You searched for: Content Type Working Paper Remove constraint Content Type: Working Paper Publishing Institution Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Remove constraint Publishing Institution: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University Political Geography Europe Remove constraint Political Geography: Europe Publication Year within 25 Years Remove constraint Publication Year: within 25 Years Publication Year within 10 Years Remove constraint Publication Year: within 10 Years Topic International Cooperation Remove constraint Topic: International Cooperation
- Author: Martin L. Weitzman
- Publication Date: 01-2014
- Content Type: Working Paper
- Institution: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract: It is difficult to resolve the global warming free-rider externality problem by negotiating quantity targets. By contrast, negotiating a single binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained) counters self interest by incentivizing agents to internalize the externality. The model of this paper indicates an exact sense in which each agent's extra cost from a higher emissions price is counterbalanced by that agent's extra benefit from inducing all other agents to simultaneously lower their emissions. Some implications are discussed.
- Topic: Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, Industrial Policy, International Cooperation
- Political Geography: Europe