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  • Author: Shivaji Mukherjee
  • Publication Date: 01-2013
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Center for the Advanced Study of India
  • Abstract: In this dissertation I try to answer the puzzle of why the Maoist insurgency in India, which is considered to be the most important internal security threat to the world's largest democracy, occurs in certain districts in India and not others. To restate the puzzle described in the Introduction Chapter, why did the insurgency emerge and consolidate along certain districts in the central-eastern part of India and not in other areas? Why are certain districts affected by the insurgency and not others? Is it as Fearon and Laitin (2003) would argue, purely because of opportunities for rebellion being present in some areas of India in the form of forest cover or mountainous terrain? Is it because of the fact of rebellious tribes or oppressed lower castes facing horizontal inequalities living there as theorized by Murshed and Gates (2005)? Is it as Gurr (1970) would argue because these areas are poorer or with higher levels of economic inequality than others? Yet there are other areas of the country which have similarly high forest cover, poverty, and socio-economically deprived ethnic groups like dalits (lower castes) and adivasis (tribal people), and yet have no Maoist insurgency. Is it as Teitelbaum and Verghese (2011) have recently argued because of colonial direct rule setting up the caste structures and poor quality civil services leading to Maoist insurgency in India? But the Maoist insurgency occurs in certain districts of states like Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Orissa where there was indirect rule through native princes, rather than direct rule. None of these existing theories can fully explain the spatial variation in Maoist insurgency in India. There must be some other omitted variable which explains the full extent of this unusual spatial variation.
  • Topic: Security, Communism, Post Colonialism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency
  • Political Geography: South Asia, India
  • Author: Bruce Riedel
  • Publication Date: 05-2002
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Center for the Advanced Study of India
  • Abstract: July 4th, 1999 was probably the most unusual July 4th in American diplomatic history, certainly among the most eventful. President Clinton engaged in one of the most sensitive diplomatic high wire acts of any administration, successfully persuading Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull back Pakistani backed fighters from a confrontation with India that could threaten to escalate into a nuclear war between the world's two newest nuclear powers. The events of that 4th accelerated the road to a fundamental reconciliation between the world's two largest democracies, India and the United States, but also set the scene for another in the series of military coups that have marred Pakistani democracy. As the President's Special Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs at the National Security Council I had the honor of a unique seat at the table and the privilege of being a key adviser for the day's events.
  • Topic: Security
  • Political Geography: Pakistan, United States, America, South Asia, India, Asia