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Begin New Search Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publication Year within 10 Years

51. Sign of the Times: How the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review Affects Relations with Africa

Author:
Zainab Usman and Jonathan Glennie
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In March 2021, the British government published a vision document: “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.”1 Previously, the government had issued documents on security, defense, development, or foreign policy, but this integrated review bundled together all aspects of policy related to a vision of a so-called Global Britain. This newly integrated approach to policymaking mirrors a strategic consolidation within the UK government, specifically the merger of the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to become a new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). While the review is framed as a necessary response to a changing global landscape, domestic political considerations around the British exit from the European Union (Brexit) weigh heavily. The review also points to the current UK government’s inclination to prize geopolitical competition over a previous emphasis on global cooperation. Steep cuts to the UK’s generous foreign aid budget as well as the abolition of DFID have already drawn significant academic, policy, and media attention. Yet these actions are part of a broader UK strategy to redefine the country’s relations to the rest of the world, with significant implications beyond the controversial foreign aid cuts for poor countries, including those in Africa. The review will shape relations with a continent that has deep historical ties from the colonial era, a large diasporic presence, and long-standing economic relations with the UK. This analysis draws out the implications of the UK’s 2021 integrated review for African countries and recommends next steps for African and other international stakeholders to navigate the UK’s overhauled external relations strategy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Development, and Integration
Political Geography:
Africa and United Kingdom

52. Eden Denied: Environmental Decay, Illicit Activities, and Instability in Iraq’s Southern Border Area

Author:
Harith Hasan
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Iraq’s Basra Governorate, on the border with Iran, has endured environmental degradation due to conflict and a reduction of water flows into the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The ensuing decline in agriculture has led to rural migration, unemployment, poverty, a flourishing of informal and illicit economies, and the growth of violent groups. Iran’s dominant influence in Iraq has sustained this situation. Unless these problems are addressed, instability in Basra will increase and will have long-term consequences for Iraq and the Middle East.
Topic:
Environment, Water, Conflict, Borders, and Instability
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Basra

53. Border Nation: The Reshaping of the Syrian-Turkish Borderlands

Author:
Armenak Tokmajyan and Kheder Khaddour
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Turkish-Syrian border is divided into separate areas of control—under the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib, and Turkey in several cantons—which sustain contradictory political projects. Yet these border areas constitute a single political-security ecosystem, one connected to southern Turkey and regime-held Syria. As such, only a peace agreement that treats the border areas as an indivisible whole and delimits the major powers’ zones of influence can lead to a stable long-term arrangement.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Borders, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

54. Government Internet Shutdowns Are Changing. How Should Citizens and Democracies Respond?

Author:
Steven Feldstein
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Governments worldwide continue to deploy internet shutdowns and network disruptions to quell mass protests, forestall election losses, reinforce military coups, or cut off conflict areas from the outside world. Data from the past few years show that incidences of global shutdowns have remained steadily high: 196 documented incidents in 2018, 213 incidents in 2019, and 155 in 2020. The first five months of 2021 recorded fifty shutdown incidents.1 Government-instigated internet shutdowns largely took place in relation to five event types: mass demonstrations, military operations and coups, elections, communal violence and religious holidays, and school exams. As Clément Voule, the United Nations special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, pointedly observes: “Shutdowns are lasting longer, becoming harder to detect and targeting particular social media and messaging applications and specific localities and communities.”2 Events in Russia have put a finer point on internet shutdown trends. On March 4, 2022, Roskomnadzor, the Russian internet regulator, announced that it would block Facebook and Twitter and would ban new uploads to TikTok.3 On March 14, it added Instagram to the banned list.4 Russian authorities have also restricted access to a slew of news websites, including the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. Roskomnadzor claimed these measures were enacted in response to new limits imposed by platforms on Russian propaganda outlets—accusing Facebook of “discrimination.”5 The Kremlin’s crackdown is an ominous signal about where the shutdown struggle is headed in authoritarian countries. Despite these bleak trends, there is a growing international consensus—at least among liberal democracies—that protecting internet access is integrally linked to freedoms of expression and association and forms a crucial part of the global democracy and human rights agenda. This paper picks up on this emerging norm and probes several key questions: What can citizens do to evade authoritarian controls and regain internet access? How can democratic governments support these efforts and push back against governments that shut down and block the internet? The short answer is that there is a multitude of responses available to democracies and civil society organizations to push back against internet blackouts and network disruptions. Democracies can exert meaningful pressure against repressive governments to ease internet blocks, and citizens are able to exercise creative options to circumvent internet controls. The paper walks through different tools available to citizens to evade internet controls. It examines where internet shutdown trends are headed and incentives for particular regimes to adopt new modes of censorship. It then presents a multifaceted strategy for democracies, civil society organizations, and technology developers and companies to counter internet shutdowns.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Democracy, and Internet
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

55. Negotiating Local Business Practices With China in Benin

Author:
Folashade Soule
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Commercial negotiations between Benin and China demonstrate how both sides navigate the dynamics of Africa-China business-to-business relationships. In Benin, Chinese and local Beninese officials engaged in drawn-out negotiations on a deal to construct a business center aimed at deepening business links between Chinese and Beninese merchants. Strategically located in Cotonou, Benin’s principal economic city, the center aims to promote investment and wholesale businesses by serving as a hub for China’s business-to-business relations not just in Benin but regionally in West Africa, especially in the large and growing neighboring market of Nigeria. This paper relies on original research and fieldwork conducted in Benin from 2015 to 2021 and the author’s access to draft and final contracts from the negotiations, which allow for a side-by-side comparative textual analysis, as well as initial field interviews and follow-up interviews with key negotiators, Beninese businessmen, and former Beninese students in China. The paper shows how Chinese and Beninese authorities negotiated the establishment of the center and, above all, how Beninese authorities made Chinese negotiators adapt to local Beninese labor, construction, and legal norms and put pressure on their Chinese counterparts. This strategy meant that negotiations took longer than usual to complete. China-Africa cooperation is often characterized by speedy negotiations, an approach that in some cases turns out to be harmful—since this can allow vague and unfair clauses to be featured in final contracts. The negotiations over the Chinese business center in Benin is a good example of how well-coordinated negotiators that take their time and work in coordination with various counterparts throughout the government can help facilitate better outcomes in terms of high-quality infrastructure and compliance with prevailing construction, labor, environmental, and business norms, while also preserving a good bilateral relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, and Business
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Benin

56. Throwing Down the Gauntlet: What the IMF Can Do About Egypt’s Military Companies

Author:
Yezid Sayigh
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Until recently, both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were wholly reticent to say anything about the involvement of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and other military agencies in Egypt’s civilian economy. This is a longstanding problem. By turning a blind eye to the diversion of resources to the military sector and to the increasingly significant impacts on the economy and public finances, these international financial institutions (IFIs) have undermined the effectiveness of their own programs and allowed their resources to be invested in support of suboptimal policies by the Egyptian government. There is a question of propriety when international assistance allows distorted policy incentives to continue or even intensify and disregards the fact that much of the hype about global growth in the Egyptian economy obscures the very real constraints imposed on private sector development. It is high time to throw down the gauntlet: IFIs and their governmental sponsors should tackle the reality of military involvement systematically in their programs and policy recommendations, and they should confront the issue head on in their dealings with Egypt’s authorities. Reticence persists but is starting to dissipate. A report released by the World Bank in December 2020 noted that military agencies account for an appreciable proportion of all state-owned enterprises producing capital goods; consumer durables and apparel; materials; food, beverages, and tobacco; automobiles and components; retailing; media and entertainment; semiconductors and intelligent transportation system equipment; and technology hardware and equipment.1 The IMF went further in a July 2021 review of its loan agreement with Egypt, in which it referred to the presence and role of Egyptian military companies for the first time ever.2 Significantly, it included them explicitly in its assessment of state-owned enterprises in general—many of which, the report noted, are “registering weak financial performance while some are benefiting from an uneven playing field”—and implied that military companies should come under the same broad reform policies that the IMF proposes for the public sector as a whole. Now that the IMF, in particular, has broken its former silence, it should refine its approach so as to tackle the Egyptian military’s economic role in a more targeted and consistent manner—hence making its approach more effective and sustainable. This requires a mix of measures. The first set involves bringing military agencies and companies within the scope of recommendations proposed by the IMF for Egypt’s civilian public sector and state-owned enterprises as a whole. These first measures therefore engage with IMF recommendations and Egyptian government policy initiatives relating to broad questions of ownership, regulation, and financing strategy. The second set of measures tackles the specific aspects of the legal, regulatory, and judicial frameworks that enable the military’s activities in the civilian domain. Unless they are revised, these enabling frameworks will impede wider reforms, but the Egyptian government and IMF have, for the most part, neither reviewed nor addressed them to date.
Topic:
Regulation, Economy, Business, IMF, Civil-Military Relations, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and Egypt

57. How Huawei’s Localization in North Africa Delivered Mixed Returns

Author:
Tin Hinane El Kadi
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Trade between China and North Africa has increased significantly since the early 2000s, but it has largely reproduced patterns of unequal exchange. Since they were unveiled, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Chinese government’s 2016 Arab Policy Paper have signaled the promise of a qualitative shift in China’s engagement with the region. China has committed to increase investments in high-value-added sectors and to boost cooperation in science and technology with countries across North Africa. The digital space is a notable aspect of recent China–North African partnerships. Chinese tech firms are becoming ever more important actors in North Africa through the Digital Silk Road, the digital component of the BRI. North African governments see the Digital Silk Road as an opportunity to help bridge the digital divide and bolster their own national efforts to build digital economies and create high-quality jobs for the millions of unemployed university graduates across the region. In recent years, the region has become home to notable Digital Silk Road projects such as smart cities, satellite navigation centers, data centers, and network infrastructure. Huawei’s localization strategies in Algeria and Egypt show that, far from imposing a one-size-fits-all blueprint on other countries, as Beijing is often depicted as doing in U.S. and European media and policy discussions, Chinese tech players adapt their engagement depending on local development agendas. Flexibility, customization, and services tailored to local demand have been cornerstones of Huawei’s localization strategies in North Africa. Accommodating local development priorities is central to Huawei’s success in globalizing its business ventures. The Chinese firm has responded favorably to Algeria’s and Egypt’s attempts to leverage foreign companies for conducting more value-added activities within their respective economies. Among other things, Huawei opened its first African factory in Algeria, employing Algerians to assemble products for and beyond the Algerian market. It also launched an OpenLab for conducting research and development (R&D) activities in Egypt and established partnerships with several universities in the region to train local students. However, closer scrutiny of Huawei’s localization in both Algeria and Egypt indicates that the company improved its brand image without engaging in meaningful capacity building. For all its success at winning the hearts of government officials across the region, Huawei has engaged in training, manufacturing, and R&D in a way designed to maintain the firm’s technological edge. The Chinese tech giant has managed to localize seemingly developmental activities in North Africa without contributing much to technological upgrading. North African governments should take lessons from China’s playbook of how it became a technological superpower. This means adopting policies that could maximize the benefits of Chinese and non-Chinese investments by ensuring positives spillovers and protecting potential local tech champions. Increasing economic integration across North African countries and moving beyond fragmented bilateral commercial negotiations with China are two steps that may help level the playing field with the Asian giant.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Telecommunications, Huawei, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Algeria, North Africa, and Egypt

58. Coronavirus and the Widening Global North-South Gap

Author:
Rosa Balfour, Lizza Bomassi, and Marta Martinelli
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) has a growing interest in investing in the Global South as the bloc seeks to fill a niche amid the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, find new allies in support of multilateralism, and diversify its international relations in pursuit of its norms and interests. But the union’s policies and ambitions are underinformed by empirical research on how the Global South views the EU and Europe as a whole. This paper presents the initial results of an eighteen-month-long project conducted by Carnegie Europe and the Open Society European Policy Institute (OSEPI) that explored perspectives on Europe’s international role through the eyes of the Global South.1 The project was launched in 2020 and, by necessity, the coronavirus pandemic and the world’s responses to it became the backdrop for identifying and deconstructing the key issues and dilemmas in the relationship between the EU and the Global South. What followed were some sobering lessons that offer new ways of thinking about future engagement. After two years of battling the coronavirus, and as domestic restrictions ease in much of the Global North, what has emerged is a widening gap between North and South. Without the resources and policy innovations the West used to shield itself from the worst of the pandemic’s economic effects, developing countries, already economically vulnerable, were hit hard by the crisis. In some countries, this has reversed decades of progress on poverty, healthcare, and education. The pandemic could have been a watershed moment: an opportunity for the EU to reframe donor-recipient relations, build on ongoing efforts to eliminate global poverty, and demonstrate the value of multilateralism. Yet, rather than capitalizing on the chance to strengthen the Global South’s resilience, the EU was perceived as pursuing more insular strategies, from hoarding COVID-19 vaccinations to opposing vaccine waivers. While outwardly espousing the benefits of international solidarity, the EU was unable to enact extensive policies to address the structural economic and political imbalances in its relationship with the Global South. This shortsightedness led to several missed opportunities for the EU to play a leading role in helping the Global South navigate what will be a long and painful recovery from the pandemic. At the same time, geopolitical games among the United States, Europe, China, and Russia tarnished the West’s image, leading to further resentment and frustration. The EU’s efforts to deweaponize access to healthcare by exporting half the vaccines it produced and supporting the establishment of the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) initiative in the early days of the pandemic were admirable; but a series of missteps—by accident or design—seriously dented the EU’s credibility in the eyes of many of its partners. Much of this harm can be attributed to a strategy that tried to balance competing and contradictory aims with a values-based external policy that boasted the principles of solidarity at its core. China and Russia exploited this weakness to position themselves as more reliable partners than their Western counterparts. However, there are still opportunities for the EU to regain what it has lost. Both Africa and Asia have turned to multilateralism to effectively combat the coronavirus. The Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (ACDC) has played a leading role in coordinating African responses to the pandemic, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has announced the creation of the Center for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases. The EU can support these organizations in a bid to deepen partnerships with the Global South. Lizza Bomassi Lizza Bomassi is the deputy director of Carnegie Europe, where she is responsible for harmonizing Carnegie Europe’s strategic and operational priorities and managing relations with Carnegie’s global centers and programs as well as partner organizations in Europe. The coming year is rife with opportunities to enact course correction: patent waivers will be discussed in the World Trade Organization (WTO), while Indonesia’s 2022 presidency of the Group of Twenty (G20) and the EU’s Global Gateway initiative are chances for Europe to recharacterize its relationship with the Global South. The EU must embrace ambitious and creative forms of cooperation to build lasting alliances that will, in turn, address global inequality in a manner that aligns with the union’s declared intention to create more equal partnerships in the global community.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Multilateralism, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global South and Global North

59. How Inequality and Polarization Interact: America’s Challenges Through a South African Lens

Author:
Brian Levy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past decade, toxic interactions between persistent inequality, racial tensions, and political polarization have undercut the promise of South Africa’s so-called rainbow miracle transition from apartheid to democracy. South Africa’s recent history sheds light on the United States’ recent political travails. It illustrates how interactions between inclusion and inequality on the one hand and political ideas and entrepreneurship on the other can fuel positive spirals of hope, economic dynamism, and political legitimacy—but can also trigger vicious, downward spirals of disillusion, anger, and political polarization. South Africa was able to transition from a society structured around racial oppression into a nonracial democracy whose new government promised “a better life for all.” Especially remarkable was the speed with which one set of national ideas appeared to give way to its polar opposite. From a society marked by racial dominance and oppression, there emerged the aspiration to build an inclusive, cooperative social order, underpinned by the principles of equal dignity and shared citizenship. In the initial glow of transition, South Africa’s citizens could hope for a better life for themselves and their children. In time, though, the promise wore thin. It became increasingly evident that the economic deck would continue to be stacked, and that the possibility of upward mobility would remain quite limited. Fueled by massive continuing inequities in wealth, income, and opportunity, South Africans increasingly turned from hope to anger. In the United States, a steady and equitably growing economy and a vibrant civil rights movement had fostered the hope of social and economic inclusion. But that hope turned to anger as the benefits of growth became increasingly skewed from the 1980s onward. In 2019, the U.S. economy was more unequal than it had been since the 1920s. Younger generations could no longer expect that their lives would be better than those of their parents. Such economic adversity and associated status anxiety can trigger a heightened propensity for us-versus-them ways of engaging the world. In both South Africa and the United States, polarization was fueled by divisive political entrepreneurs, and in both countries, these entrepreneurs leveraged inequality in ways that added fuel to the fire. In the 2010s, South Africa went through a new ideational reckoning, in part to correct the view that the transition to democracy had washed the country’s apartheid history clean. But opportunistic political entrepreneurs also pushed an increasingly polarized and re-racialized political discourse and pressure on public institutions, with predictable economic consequences. South Africa’s economy slid into sustained stagnation. Paralleling South Africa, America’s divisive political entrepreneurs also cultivated an us-versus-them divisiveness. However, unlike in South Africa, political entrepreneurs and economic elites in the United States also used divisive rhetoric as a way to persuade voters to embrace inequality-increasing policies that might otherwise not have won support. By the late 2010s, the risks were palpable in both South Africa and the United States of an accelerating breakdown of the norms and institutions that sustain inclusive political settlements. For South Africa, the reversals were not wholly unexpected, given the country’s difficult inheritance—though a recent turn away from angry populism suggests that, paradoxically, the rawness and recency of the anti-apartheid struggle and triumph might perhaps offer some immunization against a further-accelerating a downward spiral. But for the United States, the converse may be true. Increases in inequality since the 1980s, and their attendant social and political consequences, have been largely self-inflicted wounds. Complacency bred of long stability may, for decades, have been lulling the country into political recklessness at the inequality-ethnicity intersection, a recklessness that risks plunging the country into disaster. But this paper’s analysis is not all gloom and doom. South Africa’s escape from the shackles of apartheid teaches that, even in the most unlikely settings, downward spirals of despair and anger can transmute into virtuous spirals of hope. The country’s first fifteen years of democracy also show that, once a commitment to change has taken hold, making the shift to an inclusion-supporting economy is less daunting than it might seem. Reforms that foster “good enough inclusion” can be enough to provide initial momentum, with the changes themselves unfolding over time—and an initial round of change can bring in its wake a variety of positive knock-on effects. But lessons can be overlearned. Mass political mobilization was pivotal to South Africa’s shaking loose the shackles of apartheid—and new calls to the barricades might seem to be the obvious response to current political and governmental dysfunction. However, different times and different challenges call for different responses. In both contemporary South Africa and contemporary America, the frontier challenge is not to overthrow an unjust political order but to renew preexisting formal commitments to the idea that citizenship implies some shared purpose. Renewal of this kind might best be realized not by confrontation but rather by a social movement centered around a vision of shared citizenship, a movement that views cooperation in pursuit of win-win possibilities not as weakness but as the key to the sustainability of thriving, open, and inclusive societies.
Topic:
Governance, Democracy, Inequality, Institutions, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Africa, South Africa, North America, and United States of America

60. U.S. Strategy and Economic Statecraft: Understanding the Tradeoffs

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Ethan Kapstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Few would dispute that U.S. economic policy has enormous consequences for America’s national security and role in the world. But economic policy is too often made without a clear picture of the strategic tradeoffs it entails. The purpose of this paper is to help clarify some of these tradeoffs by considering three alternative models of U.S. economic statecraft. The first model examined here, America First, has several national security and economic disadvantages. It would not only antagonize some of Washington’s key military allies but probably also undermine U.S. international competitiveness. It might even induce countries to turn their economic attention toward China, reducing the United States’ global influence accordingly. A better approach would be a blend of two other models, namely alliance economics and globalization 2.0. Together these approaches could help orient the United States for the geopolitical challenges of the next decade. By emphasizing commercial relations with U.S. military allies, such a blend would recall Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which calls for international economic cooperation among NATO member states. And by leading a reformed multilateral system, the United States would again put itself at the center of the rules-based global economic order that brought prosperity to millions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Cooperation, and Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

61. West African Elites’ Spending on UK Schools and Universities: A Closer Look

Author:
Matthew Page
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Political, business, and cultural elites from around the world have a strong affinity for the United Kingdom (UK) education system. Nowhere is this truer than in West Africa, where some families in Nigeria and Ghana have a long tradition of sending their children to private boarding schools and universities in the UK. These institutions are especially popular destinations for the offspring of prominent politically exposed persons (PEPs) from the region. Immigration officials, admissions staff, and UK law enforcement are not likely to scrutinize the conditions under which the children of PEPs enroll in British schools, even though the PEPs themselves may have modest legitimate earnings and opaque asset profiles that in other circumstances would raise serious financial concerns. This relative lack of review has allowed some West African PEPs to channel unexplained wealth into the UK education sector. It is not easy to estimate the overall value of this flow, yet it likely exceeds £30 million annually.1 Most of these funds emanate from Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, Ghana; compared with these two countries, only a handful of students from elsewhere in West Africa seek an education in British schools. Tackling this small but significant illicit financial flow should be a priority for UK policymakers. In doing so, they would be helping to realize the UK’s global anticorruption objectives, advance its International Education Strategy, and close a troublesome anti–money laundering (AML) loophole. Failing to do so would exacerbate existing corruption challenges both at home and abroad and increase the UK education sector’s reputational liabilities.
Topic:
Corruption, Education, Law Enforcement, Higher Education, and Elites
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, Europe, and West Africa

62. What Is So Foreign About Foreign Influence Operations?

Author:
Hedvig Ördén and James Pamment
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Influence operations are increasingly seen as a threat to democratic societies because they can corrupt the integrity of political deliberation. As individuals engage in debate on social media, political deliberation becomes vulnerable to potentially destructive forms of interference. Many debates on what to do about influence operations emphasize that these operations constitute what is deemed to be a foreign threat. But does the notion of foreignness, viewed in isolation, constitute a helpful lens for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate influence operations? Ultimately, the lens of foreignness is only helpful when applied to a narrow set of cases. One sensible way of reviewing when the concept of foreignness can be useful in distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate influence operations is to consider three separate conceptions of how to determine what counts as foreign: foreign states, foreign citizens, and foreign interests. In the first case, influence operations are seen as threatening acts directed at a targeted state by foreign states, using behaviors seen as analogous to acts of war. In the second instance, influence operations are considered threatening acts conducted by foreign citizens that undermine domestic democratic systems in a targeted state. In cases of the third sort, influence operations are viewed as acts aimed at advancing foreign interests through the illegitimate employment of soft power. Given these various models, the notion of foreignness constitutes a useful lens for discussions of influence operations in cases when there is overwhelming evidence of state-based, hybrid, and irregular warfare. An argument can also be made for employing the distinction in relation to the protection of democratic institutions, such as elections. However, when influence operations are regarded as a more generalized threat to political deliberation, foreignness is not a helpful category for determining the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such campaigns. In such cases, rather than focusing on the (domestic or foreign) identity of the malicious actors themselves, it is more fruitful to conceive of illegitimacy in terms of specific manipulative communication techniques. Suitable countermeasures could include, for instance, creating greater transparency surrounding, or even restricting, the use of artificial techniques to inflate the level of perceived engagement a piece of online content generates.
Topic:
Democracy, Soft Power, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Global Focus

63. How Middle-Power Democracies Can Help Renovate Global Democracy Support

Author:
Rachel Kleinfeld, Thomas Carothers, Steven Feldstein, and Richard Youngs
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Middle-power democracies—countries which regardless of their geopolitical weight have made democracy support a sustained component of their foreign policy—will be crucial to reimagining democracy support strategies and policies to better meet the moment. Some of these states have crafted new initiatives and wielded diplomatic tools to deepen their impact in recent years. However, these states have on the whole punched below their collective weight. This paper suggests that middle-power democracies can maximize their impact on global democracy in the following ways: Enhancing solidarity: when a country acts courageously in defense of democracy, it needs to know that others will stand alongside it. Sharpening their focus: middle-power democracies should target policy areas aligned with democratic values on issues both at the top of the geopolitical agenda and at the top-of-mind for citizens around the world—for example, economic recovery, injustice and discrimination, corruption, digital repression, and climate change. Improving diplomatic cooperation: pursuing flexible and focused multilateral partnerships allows for collaboration on key policy interests and amplifies middle-power actions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Democracy, Solidarity, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

64. How Do Indian Americans View India? Results From the 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey

Author:
Sumitra Badrinathan, Devesh Kapur, and Milan Vaishnav
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Indian Americans are now the second-largest immigrant group in the United States. Their growing political influence and the role the diaspora plays in Indian foreign policy therefore raises important questions—about how Indian Americans view India, the political changes underway there, and the course of U.S.-India relations. Since coming to power in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made outreach to the far-flung Indian diaspora a signature element of his government’s foreign policy. Modi’s courtship of the diaspora has been especially notable in the United States, where the Indian American population has swelled to more than 4 million and has become the second-largest immigrant group in the United States.1 In two separate, large rallies on U.S. soil—in 2014 and 2019—Modi sought to highlight the achievements of the diaspora, outlining the many ways in which they can support India’s interests from afar while underscoring their increasingly substantial economic, political, and social influence in the United States. These high-octane gatherings, however, naturally lead to a series of questions: How do Indians in America regard India, and how do they remain connected to developments there? What are their attitudes toward Indian politics and changes underway in their ancestral homeland? And what role, if any, do they envision for the United States in engaging with India?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Immigration, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

65. The Road from Galwan: The Future of India-China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China and India struggle to comprehend each other’s international ambitions. The misperceptions that follow lead to a lack of trust, border skirmishes, and potentially worse. On June 15, 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a brawl that left twenty Indian soldiers dead while causing an unspecified number of Chinese casualties. The clash is a part of a broader border standoff along the Galwan River between the two forces on the Line of Actual Control that is yet to be resolved. The Indian strategic community is broadly in agreement that this border dispute marks an implacable decline in India-China ties. They argue that the very basis of relations that emerged after former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 has been shaken, if not destroyed. Yet, how did the two countries manage to reach this nadir in ties, and furthermore, what does the Galwan clash signify for the future of Sino-Indian relations? This paper argues that, long before the present border dispute occurred, Sino-Indian relations had been steadily declining due to rampant misperceptions of the other side, contributing to a lack of trust. The most fundamental misperception between the two countries is the inability to comprehend each other’s international ambitions, yielding the fear that their foreign policies are targeted against the other. This paper traces the impact and development of these misperceptions on Sino-Indian ties through three different phases before considering the future of the relationship after the Galwan dispute.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

66. South Africa: When Strong Institutions and Massive Inequalities Collide

Author:
Brian Levy, Alan Hirsch, Vinothan Naidoo, and Musa Nxele
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
South Africa's economic and social imbalances can no longer be swept under the rug. The country has three choices: muddle through, endure another surge of ethnopopulism, or pursue inclusive development. South Africa was one of the 1990s iconic cases of democratization. Yet starting in the mid-2000s, the country began to experience a disruptive collision between its strong political institutions and massive economic inequality. The collision intensified across the 2010s, resulting in economic stagnation and increasing threats to institutional integrity. Understanding why this collision occurred and worsened over time is relevant not just for other middle-income countries but also many higher-income democracies wrestling with similar tensions between a declining tolerance for high or rising inequality and institutions that seemed strong in the past but find their legitimacy increasingly being questioned. Ideally, ideas, institutions, and growth all reinforce one another in a virtuous developmental spiral. Ideas offer hope by encouraging cooperation and the pursuit of opportunities for win-win gains. Institutions assure that the bargains underpinning cooperation will be monitored and enforced. Together, ideas and institutions provide credible commitment, which fuels economic growth. However, such a benign scenario does not reckon with the ways in which persistent high inequality, accompanied by unresolved tensions between the distribution of economic and political power, can both put pressure on institutions and quickly change hope into anger. The result can be a cascading set of pressures and an accelerating downward spiral. For the first fifteen years of democracy, South Africa enjoyed the advantages of both effective institutions and a shared willingness of stakeholders believed in the power of cooperation. This enabled the country to move beyond counterproductive conflict and pursue win-win outcomes. Growth began to accelerate, which created new opportunities for expanding the middle class. Increased fiscal space made it possible to broaden access to public services and to social grants, which reduced absolute poverty. There were, however, some stark limitations in what was achieved. Gains for the poorest did little to alter their difficult economic and social realities. Less than a quarter of the total population, including essentially all white South Africans, enjoyed a standard of living that was middle class or better. There was ample reason for the majority of South Africans to feel that, notwithstanding the promises of mutual benefit, the deck remained stacked against them. This increased the vulnerability of South Africa’s political settlement.
Topic:
Development, Inequality, and Institutions
Political Geography:
South Africa and Africa

67. Russia in the Arctic—A Critical Examination

Author:
Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia has big Arctic plans, but how they will be realized is uncertain. For the United States this will likely mean the return to a Cold War–like environment rather than a new chapter in great-power competition in the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic ambitions have attracted increasing attention in the West over the past decade as climate change opens up new opportunities in the region for navigation and exploration of its riches. For its part, Moscow casts a wary eye on what it sees as a challenge from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its position and ambitions there. The Kremlin’s rhetoric about Western encroachment has become more strident, in sync with its enhanced military posture and ambitious economic and infrastructure projects.
Topic:
NATO, Cold War, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

68. The Making of the Kurdish Frontier: Power, Conflict, and Governance in the Iraqi-Syrian Borderlands

Author:
Harith Hasan and Kheder Khaddour
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Iraqi-Syrian border continues to be geopolitically restless. Kurdish parties have taken advantage of central government weaknesses to increase their autonomy in these areas. Even after the collapse of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, the Iraqi-Syrian border continues to be one of the most geopolitically restless areas in the Middle East. In the last few years, a variety of Kurdish entities and groups have increasingly shaped the dynamics across the northern section of this border. In particular, there are two dynamics that deserve attention. First, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Kurdish-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria have come to effectively control new border crossings in this area as the Syrian government has lost access and the Iraqi government’s presence has been contested. This means that the movement of people and goods in this area is largely controlled by two entities that are neither state nor nonstate actors. The reality on the ground reflects hybrid arrangements that have emerged as a result of the weaknesses of both central governments and the increasing autonomy gained by Kurdish parties (which, in the case of the KRG, is stipulated constitutionally). Second, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), by virtue of its participation in the war against the Islamic State and by taking advantage of the consequent power vacuum, managed to augment its influence along the border. Its ideological and organizational ties with local groups, such as the People Protection Units (YPG) in Syria and Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) in Iraq, enabled it to exert security and political influence. On the one hand, this turned segments of the border into an arena for transnational, pan-Kurdish militancy. On the other hand, these groups’ presence intensified intra-Kurdish rivalries, especially between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is the KRG’s main ruling party, and the PKK. This rivalry reflects a clash of two visions for the border: the PKK’s revolutionary, transnational vision that seeks to eradicate or at least underplay the reality of the border; and the KDP’s pragmatic and territorial vision seeking to assert the border’s reality as a demarcation of the KRG’s authority and future statehood. In addition, the KDP is allied with Turkey, which has been fighting the PKK for several decades and is currently waging a military campaign against the group in northern Iraq and Syria. To a large extent, the future of this border is predicated on this geopolitical conflict and whether the PKK manages to entrench itself further or becomes isolated and marginalized as the KRG, the Autonomous Administration, and the Iraqi federal government assert their territorial authorities.
Topic:
Governance, Conflict, Borders, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

69. Along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Border, Stability Is Built on Flexibility

Author:
Bader Al-Saif
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over time, the Kuwait-Saudi border has developed a unique, flexible approach of firm physical boundaries but open economic boundaries. This approach allows both countries to resolve border disputes, such as an oil-related dispute from 2009 to 2019, but more investment could further strengthen Kuwait-Saudi ties. In a divided zone along their border, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have introduced a flexible arrangement based on a rigid physical border and a fluid economic border. This flexibility, leading to the co-management and equal profit sharing of hydrocarbons, has largely averted conflict. It rests on constructive ambiguity and avoidance of direct confrontation. The approach has its challenges but showed its merit in 2009–2019 when the two resolved a major dispute over the zone.
Topic:
Political stability, Conflict, Borders, and Investment
Political Geography:
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

70. India’s Sustained Economic Recovery Will Require Changes to Its Bankruptcy Law

Author:
Anirudh Burman
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As India’s economy recovers from the coronavirus pandemic, Indian businesses need efficient financial structures to regain their ground. Key reforms to India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code could fill these gaps. One of the key drivers of economic recovery in India will be the efficient movement of capital from inefficient firms to efficient ones. The economic downturn caused by the coronavirus pandemic has been severe, and India’s economy was one of the worst affected in 2020–2021. Though the economy is recovering faster than initial estimates, sustained economic recovery will not take place if stressed businesses cannot restructure their debts properly or if failing firms cannot be resolved efficiently. India’s bankruptcy law is key to solving these challenges. In 2016 India enacted the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), which was a landmark reform to the nation’s financial system and the first comprehensive law to regulate insolvency.1 But the IBC has been suspended for a period of one year since the COVID-19-related lockdown was imposed in March 2020. In its place, India’s banking regulator, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), has introduced a limited restructuring scheme for COVID-19-related stress in the meantime. Older mechanisms for insolvency that are still in operation have historically not worked according to expectations. As the one-year period of suspension comes to a close, this paper argues that bringing back the IBC—with adequate modifications—is an important prerequisite for sustained economic growth. India historically suffered from a patchwork framework of insolvency laws that either did not give lenders adequate powers to recover their debts upon default or only catered to the interests of certain kinds of lenders—to the exclusion of others.2 The IBC is a modern and comprehensive bankruptcy law that since its enactment has had a significant role in reducing the problem of nonperforming assets (NPAs), or “bad loans,” in India’s financial system. In the wake of the economic disruption caused by COVID-19, the Indian government suspended the operation of critical parts of the IBC. These changes meant that lenders could not trigger insolvency proceedings against defaulting businesses if the default occurred after March 20, 2020. While this suspension possibly prevented unnecessary business failures and provided a “calm period” for the economy, these measures have outlived their utility.
Topic:
Law, Finance, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

71. China’s Improvised Mask Diplomacy in Chile

Author:
Urdinez. Francisco
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
During the pandemic, Chinese medical and equipment supplies to Chile have come mostly from a diverse cast of Chinese players with local experience in Chile. They adapted to Chile’s unique system of emergency and disaster management. China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular. Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Disaster Relief, Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South America, and Chile

72. Breaking the Israel-Palestine Status Quo

Author:
Zaha Hassan, Daniel Levy, Hallaamal Keir, and Marwan Muasher
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A new U.S. approach should prioritize protecting the rights and human security of Palestinians and Israelis over maintaining a peace process and attempting short-term fixes. The authors of this paper identified four overarching areas of focus: (1) prioritize rights and protect people, (2) roll back the Trump administration’s actions and reassert international law, (3) clarify expectations for Palestinians and Israelis, and (4) support new multilateral approaches and accountability.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

73. Economic Diversification in Africa: How and Why It Matters

Author:
Zainab Usman and David Landry
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Many African countries have placed economic diversification high on the policy agenda, yet they first need to define what it means in their specific structural and socioeconomic contexts. For decades, economic diversification has been a policy priority for low- and middle-income economies. In the words of former managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine Lagarde, “We know that economic diversification is good for growth. Diversification is also tremendously important for resilience.” Unfortunately, this goal continues to elude many African countries. In fact, the continent is home to eight of the world’s fifteen least economically diversified countries. This reality weakens the foundation of their economic transfomation and slows their pace of progress. It also makes these countries particularly vulnerable to sudden external shocks, as the pandemic-induced disruption of tourism and oil-dependent economies has illustrated. Given the importance of diversifying African economies, it is critical to recognize how various dimensions of diversification can have different implications for the menu of policy options. Closely associated with the process of structural transformation from lower to higher productivity sectors, economic diversification has three evident dimensions. The first relates to the expansion of economic sectors that contribute to employment and production or gross domestic product (GDP) diversification, and the second is associated with international trade or exports diversification. This paper, however, focuses on a third dimension that the economics literature pays scant attention to: fiscal diversification. This fiscal element involves expanding government revenue sources and public expenditure targets and can therefore play a central role in helping to catalyze broader economic transformation through the expansion of activity in specific industries and sectors. It is also critical that policymakers effectively measure the extent to which this objective is being achieved. Both the expansion of existing economic sectors and the creation of new ones may diversify an economy. But these processes are vastly different in practice and will garner distinct outcomes. Of the main tools used by economists to measure diversification, the Theil Index differentiates between the respective contributions of new economic sectors and existing ones to overall diversification. Another tool widely used by development practitioners—the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework—has significant potential for evaluating fiscal diversification but would need to capture more information on government revenue collection and spending and link them to policy objectives.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Diversification, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa

74. Measuring Trade Facilitation: Evidence from India

Author:
Vijay Singh Chauhan and Sruti Vijayakumar
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement has placed trade facilitation initiatives high on the agenda of international governments. This case study of India studies what trade facilitation may mean for a fast-paced economy. In this paper the authors use the trigger presented by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) to undertake a comprehensive review of various publicly available studies for India relating to performance measurement of the ecosystem that handles the cross-border movement of goods, focusing on the period since 2015. The paper summarizes the results of six key composite performance indicators—namely, (1) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) trade facilitation indicators (TFIs); (2) the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (EODB) Index; (3) the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI); (4) the World Economic Forum’s (WEF’s) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI); (5) the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGIs); and (6) the United Nations’ Global Survey on Trade Facilitation and Paperless Trade Implementation (GSTF-PTI). This paper, by examining these composite survey-based indicators and the intertemporal trends they exhibit for India, reveals that they have not been moving in agreement with each other and that some of the trends are evidently counterintuitive. A comparison between delineated subindicators of select composite indicators sometimes indicates surprising trends. Import cargo release times (a performance measurement prescribed by the TFA) for the largest containerized port in the country, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT), have been extracted from various studies that have relied on the data from the customs automation system; the container tracking system, which employs radio-frequency identification (RFID); and survey-based studies, including the Trading Across Borders (TAB) component of the World Bank’s EODB Index. These import cargo release time studies present a consistent trend of improvement since 2017. The paper, therefore, highlights the greater robustness of cargo release time trends, based particularly on technology-enabled data-driven studies as a more meaningful metric for measurement of performance of border management agencies and practices vis-à-vis survey or perception-based indicators representing “enablers” of trade facilitation.
Topic:
Economics, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

75. Tracking Reforms in Land Leasing and Change in Land Use: Insights From Gujarat and Karnataka

Author:
Ankit Bhatia
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As India’s economy has become more urban and industrialized, property and land rights have evolved, too. In the states of Gujarat and Karnataka, key reforms in land leasing and change in land use show what may—and what may not—be a path forward. India is primarily an agrarian society. More than 60 percent of its population is dependent on agriculture and allied services and dwells in rural areas. In the past couple of decades, India has attempted to shift away from its rural-agrarian base toward an urban-industrialized economy. In this journey, it encountered many challenges, but none remain as severe and persistent as the ones related to the assignment and balancing of land and property rights. Land governance in India remains historically complex, politically sensitive, and economically inefficient. In recent times, state governments have attempted proactive measures to reform the sector and bring greater efficiency to land markets. Despite the exigency of these reforms, issues surrounding equity, abuse of power, and nexus among powerbrokers remain central and require thorough analysis. To unpack the fuller effects of the recent reforms, this paper aims to examine key reforms in land leasing and change in land use sub-sectors initiated by Gujarat and Karnataka states. The paper takes a comparative assessment approach to decipher the nuances and complexities of land governances in the two states. Given that land has deep historical connections, this paper briefly delves into the historical evolution of land leasing and change in land use regulation in the two states. The historical analysis highlights the political economy context of each sector and is followed by an in-depth review of the recent reforms. The paper covers reforms effectuated through legislative, executive, and judiciary actions. This approach allows a comprehensive tracking of different mechanisms at play. The paper brings out some interesting findings. In both the states, the change in land use sub-sector was able to reform more frequently than the land leasing sub-sector. Despite both states relying upon all three branches of government to initiate reforms, executive action was used most frequently. On occasion, the judiciary played a critical role, especially when lower branches passed judgments that provided windfall relaxation to the protective regulation. Further, the paper finds that most reforms were not structural in nature; they were merely attempts to ease the restrictions on the transfer of agricultural land. In a complete departure from past objectives, recent reforms attempted to dilute the protective framework of land leasing and change in land use regulation. It is understandable that socioeconomic and political realities have shifted and the archaic regulation may not serve its intended purpose. However, the recent reforms have failed to show a concrete new direction. Instead, they largely focused on allowing a greater transfer of land resources to industries, pushing toward more capital-intensive agriculture, and promoting digitalization of land-related governance and public service delivery.
Topic:
Reform, Economy, Urban, and Land Reform
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

76. Evolving UAE Military and Foreign Security Cooperation: Path Toward Military Professionalism

Author:
Melissa Dalton and Hijab Shah
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The UAE has an opportunity to professionalize the military by building its strategic planning and force development capabilities and by committing to international principles of professional military conduct and greater transparency and accountability. After two decades of concerted investment and operational experience, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) armed forces, dubbed “Little Sparta,” are now one of the leading militaries in the region. With approximately 63,000 active uniformed personnel for a population of 9.9 million (only 1.2 million of which are Emirati), allegedly augmented by foreign auxiliary and mercenary forces, the UAE has gained global attention for its role in countering Iran and violent extremist networks and for interventions in Yemen and Libya. It is one of the United States’ closest military partners in the Middle East. American scholar Kenneth Pollack assesses that, taken as a whole, the UAE’s military is the most capable among the Arab states, while there may be variance across the force.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
United Arab Emirates, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

77. Lebanon’s Political Economy: From Predatory to Self-Devouring

Author:
Lydia Assouad
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To survive its ongoing financial crisis, Lebanon needs a new economic system that addresses massive income inequality. Paired with political and institutional reform, tax reform can help. Over the past three decades, Lebanon’s ruling class—which comprises intertwined political and business elites—has run the country into the ground. To survive its ongoing accumulation of challenges, including the financial crisis that erupted in October 2019, Lebanon requires a revamped state backed by a new economic model with social justice at its core. Tax reform is central to such an endeavor—and to ensuring that the state has the means both to deliver basic services and to tackle poverty and inequality.
Topic:
Poverty, Inequality, Economic structure, Business, Social Justice, Tax Systems, and Elites
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

78. How China and Pakistan Negotiate

Author:
Katharine Adeney and Filippo Boni
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since being officially launched in April 2015, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been one of the most watched set of projects under the aegis of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Having already injected around $25 billion into Pakistan, the CPEC not only has been dubbed the “flagship project” of the BRI, but it also holds a central role in Beijing’s global ambitions.1 While much has been said about the geopolitical implications of the CPEC, including for both India and the United States, less attention has been devoted to providing in-depth insights into the mechanics of how the BRI is unfolding on the ground in Pakistan. How do China and Pakistan negotiate the terms of CPEC deals? To what extent has Islamabad managed to exert agency in its dealings with Beijing? How does China adapt to the contexts it operates in? By now, the CPEC has been subject to much media, academic, and policy scrutiny, but these questions have not been answered. The power asymmetry between the two partners—coupled with the impression that the BRI represents a unidirectional Chinese endeavor, not just in Pakistan but also globally—has contributed to the erroneous representation that Beijing is merely imposing the CPEC on its all-weather partners in Islamabad. On the contrary, this study highlights China’s adaptive strategies in dealing with a host of Pakistani actors (including political parties, local communities, and the military) against the backdrop of Pakistan’s evolving political landscape and change in leadership following the country’s 2018 elections. In filling this gap, this paper foregrounds the importance of adopting a relational approach to studying how the BRI unfolds on the ground. This entails looking at how Pakistan and China have negotiated the CPEC’s energy, infrastructure, and industrial cooperation projects. The analysis is based on semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the two authors during three rounds of fieldwork in 2015, 2018, and 2020–2021 triangulated with a host of official reports, statements, and newspaper articles. Examining the domestic contours of the CPEC shows that Pakistani actors have wielded agency in important ways throughout the process, while Chinese actors at times have accommodated key Pakistani demands.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

79. The Hidden Face of Informal Cross-Border Trade in Tunisia After 2011

Author:
Hamza Meddeb
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Despite the heavy-handed approach to security that has been adopted at Tunisia’s land borders, informal cross-border trade continues to thrive. Land corridors have been shut down, but the continued dynamic activity in maritime corridors has compensated for this loss, allowing Turkish and Asian consumer goods adapted to the declining purchasing power of the Tunisian population to penetrate local markets. The dynamism of Tunisia’s maritime corridors owes much to the emergence of small entrepreneurs and underprivileged outsiders who operate informally through trade networks connecting Tunisian and Asian ports. Some well-established firms also have adopted informalization strategies to circumvent trade barriers and restrictions against bilateral trade between Turkey and Tunisia. The rise of these informal networks and approaches reflects a growing trend: the progressive shift of Tunisia’s trade away from Europe and the rise of Turkey and China as major trade partners.
Topic:
Borders, Trade, and Informal Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Turkey, North Africa, and Tunisia

80. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

81. The Local Roots of Chinese Engagement in Pakistan

Author:
Muhammad Tayyab Safdar
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China has deepened its economic engagement with Pakistan through elite-centered negotiations over the routes and projects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). But elites are not the whole story: China has made inroads beyond Pakistan’s political elites with a broader array of local stakeholders in the country’s education, media, and energy sectors. Pull factors in each of these areas are giving local Pakistani actors incentives to develop closer relationships with Chinese actors. In education, China’s status as a rising global power and the promise of future economic returns have driven ever more Pakistanis to learn Mandarin and opt to study abroad in China. In the media sector, the financial pressures facing Pakistan’s private media houses have contributed to increasing domestic buy-in for news sharing agreements with Chinese media organizations. In the power sector, the lack of alternative sources of external funding for local Pakistani conglomerates has resulted in the emergence of joint ventures on electricity generation projects with large Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). At the same time, Chinese government policies are serving as push factors to incentivize Chinese actors to expand their interactions in different segments of Pakistani society. For example, China has opened and sponsors Confucius Institutes and classrooms across Pakistan, while also offering scholarships to Pakistani students interested in studying in China. As Chinese firms have expanded their presence in Pakistan, they have worked with local universities to adapt to local customs and cultural and religious values. In media circles, stakeholders like China’s Xinhua News Agency have worked with local Pakistani media outlets to localize information dissemination and shape Pakistani public opinion on important international issues in ways that are in sync with Beijing’s worldview. And Chinese investment in Pakistan’s power sector is aligned with Chinese SOEs’ Go Global strategy and the expansion of these firms’ operations in overseas markets as part of the BRI. China’s engagement with Pakistani political, social, and economic institutions comes in response to local conditions. By adapting to these conditions and working through local institutions and actors, a host of Chinese actors are poised to continue deepening their interactions with different parts of Pakistani society.
Topic:
Education, Partnerships, Media, Economy, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

82. Yemeni Border Markets: From Economic Incubator to Military Frontline

Author:
Ahmed Nagi
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A string of border markets on Yemen’s northwestern border with Saudi Arabia turned the confluence of two countries’ peripheries into a center, gave rise to a distinct economic system, and bridged cross-border communities. The ongoing war in Yemen has either destroyed these markets or forced their closure. An end to the hostilities is unlikely to restore the status quo ante, owing to Saudi Arabia’s desire to establish a buffer zone. This would militarize the borderlands in perpetuity.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Borders, and Military
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

83. How Duterte Strong-Armed Chinese Dam-Builders But Weakened Philippine Institutions

Author:
Alvin Almendrala Camba
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese construction contracts and development finance have increased massively in recent years. According to many experts, these projects are largely transplants designed to offshore and export Chinese technology, labor, and policy designs to host countries. However, these views have little regard for important nuances of place, time, and politics, ignoring the degree to which host countries—such as local elites, members of civil society, and norms—shape project design, implementation, and results on the ground. Under the regime of President Rodrigo Duterte, political elites in the Philippines have pressed Chinese firms to adapt to some of their demands for political expediency on key infrastructure projects. This pattern is evident from the Kaliwa Dam and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project—both of which have made substantial progress during Duterte’s rule. In particular, Manila has bypassed local social and environmental regulations and has paved the way for Chinese dam builders to break ground on projects quickly so as to strengthen the Duterte government’s political standing. Around the world, Chinese firms have been highly attentive to the will of local political elites, limiting or sometimes completely avoiding relationships with opposition elites and ties to civil society members. Philippine politics is turbulent. Projects supported by the Duterte regime today might not have the same traction under his successor. So while these Chinese concessions have earned favor with Duterte and his allies, such tactics may prove unsustainable over the long term and could easily spur future resentment against China among local communities marginalized by this decisionmaking. In sum, it is Filipinos, not Chinese actors, who mostly have set the agenda on these major infrastructure projects, except on a few specific contractual terms.
Topic:
Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Rodrigo Duterte, and Construction
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, and Asia-Pacific

84. Reimagining Regional Governance in Latin America

Author:
Federico Merke, Oliver Stuenkel, and Andreas Feldmann
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Latin America’s existing predicament stems from a complex set of interlinked social, economic, and political crises, which have been magnified by the advent of the coronavirus pandemic and a rising tide of isolationism and “antiglobalism.” These crises range from domestic polarization and economic travails, to ideological divergence, personal rivalries among the region’s leaders and U.S.-Chinese geopolitical competition, and all are hampering regional governance and negatively impacting the prospects of cooperation. Latin American governments urgently need to work together to address the manifold challenges they face as events in recent decades have shown that unless better regional mechanisms can be found, domestic and transnational challenges—from organized crime and environmental degradation to migration and anemic economic growth—will become even more difficult to address, with potentially devastating long-term consequences. Yet, despite the high stakes, traditional regional governance mechanisms seem paralyzed, lacking even the capacity to discuss the current untenable situation, let alone address it. The conventional wisdom is that regional cooperation across Latin America is practically nonexistent because its heads of states have insurmountable ideological differences and because the region’s dominant diplomatic institutions have failed to fulfill their purpose. All is not lost in the realm of regional governance, however. While cooperation is either dysfunctional or nonexistent in many dimensions, in others it persists with surprising resilience and vigor, although it is often overlooked or underappreciated. Existing cooperation is for the most part technical and based on the committed work by government officials who, even during the bleakest moments of the pandemic, have shown adherence to principled norms and driven by a refreshing degree of pragmatism. Effective regional governance and cooperation in Latin America is necessary for a broader conversation on the region’s role in a rapidly changing global order, shaped by technological transformation and genuinely global problems such as climate change, migratory pressures, and increasing security threats. As great power competition continues to shape the global order, Latin America often is regarded as a peripheral player. Yet far from being somehow apart or exempt from today’s rising geopolitical currents, Latin America, for better or for worse, is very much affected by them. Regional governance is a fundamental instrument to help Latin America overcome its numerous daunting challenges. Even when ideological differences make cooperation difficult at the high politics level, it is crucial to find avenues of progress at other levels and in informal or less visible ways.
Topic:
Politics, Regional Cooperation, Governance, Economy, and Ideology
Political Geography:
Latin America

85. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

86. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

87. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:
Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

88. Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
At present, the relationship between Turkey and the United States is in a deep crisis. The meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the margin of the June 2021 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Brussels raised expectations that the U.S.-Turkey relationship can be put back on track. And yet recovery from the present crisis is uncertain, as the underlying factors that previously shaped the relationship have changed. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more multipolar system have altered the nature of U.S.-Turkey engagement. In Washington, competition between global powers is now the overriding frame for U.S. foreign policy. Ankara, however, views the world very differently. The rise of Asia and the ascendancy of China are seen more as opportunities than threats. Ankara interprets these trends, as well as Russia’s growing regional activism, as signs of the lasting emergence of a multipolar world order. This understanding now shapes the strategic calculus of Turkish policymakers. Turkish political elites firmly believe that a successful repositioning of their country in this multipolar environment will benefit the nation in the long run. This growing divergence in terms of how Ankara and Washington see the world creates a challenging environment for constructively addressing the range of prevailing bilateral disputes. This paper examines five main areas of disagreement between the two countries and explores how the two sides might overcome these differences. At the top of the list of current disagreements are Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air and missile defense system from Russia and ongoing U.S. support for Syria’s Kurdish military and political factions. Also important are the consequences of the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey; the U.S. position on the self-exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who many in the Turkish government believe was the architect of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016; the possible impact of the Halkbank court case on grounds of past violations of Iran sanctions; and the Biden administration’s decision to use the word “genocide” to refer to the killings and deportations of Ottoman Armenians during World War I. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Turkey-U.S. relationship is in need of redefinition. The Turkey-U.S. relationship has long been defined as a strategic alliance underwritten by NATO. Today, this definition has become obsolete and does not capture the new reality of this relationship. Turkey undoubtedly will remain a strong NATO ally, but its relationship with the United States will no longer be shaped by the power asymmetry of this military alliance. In other words, the reality of the United States being the main security provider will not be sufficient to override and contain the centrifugal trends that have shaped the relationship since the end of the Cold War and that have gained momentum in the past decade as a result of the growing divergences between Ankara and Washington. Yet differences with Turkey cannot be managed with the same clinical approach reserved for adversaries of the United States. Turkey is not an adversary, and therefore, a categorical separation of areas of agreement and cooperation from areas of disagreement is unrealistic. Unlike in the case of the United States and its true adversaries, the perpetuation of areas of dispute will always hinder the scope of U.S. collaboration with Turkey. The underlying alliance relationship has a built-in expectation of solidarity and mutual trust. Without these values, the bilateral relationship cannot function effectively. Neither will the “grand bargain” approach favored by Ankara be successful. Turkey wants a diplomatic process with the United States that would involve deliberations on all the disputed areas in a flexible manner. These deliberations could then lead to trade-offs that would create the conditions for a mutually beneficial reset. Ankara could also showcase its flexibility provided that Washington demonstrates its willingness for compromise. And yet there is little interest in Washington in undertaking such an enterprise with the Erdoğan government. A scenario of gradual rapprochement as an alternative to the grand bargain championed by Turkey or the principled engagement currently favored by Washington can be promoted. The gradual rapprochement would entail a series of confidence-building actions. Positive areas of engagement could include future negotiations with Iran, the reconstruction of Syria, the normalization of Libya, the stabilization of governance reform in Afghanistan given Turkey’s interest to operate the Kabul airport even after the U.S. and NATO withdrawals, the countering of Russian aggressiveness (especially toward Ukraine), and collaboration in Africa to dampen the influence of China. The Turkey-U.S. relationship may in that sense be in acute need of gradual but concrete steps that over time will set a new tone for a more positive and constructive strategic partnership and reestablish mutual trust.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Multipolarity, and Military
Political Geography:
Turkey, North America, United States of America, and Mediterranean

89. Fake Civil Society: The Rise of Pro-Government NGOs in Nigeria

Author:
Matthew T. Page
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Nigeria’s dynamic and expansive civil society is one of its greatest strengths and is crucial to maintaining what democratic space still exists in the country. Yet its independence, outspokenness, and unwavering commitment to democracy, transparency, and human rights have long antagonized the kleptocratic, power-hungry—but also image-conscious—ruling elites. To help protect themselves from domestic pressure and outside scrutiny, Nigeria’s top powerbrokers have cultivated a new generation of pro-government non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Like the fake grassroots groups bankrolled by past military juntas, these surrogate organizations masquerade as authentic civil society groups, singing the praises of top officials and attacking their critics. A symptom of the country’s more fundamental political ills, Nigerian elites’ growing use of civil society surrogates should set off alarm bells both domestically and internationally. It is both corrupting and corruptive, compounding the country’s downward democratic trajectory. Like many countries in Africa—and, for that matter, elsewhere in the world—Nigeria has recently experienced democratic backsliding that threatens its long-term stability and prosperity. The rise of pro-government NGOs is both a cause and a consequence of this backsliding and must be addressed as part of any effort to arrest and reverse it.
Topic:
Civil Society, Government, Democracy, and NGOs
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

90. A High-Tech Alliance: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Science and Technology Collaboration

Author:
James L. Schoff, Douglas E. Rake, and Joshua Levy
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In both Japan and the United States, there is a growing recognition that national security and alliance security involve more than just military concerns and extend to new technology areas and their economic effects. Looming over the two allies is a wide-ranging question of how to enable greater science and technology (S&T) research collaboration for commercial and defense purposes, involving such fields as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information science (QIS), cybersecurity, and space utilization. Competing domestic political and economic considerations in each country make this a particularly complex challenge for policymakers, who can be expected to treat the international sharing or sale of assorted technologies differently. Still, there is little doubt that it is in the mutual interest of Japan and the United States to harmonize their approaches and find acceptable ways to enable deeper and broader S&T collaboration—and to do so expeditiously.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Collaboration
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

91. Tangled Wires: Preparing India’s Power Sector for the Clean Energy Transition

Author:
Jonathan Kay
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Almost none of the world’s largest polluters have enacted policies compatible with the Paris Agreement’s target of limiting global warming to within 2 degrees Celsius, a threshold past which climate disruption is projected to become even more frequent, severe, and unpredictable. Fortunately, despite the absence of adequate government support, renewable energy has grown at an astonishing pace in recent years thanks to its plummeting cost. India, for example, has more than doubled its stock of wind and solar power in the last five years, driven less by sustainability concerns than by clean energy’s potential for cost-effectively meeting citizens’ pressing development needs. However, the low prices of wind and solar projects disguise the structural costs renewable energy poses for grids when deployed at larger scales. The intermittent, unpredictable nature of the electricity generated by such technologies—in contrast to the stable, on-demand flow of power from traditional fossil fuel generation—requires fundamental changes to how countries invest in and operate their grids. For India, one of the most important steps for coping with the variability of these new sources of energy will be better coordination of the flow of power between the country’s disparate state-run grids. By increasing the volume of energy traded between state utilities, periods of surplus power in one region can compensate for deficits in others, making for a more stable and reliable supply of renewable energy—one that can better displace expensive and polluting fossil fuels. Yet, while such reforms would be difficult under the best of circumstances, they will be particularly challenging given the unique dysfunctions of India’s power sector. With its politically compromised, perennially loss-making electricity distribution companies already struggling to keep the lights on, bolder change appears unlikely. Deeper reforms to India’s power sector are therefore prerequisites to adopting solutions like regional coordination that can ensure the continued growth of renewable energy. The good news is that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s national popularity and the dominance of his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at the state level offer the country’s leaders an opportunity to reform the power sector where others have failed. But to take advantage of this opening, Modi must go beyond his modus operandi by investing in incremental institutional solutions rather than one-and-done technical fixes and by serving as a coordinator for India’s states rather than legislating by central fiat. Deeper reforms enabling India to maintain its rapid expansion of renewable energy not only would provide clean, low-cost power to its people but also would help the world offset the failings of more laggard countries, perhaps even putting back within reach the Paris Agreement’s more aggressive target of keeping global warming to within 1.5 degrees Celsius. But the hardest part of this ambitious task lies ahead—in ending the vicious cycles that have plagued India’s power sector for decades.
Topic:
Climate Change, Pollution, Fossil Fuels, and Energy
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

92. What Railway Deals Taught Chinese and Brazilians in the Amazon

Author:
Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Maiara Folly, and Maurício Santoro
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Chinese investments in Brazil have expanded and diversified considerably, especially ones involving infrastructure. Chinese investors have also diversified geographically. Increasingly, major Brazilian infrastructure projects are being planned or implemented with Chinese backing in environmentally sensitive regions such as the Amazon rain forest and the Cerrado, a large savanna region in Central-West Brazil. Chinese actors have become directly involved in such projects against a backdrop of sharpening debates about sustainability and other consequences of large-scale infrastructure projects. This is especially true in protected areas such as land populated by Indigenous groups and conservation units. A notable example is the Ferrogrão project, a major railway line designed to cross sections of the Amazon and Cerrado to deliver goods to Brazilian ports. This paper examines the diverse ways that Brazilian and Chinese actors have learned from each other as they negotiate the terms of these deals. It also explores how these learning processes have been conditioned by intense domestic political debates over these projects in Brazil. Official documents and secondary sources reveal that, rather than a set Chinese way of doing business or a stock Brazilian response, such projects entail dynamic institutional learning. Such learning is shaped not only by the particulars of the Ferrogrão project but also by Chinese actors’ broader engagement with Brazilian infrastructure projects over the past ten years.
Topic:
Environment, Infrastructure, Investment, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, South America, and Amazon Basin

93. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

94. China’s Digital Yuan: An Alternative to the Dollar-Dominated Financial System

Author:
Rajesh Bansal and Somya Singh
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Central bank digital currencies (CBDC) are digital tokens issued by central banks. In a way, they are the digital version of cash; their value is guaranteed by a central bank. Unlike money held in credit cards and mobile wallets, CBDCs are not a mere representation of physical money stored elsewhere. Instead, they are a complete replacement for currency notes. While several countries are developing their digital currencies, China is well positioned to take the lead with the digital yuan. This paper highlights ways in which China can use its digital yuan to internationalize the renminbi (RMB) and gradually chip away at the hegemony of the dollar. The first part of the paper focuses on the dollar’s dominance in the global financial system and the privileges the United States accrues as a result of the dollar being the world reserve currency. The United States has a tight grip on the world’s payment rails, especially in the case of cross-border transactions. For example, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)—the largest cross-border payment clearinghouse in the world—has to comply with and implement unilateral U.S. sanctions. These sanctions seriously hinder trade and damage the economies of the countries affected by them, as was the case with Iran, which lost $150 billion worth of revenue as a result of U.S. sanctions.1 Once a country is cut off from SWIFT’s network, it becomes extremely difficult for it to trade with the rest of the world. Thus, via the dollar’s dominance and its geopolitical muscle, the United States is positioned to maintain a tight grip on the world’s financial system. In an increasingly multipolar world, this outdated, decades-old system of the dollar as the apex currency and the United States’ position of power that allows it to pursue its own geopolitical interests has become outdated. The U.S. dollar’s hegemony has been challenged by economies like those of the European Union (EU), Russia, and China. Of all the countries, China finds itself in a dominant position to gain from this transition. In order to challenge the dollar’s hegemony and internationalize its currency, China will have to move away not just from the dollar but also from the payment rails dominated by the dollar. The best way to simultaneously do both would be to introduce a new payment rail like CBDCs. This paper analyses the way the launch of China’s CBDCs could greatly enhance its currency internationalization prospects. Considering China’s growing economy and influence over the world, the paper argues that China’s CBDC launch could bring a period of momentous change in the global financial system. In order to challenge the dollar, China will have to build the payments infrastructure required to facilitate the use of its digital yuan. It will also have to incentivize other countries to adopt its digital currency. China’s ability to successfully promote its currency using CBDCs will depend heavily on the country’s ability to relax capital controls and maintain the world’s trust in its institutions. China’s geopolitics will play a key role here. In the last decade, some of China’s major geopolitical efforts have set the stage for its CBDC launch. As China continues to use its foreign policy and technological capabilities to grow its influence in the global financial system, the launch of the digital yuan could be a significant step forward in this direction. This paper examines the reasons for China’s past efforts at currency dominance and explores ways in which the country can use its CBDC to further internationalize its digital yuan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Finance, Economy, Central Bank, and Currency
Political Geography:
China and Asia

95. Understanding the Encryption Debate in India

Author:
Anirudh Burman and Prateek Jha
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Encryption has become a contentious instrument for protecting the security and confidentiality of online communication. Rapid digitalization in the past decade has led to the proliferation of domestic and foreign online communication services that use encryption and, consequently, pose challenges to national security bodies and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). To address these challenges, the Indian government introduced new regulations in February 2021. These regulations require large social media platforms to enable traceability, or the ability to provide information concerning the originator of online communications. Technology companies and privacy activists have opposed such a move on the grounds that traceability would require the breaking of the end-to-end encryption used by many online communication platforms like WhatsApp and therefore would compromise the security of online communications on such platforms. This traceability requirement, however, is only the latest development in a drawn-out, contentious debate over the use of encryption. The contestation between maintaining higher degrees of online security and issuing new rules to grant technological exceptions for security agencies and LEAs is not specific to India. One of the first serious discussions on the issue took place in the United States in the 1990s, when public opposition warded off an early government attempt to sidestep encryption protections with a court order. In the past decade, the use of encryption has only grown more pronounced. The revelations that the United States’ National Security Agency was collecting vast amounts of communications data led to the introduction and increased adoption of end-to-end encryption for online communications. End-to-end encryption is now used widely by online communication platforms like WhatsApp, Signal, and Threema. Its use presents law enforcement and national security agencies with new challenges. Even though these agencies today have greater and easier access to more information than ever before, the absolute confidentiality provided by encrypted online communication platforms makes it harder for these agencies to engage in real-time surveillance to investigate crimes and identity wrongdoers. While some policymakers from India and other countries argue that encryption must only be weakened to solve specific problems, most experts agree that, as of today, there is no technological solution that would weaken encryption for specific law enforcement and national security purposes, while managing to maintain preexisting levels of security and confidentiality for general use. The introduction of any mechanism for specific access would, it is claimed, introduce both known and unknown vulnerabilities into these communications platforms. Such a mechanism would have a systemic effect on all online communication dependent on encryption for ensuring security and confidentiality. In India, these developments create challenges in specific ways. For example, India reports the highest number of child pornography cases worldwide, and encrypted communications makes it difficult to identify culpable parties. Similarly, as India has digitized rapidly, there has been a surfeit of fake and offensive online news that has, in some cases, led to mob lynchings. In addition, terrorist networks have been found to be using encrypted communication channels while planning and carrying out terrorist attacks in India. Over the years, the Indian government’s approach to encryption has responded to these concerns in a variety of ways. Indian financial regulators mandated the use of encryption for banking and financial services as they realized the security of such transactions was best protected through encryption. At the same time, the Indian government prohibited telecom operators from implementing bulk or mass encryption in telecommunication services. Starting in 2015, the government introduced different regulatory proposals requiring that messaging platforms and other communication service providers provide plaintext copies of communications to Indian government agencies on request. These proposals, however, faced significant opposition and were withdrawn. Earlier in 2021, the Indian government’s new rules requiring traceability have been officially notified. The mechanisms through which they will be implemented are not yet clear. It is also unclear if these rules are the last demands the Indian government will make to weaken encryption, or whether further demands will arise in the future. To weigh the relative benefits and drawbacks of the Indian government’s proposal, analysts should consider relevant factors such as (but not limited to) whether such changes will offer law enforcement officials the access they desire, how the security of encrypted communications will be affected, and how citizens’ civil liberties will be impacted, among others.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, Digitalization, and Encryption
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

96. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Between August 2016 and the present, Turkey has launched four military operations in northern Syria. Each operation has served specific objectives and was designed to respond to rapidly changing scenarios on the ground. It is possible to identify the key priorities that have informed Turkey’s Syria policy over the years. Boiled down to its core, the Turkish government’s activism in Syria has been driven by domestic politics and has helped Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) preserve power. Domestically, Ankara has used the Syrian conflict as a pretext to suppress the rights of the Kurds living in Turkey and limit their parliamentary representation to secure a landmark constitutional reform in 2017. In the following years, successive military operations in Syria have helped Erdoğan connect with increasingly nationalistic constituencies and drum up support around key electoral dates. Finally, after the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish government’s Syria policy played a major role in rebuilding the credibility of the Turkish Armed Forces while redrawing the balance between civilian and military power. In foreign policy terms, Turkey’s military operations in Syria have resulted in increasingly tense relations with the United States. Washington’s support for the Syrian Kurds has alienated Ankara to an extent that U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate. The thorniest topic of the day in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relation—Ankara’s decision to deploy the Russian S-400 missile system—is also deeply related to the Syrian crisis. This decision was made in the context of a strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Ankara. Finally, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has also given Turkey new leverage over the EU when it comes to the management of refugee flows. Solving the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a priority of the Turkish government since the early stages of the Syrian civil war—and a main driver of Ankara’s policies toward both Syria and the EU. Overall, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has not only been a source of conflict—or rapprochement—with its traditional partners and neighbors across the region. It has also equipped Turkey with new tools for conducting a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. The strategies Turkey has employed in Syria have boosted the country’s image and international role. These operations have secured a seat for Turkey at the negotiating table with Russia and the United States. Ankara has used these tools, these lessons learned, and its new capabilities to inform its revisionist foreign policy posture. Going forward, and with an eye on the country’s 2023 presidential election, Turkey will continue to use these tools to reinforce its position in the international arena.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Syrian War, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

97. Chinese Mining and Indigenous Resistance in Ecuador

Author:
Cintia Quiliconi and Pablo Rodriguez Vasco
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources of copper in Latin America. But Chinese mining operations in Ecuador, which could have contributed to Ecuadorian development, soon gained a negative reputation after these activities prompted a great deal of local pushback, especially from affected Indigenous communities. As a result, the major Chinese mining consortium that now controls Ecuador’s two main copper mines has taken adaptive steps to stabilize its mining investment and increase the security of its supply networks, steps that often have not produced the intended results. Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels. This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon. In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities. To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land. In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016. This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced. This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
Topic:
Development, Government, Mining, Indigenous, and Resistance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South America, and Ecuador

98. Civil Society and the Global Pandemic: Building Back Different?

Author:
Carnegie Civic Research Network
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the coronavirus pandemic began, civic activists around the world have shifted into a higher gear. As Carnegie’s Civic Research Network analyzed last year, the gravity of the health emergency has pushed many civil society organizations (CSOs) to engage in new ways to help alleviate the pandemic’s impact.1 Sometimes they have done this in cooperation with governments, but other times they have acted on their own out of frustration at governments’ sluggish and inadequate responses to the emergency. At the same time, many activists have had to defend themselves as governments have used the pandemic as a pretext for further clamping down on independent civil society voices, under the cover of emergency laws passed to help manage the crisis. As civic activists grapple with the challenges of the pandemic, they are also turning their attention to the long term. It is clear that the pandemic will reshape economics, politics, and international relations, but it is not yet clear how. Many countries are undergoing major economic upheaval and are searching for new economic templates to overcome the damage they have experienced. On the political side, the pandemic has fueled authoritarian actions and damaged the credibility of many democratic governments. Post-pandemic political life will likely entail heightened struggles for democracy and a search for new democratic practices that more effectively meet citizens’ needs. With regard to geopolitics, the pandemic is contributing to still greater tensions between the world’s major powers. Because of these factors, the pandemic is likely to have a long-term impact on the nature of civil society worldwide. Civil society has already adapted to the coronavirus pandemic through the growth of self-help activism. Looking further ahead, civic actors are helping to spark a rethink of economic models. In the political sphere, at least some civic actors are engaging in efforts to revitalize democratic politics, including through new ideas on technology’s role in post-pandemic politics. Finally, civil society is being reshaped by geopolitical competition: some civil society actors are being pulled into the Chinese and Russian orbits, while others are more firmly resisting political encroachment by these powers. In an overarching sense, civic activists are juggling uneasily at present as they focus on the immediate challenges of the pandemic while also trying to fashion new economic, political, and geostrategic agendas for the period after the pandemic.2
Topic:
Civil Society, Politics, Economy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Activism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

99. India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal–China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India’s postindependence ties with Nepal were predicated on the intimate cultural and historical links between the two countries. As India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted, “though Nepal was an independent country, it was very closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a foreign country.” New Delhi also regarded China as an “interloper” in Nepal in 1950 who threatened India’s security and interests in the region, ignoring at least a century of Sino-Nepali history centering around Tibet. This paper argues that New Delhi’s close relationship with Nepal, bound in history and culture, and the misperception about China’s relations with Nepal before 1950 have contributed to a skewed understanding of Sino-Nepali relations. The Working Paper looks at the impact that New Delhi’s misperceptions of Sino-Nepali relations, termed the “fog of misunderstanding,” has had in the context of the triangular relations between China, India, and Nepal. The paper is divided into four sections arranged chronologically. The first section looks at the historical Sino-Nepali relationship from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. It establishes that this early relationship was centered on Tibet. While the Gorkha kings of Nepal sought to preserve their trade privileges in the region, the Chinese were concerned about the security of their southwestern frontier. Notably though, Beijing’s concern with security does not appear to have extended into any desire to conquer Nepal. This section also touches upon British India’s policy toward Nepal in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent approach that the government of independent India took in the first few years, without an adequate appreciation of Kathmandu’s history with China. As a consequence, India developed a suspicious attitude toward Beijing’s desire to re-establish ties with Kathmandu after the Chinese Civil War, and shaped its policy toward Nepal with this factor in mind. The second section delves into Indian and Chinese policies toward Nepal in the period from 1955 until the end of the monarchy in 2008. It showcases how, during this long period, the three kings of Nepal sought to leverage their ties with China in order to maintain some semblance of balance and how China, in turn, followed a limited but strategic approach that was centered on the kings. The fog of misunderstanding continued to shroud India’s attitude to Nepal-China relations during this period and, consequently, India’s Nepal policy lacked a working template to manage relations with a smaller neighbor sandwiched between India and China in a way that would preserve New Delhi’s influence in a positive way. In contrast to China’s political approach, New Delhi fluctuated between the monarchy and an assortment of democratic political parties, suggestive of a provincial approach in New Delhi’s dealing with Kathmandu. As a result, China’s approach ensured that its main objective in Nepal, namely the security of its southwestern frontier, was secured with a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy. The third section deals with the aftermath of the fall of the Nepali monarchy, 2008 to 2016. During this important period, New Delhi had a fresh opportunity to reset ties by providing the support to democratic forces in Nepal, that could have resulted in a transformation of the Indo-Nepali ties. However, India appeared to hew to its traditional policy. China, on the other hand, quickly built new ties with the post-monarchical dispensation. India’s perceived actions as a result of the adoption of the new constitution of Nepal plunged Indo-Nepali ties to a nadir. It seems to have pushed Kathmandu to strengthen its relationship with China. This section of the paper also outlines the changing nature of China’s policy and objectives in Nepal, especially in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and its possible implications on the future course of the triangular relationship, as well as for India-Nepal relations. It postulates that under President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Nepal has shifted from protecting its periphery to a broader goal of bringing Nepal under its strategic control. This section highlights the political and economic levers that Beijing is using to build a preeminent position in Nepal. The paper concludes with an assessment of options available to all three countries going forward, and India’s options in Nepal in the face of China’s new policy in the region. It suggests that a decisive reset in policy toward Nepal is required to restore healthy relations that are based on mutual respect and mutual sensitivity. New Delhi may need to re-orient its thinking toward Nepal in the context of triangular relations, including on the boundary issue and the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that have been long-standing irritants in the India-Nepal relationship. Nepal, for its part, should also reflect carefully on whether its leveraging of China might become counterproductive in the light of changing strategic balance in its vicinity, and the implications of giving up the policy of balance for one that tilts decisively toward Beijing. The paper concludes that there is sufficient scope and opportunity for course correction by India, and that through sustained efforts India may be able to preserve its influence and security in Nepal and counter China’s expanding footprint.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Nepal

100. China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:
Deep Pal
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China’s economic and political footprint has expanded so quickly that many countries, even those with relatively strong state and civil society institutions, have struggled to grapple with the implications. There has been growing attention to this issue in the United States and the advanced industrial democracies of Japan and Western Europe. But “vulnerable” countries—those where the gap is greatest between the scope and intensity of Chinese activism, on the one hand, and, on the other, local capacity to manage and mitigate political and economic risks—face special challenges. In these countries, the tools and tactics of China’s activism and influence activities remain poorly understood among local experts and elites. Both within and beyond these countries, meanwhile, policy too often transposes Western solutions and is not well adapted to local realities. This is especially notable in two strategic regions: Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe; and South Asia. China’s economic and political profile has expanded unusually quickly in these two regions, but many countries lack a deep bench of local experts who can match analysis of the domestic implications of Chinese activism to policy recommendations that reflect domestic political and economic ground truth. To address this gap, the Carnegie Endowment initiated a global project to better understand Chinese activities in eight “pivot” countries in these two strategic regions. The project’s first objective was to enhance local awareness of the scope and nature of Chinese activism in states with (1) weak state institutions, (2) fragile civil societies, or (3) countries where “elite capture” is a feature of the political landscape. Second, the project aimed to strengthen capacity by facilitating a sharing of experiences and best practices across national boundaries. Third, the project sought to develop policy prescriptions for the governments of these countries, as well as the United States and its strategic partners, to mitigate and respond to activities inimical to political independence or well-balanced economic growth and development. To establish a comprehensive picture of China’s activities and their impact, this project dug deeply into Chinese activism in four case countries in each region—eight countries in total. We began by holding workshops, so that influencers across countries could share experiences and compare notes. Invited participants included policymakers, experts, journalists, and others—all with deep local knowledge, steeped in their countries’ politics, economies, and civil societies. In Europe, the four countries were Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania, and in South Asia, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Cross-national discussions among these regional participants aimed to raise awareness, discuss the implications of China’s growing activism in their countries, and compare notes on the diverse ways in which these various countries had managed the rapid influx of Chinese capital, programs, people, technology, and other sources of influence.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Engagement, Regionalism, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, China, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldives