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1181. Harnessing Inland Waterways for Inclusive Trade Among Bay of Bengal Countries

Author:
Veena Vidyadharan
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The transboundary rivers Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna along with their tributaries and distributaries create a vibrant water grid connecting their riparian countries. Historically, these rivers have played a prominent role in shaping the economy of the Indian sub-continent as a major means of trade and transportation. In the post-colonial era, new political boundaries between countries mostly cut off these riverine networks because the priority of the newly-established countries and their governments was to develop road and rail networks for internal consolidation and integration more efficiently. Hence, waterways connectivity among new regional countries was comparatively neglected. India and Bangladesh, for example, share 54 transboundary rivers. Despite existing bilateral agreements for using designated riverine routes for trade and transit, only in the past few years have infrastructural development initiatives started in India for constructing river terminals, multimodal terminals as well as fairway development. And there are other opportunities.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Regional Integration, and Ecology
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, South Asia, India, Indo-Pacific, and Bay of Bengal

1182. Making BIMSTEC a Regional Vehicle for Nepal’s Economic Growth

Author:
Sunil KC
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Recently, the government of Nepal, led by Nepal Communist Party Chairman KP Sharma Oli who ascended to power in 2018, came up with an integrated foreign policy that reflects rapid changes in both the domestic and geopolitical spheres. The new foreign policy has shifted from a traditional course to a modern one with “Economic Diplomacy” as the main driver. With the slogan of “Happy Nepali, Prosperous Nepal”, Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali has prioritized engagement with regional groupings. It is in this context that the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation or (BIMSTEC), established in 1996, with a permanent secretariat in Dhaka, Bangladesh, could serve as an important platform in achieving Nepal’s foreign policy goals of development and prosperity. Nepal became a member of BIMSTEC in 2004.. BIMSTEC acts as a vital bridge for Nepal to connect with South and Southeast Asia to expand its trade, economy, business, investments, and cultural connections. However, due to an unstable domestic political environment, Nepal has not been utilizing regional forums in advancing the nation’s interest. Now, with a stable government in power, Nepal must look at regional forums as important gateways for conducting business and national development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
South Asia, Nepal, and Southeast Asia

1183. Dealing with Coronavirus Pandemic in the Bay of Bengal Region

Author:
Prabir De
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The coronavirus has had a devastating impact on the health and economies of countries in the Bay of Bengal. India, Bangladesh, and Nepal are the region’s most affected countries in terms of COVID-19 cases and deaths, followed by Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. It seems that Bhutan and Thailand, the least affected countries in the region, have successfully escaped the brunt of the pandemic. All these countries implemented strict lockdowns as early as March 2020, and the region’s recovery rates have been relatively high. However, the devastation from the pandemic did not reach its peak until after the lifting of lockdowns. The economic costs of the pandemic have soared and are still climbing. Today, most Bay of Bengal countries are facing a second or third wave of COVID-19 infections. India has been badly hit by a huge second Coronavirus wave, registered daily cases over 400,000 since Aril 2021. The damage being done by these additional waves is more intense than their predecessors. The Bay of Bengal countries are now looking for COVID-19 vaccines. India serves as the region’s primary producer of immunizations. Two Indian pharmaceutical companies have launched vaccines, with five more firms in the race to launch their own treatments. When vaccines are developed in India, they are easier to distribute across the region. In terms of availability, accessibility, and affordability, India’s vaccines are better suited to the needs of the region. In recent months, India has successfully supplied over 18 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to many Bay of Bengal countries, with Thailand being a notable exception. India has also ensured more supply of the vaccines in the neighborhood.
Topic:
Economics, Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, South Asia, India, Nepal, Thailand, Bhutan, and Bay of Bengal

1184. Sri Lanka’s Asia‐Centric Focus in a Contested Bay of Bengal Region

Author:
Dushni Weekaroon and Kithmina Hewage
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Bay of Bengal – home to one of the world’s pre-eminent historic trading networks – is once again at the nexus of rising regional and global rivalries. A multiplicity of port developments along the Bay of Bengal littoral underscore the tussle for control of maritime connectivity and trade—as well as diplomatic and defense advantage. Against the backdrop of a weakened post COVID-19 global economy, and as countries seek every possible advantage, the probability of competing tensions spilling over into outright confrontations and tit-for-tat retaliatory measures is high. Unless carefully assessed and managed, small but strategically positioned countries like Sri Lanka can get swept up and carried away in power rivalries being played out on their shores. Indeed, a common narrative has been to assert that Sri Lanka was forced to cede an important port to China after being lured into a ‘debt trap’ by easy Chinese loans. There is no gainsaying that over the last decade, China got a head start in investing in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure push, drawing the country firmly into the orbit of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Aside from China’s famed involvement in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, its long-term footprint is also assured through investments in a large-scale land reclamation project – the Colombo Port City – that is a vital link in its BRI chain of connectivity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
South Asia, Sri Lanka, and Bay of Bengal

1185. Improving Land Connectivity Around the Bay of Bengal is Essential for Integration

Author:
Pritam Banerjee
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Facilitating cross-border movement by road is the most critical element of any strategy for greater economic integration among BIMSTEC countries. Cross-border road freight can facilitate even a small consignment to be delivered directly across the border with cost-effectiveness; unlike a full railway rake or even a coastal short-sea feeder vessel which require some level of aggregation of consignments into a larger parcel of goods. Direct road services also reduce multiple handling and trans-shipment requirements. Multi-modal solutions that support optimal use of international connectivity from different air and marine hubs in the region can only be facilitated by an existing efficient road freight feeder network. For example, a Bangladeshi exporter can exploit the cheaper and faster shipping connectivity to Europe via India’s Jawaharlal Nehru Port with the help of an efficient cross-border road feeder service that directly connects the exporter’s factory in Bangladesh to this port in western India. As feeder services for ocean and especially air transport? reduce frequency or become more expensive in the post-Covid ‘normal’, access to cheaper and faster connectivity to global markets from large regional hubs will be critical for the region’s entrepreneurs.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Economy, Regional Integration, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia and Bay of Bengal

1186. Three Dilemmas Facing the Indo-Pacific’s Regional Order

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
For decades, an international order delivered security and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific. The order was based on U.S. military hegemony and alliances that preserved the strategic status quo and multilateral cooperation that enabled economic development and growth. That order is now under strain. The COVID-19 pandemic is challenging the order’s founding principles, prompting some regional states to limit their interdependency in certain sensitive sectors under the guise of supply chain resilience. The pandemic was not the first challenge to test the order; serious threats began to emerge over a decade ago, with the global financial crisis of 2008, and were sharply exacerbated by China’s economic rise and strategic revisionism, which threatens U.S. military and economic primacy and the territorial status quo. The United States, India, and like-minded middle-power partners from the Indo-Pacific and Europe have struggled to respond effectively. The other contributions in this series on navigating U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific show how these states have sought to recover from the pandemic while also answering structural threats of revisionism and economic headwinds from decoupling, protectionism and changing integration patterns. Cutting across those specific policy issues are three overarching dilemmas that each state will be forced to resolve when making policy. How policymakers navigate these dilemmas will define the policy settings of their regional strategy.
Topic:
Security, Economic Growth, Multilateralism, Regional Integration, Economic Development, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, South Asia, India, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

1187. Covid’s Impact on India’s Soft Power in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Rani Mullen
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Understanding India’s soft power in the Indo-Pacific and the possible impact of its recent decline is essential to a well-informed American strategy in the region. As the world’s second-most populous country and largest democracy, India is an important power and American partner, as highlighted in President Biden’s March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which also identified the Indo-Pacific as vital to American national interests. The Great Power competition in the Indo-Pacific and India’s hard power has been analyzed in other articles in this series. As Joseph Nye pointed out in the 1980s, successful states require both hard and soft power–the wherewithal to coerce as well as the ability to entice and influence the behavior of other countries without force. America’s partnership with India is based not only on the mutual strategic interest of countering China but also on the soft power element of shared democratic values. At the same time, India’s ability to persuade regional countries to partner with it, despite it not having China’s deep pockets or hard power, is key to keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open.
Topic:
Soft Power, COVID-19, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

1188. Re-thinking Coalitions: The United States in a World of Great Power Competition

Author:
Timothy D. Hoyt
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
In 2018, the United States government released The National Security Strategy of the United States and its related National Defense Strategy.1 Each document identified key changes in the national security environment, focusing on the emergence of “great power competition” with both Russia and China. President Biden’s interim national security guidance, issued in March 2021, is more circumspect. The guidance avoids the term “great power competition” but points out China’s increased assertiveness and its potential to mount a challenge to the current international system, as well as Russia’s continued interest in expanding global influence.2 The US-China competition, in particular, is regularly compared to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.3 The Cold War analogy should be used with great caution. It is relatively anomalous in the history of international relations – the result of a unique combination of catastrophic war, which destroyed most of the then great powers, and fundamentally incompatible ideological positions of the two remaining great powers. Similarly, efforts to compare the U.S.-China competition to other bipolar competitions should be made cautiously as well.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Power Politics, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

1189. India’s Networking Response to the Chinese Threat

Author:
Rajesh Basrur
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
India has experienced rising tensions with China in recent years, as demonstrated by two border crises in 2017 and 2020-21. The second event saw the death of some 20 Indian troops, and at least 4 Chinese soldiers, in hand-to-hand combat – the first fatalities in nearly half a century of periodic border face-offs. New Delhi’s policy response has spanned both internal and external balancing. The former has involved augmenting India’s capacity to engage in limited combat of the type that nuclear-armed states have occasionally fought, as did the Soviet Union and China in 1969 and India and Pakistan in 1999. The Indian military has bolstered its border by deploying combat troops, cruise missiles, and advanced combat aircraft. However, China has done much the same, putting pressure on India to upscale its military capabilities. Simultaneously, India has tried to reduce its dependence on the Chinese economy, a more complicated task. Despite a 10 percent decline in bilateral trade owing to the Covid-19 pandemic and border tensions, China was India’s largest trading partner ($77.7 billion) in 2020. The Narendra Modi government sharply cut Chinese investment when the 2020 border confrontation in Ladakh broke out, expelling major Chinese companies like TikTok, WeChat, and UC Browser. Despite these measures, India’s ability to shut China out of its economy is limited. The Indian market depends heavily on Chinese electronic components (70 percent in value terms), pharmaceutical ingredients (70 percent), and consumer durables (45 percent).
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

1190. In Its Hour of Need: India’s Covid-19 Crisis and the Future of The Indo-Pacific

Author:
Jivantli Schottli
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
India struggled with an unprecedented second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. At its height, more than 400,000 new coronavirus cases were being reported daily. In many countries, the second wave was more virulent than the first, mirroring what happened in the fall of 1918, the second and deadliest phase of the Spanish influenza pandemic. Foreign aid poured into India, but the main challenge is to enable and fast-track partnerships and to ramp up vaccine production. Facing an acute situation at home, the Government of India suspended vaccine exports in late March. This was a major blow to countries who had either received doses as part of India’s vaccine diplomacy, or had placed orders with India’s Serum Institute, the world’s largest vaccine producer. In total, India shipped 64 million doses of vaccines to 85 countries. China has stepped in to fill the gap, further cementing its status as the world’s largest vaccine exporter. Since the pandemic began last year, India reported more than 23 million cases and more than 250,000 deaths. In the first seven days of May, India recorded 2.7 million cases and over 25,700 deaths. Earlier in March, cases began to skyrocket in India’s richest state Maharashtra, home to the country’s financial capital Mumbai, a city with an estimated population of 12.5 million. During March, Maharashtra accounted for nearly 70% of the national caseload. Throughout April, a more potent variant of the virus accelerated infection rates and spread across the country. At the time of writing, not only Delhi but states to the north, west, and south experienced shocking, heart-wrenching scenes of suffering spurred on by a lack of oxygen supplies, intensive care units, and hospital beds. Although authorities did not announce a national lockdown, restrictions ranging from complete lockdowns to partial curfews were put in place across the country’s 28 states and eight union territories.
Topic:
Partnerships, Vaccine, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Indo-Pacific