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2. Faltering Lion: Analyzing Progress and Setbacks in Somalia’s War against al-Shabaab
- Author:
- James Barnett
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Analysts have long understood the war against al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate, as “unwinnable” and “[with] no end in sight.” Most have considered the group one of the largest and most sophisticated jihadist insurgencies on the planet while viewing Somalia, the state in which it was born and primarily operates, as a quintessential “failed state.” Yet in mid-2022, many analysts began to change their tune. Al-Shabaab began to suffer its most significant setbacks in a decade at the hands of a clan uprising in Somalia’s central states of Hirshabelle and Galmudug. The uprising quickly received military support from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and some United States officials believe it constitutes Somalia’s Anbar Awakening. Meanwhile, Somali officials speak of this offensive, which they’ve now dubbed Operation Black Lion, as the long-awaited death blow against the group. Unfortunately, the pendulum started to swing back after al-Shabaab began regrouping and counterattacking in early 2023. As of September 2023, the Somali government is struggling to complete the offensive that began last year in central Somalia. All the while, the government promises to achieve ever more ambitious goals for defeating the group in its southern Somalian strongholds by the end of 2024. The question, then, is whether Somalia is really turning a page in the war against al-Shabaab, with the group’s defeat or meaningful degradation in sight for the first time in years, or if the FGS’s battlefield progress in 2022 was merely a short-lived setback for the terrorist group. In this report, I argue that the ongoing, if faltering, offensive against al-Shabaab reveals the dilemma of counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa: On the one hand, al-Shabaab is not invincible, and the group’s center of gravity—its ability to gain a modicum of acceptance or legitimacy from vulnerable Somali communities—has been exposed as fragile. On the other hand, Somalia’s perennial and myriad political disputes, as well as other issues like a lack of state capacity and rampant corruption, are preventing its federal and state governments from capitalizing on the opportunities available to them. Instead, Mogadishu, aware of its limited military capacity, is looking to the militaries of neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia to bear the brunt of its anticipated offensive into southern Somalia, even though these countries’ controversial interventions in Somalia over the years have catalyzed al-Shabaab’s formation and expansion. In any case, there appears to be little appetite from either country to engage in another offensive. Al-Shabaab, for its part, is counterattacking against government forces in central Somalia and looking to expand its operations in neighboring countries—in part to hinder those regional militaries’ potential participation in any forthcoming offensive. Consequently, the situation looks less promising than it did at the end of 2022, and al-Shabaab is unlikely to face a meaningful defeat in the coming months. Instead, the best-case scenario would see this military offensive degrade al-Shabaab over the coming months to the point that the terrorist organization partially fractures and loses some of its popular support, possibly opening up room for the FGS to negotiate with factions of the group. A more likely scenario, however, would see the conflict remain a stalemate, with the government’s current offensive bringing only temporary or superficial gains that do not meaningfully degrade al-Shabaab’s capacity. I have drawn this report from insights I gained during a four-week trip to Kenya and Somalia in June 2023. Within Somalia, I traveled around the federal capital, Mogadishu, as well as the capitals of the states of Jubbaland, Galmudug, and Puntland, in the south, center, and north of the country respectively. I also traveled to the frontline town of Bar Sanguuni, near al-Shabaab–controlled territory in Jubbaland, and separately to Las Anod, a disputed city that both Somaliland and local clans have claimed and that is at the heart of a new regional conflict. Given the sensitivity of discussing security matters in Somalia, I have anonymized the details of interview subjects in almost all references.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Alliance, and Al-Shabaab
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Somalia
3. Pakistan Security Report 2022
- Author:
- Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
- Abstract:
- In 2022, the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan marked an increase of 27 percent from the previous year. The number of terrorist attacks in the country also continued to rise for the second consecutive year. A total of 262 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in the year – including 14 suicide bombings –claimed in all 419 lives and injured another 734 people. A 25 percent increase has been recorded in fatalities in the outgoing year as compared with 2021. Pak Institute for Peace Studies revealed these statistics in its annual “Pakistan Security Report 2022”. The report further noted that the proscribed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was becoming a major irritant in Islamabad’s relations with the Taliban government in Kabul as the militant group remained one of the major actors of violence in Pakistan in the year 2022. Other critical actors of violence in 2022 were Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Over 60 percent of total terrorist attacks recorded in Pakistan in the year were perpetrated by these three militant groups. Similarly, about 95 percent of the total recorded terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2022 concentrated in in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Governance, and Counter-terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan and Asia
4. Ukraine Russia Crisis: Terrorism Briefing
- Author:
- Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
- Abstract:
- On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an attack on Ukraine. Figure 1 highlights that the invasion comes after a decade of deteriorating relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West. This brief covers several aspects relating to the current Ukrainian war, including the frequency of past acts of terrorism in Russia, Ukraine and Georgia and covers likely future scenarios. It also analyses cyberattacks on Ukraine over the last decade and lead up to the current war. The main finding is that terrorism increases with the intensity of conflict. Both the Georgian conflict in 2008 and the Ukrainian conflict of 2014 saw substantial spikes in terrorist activity around the wars, and as the current war intensifies increased terrorist activity should be expected. Secondly, cyberattacks on Ukraine have markedly increased over the last decade, and especially in the months and weeks leading up to the war. Further, cyberattacks have the potential to unintentionally spill over into other countries because of global connectivity, the effects of which have been seen on numerous occasions. As cyberattacks by nefarious actors are a recent phenomenon, and given the difficulty in the attribution of such attacks, the demarcation between what constitutes a cyberattack, cyber warfare or cyber terrorism are unclear. Regardless, this briefing looks at the broad phenomena of cyberattacks in Ukraine to offer background on recent events.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia
5. Global Terrorism Index 2022
- Author:
- Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
- Abstract:
- This is the ninth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last decade. The calculation of the GTI score takes into account not only deaths, but also incidents, hostages, and injuries from terrorism, weighted over a five-year period. The GTI report is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) using data from TerrorismTracker and other sources. TerrorismTracker provides event records on terrorist attacks since 1 January 2007. The dataset contains over 60,500 terrorist incidents for the period 2007 to 2021.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Ideology, COVID-19, and Ecology
- Political Geography:
- North Africa, Morocco, Sahel, Global Focus, and Sub-Saharan Africa
6. Global Peace Index 2022
- Author:
- Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
- Abstract:
- This is the 16th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 per cent of the world’s population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. In addition to discussing the findings from the 2022 GPI, the report includes an analysis of the military conflict in Ukraine. It covers likely increases in military spending, new and emerging uses of technology in the war, its impact on food prices and global shipping routes. The report also contains a deeper analysis on violent demonstrations around the world.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Economics, Terrorism, Military Spending, Conflict, Peace, and Instability
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
7. Countering Terrorism on Tomorrow’s Battlefield: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 2)
- Author:
- Sarah J. Lohmann, Lucas M. Cox, Denise Feldner, Trevor P. Helmy, and Katherine L. Kuzminski
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- Every day, malicious actors target emerging technologies and medical resilience or seek to wreak havoc in the wake of disasters brought on by climate change, energy insecurity, and supply-chain disruptions. Countering Terrorism on Tomorrow’s Battlefield is a handbook on how to strengthen critical infrastructure resilience in an era of emerging threats. The counterterrorism research produced for this volume is in alignment with NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept, which details how NATO Allies can transform and maintain their advantage despite new threats for the next two decades. The topics are rooted in NATO’s Seven Baseline requirements, which set the standard for enhancing resilience in every aspect of critical infrastructure and civil society. As terrorists hone their skills to operate lethal drones, use biometric data to target innocents, and take advantage of the chaos left by pandemics and natural disasters for nefarious purposes, NATO forces must be prepared to respond and prevent terrorist events before they happen. Big-data analytics provides potential for NATO states to receive early warning to prevent pandemics, cyberattacks, and kinetic attacks. NATO is perfecting drone operations through interoperability exercises, and space is being exploited by adversaries. Hypersonic weapons are actively being used on the battlefield, and satellites have been targeted to take down wind farms and control navigation. This handbook is a guide for the future, providing actionable information and recommendations to keep our democracies safe today and in the years to come.
- Topic:
- NATO, Climate Change, Terrorism, Infrastructure, Elections, Drones, Pandemic, Resilience, Supply Chains, and Energy Sector
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America
8. Seven Myths about the Iran Nuclear Deal
- Author:
- Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- In 2015, President Barack Obama worked with three European powers, the European Union, Iran, China, and Russia to conclude the Iran nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2018, President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the deal. Instituting his policy of “maximum pressure,” Trump imposed crippling economic sanctions that punished Iran not just for its ongoing nuclear weapons program but also for, among other things, its regional aggression and support for terrorism worldwide. Earlier in 2018, Israeli agents conducted a dramatic operation in Tehran, breaking into a secret warehouse and capturing a trove of Iranian nuclear files. These documents revealed a more advanced and comprehensive nuclear weapons program than had been previously known. The nuclear archive also showed Iranian officials’ plan for concealing nuclear weapons efforts under the guise of civilian research and development, and how Iranian officials systematically deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to cooperate with IAEA inspectors to verify the peaceful nature of its program. After the Israelis shared the nuclear archive with the IAEA, its inspectors found traces of uranium at several undeclared sites. Despite being obligated to do so, Tehran has refused to explain the presence of the uranium or reveal its current location. Iran’s requirements under the NPT are wholly separate from the JCPOA, but Tehran is using the Biden administration’s profound desire to return to the nuclear deal to bring political pressure on the IAEA to close the book on Iran’s violations. A fair-minded observer of Iran’s relations with the IAEA cannot but conclude that Tehran has never wavered from its intention to build a nuclear weapons capability and that its publicly declared “civilian” nuclear activities are an effort to hide its nuclear bomb program in plain sight. From the very inception of the JCPOA, however, the deal’s supporters have spun myths that disguise these self-evident truths. After Trump left the deal, those same supporters continued to recite the old myths while adding some new ones about the purported comparative advantage of the JCPOA over maximum pressure. As President Biden prepares to bring the United States back into the JCPOA, and as the public, the press, and Congress consider the deal's terms, we identify the seven most pernicious myths and explain the reality that they seek to conceal.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
9. Seven Myths about the “Historic” Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Agreement
- Author:
- Michael Doran
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Commentators in the United States and Israel have hailed the agreement on the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon, which the Biden administration recently brokered, as a great success. They liken it to the Abraham Accords and claim that it is a major step toward normalizing relations between the Jewish State and a historic Arab foe. But a close examination of the agreement simply does not support this view. Amos Hochstein, the US State Department senior advisor for energy security, led the mediation effort to resolve this dispute. He built on the initiatives of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump to reconcile the conflicting claims of Israel, which claimed Line 1 (see map) as the northern border of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and Lebanon, which claimed Line 23 as its southern border. In the final months of the Trump administration, Lebanese negotiators revised their claim, moving it further south to Line 29. Beirut, however, never registered this new claim with the United Nations. In other words, Line 23 always remained the official Lebanese position. When Hochstein arrived in Beirut last February, the Lebanese government abruptly dropped its insistence on Line 29 and presented its retreat as a sign of its flexibility, a compromise proposal that it could withdraw if the negotiations failed to produce satisfactory results.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon
10. Dealing with a Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan: Supporting the Afghan People without Legitimizing the Regime
- Author:
- Lisa Curtis
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Nearly 20 years after U.S. forces overturned Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Islamist movement is back in power. This follows the U.S. troop withdrawal in summer 2021 and a failed peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban that was concluded during the Trump administration. The U.S. government must continue to monitor terrorism threats emanating from Afghanistan and work with like-minded nations to protect Afghan civil society, especially women and girls. While competing with China may be America’s number one foreign policy priority, managing terrorism threats and protecting women’s rights in Afghanistan also demands continued U.S. attention and resources. First and foremost, the United States and other international donors must help Afghanistan avoid a humanitarian disaster and ensure average Afghans can meet their basic needs for food, shelter, and access to healthcare. While the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations are finding ways to get cash into the system without funneling it through the Taliban, there is a need to identify a more reliable and sustainable solution to Afghanistan’s liquidity crisis. However, releasing to the Taliban without conditions the nearly $7 billion in Afghan foreign reserves that Washington froze following the Taliban takeover of the country is not the answer. The Biden administration must avoid giving these assets to the Taliban interim government, which comprises mostly individuals who have been sanctioned for their involvement in terrorism.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Taliban, and Humanitarian Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and South Asia
11. Iran Entangled: Iran and Hezbollah’s Support to Proxies Operating in Syria
- Author:
- Nakissa Jahanbani and Suzanne Weedon Levy
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- At a time when power dynamics in the Middle East region are in flux due to the shifting circumstances of the Islamic State, the drawdown of U.S. troops in the region, and the intensification of Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. and Saudi Arabian targets in the region, an historical look at the support Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) provided to proxies during the Syrian civil war may yield insights into Iran’s past and present playbook not only in Syria but potentially other contexts. The civil war in Syria was a unique catalyst that intensified Iranian economic, political, and religious activity in the country, which was ongoing since the 1980s. During the conflict, Iran demonstrated the ability to exert influence tactically while also building a religious and social support base in Syrian society. Iran achieved these goals, in part, through raising and supporting various non-state militant groups in Syria. Drawing on open sources and interviews with subject matter experts, this report investigates the nature of Iranian and LH support to proxies operating in Syria from 2011 to 2019. While the nature of Iran’s proxy network is dynamic, it is useful to investigate the network at its peak years to understand existing and potential future structures and capabilities for Iranian external operations. This report investigates support from Iranian actors—inclusive of the IRGC and its various components, notably the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), as well as the Iranian government more generally—and LH through the lens of kinetic (e.g., joint attacks between the militias and Iranian actors and/or LH, personnel placed with militias, and training and weapons provided to militias) and non-kinetic assistance (e.g., funding, logistical support, recruitment and social service assistance, and meetings between Iranian actors and/or LH and militias). Looking at these two categories of support provides a more holistic snapshot of Iranian influence and capacity-building with proxies in Syria. The report’s findings indicate a pattern of support on the part of Iran and LH that potentially indicates a phased rollout of battlefield-related supports to be replaced with longer-term societal entrenchment efforts. Furthermore, Iran and LH share a division of labor between Iranian actors and LH for kinetic supports, but not non-kinetic ones. Specifically, this report found training, weapons provisions, funding, and joint attacks among the most common supports provided by Iran and LH. Finally, of all Iranian actors, this report found the IRGC to be the most prolific supporter to proxies operating in Syria.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Weapons, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Proxy War, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Strategy, and Military Tactics
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Syria
12. Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- Its self-declared caliphate is gone, but ISIS continues to stage attacks and intimidate the public in much of its former domain. The forces fighting the group need to hinder the militants’ movement between Syria’s regions – and, above all, to avoid debilitating conflicts with one another.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, ISIS, War on Terror, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
13. Hezbollah in Colombia: Past and Present Modus Operandi and the Need for Greater Scrutiny
- Author:
- Aurora Ortega
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- A probe of the group’s commercial activities can yield insights on its Latin American operations, which in recent years have touched not only Colombia but also Peru, Chile, and Bolivia. Research on Hezbollah in Latin America has tended to focus on Venezuela and the Tri-Border Area, covering Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, but recent events show that less noted countries deserve attention too. In 2014, for example, Peruvian police arrested a Hezbollah operative in Lima’s Surquillo district for planning a terrorist operation, and security services in the region also evidently disrupted a Hezbollah terrorist plot targeting innocent civilians in Chile. In 2017, Bolivian authorities identified a Hezbollah-affiliated warehouse and seized enough explosive precursor material to produce a two-and-a-half-ton bomb. Then, in fall 2021 in Colombia, local reporting indicated that Hezbollah was planning to assassinate an Israeli national as part of a broader operation that also targeted Americans, reportedly to avenge the January 2020 killing of Iran’s Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani. In this incisive Policy Note, researcher Aurora Ortega demonstrates how enhanced scrutiny of Hezbollah’s commercial ventures could provide insight into the group’s operations and potentially disrupt its infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere. To this end, she highlights the activities of little-known Hezbollah agents in Latin America and outlines opportunities for the United States to interdict them through a mix of law enforcement, sanctions, and diplomacy.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Non State Actors, Law Enforcement, Hezbollah, and Commerce
- Political Geography:
- Colombia and South America
14. U.S. Counterterrorism Reimagined: Tracking the Biden Administration's Effort to Reform How America Addresses Violent Extremism
- Author:
- Matthew Levitt
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- This collection reveals the growing prevalence of nonkinetic tools while exploring the balance authorities must strike between preventing attacks and protecting civil rights. Two very different events epitomized the CT/CVE challenge facing the incoming Biden administration in 2021: the January 6 insurrection at the Capitol and the August U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. The first reflected the sharp rise in violent extremism from white supremacists, anti-government actors, and other similar figures, while the second presented the disturbing prospect of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as a haven for Islamist terrorism. These watershed moments occurred as Washington sought to free up funds to address a wide range of equally important national security issues, from the rise of China and Russia, to climate change, domestic infrastructure needs, and public health issues. The tenth volume of The Washington Institute’s Counterterrorism Lecture Series, edited by Matthew Levitt, covers the period January 2021 to March 2022. While revealing a trend toward nonkinetic tools—as indicated by a full-day Institute panel devoted to the subject—the selections also probe the delicate but necessary balance officials must strike between preventing attacks and protecting civil rights.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Civil Rights, Joe Biden, and Countering Violent Extremism
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
15. Fighting Jihadists By, With, and Through U.S. Partners: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects
- Author:
- Ido Levy
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Special forces have succeeded especially in such missions, but any BWT effort requires some U.S. ground presence to achieve its goals. As part of its bid to end Middle East “forever wars,” the United States has employed a “by, with, and through” (BWT) doctrine for fighting jihadist adversaries. Such operations rely on local partner forces to assume the bulk of the hard ground combat, sometimes with U.S. accompaniment, while American advisors provide support through training, intelligence, heavy air and artillery assets, equipment, funding, and logistics. BWT missions have seen success over the past two decades in theaters such as Iraq (with the Counter Terrorism Service), Syria (with the Syrian Democratic Forces), and Somalia (with the Danab Brigade). But they do not succeed on their own and must be guided by several principles, including a serious U.S. commitment, alignment of American and partner interests, and strong interpersonal relations between advisors and local actors. In this tightly argued Policy Note, military analyst Ido Levy emphasizes the particular success of U.S.-created special forces in missions against jihadist forces. But he cautions that BWT efforts cannot thrive without some U.S. ground presence and, as occurred in Afghanistan, would likely fail amid an outright American withdrawal.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Jihad
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and United States of America
16. Hamas at 35
- Author:
- Devorah Margolin
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- A look back at the group’s track record and unchanging core ideology shows why its gestures toward democracy and inclusivity should not be mistaken for true moderation. On December 14, Hamas celebrated the thirty-fifth anniversary of its founding. In addition to unveiling a new logo, the group held a rally in Gaza City, where it showed off the gun of slain Israeli soldier Hadar Goldin, released numerous statements reiterating its goals, and hinted at future conflicts with Israel. Such hostile displays are no surprise given the course of the group’s ideological and political development over the past four decades.
- Topic:
- Economics, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, Hamas, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
17. Pakistan’s Destabilization Playbook: Khalistan Separatist Activism Within the US
- Author:
- Aparna Pande, Husain Haqqani, C Christine Fair, Michael Rubin, Seth Oldmixon, and Clay Westrope
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Hudson Institute’s South and Central Asia Program assembled a group of South Asia experts to evaluate the fifty-five interlinked Kashmiri and Khalistani groups currently operating within the United States and the possibility that these groups receive funding, support, and military training from Pakistan, have ties to militant and terrorist groups in India, and could detrimentally impact US foreign policy in South Asia. The activities of Khalistani groups located in North America should be investigated, within the limits prescribed by law, to prevent a reoccurrence of the violence orchestrated by the Khalistan movement in the 1980s. During that period, along with numerous attacks on civilians, the Khalistan movement was linked to the 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182 from Montreal to London that left 329 dead and the failed bombing of an Air India jet in Tokyo on the same day. The US government has shown reluctance to act on intelligence from India concerning Pakistan-supported Khalistan militancy, largely due to Pakistan’s role as the artery providing logistical support to the US military mission in Afghanistan following 9/11. Compounding the issue, China has blocked the designation of Pakistan-based terrorists under the United States’ terrorist-designation process within the United Nations Security Council.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Political Activism, Separatism, and Destabilization
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, South Asia, and United States of America
18. A Course Correction for the Sahel Stabilisation Strategy
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- Since 2013, when it sent troops to Mali, France has led international efforts to root out Islamist militancy from the Sahel. Yet the jihadist threat has grown. Paris and its partners should reorient their military-centred approach toward helping improve governance in the region.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Military Strategy, Violent Extremism, Political stability, and Strategic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Europe and France
19. Overkill: Reforming the Legal Basis for the U.S. War on Terror
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Congress passed a use of force authorisation that successive presidents have used to expand military action ever further. As part of our series The Legacy of 9/11 and the “War on Terror”, we argue that Washington should enact a new statute that promotes transparency and narrows the war’s scope.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Military Strategy, War on Terror, and Civil-Military Relations
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
20. Mali: Enabling Dialogue with the Jihadist Coalition JNIM
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- Authorities in Mali seem to be considering negotiations with Jamaat Nusratul Islam wal-Muslimin, the country’s largest Islamist insurgency. Pursuing talks will be a tall order, given the stakes and the group’s al-Qaeda connection. Both the government and the militants should begin with incremental steps.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Terrorism, Conflict, Violence, and Dialogue
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Mali
21. Radical Right Narratives and Norwegian Counter-narratives in the Decade of Utøya and Bærum Solo-actor Attacks
- Author:
- Mette Wiggen
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hedayah
- Abstract:
- This country report, written by Dr. Mette Wiggen, is one of the outputs of the CARR-Hedayah Radical Right Counter Narratives Project, a year-long project under the STRIVE Global Program at Hedayah funded by the European Union and implemented by the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR). The overall project creates one of the first comprehensive online toolkits for practitioners and civil society engaged in radical right extremist counter narrative campaigns. It uses online research to map narratives in nine countries and regions, including Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. It also proposes counter narratives for these countries and regions and advises on how to conduct such campaigns in an effective manner.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Political Extremism, Civil Society Organizations, and Countering Violent Extremism
- Political Geography:
- United States, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Canada, Norway, Germany, Hungary, Australia, and New Zealand
22. From Direct Action to Terrorism: Canadian Radical Right Narratives and Counter-narratives at a Time of Volatility
- Author:
- William Allchorn
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hedayah
- Abstract:
- This country report, written by Dr. William Allchorn, is one of the outputs of the CARR-Hedayah Radical Right Counter Narratives Project, a year-long project under the STRIVE Global Program at Hedayah funded by the European Union and implemented by the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR). The overall project creates one of the first comprehensive online toolkits for practitioners and civil society engaged in radical right extremist counter narrative campaigns. It uses online research to map narratives in nine countries and regions, including Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. It also proposes counter narratives for these countries and regions and advises on how to conduct such campaigns in an effective manner.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Ideology, Radical Right, Political Extremism, Narrative, and Direct Action
- Political Geography:
- Canada and North America
23. The Overseen Factors Impacting the Afghan Peace Process
- Author:
- Sahar Khan
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The international community is focused on the ongoing intra-Afghan peace process, which has steadied despite several challenges. There are two developments, however, that will have a lasting impact on the process: The International Criminal Court’s investigation into war crimes committed by the Taliban, Afghan forces, and US forces, and the strategic evolution of the Taliban as a legitimate political actor.
- Topic:
- Security, International Law, Terrorism, Taliban, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, and Eurasia
24. Pakistan Security Report 2020
- Author:
- Safdar Sial, Anam Fatima, Ahmed Ali, and Mikail Shaikh
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
- Abstract:
- The year 2020 sustained the declining trend in the incidence of terrorist violence in Pakistan that has been ongoing since 2014. The statistics provided by Pakistan Security Report 2020 indicated a 36 percent decrease in the number of terrorist attacks this year, as compared to 2019; the number of people killed in these attacks also plummeted by 38 percent. However, these plummeting numbers do not suggest, in any way, that the threat of terrorism has been completely eliminated. While multiple factors have contributed, including continuous operational and surveillance campaigns by security forces, and some counter-extremism actions taken under the National Action Plan (NAP), in reducing terrorist violence at the tactical and operational levels, but the militant and sectarian groups have been becoming active again of late. Secondly, the underlying factors of religious extremism and persecution persist in the country, which could feed into terrorist violence and/or faith-based violence by individuals and mobs. While the incidence and level of terrorist violence can be measured, it is very hard to measure extremism and extremist trends in a society. Therefore, a reduction in terrorist violence should not be taken as a measure of a reduction in extremism.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan
25. Amidst Anti-COVID Protests, Far-Right Extremists Are Using a New Symbol: An All-Black American Flag
- Author:
- Grace Vaule
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- TRAC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
- Abstract:
- Currently, amidst a backdrop of COVID-related vaccine and mask mandates, far-right extremists in the United States are using another symbol: the all-black American flag.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Violent Extremism, COVID-19, Political Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
- Political Geography:
- United States
26. The Dual Strategy Behind Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’s (JNIM) Katiba Macina Territorial Expansion
- Author:
- Frida Bergström
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- TRAC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
- Abstract:
- The takeover of four distinct areas by the AQC affiliate, Jama’a Nusrat ul- Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) reflects an issue that is expanding exponentially into Mali’s neighbouring countries.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Militant Islam, Political Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
- Political Geography:
- West Africa and Mali
27. Counterterrorism Yearbook 2021
- Author:
- Leanne Close and Daria Impiombato
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- ASPI is delighted to release its 5th edition of the Counterterrorism (CT) yearbook, edited by Leanne Close, APM and Daria Impiombato. The 2021 yearbook provides a comprehensive picture of the current global terrorism landscape. The yearbook's 29 authors found Covid-19—a key theme in most chapters—to have had an impact on global terrorism. However, pervasive online social media platforms have played a more significant role, increasing terrorists’ ability to radicalise and incite individuals to commit terrorist acts, as well as encouraging financial support to terrorist groups. The yearbook begins with an overview of current trends and the terrorism landscape in 2020 identified in the 8th Global Terrorism Index (GTI) produced by Australia’s Institute for Economics and Peace. As well as analysis of the impacts of Covid-19 on terrorist threats globally, several key themes emerge from the yearbook’s chapters, consistent with the trends identified in the GTI. These include the impact of social media and technology on terrorist events and radicalisation, and a nexus between terrorism and organised crime. One concerning example highlights the impact of natural disasters on violent extremism, with a study of 167 countries over 30 years from 1970, which found that an increase in deaths from natural disasters resulted in an increase in terrorism-related deaths and attacks in the following two years. Strong examples of prevention and strategies to counter violent extremism are outlined in the yearbook, providing governments and CT practitioners with contemporary analysis of current and emerging challenges and offering key policy recommendations to combat radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism in all its forms.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, and Hybrid Threats
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
28. Reviewing Jihadist Governance in the Sahel
- Author:
- Natasja Rupesinghe, Mikael Hiberg Naghizadeh, and Corentin Cohen
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The ways in which jihadist insurgents in the Sahel govern is rarely considered in the academic literature. They have often been portrayed as ‘Islamic terrorists’, who achieve their objectives by using brutal force against the civilian population and who finance their activities through criminal networks and activities. However, scattered empirical evidence reveals a different picture. Jihadist insurgents, like other insurgent groups, often use a variety of strategies to rule territory and populations. The scale, character and form of how such groups govern differs not only between countries but also at the sub-national level within the same group. Nevertheless, until recently jihadist insurgent governance in Africa and particularly the Sahel region has largely been overlooked. This synthesis reviews the existing literature on jihadist governance in West Africa, with a particular emphasis on the understudied region of the Sahel. The review is organised as follows: first, we clarify key concepts and provide definitions. Second, we provide a brief overview of Islam and politics in the Sahel, contextualising the rise of Salafist-jihadism as well as historical cases of jihadist governance. Third, we provide a brief overview of the literature and synthesise the existing research on jihadist insurgent governance in the Sahel. Fourth, we examine some key cases of jihadist governance in northern Mali, Nigeria and the Liptako-Gourma region straddling Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Finally, we conclude by summarising our findings, discussing the implications for the study of civil war and insurgency and consider avenues for future research.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Terrorism, Governance, and Jihad
- Political Geography:
- Africa
29. Economic Value of Peace 2021: Measuring the global economic impact of violence and conflict
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
- Abstract:
- The comprehensive methodology includes 18 indicators covering the direct and indirect costs of violence, and the expenditures to contain and prevent violence. The model also includes a multiplier for the direct costs to account for the additional economic activity resulting from a redirection of these costs to more productive pursuits. The economic impact of violence provides an empirical basis to better understand the economic benefits resulting from improvements in peace. Estimates are provided for 163 countries and independent territories, covering over 99.5 per cent of the global population. It uses the best available data to calculate the overall impact. However, not all categories of violence have reliable data, therefore preventing their inclusion in the model. Some examples of costs excluded from the model are counter-terrorism and intelligence agency expenditures, insurance costs, lost business opportunities and family violence. As such, the estimates presented in this report are considered highly conservative. In 2019, the economic impact of violence decreased by $64 billion from the previous year. This was the equivalent of a 0.4 per cent decrease and was largely driven by reductions in Armed Conflict. This fall predominantly occurred in the Middle East and North Africa region and was driven by fewer terror attacks, conflict deaths, and population displacement costs. This is a continued reversal of previous periods where between 2012 and 2017, the global economic impact of violence rose by 12.2 per cent to peak at $14.8 trillion. This is the second consecutive year of improvement.
- Topic:
- Political Violence, Terrorism, Peacekeeping, Violence, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
30. A Fight by Other Means: Keeping the Peace with Colombia’s FARC
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- Colombia’s 2016 peace deal was a landmark achievement, convincing the FARC guerrillas to disarm and enter civilian life. Yet much remains to be done to show insurgents that they can redress their grievances through ordinary politics. The country’s leaders should recommit to finishing the job.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Colombia and South America
31. Syria: Shoring Up Raqqa’s Shaky Recovery
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- After suffering grievously under ISIS, and during the battles to defeat it, Raqqa is being rebuilt. The calm is tenuous, however. The U.S. and partners should work toward long-term stability in Syria’s north east, through investment and talks about sustainable governance and security arrangements.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, ISIS, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
32. Once a Jihadist, Always a Jihadist? A Deradicalization Program Seen from the Inside
- Author:
- Marc Hecker
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- France has traditionally taken a security-based approach to the fight against terror. It was a latecomer to the field of radicalization prevention and the establishment of disengagement programs aimed at jihadists. It only started to think seriously about the issue in 2013 and its first attempts involved certain irregularities. For that reason, deradicalization suffers from a persistent bad reputation in France. The disengagement and reintegration programs established since 2016—RIVE from 2016 until 2018 and PAIRS, which started in 2018 and is still running—have operated behind closed doors. Discreetness was preferred to overcommunication. This study—the result of a long-term field survey of the staff, participants, and partners of PAIRS—opens the black box of disengagement methods. It offers a nuanced assessment of these initiatives, which, after four years of operations, have produced reassuring results: among the dozens of terrorist offenders who have participated in RIVE and PAIRS in open custody, none have reoffended.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Radicalization, Islamism, Jihad, and Deradicalization
- Political Geography:
- Europe and France
33. A transatlantic agenda for homeland security and resilience beyond COVID-19
- Author:
- Anna Wieslander
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has disclosed the importance of resilient power – a society’s capability to absorb unexpected major shocks, handle and adapt to these, and then, most importantly, bounce back. As the pandemic still rages, endurance has become a major challenge for individuals, institutions, companies, and societies. It emphasizes another dimension of resilience: it is not only about how fast society is able to bounce back and recover at a certain moment, but also how it can withstand repeated shocks over time. The pandemic also brought the notion of solidarity to the forefront and exposed the connection between strong resilience and solidarity in open societies. Solidarity was repeatedly tested within and between nations, as well as between different parts of society. Fragmentation and competition flourished amid weak resilience and discouraged tendencies toward cooperation, despite potential gains. To successfully handle modern challenges to homeland security and resilience, such as climate change and pandemics, there is no way around efficient cooperation. For resilience to be strong, it must be developed not only among states but also in partnership with the private sector, as resilience must be ensured for individuals, communities, private businesses, and public institutions, and at all levels of authority. Furthermore, the pandemic has heightened other threats to modern societies, including disinformation, cyber operations, attacks on election systems, and social media manipulation. Ultimately, these threats are targeted to undermine democracy itself. They differ in character, magnitude, and scope, but are often non-military. This new report, “A Transatlantic Agenda for Homeland Security and Resilience Beyond COVID-19”, highlights some of these modern challenges, which could be possible focus areas for transatlantic cooperation, as well as ideas for building and enhancing capabilities. This report is the result of a half-day online workshop held on January 28, 2021. This report aims to help shape a transatlantic agenda on homeland security and resilience that encompasses everything from policy and capabilities to future science and technology in a time when the transatlantic relationship is ideally positioned to be revitalized and deepened.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Terrorism, Infrastructure, European Union, Crisis Management, Resilience, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Non-Traditional Threats
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America
34. Arab Gulf States and the Situation in Afghanistan
- Author:
- Sara Nowacka
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Arab state authorities are refraining from making unequivocal declarations about the future of relations with Afghanistan after the Taliban took power. The priority of the Arab leadership in the Persian Gulf will be to prevent the destabilisation of Afghanistan and to influence the Afghan government policy towards terrorist organisations. Given the convergence of EU and Arab state goals related to countering the threat of terrorism in the country, the Union could include them in the announced regional platform for cooperation on Afghanistan.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Terrorism, Taliban, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, Middle East, and Gulf Nations
35. Accidental Allies: The US–Syrian Democratic Forces Partnership Against the Islamic State
- Author:
- Michael Knights and Wladimir van Wilgenburg
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- To some, America's partnership with the SDF exemplified an economy-of-force effort that minimized U.S. casualties and wrested control of northeast Syria from the Islamic State. To others, it was a cautionary tale about a U.S. military hoodwinked into working with a terrorist group. The story of America’s military and political partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces is a controversial one. To some, it is a shining example of an economy-of-force effort that minimized U.S. casualties, wrested control of northeast Syria from the Islamic State, and improved the area’s general political trajectory. To others, it is a cautionary tale of a U.S. military that was hoodwinked by a charismatic and capable partner closely tied to a U.S.-designated terrorist group, the Kurdistan Workers Party, with Washington deliberately averting its eyes from the strategic, political, and moral costs of the partnership. The subject deserves a neutral, data-led investigation that follows the facts wherever they lead. In this volume—copublished by The Washington Institute and I.B. Tauris—military expert Michael Knights and journalist Wladimir van Wilgenburg dive deep into the U.S. relationship with the SDF. The study benefited from intensive debates on sourcing, objectivity, and the need to probe uncomfortable issues. The findings cast light not only on the successes and shortcomings of this particular alliance, but also on how Washington might most profitably pursue “by, with, and through” operations with other forces in the future.
- Topic:
- Security, Politics, Terrorism, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Military
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America
36. Back to Basics: U.S.-Iraq Security Cooperation in the Post-Combat Era
- Author:
- Michael Knights and Alex Almeida
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Questions about the viability of the Iraqi security forces—brought into sharp focus by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan—require a data-led analysis of where the forces are today and what mix of U.S., NATO, and European efforts can help them thrive in the future. The August collapse of the Afghan National Security Forces shook the world’s faith in U.S. security cooperation, prompting hard questions about similar arrangements with Iraq. In a country where the United States has been training forces for two decades, officials need straight answers. How resilient are today’s U.S.-supported Iraqi security forces, and could they operate with gradually reduced American support? What kind of near-term Iraqi force development should the coalition credibly expect to see? And how should U.S.-led security cooperation evolve after the December “transition of mission” to a non-combat role? In this urgently applicable Policy Focus, longtime ISF watchers Michael Knights and Alex Almeida provide a data-led analysis of where Iraq’s security forces are today, how they will look tomorrow, and what mixture of U.S., NATO, and European efforts can ensure the best result commensurate with American interests. The roadmap they outline shows how Baghdad can ultimately achieve enduring victory over the Islamic State and overmatch the domestic opponents of a sovereign, stable, and democratic Iraq.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Politics, Terrorism, and Shia
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America
37. A Blurred Line Between Civil Society and Terrorism: Examining Charges of NGOs Funding the PFLP
- Author:
- Matthew Levitt
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The Israeli evidence could reveal a troubling reality wherein groups publicly defend the human rights of some people while supporting acts of terrorism targeting others. On October 19, Israel designated six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist groups affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, causing a firestorm among international civil society and human rights organizations. While such action is inherently controversial, any assessment must consider the underlying evidence, which here emerged from a series of investigations pointing to massive fraud. The effort drew on various sources, including classified intelligence, seized materials, and statements made by arrested employees. And it cast light on high-profile cases such as the August 2019 murder of Israeli teen Rina Shnerb, whose killers were employed by one of the designated groups. In this groundbreaking Policy Note, counterterrorism expert Matthew Levitt closely analyzes Israel’s NGO designations. In doing so, he validates U.S., European, and international requests for an explanation, but simultaneously cautions that the evidence—if proven even partially true—could reveal a troubling reality wherein Palestinian NGOs publicly defend the human rights of some people while supporting terrorist acts against others.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Terrorism, NGOs, and Palestinians
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
38. Professionalizing the Iraqi Army: US Engagement after the Islamic State
- Author:
- C. Anthony Pfaff
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- Security cooperation with Iraq remains a critical component of the US-Iraq relationship. Despite neighboring Iran’s ability to limit US political and economic engagement, Iraq still seeks US assistance to develop its military and to combat resurgent terrorist organizations. This monograph provides a historical and cultural basis from which to understand the limitations and potential for US cooperation with Iraq’s armed forces.
- Topic:
- Security, Politics, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Islamic State, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
39. The India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan
- Author:
- Zachary Constantino
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- The most consequential regional competition for influence in Afghanistan is the contest between India and Pakistan. Indian leaders strive to cultivate Afghanistan as a natural partner and reliable bulwark against Islamic militants, including Pakistan-backed groups, while Islamabad seeks to counter what it regards as an Indo-Afghan nexus to encircle and weaken Pakistan. This report examines the interests and strategies of both countries in Afghanistan within the context of peace negotiations and developments in Kashmir.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Conflict, Peace, Strategic Competition, and Proxy War
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, India, and Kashmir
40. Terrorism is terrorism: The Christchurch terror attack from an Israeli CT perspective
- Author:
- Boaz Ganor
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- Print this page SR155 Terrorism is terrorism - banner 19 MAY 2020 Terrorism is terrorism: The Christchurch terror attack from an Israeli CT perspective By Professor Boaz Ganor This report by Professor Boaz Ganor examines the different phases of the Christchurch terror attack, its similarities to and differences from Islamic jihadist terror attacks, and the lessons to be learnt for preventing, thwarting and managing such attacks, based on Israeli counter-terrorism experience. Lone-wolf attacks have become a widespread phenomenon in many countries, some have ended with a limited number of casualties. The 2019 Christchurch terror attack resulted in dozens of casualties. This report rigorously examines each phase of the attack to assess where points of intervention may have been overlooked and what can be learned from this experience to evolve counter-terrorism strategy and methods. Professor Ganor shares key lessons from the Christchurch attack that will help prevent or thwart future attacks through social media intelligence, artificial intelligence, machine learning and big data, security, gun regulation, damage mitigation and victim treatment, post attack activity, and international cooperation.
- Topic:
- National Security, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Israel, Palestine, Australia, Australia/Pacific, and New Zealand
41. Reframing Islamic State: Trends and themes in contemporary messaging
- Author:
- Telli Betül Karacan
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Studies of IS propaganda show that it uses both new and old, proven methods to recruit members and conquer new territories following the loss of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Islamic State, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, India, Asia, North Africa, and Syria
42. Pandora’s Box in Syria: Anticipating negative externalities of a re-entrenching regime
- Author:
- Samar Batrawi
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- During 2019, the original Syrian conflict entered its closing phases, except for the battlefields of Idlib and in the north east. As a result, conflict dynamics have become somewhat easier to read, as the regime and its key allies have shifted towards a triumphalist ‘post-war’ narrative and corresponding governance styles, deal-making and decision-making. These developments can be witnessed in three interlinked spheres: security, civil, and political economic practices. Together, they largely form the Assad regime’s political economy, which – although poorly understood due to limited access – is crucial to understand to assess the negative externalities likely to result from its wartime survival and re-entrenchment. The paper analyses six such externalities: 1. risk of conflict relapse due to economic pressures 2. the politics of refugees 3. risks and instrumentalisation of terrorism 4. regional instability 5. humanitarian culpability 6. deterioration of the international legal order. These externalities are interconnected and emerge from the political economy of the regime – the accumulation of its security, civil and political economic practices. Their nature and volume suggest that the Syrian civil war will plague its neighbors, as well as Europe, for a long time to come. These externalities also focus our attention on the fact that adequate containment strategies should be designed as a matter of urgency, to limit their negative impact.
- Topic:
- Security, International Law, Political Economy, Terrorism, Refugees, Conflict, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, and Idlib
43. Reforming the Department of Homeland Security Through Enhanced Oversight & Accountability
- Author:
- Carrie Cordero
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- In November 2002, 14 months after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the department) was created by Congress to make America safer from terrorism.1 At the time, the policy focus was on international terrorism, in particular al Qaeda. Since then, not only has the terrorism landscape evolved—from al Qaeda and its affiliates to ISIS to the present increased attention to domestic terrorism linked to white supremacist violence2—but the scope and complexity of national security threats have evolved. The new department centralized border security, immigration enforcement, transportation security, emergency management, and critical infrastructure protection, plus additional functions, with an intent to protect against future terrorist attack. The fundamental activities of the department, however, have always been broader than terrorism. And over the years, attention to the department has quickly shifted depending on the critical events of the time, whether a natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, or persistent cyberattacks and other malign cyberactivity since the mid-2000s, or the emergence of a global pandemic.3 Meanwhile, due to a variety of factors, the size and complexity of DHS’s law enforcement functions have grown, while recent attention has focused primarily on the border and immigration functions. The department is arguably the most operational agency in the federal government in terms of its routine activities that affect and directly touch millions of people each day. These varying and disparate missions across the department are focused domestically and therefore require substantial attention to whether and how they are carried out in accordance with law and respect for constitutional protections. This report, issued as part of a Center for a New American Security (CNAS) project4 on enhancing DHS oversight and accountability, posits that 18 years into the department’s existence, the functions of border security and immigration enforcement, as well as the law enforcement functions of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in particular, have grown disproportionately large in size and broad in scope, without the necessary oversight and accountability structures that must accompany such activities.5 And DHS’s border and immigration functions are under tremendous strain as they are tasked with increased policy directives, humanitarian challenges on the southern border, intense political pressure, and growing public scrutiny about these functions. The department is in severe need of legislative attention and policy coordination. If it does not reform to address the issues identified in this report, it is likely the department will face calls for partial or full dismantlement under a future administration.6 Such a result would undo nearly 20 years of effort to better protect the nation from terrorism and emerging homeland threats, and risk returning to a pre-9/11 era of dis-jointed homeland security coordination.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Homeland Security, Accountability, and Oversight
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
44. The Terrorist Lists: An Examination of the U.S. Government’s Counterterrorism Designations Efforts
- Author:
- Seth Loertscher, Daniel Milton, Bryan C. Price, and Cynthia Loertscher
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- After the attacks of September 2001, the U.S. government grappled with ways to apply all aspects of its national power against the terrorist groups it found itself combating militarily. On the diplomatic and financial fronts, much of this increased effort revolved around the sanctioning and designating of terrorist groups and individual terrorist actors, resulting in a drastic increase of the number of individuals and groups which were branded with the term “terrorist.” Yet despite the application of these tools for almost 20 years, or longer in some cases, little work has been done to understand the impact of these programs. This report examines two sanctioning efforts the U.S. government has employed against terrorist actors: the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list and the designation of individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under the authority granted by Executive Order 13224. Although the specific purposes of each of these programs differ from one another, ultimately both represent a non-kinetic approach to counterterrorism that relies on the application of diplomatic and/or financial statecraft. The examination of each of these programs in this report has two general goals. The first is to provide an overview of the program and descriptive statistics regarding its implementation. The second is to provide some form of assessment regarding the impact that these programs have on terrorist groups and individuals. In accomplishing these two goals, the authors relied exclusively on open-source information collected by researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). This report attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the impacts of these tools, in addition to highlighting some of the structural limitations and gaps in the application of counterterrorism sanctions.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, Hamas, and Abu Sayyaf
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Middle East, Global Focus, and United States of America
45. Rising in the East: A Regional Overview of the Islamic State’s Operations in Southeast Asia
- Author:
- Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- In 2016, the Islamic State acknowledged a series of pledges from Southeast Asian militant groups by declaring Isnilon Hapilon of the Abu Sayyaf Group to be the regional emir and encouraging local supporters to travel to the Philippines to wage jihad. Since 2016, a wave of Islamic State-linked attacks, including attempted and successful suicide attacks across the region, as well as the Marawi siege in 2017 by Islamic State-linked groups, has raised significant regional security concerns. Critical questions about the growing influence of the Islamic State in Southeast Asia, the interconnectedness of Islamic State affiliates, and the risks associated with returning fighters from Iraq and Syria remain unanswered. In the first of a four-part series on the Islamic State in Southeast Asia, this report sheds light on the overarching characteristics of Islamic State-linked operations across Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines between 2014 and 2019, highlighting how the Islamic State’s arrival has affected regional militancy. Drawing on open-source materials, the report maps the characteristics and regional dispersion of Islamic State-linked activity in the region, providing regional and country-level context for the nature of the threat. Additionally, the report identifies six regional militant groups as the Islamic State’s operational affiliates, defined as groups that have claimed attacks concurrently with the Islamic State. The findings of the report draw attention to a marked increase in the use of Islamic State-linked suicide attacks and lethality in 2019, and significant numbers of failed and foiled attacks by Islamic State-affiliated or -inspired individuals in Indonesia and Malaysia. While the most important dimension of the Islamic State threat may be the existing militant infrastructure offered by its operational alliances in the Philippines and Indonesia, the threat in Malaysia exists in the form of independent plotters and radicalized individuals who present a pool of potential recruits for existing networks of militants in the region.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
- Political Geography:
- Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, and Philippines
46. Small Groups, Big Weapons: The Nexus of Emerging Technologies and Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism
- Author:
- Stephen Hummel and F. John Burpo
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- Historically, only nation-states have had the capacity and resources to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) due to the significant capital, infrastructure, and intellectual capacity required to develop and maintain a WMD program. In recent years, however, this paradigm has been shifting, particularly for non-state actors. The commercialization of emerging technologies is reducing the financial, intellectual, and material barriers required for WMD development and employment. This report surveys three emerging technologies—synthetic biology, additive manufacturing (commonly known as 3D printing), and unmanned aerial systems—and examines the nexus of each with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons agent proliferation. It examines how non-state actors might use these emerging technologies to overcome traditional barriers against the development and employment of WMD. This product, a joint collaboration of the Combating Terrorism Center and the Department of Chemistry and Life Science at West Point, is a timely primer for policymakers, scientists, and security specialists concerned with the impact of emerging technologies on WMD development and terrorists’ capabilities broadly.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
47. Broken, but Not Defeated: An Examination of State-led Operations against Islamic State Khorasan in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2015-2018)
- Author:
- Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- Since its official formation in January 2015, the Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan and Pakistan has risen to prominence as one of its most dangerous affiliates, making it one of the world’s top four deadliest militant organizations in 2018. Islamic State Khorasan’s (ISK) ascendency, however, has not come without heavy costs. Since 2015, a variety of state-led operations against ISK have inflicted substantial manpower and leadership losses upon the group across Afghanistan and Pakistan. This report is the first to conduct a systematic review of operations against ISK between 2015 and 2018 to answer the following questions: what is the nature and level of manpower losses incurred by ISK in various campaigns against the group? How have these operations altered the level of the ISK threat, and what do they reveal about ISK’s militant base? Finally, how have these operations affected ISK’s operational capacity? This report draws on open-source materials to assess the above questions, and provides detailed information on the various state-led operations against ISK in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the group’s associated costs in terms of losses of both leadership and other ISK-linked individuals. As this report demonstrates, intense targeting of ISK in both countries has resulted in substantial losses for the group; between 2015 and 2018, ISK’s losses amounted to the killing, capture, or surrender of well over 10,000 ISK-linked individuals and over 500 militants in leadership roles, predominantly in Afghanistan. A parallel examination of the group’s losses and its operational activity indicates that while state-led operations have curtailed ISK’s overall number of attacks and its geographical expansion, the group has retained its ability to conduct highly lethal attacks, as evidenced by recently claimed attacks in Kabul in late February and early March 2020. The report’s findings also imply that one of ISK’s key strengths, which has allowed it to survive the onslaught of state-led operations, is its access to a steady supply of experienced militants on both sides of the border that allows it to replace its top leaders and replenish its human capital.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia
48. Leaders under Fire: Defending Colombia’s Front Line of Peace
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- Murders of Colombian grassroots activists are increasing at an alarming rate. The killers seek to sabotage the country’s 2016 peace agreement and the rural economic reform it promised. Bogotá should step up prosecution of these crimes while pushing to improve social conditions in the countryside.
- Topic:
- Economics, Terrorism, Political Activism, Reform, Conflict, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Colombia and South America
49. Taking al Qaeda Seriously in Afghanistan: Policy Options for the United States
- Author:
- Hannan Hussain
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Despite limited numerical strength, al Qaeda exercises sufficient leverage over contending Taliban factions and continues to cultivate an enduring interest in attacking U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan. To break the al Qaeda-Taliban nexus, Washington must upgrade its verification metrics, and initiate COVID-19 recovery assistance that limits al Qaeda’s influence-building in Afghanistan.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Terrorism, Taliban, Al Qaeda, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, North America, and United States of America
50. The Future of US-Kazakhstan Relations
- Author:
- Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Since achieving its independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has maintained warm relations with the United States. The country regards the United States both as a potential source for trade and investment and as a partner to balance the influence of Russia and China in Central Asia, a perspective which underlines the importance of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s February visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. During the visit, Pompeo was generous in his praise for Kazakhstan and highlighted the importance of bilateral ties, while criticizing China’s detention of hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, Kyrgyz, and ethnic Kazakhs in so-called “re-education” camps.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, War, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, North America, and United States of America
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