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Begin New Search Political Geography Italy Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Who Are These Bond Vigilantes Anyway? The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt Ownership in the Eurozone

Author:
Tobias Arbogast
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
This paper examines the ownership structure of eurozone public debt and the distribu- tional consequences thereof. Through both a comparative perspective and an explorative case study of Italy, this paper asks two research questions. Firstly, it asks who holds gov- ernment debt in Spain, France, Germany, and Italy. I focus in on Italy to provide, to the author’s knowledge, the first highly disaggregated view of the holding structure of public debt. Secondly, for Italy I study distributional effects by examining who benefits from the interest received on government debt. This is accomplished through an investigation of the various stakeholders associated with public debt. Results indicate that most of the public debt is held by private and public financial institutions but rarely directly by households. Both direct and indirect beneficiaries of the interest received on government bonds in Italy turn out to be largely wealthy households, reflecting the unequal ownership of wealth more generally. However, prominent public financial institutions are also significant beneficiaries, which likely ameliorates a possible regressive distributional effect of the public debt hold- ing structure. The paper discusses the results with an eye on inequality and contributes to further study of the political economy of public debt.
Topic:
Debt, Inequality, Financial Institutions, and Public Debt
Political Geography:
France, Germany, Spain, and Italy

2. Not All Firms Are Created Equal SMEs and Vocational Training in the UK, Italy, and Germany

Author:
Chiara Benassi, Niccolò Durazzi, and Johann Fortwengel
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Why do skill formation systems put SMEs at greater disadvantage in some countries than others vis-à-vis large employers? By comparing vocational education and training (VET) institutions and their differential effect on firms of different sizes across three countries (UK, Italy, and Germany), we show that the design of VET has profound implications for shap- ing the ability of SMEs to use institutions as resources. In particular, quasi-market institu- tions in the UK amplify SMEs’ disadvantage, while non-market coordinating institutions in Italy and Germany narrow the gap between SMEs and large employers. By unpacking the comparative disadvantage of SMEs, we offer important nuances to the argument that institutions help firms coordinate their business activities in different varieties of capitalism.
Topic:
Political Economy, Capitalism, and Vocational Training
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Germany, and Italy

3. Has the “External Constraint” Contributed to Italy’s Stagnation? A Critical Event Analysis

Author:
Lucio Baccaro and Massimo D'Antoni
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Has the strategy of the “external constraint” (voluntarily limiting the country’s policy-mak- ing discretion by tying it to the European mast) contributed to Italy’s stagnation over the past twenty-five years? The existing literature is divided on this question. The dominant in- terpretation is that Italy’s stagnation is due to insufficient liberalization, and that the exter- nal constraint has had no negative and even a positive influence. An alternative interpreta- tion emphasizes the demand compression and supply-side effects of the external constraint. Based on three case studies of public debt management, privatization, and labor market policy, this paper reconstructs the process by which the external constraint has affected out- comes. It argues that it has had a negative impact, but more as a necessary condition than as a sufficient one. In other words, it would probably have been possible to manage the exter- nal constraint differently to produce better outcomes, but without the external constraint, the stagnation would likely have been less deep.
Topic:
Political Economy, European Union, Economic Growth, and Liberalism
Political Geography:
Europe, Italy, and Southern Europe

4. Is the Euro up for Grabs? Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Author:
Lucio Baccaro, Bjorn Bremer, and Erik Neimanns
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic may lead to a resurgence of the euro crisis. In this context, Italy seems particularly vulnerable: support for the euro is lower than in most other eurozone countries, and a possible exit could have serious consequences for the common currency. Based on a novel survey experiment, this paper shows that the pro-euro coalition is fragile in Italy and preferences are malleable. They are heavily dependent on the perceived costs of continued membership, as a majority of Italians would opt for Italexit rather than accepting a bailout plan requiring the implementation of austerity policies. Individuals who feel they have not benefited from the euro are most likely to support exit when faced with the pros- pect of austerity. This suggests that, differently from Greece, where voters were determined to remain in the euro at all costs, the pro-euro coalition may crumble if Italy is exposed to harsh conditionality.
Topic:
European Union, Eurozone, Voting, and Currency
Political Geography:
Europe, Italy, and Southern Europe

5. Constructing Quality: Producer Power, Market Organization, and the Politics of High Value-Added Markets.

Author:
Elizabeth Carter
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Economists assume increased producer flexibility creates production advantages. So why do inefficient French quality wine producers dominate their flexible, efficient Italian counterparts? French AOC wine producers created “corporatist” producer organizations which served three purposes: encouraged increased product quality information across the supply chain; allowed for the emergence of a unique production style; and enabled producers to define their production methods as “quality” via state regulation. Italian DOC wine producers have fragmented political structures at both the regional and national levels, causing producers to rely more on the price mechanism and less on political structures to coordinate supply chain transactions. Market asymmetries persist across the supply chain, making it difficult for producers to guarantee quality and adversely shaping their potential production and brand strategies. Solving supply chain problems through representative political institutions yields superior economic outcomes than uncoordinated market transactions because the former corrects market power asymmetries.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Politics, and Regulation
Political Geography:
France, Italy, and Global Focus