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Begin New Search Topic Economics Political Geography China Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 5 Years

1. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

2. Campaigning to Dissuade: Applying Emerging Technologies to Engage and Succeed in the Information Age Security Competition

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents the United States with its most comprehensive economic and security rival since Great Britain during the nineteenth century. Starting in 2018, US defense strategies have highlighted the threat that the PRC poses to US allies, and successive presidential administrations and Congresses responded by increasing defense budgets to expand US military capability and capacity. Despite these efforts, numerous assessments now show that modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has eroded—and in some missions overcome—US military superiority. Absent large and politically fraught increases in defense spending, continued expansion and improvement of today’s US force are unlikely to regain broad overmatch against the PLA in the Western Pacific. Instead, the United States will need new strategies and operational concepts to deter PRC aggression. Recognizing this imperative, the 2022 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) attempted to move in a different direction from its predecessors through two new lines of effort called “campaigning” and “integrated deterrence.” However, in unclassified documents and speeches by defense officials, both the essence of integrated deterrence and the mechanism of campaigning remain unclear. 1 Emerging technologies offer the US military a way to put these new concepts into action, sustaining its ability to prevent conflict and gaining an upper hand in the strategic competition with China despite the PLA’s “home team” advantages. The United States remains the world leader in operational and technological innovation, as evidenced by decades of advancements in networking and computing—marked recently by the rapid commercialization of artificial intelligence (AI). Building on the 2022 NDS, this report proposes a strategy for campaigning that would exploit information technologies to dissuade China from pursuing acts of aggression against allies such as Taiwan. The primary objective of the proposed campaigning model is to shape PRC government decision-making, especially that of the PRC military, in ways that are conducive to long-term regional stability and prosperity. A whole-of-government effort like that implied by the 2022 NDS would be the most effective form of campaigning because it could exploit the PRC government’s numerous vulnerabilities, from its appalling record on human rights to its loss of economic momentum and its growing demographic challenges. However, this report focuses on actions the US military can take by itself or with allied militaries to dissuade future PRC aggression. In the proposed approach, campaigning is an ongoing sequence of probing, signaling, adapting, and acting by the US military and intelligence community, coupled with and informed by instrumentation of the information environment. In addition to demonstrating US resolve, campaigning should enable the US to estimate competitor habits, preferences, and fears. These estimates would guide future campaigning activities and inform US force planners regarding a competitor’s uncertainty and areas of concern. Armed with increasing insight about adversary beliefs, campaigning actions would aim to shape an opponent’s preferences and priorities away from violent paths to their goals and toward scenarios that are more aligned with US interests. In offering an approach to dissuasion, this report diverges from the strategy of deterring war primarily through threats of denial or punishment. This construct has dominated US defense strategy since the Soviet Union collapsed because conventional dominance enabled the US military to credibly stop or reverse an act of aggression and nuclear weapons provided the capability to impose existential punishment. Today, the PRC’s status as a peer competitor makes denial and punishment less credible. The US government will instead need to prevent conflict before it becomes imminent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

3. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

4. Strategic Competition in the Financial Gray Zone

Author:
Heather A Conley, James Andrew Lewis, Eugenia Lostri, and Donatienne Ruy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the past 10 years, the U.S. government has slowly reoriented its foreign and security policy from the fight against global terrorism toward strategic competition with Russia and China. This reorientation has been accompanied by a new examination of how strategic competition will impact the integrity and future stability of the U.S. economy and financial system. One of the most important elements of strategic competition is sub-threshold warfare (also called asymmetric, hybrid, or gray zone warfare), wherein strategic competitors seek to shape the geostrategic environment in their favor, from information operations to economic warfare—which includes such tools as illicit finance and strategic corruption. Strategic competitors present a clear economic and financial threat to the United States when they operate in the emerging financial gray zone, in which malign actors can take advantage of the U.S. financial system to further their aims and disarm the country internally. The U.S. government, along with its allies, has only begun to acknowledge the sweeping nature of the financial gray zone and to reposition itself to compete within it. Because adversaries exploit the seams between the internal and external policies and authorities, Washington must have greater insights into a complex operating system and better integrate data across the many relevant agencies—in a way, connecting the financial dots. As it develops this comprehensive picture, the U.S. government should develop stronger defensive and offensive policy tools to counter this emerging threat.
Topic:
Economics, Finance, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective

Author:
Gerard Dipippo, Ilaria Mazzocco, and Scott Kennedy
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A new report by the CSIS Economics Program and the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics quantifies the size of total industrial policy spending by China and compares it to seven other major economies: Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Much of the existing research on industrial policy focuses on its effects, but there are few, if any, published studies that attempt a systematic comparison and quantification of overall industrial policy spending. The heart of the report is the careful calculation of total industrial policy spending by China and the other economies, combining estimates from multiple tools, among them direct subsidies, tax breaks, below-market credit, and state investment funds. The report provides additional context by examining the historical trajectory of industrial policy of these economies and the evolution of industrial policy across these economies for three industries—aluminum, semiconductors, and electric vehicles. The historical and sectoral analyses point to some similarities across economies, but they also demonstrate how distinctive China has been in terms of both quantifiable spending and non-quantifiable policy tools. Finally, this report discusses several important policy implications, including greater transparency and more harmonized reporting about industrial policy spending and the potential ways in which policymakers could employ these data to more effectively limit industrial policy spending by China and other economies.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Industry, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. China’s Dilemmas in Bailing Out Debt-Ridden Sri Lanka

Author:
Ganeshan Wignaraja
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Ganeshan Wignaraja, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) of the National University of Singapore and a Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London, explains that "Sri Lanka is now stuck in a ‘debt trap’. However, the debt trap is not wholly Chinese."
Topic:
Debt, Development, Diplomacy, and Economics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Sri Lanka

7. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence

Author:
Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

8. Immaterial Competition: Rethinking the Roles of Economics and Technology in the US-China Rivalry

Author:
Arthur Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-China rivalry is likely to be the fulcrum around which international affairs are structured in the twenty-first century, akin to the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. This rivalry, like its predecessor, emerges from divergent geopolitical interests and imperatives. While the Chinese Communist Party’s aims are many, various, and subject to change, they include its continued control of the Chinese State; economic and technological modernization and leadership; internal order; complete union with Taiwan on Beijing’s terms; certain territorial concessions from its neighbors; and the disestablishment of security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific that it views as threatening and trammeling. The latter three are in direct conflict with US interests and imperatives in the Indo-Pacific: prohibiting China’s unilateral modification of the status quo vis-à-vis Taiwan; preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its allies and partners; and maintaining its military partnerships and presence in the region. These antithetical interests animate a larger struggle for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and serve as the terms on which this contest will be decided. Explanations of the rivalry as an ideological contest or a competition born from competing economic interests are less compelling by comparison. The United States and China are motivated to an extent by ideological imperatives, but these do not appear to propel or serve as the central stakes for the rivalry as much as they affect each’s disposition toward the other. Long-standing trade, investment, and commercial disputes and competition, meanwhile, are not so substantial that they motivate the rivalry. While these issues are impactful to niche communities and conspicuous to national policymakers, they are not particularly consequential for national prosperity. The logic of competition, trade, and globalization, in fact, suggests that the US-China commercial relationship is mutually beneficial, notwithstanding each’s concerns with the other’s economic statecraft and market-leading firms. In their geopolitical rivalry, there are a few key forces or contests of interest: path dependence, regime continuity, prudent strategy, third-party alignments, and the balance of military forces in the Indo-Pacific. Each affects the United States’ and China’s ability to achieve their ends and shapes their rivalry. Economic and technological statecraft, by contrast, is largely peripheral to these ends as it does not effectively advance political objectives relevant to territory, borders, security architectures, and national defense. That is not to suggest that economic and technological factors are irrelevant, however; they shape, constrain, and advantage the United States and China across their rivalry’s key forces and contests of interests. Particularly noteworthy are economic and technological factors’ impact on the military balance. Tradition and intuition hold that nations with bigger and more advanced economies are better postured to resource, procure, and manufacture military equipment and can therefore generate greater military power. In the case of the US-China military competition, however, total military power is less relevant than the specific military balance in the Indo-Pacific, in which the distribution and strength of forces in the theater, the capability and reliability of key materiel inputs of outsized importance, and the operational concepts and tactics with which each’s military fights are more important. Total military power—and in particular greater military equipment—matters on the margin, of course, if only because the party with the greater mass and quality of materiel will be able to retain more forces in the Indo-Pacific, maintain more of these key materiel inputs, and develop novel operational concepts and tactics tailored to their superior materiel. Neither the United States’ nor China’s total economic production, public balance sheet, high-technology commercial firms, and scientific production are likely to provide a decisive or lasting advantage on this count. Each country’s economy can support substantially greater military spending, limiting the extent to which one can derive an advantage from the other’s more binding constraints. The capacity and maturity of each country’s defense industrial base is of greater relevance, but these are flexible quotients that investment can improve. This elasticity of defense production suggests that microeconomic endowments may be binding in the short run but variable in the longer run, meaning that policy choices—rather than existing economic endowments—constrain military production. Technological endowments, informing each country’s capacity for broad innovation, are of similarly bounded importance because military technology is somewhat narrow and other factors, such as military procurement processes and inflexibility in concepts of operation, limit the extent to which superior technology translates into military advantage. The fundamental result of this argument is that the concerns that propel the emerging US-China economic and technological competition are ultimately not all that relevant to the matters at the core to their rivalry and to the instruments of national power most relevant to these issues. The US should therefore be wary of policies ostensibly demanded by economic and technological competition and may find its interests better served by limiting its rivalry with China to military competition driven by its core geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. Understanding and Countering China's Approach to Economic Decoupling from the United States

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Many experts have highlighted American efforts to partially decouple from China. Yet China began pursuing a far more ambitious and comprehensive decoupling strategy vis-à-vis the United States long before Donald Trump entered the White House. This monograph examines China’s evolving approach to economic decoupling from the US. It makes the following arguments and conclusions. First, on the back of a preexisting mercantilist political economic structure, China has been explicitly pursuing economic decoupling from US and allied economies on Chinese terms for at least a decade. Second, while the US seeks to decouple some aspects of its economic activity from China, the latter seeks to dominate vast segments of the Asian economy and to decouple these segments from the US. This is the Chinese strategy and threat that the US vastly underappreciates. Third, the most important segments are the high-tech and high-value sectors. These sectors are where competition is the most consequential and where decoupling on US terms needs to occur. Fourth, China faces increasingly serious problems and obstacles regarding its decoupling strategy. Many of these arise out of structural weaknesses inherent in its political economy. The monograph is written to assist the Biden administration and those who follow it to possess a deeper understanding of: China’s actions and the motives behind them; China’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; and How the US and its allies can craft an evolving approach that better plays to their individual and collective strengths and advantages. China hopes the US and its allies will adopt a cautious, gradualist, and ineffective approach to countering Beijing’s strategy and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party knows the US and other advanced economies still have immense advantages despite clever Chinese messaging to the contrary. The US and its allies continue to enjoy considerable leverage and remain well placed to partially decouple from China on their preferred terms, but they need to act quickly, collectively, and decisively.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, and National Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. Chinese Information and Influence Warfare in Asia and the Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army’s increasingly provocative and reckless activities in and around disputed zones such as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the South China Sea constitute only one means through which Beijing seeks to change key aspects of the regional order and compel others to “accept its interests.” However, the Chinese Communist Party and PLA are already decades into China’s information and influence war, which is designed to either weaken the will and capabilities of the United States and its allies should military conflict break out or, even better, eliminate the need for China to use military force to achieve its primary objectives (i.e., to “win without fighting”). In this context, the PLA is several steps ahead of the West; whereas Western analysts observe that the PLA is operating in the “grey zone,” the PLA is instead redefining and expanding this grey zone by manipulating how other countries think about it. With respect to this so-called grey zone, a cost-benefit analysis encompassing both objective and subjective elements typically determines an entity’s decision to respond with military force. For example, crafting narratives about the PLA’s military superiority, elite capture, ability to foment disunity within a target country, or normalization of coercion raises the West’s threshold of what provocations demand a military response—thereby expanding the grey zone within which the PLA and CCP are allowed to operate. Thus, Beijing is well ahead of the US and its allies in conceptualizing and operationalizing the use of military actions other than (kinetic) war to achieve political or strategic objectives. Finally, Asia and the Pacific constitute both the primary and most suitable region within which the Chinese can conduct information and influence warfare. These sub-regions’ unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics render them especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. This policy memo describes the key objectives, strategies, and tactics of Chinese information and influence warfare developed and refined for use in the Asia-Pacific region. It focuses on maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the areas of highest interest for the US, Australia, and their allies. Offering Singapore, Thailand, and the Solomon Islands as three pertinent case studies, the memo also lays the groundwork for an examination of effective US and allied counters to Beijing’s activities in these contexts, which follow-up reports in this series will present.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, National Security, Territorial Disputes, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China and Asia