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Begin New Search Topic Security Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 25 Years Publication Year within 5 Years

1. Takeaways From a Time of Increased Friction: South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation From 2015 to Present

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
South Korea and Japan share common challenges and liberal democratic values but have been unable to build a close security relationship, due mainly to their political differences. This paper examines the two countries’ defense cooperation in the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arenas over the past six years to explore how the external security environment, as well as bilateral political problems, have affected their joint activities. The paper’s analysis shows that defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan is not always a binary choice between full cooperation or no cooperation. The two countries not only weigh external threats and bilateral problems, but also ponder such factors as U.S. encouragement to adjust the scope of their cooperation. The paper also shows that while the main constraint for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is their historical animosity, in recent years, frictions involving the countries’ armed forces have become a new reason for limiting cooperation. As a result, grassroots military-to-military exchanges between the two countries, which in the past continued despite political problems, have largely stopped since late 2018. The paper concludes by proposing that South Korea and Japan work to restore routine bilateral working-level exchanges. It also recommends that the United States continue to urge the two countries to cooperate, and that multilateral exercises be employed as forums for cooperation between the two armed forces, as that is an area that is least impacted by bilateral problems.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

2. Iranian Public Opinion At the Start of the Raisi Administration

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Clay Ramsay, and Ebrahim Mohseni
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in- depth surveys of Iranian public opinion on nuclear policy, regional security, economics, domestic politics, and other topics since the summer of 2014. Each survey includes a combination of trend-line questions, some going as far back as 2006, and new questions written to assess and inform current policy debates. This report covers findings from a survey fielded in late August and early September, shortly after Ebrahim Raisi was inaugurated as Iran’s new president on August 5, 2021. It provides insights into Iranian public attitudes regarding a wide range of foreign and domestic policy issues as Raisi takes office, eight months after we released a similar survey of Iranian attitudes in the early days of American president Joe Biden’s first term in office. Much has changed, and much has stayed the same since February 2021. Biden had campaigned on a pledge to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lift sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, as a first step toward further negotiations, so Iranians were relatively positive in February about the prospects for reviving the nuclear deal and improving U.S.-Iranian relations. It took about ten weeks for the new administration to begin indirect negotiations with Iran on a mutual return to full compliance with the JCPOA. The Iranian parliament had responded to Trump’s maximum pressure campaign by passing a law specifying that if the Biden administration did not reverse that policy within weeks of taking office, Iran would exceed JCPOA-mandated limits on its nuclear program in more consequential ways and suspend special International Atomic Energy Agency access to Iran’s nuclear sites that were called for by the JCPOA. The economic, political, and public health crises confronting the new Biden administration precluded it from moving that quickly. The Iranian government promised to r The talks in Vienna made slow, but significant progress as preparations for Iran’s presidential election intensified. Members of the negotiating teams indicated that agreement had been reached by mid-June on some key issues, including the sequence of steps that Iran would take to resume fulfilling its JCPOA commitments and the corresponding sanctions relief it would get from the United States. Some important points of disagreement still needed to be resolved, though. Iran wanted reliable assurances that the United States would not withdraw again or take other steps to preclude Iran from receiving the promised benefits if it abided fully by its JCPOA obligations through October 2025, when the JCPOA specifies that many of Iran’s special nuclear commitments would end and it would have the same rights and responsibilities as other non- nuclear weapon states party to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The United States also wanted assurance from Iran that once the JCPOA had been restored, it would start follow-on negotiations to address additional U.S. concerns.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

3. An Effect-Centric Approach to Assessing the Risks of Cyber Attacks Against the Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Power Plants

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Charles Harry, and Jor-Shan Choi
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Cyberattacks against the digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are of grave security concern. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all NPPs to protect critical digital assets that support safety, security, and emergency preparedness functions against cyberattacks.1 Other standards bodies like the International Society of Automation (ISA) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have also developed standards that address cybersecurity for industrial control systems (ICS) including DI&C.2 Due to concerns for security, relevant stakeholders such as regulators, plant operators, information technology (IT) and operation technology (OT) staff, and equipment suppliers are sometimes reluctant to reveal in technical detail about vulnerabilities posed by DI&C systems. Yet, because some types of cyberattacks against an NPP may cause core damage or significant release of radioactivity, harming the plant, the public and the industry, the safety implications of potential cyberattacks should be evaluated. This divide between security and safety is a challenge for stakeholders focused in cyber security for NPPs. To bridge this security and safety divide, this study proposes and demonstrates a methodology for assessing and addressing the safety consequences of cyber events that disrupt one or more parts of the DI&C systems at NPPs. The methodology builds on the “effect-centric” cyber risk assessment framework developed by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). It is used to analyze two historical cyberattacks and one hypothetical attack scenario. As the focus is on plant safety, these assessment, evaluation, and analysis can be candidly and openly discussed with the goal of finding the best defense to thwart the specific cyberattack.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, and Regulation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. Emerging Technologies and Trade Controls: A Sectoral Composition Approach

Author:
Lindsay Rand and Tucker Boyce
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The rapid development of dual-use emerging technologies has magnified the importance of reconciling technological leadership, economic competitiveness, and national security objectives. While trade controls on dual-use technology transfer can promote peace and mitigate security threats, overly cumbersome policies may impose economic burdens on the private sector that threaten competitiveness and innovation. Striking a balance between these opposing agendas has become especially challenging in the context of emerging technologies that have elicited significant interest in both the military and civilian markets. The dilemma has also been complicated by the merging of economic security discourse and policy with national security. Policymaking mechanisms should be calibrated at the level of individual technologies to avoid security and/or economic consequences of under or over-regulation. This report offers policymakers data, findings, and recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness of individual policies and to work towards a comprehensive technology strategy. In order to develop trade policies that can achieve the intended security benefits without unwarranted damage to economic competitiveness and technology innovation, policymakers must recognize technology-specific development characteristics and the associated global sectoral composition – companies, universities, research institutes, and public-private collaborations - worldwide. This report applies a mapping methodology to three emerging technologies whose level of emergence and security relevance qualifies them as “chokepoint” technologies: position, navigation, and timing (PNT), quantum computing, and computer vision. Entities in each technology category were selected and analyzed using open source information in order to identify trends with respect to global dispersion, foreign involvement (including partnerships, commerce, and investment), and specific technology focus area. A second level of analysis was conducted to compare and contrast the key trends for each of the three sectors to determine how technology-specific factors impact innovation and market establishment and to illustrate the importance of technology-specific trade policies. Analysis of the data shows clear differences among the three technologies that have important implications for the desirability and feasibility of strategic trade controls:
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, Trade, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Do as I Say, and as I Do: 
Chinese Leadership in Nuclear Security

Author:
Sara Z. Kutchesfahani
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes China’s words and actions regarding the Nuclear Security Summits to better understand what Chinese leadership on nuclear security could look like in the future. It finds that China accomplished the many things it said it would do during the summit process. The paper also explores how China’s policy and actions in other nuclear arenas could be paired with Chinese nuclear security policy to form a coherent agenda for nuclear risk reduction writ large. Consequently, the paper addresses how China doing as it says and does – per nuclear security – may be used as a way in which to inform its future nuclear security roles and responsibilities. In particular, it assesses China’s opportunities to assume a leadership role within this crucial international security issue area, especially at a time where U.S. leadership has waned.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, China, Beijing, and Asia