but for every one of its 12 constituent regions and countries. Finally, the analysis looks at the potential impact of extra public spending on the UK rail infrastructure. Looking further into the future, if rail infrastructure spending were 50% higher than the ‘baseline’ expectation, an extra 104,000 rail supply sector jobs would be supported throughout the five-year period 2025-29. Even if these jobs simply displaced other work, the economy would still benefit, because of their high-productivity, high-wage nature. In the more immediate future, the economy will still be recovering from the Covid pandemic, and will therefore have a degree of spare capacity. This means that any extra jobs created by an uplift in rail infrastructure investment could be genuinely additional, rather than displacing other employment. And this work could support more new jobs in turn, through induced effects. Here, we find that every extra £100 million per annum of spending on rail infrastructure would support an additional 1,400 well-paid jobs in the rail supply sector, plus a further 700 jobs across the wider consumer-facing economy.
Topic:: Economics, Infrastructure, Railways, and Travel
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

2096. Assessing the Economic, Societal and Cultural Benefits of YouTube in Brazil

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: Read how Oxford Economics and YouTube partnered to identify the economic and societal benefits of YouTube in Brazil. Through our rigorous economic modelling and survey capabilities, we found that, in 2020, YouTube contributed R$3.4 billion to Brazil’s GDP and 122,000 full-time equivalent jobs. Our research shows that YouTube fosters significant positive trends for Brazil’s creators in terms of professional goal achievement, business growth, and improved practical skills, as well as serving as a vital resource for teachers and learners
Topic:: Economics, GDP, Social Media, and YouTube
Political Geography:: Brazil and South America

2097. The value of franchising

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: The franchise business model plays an important role within the U.S. economy. Prior to the pandemic, in 2019, the economic output of franchise establishments in the United States was about $787.5 billion and represented 3% of the country’s GDP. Most people immediately associate franchising with fast food restaurants. However, quick service restaurants are just a fraction of the entire sector, making up only a fourth of all franchised establishments, less than half of the workers, and just over a third of the economic output. Beyond their economic contribution, we find that franchises offer pay, benefits, and training on par with comparable non-franchise small businesses. In addition, 32% of franchisees report they would not own a business if they were not franchisees. Lastly, we highlight how franchisees are embedded in their local communities through their local supply chains and charitable giving.
Topic:: Leadership, Business, and Franchising
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2098. The socio-economic impact of cultivated meat in the UK

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: A report on the potential socio-economic benefits of the cultivated meat sector in conjunction with leading UK producer Ivy Farm Technologies. The cultivated meat industry is in its infancy, both in the UK and in most countries around the world. But it clearly presents significant opportunities for entrepreneurs, investors, and other commercial partners to exploit the global potential of a move away from conventional farming towards more sustainable methods. However, the UK industry is currently not able to take advantage of the commercial opportunities while it awaits regulatory approval. This report has sought to demonstrate that there is a strong economic rationale for allowing UK firms to move from research and development into production. As the report highlights, the UK cultivated meat market has the potential to grow into an industry with a total gross value added contribution to UK GDP of over £2 billion in 2030. The detailed analysis of the value of economic activity generated, the number of highly-skilled jobs created and supported, and the taxation revenue (up to £523 million) generated shows the industry has the potential to become an important sectoral driver of growth during the next decade.
Topic:: Economics, Job Creation, Socioeconomics, and Business Management
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

2099. Future of Construction

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: Future of Construction gives forecasts for global construction to 2030 as well as perspectives on climate related challenges for the construction industry. Global construction output in 2020 was US$10.7 trillion (in 2017 prices and exchange rates) and we expect this to grow by 42% or US$4.5 trillion between 2020 and 2030 to reach US$15.2 trillion. The Global Construction industry is set to be a global engine for economic growth and recovery from COVID. Shorter term, global construction output is expected to reach US$13.3 trillion by 2025 – adding US$2.6 trillion to output in the five years from 2020. Asia Pacific will account for US$2.5 trillion of growth in construction output between 2020 and 2030, up by over 50% to become a US$7.4 trillion market by 2030. Construction output in North America will grow by 32%, or US$580 billion from 2020 to 2030, to US$2.4 trillion in 2030. Western Europe is forecast to grow by 23% between 2020 and 2030 and is expected to push up construction output to US$2.5 trillion in 2030. Average annual growth in construction of 3.6% per annum over the decade to 2030 will be higher than manufacturing or services.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Green Technology, Manufacturing, and Construction
Political Geography:: Global Focus

2100. Economic impact of the global ferry industry

Author:: Oxford Economics
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Oxford Economics
Abstract:: The global ferry industry comprises companies that own or operate vessels that transport passengers, goods and vehicles over short sea and inland routes. Ferries provide vital connections which enable all types of journey, whether that be local trips to work, study, visit others, or access amenities, or longer trips for business or tourism. Ferries also facilitate trade within and across national borders. Ferries therefore play a pivotal role as an economic and social enabler. As they do so, they sustain significant economic activity in their own right, both directly through the income and employment they support, and through wider supply chain and worker spending effects which benefit other parts of the economy. In this study, commissioned by Interferry, we assess the economic footprint of the global ferry industry. Our modelling suggests the global ferry industry could have supported $60 billion in GDP and 1.1 million jobs globally in 2019.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Maritime Commerce, Labor Issues, Maritime, and Travel
Political Geography:: Global Focus

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