Search

You searched for: Content Type Working Paper Remove constraint Content Type: Working Paper Publishing Institution Council on Foreign Relations Remove constraint Publishing Institution: Council on Foreign Relations Political Geography East Asia Remove constraint Political Geography: East Asia Topic Security Remove constraint Topic: Security
Number of results to display per page

Search Results

  • Author: Neil E. Silver
  • Publication Date: 04-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Council on Foreign Relations
  • Abstract: The political dynamics of China-Japan relations have changed in reaction to three events: the demise of bipolar world politics, China's ''rise,'' and Japan's unexpected economic stall. These changed political dynamics have brought important challenges and consequences for the United States.
  • Topic: International Relations, Security
  • Political Geography: United States, Japan, China, Israel, East Asia, Asia
  • Author: Michael J. Green, James T. Laney, Morton I. Abramowitz
  • Publication Date: 07-1999
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Council on Foreign Relations
  • Abstract: In May, former Secretary of Defense William Perry traveled to North Korea with a comprehensive proposal to increase outside assistance for its isolated and declining Stalinist regime in exchange for steps by the North to reduce its threatening military posture. The Perry proposal was designed to test North Korea's intentions not only to abide by the 1994 Agreed Framework, which aimed to cap Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, but also to stop further missile tests and military provocations. It is unlikely that North Korea will respond positively. The regime has survived for five decades only by maintaining a belligerent stance. Pyongyang has rebuffed South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's unprecedented efforts to improve North-South relations and has continued to produce military tensions, even in the wake of the Perry visit. But it is too soon to give up on a comprehensive package to reduce tensions with North Korea. Despite the illusion of self-sufficiency, or juche, the North is increasingly dependent on outside help to sustain itself. It is possible that over time Pyongyang will find no alternative to greater interaction with the outside world. Barring an increase in threatening North Korean actions, the United States should keep the Perry proposal on the table and continue to support Kim Dae Jung's policy of engagement. A second Taepodong missile test by North Korea would not violate any existing North Korean commitments, but it would significantly change the situation in Northeast Asia. We should make every effort to deter a launch, but if one takes place, the United States, Japan, and South Korea will have to examine ways to enhance defense against a different North Korean threat. South Korea should suspend new investment in North Korea and Japan should impose new sanctions and consider restrictions on financial transfers to the North. The United States should lower its diplomatic activity toward Pyongyang, keeping channels open, but forcing North Korea to provide incentives for greater dialogue. A missile launch should not end our attempts at diplomacy or cause us to forget that North Korea's relative military capabilities are in decline, but if a test is conducted business cannot continue as usual. Although a North Korean missile launch would do great damage to political support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the United States, Japan, and South Korea, it should not be a reason for us to abandon our commitments under the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework stands as the major bulwark against a return to the kind of calamitous military steps the United States was forced to consider in 1994 to stop North Korea's nuclear program. Inspections of suspicious underground facilities at Kumchangri in May revealed no North Korean violation of the Agreed Framework. Although we cannot assume from this that Pyongyang has forsaken its nuclear ambitions, we do know that implementation of the Agreed Framework remains the best approach to preventing nuclear weapons development in the North. In the end, there is no easy solution to the intractable North Korean problem. Efforts to reduce tensions and build North-South reconciliation have yielded little. We are strong enough to test inducements for change in the North, but our policy must be based on robust deterrence and close defense cooperation with our allies.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation
  • Political Geography: United States, Japan, East Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Korean Peninsula
  • Author: James Laney, Michael J. Green
  • Publication Date: 07-1999
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Council on Foreign Relations
  • Abstract: Good morning. Thank you for coming. I'm Michael Green, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations here in Washington, and the director of this independent task force on Korea policy, which is sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. We are here today to release and explain our recent study on policy towards North Korea. This is, in many ways, the culmination of a two-year effort by the Council.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation
  • Political Geography: United States, Washington, East Asia, North Korea, Korea
  • Author: Harold Brown, Bruce Stokes, Richard L. Armitage, James J. Shinn
  • Publication Date: 04-1998
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Council on Foreign Relations
  • Abstract: The U.S.-Japan security relationship is far too important to peace and stability in Asia to allow it to simply wither away or to be destroyed by a crisis. But the relationship is not sustainable in the form that served it so well during the Cold War. To weather both the "tests of war" and the "strains of peace," the alliance must be strengthened by adapting to the new realities and security challenges of the 21st century. The revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, announced September 23, 1997, was an important step in that direction. But the Japanese Diet must still pass laws implementing these changes. More broadly, Japan must: make the case directly and convincingly to the Japanese public that closer security ties with the United States are in Japan's self interest; agree to engage in explicit defense cooperation so that Japanese forces can be "planned in" rather than "planned out" of U.S. military operations in a range of Asian regional contingencies; engage in a serious dialogue with the United States on long term weapons acquisition plans, including some commitment by Japan to Theater Missile Defense. For its part, the United States must: convince the American public and the Congress that a continued security relationship with Japan is essential to the United States; increase the flexibility of the Pentagon regarding the basing of its troops in Asia, including its forces in Japan, and especially in Okinawa; clearly commit to keep the Japanese security alliance as America's premier security relationship in Asia. And both nations need to: cooperate more closely in gathering and sharing intelligence; coordinate more actively on nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism activities; enhance mutual political consultation so that in a crisis Japan shares more authority in as well as responsibility for the alliance. These changes should be implemented at a deliberate pace with a careful eye to the political climate and the art of the possible in Washington, Tokyo, and other Asian capitals. Only in this way can the U.S.-Japan security relationship be adapted to the challenges that lie ahead.
  • Topic: Security
  • Political Geography: United States, Japan, East Asia