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22. What Does the Arab Spring Mean for Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus?
- Author:
- Aigerim Zikibayeva
- Publication Date:
- 09-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The demonstrations that were sparked by Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest of police corruption in Tunisia in December 2010 spread a contagion of revolutions across North Africa and the Middle East. The revolutionary spirit that spread to the neighboring countries of Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, Morocco, and Jordan, has raised the question of a possible spillover in other regions of the world. The long-term instability in Eurasia as a whole, in Central Asia and the Caucasus in particular, has caused serious concerns about the possibility of rising radical Islamic threats in these regions, as well as the possibility of similar revolutions against the existing regimes. Perceptions and responses to these events in Russia and the United States also bear impact on the "reset" policy between the two nations.
- Topic:
- Armed Struggle and Regime Change
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, Central Asia, and Arabia
23. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
- Author:
- William Thornberry and Jaclyn Levy
- Publication Date:
- 09-2011
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged from a decades-long militant Islamist tradition in Algeria. In 1998, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, or GSPC) broke away from the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, or GIA) because of the GIA's extensive targeting of civilians. Gradually, the GSPC evolved to encompass global jihadist ideology in addition to its historical focus on overturning the Algerian state. In 2006, the GSPC officially affiliated with al Qaeda core, soon rebranding itself as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In the following years, AQIM was able to conduct a small number of large-scale attacks, most notably its 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters in Algiers. In recent years, counterterrorism pressure and weak governance have combined to shift the center of AQIM's presence to the Sahara-Sahel region. AQIM continues to make its presence known through smuggling operations, kidnappings, and clashes with security forces in the desert. In the coming years, general instability within the region could allow AQIM to further expand its influence.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Arabia and North Africa
24. An Arms Control Process for the Middle East
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan
- Publication Date:
- 04-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Arms transfer to the Middle East are not the sole cause of the regional problems. In fact the acquisition of arms has been the product of the unresolved political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as other conflicts in the region. Over the past five decades there have been a number of arms control proposals and attempts for the Middle east. One main weakness of these proposals was that they were not integrated into a political process. The continued Arab-Israeli conflict made it practically impossible to formulate and implement formal arms control agreements, resulting in a failure from the beginning. Therefore, in any move towards arms control and regional security in the region, the linkage between both conventional and non-conventional weapons and the ongoing peace process must be made. A peaceful solution to the Arab –Israeli conflict should proceed alongside any arms control negotiations, specially in the establishment of a Weapons of Mass destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the region. It is quite evident that peace cannot be achieved while still being threatened by a weapons of mass destruction capability of a neighboring country, nor can a WMDFZ be achieved without the context of a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. This has been recognized by the Obama administration as being a “vital national security interest of the United States”. The position of many countries in the region is that they find it difficult to enter serious arms control negotiations until some form of regional peace is fully established. This stems from their perception that nations in the region still consider military force as the only viable source to achieve their policy objectives. The danger from this underlying reasoning, if perceived as the only alternative to preserving a regional security balance, is that it could give rise to an uncontrollable arms race and to a parallel proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Any massive rearmament will surely create an unrestricted arms race in the Middle East which will automatically be accompanied by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The fear is that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could give rise to states announcing a so-called “in-kind” deterrence or “the right to retaliate in kind”. Unless controlled this arms race will give rise to another military conflict with catastrophic human and environmental consequences.
- Topic:
- Security and Armed Struggle
- Political Geography:
- United States, United Kingdom, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia
25. Iraq: Creating a Strategic Partnership
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 02-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Iraq is changing rapidly, although the outcomes of many of these changes remain unclear. The country faces major challenges in many areas—ranging from quelling the ongoing violence to achieving political accommodation and economic stability. Each of these challenges is critical to the future security and stability of Iraq: Defeat the threat posed by the remnants of the Sunni insurgency, neo-Ba'athists, and Shi'ite militias. Deal with the risk of new forms of ethnic and sectarian violence——especially ethnic conflict between Arab, Kurd, and other minorities in the North. Create effective Iraqi security forces that can fully replace U.S. forces, defeat or reduce the various insurgent and terrorist groups to acceptable levels of activity, enforce the rule of law, and grow strong enough to ensure Iraq's security from threats or pressure from neighboring states. Restructure the Iraqi government to both reflect the results of the 2010 Parliamentary elections and create a level of effective governance that can bring together all of the nation's major factions. Accelerate the slow pace of political accommodation and meet the need for stable political compromises between each major faction so as to rebuild full national unity over time. Find a new balance between central, provincial, and local governance that effectively serves the needs of the Iraqi people, aids political accommodation, builds capacity, reduces corruption, and shifts the climate from one dominated by counterinsurgency to one focused on the rule of law. Cope with the challenges of poverty, unemployment, and underemployment; poor distribution of income; and key problems in the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors than affect large portions of the population. Move Iraq toward economic development in ways that deal with the complex heritage of nearly 30 years of war and internal conflict; massive population growth; and the need to create a competitive economy. Put Iraq's budget on a stable path toward developing effective Iraqi security forces and government services; helping fund economic reconstruction and development; dealing with the near phaseout of international aid and continuing foreign debt and reparations issues; and reducing the dependence of the government on uncertain levels of oil export earnings for the majority of its revenues.
- Topic:
- Politics
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Arabia, and Kurdistan
26. Iraq After the Election: Meeting the Challenges of 2010
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 08-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Paralysis by democracy : lack of national unity government Lack of government effectiveness and capacity at every level Remnants of insurgency and possible revival Sectarian and ethnic challenges Budget crisis, crippled economy, loss of foreign aid Halt in progress in developing Iraqi security forces Coming US withdrawal Uncertain neighbors
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia
27. Contexts of Language in Mahmoud Darwish
- Author:
- Ibrahim Muhawi
- Publication Date:
- 07-2009
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- This paper explores three contexts of language in Mahmoud Darwish's poetry. The first is Darwish's performative use of language. The second deals with reading Darwish as a resistance poet. The third is Darwish's death, which I interpret as part of his language. This last point is speculative but of considerable interest in view of the role he assumed as the poetic voice of Palestine.
- Topic:
- Political Violence, Politics, Armed Struggle, and Insurgency
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Arabia
28. Meeting the Challenge of a Fragmented Iraq: A Saudi Perspective
- Author:
- Nawaf Obaid
- Publication Date:
- 04-2006
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- During an official visit to Washington DC on September 20th, 2005, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal proclaimed: “US policy in Iraq is widening sectarian divisions to the point of effectively handing the country to Iran…. We fought a war together to keep Iran out of Iraq, now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason…. Iraq is disintegrating.”
- Topic:
- International Relations
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, Washington, Middle East, Arabia, and Maryland
29. The Arab-Israeli Military Balance in 2002 Part Four: Trends in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Reasons for proliferating outweigh disincentives, and motivation is growing. Arms control regimes harass proliferators without stopping stem and fail to offer nonproliferators security. War fighting concepts are likely to lack clear structure and be highly volatile in terms of enemy, targets, and crisis behavior. Only a few leadership and military elites -- such as Egypt and Israel -- have shown a concern with highly structured strategic planning in the past. Iran - Iraq and Gulf Wars have demonstrated missiles and weapons of mass destruction will be used. Israeli actions in 1967 and attack on Osirak, Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel in 1973, demonstrate regional focus on surprise and preemption. Iraq has already demonstrated regional concern with launch on warning, launch under attack options. Syria probably has some option of this kind. Concentration of population and leadership in single or a few urban areas makes existential attacks possible.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Arabia, and Egypt
30. If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf. It still has an army of around 375,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. At the same time, Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces. Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate as effectively as possible for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolescent by Western standards. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has taken delivery on over $66 billion worth of new arms since 1991, Kuwait has received $7.6 billion, Iran $4.3 billion, Bahrain $700 million, Oman $1.4 billion, Qatar $1.7 billion, and the UAE $7.9 billion, Equally important, the US has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is no obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers and then sustain coherent operations. Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces. Iran remains a major threat to Iraq. Iran lost 40-60% of its major land force equipment during the climactic battles of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It has, however, largely recovered from its defeat by Iraq and now has comparatively large forces. Iran now has an army of around 450,000 men – including roughly 125,000 Revolutionary Guards, and an inventory of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored vehicles, and 3,200 major artillery weapons. It also has over 280 combat aircraft with potential operational status. Iran has been able to make major improvements in its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf, and to conduct unconventional warfare. Iran has also begun to acquire modern Soviet combat aircraft and has significant numbers of the export version of the T-72 and BMP. Iran has not, however, been able to offset the obsolescence and wear of its overall inventory of armor, ships, and aircraft. Iran has not been able to modernize key aspects of its military capabilities such as airborne sensors and C4I/BM, electronic warfare, land-based air defense integration, beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat, night warfare capabilities, stand-off attack capability, armored sensors and fire control systems, artillery mobility and battle management, combat ship systems integration, etc. In contrast, no Southern Gulf state has built up significant ground forces since the Gulf War, and only Saudi Arabia has built up a significant air force. Only two Southern Gulf forces – those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a significant defense capability against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made real progress in improving its 75,000 man National Guard. Its army, however, lacks effective leadership, training, and organization. It now has an army of around 75,000 men –, and an inventory of some 1,055 main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It also has around 350 combat aircraft with potential operational status. The army has made little overall progress in training since the Gulf War, can probably only fight about half of its equipment holdings in the Iraqi border area (and it would take 4-6 weeks to deploy and prepare this strength), and has declined in combined arms capability since the Gulf War. It has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have experienced a growing readiness crisis since the mid-1990s. It has lacked cohesive leadership as a fighting force since that time and cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management.. Kuwait now has an army of only around 11,000 men, and an active inventory of some 293 main battle tanks, 466 other armored vehicles, and 17 major artillery weapons. Only its 218 M-1A2s are really operational and only a portion of these are in combat effective forces. It has only 82 combat aircraft and 20 armed helicopters with potential operational status, and only 40 are modern F-18s. It is making progress in training, but has not shown it can make effective use of combined arms above the battalion level, and has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have moderate readiness, but cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management. There has been little progress in standardization and interoperability; advances in some areas like ammunition have been offset by the failure to integrate increasingly advanced weapons systems. Showpiece exercises and purchases disguise an essentially static approach to force improvement which is heavily weapons oriented, and usually shows little real-world appreciation of the lessons of the Gulf War, the “revolution in military affairs,” and the need for sustainability. Current arms deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in Southern Gulf forces, and no meaningful progress in being made towards integrating the Southern Gulf countries under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
- Topic:
- Security and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia
31. Saudi Military Forces Enter the 21st Century: IX. The Saudi Air Force
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21 st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
- Topic:
- Security and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States, Middle East, and Arabia
32. Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on Al Khobar
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2001
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21 st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
- Topic:
- Security and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States, Middle East, Arabia, and Saudi Arabia