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1. Authoritarian kleptocrats are thriving on the West’s failures. Can they be stopped?

Author:
Francis Shin and Ben Judah
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
A hidden web of power revealed itself to Internet users in early 2022. Following a brutal government crackdown in Kazakhstan in January, anyone using open-source flight-tracking websites could watch kleptocratic elites flee the country on private jets. A little more than a month later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought a new spectacle: social media users were able to track various oligarchs’ superyachts as they jumped from port to port to evade Western sanctions. These feeds captured a national security problem in near real time: In Eurasia and beyond, kleptocratic elites with deep ties to the West were able to move themselves and their assets freely despite a host of speeches by senior officials, sanctions, and structures designed to stop them. Kleptocratic regimes—kleptocracy means “rule by thieves”—have exploited the lax and uneven regulatory environments of the global financial system to hide their ill-gotten gains and interfere in politics abroad, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. They are aided in this task by a large cast of professional enablers within these jurisdictions. The stronger these forces get, the more they erode the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the international sanctions regime imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine has little hope of long-term success if the global financial system itself continues to weaken. The West still has a long way to go to rein in the authoritarian kleptocrats who have thrived on the institutional dysfunction, regulatory failure, and bureaucratic weakness of the transatlantic community for far too long. We need to rethink not just how we combat kleptocracy, but also how we define it. Policy makers need to understand that authoritarian regimes that threaten transatlantic security are closely linked to illicit financial systems. As it stands, our thinking about how foreign corruption spreads is too constrained by stereotypes about kleptocratic goals and actions.
Topic:
Corruption, Diplomacy, Intelligence, Politics, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Rule of Law, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, and United States of America

2. Two Peripheries: The Ukraine War's Effect on North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Anthony V. Rinna
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Spanning the Eurasian landmass, Russia’s actions in adjacent Ukraine invariably affect the geopolitical state of play on the similarly adjacent Korean Peninsula. Although ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia have been of largely secondary importance for both countries since their veritable rupture in the early- and mid-1990s, Moscow-Pyongyang relations became more mutually beneficial in 2022. Whereas most countries have outright condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or taken up an ambiguous position, the DPRK has been vocal in its support for Russia. From the DPRK perspective, the Kremlin’s post-2022 diplomatic and economic estrangement from much of the world has provided Pyongyang with an opening to leverage ties with Russia to push for an easing of its own diplomatic and economic isolation. Meanwhile, strengthening its DPRK ties allows Russia to undermine US influence on its Asian periphery. In supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea appears to be aiming toward obtaining economic benefits from closer ties with Russia, a country whose economy has managed to stay afloat despite heavy Western sanctions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided the impetus for Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow. However, the roots of the current upswing in Moscow-Pyongyang relations go back to the April 2019 summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Kim received an invitation to meet with Putin in May 2018 yet waited eleven months to meet with the Russian leader, even as Kim regularly met with the leaders of other major players on the Korean Peninsula. Kim may have decided after the February 2019 Hanoi summit yielded few results that strengthening ties with Russia, which was more reluctant than China to support UN sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017, was a more viable option for sanctions relief. Aside from the fact that Russia has demonstrated a clear unwillingness to impose new sanctions against the DPRK, North Korean citizens are reported to still be working in Russia in contravention of UN Resolution 2397. North Korean workers’ earnings are said to have suffered because of Russia’s reduced access to hard currency. Yet, the ruble’s continued resilience may mean that earning currency in Russia is still worthwhile for laborers dispatched at Pyongyang’s behest.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

3. Is There Life in the Desert? Russian Civil Society After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
By the end of 2021, all leading independent NGOs and individual human rights activists had been completely suppressed, and all issues deemed inconvenient for the Kremlin had been removed from the agenda of those still operating. This report focuses on the state of Russian civil society at the outset of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as on how it was affected by the war and what are the prospects for its development in the future. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has been moving along the path of creating a fully state-controlled civil society in which the political potential of independent civil activism would be completely undermined. To achieve this goal, the Kremlin pro-actively advanced its network of government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) while simultaneously limiting foreign funding for NGOs. Those who did not abide by the Kremlin’s rules were systematically discriminated against and persecuted under the so-called “foreign agent” laws. Meanwhile, local authorities have stopped all formal and informal interaction with “politicised” civil actors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added further impetus to these trends and strengthened the Kremlin’s resolve to root out any sources of potential defiance. The independent professional NGOs that remained were in a deep crisis. Since February 2022, they have switched to survival mode. In all likelihood, they will either be co-opted by the state through a centralised system of financial support or cease to exist in the near future. The niches that they have left – including in the field of human rights advocacy – are being quickly filled by GONGOs. With their colossal resources, wider media access, and connections in the government, GONGOs are able to attract more young people to join their ranks. In many regions, even the scanty of organised independent civic activism that existed before the war was neither there nor likely to re-emerge in the coming years. In Russia, the level of involvement in NGOs has always been low and the population at large indifferent to the problems of civil society. Therefore, one should be wary of inflated expectations when contemplating the future of Russian civil activism. Even if Putin’s regime collapses, one can hardly anticipate a quick transition towards a truly independent and vibrant civil society. The study was conducted on the basis of interviews with representatives of independent NGOs from various regions who, as of February 2022, were based in Russia. The geography of this survey was expanded as much as possible to make the study more reliable and better reflect the content of the processes underway in the country. This analysis also shows that representatives from Moscow, large provincial cities, and the North Caucasus differ significantly in their perception of the current situation with civil society, whereas their visions for the future diverge considerably. A profound lack of communication among them only amplifies the divisions and fragmentations in Russia’s civil society. The situation in the North Caucasus is of particular note. Albeit being severely weakened, local independent NGOs and activists are – in contrast with the rest of Russia – more disapproving of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine but more optimistic about the future of their home regions. They pin their hopes on the revival of indigenous languages and cultures with the help of diasporas abroad and the emergence of civil society.
Topic:
Civil Society, Human Rights, Politics, War, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

5. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

6. The Challenge of European Political Will

Author:
Rachel Lutz Ellehuus and Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In this follow-on report to 2021’s Europe's High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities and Missions, the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and International Security Program examine the other side of the coin of European military effectiveness: the political will of European countries to conduct military missions and operations. The report identifies the endogenous and exogenous factors constraining or increasing political will and maps them onto six country case studies. Four prototypes of political will emerged from the analysis: global partners, international activists, constrained partners, and minimalists. The report then assesses the political will of European allies and partners to conduct fifteen types of military missions and operations worldwide, from peacekeeping to large-scale combat. It concludes with a summary of key findings. First, it finds that internal and external factors—such as strategic culture and alliance dependence, respectively—will continue to constrain European political will in many cases, even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Second, European states are more likely to have the political will to engage in military missions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum (such as maritime patrol missions) and less likely at the higher ends of the spectrum, except in cases of significant collective or national defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. In Russia, Navalny Inspires Respect for Some, Indifference for Most

Author:
Dina Smeltz, Brendan Helm, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has been sentenced to three and a half years in prison after he returned to Russia from Germany, where he was being treated for exposure to a nerve agent in August 2020. An investigation into the poisoning, conducted with the help of Navalny, has implicated Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). Following Navalny’s arrest and the release of a separate investigation into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s wealth conducted by Navalny, tens of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets across the country to march in support for the jailed Navalny. They were met by a heavy show of force from Russian riot police that included batons, shields, and thousands of arrests. This repressive response prompted US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to condemn “the persistent use of harsh tactics against peaceful protesters and journalists.” Navalny has inspired popular protests and gathered a large international following. But recent surveys by the Levada Analytical Center, including one in partnership with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, show that the overall Russian population is generally indifferent to his actions, and more suspect that he staged his own poisoning or it was a “provocation from the West” than believe the Russian government targeted him.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Public Opinion, Internet, and Survey
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

8. Triangular Diplomacy: Unpacking Russia's Syria Strategy

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Moscow has repeatedly played actors off each other to secure its own interests and keep the Assad regime in power. Sometime before July 10, the UN Security Council will vote on whether to extend the annual mandate for cross-border assistance into Syria, which now passes through a lone outpost at Bab al-Hawa. Securing this extension is essential from a humanitarian standpoint, but keeping the border open matters equally for reasons of stability, given the fragile ceasefire in Idlib. Looming over the process is the strategic mischief of Moscow, which has repeatedly played various actors in Syria off each other to secure its own geostrategic and economic interests and to keep the Assad regime in power. The Kremlin, to the latter end, has reliably vetoed Security Council resolutions that would check the Syrian regime, claiming falsely that such moves would facilitate Western incursions in the country. In this Policy Note, Russia expert Anna Borshchevskaya and recent State Department senior advisor and NSC Syria director Andrew J. Tabler examine Russian diplomatic technique and subterfuge in Syria. The authors argue that by taking a strong stand and better uniting with partners and allies, the Biden administration can cut through Moscow’s rhetoric and ultimately promote a sustainable future for Syria.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

9. Russia’s Foreign Policy: The Internal-International Link

Author:
Aldo Ferrari, Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, Maxim Matusevich, Marianne Belenkaya, Andrei Kolesnikov, Alicja Curanović, Alexander Graef, and Paola Magri
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
What drives Russia’s foreign policy in Vladimir Putin’s times? Why did the Kremlin decide to annex Crimea, occupy South Ossetia, intervene in Syria, or give its blessing to Nord Stream II? When explaining Russia’s foreign policy, the consolidation of Putin’s autocratic tendencies and his apparent stability despite many economic and political challenges have contributed – at least in the West – to an excessive “Putin-centrism” and the relative neglect of other agents of domestic politics. As a result, many facets of the country’s foreign policy decisions are misunderstood or shrouded under a thin veil of vagueness and secrecy. This Report attempts to fill this gap, exploring the evolving distribution of political and economic power under the surface of Putin’s leadership to assess the influence of different “lobbies” on Russia’s foreign policy. Who decides what in Moscow? The answer, unsurprisingly, is not always “Vladimir Putin”. All of the contributions in the volume underline the complexity of Russia’s decision-making process beneath the surface of a monolithic and increasingly personalistic government.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Authoritarianism, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Eurasia

10. On the New National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On June 2, 2021, the new National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation was approved. It is a guiding document for Russia's security policy planning process; however, as a public document, it also has a significant political implication as it is saturated with political messages reflecting Russia's position on various important issues. Russia's new National Security Strategy is the fifth such document. The first document, which was approved as early as in 1997 by then President of Russia, B. Yeltsin, was called the Concept of National Security. At the beginning of 2000, the decree on the amendments to this document was signed by V. Putin who, at the time, was only the acting president of the Russian Federation. Afterwards, at a meeting of the Russian State Council in September 2008, then President, D. Medvedev, declared the need to develop a new strategy. It should be noted that this session was officially dedicated to the "conflict in South Ossetia." As a result, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, which was supposed to be active up until 2020, was approved in May 2009; however, this strategy did not last as far as 2020 - in late 2015, it was replaced by a new national security strategy developed by Russia after the annexation of Crimea and the armed aggression in eastern Ukraine. These events created a whole new reality which also strained relations between Russia and the West, eventually reflected in the strict tone towards the West in the 2015 National Security Strategy. As for the National Security Strategy, it was developed in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Law on Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation adopted in 2014. According to this law, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation must be adjusted every six years. A new National Security Strategy was developed and approved on July 2, 2021, precisely in line with the requirement of this six-year period of the law.
Topic:
International Relations, National Security, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Georgia, Crimea, and Russian Federation

11. A strategic concept for countering Russian and Chinese hybrid threats

Author:
Lauren Speranza
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Tackling hybrid threats, particularly from state actors such as Russia and China, remains one of the greatest challenges for the transatlantic community. Hybrid threats have gained more traction among policymakers and publics across Europe and the United States, especially in a world with COVID-19. Over the last five years, Euro-Atlantic nations and institutions, such as NATO and the European Union (EU), have taken important steps to respond to hybrid issues. But, as hybrid threats become more prominent in the future, policymakers must move toward a more coherent, effective, and proactive strategy for countering Russian and Chinese hybrid threats. To develop such a transatlantic counter-hybrid strategy for Russia and China, this paper argues that two major things need to happen. First, transatlantic policymakers have to build a common strategic concept to guide collective thinking on hybrid threats. Second, transatlantic policymakers need to take a range of practical actions in service of that strategic concept. In a strategic concept for countering Russian and Chinese hybrid threats, Lauren Speranza offers five strategic priorities that could form the basis of this strategic concept and presents a series of constructive steps that NATO, the EU, and nations can take, in cooperation with the private sector and civil society, to enhance their counter-hybrid capabilities against Russia and China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Resilience, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

12. COVID 19 in the North Caucasus Region

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
According to the latest data, the Russian Federation is one of the top countries in the world in terms of the number of confirmed cases of COVID 19 infections. That said, the media is paying much less attention to the pandemic taking place in the North Caucasus region. According to June 20, 2020’s data, the North Caucasus republics had the following statistics with regard to the virus: Dagestan – 7,103 infected, 344 deceased; Chechnya – 1,579 infected, 20 deceased; Ingushetia – 2,782 infected, 64 deceased; North Ossetia – 3,737 infected, 66 deceased; Kabardino-Balkaria – 4,361 infected, 43 deceased; Karachay-Cherkessia – 2,730 infected, 9 deceased and the Republic of Adygea – 1,511 infected, 12 deceased. It must be pointed out that the spread of the pandemic in the North Caucasus region started a little later as compared to the other regions of Russia which means that the peak of the dissemination remains ahead. Statistics show that the Republic of Dagestan is at the top with the number of infections as well as the number of deceased patients. Here we must also point out the high rate of per capita infections and deaths in Ingushetia. If we calculate the death rate per million people and count Dagestan and Ingushetia as sovereign states, they would both overtake affected regions such as Iran and Armenia, positioning themselves firmly among the top 30 affected countries. The relatively small number of deaths in Chechnya, as compared to the neighboring republics, must also be highlighted. This could be explained by the incorrect assessment/calculation of the death rate. As in other Russian regions, the North Caucasus republics have also introduced a quarantine and a number of restrictions. Quarantines also cover mosques and other religious places of mass gathering that hold an important place in the daily life of North Caucasians. Let us look at the situations in the individual republics.
Topic:
Politics, Crisis Management, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and North Caucasus

13. Russia’s Energy Strategy-2035: Struggling to Remain Relevant

Author:
Tatiana Mitrova and Vitaly Yermakov
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2035 (ES-2035) enters, finally, the home stretch. The Ministry of Energy submitted its version of the document to the Russian Government in early October 2019. Once approved (this is expected before year’s end), ES-2035 will become the best available indication of Russian energy policymakers’ plans. It therefore merits careful consideration. This paper reviews the key goals, scenarios and indicative ranges for output and consumption contained in ES-2035. It thus contributes to understanding the strategic compromises that Russia might be ready to take, as well as those that are unlikely to be acceptable. Our review of the draft ES-2035 suggests that it provides general guidelines to the future evolution of Russia’s energy sectors, but struggles to remain relevant amid fast-paced changes in the global markets. Several crucial but politically sensitive energy issues still need further clarification of policies: the future fiscal regime for oil and gas that could incentivize output and prevent production declines; industrial and technological policy; the choice of the future model for Russia’s gas industry and whether it is going to develop under continued state regulation or in the market environment; climate policy and the strategy to promote (or not) renewables and other technologies of energy transition; and the future of competition in wholesale and retail power markets.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Politics, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

14. Russia’s Rising Influence in Africa

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka and Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s increasing presence in Africa is motivated by global political ambitions and economic goals. To expand its influence, Russia is involved in local conflicts and fuels anti-Western sentiment. Competing with EU and U.S. countries, it is simultaneously becoming an important security partner for many African governments. An obstacle to Russia further increasing its presence in Africa is its weak economic condition, which not only limits the possibility of economic expansion on the continent but also its interference in internal political processes in African countries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and African Union

15. Leading the free world: How America benefits

Author:
Paul D. Miller
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
What is “world order” and why should Americans care? Less than half of all Americans have a passport, and less than five percent travel internationally. Only 26 percent of US gross domestic product (GDP) comes from international trade. Since the end of the Cold War most Americans probably feel safe from foreign threats most of the time: they feel little sense of danger or threat from the world. Even the terrorist attacks of 2001 have receded into memory and increasingly feel like an aberration rather than a precedent. Americans may feel a sense of unease about the world, but we are confident that even the nation’s wars safely take place “over there,” not here at home. If the United States can afford to tune out much of the world because of its geography, wealth, and power, why should we care? Americans have been the unconscious beneficiaries of a world order that would not exist without them. Just as we take for granted electricity and indoor plumbing without thought to the wiring and piping that make them possible, so too we take for granted the peace, prosperity, and stability of our world without thought to the infrastructure of the free world. The free world exists because the most powerful states in the world are open societies: liberal capitalist democracies who largely see the world the same way and have worked together to keep the peace and build wealth. That order is now imperiled. The United States no longer enjoys an unquestioned advantage over its rivals, Russia and China, as it once did. North Korea and Iran threaten the United States with nuclear weapons and support for terrorism. Perhaps most threatening of all: rising nationalist and populist movements around the world, including in the United States, are undermining popular support for international cooperation, free trade, and collective security. This report is about the free world: what it is, why it is imperiled, why Americans should care, and what we can do about it. Some skeptics have criticized the international order. President Donald Trump regularly criticizes “globalism,” and many Americans seem inclined to believe that the United States is losing its sovereignty and that the world is taking advantage of America’s generosity. We respectfully disagree. The free world, and American leadership of it, is good for America and good for the world. It helps keep us safe and give us opportunity. Far from eroding America’s sovereignty, it is a tool of American influence. Most importantly, the aspirations of the free world are just. It is a system of ordered liberty among nations, a tool or mechanism for allowing nations and individuals to flourish in freedom and safety. Investing in the free world is an investment in our values and our common values.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nationalism, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

16. The Russian Orthodox Church: Faith, Power and Conquest

Author:
James Sherr and Kaarel Kullamaa
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Until recently, the Russian Orthodox Church was a subject that interested few outside expert circles. That dramatically changed in late 2018 when the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople granted autocephaly (independence) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The reverberations of this decision — religious, political and geopolitcal — underscore the importance that the Church once again plays in Russian policy. In this report, we consider the role that the Russian Orthodox Church has played as an adjunct to an imperial policy stretching back over many centuries. Today, the Russian Federation has a secular constitution. But as much as in tsarist times, the Church regards itself as one of the pillars of Russia’s political order. As much as in the time of Catherine the Great, it is also a protagonist in its wars of identity and the rewriting of the history of former imperial subjects whose experience of the relationship between church and state is different from Russia’s. This diversity is well brought out in the report’s two case studies, Ukraine and Estonia. In both countries, local Orthodox churches embodied distinctive cultural traditions and values until they felt the full force of Russian control, tsarist and Soviet. Since 2014, Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine has revived many historical controversies. It also has raised entirely new security concerns about the borderline between faith and politics. These concerns are summarised at the conclusion of the report, which closes with a section on policy recommendations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Religion, International Affairs, Governance, and Christianity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Estonia

17. Rethinking Russia Presents Its Analytical Report “Parliamentary Diplomacy and Its Role in Modern Politics”

Author:
Rethinking Russia
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Rethinking Russia
Abstract:
The first Development of Parliamentarism International Forum was held in Moscow June 4-5, 2018. It brought together over 500 people from 96 countries. The Forum did epitomize such a rapidly expanding format of global interaction as parliamentary diplomacy. It can hardly be regarded as a new format of international cooperation, but it has acquired considerable relevance in recent years. Rethinking Russia has been researching the phenomenon of parliamentary diplomacy and by the end of the Development of Parliamentarism International Forum we have just issued our report “Parliamentary Diplomacy and Its Role in Modern Politics”. The report dwells upon international practice as well as the efforts Russia has been realized in order to enhance its capabilities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

18. Regards sur l’Eurasie - L’année politique 2016

Author:
Anne De Tinguy, Bayram Balci, François Dauceé, Laure Delcour, Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, Aude Merlin, Xavier Richet, Kathy Rousselet, and Julien Vercueil
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
Looking into Eurasia : the year in politics provides some keys to understand the events and phenomena that have left their imprint on a region that has undergone major mutation since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991: the post-soviet space. With a cross-cutting approach that is no way claims to be exhaustive, this study seeks to identify the key drivers, the regional dynamics and the underlying issues at stake
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Corruption, Crime, Democratization, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Politics, Sovereignty, War, International Security, Regional Integration, and State
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, and European Union

19. Tableau de bord des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale et d'Eurasie 2011 (Volume 2)

Author:
Jean-Pierre Pagé
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia Dashboard 2011 (Volume 2)
Topic:
Markets, Political Economy, Politics, Governance, Finance, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Eastern Europe, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, Central Europe, and Belarus