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1. Using Targeted Sanctions to Help Prevent Mass Atrocities: Results from Interviews with Experienced Practitioners

Author:
Tallan Donine, Kyra Fox, Daniel Solomon, Alex Vandermaas-Peeler, and Lawerence Woocher
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
The Simon-Skjodt Center’s “lessons learned” project aims to understand better how policy makers, across all levels of government, can take effective action to prevent mass atrocity crimes and protect civilian populations in situations where they face serious threats of group-targeted, systematic violence. We have sought to identify, distill, and organize insights on a range of policy tools—ranging from “naming and shaming” to sanctions to prosecutions—which are sometimes used to help prevent or respond to mass atrocities. To complement our review of the empirical research literature on the use of targeted sanctions, we conducted interviews with people who had substantial policy or operational experience working in the US government on targeted sanctions prior to 2021. The premise for the interviews is that experienced practitioners have important insights about when and how targeted sanctions can be most effective in helping prevent mass atrocities.3 While one can find many ideas about how to use targeted sanctions most effectively, none that we are aware of are: (1) focused specifically on the use of targeted sanctions for mass atrocity prevention and (2) based on the collective perspectives of a set of experienced practitioners. This report summarizes the results of the interviews with experienced targeted sanctions practitioners. Details on the methods employed and the interview respondents are presented in appendices.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Sanctions, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

3. Informing Australia’s next independent intelligence review: learning from the past

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Australian Government commissions a review of its intelligence community every five to seven years. With July 2023 marking six years since release of the last review’s report and, with funding already allocated in this year’s federal budget, the next one is likely to commence shortly. The best starting place for the forthcoming review is the work that precedes it, so reflection on 2017’s Independent Intelligence Review proves valuable. This report, Informing Australia’s next independent intelligence review, reflects on the experiences of the 2017 review and the implementation of its recommendations, and draws lessons to inform the terms of reference, approach and suggested focus of the next review. In doing so the report identifies three broad topics upon which the next review can most profitably ground its work: attracting, building and retaining a skilled workforce; adapting to rapid and profound technological change; and leveraging more, and closer, partnerships. It also highlights how the past six years have raised important and challenging questions in relation to each of those broad topics and identifies opportunities to further advance the future performance of the National Intelligence Community. In addition, specific recommendations are made to inform government’s planning and preparation for the new review.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and Statecraft
Political Geography:
Australia

4. An inflection point for Australian intelligence: revisiting the 2004 Flood Report

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The 2003 Iraq war, and more particularly intelligence failure in relation to Iraqi WMD, led to a broad-ranging inquiry into Australian intelligence conducted by Philip Flood AO. Flood’s July 2004 report has proven an inflection point between the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) of the immediate post–Cold War period and today’s National Intelligence Community (NIC). Flood laid out an ambitious vision for Australian intelligence and forcefully advocated for sovereign intelligence capability. The scope of his review extended beyond more than ‘recent intelligence lessons’ – that is, Iraq’s WMD, the 2002 Bali bombings and the unrest that led to 2003’s Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands - to the effectiveness of oversight and accountability within the AIC (including priority setting), ‘division of labour’ between AIC agencies and their communications with each other, maintenance of contestability in intelligence assessments, and adequacy of resourcing (especially for the Office of National Assessments - ONA). It was in addressing these matters that Flood laid the foundation for the future NIC, upon which would be constructed the reforms instituted by the L’Estrange-Merchant review of 2017. Importantly, Flood’s recommendations significantly enhanced ONA’s capabilities—not just analytical resources but also the resources (and tasking) needed to address the more effective coordination and evaluation of foreign intelligence across the AIC. This was a critical step towards the more structured and institutionalised (if sometimes bureaucratic) NIC of 2023 and an enhanced community leadership role for, ultimately, ONI. In addition, the Flood Report identified issues that remain pertinent and challenging today – including the vexed issue of the public presentation of intelligence for policy purposes, the central importance of the intelligence community’s people (including training, career management, recruitment and language proficiency), intelligence distribution (including avoiding overloading time-poor customers), the need to maximise collaborative opportunities between agencies, and how best to leverage intelligence relationships (including broadening relations beyond traditional allied partners).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Intelligence, National Security, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

5. Incels in Australia: the ideology, the threat, and a way forward

Author:
Jasmine Latimore and John Coyne
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report explores the phenomenon of ‘incels’—involuntary celibates—and the misogynistic ideology that underpins a subset of this global community of men that has become a thriving Internet subculture. It examines how online spaces, from popular social media sites to dedicated incel forums, are providing a platform for not just the expansion of misogynistic views but gender-based violent extremism. It raises key questions regarding Australian efforts to counter misogynistic ideologies within our nation. If there’s a continuum that has sexist, but lawful, views on gender at one end and gendered hate speech at the other, at what point does misogynistic ideology tip into acts of gendered violence? What’s needed to prevent misogynistic ideologies from becoming violent? And how do we, as a society, avoid the epidemic levels of violence against women in Australia? This report doesn’t intend to provide answers to all of those questions. It does, however, seek to make an important contribution to public discourse about the increasing trend in misogynistic ideology through examination of a particularly violent community of misogynists, and proposes a range of policy options for consideration to tackle the threat that misogynistic ideology poses to Australia. This report makes six recommendations designed to reduce and, where possible, prevent the risk of future occurrence of incel and similar violence in Australia. The recommendations include greater awareness raising and policy recognition that incel violence can be an ideological form of issue-motivated extremism which would provide certainty that incels could formally fall within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)—in addition to law-enforcement agencies—and would encourage tailored education programs focused on engaging young males at risk from indoctrination in this extreme subculture (along with their parents).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Law Enforcement, Counter-terrorism, Ideology, Threat Assessment, and Incels
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

6. Chinese foreign policy in 2023: Stepping back from the brink

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2023, decision-makers in Austria and Europe have to most importantly consider three partly interrelated and highly topical questions that are and should be preoccupying China researchers. Will China escalate its support for Russia during the war in Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan? How will China’s protest movement and exit from Zero-COVID impact foreign policy? Further trends in China research will address the need to employ digital methods due to a lack of access for fieldwork (COVID or political restrictions) (BCCN 2022), the importance of protests more broadly (labour issues or Hong Kong democracy) (Wei and Chan 2022; Cheng et al 2022), and the fragility of a centralized system around Xi Jinping with no succession plan as Xi enters his third term as president in March 2023 (Tsang and Cheung 2021). Following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has supported Moscow in the informational and diplomatic domain, but has remained self-interested in the economic domain, and has not shifted from previous policies in the military domain (Chestnut Greitens 2022, 751). China needs Russia as a partner in mounting a (normative) challenge to US power and the liberal international order (Johnston 2022, 1307), gaining influence in multilateral institutions (Wang and Sampson 2022, 374), and preserving the Communist Party regime (Pavel, Kirchberger and Sinjen 2022, 295). The Chinese leadership would like to see a Russian victory, and dreads a defeatinduced regime collapse in Moscow (Lo 2022). Beijing has condemned the West for provoking the war and for imposing sanctions. In the UN, China abstained or voted for Russia. At the same time, since the beginning of the war, bilateral trade has grown significantly. Yet, Chinese companies and banks have partly withdrawn or broken off ties with Russian counterparts to steer clear of secondary sanctions. Moreover, while joint military exercises continue, there is no clear evidence for arms or equipment deliveries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

7. Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives

Author:
John Hemmings, Ariel Mota Alves, Attawat Joseph Ma Assavanadda, Fikry A. Rahman, Katrina Guanio, and Siu Tzyy Wei
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated. The primary mechanism for engagement with the individual countries in Southeast Asia has been through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its attendant bodies, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM). Meanwhile, ASEAN member states have promoted the principle of “ASEAN centrality” as a means to prevent major power interference in the sub-region and to retain influence over security cooperation within Southeast Asia and beyond. As a result, the acknowledgement of ASEAN centrality has become a “boilerplate” for strategy and policy documents related to regional security. One example of this is the inclusion of the principle in the 2021 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the increasingly pressing nature of challenges confronting the broader region, their speed and intensity, are beginning to outpace the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN. The ASEAN Way – an emphasis on informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus as the basis of major decisions – has been integral to creating internal cohesion and harmony within ASEAN decision-making and is an enabler of socio-political integration. On the other hand, it has also stymied efforts to develop effective collective responses to conflicts and has made ASEAN hostage to great powers able to use their influence over members to break consensus. While defenders of ASEAN point to its successes and remain confident that it will adapt to regional issues over time, others are increasingly skeptical that ASEAN can retain its status as the gatekeeper of regional security agenda. It is in this context that Pacific Forum carried out this extended study with support from the Luce Foundation to investigate Southeast Asian perspectives on the “biggest threats or most pressing security issues, now and in the foreseeable future.” We asked a group of our Southeast Asian cohort of Young Leaders (ages 21 to 35), what problems were most pressing to them, and asked them how they thought their countries should address these issues, noting which third-parties would be most important for them to leverage in doing so. We believe this publication, which cuts across a broad range of security issues, is a fair representation of the eclecticism and diversity that characterize the region itself and hope that our readers will find them as useful as we have here at Pacific Forum. The collection starts with traditional security issues and then moves to more non-traditional security issues, though this does not reflect any internal emphasis or prioritization on the part of the editors. The first essay, by Siu Tzyy Wei, is entitled “Caught in the Middle: The Measured Voice of Brunei’s Foreign Policy Amidst the South China Sea Dispute.” Beginning with the South China Sea is appropriate for any collective study on the region, but Brunei’s position as a “silent claimant” presents a perspective not often heard. The author’s assertion that it is China and external powers – AUKUS and the Quad are mentioned – that are adding pressure to the South China Sea and adding a dangerous complexity, compelling Brunei’s “neutrality,” a striking claim given the threat to Bruneian sovereignty. The second essay moves to another flashpoint, the political crisis in Myanmar; a national issue that has reverberated around ASEAN as well as further abroad in Washington and Brussels. Appropriately titled “The Coming of the Raging Fire: The Revolution in Myanmar,” Thiha Wint Aung analyzes the lead-up to the political crisis and concludes by calling for the international community to explicitly support the people’s “armed resistance” against the military. The third essay presents a bold national case for a region-wide issue: dealing with rising Chinese influence. In “Malaysia’s China Policy Amid China’s Growing Security Concerns,” Fikry A. Rahman argues that Malaysian policy elites will have to prioritize strategic concerns over economic ties vis-a-vis China if it is to adequately defend Malaysian sovereignty. The next group of essays focuses on non-traditional security issues, beginning with climate change, one of the most pressing global issues. Southeast Asia is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as noted in the fourth essay, “When it Rains, it Pours: Disaster Displacement and the Future of Human Security in the Philippines Amid Changing Climate.” Katrina Guanio calls for policymakers to be aware of gradual or even sudden human migrations due to inclement weather, such as typhoons, and the impact these have on national health, economic, and security dynamics. Taking an unusual and unique perspective, the fifth essay, “Climate Maladaptation: Migration, Food Insecurity, and the Politics of Climate Change in Timor-Leste” by Ariel Mota Alves, makes the provocative argument that international organizations can sometimes promote detrimental Western development narratives that undermine local solutions to local climate change effects. The sixth essay, “Human Trafficking in Vietnam: A Top-Tier Non-Traditional Security Threat in the 21st Century” by Thu Nguyen Hoang Anh, measures the impact of the scourge of human trafficking in Vietnam and offers practical policy solutions to mitigating its impact on victims. Finally, the seventh essay, by Attawat Assavanadda, looks at “Thailand’s Brain Drain Challenge: Trends and Implications,” noting the push-pull drivers of the phenomenon and its impact on Thailand’s overall development. As one can see from this summary, the range of topics chosen by our talented Young Leader cohort from Southeast Asia is as diverse, inspiring, and multidimensional as the region itself. Ranging from security issues that are well covered by regional and international media to those that take an eclectic look at local variations of international issues, we are pleased to showcase these essays. As ever, the mission of Pacific Forum only begins with the creation of such young leader cohorts, and empowering them to present their analyses and recommendations should only be a prelude to robust regional conversations and discussions. We have been since our creation – a forum for those discussions – and hope that our readers will take that engaging approach to these essays and their authors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Migration, Brain Drain, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia

8. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

9. The EU in the South Caucasus: Navigating a geopolitical labyrinth in turmoil

Author:
Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The tectonic plates of geopolitics are shifting in such a profound way that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has not only increased tensions between the world’s major powers, but also severely impacted the regions in which they traditionally strive to project their power. This applies especially to areas in the wider Eurasian region that the Russian Federation unjustifiably considers as part of its sphere of influence, such as the South Caucasus. Russia’s failure to achieve a quick and decisive victory in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not only forced the Kremlin to limit its objectives on the battlefield, at least for the time being, to Ukraine’s east. It has also reduced the credibility of the Russian military that much of its power projection has depended upon – and has reduced its attractiveness as a security partner for countries that have traditionally regarded Russia as such. Russia has had to withdraw some of its troops and military equipment from the South Caucasus, its leadership is preoccupied with Ukraine, and it has not lived up to its security commitments to Armenia. This has contributed to a geopolitical vacuum and uncertainty in the South Caucasus that other actors are eager to exploit.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe and South Caucasus

10. Climate and Environmental Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Author:
Kira Vinke, Loyle Campbell, Dana Schirwon, Katongo Seyuba, Florian Krampe, Hafsa Maalim, and Guélor Isulu Mbungwal
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Climate change is compounding the Democratic Republic of Congo’s tangle of problems – a long-running civil war, weak governance, and deeply entrenched poverty and inequality. The country’s future is of global significance: its vast Congo-basin rainforest is a crucial carbon sink and a haven of biodiversity. DRC’s hydropower potential and its deposits of copper and cobalt could enable the energy transition, but a green resource looms over development prospects. Germany will need flexible and well-aligned national strategies to effectively support peace, human progress, and environmental protection in the DRC while putting the focus on the needs of marginalized populations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Poverty, Inequality, and Hydropower
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

11. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

12. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

13. Sustaining Congressional Engagement with Southeast Asia

Author:
Erik Ashida
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As a representative institution whose members can outlast presidential administrations, Congress plays a vital role in sustaining long-term US foreign policy commitments. The perception of long-term commitment is particularly important in Southeast Asia, where most states seek to maximize their strategic autonomy by balancing relations among great powers. Thus, expectations about the future behavior of great powers can significantly affect foreign policy choices. Congress speaks through the exercise of its formal powers but also in more subtle ways. Congressional actions on foreign relations operate along three channels. The first channel is support for policies initiated by the executive branch, e.g., passing appropriations, making requested statutory changes, or, at the very least, not obstructing what an administration seeks to do. The second channel is symbolic support for a relationship, such as meetings with foreign officials or public statements of support. Though these actions are generally nonbinding, they can be a more meaningful gauge of support than the first channel because legislators must seek them out and can define the terms of their engagement—something not always possible when voting on legislation. The third channel is policy advanced independently from the executive branch, such as standalone bills, conditions placed on funding, or rigorous oversight. Each of these tools is available to individual legislators, groups of legislators such as caucuses or committees, or the entire legislative branch acting collectively.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:
Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

14. What North Korea Has Been Learning From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A year ago, in February 2022, Russia invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. Russian aggression has upended the post-war security mechanisms in Europe and made the international multilateral system, including the UN Security Council, more fragile and ineffective than ever. Even though the war in Ukraine has implications for security in Northeast Asia, many Asian nations consider it a distant issue for Europeans to solve. However, this perspective mirrors what Europe’s Asian counterparts, especially the Koreans, have faced for decades. It serves as an apt analogy for explaining the dangers of North Korea to Europe. North Korea is also watching the war closely to discern what lessons or leverage can be extracted from the unfolding conflict. This short article reflects on two lessons and three opportunities that the War in Ukraine presents to Kim Jong Un and concludes with recommendations on what the Europeans could do in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

15. Two Peripheries: The Ukraine War's Effect on North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Anthony V. Rinna
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Spanning the Eurasian landmass, Russia’s actions in adjacent Ukraine invariably affect the geopolitical state of play on the similarly adjacent Korean Peninsula. Although ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia have been of largely secondary importance for both countries since their veritable rupture in the early- and mid-1990s, Moscow-Pyongyang relations became more mutually beneficial in 2022. Whereas most countries have outright condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or taken up an ambiguous position, the DPRK has been vocal in its support for Russia. From the DPRK perspective, the Kremlin’s post-2022 diplomatic and economic estrangement from much of the world has provided Pyongyang with an opening to leverage ties with Russia to push for an easing of its own diplomatic and economic isolation. Meanwhile, strengthening its DPRK ties allows Russia to undermine US influence on its Asian periphery. In supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea appears to be aiming toward obtaining economic benefits from closer ties with Russia, a country whose economy has managed to stay afloat despite heavy Western sanctions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided the impetus for Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow. However, the roots of the current upswing in Moscow-Pyongyang relations go back to the April 2019 summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Kim received an invitation to meet with Putin in May 2018 yet waited eleven months to meet with the Russian leader, even as Kim regularly met with the leaders of other major players on the Korean Peninsula. Kim may have decided after the February 2019 Hanoi summit yielded few results that strengthening ties with Russia, which was more reluctant than China to support UN sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017, was a more viable option for sanctions relief. Aside from the fact that Russia has demonstrated a clear unwillingness to impose new sanctions against the DPRK, North Korean citizens are reported to still be working in Russia in contravention of UN Resolution 2397. North Korean workers’ earnings are said to have suffered because of Russia’s reduced access to hard currency. Yet, the ruble’s continued resilience may mean that earning currency in Russia is still worthwhile for laborers dispatched at Pyongyang’s behest.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

16. United Kingdom Engagement with North Korea

Author:
Alastair Morgan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As one of the Allied Powers, The United Kingdom was involved in Post-World War II planning for the Korean peninsula, including the November 1943 Cairo Conference declaration that “… in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.” However, US President Roosevelt’s proposal at the February 1945 Yalta Conference did not establish a formal role for the UK in the trusteeship of Korea. Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula at the 38th parallel in August 1945, and direct British involvement in the peninsula was limited prior to the Korean War. The United Kingdom’s Korean War contribution to the United Nations Command was second only to the United States, with significant deployments of maritime and air assets in addition to the provision of ground troops. Almost 60,000 British troops saw action, with nearly 5,000 killed, wounded, missing in action, or taken prisoner. Following the armistice, the United Kingdom has continued to send representation to the United Nations Command. The armistice agreement includes an obligation on so-called “Sending States” to respond to renewed hostility. Although there is no automatic UK commitment to send forces, the armistice agreement remains a consideration in engagement with North Korea.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Education, Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

17. North Korea-Germany Relations: An Ambassador's Perspective of Diplomacy with Pyongyang

Author:
Armin Schäfer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in 2001 at the request of the South Korean government, which hoped that Germany and the European Union (EU) would play a more active role in supporting the “Sunshine Policy.” Since then, Germany, together with the other EU states, has sought to moderate North Korea through a “Policy of Critical Engagement” to convince it of the benefits of international cooperation, respect for the rule of law, and improving the political and economic situation of its people. In doing so, Germany could build on the long relationship between North Korea and the former East Germany. “Critical engagement” means being willing to talk and get involved, but without holding back on criticism—and, if need be, imposing sanctions. It also implies that comprehensive engagement is not (yet) possible because of the circumstances. There is ample cause for a constrained approach from North Korea’s aggressive foreign policy and systematic human rights violations to the absence of suitable economic and fiscal conditions for business and development cooperation. Moreover, the lack of will on the part of considerable segments of the North Korean regime to engage with other countries also hampers broader engagement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Education, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Germany

18. North Korea-Guyana Relations in the Burnham Era

Author:
Moe Taylor
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
During the reign of Forbes Burnham (1923-85), the South American republic of Guyana (formerly British Guiana) became one of North Korea’s greatest foreign policy success stories. Pyongyang not only acquired a new trading partner in the Americas but also gained a vocal advocate for its position on Korean unification on the international stage. These close ties grew in large part from Burnham’s admiration for North Korea, where he saw a highly disciplined citizenry united around the Great Leader, willing to work hard and sacrifice for the collective good. Guyana perhaps did more than any other single actor to help North Korea become viewed as an economic model for developing countries. First elected Premier of the colony of British Guiana in 1964, Burnham became Prime Minister upon independence in 1966 and ruled until his death in 1985. A lawyer and trade unionist from the capital’s Afro-Guyanese middle class, his rise to power was backed by the United States, which viewed him as the only realistic alternative to the communists. While Burnham veered to the Left once in power and frequently irritated Washington, he was more or less tolerated because his pro-Soviet opposition would almost certainly fill his absence.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, South America, and Guyana

19. Normalizing U.S.–Pakistan Relations

Author:
Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is often portrayed negatively among the lawmakers, media, and general public of both countries, with a focus on mutual resentment and dysfunction. The early relationship was burdened by mismatched expectations regarding support in conflicts with India. Different priorities from the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s further strained the relationship. The United States also sanctioned Pakistan and India for developing nuclear weapons, which had a disparate impact on Pakistan, causing ongoing tension. Many in Washington’s policy and journalistic communities hold negative views of Pakistan, viewing it as an enabler of terrorism that seeks geopolitical rents but rarely delivers. Pakistanis often resent what they view as Washington’s use of the country as a “frontline state” in both the Cold War and the War on Terror, claiming tens of thousands of lives, only to discard it later. These grievances are largely dismissed in Washington as self–inflicted. Despite the negative public debate, serving officials in both governments generally hold a more nuanced view, recognizing the broad overlapping interests shared by the United States and Pakistan in areas like climate change, trade, and counterterrorism. There is already an exhaustive literature on terrorism in Pakistan, nuclear security, and potential conflicts along the Line of Control with India. This brief will instead focus on revitalizing U.S.–Pakistan relations through innovative diplomacy in areas that have received less attention, such as trade, regional integration, people–to–people connections, and climate change. Its principal recommendation is that Washington should resist viewing Pakistan through the narrow lens of the “War on Terror” or great power competition. Instead it should pursue its interests through more normalized relations, while recognizing U.S. limitations in influencing events in Pakistan or the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. Less is More: A New Strategy for US Security Assistance to Africa

Author:
Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The US strategy toward Africa today is neither effective nor sustainable. It’s time to flip the script. US policy in Africa has for too long prioritized short-term security to the detriment of long-term stability by prioritizing the provision of military and security assistance. This is done in hopes that partner countries will use this capacity to suppress radical groups at home and reduce the likelihood that they will spread disorder in the region or create threats to US interests at home and abroad. Yet, this strategy has neither produced security in Africa nor reduced threats to the United States and its interests. Washington should rein in its use of security assistance with partners that fail to demonstrate commitment to the reforms necessary to build long-term stability. Partnerships and military assistance with illiberal, undemocratic countries have delivered little, if any, sustainable security improvements, and in many cases have prompted further instability and violence by building the capacity of abusive security forces. They have also provided harmful associations between the US government and the abuses committed by those we arm and assist. Since terrorism in Africa poses a low threat to US national security interests, there is no justification for focusing on short-term security issues at the cost of good governance, rule of law, and other factors that contribute to long-term stability. The costs of doing so are increasingly being recognized, with Congress today more likely to apply existing legal provisions to end security cooperation with abusive regimes. But these interventions typically come too late and are too inconsistent to influence behavior of illiberal regimes. A more systemic approach is needed to break the pattern of poor outcomes. The rise of great-power competition exacerbates the risk that the US national security establishment will double down on its security cooperation strategy in the region out of concern that doing otherwise would leave a vacuum that America’s competitors might fill. In reality, however, the argument for being more selective in distributing security assistance is even stronger with the return of great-power competition, as values and reputation become increasingly important in attracting support for the United States over other great powers. Security and military assistance will continue to play a role in the region. However, the United States would be better off being more deliberate and cautious, only pursuing it after completing a holistic assessment of the potential impact of such assistance on governance, human rights, and broader stability. Security assistance can and must be more closely scrutinized with enhanced US government oversight tools to ensure it does not undermine governance and stability, and Washington should be more willing to choose different tools when shaping relationships with weak partners, to condition assistance to ensure it does not facilitate bad outcomes, and to cut it off when partner countries use it to abuse civilians.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

21. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

22. Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Ankara’s Ambitions, Regional Responses, and Implications for the United States

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
For the past century, Turkey’s foreign policy has been driven by the need to preserve the achievements of the Lausanne Treaty in the face of often serious threats from major powers. As a result, Turkey was a predominantly status quo country, and its relations with neighboring states were largely shaped by its place in broader geopolitical struggles. With the end of the Cold War, however, and the subsequent growth of Turkey’s economic, military and diplomatic strength, this has changed. Turkish foreign policy has begun to focus on reshaping the regional order in accordance with its growing desire for influence. Going forward, the nature of Ankara’s efforts, and the response they provoke from Turkey’s neighbors, will be an increasingly crucial factor in determining Turkey’s relations with the United States and Europe. Turkey’s new dynamics will remain a source of tension under any future Turkish government, but they need not, if managed well by all sides, lead to a lasting rift between Turkey and the West. The more deeply embroiled Turkey becomes in disputes with key US allies from Western Europe to the Persian Gulf, the more difficult it will be for Washington and Ankara to have a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship. And the more Turkey views itself as a revisionist power, the more it will come into conflict with America’s allies. As a result, it is more important than ever for US policymakers to understand the historic trajectory of Turkey’s place in its region. Turkey emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a status quo power, an orientation that it maintained for the better part of the last hundred years. Though the new country had been shorn of its former territories in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East, it had also forcefully defeated foreign efforts to occupy the territory of Anatolia itself. For modern Turkey’s founders, the success in avoiding complete colonization far outweighed the failure to preserve the full geographic scope of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, they forged a pragmatic foreign policy tradition that prioritized preserving their achievement: a Turkish state sovereign and secure within its current borders. This goal remained constant over a long and turbulent 20th century, even as its implications changed, and allowed for Ankara to be flexible about which countries to work with to maximize its self-declared interests. In the inter-war period, when threats came largely from powerful European empires like France, Italy, and Britain, the defense of Turkish sovereignty called for a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, however, Turkey’s geopolitical position changed dramatically. Suddenly, the Soviet Union emerged as the most direct and dangerous threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. In this new strategic context, seeking the support of the United States and NATO became the only feasible way to preserve the imperiled status quo, equip the country’s armed forces, and ultimately defend its borders. The result was a strong and mutually beneficial alliance with the United States and much of Europe. The success of this alliance, however, sometimes obscured the complex, constantly evolving and often paradoxical relationship between Turkey’s status quo orientation and its historically-grounded relationships with regional states. The circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created a bitter legacy, giving almost all of Turkey’s neighbors both emotional and practical reasons to feel hostility towards it. With other countries that shared a commitment to the status quo, however, Ankara had equally good reason to overcome this animosity. For countries that found themselves on the wrong side of Turkey’s geopolitical alignment, by contrast, these resentments and unresolved problems were consistently exacerbated. The history of Turkey’s regional relationships can be read through the ever-shifting dynamics of power politics and unsettled history. In the case of Greece, for example, Ankara and Athens began an ambitious rapprochement in the 1930s when they both felt their security was threatened by Italian irredentism in the Eastern Mediterranean. When this shared threat was supplanted by the Soviet Union, the two countries were brought into an even closer alignment under the NATO umbrella. Soon though, the growing rebellion against British rule on Cyprus rendered the status quo unsustainable, leaving Athens and Ankara with radically divergent views on what should come next. Only in this context were a number of longstanding questions re-opened, such as maritime borders and the status of historic minorities in both countries. Crucially, even as tensions over Cyprus worsened, both sides still had Washington to help remind them of their shared security interests. Throughout the Cold War, the United States was in a position to manage Turkish-Greek tensions in order to pre-empt the risk of an intra-NATO war between two allies that would benefit the Soviets. In other words, by acting as a forceful advocate for the status quo, Washington helped ensure that both Greece and Turkey maintained their shared commitment to it. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party, Turkey embraced not just a new foreign policy but a new foreign policy orientation. Ankara is no longer interested in maintaining the status quo—it now wants to transform it. Just as Turkey’s status quo orientation led to different policies as circumstances change, Turkey’s new anti-status quo orientation has also led Erdoğan’s government to pursue different strategies. But to make sense of these shifts, and the reaction they have provoked in the region, it is crucial to appreciate that, no less than in the previous century, Turkey’s neighbors have responded in light of their history but also, more importantly, their own orientation toward the regional status quo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, AKP, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

23. Fighting to Win: Ukraine, Russia, and the War for Survival

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Both the Kremlin and Ukrainians see the war as an existential conflict, even as a “holy war,” and are prepared to fight for years to achieve victory. Russian war aims vis-à-vis Ukraine have morphed into creating a “frozen conflict” to maintain its land bridge with Crimea. However, its primary war aim remains weakening NATO to regain its sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states. To achieve this, Russia will conduct a prolonged strategic defense in Ukraine to demonstrate that Ukraine will never regain its territorial integrity and to show that American support will eventually end as it has for other client states. Ukraine’s primary war aim of restoring its territorial integrity is shared across its society. To achieve this, Ukraine’s strategy is to break the will of the Russian army and then reclaim Crimea, even if that takes several years. Ukrainians do not fear a long war but an inconclusive one that reignites in five or ten years. They want to settle this conflict with Russia once and for all, and see NATO membership as the only way to prevent it from happening again. For US policymakers, the dangers arising from the war overshadow opportunities. One opportunity is a Russian defeat that can serve both as a brake against further Kremlin aggression and as a catalyst for Russia to possibly change her imperial identity. Another opportunity is the chance to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces and geographic position to give it an overwhelming advantage against any possible future Russian aggression. For that to happen, Ukraine must enter the alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

24. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

25. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

26. Fighting into the Bastions: Getting Noisier to Sustain the US Undersea Advantage

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Airpower enthusiasts concluded after World War I that “the bomber will always get through.”1 Fast, high-flying aircraft seemed to hold a decisive edge over air defenses and offered commanders the assurance they could attack targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. But airpower advocates’ spirits were quickly dampened during World War II by the advent of interceptor fighters, radar-guided artillery, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), which together demonstrated that bombers could be stopped—often with devastating results. Air forces adapted, adding escort fighters, radar jammers and decoys, and higher-altitude bombers to sustain their ability to strike behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, this move-countermove competition continued. New surface- and air-launched missiles targeted bombers, and countries developed specialized aircraft and weapons to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses or use stealth to avoid detection and targeting altogether. Today, the US submarine force faces a similar challenge. The US fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has long been considered an asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which lacked robust and effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Relying on this advantage, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on SSNs to compensate for the impact of improved air defenses on the ability of bombers and strike fighters to execute attacks.2 However, the unfailing ability of US SSNs to reach their targets is eroding as emerging technologies and weapons proliferation combine in new approaches to ASW that could neutralize America’s undersea advantage. During the last decade, the PRC and Russian Federation began fortifying their undersea defenses in the South and East China Seas and Arctic Ocean, respectively. Leveraging geographic constraints, US adversaries have instrumented these bastions with networks of fixed and mobile acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, complemented by aircraft and ships capable of pouncing on contacts or deploying dense mine barriers.3 Improved adversary defenses could degrade or defeat US undersea operations, preventing US submarines from conducting critical missions such as sinking a Chinese invasion fleet or tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To sustain its offensive undersea advantage, the US Navy will need to take some lessons from air warfare and begin supporting submarines with systems designed to suppress or destroy enemy undersea defenses. This imperative will fundamentally shift the paradigm for US submarine operations from “alone and unafraid” to “it’s all about team.” Moreover, the emergence of new generations of capable long-range active sonars will demand that the US undersea force increasingly rely on jamming and deception to counter enemy sensors, much as their counterparts already do above the water. The US submarine force will need to learn how to use noise, rather than avoid it. The Navy should pursue four lines of effort, outlined below, to sustain its offensive undersea advantage. Except for features to be incorporated into the next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, the SSN(X), the concepts and capabilities proposed in this report leverage mature or maturing technologies and can be fielded within five years. Implementing these recommendations will require the US Navy to refine its use cases for offensive undersea warfare to use available uncrewed vehicle technologies, rather than continue pursuing purpose-built systems that may take a decade or more to be fielded.4
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

27. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

28. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

29. From Fueling Victory to Running on Empty: Lessons from American Energy Policy in War and Peace

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to draw important lessons from how the United States has handled its national energy policy in the past in order to guide policymakers and industry leaders in the future. In the end, this is a study in contrasts. In the case of World War II, the federal government successfully used America’s energy independence and abundance to help Great Britain survive the Nazi onslaught and then to win a two-front world war, the greatest victory in history. In the case of the 1970s, the United States became dependent on others, specifically the Middle East, for its energy prosperity. As a result, America lost control over not only its ability to conduct foreign policy but also its economy. Construction of the Big Inch oil pipelines, the most extensive government energy project ever created, epitomized America’s successful national energy strategy in World War II. This project enabled the United States to literally fuel victory over the Axis. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the dramatic rise in the price of oil imposed by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) severely damaged the US economy, set back global growth for nearly a generation, and symbolized the failure of America’s energy strategy in that decade. The end of this study will summarize the key lessons from these two contrasting approaches to a national energy strategy. However, two stand out: Energy independence—and having access to cheap, abundant energy—is an essential prerequisite for American national and economic security. A national energy strategy that relies on the expertise of leading energy executives and engineers in the private sector will tend to be successful; one that ignores their advice and assistance will tend to fail. Whether America will enjoy energy security as it faces the challenges of the twenty-first century will depend on many factors. But drawing the right lessons from these two contrasting historical eras can prepare the way for a new era of energy abundance and national power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, History, and Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

30. Turkey after the elections, what direction it will take

Author:
Vít Marek
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On Wednesday, June 7, a debate took place as part of the Café Evropa cycle, on the topic: "Turkey after the elections, which direction will it go?". The invitation to the debate was accepted by Lucia Najšlová, political scientist and author of the book Turkey and the EU: The Politics of Belonging, as well as by Deník N journalist Dominika Píhová and Břetislav Tureček, head of the Center for Middle East Studies at the Metropolitan University in Prague. The debate was moderated by Žiga Faktor, the head of the Brussels office of the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

31. Towards an Intersectional Feminist Development Policy for Germany

Author:
Aïssa Boodhoo and Damjan Denkovski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
Abstract:
In the development of Germany’s Feminist Development Policy Strategy, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) conducted a consultative process which included online consultations, a high-level conference, and civil society dialogues. While the broadest consultative process by the German government to date, the BMZ process had limitations in terms of Global South participation and language accessibility. To complement the official BMZ-led process, the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP) initiated a comprehensive co-creation process involving diverse feminist civil society organisations from the Global South, Germany, and other Global North countries. Guided by position papers from various perspectives, desk research, and interviews, the CFFP feminist convenings process involved over 100 feminists from diverse backgrounds, spanned over 25 countries, provided compensation to small and Global South organisations, and incorporated intersectional perspectives. The process consisted of in-person and online convenings held in multiple languages, ensuring broad accessibility. This report is a summary of the rich discussions and recommendations of feminists. It aims to influence policymakers and initiate action in shaping Germany's Feminist Development Policy. This report opens by discussing five action areas in chapter 1, which serve as comprehensive guidelines for immediate transformative action across policy areas. The second chapter discusses feminist reflections in six thematic areas: economic justice, climate justice, food sovereignty and agriculture, sexual and reproductive health and rights, protecting minority rights, and education.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Climate Change, Development, Economics, Education, Minorities, Partnerships, Feminism, Reproductive Rights, Digitalization, Funding, and Food Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Germany and Global Focus

32. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

33. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

34. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America

35. Next Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2023 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Taiwan faces growing threats to its security. The circumstances and factors that have deterred for decades an attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Taiwan and enabled its people to remain secure and prosperous are changing. The conventional military balance in the western Pacific has tipped in China’s favor, although its military, the People’s Liberation Army, is not yet ready to seize and control Taiwan. Apart from the military threats of invasion, blockade, and seizure of one of its small outlying islands, Taiwan is the target of Chinese economic and diplomatic pressure, disinformation, united front tactics, and other forms of psychological warfare. Most of the global focus on Taiwan centers on the risk of war, leaving insufficient attention to these gray-zone threats that are designed to sow doubts about US willingness to defend Taiwan if attacked and to induce a sense of deep psychological despair about its future unless it is integrated into the PRC. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to convince the people of Taiwan to lose faith in their democracy and to surrender sovereignty. China is more likely to succeed in that endeavor if Taiwan becomes isolated from the rest of the world. Only 13 sovereign states now maintain full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, the official name that Taiwan uses to distinguish itself from its giant neighbor. Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, Beijing has poached nine of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked Taipei from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization and its decision-making body, the World Health Assembly. On the economic front, Taiwan remains an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but it has been excluded from the ASEAN-inspired Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Beijing is lobbying members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to oppose Taipei’s application for membership. Easing Taiwan’s isolation and providing reassurance that the world cares deeply about the fate and well-being of its 23.5 million people are crucial to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

36. Enemies Foreign and Domestic: Confronting Kleptocrats at Home and Abroad

Author:
Kelly M. McFarland
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
As Putin and his kleptocratic regime of oligarchs wage a devastating war in Ukraine, the costs of corruption have never been so starkly visible. Beyond Russia, recent examples of corruption in China, Afghanistan, the Northern Triangle, the Solomon Islands, and elsewhere, prove that rampant corruption poses a significant threat to aspirations for a greener, healthier, more peaceful, and more democratic world. Countries such as Russia and China have elevated their brand of corruption into a distinct and powerful aspect of their foreign policy. They employ this strategic corruption abroad to stunt economic growth; prop-up fellow authoritarian regimes; exacerbate social inequality; erase political trust; accelerate pandemics and degrade healthcare systems; exploit the environment; and propel state oppression. As U.S. policymakers seek to counter this strategic corruption, they must first recognize the extent to which domestic laws and actors within the United States enable this corruption to fester. In the fall of 2021 and spring of 2022, ISD convened a series of New Global Commons working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group crafted workable definitions of corruption, evaluated the unique political and related threats posed by corruption and kleptocracy, assessed Russia and China’s use of strategic corruption, and developed principles and recommendations for government and non-government entities to build a global, sustained, anti-corruption response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Diplomacy, Authoritarianism, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

37. The Berlin Pulse 2023/24 (full issue)

Author:
Julia Ganter, Steffen Müller, Sarah Pagung, Norbert Röttgen, and Lila Roldán Vázquez
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
What do Germans und US citizens think about the most pressing foreign policy issues? Here are the highlights of this year’s public opinion survey, addressing Germany’s international role, biggest challenges and most important partners. A majority (57 per cent) of Germans believe that Germany’s international influence has declined over the past two years, despite Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s proclaimed Zeitenwende. As a result, only 38 per cent of respondents would like to see Germany become more engaged in international crises. This is the lowest figure since the start of the survey in 2016. 76 per cent believe that this involvement should preferably be of a diplomatic nature, compared to 65 per cent last year. 71 per cent of respondents are against Germany taking a leading military role in Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

38. French Engagement in the Western Balkans: Boosting Strategic, Political, Economic, and Societal Cooperation

Author:
Florent Marciacq and Romain Le Quiniou
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
After years of lower interest, France has signaled its ambition to re-engage in the Western Balkans. It is not starting from scratch. Historical affinities with the countries of the region abound, in culture, sciences, politics, and economy. But shifting priorities in the past decades have eroded French presence in the region. To regain a foothold in this important part of Europe, France has taken a series of initiatives aimed at boosting its engagement. In 2016, it hosted the Berlin Process summit; in 2017, it launched with Germany an initiative to coordinate the drive against firearms trafficking in the Western Balkans; in 2018, it expanded the intervention mandate of the French Development Agency (AFD) to all Western Balkans countries and adopted a national Strategy for the Western Balkans; in 2020, after a two-year stalemate, it withdrew its reservations against the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, while sketching the contours of the revised enlargement methodology. Drawing from a series of consultations in the region and structured cooperation with partner think-tanks, this policy paper is conceived as an independent, expert contribution to French efforts at re-engaging with the Western Balkans. It explores perceptions of French re-engagement in the region and reflects the potential of the 2019 Strategy for the Western Balkans in light of the forthcoming French Presidency of the European Council and in the context of the grands débats on the future of Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Balkans

39. India–East Africa: A Not So Healthy Relationship?

Author:
Isabelle Saint-Mezard and Françoise Nicolas
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Due to historical as well as geographical reasons, India and East Africa have long been close partners. In the recent period however, and even more so since the early 2000s, these ties have tightened as a result of combined efforts by the government of India and its business community. The presence of communities of Indian origin in several East African countries has also acted as a catalyst. East Africa is perceived as a valuable partner both by Indian authorities and by Indian private companies. Although the two types of Indian players may not explicitly coordinate their actions, their interests dovetail nicely in this particular region. The health sector sticks out as one major sector on which Indian actors focus in East Africa. It provides a striking example of the multilayered complementarity between India and East Africa, on the one hand, and between public and private Indian players’ interests on the other. However, India’s activism in the health sector is not necessarily perceived positively by the East African host countries. Despite some technology transfers and efforts by the Indian actors, be they public or private, to promote capacity-building, East African countries find themselves in a situation of dependence as a result of Indian companies exporting and producing drugs, building hospitals, improving hospital management and Information Technology (IT) infrastructure, or digitalizing healthcare. However, the major point of tension pertains to the promotion of medical tourism. Although offshore healthcare comes with many benefits, it is unlikely to be sustainable for the East African economies in the long run. Moreover, the money spent on medical tourism could arguably be used more usefully to develop local medical facilities and competence. The recent developments in the context of the pandemic have made the associated risk very clear. The challenge in the coming years will be for the two parties to find a way to better balance their relationship and set it on firmer ground – in other words, to make it healthier.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Health, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, and India

40. The Russian-Iran Partnership in a Multipolar World

Author:
Clément Therme
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The strengthening of the partnership between Russia and Iran depends on overlapping security interests; bilaterally, regionally and on the world stage. Tehran has pursued a regional policy program that is largely in line with Russia’s interests, whether these relate to Syria (from 2011), the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Afghanistan (since 1991). This security dimension was already one of the foundations of the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War-period. It has now appeared in regional dealings between Tehran and Moscow. In addition, the decline of US international predominance, which has been apparent since the 2000s, has allowed Russia and Iran to develop a shared ideological discourse in opposition to “Western values”. Beyond this shared ideological basis, Tehran has developed a true “Realpolitik” whereby it relies on Russian foreign policy to relieve US pressure on Iran that is aimed at regime change or, at the very least, a change in the behavior of the Islamic Republic. In other words, in seeking to preserve intact the main ideological tenets of its regime, Tehran has added a new dimension to its relationship with Moscow. Since 1991, this relationship has become a matter of survival for a regime that faces both popular opposition at home and external pressure from Washington: pressure that increased during the Trump administration of 2017-2021.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, and Middle East

41. Foreign Policy in the Presidential Campaign in South Korea

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The presidential election in South Korea will be held on 9 March. The main candidates are representatives of the largest political parties: Lee Jae-myung of the ruling liberal Democratic Party and Yoon Suk-yeol of the opposition conservative People Power Party. A Lee victory would largely mean the continuation of the current government’s foreign policy—striving for dialogue with North Korea, maintaining a strong alliance with the U.S., and stable relations with China. If Yoon wins, it would increase the likelihood of stronger support of South Korea for the U.S. in its rivalry with China and increased tensions in relations with North Korea. Both candidates condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but draw different conclusions from the war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Presidential Elections, and Campaigning
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

42. China's Foreign Policies Today: Who Is in Charge of What

Author:
Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
While the war in Ukraine is a game changer for international and in particular European security, China appears to be marching on. And, in some ways, it is true. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, China’s foreign policy has significantly shifted from a defensive to an assertive approach. For decades, Beijing worked to integrate into the liberal international order, presenting itself as a peacefully rising power. By contrast, under Xi’s leadership, the country is attempting to create a global system that is more favourable to its own interests. The Report examines China’s current approach to foreign policy, and the drivers of the country’s shift away from tradition. What are the main characteristics of China’s foreign policy in the wake of the Ukraine war? How are decisions being taken, and to what extent do interest groups continue to have a say in decision-making after the recent power centralisation?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Asia

43. China's messaging on the Ukraine conflict

Author:
Samantha Hoffman and Matthew Knight
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’. ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

44. Agenda for change 2022: Shaping a different future for our nation

Author:
Gill Savage, Peter Jennings, John Coyne, Malcolm Davis, and Robert Glasser
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In line with previous Agenda for Change publications from 2016 and 2019, this piece is being released in anticipation of a federal election as a guide for the next government within its first months and over the full term. Our 2022 agenda acknowledges that an economically prosperous and socially cohesive Australia is a secure and resilient Australia. ASPI’s Agenda for change 2019: strategic choices for the next government did, to a great extent, imagine a number of those challenges, including in Peter Jennings’ chapter on ‘The big strategic issues’. But a lot has changed since 2019. It was hard to imagine the dislocating impacts of the Black Summer fires, Covid-19 in 2020 and then the Delta and Omicron strains in 2021, trade coercion from an increasingly hostile China, or the increasingly uncertain security environment. Fast forward to today and that also applies to the policies and programs we need to position us in a more uncertain and increasingly dangerous world. Our Agenda for change 2022 acknowledges that what might have served us well in the past won’t serve us well in this world of disruption. In response, our authors propose a smaller number of big ideas to address the big challenges of today and the future. Under the themes of getting our house in order and Australia looking outward, Agenda for change 2022 focuses on addressing the strategic issues from 2021 and beyond.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, National Security, Cybersecurity, Economy, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia

45. The costs of discounted diplomacy

Author:
James Wise
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report outlines how and why Australia has under-appreciated diplomacy and under-invested in diplomatic capability—and why things should change. The prominence of deterrence, alliances and border controls in Australian security thinking has pushed diplomacy into the shadows. Over the last twenty years, Australian governments, sensibly, have invested massively in defence, intelligence and border control. Over the same period, though, the operating budget for DFAT’s foreign policy and diplomatic work, has been cut by 9 per cent. In a more contested and multipolar international environment, lightweight diplomacy reflects lightweight thinking. Australia will be safer, richer, better regarded and more self-respecting if our diplomatic influence is enlarged, not if it remains stunted. A properly funded DFAT can improve the government's understanding of the motivations, intentions and capabilities of others, and help the government to develop policies and coalitions that enable Australia to navigate risks and exploit opportunities. The report recommends that the government prepare a comprehensive capability assessment for DFAT, followed by a financial plan to match capability needs. The report will help analysts calculate whether governments are increasing or decreasing the critical operating budget for DFAT’s policy function—an important bellwether of their commitment to the role of diplomacy in Australia’s national security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Australia

46. Meeting Antarctica’s diplomatic challenges: Joint approaches for Australia and the United States

Author:
Evan T. Bloom
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report describes current security and environmental policy challenges related to Antarctica and proposes options for Australia and the United States to address them. It assesses the current and potential future actions of strategic competitors like China and Russia, and proposes policy responses. It suggests ways in which the US and Australian governments can work more closely to protect and promote the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), advancing support for an approach to governance that the two nations have felt for decades is in their respective national interests. This requires both countries (as well as others) to make a clear-eyed assessment of current and future fault lines and move more quickly to address political and environmental challenges that have implications well beyond Antarctica. In particular, this involves determining when it’s necessary to counter the ambitions of strategic competitors, such as China and Russia, in the Antarctic context, and when cooperation may be the more appropriate objective. The current Antarctic governance regime, while far from perfect... achieves a great deal that’s in the long-term national interests of Australia and the US. The ATS shouldn’t be dismissed as out of date; it can still be effective in addressing core regional concerns of both countries. Both countries can use their influence to insist on the implementation by all countries of ATS rules and can invoke those rules to fight for environmental protection and policies that support scientists. It’s unlikely that a more effective set of treaties could be negotiated today. Australia and the US should spend more time at both senior and working levels to coordinate positions and on outreach to other governments on Antarctic issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and National Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Antarctica

47. Producing policy-relevant China research and analysis in an era of strategic competition

Author:
Samantha Hoffman
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This brief report explores the challenge of producing policy-relevant China research and analysis. Policy-relevant research is defined as work that drives action, affects decision-making, or both. It’s the kind of research think tanks seek to do, bridging the gap between academia and civil servants who work on policy. This paper focuses on two key findings: There’s a distinction between conducting policy-relevant research and the process of disseminating it in a way that will effectively shape and influence the policy process in particular places by particular policy- and decision-makers. In practice, the difference between the two isn’t always clearly understood and perhaps not clearly taught. There’s limited training that prepares the China analytical community to deal with the challenges of producing policy-relevant research under conditions of restricted access to China. Researchers require more support in navigating the research environment and filling skill-set gaps.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, Strategic Competition, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

48. AUKUS Update #1: May 2022

Author:
Marcus Hellyer and Ben Stevens
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
On the 16th of September 2021, the leaders of Australia, the UK and the US announced the creation of a new trilateral security partnership called ‘AUKUS’—Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The three national leaders stated, ‘We will foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains. And in particular, we will significantly deepen cooperation on a range of security and defense capabilities.’ At a time of rapidly increasing strategic uncertainty, when it’s increasingly clear that authoritarian regimes are willing to use military power to achieve their goals, it’s important to monitor the implementation of AUKUS so that governments and the public can assess whether it’s achieving the goal of accelerating the fielding of crucial military technologies. To track the implementation of AUKUS, ASPI will publish regular updates on progress. This is the first of those updates.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

49. US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate

Author:
David Santoro
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The study US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate analyzes the mutual vulnerability question in US-China strategic nuclear relations. It asks whether the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China and, if so, how and under what conditions it should do so. The goal is not to give a yes-or-no answer but to provide a comprehensive examination of the issue to better understand the benefits, costs, and risks associated with various options. The study includes chapters by US, Japanese, South Korean, Australian, and Chinese scholars.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

50. Trouble on the Rocks: US Policy in East China Sea and South China Sea Disputes

Author:
Benjamin Tracy
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The South and East China Seas are strategic not only for US security and commercial interests, but are vitally so for US treaty allies Japan and the Philippines. Both countries are involved in territorial disputes with China, a rising power and security concern for the US and its allies. Despite treaty alliances with both, the United States has consistently confirmed that the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are covered under Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty while stating that Philippine-claimed islands in the South China Sea are not explicitly covered in the Mutual Defense Treaty. This research project aims to understand why US policy is inconsistent in defending treaty allies’ territory. The methods used to solve this question are to look at the historical context of both disputes as well as strategic interests. UNCLOS is also analyzed to see whether international law influenced US policy. The result was that the US more consistently covered the Senkaku Islands due to the need to gain Japan’s trust as an ally in the post-war order and the US has an interest in maintaining status-quo in the region. There are three recommendations for the US in order to create a more consistent policy, which include signing UNCLOS, reengaging with regional allies such as the Philippines to establish a stronger defense commitment, and strengthening alliances with actors such as the Quad as well as the UK and France.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

51. International Practice of Sanction Evasion and Circumvention Possibilities for Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Sanctions play a special role in the economic and political life of the world. Historically, despite their various forms of use, sanctions have acquired an essentially functional substance in the 20th century. The goal of the sanctions is primarily to ensure global peace. In case of violation of market principles, military aggression, or disregard for the rules established between nations, the violator is sanctioned by specific countries and/or groups of states, who, in doing so, aim to bring it back to the norms of international law. Sanctions increase political and economic pressure on the target country, which are reflected in various dimensions and quantitative figures. Consequently, the country loses some of its political leverage and experiences tangible economic regress. For the sake of universal peace and global security, the policy of sanctions has not lost its relevance in the 21st century. As a result of Russia’s aggressive military intervention in Ukraine, the world community has applied an unprecedented package of sanctions against the aggressor, which has spread to almost every industry of the country and is still being added to. In this regard, Russia broke the anti-record and surpassed countries such as North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. Over the decades, sanctioned countries have accumulated extensive experience on how to circumvent the imposed sanctions, so as to at least partially help the country overcome the economic difficulties. It is interesting which ways and schemes such countries use to circumvent the restrictions, and based on that experience, what opportunities there are for the Russian Federation to do the same and evade the sanctions imposed on it, a move which will not only limit but also further pave the way for its aggressive foreign policy and threaten world peace.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Oil, Sanctions, Global Markets, Cryptocurrencies, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

52. Turkey’s Place and Role in the Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In recent decades, Ankara has maintained a kind of balance in foreign policy and this approach naturally applied to Russia and Ukraine as well. NATO member Turkey sought to develop lucrative military-political and trade-economic relations with both Russia and Ukraine. However, after the Kremlin's war with Ukraine, Ankara clearly saw the facing imminent Russian threat, precipitating the change in its position (supply additional weaponry to Ukraine, close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, etc.). At the same time, the longer the Russia-Ukraine war lasts, the more drastic consequences it will have for Turkey. Consequently, Ankara will have to take even more decisive retaliatory steps.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

53. Positions, Role and Activity of the International Community in the War Waged by Russia against Ukraine

Author:
Nika Petriashvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
This volume of the Security Review focuses on the Russia-Ukraine war. Regardless of the outcome of the war, it will fundamentally alter the post-Cold War world order and have a major impact on Georgia's security environment. Alex Petriashvili tells us about the reaction of the international community to the start of the war by Russia, what the West has done so far and what we should expect from it in the future. To what extent is the Georgian security system ready to withstand such challenges?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Community, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

54. The Saudi-Emirati axis and the preservation of regional order

Author:
Gertjan Hoetjes
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Arab uprisings of 2011 spurred the emergence of a Saudi-Emirati axis that sought to mitigate and – where possible – eliminate challenges posed by what these countries perceive as the so-called ‘triple threat’ to the regional order of the Middle East and North Africa: Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and violent extremist groups. Using a variety of foreign policy instruments - including military intervention and strategic outreach, funding allies and proxies as well as supporting religious networks and media outlets – the axis substantially shaped or influenced the domestic and regional events that occurred in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Broadly speaking, the Saudis and Emiratis have been successful in maintaining a monarchical/authoritarian pole in the region’s political order in their quest for domination. They have succeeded in doing so mainly through the use of soft power (finance, religious influence and media framing) in relation to weaker ‘client’ states in the region such as Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. Their military interventions have generally not achieved their intended objectives and Saudi as well as Emirati shortcomings have been on full display in Yemen, Libya and Syria. While both countries were unable to prevent the emergence of a more multipolar regional order that includes Turkey and Iran, they have effectively helped smother popular calls for political renewal. Growing regional geopolitical competition has, however, not gone hand in hand with growing domestic turmoil. The vast financial reserves, increasing hard power and substantial reservoirs of soft power of both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates ensures that they will continue to act as defenders of the monarchical status quo of the Gulf region and its web of client states in the foreseeable future, even as competition between both partners increases at the same time.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Violent Extremism, Geopolitics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates

55. A new formula for collaboration: Turkey, the EU & North Africa

Author:
Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Over recent years, relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) have been difficult and driven more by crisis management rather than equal partnership. Yet, despite this downward spiral, both blocs remain key partners on domains such as trade, migration and counterterrorism and repeatedly express their interest in developing a more cooperative and constructive relationship. This report is a product of the ‘Searching for a New Formula for collaboration between Turkey and the EU in/with North Africa’ project, which investigated the extent to which Turkey and the EU could collaborate in and with North Africa, more specifically, Morocco, Egypt and Algeria. North Africa was chosen because it offers an underexplored area of research for Turkey-EU relations; Morocco, Egypt and Algeria were selected for specific study as they are the countries with which both Turkey and the EU have the highest trade volumes in the region. Moreover, there are currently no joint projects between Turkey and the EU in Morocco, Algeria or Egypt, although the region is an area of strategic importance for both Turkey and the EU. The recent war in Ukraine has also increased the value of North Africa as a provider of agricultural products and gas for the region. Libya and Tunisia were excluded from the research to narrow the scope of the project. To avoid the traps of reproducing ‘neo-colonial’ or ‘neo-Ottoman’ discourses and of following a top-down approach, this study used action research as a democratic, participatory and collaborative research methodology. It engaged diverse participants from Turkey, the EU and North Africa in semi-structured in-depth interviews, conferences and a survey. Through a cyclical process, the study devised a tripartite collaborative model and concrete project ideas under five major policy options in which cooperation between Turkey, the EU, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt could be actionable. This report gives a detailed account of the abovementioned tripartite collaborative model and the subsequent project ideas which were designed to be mutually beneficial for all three blocs –Turkey, the EU and North Africa. It should, nevertheless, be mentioned that current geopolitical uncertainties in the wider region could challenge the implementation of these projects. The civil war in Libya, the political tension between Turkey and Egypt or Morocco and Algeria, and the influence of China and Russia in the region could pose potential risks for collaboration. However, we maintain that such uncertainties make it even more timely to seek opportunities for a future collaborative environment in the Mediterranean as, ‘if the Mediterranean is weak, all Mediterranean countries are weak’.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Crisis Management, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and North Africa

56. The Russians are coming! The Russians are coming? Russia’s growing presence in Africa and its implication for European policy

Author:
Guido Lanfranchi and Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The growth of Russia’s presence across Africa over the last decade has generated significant international concern, further exacerbated after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s engagement can affect the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states (MS) in Africa. How should European policymakers understand these developments and respond to them? To answer this question, this report looks at Russia’s engagement in Africa, reaching three main conclusions. First, Moscow’s engagement with Africa has so far remained limited as compared to that of other global players, particularly in the economic domain. The current level of (media) attention devoted to Russia’s role in Africa is thus not supported by sufficient evidence of its actual engagement in the continent. At the same time, however, the growth of Russia’s presence is a real trend. Second, Russian actors are guided by a rather loose strategy when it comes to Africa. The Russian state has some interests that act as a broad framework. However, the actual engagement is carried out not only by state actors, but also by state-backed conglomerates and politically connected private businesses. These latter actors have their own specific interests, which are not always fully aligned with those of the Russian state. While state actors are often driven by geopolitical considerations, Russian companies are more interested in economic opportunities. Third, Russia’s engagement in African countries is significantly shaped by the different national contexts and by the interests of African governments. For instance, in a strong state like Ethiopia, Russia’s engagement takes place exclusively at the governmental level. By contrast, in Sudan and Mali (contexts with weaker state structures), other Russian actors like PMCs and private businesses are involved. Yet, in all three cases, Moscow’s presence tends to grow when relations between African governments and their international partners (especially in the West) deteriorate, often in the wake of authoritarian turns. This shows the opportunistic nature of Russia’s engagement, as well as the complex trade-offs faced by EU/MS governments when engaging with African governments. These findings have significant consequences for the policy response of the EU and its member states. This report suggests that: (i) Rather than trying to respond reactively to Russia’s presence, EU/MS should focus on strengthening their own relations with relevant African partners. Addressing some of the political and economic imbalances in the Europe-Africa partnership may be an effective way to strengthen such relations, and by doing so to reduce the chances of an increase in Russia’s influence. (ii) In countries where this preventive strategy is difficult to implement (e.g. when facing authoritarian governments), decisions on whether/how to engage should go beyond debates about Russia’s (potential) presence, and be based instead on a comprehensive understanding of EU/MS interests and norms. Partnerships with non-governmental actors (e.g. the private sector, traditional authorities) may allow EU/MS governments to remain engaged despite souring ties with the government. (iii) In countries where Russia’s presence is already established, evidence-based and context-specific assessments of this presence should inform the EU/MS policy response. This can allow EU/MS governments to avoid overreacting to Russia’s influence, while also not underestimating its dangers. (iv) To pursue their interests in an increasingly multipolar world, EU/MS governments should try to strengthen their leverage vis-à-vis Russia (as well as other actors). To do so, EU/MS policymakers should leverage more strategically the engagement of European businesses across Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Europe

57. Ukraine Will Not Happen in Asia: America Seeks to Check China through Taiwan Visit and Quad Initiatives

Author:
Sarosh Bana
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Sarosh Bana, Executive Editor of Business India in Mumbai and former board member of the East-West Centre (EWC) Association—an organization representing the more than 65,000 individuals who have participated in East-West Center programs,
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

58. FSM Engagement with the United States and China: A Lesson Learned for the Pacific Islands

Author:
Gonzaga Puas
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Gonzaga Puas, Professor at Pacific Islands University and Founder of Micronesia Institute of Research and Development, explains that the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is at a "junction, where the confluence of the two super-powers [the United States and China] meet... FSM is aware of its strategic importance and is judiciously managing the influence of both superpowers."
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, Oceania, and Micronesia

59. South Korean Foreign Policy: Changing Generational Priorities

Author:
Kathleen Stephens and Andy Hong
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Ambassador (ret) Kathleen Stephens, US ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2008 to 2011 and President of the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), & Mr. Andy Hong, Program Officer at KEI, explain that "young Koreans cast the key swing votes" in Korea's March 9 presidential election and that "[t]raditional approaches... to the US-ROK alliance, relations with China and Japan, and inter-Korean policy carry less salience for this new cohort of voters."
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Alliance
Political Geography:
South Korea and United States of America

60. From Strategic Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity? The Dynamics of South Korea’s Navigation of US-China Competition

Author:
Clint Work
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Clint Work, Nonresident Fellow with the Henry L. Stimson Center's 38 North Program, explains that while President Yoon has made it clear that he will opt for strategic clarity amidst a growing US-China rivalry, he must navigate the challenges all previous ROK presidents have faced in dealing with Beijing
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

61. A New Horizon for Korea-US Economic Relations under the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration

Author:
Jin Kyo Suh
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Jin Kyo Suh, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, explains that "Korea-US relations are entering a new era with the inauguration of the Yoon Seok-yeol government.." as "President Yoon Seok-yeol himself is well aware of the importance of universal values, such as freedom, democracy and human rights."
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

62. US Southeast Asia Policy: Towards A Balance of Commitment Approach

Author:
Prashanth Parameswaran
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran, a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Senior Columnist at The Diplomat Magazine, explains that "A balance of commitment approach in U.S. Southeast Asia policy can help policymakers be attentive to both the interrelationships between power, threats and resources shaping decisions in the U.S. domestic political system and the careful calibration of components in commitment level and distribution in the Southeast Asia required to sustain an expanded, balanced approach that serves U.S. interests and meets regional needs."
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Domestic Politics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

63. A Proverbial Shot in the Arm: US Investment Is Key to Boost Philippine Economic Recovery and Resilience

Author:
Ser Percival K. Peña-Reyes
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Ser Percival K. Peña-Reyes, Director of the Ateneo Center for Economic Research and Development explains that "despite all the challenges faced by the Philippines, the United States continues to be a huge source of fresh equity capital (one of three components of FDI). Among 123 equity capital sources, the United States is the second largest..."
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Investment, Resilience, COVID-19, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:
Philippines, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

64. Global Peace Index 2022

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the 16th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 per cent of the world’s population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. In addition to discussing the findings from the 2022 GPI, the report includes an analysis of the military conflict in Ukraine. It covers likely increases in military spending, new and emerging uses of technology in the war, its impact on food prices and global shipping routes. The report also contains a deeper analysis on violent demonstrations around the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Economics, Terrorism, Military Spending, Conflict, Peace, and Instability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

65. A 'Bright Path' Forward or a Grim Dead End? The Political Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan

Author:
Anton Louthan
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report assesses the political impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan. Specifically, it examines whether and how the People’s Republic of China can pursue a strategy of economic statecraft to further its foreign policy and political interests in Kazakhstan. Despite Kazakhstan’s importance for the success of the BRI’s overland trade corridors, the report argues that important financial, foreign policy, and political constraints limit Beijing’s potential to influence Nur-Sultan. Beijing’s concerns over upsetting its relationship with the Russian Federation and the fact that the value of bilateral trade, investment, and Kazakhstani indebtedness to China have decreased in recent years suggest that Beijing is less willing to, capable of, or interested in using the BRI to influence Kazakhstan. The perceived closeness in this bilateral relationship has less to do with the influence of the BRI and more to do with the alignment of both countries’ geopolitical interests before the initiative’s creation. The report does not suggest that Chinese influence has decreased, but rather shows how Kazakhstan has been able to maintain a degree of political autonomy. Nur-Sultan has played a proactive role in forming its relationship with Beijing through its pursuit of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s “multi-vector” foreign policy strategy. In diversifying Kazakhstan’s diplomatic, economic, and political ties with Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States, Nur-Sultan has been able to avoid complete dependence on one country. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has been able to shape the size and scope of Chinese economic activity by guiding the initiative’s investments and projects to further the government’s domestic development agenda, Nurly Zhol (translated as “Bright Path”). However, issues related to corruption and deepening ties between Chinese and Kazakhstani elites through the BRI have likely strengthened Kazakhstan’s authoritarian political structure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Autonomy, and Influence
Political Geography:
China, Kazakhstan, and Asia

66. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

67. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

68. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence

Author:
Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

69. The Wagner Group's Playbook in Africa: Mali

Author:
Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
What is the Wagner Group doing in Mali? Since it rose to prominence after its involvement in the Syrian Civil War alongside the Assad regime, Wagner Group, a Russian-owned Private Military Contractor (PMC), has expanded its footprint into Africa. [1] Wagner has immersed itself in Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, leading training exercises, fighting anti-government forces, and brutally quelling protests. Wagner Group often overlaps with Russian state foreign policy aims, but its position as an independent contractor lends it unpredictability, while giving Russia plausible deniability. The group offers the Russian state a valuable tool: the ability to test new environments for military cooperation without appearing heavy-handed or overtly involved. Wagner has established a pattern of political, military, and economic involvement in Sudan and CAR since 2015. Wagner Group and its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have followed this strategy successfully in Mali, contributing to France’s recent decision to withdraw its military forces from the country. Although Wagner group still needs to adapt its strategy to succeed in a new environment in Mali, the Kremlin has strong-armed a key competitor out of the country. This creates potential contagion effects for the rest of the Sahel, particularly those countries facing long-term insurgencies, such as Burkina Faso.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Wagner Group, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Mali

70. Serbia on Edge

Author:
Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

71. China's Security Management Towards Central Asia

Author:
Niva Yau Tsz Yan
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In the early years of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and Central Asian countries (roughly 1992-1999), bilateral security discussions strictly focused on the then-looming influence of a Uyghur-led independence movement in Xinjiang. Chinese officials directly asked Central Asian states to not support the East Turkestan Movement, orienting the issue as a regional mutual security interest. While concerns for stability in Xinjiang continue as the foundational drive towards deepening security relations with Central Asian states, new security interests have entered discussions since the late 2010s as expanded bilateral trade brought new issues, such as investment security and corruption-fuelled anti-China sentiment. Also, domestic issues in Central Asia, concerning leadership transition, economic decline, and nationalism, expanded the Chinese discussion of the role of Islam in politics and implications on Xinjiang’s stability. To address these interests, Chinese security engagement in Central Asia has steadily expanded. Within and beyond the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), multilateral dialogue on security issues have been regularized among all ranks of Central Asian security officers. The SCO has conducted annual security exercises since 2010, though the size of deployment, focus, and scope have changed. Between 2010 and 2019, the SCO created five expert groups to coordinate regional law enforcement agencies in order to address specific security issues. However, in comparison, bilateral security engagement remains more diverse. The number of meetings is increasing, and their formats are becoming more efficient. There are joint patrols and operation, regular military exercises pre-pandemic, short-term training and long-term military degree programs in China, transfer of security equipment, construction of security infrastructure, and the presence of Chinese private security companies. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the two most responsive countries towards welcoming these initiatives. In addition to multilateral and bilateral security engagement, the PRC has increased its military capacity in its western region. More emphasis has been placed on increased combat readiness, as well on the condition and human capacity on the border. While some areas of existing security cooperation are productive in meeting security goals, such as consensus over non-tolerance of Uyghur independence supporters and tightening illegal cross-border activities, two problems persist. First, while the PRC to an extend desires a regional approach to security, deliverables are more visible as the outcome of bilateral cooperation in Central Asia. These regional efforts are meant to deter any Central Asian governments from making independent assessments and forming their own foreign policy on Xinjiang without PRC participation. Second, language remains the most difficult operational obstacle to overcome. The dominance of the Russian language cements a substantial cultural and operational gap between the armies. So far, Central Asia-PRC cooperation has been a pragmatic, opportunistic choice—a choice that Central Asian leaders made due to the absence of comparable committed engagement from other major powers. Moving forward, in order to balance PRC security engagement, Central Asia’s strategic significance must be independently considered outside of its role in securing Xinjiang for the PRC.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, and Asia

72. Security Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Leah Pedro and Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On May 2–3 2022, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Syria/Iraq Office and the Foreign Policy Research Institute convened a panel of foreign policy experts for a dialogue on security challenges present in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first day addressed state fragility in the region and how this phenomenon intersects with systemic security issues, including climate change, maritime issues, and migration. The second day of dialogue addressed military issues, including Russian naval modernization, US-Russian regional retrenchment, and how each country views the other’s long-term regional ambitions. Additionally, the conversations in the second day covered European regional security views and how the broader US-Russia rivalry impacts thinking on the continent amidst the current crisis landscape. In each panel, two guest speakers shared their subject matter expertise on the focus topic and a dialogue followed brief presentations. The entirety of the event was conducted under Chatham House Rule, wherein the participants could share views and opinions freely. As a result, findings from these conversations can be more transparent than traditional formal dialogues in traditional diplomatic channels. In this report, we share the consensus highlights and points of contention which came from the discussions. As the nature of Chatham House Rule protects the identity of our participants, below are a few areas of expertise found among those involved in the dialogue.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Migration, National Security, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Mediterranean

73. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

74. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. Can the U.S. Regain Battlefield Superiority against China? Applying New Metrics to Build an Adaptable and Resilient Military

Author:
Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Organizational behavior is driven by metrics and measurements, which can compel change more effectively than a flurry of management directives from the C-suite. With Pentagon leaders calling for new ways of building and fighting the force, the time has come to re-examine some of the US military’s fundamental metrics and assess how they could better incentivize the characteristics needed for future combat.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

76. Chinese Political Warfare: The PLA’s Information and Influence Operations

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Material power is relatively easy to understand and quantify. Much less attention is given to nonmaterial power, which is admittedly more nebulous and difficult to assess. Even so, if power is broadly defined as the capacity to exercise or impose one’s will over another, then nonmaterial forms of power need to be taken seriously. This means understanding them, increasing one’s capacity to operationalize and exercise them, and institutionalizing their use to achieve national and security interests. The issue of nonmaterial power (especially information and influence operations, which will fall under the term political warfare) is arising because these forms of power have been taken for granted or have been largely ignored by the advanced democracies. Beijing is exploiting our complacency. There is already a rich and growing body of literature on the various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This brief does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already out there
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Armed Forces, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China and Asia

77. Defending Guam

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Bryan Clark, and Matthew Costlow
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Guam, “where America’s day begins,” constitutes an indispensable strategic hub for the United States. The largest of the Mariana Islands in the western Pacific, it allows the United States to successfully project power within the Indo-Pacific region and so makes credible US security commitments to key US allies located there. Guam is home to Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), from which F-22 Raptors and strategic bomber rotations project US power from the skies, and to the deep-water port Apra Harbor, which plays a critical role in US Navy missions aimed at keeping trade routes open. Thus, this US territory is essential to the security of the American citizenry. Guam’s great strategic value to the United States and its proximity to North Korea and the People's Republic of China (PRC) make it a prime target of missile attack by these US adversaries. Of particular concern, however, is the threat posed by possible Chinese long-range missile strikes, and so, to enable the successful projection of US power within the region and provide credible assurance to key allies, Guam’s defenses must be strengthened. Due to its significance to US security and its status as a US territory, military officials have increased their emphases on the need to speed up the construction of an adequate defense. Then-Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Davidson regularly connected Guam to the US homeland, stating to Congress, “Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific territories are part of our homeland and must be defended.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Pacific Ocean and Guam

78. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

79. Russia Can Still Be Defeated, But Time Is Short

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
At Davos last May, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sparked a controversy when he argued that Kyiv must cede territory to Moscow to achieve peace. Kissinger may well be correct to assert that a stable balance between Russia and Ukraine will require some trade-offs based on the principles of Realpolitik. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that Putin—a former KGB officer who considers the collapse of the Soviet Union to have been the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century—launched this war simply to secure a border readjustment. Putin’s essay, published in April 2021, expresses his view with admirable clarity: Ukraine, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is Russia. In sum, he launched this invasion to subordinate Ukraine to Moscow—totally and permanently. We should also not conclude that Russia’s battlefield setbacks have been so severe as to deflect Putin from his original goal. After he failed to subordinate Ukraine swiftly with a quick knockout blow directed at the capital, Kyiv, he moved to Plan B: a strategy of exhaustion. He is now determined to grind Ukraine down slowly and deliberately with the expectation that eventually it will have no choice but to bow to his iron fist. For its part, the West should thwart Putin’s strategy by safeguarding Ukraine’s political and economic independence. Kissinger’s comments did not bring us closer to achieving that goal. If members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) follow his lead and attempt to cajole Kyiv into ceding territory now, while Russia still believes it has the upper hand on the battlefield, their efforts will only whet Putin’s appetite for expansion. Putin will begin to entertain compromises acceptable to the West only when he comes to believe that failure to do so will lead inevitably to catastrophic losses for Russia. The bad news is that the military balance on the ground right now will not lead him to such a conclusion. If NATO members act quickly, however, there is still time to shift the dynamic in Ukraine’s favor—but it will not be easy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

80. Understanding and Countering China's Approach to Economic Decoupling from the United States

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Many experts have highlighted American efforts to partially decouple from China. Yet China began pursuing a far more ambitious and comprehensive decoupling strategy vis-à-vis the United States long before Donald Trump entered the White House. This monograph examines China’s evolving approach to economic decoupling from the US. It makes the following arguments and conclusions. First, on the back of a preexisting mercantilist political economic structure, China has been explicitly pursuing economic decoupling from US and allied economies on Chinese terms for at least a decade. Second, while the US seeks to decouple some aspects of its economic activity from China, the latter seeks to dominate vast segments of the Asian economy and to decouple these segments from the US. This is the Chinese strategy and threat that the US vastly underappreciates. Third, the most important segments are the high-tech and high-value sectors. These sectors are where competition is the most consequential and where decoupling on US terms needs to occur. Fourth, China faces increasingly serious problems and obstacles regarding its decoupling strategy. Many of these arise out of structural weaknesses inherent in its political economy. The monograph is written to assist the Biden administration and those who follow it to possess a deeper understanding of: China’s actions and the motives behind them; China’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; and How the US and its allies can craft an evolving approach that better plays to their individual and collective strengths and advantages. China hopes the US and its allies will adopt a cautious, gradualist, and ineffective approach to countering Beijing’s strategy and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party knows the US and other advanced economies still have immense advantages despite clever Chinese messaging to the contrary. The US and its allies continue to enjoy considerable leverage and remain well placed to partially decouple from China on their preferred terms, but they need to act quickly, collectively, and decisively.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, and National Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

81. Six Months after the Russian Invasion, the West Needs Better Clock Management

Author:
Peter Rough, Luke Coffey, and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine’s status as a borderland between Europe and Russia has often confined it to the periphery of Western strategic thought. For many, Ukraine constitutes the southeastern edge of the European continent, but not its heartland. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, Ukraine sits at the center of his strategic vision for Eurasia. Far from a backwater, the country is the key to his imperial aims—a prize for which he has risked his army and bet his rule. In Putin’s mind, if Russia were to control Ukraine, Moscow would dominate the Black Sea—and so would be in a stronger position in every connected region, from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus and from the Balkans to the Caspian Basin. Russia would also complete its breakout into the Eastern Mediterranean, long a priority of Moscow, by securing the connection between its warm water ports in the Black Sea to its new bases on the Syrian coast.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

82. Seven Myths about the Iran Nuclear Deal

Author:
Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2015, President Barack Obama worked with three European powers, the European Union, Iran, China, and Russia to conclude the Iran nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2018, President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the deal. Instituting his policy of “maximum pressure,” Trump imposed crippling economic sanctions that punished Iran not just for its ongoing nuclear weapons program but also for, among other things, its regional aggression and support for terrorism worldwide. Earlier in 2018, Israeli agents conducted a dramatic operation in Tehran, breaking into a secret warehouse and capturing a trove of Iranian nuclear files. These documents revealed a more advanced and comprehensive nuclear weapons program than had been previously known. The nuclear archive also showed Iranian officials’ plan for concealing nuclear weapons efforts under the guise of civilian research and development, and how Iranian officials systematically deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to cooperate with IAEA inspectors to verify the peaceful nature of its program. After the Israelis shared the nuclear archive with the IAEA, its inspectors found traces of uranium at several undeclared sites. Despite being obligated to do so, Tehran has refused to explain the presence of the uranium or reveal its current location. Iran’s requirements under the NPT are wholly separate from the JCPOA, but Tehran is using the Biden administration’s profound desire to return to the nuclear deal to bring political pressure on the IAEA to close the book on Iran’s violations. A fair-minded observer of Iran’s relations with the IAEA cannot but conclude that Tehran has never wavered from its intention to build a nuclear weapons capability and that its publicly declared “civilian” nuclear activities are an effort to hide its nuclear bomb program in plain sight. From the very inception of the JCPOA, however, the deal’s supporters have spun myths that disguise these self-evident truths. After Trump left the deal, those same supporters continued to recite the old myths while adding some new ones about the purported comparative advantage of the JCPOA over maximum pressure. As President Biden prepares to bring the United States back into the JCPOA, and as the public, the press, and Congress consider the deal's terms, we identify the seven most pernicious myths and explain the reality that they seek to conceal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

83. Chinese Information and Influence Warfare in Asia and the Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army’s increasingly provocative and reckless activities in and around disputed zones such as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the South China Sea constitute only one means through which Beijing seeks to change key aspects of the regional order and compel others to “accept its interests.” However, the Chinese Communist Party and PLA are already decades into China’s information and influence war, which is designed to either weaken the will and capabilities of the United States and its allies should military conflict break out or, even better, eliminate the need for China to use military force to achieve its primary objectives (i.e., to “win without fighting”). In this context, the PLA is several steps ahead of the West; whereas Western analysts observe that the PLA is operating in the “grey zone,” the PLA is instead redefining and expanding this grey zone by manipulating how other countries think about it. With respect to this so-called grey zone, a cost-benefit analysis encompassing both objective and subjective elements typically determines an entity’s decision to respond with military force. For example, crafting narratives about the PLA’s military superiority, elite capture, ability to foment disunity within a target country, or normalization of coercion raises the West’s threshold of what provocations demand a military response—thereby expanding the grey zone within which the PLA and CCP are allowed to operate. Thus, Beijing is well ahead of the US and its allies in conceptualizing and operationalizing the use of military actions other than (kinetic) war to achieve political or strategic objectives. Finally, Asia and the Pacific constitute both the primary and most suitable region within which the Chinese can conduct information and influence warfare. These sub-regions’ unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics render them especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. This policy memo describes the key objectives, strategies, and tactics of Chinese information and influence warfare developed and refined for use in the Asia-Pacific region. It focuses on maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the areas of highest interest for the US, Australia, and their allies. Offering Singapore, Thailand, and the Solomon Islands as three pertinent case studies, the memo also lays the groundwork for an examination of effective US and allied counters to Beijing’s activities in these contexts, which follow-up reports in this series will present.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, National Security, Territorial Disputes, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China and Asia

84. France Should Embrace the Transatlantic Relationship—and Help Lead It

Author:
Angélique Talmor
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion three years ago that the transatlantic alliance was “braindead” rings as utterly misguided today.1 The resurgence of war in Europe has reinforced NATO’s raison d’être and forced Europeans to face the fact that there is no realistic alternative to transatlantic cooperation. Further, more European policy leaders recognize China’s increasing threat,2 which bolsters the case for Western “friend shoring” on defense and other issues. This process will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. France, the largest military power in the European Union and the second-largest EU economy, is more reluctant to embrace Atlanticism than most of its NATO counterparts. This hesitance risks limiting the success and scope of efforts to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, in the evolving geopolitical context, France’s best shot at preserving its interests and influence would be through embracing Atlanticism and helping lead the reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation in the realm of defense and beyond. American policymakers should encourage and extend a hand to their oldest ally to embrace such a shift.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

85. US Has an Opportunity to Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Just over one year ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan. Leading up to this takeover, in February 2020 President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2021, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued the fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. While the US does not have many good policy options in Afghanistan because of the Biden administration’s actions, the US and international community need to consider how to support the NRF at this perilous time. This assistance can include establishing formal contact with the NRF leadership and inviting Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC; refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; providing the NRF with winter gear; allocating a certain percentage of all frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing, and consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnic Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Taliban
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

86. How to Strengthen US Deterrence and Weaken the Attempts of Rival Nuclear Coercion

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, Russia started the largest European war since 1945 as it intensified its invasion of Ukraine to a new level and threatened escalation to nuclear war. Though Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used, and continues to use,1 his nuclear arsenal to threaten the United States and other NATO nations against continuing to support Ukraine’s defense. Through pre-invasion nuclear saber-rattling, verbally threatening to employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield,3 and putting such weapons on alert,4 Russia caused President Joe Biden and his administration to declare repeatedly their fears of “World War III”5 and to adopt a gradual, highly cautious approach to helping Ukraine. The White House has chosen to provide only weapons suitable for operations to allow Ukraine to achieve some tactical victories and prevent Russia from a quick and final victory,6 but this aid does not allow Ukraine to achieve and sustain the military victories necessary to win the war.7 Thus, Russia appears to have successfully used nuclear threats to deter the United States from certain actions that are on lower levels on the spectrum of escalation, enabling itself to control escalation8 to serve its aims. Russia’s explicit and implicit nuclear threats deterred US officials from providing Ukraine with real-time targeting data and heavy artillery early in the war9 and electronic warfare capabilities later in the war.10 The nuclear threats also caused US officials to press Ukraine not to hit Russian targets deep behind Russian lines.11Russian officials have ample grounds to conclude that their nuclear coercion has affected the course of the war in their favor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

87. An Assessment of US and Allied Information and Influence Warfare

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The first two policy memos in this series on Chinese information and influence warfare pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes it is engaged in a perpetual “struggle” against the West and makes no fundamental distinction between wartime and peacetime. These reports also explained that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a central and often dominant role in leading doctrine and operations when it comes to informational and influence warfare. Additionally, the previous memos argued that Asia and the Pacific are both the primary and most suitable subregions for the conduct of such Chinese activities. For the CCP and PLA, the region has unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics that render it especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. Previous memos focused on the PLA’s Three Warfares framework, which consists of public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare. The Chinese intent is not merely to disrupt, confuse, or create mischief but to craft and control grand narratives. Doing so is extremely effective because these narratives determine how we reflexively interpret information and situations, what seems possible or not, what seems prudent rather than reckless, and what appears to be rational and in one’s long-term interest. Grand narratives determine how we think about a problem, issue, or development. In doing so, they predetermine the range of “reasonable” options and solutions that we believe are available. The previous memos also offered analysis and examples of how the CCP and PLA are using political warfare to achieve strategic objectives and to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies. Ominously, and in important respects, Beijing is not just “winning without fighting” but taking the more insidious approach of achieving strategic goals without victory.1 This third memo in the series examines US and allied information and influence doctrine and operations, especially by the defense establishments. In these democracies, the government has largely allowed the defense establishments to lead doctrine and capability for the information and influence elements of political warfare. The paper looks at the strengths and shortcomings of how the US and others conceive of information and influence warfare as it relates to responding to Chinese efforts in the region, as detailed in the first two memos. In doing so, it prepares the way for the fourth and final memo, which will look at specific policies and activities that the US and its allies could engage in to advance its interests and values and to counter some of the more damaging and insidious elements of Chinese political warfare in the region. The memo focuses on the US and, to a lesser extent, Australia because these Five Eyes countries are the most active and invested in understanding and countering Chinese information and influencing warfare efforts in the region. It is important to remember that such warfare is different in nature, purpose, and implementation from the usual diplomatic and soft-power efforts undertaken by democracies. The first memo argues as follows: Engaging in information and influence operations (or countering those by other countries) is a whole-of-government enterprise. [But it is] very different from the usual public messaging and soft power efforts led by diplomats and embassies. Engagement in this kind of political warfare is far more akin to missions undertaken by defense forces in that there must be specific objectives, tactics designed based on the objectives and resources available, and quick implementation by ready and well-resourced teams formed specifically for these tasks—even if this type of warfare is relentless and a protracted struggle.2
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

88. How to Target Iran’s Kleptocracy

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called morality police sparked protests that continue to spread across the country, posing the most serious challenge to Tehran’s theocratic dictatorship in years. The demonstrations have focused on opposing the compulsory wearing of the hijab, but Iranians are also venting anger at a regime that has lost legitimacy after decades of political repression, economic mismanagement, and systemic corruption. Policymakers in the United States are rightly focused on constraining Iran’s nuclear program and state sponsorship of terrorism. Sanctions and other measures targeting the regime’s illicit financial networks tend to reflect these urgent priorities. But Iran’s theocratic regime is also a sprawling, deeply entrenched kleptocracy against which the US should apply more pressure. This brief examines the prevailing forms of corruption within Iran, the implications for US policy, and how the US can intensify efforts to expose and target the regime’s kleptocracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Human Rights, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

89. Seven Myths about the “Historic” Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Agreement

Author:
Michael Doran
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Commentators in the United States and Israel have hailed the agreement on the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon, which the Biden administration recently brokered, as a great success. They liken it to the Abraham Accords and claim that it is a major step toward normalizing relations between the Jewish State and a historic Arab foe. But a close examination of the agreement simply does not support this view. Amos Hochstein, the US State Department senior advisor for energy security, led the mediation effort to resolve this dispute. He built on the initiatives of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump to reconcile the conflicting claims of Israel, which claimed Line 1 (see map) as the northern border of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and Lebanon, which claimed Line 23 as its southern border. In the final months of the Trump administration, Lebanese negotiators revised their claim, moving it further south to Line 29. Beirut, however, never registered this new claim with the United Nations. In other words, Line 23 always remained the official Lebanese position. When Hochstein arrived in Beirut last February, the Lebanese government abruptly dropped its insistence on Line 29 and presented its retreat as a sign of its flexibility, a compromise proposal that it could withdraw if the negotiations failed to produce satisfactory results.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

90. Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap. So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage. As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, North America, and United States of America

91. US Reengagement with Pakistan: Ideas for Reviving an Important Relationship

Author:
Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-Pakistan relationship has gone through many changes. The relationship had a high point when President Dwight Eisenhower described Pakistan as the ‘‘most allied ally of the United States,” and another high point occurred when President Ronald Reagan said that “the American people support close ties with Pakistan and look forward to expanding them.” The relationship has also had low points, such as when in January 2018 President Donald Trump said, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” US administrations going back to President Eisenhower have pinned great hopes on their alliance with Pakistan only to be disappointed and frustrated. For policymakers in both countries, some of the most important recent issues have been Pakistan’s poorly veiled support for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, its backing for jihadi groups targeting Kashmir, its close embrace of China, and its expanding nuclear arsenal. Successive American administrations have assumed that with the right kind of incentives—economic and military—Pakistan would finally change how its policy diverges from US interests. However, neither the award of military and civilian aid nor the cutoff of aid has been able to change Pakistan’s existing national security paradigm and the policies framed by its security establishment. Pakistan, for its part, has been upset as it believes it has offered a fair exchange to the US for its aid by abetting US strategic plans: containment of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, military assistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and post-2001 logistical and political support for the American military mission. Pakistan complains that Washington does not respect its contribution or fully appreciate its security threats, regional concerns, and aspirations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

92. Revitalizing the U.S.-Philippines Alliance to Address Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, and Zachary Durkee
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The purpose of this report is to assess the current state of the relationship and provide recommendations for revitalizing and expanding bilateral ties following a six-year period marked by turbulence and volatility. While Duterte has tested the flexibility of the alliance with his controversial counternarcotics campaign and attempted realignment toward China, his actions have also highlighted a broader need for the United States to reprioritize its oldest ally in Asia. To reinvigorate U.S.-Philippines relations, the report makes a series of policy recommendations regarding security and defense ties, foreign assistance, energy cooperation, and diplomatic ties. It further proposes ways to improve the narrative regarding U.S.-Philippines legacy issues and the two countries’ complicated colonial history.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Rodrigo Duterte
Political Geography:
Philippines, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

93. Competitive Connectivity: Crafting Transatlantic Responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Jacob Stokes, Carisa Nietsche, Joshua Fitt, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Given the uncertain future of BRI, researchers at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) identified the major drivers likely to influence the direction of the program and examined their numerous permutations. The authors selected three scenarios and focused on how conditions of each scenario would play out in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. For each scenario, the report identifies the risks and implications for the United States and its allies. The scenarios are designed to prepare policymakers and planners for the possible futures they could face, including key challenges and opportunities that may arise in the years to come. Lastly, this paper identifies additional policy steps that will prepare the transatlantic allies to both compete with China’s investments and increase their own resilience.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

94. Russia in the Arctic: Gauging How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Will Alter Regional Dynamics

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Nicholas Lokker, Heli Hautala, and James Frey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is producing ripple effects that will reverberate far beyond Ukraine for years to come, affecting issue areas and regions where the United States and Europe must manage relations with Moscow. Such effects will certainly be felt in the Arctic (which for this study will be limited to the European Arctic or the “High North”). Already, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, altering the region’s security architecture. Amid the changes that are unfolding, it is critical that analysts and policymakers reexamine long-standing assessments and assumptions about Russia. To that end, this paper reexamines Russia’s approach to the Arctic in light of events in Ukraine. Given the high degree of uncertainty about the trajectory of the war in Ukraine and its effect on Russia, it is impossible to confidently project a single future for Russia’s Arctic policy. CNAS researchers, therefore, identified four drivers that are most likely to shape Russia’s approach to the Arctic: Russia’s perception of the Western threat, the impact of Western sanctions, China’s role in the Arctic, and whether Putin remains in power. Using different permutations of those drivers, the authors developed three scenarios for how the future Russian approach to the Arctic could evolve looking out to 2025.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Arctic, and United States of America

95. Precision and Posture: Defense Spending Trends and the FY23 Budget Request

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the fiscal year (FY) 2023 defense budget request and assesses whether it sufficiently resources what was known of the Biden administration’s national defense strategy when the budget was released. Because of the delay of the full, unclassified version of the strategy, the analysis focuses on two factors—high-end munitions stockpiles and overseas posture—that past studies have indicated are critical for strengthening deterrence against China and Russia in the near term. This report concludes that while the FY23 request makes some strides on both issues, more must be done today to improve the United States’ chances of deterring and, if necessary, defeating the adversary tomorrow. The ongoing war in Ukraine has elevated the issue of munitions stockpiles to front-page news as both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to consume high volumes of key weapons. We examine the sufficiency of existing critical conventional munitions stockpiles and the future procurement plans to meet the threats posed by China and Russia. We find that while the services have shifted to investing in longer-range weapons, they are still underinvesting in the specific capabilities, in particular anti-ship and area-effects weapons, that would be needed to counter China in a variety of scenarios. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DoD) is not buying enough of these weapons to blunt and defeat an initial invasion, and it certainly is not stockpiling enough precision-guided munitions (PGMs) for a protracted war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Budget, Defense Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

96. Building a Flywheel: The Biden Administration's Opportunity to Forge a New Path with North Korea

Author:
John Park
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to maintain a level of stability in its increasingly competitive relationship with China, North Korea has the potential to complicate their intensifying rivalry. Dealing with North Korea is a complex endeavor that requires deft handling by both nations because the stakes are high and instability can spread rapidly. For decades, China has been seeking to bolster the stability of the Kim family regime and increase China’s economic engagement with North Korea, to the point where North Korea Inc.—the Kim regime’s network of elite state trading companies—has embedded itself in major commercial hubs throughout China. By prioritizing the stability of the North Korean regime over denuclearization in its policy actions, China created a loophole in which the North Korean regime could enjoy economic benefits without having to do denuclearization work. Beijing thus impeded the development of a connection to a larger process in which major denuclearization activity would be paired with major economic and diplomatic concessions. In contrast to China’s sustained engagement with North Korea, U.S. policy toward North Korea over the last decade has focused substantially on sanctions implementation. There was a brief period of summit diplomacy during the Trump administration, but those efforts failed to bring about progress toward denuclearization. The North Korean nuclear issue has mutated into a much more complex challenge that no longer fits into past policy molds that rely heavily on sanctions implementation. President Joe Biden’s administration will need to recognize that North Korea under Kim Jong Un has become highly resilient to U.S. policy tools such as sanctions, largely due to far-reaching advancements in the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) as well as the migration and embedding of North Korea Inc. deep inside the Chinese national economy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, North Korea, and United States of America

97. Toward a New Transatlantic Approach to Russia Sanctions

Author:
Edward Fishman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Angela Stent
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This policy brief is a product of the Center for a New American Security Transatlantic Forum on Russia, an initiative designed to spur coordination between the United States and Europe on Russia-related policy across multiple issue areas. The policy briefs are informed by a series of dialogues with leading experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The analysis and recommendations in the memo reflect areas of agreement between U.S. and European experts. Where there are notable differences in perspective, we highlight those to better enable policymakers to navigate fissures that can hinder coordination. We thank all the experts who contributed to such fruitful dialogue, especially Nigel Gould-Davies, Brian O’Toole, and Maria Shagina. Introduction As Russia continues to build its forces on Ukraine’s border, the United States and its allies have laid out the economic costs that Russian President Vladimir Putin would face for any further aggression against Ukraine. The Biden administration has stated it is willing to pursue “economic measures that we've refrained from using in the past.”1 In addition, the United States has indicated it is prepared to use export controls on U.S.-origin technologies that are key to Russia’s industrial sectors and potentially enact a Russia-focused Foreign Direct Product Rule—a tool that, to date, has only been used against Huawei. It is unclear if such a package is enough to deter Putin, especially if he is intent on pursuing his maximalist objectives—autonomy for parts of eastern Ukraine that would give Russia a veto over Ukrainian foreign policy and closing NATO’s door to Ukraine. Nonetheless, implementing such sanctions if Putin further escalates in Ukraine is critical for raising the costs to Putin and for restricting Russia’s ability to sustain its aggressive foreign policy over the long term. Regardless of what happens in Ukraine, however, U.S.-Russia relations are on a new course. The era of working toward a stable and predictable relationship with Russia is over for now. The United States will need a new, more proactive approach—one in which sanctions will be a tool (among many) that Washington should use to deter future Russian attacks on liberal democracies and disrupt Russia’s destabilizing actions, especially the corrupt networks that Moscow uses to spread its influence and sustain its hold on power. This policy brief outlines the current state of play of U.S. and European sanctions policies on Russia and how the United States and Europe can update its sanctions approach in this new era of relations with Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Crisis Management, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

98. Dealing with a Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan: Supporting the Afghan People without Legitimizing the Regime

Author:
Lisa Curtis
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Nearly 20 years after U.S. forces overturned Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Islamist movement is back in power. This follows the U.S. troop withdrawal in summer 2021 and a failed peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban that was concluded during the Trump administration. The U.S. government must continue to monitor terrorism threats emanating from Afghanistan and work with like-minded nations to protect Afghan civil society, especially women and girls. While competing with China may be America’s number one foreign policy priority, managing terrorism threats and protecting women’s rights in Afghanistan also demands continued U.S. attention and resources. First and foremost, the United States and other international donors must help Afghanistan avoid a humanitarian disaster and ensure average Afghans can meet their basic needs for food, shelter, and access to healthcare. While the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations are finding ways to get cash into the system without funneling it through the Taliban, there is a need to identify a more reliable and sustainable solution to Afghanistan’s liquidity crisis. However, releasing to the Taliban without conditions the nearly $7 billion in Afghan foreign reserves that Washington froze following the Taliban takeover of the country is not the answer. The Biden administration must avoid giving these assets to the Taliban interim government, which comprises mostly individuals who have been sanctioned for their involvement in terrorism.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Taliban, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

99. Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa, 2001-2021: Summary Document of CTC’s Africa Regional Workshop

Author:
Jason Warner, Julia Broomer, and Stephanie Lizzo
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On October 21, 2021, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, as part of the Recrudescence Project (a research collaboration with the Middle East Institute and the Center on National Security at Fordham Law), hosted a closed-door workshop with 18 top observers of U.S.-Africa policy from across government, academia, think-tanks, and the private sector. The goal of CTC’s Africa Regional Workshop was to assess the successes and challenges of U.S. policy to address terrorism by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and to assist in counterterrorism (CT) efforts on the African continent over the past 20 years (2001-2021), and to consider how these approaches might be improved in the future. This anonymized summary document offers an overview of the findings from that workshop. Three topics of concern are the focus of this summary: assessments of U.S. kinetic counterterrorism engagement in Africa; assessments of U.S. non-kinetic counterterrorism engagement in Africa; and the future of U.S.-Africa policy beyond a counterterrorism lens.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Violent Extremism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

100. The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations

Author:
Jessica Drun and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
There is a campaign underway by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to reinterpret UN Resolution 2758 as based on its “One China” Principle and spread the fallacy that, through the resolution, UN member states came to a determination that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Yet, in passing the resolution in 1971, the countries solely intended to grant the seat occupied by the Republic of China in the General Assembly and the Security Council to the PRC. This is reflected in the official historic record and meeting minutes as well as in the resolutions raised at the time for the General Assembly’s consideration. The PRC understood then that the resolution did not contain the Taiwan conclusions it wanted. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai noted that, if Resolution 2758 passed, “the status of Taiwan is not yet decided.” Beijing, through its proxies at the UN, expressed its unwillingness to join the organization if it allowed “‘two Chinas,’ ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ or ‘the status of Taiwan remaining to be determined.’” However, given that Beijing did not enjoy the same level of international influence then as it does today, it did not reject the resolution when it passed. Instead, PRC officials assumed the “China” seat and only later began to leverage their position to promote Beijing’s stance on Taiwan at the UN level. The PRC’s efforts to rewrite Taiwan’s status at the UN ramped up in the 1990s and early 2000s at the same time as the island’s democratization. The PRC has since worked to “internationalize” its “One China” Principle and to conflate it with UN Resolution 2758, a revisionist shift from the original intent of the document. Beijing has managed to further institutionalize and normalize its stance on Taiwan within the UN by signing secret agreements with UN bodies, restricting Taiwan’s access to the UN and its facilities, and embedding PRC nationals across various levels of UN staff. The UN and its specialized agencies have not made the texts of these agreements, such as that of the 2005 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the PRC and the World Health Organization, available to the public or to any entity beyond the main signatories, though leaked guidance memos provide insights into the scope of the MOU’s content (See Appendix B). The PRC has likewise sought to force its views on nomenclature relating to Taiwan within the UN. This includes withholding UN accreditation from NGOs and civil society groups that do not refer to Taiwan as a part of the PRC in their organizational materials or on their websites. Recently, it has come to light that the PRC and its representatives have altered historic UN documents to change references of “Taiwan” to “Taiwan, Province of China.” (Examples are presented in a case study.) These developments have played out alongside marked shifts in the guidance of the UN Office of Legal Affairs on Taiwan, where it only 15 years ago cited an ambiguous and undefined “One China” policy, but now reiterates the PRC position on Taiwan. The PRC has likewise used UN Resolution 2758 and bilateral normalization agreements with other member states to falsely claim that its “One China” Principle is a universally accepted norm. It has also ensured that a plurality of countries back its views at the UN level and will cast votes alongside it—particularly on issues of Taiwan’s participation—and it reinforces this support through economic pressure on governments. The PRC’s efforts to constrain Taiwan at the UN have broader implications for international governance, as it shows a prioritization of one member state’s national interests over the global community’s—as exemplified by Taiwan’s damaging exclusion from global health debates during the coronavirus pandemic. The United States opposes the PRC’s attempts to redefine UN Resolution 2758 and has pushed back against UN statements claiming that Taiwan is a province of the PRC, including issuing a 2007 “non-paper” asserting its position that Taiwan’s status is not yet determined. The PRC has recently attempted to use its narrative of the “One China” Principle as embedded in UN Resolution 2758 to call into question the legitimacy of longstanding US policy on Taiwan—including the Taiwan Relations Act, which is US law.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, United Nations, and International Community
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America